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INTELLIGENCE

A collection of articles on the theoretical, doctrinal, operational, and historical aspects of intelligence.



An OSS Hero

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Jed Team Frederick
AN ALLIED TEAM WITH THE FRENCH RESISTANCE IN 1944 *(U)*
Robert R. Kehoe

Significant Military Support
THE OSS AND THE ITALIAN PARTISANS IN WORLD WAR II *(U)*
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
A Controversial Liaison Relationship
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND THE GEHLEN ORGANIZATION, 1945-49 *(S)*
Kevin C. Ruffner

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Cover

Sgt. Robert R. Kehoe (at right) receiving the Distinguished Service Cross in November 1945 from General Magruder (at left), General Donovan's successor.

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A Controversial Liaison Relationship

American Intelligence and the Gehlen Organization, 1945-49 (S)

Kevin C. Ruffner

"As the Soviets drew closer to Berlin, Gehlen dispersed his staff and transferred the FHO's intelligence files to secret locations in Bavaria. There, Gehlen and his handpicked officers waited to surrender to American forces."

Kevin C. Ruffner, a member of the History Staff, is on a rotational assignment with the Counterintelligence Center.

(b)(3)(c)

The CIA's sponsorship of the nascent West German intelligence service in mid-1949 marked an expansion into uncharted operational waters.[1] This new direction irrevocably linked the CIA with former members of the General Staff of the defeated *Wehrmacht* and Nazi Germany's intelligence services, some of whom had notorious wartime reputations.[2] The Agency made this decision after a long-running debate with the US Army about the wisdom of supporting a resurrected German General Staff and a quasi-independent national intelligence organization. (U)

The story behind CIA's involvement with the Gehlen Organization actually started during the ebbing hours of World War II. With the Soviets fighting in the streets of Berlin and the British and Americans racing across the shell of the Third Reich in the spring of 1945, many German officials realized the desperation of their cause. Reinhard Gehlen, the former chief of the German Army's intelligence branch dealing with the Eastern Front and Soviet forces, planned to survive Hitler's *Gotterdammerung* as the 1,000-year Reich crumbled. Like most Germans, Gehlen preferred surrender to the Western Allies as opposed to an uncertain fate at Russian hands. (U)

Born in 1902, Gehlen entered the *Reichswehr*, the Weimar Republic's small army, shortly after the end of the World War I. He advanced through the officer ranks and joined the General Staff as a captain in 1936. During the invasion of Poland three years later, he served as a staff officer in an infantry division where his organizational planning and staff work attracted the attention of senior officers. By mid-1942, Gehlen took charge of the German Army High Command's *Fremde Heer Ost* (FHO or Foreign Armies East), with the responsibility of preparing intelligence on the Soviet Union. Gehlen's work in this position eventually incurred the wrath of Hitler, who rejected Gehlen's pessimistic reports about the strength and capabilities of the Soviet Army. Hitler summarily dismissed Gehlen, now *Generalmajor*, in April 1945. (U)

Gehlen did not leave Berlin empty-handed. He knew that the FHO had some of the most important files in the Third Reich and that the possession of these records offered the best means of survival in the post-Hitler period. As the Soviets drew closer to Berlin, Gehlen dispersed his staff and transferred the FHO's intelligence files to secret locations in Bavaria. There, Gehlen and his handpicked officers waited to surrender to American forces. Gehlen believed that the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, while wartime partners, would soon become peacetime rivals. With his knowledge about the Russians, combined with the FHO's collective resources, Gehlen felt he could influence relations between the East and West and help shape Germany's role in postwar Europe.[3] (U)

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Gen. Gehlen (on right) with a group of enlisted men in 1943. (FOUO)

The US Army Picks Up Gehlen

Even before Nazi Germany's capitulation, Allied forces were on the lookout for German officers and enlisted personnel with intelligence backgrounds. Indeed, as the Americans looked for Gehlen, he tried to surrender to an American unit. After a circuitous route, the US Army finally delivered Gehlen and his men to the 12th Army Group Interrogation Center near Wiesbaden in June 1945. Interned at the "Generals' House," Gehlen reassembled his staff and files under the overall direction of Army Capt. John R. Boker, Jr. (U)

Boker, who had previously interrogated other German officers, expressed his feelings as he started his interrogation of General Gehlen. "It was also clear to me by April 1945 that the military and political situation would not only give the Russians control over all of Eastern Europe and the Balkans but that, as a result of that situation, we would have an indefinite period of military occupation and a frontier contiguous with them."[4] Boker quickly became the 12th Army Group's resident expert on the Soviet Army because of his interrogation of German officers who had fought on the Eastern Front. (S)

Gathering Gehlen's staff and records required some subterfuge on Boker's part. He was aware, from previous experience, that "there existed in many American quarters a terrible opposition to gathering any information concerning our Soviet Allies." He did, however, gain the support of Col. Russell Philp, commander of the Interrogation Center, and Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert, G-2 for the 12th Army Group, to employ the former FHO staff members to produce reports on the Soviets.[5] Gehlen also wanted Boker to establish contact with some of his frontline organizational elements, such as *Oberstleutnant* Herman Baun, who commanded *Stab Walli I*, which conducted espionage work against the Soviets using Russian defectors and provided raw intelligence to Gehlen's FHO.[6] Gehlen insisted that he had access to still-existent agent networks in the Soviet Union through Baun's sources. (S)

Army headquarters in Washington learned about Gehlen's activities at Wiesbaden and, after some debate, Boker received orders to bring the German group to the United States. Army G-2's primary interest, however, centered on the retrieval and analysis of the FHO records, not in its personnel. Boker, who had become quite attached to his project, resented losing control of Gehlen and his staff section after their secret departure for Washington on 21 August 1945. Placed as virtual prisoners in a classified building at Fort Hunt, Virginia, (known simply as P.O. Box 1142), the Army planned to use Gehlen in conjunction with a larger project being conducted at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, to compile

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Maj. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert (U)

a history of the German Army on the Eastern Front. (S)

Through Boker's efforts (he accompanied Gehlen's group to the United States) and those of officials with the East European Order of Battle Branch at the Pentagon, the situation for the Germans gradually improved. The BOLERO Group, as Gehlen's unit became known, served under the direction of Army Capt. Eric Waldman until its return to Germany in June 1946. By this point, Gehlen's men not only prepared reports based on German records but also had access to and commented on American intelligence reports. (S)

SSU Rejects Gehlen

While the Army exploited Gehlen and his officers in Washington, US intelligence also sought to question German scientists and engineers about Nazi rocket and atomic developments. The OSS, however, played little role in these activities. In the throes of disbandment during the fall of 1945, OSS declined the Army's invitation to employ Baun in Germany. The new Strategic Services Unit (SSU) also expressed some reluctance about using the German FHO for American intelligence purposes.[7] SSU, however, did try to determine the exact nature of the relationship between Gehlen and Army intelligence. On 25 October 1945, Crosby Lewis, SSU's new chief of mission in Germany, asked [redacted] for "Special Sources" information from counterintelligence files pertaining to *Stab Walli* and various German personalities, including Baun and Gehlen. Writing hastily, Lewis informed [redacted]

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For your information only, Baun and a group of other members of Fremde Heere Ost, experts in the G.I.S. on espionage against the Russians, are being collected by two officers of the G-2 section, USFET, who are responsible only to Gen. Sibert. It appears likely that Sibert got an OK from Washington on this when he was in the U.S. last month, at which time it appeared that OSS might fold up. Von Gehlen and several high-ranking staff officers who operated for Fremde Heere Ost and for some of the Army Group staff on the Eastern Front during the war have been flown to the U.S.—all this without any contact with the OSS here.[8] (S)

In early January 1946, SSU in Germany reported to Headquarters what it had learned "through discreet inquiries" about the Army's activities. SSU described the flight of Gehlen and his FHO staff from Berlin and their activities with the Americans. The report also stated that Gehlen had recommended that Herman Baun be contacted to provide further information about the Soviets while the general worked in the United States. Baun, in fact, had been arrested by the US Army as a "mandatory arrestee" (members of Nazi party organizations and high-ranking German Army and SS officers were subject to immediate apprehension by the Allies) in late July 1945 and interrogated at the 3rd Army Interrogation Center the following month. The announcement of his arrest and the distribution of a Preliminary Interrogation Report raised great concern at Army G-2 because the Soviets now demanded the extradition of both Baun and Gehlen.[9] (C)

The Army refused to accede to the Soviet demand and secluded Baun and several other FHO personnel at the Military Intelligence Service Center (MISC) at Oberursel on the outskirts of Frankfurt (also known as Camp King and later officially designated as the 7700th European Command Interrogation Center). The small group, including Gerhard Wessel, who had succeeded Gehlen as the head of FHO in 1945, was quartered at the "Blue House," where Baun planned to develop a full-scale intelligence organization. According to SSU, G-2 wanted to use Baun to resurrect his *Abwehr* network against the Soviets. This proved difficult and SSU reported that it "advised them [the US Army] to interrogate Baun at length and have nothing to do with his schemes for further intelligence activity."[10] (s)

In November 1945, in fact, Lewis responded to a request by General Sibert that SSU take over Baun's

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operation from the Army. After reviewing Baun's plans, Lewis rejected them outright, calling them "rather grandiose and vague suggestions for the formation of either a European or worldwide intelligence service to be set up on the basis of wartime connections of *Oberst* Baun and his colleagues, the ultimate target of which was to be the Soviet Union." Lewis found a number of shortcomings with the employment of Baun, including cost, control, and overall poor security measures. The fact that the Russians wanted to question Baun and Gehlen, as well as other German intelligence figures, also did not sit well with Lewis. [11] (S)

Meanwhile, Boleslav A. Holtsman, a SSU/X-2 counterintelligence officer in Munich, had interrogated another officer of *Stab Walli, Oberst* Heinz Schmalschlager, about German intelligence activities against the Russians. In fact, SSU felt that Schmalschlager was a better source of information on German intelligence activities on the Eastern Front than Baun, a Russian-born German.[12] Despite SSU's advice that the Army dismiss Baun and reduce its reliance on FHO-derived intelligence, the opposite took place. Baun thrived under US Army auspices and he established a service to monitor Soviet radio transmissions in the Russian zone in January 1946. Two months later, Baun received further authorization from the Army to conduct both positive and counterintelligence activities in Germany.[13] (S)

Operation RUSTY

In July of that year, the Army returned General Gehlen and the

"By October 1946, Gehlen and Baun claimed to have some 600 agents operating throughout the Soviet zone of Germany. . . ."

remaining FHO members to Germany. At this point, Lt. Col. John R. Deane, Jr., Operations Officer at MISC, published his plans to merge Gehlen's BOLERO group with Baun's already-existent staff, known as KEYSTONE, at Oberursel. General Gehlen would coordinate the functions of both elements of the German organization while he had direct responsibility for the Intelligence Group. This element evaluated economic, military, and political reports obtained by agents of Baun's Information Group.[14] The Army designated the entire organization as Operation RUSTY, under the overall supervision of Col. Russell Philp, Lt. Col. John R. Deane, Jr., and Capt. Eric Waldman, who had preceded Gehlen's return to Germany from Washington.[15] (S)

Gehlen's reports, Deane expected, "will be of great value to the G-2 Division in that they will furnish the closest thing to finished intelligence that can be obtained from sources other than U.S."[16] Deane's optimistic outlook indeed spurred the Army to submit even greater number of requests to Operation RUSTY. Baun quickly expanded his collection efforts to meet the Army's insatiable appetite for information on the new Soviet threat in Europe. By October 1946, Gehlen and Baun claimed to have some 600 agents operating throughout the Soviet zone of Germany who provided the bulk of intelligence on the Russian order of battle.[17] (S)

As the Army's demands grew, Operation RUSTY transformed from a select cadre of German General Staff officers to large group that suffered from poor cohesion and mixed allegiances. In addition to covering the Soviet zone, Operation RUSTY took on new missions in Austria and other areas of Europe as well as broadened wartime contacts with anti-Communist émigré groups in Germany and with members of the Russian Vlasov Army. The few American officers assigned to the Blue House barely knew the identities of RUSTY agents, thus making it difficult to confirm the validity of German reporting. Baun's recruiting and training of his agents proved haphazard while their motivation also raised questions because of their black market activities. Throughout the Western Allied zones of Germany, men and women openly claimed to be working for American intelligence, leading to many security breaches which undermined RUSTY's overall effectiveness.[18] (S)

Lacking internal control and American oversight, Operation RUSTY turned out to be an expensive project. By mid-1946, the Army found itself running out of funds and it once again tried to persuade SSU to take over the operation following Gehlen's return to Germany. On a tour of SSU installations in Germany, Col. William W. Quinn, SSU's director in Washington, DC, conferred with General Sibert and Crosby Lewis about the Army's proposal. Once again, Lewis repeated many of his objections that he had made earlier in the fall of 1945 and he suggested that SSU make a "thorough study" before any decision by

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Headquarters.[19] In early September, Lewis specified in writing to General Sibert the conditions in which SSU would be prepared to assume responsibility for Operation KEYSTONE.[20] Lewis emphasized the need for US intelligence to have complete access to all German records and identities of leading personalities and agents for initial vetting.[21] (U)

Neither Crosby Lewis, SSU's chief of mission in Germany, nor any other American official expressed any doubt about employing America's former enemies as sources of information. The Americans, for example, had embarked upon a large-scale project using German officers to write about their wartime experiences. The Army's German Military History Program, for example, continued until the mid-1950s and influenced US Army doctrinal and historical writing.[22] The debate about Gehlen's project, as it became shaped since 1945, revolved around more practical matters, such as cost and security. Crosby Lewis summarized his thoughts about RUSTY for Col. Donald H. Galloway, Assistant Director of Special Operations, in September 1946:

> *It is my opinion that SSU AMZON should be given complete control of the operation and that all current activities of this group be immediately stopped before further security breaches nullify the future usefulness of any of the members of the group. I further recommend that an exhaustive study be made along CE lines of the entire operation, past and present, so that at least, if it appears that the group is too insecure to continue an operation, the wealth of intelligence which is contained in the minds of the various participants as regards Russia, Russian intelligence techniques, and methods of operation against the Russians, could be extracted. In conclusion, however, it is most essential that if a final decision is made to exploit these individuals either singly or as a group, SSU understands that their employment in the past and their exploitation in the future constitutes to a greater or less degree the setting up of an incipient German intelligence service.*[23] (S)

On the conclusion of General Sibert's tour as G-2 in Europe, the debate about whether a civilian intelligence agency should be responsible for Operation RUSTY shifted from Germany to Washington. Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burress, Sibert's successor as the Army's chief intelligence officer in Germany, appealed to Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, formerly Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence and now Director of Central Intelligence, that the newly formed Central Intelligence Group (CIG) assume control of RUSTY. His memorandum, supported by extensive documentation, noted that the Army's headquarters in Germany considered RUSTY to be "one of its most prolific and dependable sources."[24] (C)

General Vandenberg, in turn, directed that the CIG take a fresh look at RUSTY. On 16 October 1946, CIG presented its summary of the Burress material and dismissed Gehlen's Intelligence, or Evaluation, Group as "drawing broad conclusions from inadequate evidence and a strong tendency to editorialize."



Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg (U)

Regarding Baun's Information Group, CIG determined that "there is no evidence whatsoever which indicates high-level penetration into any political or economic body in the Russian-occupied zone." The re (b)(1) also blasted Operation RUSTY its yearly budget of (b)(3)(c) while CIG's German Mission a (b)(3)(n) only CIG decidedly rejected assumption of RUSTY, although it did call for a full study in order to identify salvageable aspects of the operation. The report made two significant comments that reflected CIG's overall frame of mind:

> *1. It is considered highly undesirable that any large scale US-sponsored intelligence unit be permitted to operate under even semi-autonomous conditions. Unless responsible US personnel are fully acquainted not only with the details of each operation carried out but also with the*

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identities and background of all individuals concerned, no high degree of reliability can be placed from an American point of view upon the intelligence produced.

2. One of the greatest assets available to US intelligence has always been the extent to which the United States as a nation is trusted and looked up to by democratic-minded people throughout the world. Experience has proven that the best motivation for intelligence work is ideology followed by common interests and favors. The Germans, the Russians, their satellites, and, to a lesser extent, the British, have employed fear, direct pressure of other types, and, lastly, money. With most of these factors lacking to it, Operation RUSTY would appear to depend largely on the last and least desirable.[25] (C)

The Bossard Report

In a letter to General Vandenberg in October 1946, Colonel Galloway reiterated CIG's concerns about RUSTY's costs and questions about its security. He recommended that CIG not take over the operation.[26] The Army and CIG, however, agreed in the fall of 1946 that the CIG could conduct its own examination of RUSTY. As a result of discussions held in New York City in December, Samuel B. Bossard arrived at Oberursel in March 1947 to evaluate the German operation and its future potential.[27] Unlike Crosby Lewis, Bossard had a different, and favorable, impression of Operation RUSTY during the course of his two-month study. "The whole pattern of operation," Bossard proclaimed in the first paragraph of his report, "is accordingly positive and bold; the factors of control and risk have become secondary considerations and thus yield to the necessity of obtaining information with speed and in quantity."[28] (S)

In a stunning reversal of earlier criticism of RUSTY, Bossard compared the operation to the wartime work of OSS with various Resistance groups where results mattered more than control. He dismissed "the long bill of complaints prepared by our own counterintelligence agencies against the lack of security in this organization." Bossard declared, "in the end [this] serves more as a testimony to the alertness of our counter-intelligence agencies and a criticism of our own higher authorities for not effecting a coordination of interests than a criticism of the present organization and its operating personnel."[29] (S)

Bossard's report marked the first time that either SSU or CIG had the opportunity to examine on its own the operation and to question both Gehlen and Baun as well as other members of the German operation. Impressed with the anti-Communist sympathies of the Germans and the breadth of their contacts (especially with various émigré groups), Bossard found "no evidence to prove that the unusual confidence that had been placed by American authorities in the German operators had been abused." Bossard made eight recommendations to the DCI, with the bottom line being that the CIG should take responsibility for RUSTY.[30] (S)

Bossard believed that Operation RUSTY had proven to be a useful anti-Communist intelligence organization. If the United States abandoned RUSTY, it would still have the same intelligence requirements as before, although with fewer resources. Likewise, American control of the German operation could only strengthen the overall project and reduce its security risks. Bossard felt that Operation RUSTY offered the Americans a readymade, knowledgeable German intelligence service that formed a "strong core of resistance to Russian aggression."[31] (S)


R. Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter (U)

Bossard's findings unleashed a flurry of activity in Washington during the summer and fall of 1947. On 3 June, Colonel Galloway recommended to R. Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, who had just taken over as DCI from General Vandenberg, that he approve the Bossard Report. Galloway added that CIG's takeover of RUSTY should be cleared through the G-2 in Germany and brought to the attention of the National Intelligence Authority, predecessor to the

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National Security Council. Colonel Galloway remained concerned that support of the German intelligence service could conflict with both State Department policies in dealing with a "potential resistance group" as well as interfere with the signals intelligence work of the US Army and Navy.[32] (S)

A few days later, Admiral Hillenkoetter prepared a memorandum for the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, as well as President Truman's personal representative to the National Intelligence Authority on Operation RUSTY. It outlined the organization's history and CIG's earlier examination into the question of assuming responsibility. In his cover memorandum, Admiral Hillenkoetter expressed the "strong" recommendation that "Operation RUSTY be liquidated and that CIG assume no responsibility for its continuation or liquidation."[33] Hillenkoetter felt that the CIG should have no connection with RUSTY without the knowledge and approval of the National Intelligence Authority. (S)

Hillenkoetter's recommendation raised a furor in Army circles, and he held a high-level conference on 19 June 1947 to discuss Army-CIG relations and Operation RUSTY. Having been shown the proposed NIA memorandum outlining Hillenkoetter's rejection of RUSTY, Maj. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, the Army's Director of Intelligence, asked that the document be withdrawn in its entirety. He stated that he did not plan to discuss the matter even with the Secretary of War. Consequently, the Army momentarily relented in its efforts to have CIG assume responsibility for RUSTY. Hillenkoetter warned Chamberlin about the national security risks posed by the US support of a resurgent German General Staff and intelligence service. General Chamberlin agreed that this perception created problems and promised to have Maj. Gen. Robert L. Walsh, the Army's G-2 in Germany, oversee tighter control over the operation.[34] (S)

While the CIG and the Army debated the merits of Operation RUSTY in Washington, Lt. Col. Deane at Oberursel oversaw the almost-daily growth of Gehlen's intelligence service. The rapid expansion of agents and reports in 1946 presented a challenge in terms of control and quality. General Gehlen, upon his return that summer, discovered that Baun had his own plans for a German intelligence service which did not meet with Gehlen's approval. Baun's ambitious grasp for control of the organization, coupled with mounting questions about his agents and finances, resulted in his gradual removal by the Americans and Gehlen during the course of 1947.[35] The Army, in the meantime, did take some steps to improve its control over RUSTY, including the formation of a military cover organization, the 7821st Composite Group.[36] Immediately before RUSTY's transfer from Oberursel to its own compound in Pullach, a small village near Munich, in the late fall of 1947, Lt. Col. Willard K. Liebel replaced Deane as Operations Officer.[37] (S)

CIA's Misgivings

There was still little enthusiasm for RUSTY after the establishment of the CIA in the fall of 1947 [redacted] who had served as chief of the German Mission's Security Control (or counterintelligence) branch in 1946-47, provided an update to Richard Helms, chief of Foreign Branch M (which handled CIA's operations in Central Europe), in mid-March 1948 about the German intelligence organization's activities. [redacted] observed that while RUSTY "enjoys the unqualified backing of the Army in Germany," he felt that the Soviets must have penetrated the German group. "The political implications alone (leaving aside the espionage angle) would come in handy if the Russians at any time should look for a pretext to provoke a showdown in Western Germany," [redacted] declared. Likewise, he was concerned about "the political implications of sponsoring an organization which in the opinion of qualified observers constitutes a reactivation of the German *Abwehr* under American aegis."[38] (S)

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With great disgust, (b)(3)(c) acting chief of CIA's Karlsruhe operations base, related his experiences with RUSTY in an August 1948 memorandum to Headquarters. (b)(3)(c) first encountered Baun's operatives in the summer of 1946 when the Army's Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) arrested a number of Germans who claimed to work for American intelligence. CIC inform (b)(3)(c) about these arrests, and he launched an investigation as to the background of the German agents. He found that "some of the agents employed were SS personnel with known Nazi records and, in most cases, undesirable people. Recruiting methods then employed," he complained, "were so loose that former German officers and noncoms were blindly being approached to work for American intelligence in espionage activity directed against the USSR."[39] (S)

RUSTY's approach went against all principles of intelligence work. "In the recruitment methods no attention was paid to the character of the recruits, security, political leanings or quality, with the result that many of the agents were blown almost immediately (b)(3)(c) felt that RUSTY's "recruiting methods indicated a highly nationalistic group of Germans who could easily become the nucleous [sic] of serious subversive activity against any occupying power. At the same time, (b)(3)(c) commented, "the distribution of operational supplies, money, etc. was so loose and elaborate that the influence on the black market certainly was considerable."[40] (S)

(b)(3)(c) expressed his displeasure with RUSTY and protested any plans for future association between this group and CIA. In a lengthy summary (b)(3)(c) presented the viewpoint of many CIA officers:

> *The general consensus is that RUSTY represents a tightly knit organization of former German officers, a good number of which formerly belonged to the German general staff. Since they have an effective means of control over their people through extensive funds, facilities, operational supplies, etc., they are in a position to provide safe haven for a good many undesirable elements from the standpoint of a future democratic Germany. Most of these officers are unable to find employment, and they are therefore able to maintain their former standard of living without having to put up with the present difficulties of life in conquered Germany. They are likewise able to maintain their social standing as former officers and to continue their own study in the military field and continue training along military lines. The control of an extensive intelligence net makes it possible for the leaders to create a cadre of officers for the perpetuation of German general staff activity. The organization of RUSTY makes it possible for them to continue a closely knit organization which can be expanded at will.*[41] (S)

(b)(3)(c) formerly SSU's X-2 chief in Germany and now head of CIA's Munich operations base, reported his views of RUSTY in a July 1948 memorandum to (b)(3)(c) CIA's chief of mission in Germany. Like his colleagu (b)(3)(c) protested

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RUSTY's poor security practices and its "freewheeling" methods of agent recruitmer(b)(3)(c) expressed particular distaste at RUSTY's abuse of the denazification laws which undermined the operation's overall standin(b)(3)(c) quoted a "local cynic" who said that "American intelligence is a rich blind man using the *Abwehr* as a seeing-eye dog. The only trouble is—the leash is much too long."[42] (S)

In summarizing the sentiments of Agency officials in Germany, Richard Helms told Colonel Galloway in March 1948 that "nothing about RUSTY has been altered which could lead us to change the position taken by us last year. In fact, the reports in the Soviet-dominated press in Germany concerning the use of former German staff and intelligence officers are such that there is no question that the Russians know this operation is going on even though they may have some of the details wrong." Helms added, "certainly the fact that so much publicity has been given to this indicates serious flaws in the security of the operation."[43] (S)

Little by little, however, the Army managed to get CIA more involved with RUSTY, despite complaints from the field and even Admiral Hillenkoetter's overall opposition to the project. In December 1947, General Walsh again brought up the issue of CIA's taking over of RUSTY with (b)(3)(c) then CIA's chief of base in Berlin. Walsh maintained that, while the handling of RUSTY by the Army in 1947 might have been considered a "sin of commission," for the Americans not to continue the operation in 1948 would constitute a "sin of omission."[44] (S)

As late as mid-1948, Admiral Hillenkoetter resisted the Army's overtures to assume control of RUSTY. In July 1948, the DCI informed the Army's Director of Intelligence that he did not want the Army to use a 1946 letter of agreement between the War Department and CIG to obtain services, supplies, and equipment for the 7821st Composite Group, the Army's cover organization for RUSTY. Hillenkoetter believed that a new, and separate, agreement should be drawn up between both organizations to support the Army's requirements for RUSTY.[45] (S)

At the same time, Hillenkoetter provided General Chamberlin with some news about RUSTY that he had learned from various sources. In one case, Samuel Bossard, now in England, had received a letter from a mysterious "R. Gunner" about "some dangerous points." Gunner, believed to be General Gehlen, asked for Bossard's "personal advice concerning certain business questions" and wanted him to come to Munich.[46] Disagreements between Gehlen and his American military counterpart, Lieutenant Colonel Liebel, now made their way to the highest levels of CIA. The entire project appeared on the verge of disintegration.[47] (S)

The Critchfield Report

Matters soon came to head which forced the CIA to act whether it should maintain a German intelligence organization. While the Army issued RUSTY with priorities in terms of targets and regions, Major General Walsh, the Army's chief intelligence officer in Germany, informed Admiral Hillenkoetter in October 1948 that the Army could no longer fund RUSTY for any activities other than order of battle intelligence.[48] During a visit to Germany, the DCI discussed the matter with Walsh and agreed to provide limited funds while CIA conducted yet another investigation of the Army's German operation. Immediately before Admiral Hillenkoetter's agreement with the Army, Colonel Galloway and (b)(3)(c) conferred about RUSTY. They concluded that the Agency needed to begin penetration efforts against RUSTY, "or at least [be] carefully watched and reported upon, and that we should pay particular attention to its attempts to become the official German intelligence service."[49] (S)

The die was now cast, leading CIA down a long path that has now indelibly linked the Agency with General

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Col. James. H. Critchfield. Photo courtesy of James H. Critchfield. (U)

Gehlen and his intelligence service. On 27 October 1948, Colonel Galloway t(b)(3)(c) that he wanted James H. Critchfield, the newly arrived chief of Munich operations base, to examine RUSTY and prepare a report similar to that done by Bossard in 1947. Critchfield's mandate specified that he should evaluate RUSTY's OB facilities and determine which elements should either
(b)(1) exploited, left
(b)(3)(n) with the Army, or liquidated. The report, Galloway noted, should be thorough but also completed within a month.[50] (S)

Critchfield, a young US Army combat veteran, had served in military intelligence staff positions in both Germany and Austria when he joined the new CIA in 1948. He embarked on his new project with vigor and met his deadline when he cabled a summary of his findings to Washington on 17 December.[51] His full report, with annexes, arrived at Headquarters after that point. An extensive study, Critchfield and several associates examined the Army's relationship with RUSTY, its funding, organizational structure, intelligence reporting, overall operations and procedures, and Gehlen's own future projections for his group. Critchfield's report stands as the CIA's (and its predecessors) most thorough review of the growing German intelligence service.[52] (S)

Critchfield's report also set the tenor for future CIA relations with Gehlen. While he made several important points, Critchfield observed that CIA could not ignore the presence of RUSTY. He wrote:

> *In the final analysis, RUSTY is a re-established GIS which has been sponsored by the present de facto national government of Germany, i.e. by the military occupational forces. Because the 4,000 or more Germans who comprise RUSTY constitute a going concern in the intelligence field, it appears highly probable that RUSTY will emerge as a strong influence, if not the dominant one, in the new GIS. Another important consideration is that RUSTY has closest ties with ex-German General Staff officers throughout Germany. If, in the future, Germany is to play any role in a Western European military alliance, this is an important factor.*[53] (S)

As Critchfield pointed out, RUSTY was a *fait accompli*, regardless of whether CIA wanted the German organization or not. He advocated the Agency's assumption of RUSTY because "from an intelligence viewpoint, it seems desirable that CIA enter RUSTY at that point where it can control all contacts and operational developments outside of German territory."[54] Admiral Hillenkoetter, however, reluctantly agreed to this move and made it clear that "CIA was not asking to take over Rusty and was expressing a willingness to do so only because the Army was requesting it."[55] (S)

Gen. Omar Bradley, the Army's Chief of Staff (and soon-to-be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal both supported the Agency's move, as did individual members of the National Security Council. Throughout the first months of 1949, the Agency, the Department of the Army, and Gen. Lucius D. Clay, US military governor of Germany, debated the issue of the CIA's assumption of RUSTY.[56] Likewise, Critchfield in Pullach had his hands full with an ongoing dispute between Gehlen and Colonel Philp, the new US Army commander on the scene.[57] With General Clay's departure from Germany in May, the Agency assumed control on 1 July 1949.[58] (S)

CIA's Trusteeship

Even before the official transfer in mid-1949, Critchfield specified the terms of agreement between the CIA and the German organization. The basic agreement reached by Critchfield and Gehlen in June 1949 recognized that "the basis for US-German cooperation in this project lies in the mutual conviction of the respective parties that increasing cooperation between a free and democratic Germany and the United

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States within the framework of the Western European Union and the Atlantic Community is indispensable for the successful execution of a policy of opposition and containment of Communist Russia."[59] (S)

Critchfield acknowledged that "the members of the German staff of this project are acting first and foremost as German nationals working in the interest of the German people in combating Communism." Yet, the Agency's chief of base insisted that until Germany regained its sovereignty and the two countries made new arrangements, the CIA would remain the dominant partner and call the shots. Critchfield, for example, would specify US requests to Gehlen for intelligence priorities and that "complete details of operational activities will be available to US staff." While US officials would deal with the Germans in "an advisory and liaison capacity," Critchfield planned to closely examine the Gehlen Organization. "All operations outside of Germany will," Critchfield noted, "be reduced to a project basis with funds provided for each project as approved and on the basis of continuing review of operational details and production."[60] (S)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Relations between the Agency and German intelligence service (known variously as [redacted] and ZIPPER) during the first half of the 1950s were often at odds.[61] Gehlen resented the American intrusion, which was far more sweeping than the Army's. In 1950, for example, Critchfield reduced the number of Gehlen's projects from 150 to 49, and he soon whittled this latter number to 10. CIA cut the vast bulk of German projects for nonproduction of any worthwhile intelligence or even possessing any potential value. Critchfield bluntly told Gehlen in 1950 that "it was high time he recognized the fact that his organization, while viewed in a most creditable light for its tactical collection and especially its military evaluation work, was considered definitely second class in any intelligence activity of a more difficult or sophisticated nature, and that if he had any aspirations beyond that of producing a good G-2 concern for the future German Army, some drastic changes were in order."[62] (S)

While the CIA and its predecessors had long protested against the use of the German intelligence service, the American service soon found itself defending its own ties to the Gehlen Organization. As early as 1953, the two agencies had become so entwined that even Roger M. Keyes, Deputy Secretary of Defense, criticized the Agency's role in Germany. (b)(3)(c) [redacted] the Deputy Director for Plans, responded that "there is no adequate answer or correction of the assumption that we rely very largely upon the ZIPPER effort for intelligence on Eastern Europe generally." (b)(3)(c) stated, "this is a common fallacy which is always cropping up and it should be pointed out that we have our own independent operations in addition to the Zipper effort."[63] The Agency also found that supporting the German service to be an expensive proposition with little actual control over its personnel.[64] (S)

Cutting Both Ways

CIA's support of the Gehlen Organization proved a double-edged sword. On the one hand, US assistance to the nascent West German intelligence service strengthened ties between the two countries. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany remained close allies throughout the long years of the Cold War. On the other hand, CIA's relationship with the Gehlen Organization also had longlasting impact in terms of counterintelligence and Warsaw Pact propaganda efforts. (U)

The Gehlen Organization never escaped from its roots as successors to Nazi Germany's military and intelligence circles. Gehlen's intelligence service suffered devastating penetrations by the KGB, witnessed by the Hans Clemens and Heinz Felfe spy scandals of the early 1960s. These intelligence failures highlighted the CIA's concerns about the Gehlen Organization which it had expressed during the period under the US Army's control.[65]

(b)(3)(n)

[redacted]

While the Agency's support to the Gehlen Organization remains a controversial topic, it took on this responsibility after lengthy debate and with the full knowledge of the risks. The CIA recognized that its ties to Gehlen meant it inherited many negative aspects that had also plagued the Army between 1945 and 1949. Gehlen's intelligence on the Soviet Union, however, outweighed these problems during the hottest years of the Cold War. The history

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of postwar Germany needs to take into account the origins of the CIA's trusteeship of the Gehlen Organization. (U)

NOTES

1. For an "open" history of the American relationship with the German intelligence service after World War II, see Mary Ellen Reese, *General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection* (Fairfax: George Mason University Press, 1990). Other books, of varying degrees of reliability, include E.H. Cookridge (*nom de plume* for Edward Spiro), *Gehlen: Spy of the Century* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1971); Heinz Hohne and Hermann Zolling, *Network: The Truth about General Gehlen and His Spy Ring*, trans. by Richard Barry (London: Secker and Warburg, 1972); and lastly, Reinhard Gehlen, *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen*, trans. by David Irving (New York: World Publishing, 1972). A draft manuscript by James H. Critchfield, entitled *Germany: From Enemy to Ally 1946-1956*, promises to add significantly to the literature on this topic. (U)

2. For a radical view regarding the CIA's link with the West German intelligence service, see Carl Oglesby, "Reinhard Gehlen: The Secret Treaty of Fort Hunt," *Covert Action Information Bulletin* 35 (fall 1990), pp. 8-14. (U)

3. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

See also David Kahn, *Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978). (S)

4. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

5. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

6. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

7. Col. W.W. Quinn to Col. Donald H. Galloway, "Operation Rusty," 5 December 1946, (b)(3)(c)

8. Crosby Lewis to 25 October 1945 (b)(3)(c)

9. Preliminary Interrogation Report, 16 August 1945 in Baun, (b)(3)(c)

10. SAINT, AMZON to SAINT, "Russian Experts of German Intelligence Service," 8 January 1946 Baun, (b)(3)(c)

11. (b)(1) SSU's objections to takeover in 1945

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are outlined in Lewis to Colonel Galloway, "KEYSTONE Operation," 22 September 1946

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

21. Lewis to Sibert, "Operation KEYSTONE," 6 September 1946,

(b)(3)(c)

A declassified copy of this same memorandum also appears in Record Group 226, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Entry 178, Box 4, Folder 39, National Archives and Records Administration. (S)

12. SAINT, AMZON to SAINT, "Russian Experts of German Intelligence [illegible]," 8 January 1946

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

22. Kevin Soutour, "To Stem the Red Tide: The German Report Series and Its Effect on American Defense Doctrine, 1948-1954," *Journal of Military History* 57 (October 1993), pp. 653-688. (U)

13 (b)(1)

14. (b)(1)

18. (b)(1)

Examples of SSU and CIG reporting about RUSTY's security problems are numerous and can be seen in (b)(3)(c) to Chief, IB, "Agent Net Operating in the Bamberg Vicinity," 17 September 1946; (b)(3)(c) "American Intelligence Network," 18 March 1947, enclosing "American Intelligence Network," 25 January 1947;

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

23. Lewis to Galloway, "KEYSTONE Operation," 22 September 1946,

(b)(3)(c)

15. Lt. Col. John R. Deane, Jr., Operations Officer, USFET MISC, to G-2, USFET, "Plan for the Inclusion of the BOLERO Group in Operation RUSTY," 2 July 1946

(b)(3)(c)

The operation is variously described as gaining its designation from either a nickname given to Lieutenant Colonel Deane's young son or that given to Colonel Russell Philp, commanding officer at "Basket," the secure facility at Blue House. See Reese, *General Reinhard Gehlen*, p. 207, and chief of station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Bi-Weekly Letter," 4 December 1948,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

24. Copies of W.A. Burress to Hoyt S. Vandenberg, "Operation RUSTY—Use of the Eastern Branch of the Former German Intelligence Service," 1 October 1946,

(b)(3)(c)

. The "Vandenberg Report" is the best summary report about Operation RUSTY during the Army's early period of control. (S)

19. Lewis to Galloway, "KEYSTONE Operation," 22 September 1946,

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c) to Deputy A, "Operation RUSTY," 16 October 1946,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

20. The Americans referred to the German intelligence service through a variety of project names, including BOLERO, KEYSTONE, and RUSTY. The use of the term "RUSTY" supplanted KEYSTONE in 1946 until CIA's assumption in 1949. After that point, the operational terms changed once again. (C)

In November 1946, General Vandenberg asked that the Army send Gehlen and Baun to the United States for conferences with CIG.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

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(b)(3)(c)

26. Galloway to DCI, "Operation RUSTY," 17 October 1946 (b)(3)(c) This documents appears as an annex to the Bossard Report. (S)

27. The New York meeting on 19 December 1946, organized by General Vandenberg, brought together a number of the top American intelligence figures to discuss RUSTY. Held at the apartment of Allen Dulles, the meeting included Dulles, William H. Jackson (both special advisors to CIG), Brig. Gen. Edwin K. Wright (DDCI), Brigadier General Sibert, Colonel Galloway, Col. Laurin L. Williams of Army G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Deane from RUSTY, Richard Helms, and Samuel Bossard. The group agreed that CIG should hold an investigation of RUSTY "on the ground" because (b)(3)(c) "certain parts had possible long-range values." See also Richard Helms, Memorandum for the Record, "Operation Rusty," 19 December 1946. (b)(3)(c)

28. See chief of station, Karlsruhe to Chief, Munich operations base, "RUSTY," 2 November 1948, enclosing undated, unsigned Bossard Report with charts (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid*

31. *Ibid.*

32. Galloway, Memorandum to DCI, "Operation RUSTY," 3 June 1947 (b)(3)(c)

33. DCI to Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Personal Representative of the Present, "Operation 'RUSTY.'" (b)(3)(c)

34. Brig. Gen. Edwin K. Wright, Memorandum for the Record, 20 June 1947, (b)(3)(c)

35. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) The situation between Baun and Gehlen created internal division within the German intelligence service within days after the general's return to Germany in 1946. Gehlen, however, retained Baun and sent him to Iran to conduct strategic planning in the Middle East. He died in Munich in December 1951 at the age of 54. (S)

36. CIG's recommendations to General Chamberlin for changes in RUSTY are found in a 27 June 1947 untitled, unclassified note written by Bossard. (b)(3)(c) The implementation of some of the changes are announced in Headquarters, First Military District, General Orders Number 54, "Organization of 7821st Composite Group," 1 December 1947, (b)(3)(c)

37. Reese, *General Reinhard Gehlen*, pp. 93-97. Relations between Lieutenant Colonel Liebel and General Gehlen deteriorated quickly after Liebel's arrival; in part due to the American officer's insistence on obtaining identities of the German agents. Lieutenant Colonel Liebel also criticized Gehlen (referred by his operational name Dr. Schneider) for poor security practices. Captain Waldman supported Gehlen's stand during this period, which created tension within the American chain of command. (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

38. (b)(3)(c) to Helms, "Opera- (b)(3)(c) TY," 18 March 1948,

39. Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "RUSTY," 19 August 1948, (b)(3)(c)

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Chief, Munich operations base, to acting chief of station, Karlsruhe, (b)(3)(c) STY," 7 July 1948,

43. Richard Helms to ADSO, "RUSTY," (b)(3)(c) 9 March 1948, For a copy of one such Soviet article, see chief of station, Heidelberg to Chief, FBM, "Russian Newspaper Attack on American Intelligence Activities," 6 February 1948, (b)(3)(c)

44. (b)(3)(c)

45. (b)(3)(c)

46. DCI, Memorandum to Chamberlin, 31 August 1948, (b)(3)(c)

47. Headquarters told its officers in Germany to refrain from forwarding information about RUSTY to Army officials there because the Army apparently regarded the news as "sniping." (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

48. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

49. Chief of station, Karlsruhe to Chief, (b)(3)(c)

50. Cable, SO to Karlsruhe, 27 October 1948, (b)(3)(c) Richard Helms also provided some guidance for this investigation in Chief, FBM to chief of station, Karlsruhe, "RUSTY," 2 November 1948 (b)(3)(c)

51. Cable, Karlsruhe to SO, 17 December 1948, (b)(3)(c)

52. Chief of station, Karlsruhe to Chief, OSO, "Report of Investigation— RUSTY," 17 December 1948, (b)(3)(c) (hereafter cited as "The Critchfield Report.") (S)

53. *Ibid.*, p. 10 of the "Basic Report" in "The Critchfield Report." (S)

54. *Ibid.*

55. Richard Helms, Memorandum for the Files, 1 February 1949. (b)(3)(c) Colonel Calloway made his recommendations concerning RUSTY in Galloway to DCI, "Recommendations in Re Operation RUSTY," 21 December 1948, (b)(3)(c) The DCI concurred and submitted CIA's proposed takeover in Hillkoetter to Maj. Gen. William E. Hall, "Operation RUSTY," 22 December 1948, (b)(3)(c)

56. For a variety of correspondence during this delicate transition period, see S. Leroy Irwin, Director of Intelligence to DCI, "Operation 'Rusty,'" 19 January 194(b)(3)(c) Cable SO to Karlsruhe, 9 February 1949(b)(1) OUT 75997; William G. Tharp, (b)(3)(n) Executive Officer to Chief of Operations and Chief, FBM, 1 April 1949; (b)(3)(c)

57. Chief, FBM to chief of station, Karlsruhe, "Operational, 10 February 1949 (b)(3)(c) enclosing Alan R. McCracken, Acting ADSO to Maj. Gen. S. Leroy Irwin, Director of Intelligence, "Operation Rusty," 9 February 1949, (b)(3)(c)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

For further information on the hostile environment at Pullach, see chief of station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Letter to General Hall," 10 February 1949, and chief of station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "ODEUM: Current Situation," 18 April 1949

58. Shortly after CIA took over RUSTY from the Army, the Office of the US High Commission for Germany (HICOM) assumed control from the Office of the Military Government for Germany United States (OMGUS) and the Occupation Statute went into effect. In September 1949, the Federal Government of Germany formed following the ratification of the Basic Law, the new republic's constitution in May. In the spring of 1952, Germany and the Western Allies replaced the Occupation Statute with Contractual Agreements. Three years later, West Germany became a sovereign nation and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Several months later, West Germany reformed its military forces and the Gehlen Organization became Germany's official intelligence service in February 1956. (U)

59. Chief of station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Basic Agreement with ODEUM," 13 June 1949

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

60. *Ibid.*

61. CIA dropped the use of the term RUSTY in 1949, and used a new operational code, ODEUM, through 1950 when it changed to ZIPPER. Following the establishment of the BND in 1956, the Agency referred to Gehlen's group as and UPSWING. Between 1957 and 1968, the Agency referred to the German service as CIA's Pullach base stopped using the Army's cover as the 7821st Composite Group and became known as

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

64. CIA initially provided Gehlen with per month in 1949 to run his operations. By 1955, CIA had an annual expense for over to support the German intelligence service. Between 1950 and 1968, CIA spent on Gehlen's organization and US liaison operations. CIA received some funding support from the Army while RUSTY, in the early days, increased its revenue through black market activities. The Agency never had full access to the identities of Gehlen agents.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

66. Targeting of West Germany by the East German intelligence service for its Nazi links is found in Markus Wolf with Anne McElvoy, *Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster* (New York: Times Books 1997). (U)

(b)(1)
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A collection of articles on the theoretical, doctrinal, operational, and historical aspects of intelligence.

A Comprehensive Commentary
AN INTERVIEW WITH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GEORGE J. TENET (S)

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A Studies Roundtable
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DCI George J. Tenet and members of the *Studies in Intelligence* Editorial Board. From left to right: Peter Clement, William Nolte, the DCI, Brian Latell, L. Britt Snider, and Barry G. Royden.

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Prussian Nobleman, SS Officer, and CIA Agent

The Case of Otto Albrecht Alfred von Bolschwing (S)

Kevin C. Ruffner

> **"The CIA generally avoided most of these intelligence fabricators, although it did fall victim to a number of scams."**

Kevin C. Ruffner, a member of the History Staff, is on a rotational assignment with the Counterintelligence Center.

(b)(3)(c)

The situation in postwar Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s offered many opportunities for exploitation. Just as black-marketeers took advantage of material shortages, others sold information to the competing powers. As tensions mounted between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, the rubble-strewn cities of Europe, especially those in Germany and Austria, became an "intelligence jungle." (U)

One retired CIA officer recalled years later that "the inevitable result, in cold and hungry Europe of the time, was a proliferation of paper-mills such as had never been seen in Europe's history. To those of us trying to make sense of it all, it seemed that every down-at-heel veteran of the Abwehr, the Gestapo, RSHA Amt VI, and all the Fascist organizations of Central and Southern Europe was peddling fabricated information sources to notional spy networks, and that CIC, MIS, the British FSS, the Austrian Stapo, the Foreign Service's Peripheral Reports Officers, the Grumbach organization, the Gehlen organization, the Italian Carabinieri, Amt Blank, the French SDECE, and Radio Free Europe all were elbowing and shoving each other to buy the stuff, like so many women in Macy's basement on the day after Christmas."[1] (U)

The CIA generally avoided most of these intelligence fabricators, although it did fall victim to a number of scams.[2] Decades later, the bona fides of some CIA agents recruited during this period are still the subject of conjecture and debate.[3] Otto Albrecht Alfred von Bolschwing, a Prussian-born Nazi officer, is a case in point. Personality issues and doubts about his overall usefulness marred his work for CIA in Austria. Yet, the Agency failed to resolve these matters and even brought Bolschwing to the United States. Bolschwing's presence in America subsequently attracted the attention of the Department of Justice, the GAO, and the US Congress decades after his espionage role. (U)

The Gehlen Connection

During the Allied occupation of Germany and Austria, it was not uncommon for American intelligence agencies to share assets with the Gehlen organization, the nascent West German intelligence service. As early as 1948, one CIA officer reported that the Germans "took over some of the informants (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) the intelligence they furnished was of no value whatsoever."[4] The US Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) also picked up agents when they had been dropped by CIA's predecessors, the OSS, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). As early as December 1946, Headquarters told counterintelligence officials in Germany that "we believe our best policy would be steer clear of it and let such agents and informers who are being lured away by higher inducements go their merry way. It seems a shame that

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anyone is willing to pay so much for very low grade and mostly unverifiable information."[5] (S)

As the Cold War intensified, the Gehlen organization, known initially by its codename RUSTY, became an important player in the intelligence war in Western Europe. The Germans, in particular, claimed to have unique access to intelligence behind the Iron Curtain. After the Agency assumed responsibility for the German intelligence organization in mid-1949,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

The Agency took over a top Gehlen agent and made him a CIA source. (S)

Gaining control of one of Gehlen's agents presented an unusual opportunity for CIA, coming at a time when CIA had just recently assumed responsibility for ODEUM (CIA's new operational term for RUSTY).

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Coming to CIA's Attention

Otto Albrecht Alfred von Bolschwing seemed an ideal candidate for CIA recruitment. He was urbane and friendly, spoke and wrote English well, and offered unique insights into ODEUM's foreign intelligence activities. Operating in Austria, Bolschwing had reestablished his wartime ties to members of the Iron Guard, a Rumanian Fascist group, scattered throughout southern Europe. Bolschwing had joined RUSTY in 1947, although he gradually fell out of Gehlen's favor by 1950 because of his unwillingness to provide Pullach with operational information. Throughout 1949 and 1950, CIA debated whether to pick up Bolschwing from ODEUM and use him as an American source. (S)

In a late 1949 memorandum, Lucid discussed the future of American intelligence in Austria with Richard Helms, the chief of Foreign Branch M responsible for central Europe. Otto von Bolschwing figured prominently in Lucid's plans. "It would seem," Lucid declared, "that a basis does exist for splitting Bolschwing away from ODEUM and at the same time making the action work to AIS [American Intelligence Service] advantage. For example, he might be

(b)(1)

a collaborator of ours." Lucid did have some reservations about Bolschwing. "The suggestions regarding Bolschwing," he wrote, "should not necessarily be taken as an indication that we regard him as a topflight operative. As a matter of fact, he may be, but if this is the case, he has apparently managed to keep a bushel handy for concealment purposes." Lucid also added, "Always giving the devil his due, he may indeed have great potentialities which could be nursed along, particularly in the political field. His proposal for the establishment of Balkan coverage contains nothing really startling, except perhaps through the voluminous claim to contact with all of those named."[9] (S)

Lucid's mixed feelings about Bolschwing echoed earlier sentiments expressed by the CIG. A trace request to Headquarters from Austria in the spring of 1947 brought word that "Otto Albrecht Alfred Bolschwing is shady character."[10] Upon receipt of this information, the counterintelligence chief in Austria responded, "After considering the information on subject provided by Headquarters, together with Heidelberg's reply to our inquiry, we have decided not to use subject in any capacity. No approach will be made to him." He added that "we will make an effort, however, to be kept informed on his activities, particularly with regard to the CE aspect."[11] (S)

Bolschwing's Background

Bolschwing's personal history was, indeed, "not the best."[12] Born in 1909 in Prussia, the son of a nobleman, he was orphaned at an early age when his father was killed in action on the Eastern Front during World War I. As a young man, Bolschwing worked with several trading companies and other businesses in Germany, Great Britain, and elsewhere in Europe. He set out to make

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his fortune in the British mandate territory of Palestine, where he became embroiled in early Nazi intelligence activities in the Middle East.[13] (U)

Bolschwing's own "life history," (written for CIA in the fall of 1949) contained a number of fanciful exaggerations about his activities following his return to Germany in the mid-1930s.[14] While he denied his Nazi past and claimed that he always resisted the regime in his statements to CIA, Bolschwing actually worked for the section of the German *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD) dealing directly with the "Jewish problem." In 1940, Bolschwing took over the post of SD representative in Bucharest, Rumania, where he supported Iron Guardists in their abortive January 1941 coup attempt against Ion Antonescu. Bolschwing undertook this action without the approval of his superiors in Berlin, thus prompting the German Foreign Ministry to protest the SD's interference in the Reich's external affairs. Following the suppression of the Iron Guard revolt, Bolschwing spent a "few months" in confinement in Germany. His arrest and imprisonment as well as his subsequent demotion in the SS later enhanced his self-projected image as a Resistance fighter—an aspect that he played up by obtaining certificates from US Army units attesting to his underground activities at the end of the war.[15] (S)

Bolschwing's statement in 1949 that "my political ideas were not on a nationalistic but European basis, any small-scale nationalism (chauvinism), to my mind is antihistorical, I further saw and still see no chance of individual European nationalism in a moral fight against world communism"

"By early 1950, CIA decided to take Bolschwing as an agent despite some initial reservations."

failed to convince CIA about his trustworthiness.[16] One report noted that "most evaluations of B (based almost without exception on study of biography rather than personal association) run as follows: self-seeking, egotistical, and a man of shifting loyalties. His protests of democracy and, more particularly, feelings of Austrian nationalism seem to contradict his history."[17] (S)

Another observer wrote, "He is an adventurer, a lover of intrigue, and a wire-puller who is fond of power." Furthermore, "Bolschwing states that in his position in Rumania he was able to frustrate many of the evil designs of the Nazi regime, but it should be remembered as a black mark against him rather than a point in his favor that he arranged the escape of [Horia] Sima and others at a time when these men were at the height of their crimes." The report added, "if one adds to these objections the difficulties inherent in Bolschwing's involvement with political reporting on Austria, it is hard to see how, among all our other commitments, much could be gained by having MOB [Munich operations base] take him over as the principal agent for three Rumanian projects."[18] (S)

The Rumanian projects in question, ODEUM Projects 114, 115, and 116, involved members of the Iron Guard faction under Constantin Papanace. Based primarily in Italy, the group broke away from the main body of Horia Sima's Iron Guard movement while quarantined in Germany during the war. Bolschwing's ODEUM projects claimed to have widespread political and military coverage throughout Rumania through his Iron Guard contacts.[19] After reviewing Bolschwing's potential, James H. Critchfield, chief of CIA's Pullach operations base (POB), commented, "We are convinced that Bolschwing's Rumanian operations, his connections with the Papanace group, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) make him a valuable man whom we must control"[20] (S)

CIA Takes Bolschwing

By early 1950, CIA decided to take Bolschwing as an agent despite some initial reservations. In late January, Bolschwing met with Gehlen and discussed the terms of his leaving ODEUM. Bolschwing, in turn, informed US intelligence about this development, and Critchfield then spoke with Gehlen about the details of Bolschwing's departure.[21] Ironically, Critchfield found that "UTILITY [Gehlen] expressed conviction that the Papanace connection is of great value and should be salvaged" and that he "strongly recommended that the AIS in some way establish connection with Bolschwing and attempt to obtain from him a comprehensive description of these operations." Consequently, Critchfield directed [redacted] (b)(1) Bolschwing's first case officer, to contact Bolschwing t(b)(3)(n) learn more about his work with the Rumanians.[22] (S)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Shortly afterwards, [redacted] reported on his contact with Bolschwing and provided a description of his sources, both Rumanian and Austrian. [redacted] stated that "UNREST [Bolschwing's CIA cryptonym issued in February 1950] has risen steadily in the opinion of this case officer and POB in the last six months... He is unquestionably an extremely intelligent person, an experienced intelligence operator, a man with unusually wide and well-placed circle of friends, acquaintances, and sources, and a man whose grasp of the political-intelligence field throughout the Balkans, and, to a lesser degree, in Western Europe, is of a high order."[23] Both [redacted] and Critchfield were impressed by Bolschwing's motives to work for American intelligence as opposed to staying with Gehlen. "Probably the single ambition of Bolschwing," the chief of POB observed, "which is greater than that of playing a key role in Austrian intelligence is to become an American citizen and work in some capacity in political and intelligence affairs in Europe or in the United States as an American citizen."[24] (S)

A CIA Coverup

CIA's interest in Bolschwing soon extended to concealing his Nazi past. In early 1950, the Austrian Ministry of Interior investigated Bolschwing's status in that country (Bolschwing was a German citizen) and requested his Nazi Party records from the US Army's Berlin Document Center (BDC). When Pullach received word from CIA's Berlin operations base (BOB) about this request, it immediately asked that his file be withheld. A BOB officer, [redacted] agreed to pull Bolschwing's records and hold them separately, although he warned that Bolschwing was prominently mentioned in the "German Primer."[25] In a revealing memorandum to Pullach, [redacted] forwarded his recommendations:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

1. We would like to draw your attention to some circumstances, which, in my opinion, make it unwise to have a negative file check on such persons as von Bolschwing.

2. The files at the Berlin Documents Center as to Nazi membership and SS membership, as well as the SS personnel files, are so complete that it is unlikely that any person checked, who was a member of either of these two organizations, would not be found in the files. On top of this, the persons you are dealing with are so well known and their background so well publicized in the past that I deem it improbable that you can protect them from their past history.

3. At the end of the war, we tried to be smart and changed the name of several members of the SD and Abwehr in order to protect them from the German authorities and the occupation authorities. In most cases, these persons were so well known that the change in name compromised them more than if they were to face a denazification court and face the judgment which would have been meted out to them. Meanwhile, the developments in Germany and probably also in Austria have been such that membership in the SS, in the SD, or in the Abwehr no longer is regarded as a strike against any personality. Since I regard it impossible to keep secret such associations, except in cases where a person was a clandestine agent of a given organization, I request you to reassess the advisability of withholding information available in the Berlin Documents Center.

4. For the record, I would like to state, however, that we can withhold such information if desired.[26] (S)

[redacted] commented on CIA's efforts to obscure the German's Nazi background:

(b)(1)
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UNREST requested us to extract or block files which he believed were in the Berlin Document Center, to prevent their being sent to Austria in case of a request for them. This was done. These files, of which we have a copy, show that UNREST became a member of the NSDAP in 1932 with the number, 984212. This is mentioned in his personal history. He was a member of the SD Hauptamt and in 1940 was promoted to Obersturmfuehrer, in 1941 to Hauptsturmfuehrer. In February 1945, he was demoted to enlisted man in the SS and thrown out of the organization. UNREST explains in his autobiography that he received in 1935 a predated membership in the party which made him appear to have been a member since 1932. Subject was arrested by the Gestapo first in the winter of 1937-38, later in 1942 in Greece, and in September 1942 in Vienna, when he was sent to Berlin and held in a Gestapo prison until April 1943. No records of these arrests appear in the file from the Berlin Document Center. UNREST's statement in his personal history, "that he held no real SS membership and that his party

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membership was somehow mysterious" refers probably to the fact that, as an SD man, he automatically became a member of the SS and that he received his party membership in 1935, but ostensibly belonged beginning in 1932. We believe that further explanation of UNREST's SD, SS, and NSDAP connections are in order and will request that he provide it. We will later explore UNREST's reasons for keeping these files from the Austrians.[27] *(S)*

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n) soon learned that Bolschwing's ostensible reason for having the Americans deny his Nazi record to the Austrian Government centered around his own suspicious business activities in that country. Bolschwing worked in an American-sponsored firm, the Austria Verlag Gmbh, but he ran into tax problems with the Austrians. As matters developed, CIA denied Bolschwing's BDC file not only to the Austrians but also to the Army's 430th CIC Detachment and the Criminal Investigative Division (CID). This problem dragged on through 1950, eventually leading CIA to request CID's assistance in stalling any Austrian investigation of Bolschwing.[28] While both CIA and CID decided against taking any action in Bolschwing's favor, CID declined to provide any assistance to the Austrian probe. The Austrian Government apparently dropped the case by the end of 1950 through lack of evidence.[29] (S)

Performance Questions

In the midst of Bolschwing's legal problems, CIA also expressed dissatisfaction with Bolschwing's overall performance. Given a new cryptonym of USAGE in March 1950, Bolschwing failed to redirect his efforts to expand his coverage in southeastern Europe; he preferred to supply "political information, largely overt" about internal Austrian matters. "This," Critchfield noted in August 1950, "is quite contrary to our desires, since our primary interest is in fact in the Balkans and not in Austria." At a meeting with Bolschwing that month, Critchfield told him explicitly:

> *USAGE must immediately shift his emphasis not only to clandestine operations into the Balkans, but within this field must get down to the business of reporting detailed operational information and bridle his own tendencies to produce political and sociological studies, interesting from an historical and academic point of view, but not the type of material which will ensure continuance of his salary. The history of the Legionary Movement in Rumania, which he has been preparing for from four to six months, will be of interest and possibly add some new information on the subject. However, USAGE must first establish his position with us as a clandestine operator before we are willing to finance the exploitation of his intellectual interest in the Balkan problem.*[30] *(S)*

"CIA was disappointed with what little information Bolschwing provided about his operational activities."

Bolschwing reacted with surprise to the American discontent with his "reporting," and he insisted that "his Austrian coverage and connections as the aircraft carrier from which he can operate into the Balkans." He promised, however, to expand his contact with Papanace's Rumanian sources as well as activate two operations in Hungary.[31] Bolschwing, in fact, traveled to Rome with Austrian Iron Guard leader Ion Magarit to consult with Papanace about resurrecting nets throughout Rumania and Greece. Bolschwing, posing as US Army Capt. Albert A. Eisner (CIA provided this cover), never fully reported the results of his Rome trip, and nothing really came out of his collaboration with the Iron Guardists.[32] (S)

CIA was disappointed with what little information Bolschwing provided about his operational activities. Bolschwing did provide source identities in his networks, although the Agency dropped the Papanace connection in early 1951 as too expensive and duplicative of information already obtained in Italy.[33] Pullach base also questioned the effectiveness of his ongoing Austrian projects and proposed Hungarian projects. In the summer of 1951, the Agency summarized that "it seems apparent that while Pullach relations with USAGE have been cordial, and while USAGE has professed to be completely cooperative, Pullach has not been much more successful than ZIPPER in terms of overall results." POB's Critchfield added, "There appears to be little hope that he will ever develop into a first-class agent."[34] (S)

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CIA Transfers Bolschwing

Rather than drop Bolschwing as an unproductive agent, Pullach base transferred USAGE to the Salzburg operations base (SOB) in Austria. The Agency made this move after much discussion among Pullach, Salzburg, Vienna, and Washington because Headquarters felt that Bolschwing was better suited to report on internal Austrian matters than he could on activities behind the Iron Curtain. Headquarters wanted [redacted] unit in Austria, to determine if Bolschwing should be retained by American intelligence. James Critchfield had initially supported the CIA's takeover of Bolschwing from Gehlen. Only a few months later, he now expressed serious reservations about the German agent. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

If an agency takes him over without knowing his past, they will inevitably be bogged down in a series of "assessment periods" and grandiose schemes employing scores of people to exploit shadowy figures in the target area via courier lines which never seem to materialize. They will be faced with large payrolls for piddling returns, and masses of paper on all the relatively inconsequential aspects of his operation.[35] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

His new case officer in Salzburg, [redacted] however, found Bolschwing to be "reliable, efficient, amenable to direction, and can be increasingly guided into activities directly supplementary to Austrian station activities."[36] [redacted] in April 1952, [redacted] reported to Headquarters that USAGE "is genuinely devoted to the United States; he possesses truly extraordinary energy and efficiency; and he will cheerfully accept and is anxious to receive direction and guidance." [redacted] excused Bolschwing's previous failure with Pullach base because "it would appear that his past sins—which were in any event chiefly the result of lack of thorough direction—may be forgiven." In [redacted] eyes, Bolschwing "may be considered one of the most valuable assets of the Austrian station."[37] Bolschwing's new case officer accepted his explanation about his Nazi past without qualms or unusual questions. (S)

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

> **"Bolschwing's new case officer accepted his explanation about his Nazi past without qualms or unusual questions."**

SOB had big plans for Bolschwing, who now claimed to have several new projects, including penetration operations into Czechoslovakia, intelligence sources on the Soviets' strength in their zone in Austria, [redacted][38] For the next two years, Bolschwing (now known as GROSSBAHN after his transfer to Salzburg) assisted CIA in gaining intelligence on Soviet order of battle while also providing support to SOB's other collection operations against the Soviets. Bolschwing worked for CIA [redacted] In early 1953, CIA estimated the total yearly cost for Project GROSSBAHN (including Bolschwing and his sources) at [redacted][39] (S)

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

Going to America

Bolschwing's main activity during this period focused on gaining admittance to the United States. In early September 1952, [redacted] concurred with several other CIA officials that Bolschwing should depart Austria for America for security purposes. Noting his "long and faithful service for US intelligence," [redacted] felt that "the granting of citizenship and contract agent clearance to GROSSBAHN would permit him to concentrate his full energies on operations and his own support problems and to integrate his activities directly with DYCLAIM [CIA] systems and targets." [redacted], the chief of SOB, concurred in this recommendation and added:

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

We are certainly aware of the exceptional measures we are asking in GROSSBAHN's case, but we feel that the action will be most beneficial to the operations of this base. GROSSBAHN is an exceptional individual and offers, we believe, sufficient long-range potential to warrant extraordinary measures to get him on the team. He is devoted to United States interests, vitally interested in and capable of long-term intelligence work, and has all the earmarks of a professional intelligence operator and executive. Coupled with his demonstrated loyalty and reliability, these qualities make him a very rare bird, and one we should go to considerable pains to exploit.[40] *(S)*

To support Bolschwing's immigration, [redacted] prepared a packet of material pertaining to Bolschwing and his intelligence work. Among his

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
various reports, Bolschwing wrote another autobiographical account of his life, Nazi activities, and work for the Resistance. After reciting his story (in a more embellished form than his 1949 account), Bolschwing now exclaimed "I may also state that I have never been in the pay of SS or the party or the German Government, and I flatter myself that at least in this respect I am an exception."[41] (S)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n) Upon the receipt of [redacted] packet, Headquarters commended Salzburg's efforts to provide better security for its operations and personnel, although Bolschwing's proposed immigration also raised several issues. Officials in Washington expressed concern whether the Austrian station understood the legal requirements for a foreigner to gain an immigrant visa and obtain US citizenship. The process, Washington declared, was not as simple as just bringing Bolschwing to America for three months and then returning him to Austria. On another note, Washington asked what advantages Bolschwing would have as an American citizen and a long-term agent in Austria as opposed to his current status.[42] Another desk officer worried that Bolschwing could become dissatisfied once he came to the United States. As a note of caution, Headquarters warned that "in the event that it is finally decided to go through with the proposed course of action, GROSSBAHN should clearly understand that we do not and cannot assume unlimited responsibility for him."[43] (S)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n) The Headquarters communique engendered more discussion in Austria.[44] [redacted] Bolschwing's latest case officer, detailed in a lengthy memorandum about SOB's reasoning behind Bolschwing's immigration to the United States (b)(1) the spring of 1953. [redacted] defende (b)(3)(n) Salzburg's course of action becaus "we feel GROSSBAHN's background and experience qualifies him for consideration in a position as closely approximates that of staff status as his citizenship status will allow." [redacted] added that "we will (b)(1) all possible to imprint in his min (b)(3)(n) that taking the initial steps toward US citizenship will in no way obligate us, morally or otherwise, to assist him in his relocation should the course of events force his severance with KUBARK [CIA]."[45] (S)

In late August 1953, Headquarters cabled Austria and granted its permission to bring Bolschwing to the United States.[46] The Agency, however, refused to use its special legal authority and warned that it may take some time for the INS to waive Bolschwing's Nazi Party membership and allow him to enter the United States. CIA also demanded that it wanted to terminate its association with Bolschwing upon his immigration "unless much stronger, more specific plan presented for future work upon return to Austria. On basis past performance we [are] unconvinced future efforts as recruiter will be productive enough to warrant undertaking sponsorship his return. Such sponsorship," Washington added, "[is] bound to make ultimate disposal much more difficult."[47] (S)

Consequently, the Agency took steps to have Bolschwing admitted as an immigrant under the regular German quota, and he obtained an immigrant visa at the American Consulate in Munich in August 1953. The Agency's Eastern Europe (EE) Division approached the Alien Affairs division for assistance in coordinating Bolschwing's movement



Von Bolschwing in 1953. (S)

with the INS. From the beginning, CIA made no attempts to conceal Bolschwing's NSDAP membership or his SD service. EE, however, did not go into any great detail about his past other than repeating Bolschwing's own stories.[48] Meanwhile, CIA in Austria "rechecked" third agency files, notably CIC and Army G-2, for references pertaining to Bolschwing. Two of the documents (both derived from informants) pinpointed Bolschwing as a member of Adolf Eichmann's staff.[49] (S)

CIA reacted seriously to the local traces and gave Bolschwing a [redacted] examination in September 1953.[50] [redacted]

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example, about his connection to Eichmann, Bolschwing claimed that he had met him only twice and refused to offer to join the "Eichmann *Sonderkommando*." After "detailed discussion" on this point, the examiner concluded that "it does not appear that subject has been withholding any important information regarding Eichman[n], but, considering his initial reaction to the question, it is some minor fact related to the matter that subject is unwilling to mention."[51] (S)

When asked about any official positions that he had held with the Nazis, Bolschwing "produced significant reactions every time that particular questions was asked." The (b)(1) operator then compared Bolschwing's reactions to questions that dealt with his activities both before and after the end of the war. "It is this examiner's considered opinion that this difference is not due to any deception but rather to the fact that subject is unable to recall all the exact details behind all the activities that he has engaged in prior to the war and during the war, and therefore becomes emotionally disturbed by the thought that he might have forgotten some essential point."[52] (S)

Despite the fact that CIA had already told the INS about Bolschwing's NSDAP membership, Agency officials in Austria advised him not to admit this fact after his arrival in the United States.[53] CIA worried that if Bolschwing admitted this at a later date, the INS "would be forced, for appearances sake, to follow the letter of the law" and deport the German. Bolschwing's immigration visa had been procured solely through CIA's efforts despite the objections of the INS. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) also told Bolschwing not to

"Bolschwing's immigration visa had been procured solely through CIA's efforts despite the objections of the INS."

contact any member of the CIA in the United States, except in case of "dire emergency." This restriction included the renewal of social contacts or trying to reenter the intelligence business.[54] (S)

Headquarters quickly responded to the field station's request about what Bolschwing should state about his Nazi record. In addition to warning Bolschwing against applying for any sensitive or government jobs, EE elaborated on what approach Bolschwing needed to take in the United States:

> *Assuming that he has not denied Nazi affiliations on his visa application form, he should definitely not deny his record if the matter comes up in dealings with US authorities and he is forced to give a point-blank answer. Thus, if asked, he should admit membership but attempt to explain it away on the basis of extenuating circumstances. If he were to make a false statement on a citizenship application or other official paper, he would get into trouble. Actually, GROSSBAHN is not entering the United States under false circumstances, as ODURGE [INS] will have information concerning his past record in a secret file. He will enter legally under an ODURGE interpretation of the provisions of the immigration law applicable to his case. (Of course, we are asking that they grant such a favorable interpretation.)*[55] (S)

By the end of 1953, Bolschwing's only real duties involved his preparation to leave Austria with his wife and son. He had already turned over his agents to CIA case officers, although SOB expected his departure to be delayed until January 1954. The layover required an extension of Bolschwing's immigrant visa which expired in December 1953.[56] The base, meanwhile, tied up loose ends—a chore complicated once again by the fact that Bolschwing had never paid Austrian taxes. The Agency circumvented this dilemma by having Bolschwing and his household baggage leave the country under the identity of Capt. Albert D. Eisner—a CIA pseudonym that Bolschwing had used in his earlier tax battles.[57] (S)


In wrapping up its affairs with Bolschwing in Austria, CIA summarized the course of events that resulted in his immigration. "It was the consensus of opinion (Headquarters, VOB, and SOB) that agent's time in Austria had been used up; he was too badly compromised and too well identified as being a KUBARK agent in all circles." (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) stated that "GROSSBAHN was told that his days of usefulness in Austria were rapidly drawing to a close, and, if he were ever to realize his ambition of getting to the States and becoming a US citizen, now is the time to do it." CIA also advised Bolschwing that "if he did not accept the terms being offered to him at present, no guarantee could be made as to his ultimate future."[58] (S)

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(b)(6)

As he left Austria for the United States (under the sponsorship of [redacted] who had met Bolschwing at the end of the war), the German agent expressed his pleasure: "I have regarded it an honor to serve the United States and its government, and I feel utmost gratitude that I am admitted to the United States to become a citizen."[59] Bolschwing and his family quickly settled in America. Writing from his hotel in New York City to his CIA point of contact, Bolschwing admitted, "I do wish to express my thanks for the excellent arrangements with the immigration authorities. We were called for on the boat and the chief inspector, who was in possession of a govt. memorandum signed by Assistant Commissioner Hogan, personally saw to our immediate being passed through all formalities."[60] (S)



CIA-provided US Army ID card in the name of Capt. Albert A. Eisner. (S)

(b)(6)

With a sigh of relief, Headquarters reported the safe arrival of Bolschwing in New York to Ag(b)(1) personnel in Austria. EE Divisi(b)(3)(n) stated "it seems difficult to belie[redacted] that the GROSSBAHN case is at last at an end, and we sincerely hope that he has said a permanent good-bye to intelligence activities."[61] Bolschwing soon settled into a new routine in the United States, working with various firms in New York and California; he became an American citizen in 1959. (S)

Bolschwing's Ties With Eichmann

Following the apprehension of Adolf Eichmann in 1960 and his subsequent trial and execution in Israel, the CIA examined its records concerning the "architect of the Final Solution." M. Paul Hartman of the Counterintelligence Staff discovered that Bolschwing actually played a larger role in the SS than he had previously admitted. At the same time, some of Bolschwing's former CIA contacts in Austria, including [redacted] grew suspicious of GROSSBAHN's claims. In 1961, [redacted] stated that one of Bolschwing's agents had proven "fraudulent" following Bolschwing's departure to the United States.[62] The Agency, however, did not take any action against Bolschwing after learning about his false record, beyond asking him to withdraw his application for a US Government–sponsored position in India.[63] In 1963, Headquarters informed its German station and bases that Bolschwing would be in Europe on a private visit and that he had no connection with the Agency.[64] (S)

SLU Discovers Bolschwing

Over a decade later, in 1978, Bolschwing came to the attention of the Special Litigation Unit (SLU) of INS during its investigation of the wartime role of Valerian Trifa, a Rumanian Iron Guard leader, and now a bishop in the United States. Eugene M. Thirolf, an SLU attorney, inquired about certain German officials posted in Rumania in 1941, and he requested information from CIA on Otto Albrecht Alfred von Bolschwing, a German SS captain and the SD's representative in Bucharest during the early years of World War II.[65] Thirolf's request raised alarm bells in CIA because of Bolschwing's extensive record in the Agency. A quick review of these files by both CIA and Martin Mendelsohn, SLU's chief, revealed that Bolschwing "may not have been totally frank when he neglected to mention past membership in the Nazi Party" upon applying for naturalization in 1959.[66] By early 1979, SLU launched a separate investigation of Bolschwing's immigration and his wartime activities; ironically,

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Mendelsohn had initially planned to use Bolschwing as a witness against Trifa. (b)(3)(c) an attorney with CIA's Office of General Counsel, warned in early March 1979 that an investigation of Bolschwing threatened the Agency because a preliminary examination of his records raised a number of "obvious questions" about his relationship with CIA over the years.[67] (S)

OSI Enters the Picture

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

Jeffrey Mausner took over the Bolschwing investigation for the Department of Justice's new Office of Special Investigations (OSI) in the summer of 1979 and continued to examine the Agency's holdings.[68] By November 1979, Martin Mendelsohn approached CIA with several urgent questions regarding its affiliation with Bolschwing. In light of OSI's imminent suit against Bolschwing, the Department of Justice was concerned whether CIA had any objections to the legal proceedings or if the German could blackmail the Agency. Mendelsohn also expressed uncertainty as to whether CIA officials might testify on Bolschwing's behalf in view of his close connections with the Agency.[69] (S)

In January 1980, representatives from the CIA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) and the Directorate of Operations (DO) held a meeting with OSI to thrash out Mendelsohn's questions. Speaking for the (b)(3)(c) Agency, the DO's [redacted] said that CIA did not plan to assist Bolschwing with his defense. Given the fact that Bolschwing's knowledge of CIA operations was dated, [redacted] doubted that the Agency had to worry about any form of blackmail.

> **"Pressure mounted in 1980 as famous Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal announced Bolschwing's presence in the United States."**

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted] warned, however, that the Agency did not know what Bolschwing's case officer, [redacted] had told him when applying for a visa because [redacted] had since died. Likewise, the DO noted that the INS possessed an "auxiliary" file on Bolschwing at the time of his departure from Austria; neither CIA or the INS, however, could locate these records. The Agency expressed concern about this fact in the event Bolschwing's attorney subpoenaed all CIA material relevant to the case.[70] (S)

Mounting Pressure

Pressure mounted in 1980 as famous Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal announced Bolschwing's presence in the United States.[71] Desp(b)(3)(c) verbal assurances in January 1980 that CIA had no objections to OSI's suit, the Agency failed to report this in writing. Pressed by OSI's new director, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., for an answer to his office's letter of 30 November 1979 about Bolschwing, CIA delayed any formal answer until the summer of 1980. At that time, OGC attorney (b)(3)(c) tried to clarify some of OSI's concerns about the Agency's standing on this case and the availability of its records for use in court. He reitera(b)(3)(c) point that "CIA has no objection to the initiation of proceedings against von Bolschwing. Indeed, our position on this matter is neutral, and our only interest is to protect sensitive and classified information concerning our former relationship with von Bolschwing."[72] (S)

OSI still expressed great anxiety about the Agency's knowledge of Bolschwing's background at the time of his immigration in the mid-1950s. OSI's concerns resulted from another Nazi war criminal case when OSI dropped its suit against a former CIA agent because of the discovery of corroborating evidence in Agency files. Jeffrey Mausner submitted an eight-page letter to the Agency in which he emphasized that "most of our cases are based on a claim that the defendant misrepresented his Nazi background at the time of his entry into the US or at the time of his naturalization. It is," Mausner wrote, "therefore important to know exactly what INS, State Department, and CIA knew about von Bolschwing at the time of his entry and naturalization." OSI asked that the CIA search its records for any "preliminary questionnaire" used by the State Department's consular office in Munich to process his visa application in the second half of 1953. Likewise, the Department of Justice asked the Agency to produce an expert witness to discuss the recordkeeping procedures of the Alien Affairs Staff of the 1950s in order to testify as to how this office interfaced with INS. OSI clearly wanted to avoid any controversies regarding "third agency" material in CIA files.[73] (S)

The Agency, however, could not satisfy OSI's requests because the passage of time had rendered it difficult to reconstruct the complicated twists involved with Bolschwing's

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immigration. [redacted] was dead, and officers familiar with the work of the Alien Affairs Staff in the early 1950s had long since retired. While the Agency identified third agency material within its files and sent copies of these documents for review by the proper officers (including the State Department, Army, and NSA), CIA could not reconstruct the "auxiliary" file on Bolschwing.[74] (S)

In early 1981, OSI held an "on the record" interview with Bolschwing at his home in California. Represented by his son, attorney Golman V. von Bolschwing, OGC's [redacted] and the DO's [redacted] also attended the meeting. After discussing procedural issues, "Gus" Bolschwing did most of the talking and tried to defend his father's actions after nearly half a century. He labeled OSI's actions as "hypocrisy" because the details of Bolschwing's life had been known to American authorities before his arrival in the United States. "...and so I wonder as I sit here," the younger Bolschwing asked, "does the means justify the end? Do two wrongs make a right? It is just as difficult for my father at this point to prove his case, to disprove pieces of paper that are now 40 years old, as it was for certain individuals who did try to do justice to find and to prosecute Germans when there were no living witnesses or it was very hard to obtain living witnesses." Bolschwing's son then described his father's deteriorating physical and mental condition which affected his ability to recollect events in his past. Subsequent questioning by Mausner confirmed that Bolschwing's memory about his membership in the Nazi Party and the SS was, indeed, fragile.[75] (S)

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(c)

OSI Files Suit

OSI filed suit against Bolschwing in late May 1981 in the US District Court for the Eastern District of California. Allan Ryan and his attorneys linked Bolschwing's wartime activities in Germany and Rumania to German efforts to persecute the Jews. Bolschwing faced three counts of procuring his citizenship in 1959 through willful misrepresentation when he failed to declare his membership in the Nazi Party, the SS, the SD, and the RSHA—all organizations declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. The Department of Justice also accused Bolschwing of a lack of good moral character for his actions during World War II and for making false testimony. The court ordered the former German officer to appear at the US Attorney's Office in Sacramento for deposition and to provide all records, photographs, or other documents from 1932 to 1945.[76] (U)

Claiming Service as OSS Agent

To limit the damage to his case, Bolschwing presented a new twist which appeared in a Sacramento newspaper shortly after OSI filed its suit. Bolschwing now claimed that he had actually served as a "secret agent" for the OSS during the war. "It's not true," Bolschwing said, "I never served in the SS or Gestapo or SD (the intelligence branch of the SS). I did serve in the OSS for the Americans, and I did parachute into Austria." According to Bolschwing, "It was dangerous work in Germany (for the Americans)." In a separate statement, Bolschwing confided that he had even met William J. Donovan, later director of OSS in New York before the outbreak of World War II. Allan Ryan, speaking for OSI, immediately denounced Bolschwing's statement. "What he said is not true. Our case relates from the middle 1930s through the war, and, during that period, he was not a double agent for the United States or anything like that. He was not affiliated in any way with the US Government."[77] (U)

Like many of OSI's other cases, the Bolschwing suit presented numerous legal complications. Bolschwing's attorneys, including his son, believed that they needed security clearances to speak with him about his relationship with the CIA during the postwar years. The defense also wanted access to all government records pertaining to Bolschwing which delayed the case because neither OSI or CIA were able to meet the request for production. OSI protested against the need for total production as opposed to using only those government records relevant to the court case. This prompted Bolschwing's attorney, Arthur J. Ruthenbeck, to tell the media in September 1981 that "my hands have been tied.... I'm just trying to get authorization for my client to talk with me." He added, "We're in a real Catch-22 situation. One arm of the government prosecutes the case, and another says you can't talk to your client."[78] OGC's [redacted] (b)(3)(c) saw this situation in a different light: "Your hypothetical inability to represent your client, based upon your perception of unknown contractual limitations, similarly suggests a desire to infuse this litigation with premature issues."[79] Bolschwing, according to both OSI and CIA, was free to discuss all issues with his attorney, although the Department of Justice stipulated that classified material

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could not be discussed outside the courtroom. (U)

Records access and the defense's belief that it needed special permission to speak with Bolschwing hampered the suit; in the meantime, Bolschwing's health continued to deteriorate. At the behest of OSI, (b)(3)(c) prepared a classified affidavit to support the government's motion for a protective order. (b)(3)(c) the DO's Information Review Officer (IRO), cited the need to protect critical national security information from unauthorized disclosure as well as to protect confidential sources. The IRO commented that the "DO files concerning von Bolschwing contain extensive information on intelligence methodology in use by CIA." The (b)(3)(c) Agency, asserted, "...cannot, on the public record in this litigation, acknowledge the existence of such information without jeopardizing the sanctity of classified information."[80] (S)

CIA's efforts turned out to be unnecessary as OSI's director announced in late 1981 that Bolschwing voluntarily surrendered his American citizenship after admitting his membership in various Nazi organizations. As a consequence, OSI did not take Bolschwing to court, although Ryan agreed that the aging Bolschwing, diagnosed with a "progressive neurological condition," could remain in the United States until his health improved as to permit deportation. Ryan, in a prepared statement, refuted Bolschwing's last-minute claim that he had served as a wartime OSS agent. He also noted that the consent decision, offered by Bolschwing's defense, "was made by this office in consultation with higher authorities in the Department of Justice and was not reviewed by, or submitted for the approval of any other government agency."[81] (U)

> **"Bolschwing voluntarily surrendered his American citizenship after admitting his membership in various Nazi organizations."**

A Closed Case?

The case ended in March 1982, when Bolschwing died at the age of 72 of progressive supranuclear palsy.[82] Despite his death, the case has great significance for the CIA as it raises questions about the Agency's recruitment policies during the early Cold War. During the 1970s and 1980s, the GAO conducted two major investigations to ascertain the role of Federal agencies in assisting Nazi war criminals.[83] In addition, the OSI had its own cases; needless to say, the Nazi war criminal investigations have attracted considerable Congressional, media, and public interest. The CIA, in particular, has been criticized for its postwar activities and secrecy. The Bolschwing case reinforced widespread perceptions that the Agency assisted Nazis after the war and also brought them to the United States.[84] Echoes of the Bolschwing case continue to reverberate today as several members of Congress have presented bills to force the Agency to open its records on all Nazi war criminals and collaborators. (U)

NOTES

1. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)
tria, believed that "the ones that got most of this misinformation were the ones with the most money (or black-market cigarettes): CIC and the Gehlen organization." (U)

2. For a lengthy study of the problems of false intelligence, see *Paper Mills and Fabricators*, a 1951 CIA study. CIA History Staff Records, HS/CSG-2375 and HS/CSG-2485, Job 83-00764R, Boxes 2 and 5 (respectively), CIA ARC (S).

3. As an example of one such controversial case, see David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) about American agent Igor G. Orlov. (U)

4. [redacted] to Richard Helms, "Operation RUSTY," 18 March 1948, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

5. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

6. For further information about the early years of the West German intelligence service, see Kevin C. Ruffner, "A Controversial Liaison Relationship: American Intelligence and the Gehlen Organization, 1945-49," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 69-84, (S).

7. The Army's CIC, in particular, resented the development of RUSTY and the free range that its agents operated in Germany. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

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12. Undated, unsigned, typed note in (b)(3)(c)

13. A synopsis of Bolschwing's life an(b)(1) Nazi career is found in Allen A. (b)(3)(c) Ryan, Jr., *Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), pp. 218-239 (U).

14. See chief of station, Karlsru(b)(1) Chief, FBM, "ODEUM Personnel—Otto Albrecht Baron von Bolschwing," (b)(3)(c) 3 October 1949, enclosing Bolschwing, "Statement on Life History," 14 September 1949, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

15. Bolschwing received certificates from various American units in Austria, including the 71st and 410th Infantry Regiments for service in the summer of 1945. He later claimed to have worked with the 44th Infantry Division from April through June 1945; the 103rd Infantry Division in July and August 1945; the 84th Infantry Division until December 1945; and, finally, with 3rd Army Intelligence through December 1946. One of the officers who provided Bolschwing with a certificate, (b)(6) of the 71st Infantry Regiment, later sponsored him as an immigrant (U).

16. Bolschwing, "Statement on Life History." (U) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

17. Undated, unsigned memorandum, "UNREST (Bolschwing) Files.

18. Undated, unsigned, untitled report, with letterhead "Central Intelligence Agency Washington 25, D.C.," (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

19. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) D. E. Pratt to S. B. Bossard, Rumanian Projects Controlled by von Bolschwing," 15 November 1949,

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25. *The German Intelligence Services,* (b)(1) reports on German Abwehr and SD/SS intelligence personnel, organizations, and operations compiled during World War II. The "German Primer" was used by Allied intelligence during the war and remained in use afterwards. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

26. Chief of station, Karlsruhe, to chief of base, Pullach, File Checks," 24 April 1950. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
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An Austrian report noted Bolschwing's affiliation with the "CIC" in Salzburg and that he did not undergo denazification because of his claims to have been an active underground fighter. Report also states Bolschwing's SS rank and that he served in the SD. See chief of station, Vienna, to chief of station, Karlsruhe, "Austrian Police Report on Otto von Bolschwing," 12 November 1950,

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40. Chief of station, Vienna, to Chief, EE, "GROSSBAHN—U.S. Citizenship," 29 September 1952,

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47. Cable, DCI to Senior Representative Austria, August 1953,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

48. Chief, EE, to Director of Security, ATTN: Alien Affairs Officer, "Request for Aid in Facilitating US Entry for Agent," [undated], in

49. Chief of base to Chief, EE, "Otto von Bolschwing—Local Traces," 28 eptember 1953,

(b)(1)
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(b)(3)(n)

50.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
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51.

52. *Ibid.*

53. The CIA also informed the State Department about Bolschwing's immigration and Nazi record. See Cable, Senior Representative Austria to DCI, 20 November 1953,

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(b)(3)(c)
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54. Chief of base, Salzburg, to Chief, EE, "GROSSBAHN—Termination," 29 October 1953.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

56. Chief of base, Salzburg, to Chief, EE, "GROSSBAHN—Progress Report for the Period 1 October to 30 November 1953," 10 December 1953, and chief of base, Salzburg, to Chief, EE, "GROSSBAHN—Termination," 10 December 1953,

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

58.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
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Chief, EE to FI/Plans, "Termination of Project GROSSBAHN," 22 December 1953,

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(b)(3)(c)
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74. The identity and location of the "auxiliary" file remains a mystery.

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77. [redacted] "Alleged Nazi Denies Federal Charge, Says He Spied for U.S.," *San Francisco Chronicle*, [c. May 1981], [redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

"Man, 71, is Ordered to Reply to Charge of Serving the Nazis," *The New York Times*, 29 July 1981, p. A13. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

78. S. Lynn Walker, "Accused Nazi's Defense Hampered by CIA Order Not to Talk, Attorney Says," *Sacramento Union*, 10 September 1981.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

79 [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

80 [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

81. [redacted]

82. Otto von Bolschwing; Ex-Captain in Nazi SS," *The New York Times*, 10 March 1982, p. B-5 (U).

83. United States GAO, Comptroller General of the United States, *Widespread Conspiracy to Obstruct Probes of Alleged Nazi War Criminals Not Supported by Available Evidence—Controversy May Continue*, GGD-78-73 (Washington, DC: GAO, 1978) and *Nazis and Axis Collaborators Were Used to Further US Anti-Communist Objectives in Europe—Some Immigrated to the United States*, GAO/GGD-85-66 (Washington, DC: GAO, 1985). [redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

84. Christopher Simpson, *Blowback: The First Full Account of America's Recruitment of Nazis, and its Disastrous Effect on Our Domestic and Foreign Policy* (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1988), pp. 252-259 (U).

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Reflections of an intelligence scholar
and Senate Select Committee investigator

ANALYSIS, WAR AND DECISION: WHY INTELLIGENCE FAILURES ARE INEVITABLE

Richard K. Betts*

The Editors commend this article to all producers and consumers of estimative and warning intelligence. It is reprinted from World Politics, Vol. XXXI No. 1 (October 1978), Copyright©1978 by Princeton University Press, by permission of the copyright holder.

Military disasters befall some states, no matter how informed their leaders are, because their capabilities are deficient. Weakness, not choice, is their primary problem. Powerful nations are not immune to calamity either, because their leaders may misperceive threats or miscalculate responses. Information, understanding, and judgment are a larger part of the strategic challenge for countries such as the United States. Optimal decisions in defense policy therefore depend on the use of strategic intelligence: the acquisition, analysis, and *appreciation* of relevant data. In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the products of intelligence services. Policy premises constrict perception, and administrative workloads constrain reflection. Intelligence failure is political and psychological more often than organizational.

Observers who see notorious intelligence failures as egregious often infer that disasters can be avoided by perfecting norms and procedures for analysis and argumentation. This belief is illusory. Intelligence can be improved marginally, but not radically, by altering the analytic system. The illusion is also dangerous if it abets overconfidence that systemic reforms will increase the predictability of threats. The use of intelligence depends less on the bureaucracy than on the intellects and inclinations of the authorities above it. To clarify the tangled relationship of analysis and policy, this essay explores conceptual approaches to intelligence failure, differentiation of intelligence problems, insurmountable obstacles to accurate assessment, and limitations of solutions proposed by critics.

I. Approaches to Theory

Case studies of intelligence failures abound, yet scholars lament the lack of a theory of intelligence.[1] It is more accurate to say that we lack a positive or normative

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[1]For example, Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles," *World Politics*, xvi (April 1964), 455, 465-66; Harry Howe Ransom, "Strategic Intelligence and Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, xxvii (October 1974), 145.

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theory of intelligence. Negative or descriptive theory—the empirical understanding of how intelligence systems make mistakes—is well developed. The distinction is significant because there is little evidence that either scholars or practitioners have succeeded in translating such knowledge into reforms that measurably reduce failure. Development of a normative theory of intelligence has been inhibited because the lessons of hindsight do not guarantee improvement in foresight, and hypothetical solutions to failure only occasionally produce improvement in practice. The problem of intelligence failure can be conceptualized in three overlapping ways. The first is the most reassuring; the second is the most common; and the third is the most important.

1. *Failure in perspective.* There is an axiom that a pessimist sees a glass of water as half empty and an optimist sees it as half full. In this sense, the estimative system is a glass half full. Mistakes can happen in any activity. Particular failures are accorded disproportionate significance if they are considered in isolation rather than in terms of the general ratio of failures to successes; the record of success is less striking because observers tend not to notice disasters that do not happen. Any academician who used a model that predicted outcomes correctly in four out of five cases would be happy; intelligence analysts must use models of their own and should not be blamed for missing occasionally. One problem with this benign view is that there are no clear indicators of what the ratio of failure to success in intelligence is, or whether many successes on minor issues should be reassuring in the face of a smaller number of failures on more critical problems.[2] In the thermonuclear age, just *one* mistake could have apocalyptic consequences.

2. *Pathologies of communication.* The most frequently noted sources of breakdowns in intelligence lie in the process of amassing timely data, communicating them to decision makers, and impressing the latter with the validity or relevance of the information. This view of the problem leaves room for optimism because it implies that procedural curatives can eliminate the dynamics of error. For this reason, official post mortems of intelligence blunders inevitably produce recommendations for reorganization and changes in operating norms.

3. *Paradoxes of perception.* Most pessimistic is the view that the roots of failure lie in unresolvable trade-offs and dilemmas. Curing some pathologies with organizational reforms often creates new pathologies or resurrects old ones;[3] perfecting intelligence production does not necessarily lead to perfecting intelligence consumption; making warning systems more sensitive reduces the risk of surprise, but increases the number of false alarms, which in turn reduces sensitivity; the principles of optimal analytic procedure are in many respects incompatible with the imperatives of the decision process; avoiding intelligence failure requires the elimination of strategic preconceptions, but leaders cannot operate purposefully without some preconceptions. In devising measures to improve the intelligence process, policy makers are damned if they do and damned if they don't.

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[2] "As that ancient retiree from the Research Department of the British Foreign Office reputedly said, after serving from 1903-50: 'Year after year the worriers and fretters would come to me with awful predictions of the outbreak of war. I denied it each time. I was only wrong twice.' " Thomas L. Hughes, *The Fate of Facts in a World of Men—Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 233, December 1976), 48. Paradoxically, "successes may be indistinguishable from failures." If analysts predict war and the attacker cancels his plans because surprise has been lost, "success of the intelligence services would have been expressed in the falsification of its predictions," which would discredit the analysis. Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War," *World Politics*, XXVIII (April 1976), 378.

[3] Compare the prescriptions in Peter Szanton and Graham Allison, "Intelligence: Seizing the Opportunity," with George Carver's critique, both in *Foreign Policy*, No. 22 (Spring 1976).

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It is useful to disaggregate the problem of strategic intelligence failures in order to elicit clues about which paradoxes and pathologies are pervasive and therefore most in need of attention. The crucial problems of linkage between analysis and strategic decision can be subsumed under the following categories:

1. *Attack warning.* The problem in this area is timely prediction of an enemy's immediate intentions, and the "selling" of such predictions to responsible authorities. Major insights into intelligence failure have emerged from catastrophic surprises: Pearl Harbor, the Nazi invasion of the U.S.S.R., the North Korean attack and Chinese intervention of 1950, and the 1973 war in the Middle East. Two salient phenomena characterize these cases. First, evidence of impending attack was available, but did not flow efficiently up the chain of command. Second, the fragmentary indicators of alarm that did reach decision makers were dismissed because they contradicted strategic estimates or assumptions. In several cases hesitancy in communication and disbelief on the part of leaders were reinforced by deceptive enemy maneuvers that cast doubt on the data.[4]

2. *Operational evaluation.* In wartime, the essential problem lies in judging the results (and their significance) of interacting capabilities. Once hostilities are under way, informed decision making requires assessments of tactical effectiveness—"how we are doing"—in order to adapt strategy and options. In this dimension, the most interesting insights have come from Vietnam-era memoirs of low-level officials and from journalistic muckraking. Again there are two fundamental points. First, within the context of a glut of ambiguous data, intelligence officials linked to operational agencies (primarily military) tend to indulge a propensity for justifying service performance by issuing optimistic assessments, while analysts in autonomous non-operational units (primarily in the Central Intelligence Agency and the late Office of National Estimates) tend to produce more pessimistic evaluations. Second, in contrast to cases of attack warning, fragmentary tactical indicators of *success* tend to override more general and cautious strategic estimates. Confronted by differing analyses, a leader mortgaged to his policy tends to resent or dismiss the critical ones, even when they represent the majority view of the intelligence community, and to cling to the data that support continued commitment.[5] Lyndon Johnson railed at his Director of

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[4] Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1962); Barton Whaley, *Codeword Barbarossa* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press 1973); Harvey De Weerd, "Strategic Surprise in the Korean War," *Orbis*, VI (Fall 1962); Alan Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (New York: Macmillan 1960); James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army 1972), 61-65, 83-85, 274-78; Michael I. Handel, *Perception, Deception, and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War* (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations, Jerusalem Paper No. 19, 1976); Shlaim (fn. 2); Abraham Ben-Zvi, "Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks," *World Politics*, XXVIII (April 1976); Amos Perlmutter, "Israel's Fourth War, October 1973: Political and Military Misperceptions," *Orbis*, XIX (Summer 1975); U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Intelligence [hereafter cited as HSCI], *Hearings, U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: The Performance of the Intelligence Community*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975; Draft Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, published in *The Village Voice*, February 16, 1976, pp. 76-81.

[5] David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House 1972); Morris Blachman, "The Stupidity of Intelligence," in Charles Peters and Timothy J. Adams, eds., *Inside the System* (New York: Praeger 1970); Patrick J. McGarvey, "DIA: Intelligence to Please," in Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, eds., *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective* (Boston: Little, Brown 1973); Chester Cooper, "The CIA and Decision-Making," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 50 (January 1972); Sam Adams, "Vietnam Cover-Up: Playing War With Numbers," *Harper's*, Vol. 251 (June 1975); Don Oberdorfer, *Tet!* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1971). For a more detailed review, see Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statemen, and Cold War Crises* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1977), chap. 10.

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Central Intelligence (DCI) at a White House dinner: "Policy making is like milking a fat cow. You see the milk coming out, you press more and the milk bubbles and flows, and just as the bucket is full, the cow with its tail whips the bucket and all is spilled. That's what CIA does to policy making." [6] From the consensus-seeking politician, this was criticism; to a pure analysts, it would have been flattery. But it is the perspective of the former, not the latter, that is central in decision making.

3. *Defense planning.* The basic task in using intelligence to develop doctrines and forces for deterrence and defense is to estimate threats posed by adversaries, in terms of both capabilities and intentions, over a period of several years. Here the separability of intelligence and policy, analysis and advocacy, is least clear. In dealing with the issue of "how much is enough" for security, debates over data merge murkily into debates over options and programs. As in operational evaluation, the problem lies more in data mongering than in data collecting. To the extent that stark generalizations are possible, the basic points in this category are the reverse of those in the previous one.

First, the justification of a mission (in this case, preparedness for future contingencies as opposed to demonstration of current success on the battlefield) prompts pessimistic estimates by operational military analysts; autonomous analysts without budgetary axes to grind, but with biases similar to those prevalent in the intellectual community, tend toward less alarmed predictions.[7] Military intelligence inclines toward "worst-case" analysis in planning, and toward "best-case" analysis in operational evaluation. (Military intelligence officials such as Lieutenant General Daniel Graham were castigated by liberals for *under*estimating the Vietcong's strength in the 1960's but for *over*estimating Soviet strength in the 1970's.) Air Force intelligence overestimated Soviet air deployments in the "bomber gap" controversy of the 1950's, and CIA-dominated National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) underestimated Soviet ICBM deployments throughout the 1960's (over-reacting, critics say, to the mistaken prediction of a "missile gap" in 1960).[8]

Second, in the context of peacetime, with competing domestic claims on resources, political leaders have a natural interest in at least partially rejecting military estimates and embracing those of other analysts who justify limiting allocations to defense programs. If the President had accepted pessimistic CIA operational evaluations in the mid-1960's, he might have withdrawn from Vietnam; if he had accepted pessimistic military analyses of the Soviet threat in the mid-1970's, he might have added massive increases to the defense budget.

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[6] Quoted in Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1973), 103.

[7] Betts (fn. 5), 160-61, 192-95. On bias within CIA, see James Schlesinger's comments in U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities [hereafter cited as SSCI], *Final Report, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, Book I, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, 76-77.

[8] *Ibid.*, Book IV, 56-59; William T. Lee, *Understanding the Soviet Military Threat: How CIA Estimates Went Astray* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Agenda Paper No. 6, 1977), 24-37; Albert Wohlstetter: "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 15 (Summer 1974); Wohlstetter, "Rivals, But No Race," *Foreign Policy*, No. 16 (Fall 1974); Wohlstetter, "Optimal Ways to Confuse Ourselves," *Foreign Policy*, No. 20 (Fall 1975). There are exceptions to this pattern of military and civilian bias: see *ibid.*, 185-88; Lieutnant General Daniel Graham, USA (Ret.), "The Intelligence Mythology of Washington," *Strategic Review*, IV (Summer 1976), 61-62, 64; Victor Marchetti and John Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Knopf 1974), 309.

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Some chronic sources of error are unique to each of these three general categories of intelligence problems, and thus do not clearly suggest reforms that would be advisable across the board. To compensate for the danger in conventional attack warning, reliance on worst-case analysis might seem the safest rule, but in making estimates for defense planning, worst-case analysis would mandate severe and often unnecessary economic sacrifices. Removing checks on the influence of CIA analysts and "community" staffs [9] might seem justified by the record of operational evaluation in Vietnam, but would not be warranted by the record of estimates on Soviet ICBM deployments. It would be risky to alter the balance of power systematically among competing analytic components, giving the "better" analysts more status. Rather, decision makers should be encouraged to be more *and* less skeptical of certain agencies' estimates, *depending on the category of analysis involved.*

Some problems, however, cut across all three categories and offer a more general basis for considering changes in the system. But these general problems are not very susceptible to cure by formal changes in process, because it is usually impossible to disentangle intelligence failures from policy failures. Separation of intelligence and policy making has long been a normative concern of officials and theorists, who have seen both costs and benefits in minimizing the intimacy between intelligence professionals and operational authorities. But, although the personnel can be segregated, the functions cannot, unless intelligence is defined narrowly as the collection of data, and analytic responsibility is reserved to decision makers. Analysis and decision are interactive rather than sequential processes. By the narrower definition of intelligence, there have actually been few major failures. In most cases of mistakes in predicting attacks or in assessing operations, the inadequacy of critical data or their submergence in a viscous bureaucracy were at best the proximate causes of failure. The ultimate causes of error in most cases have been wishful thinking, cavalier disregard of professional analysts, and, above all, the premises and preconceptions of policy makers. Fewer fiascoes have occurred in the stages of acquisition and presentation of facts than in the stages of interpretation and response. Producers of intelligence have been culprits less often than consumers. Policy perspectives tend to constrain objectivity, and authorities often fail to use intelligence properly. As former State Department intelligence director Ray Cline testified, defending his analysts' performance in October 1973 and criticizing Secretary Kissinger for ignoring them:

> Unless something is totally conclusive, you must make an inconclusive report. . . . by the time you are sure it is always very close to the event. So I don't think the analysts did such a lousy job. What I think was the lousy job was in bosses not insisting on a new preparation at the end of that week [before war broke out]. . . . the reason the system wasn't working very well is that people were not asking it to work and not listening when it did work.[10]

II. Basic Barriers to Analytic Accuracy

Many constraints on the optimal processing of information lie in the structure of authority and the allocation of time and resources. Harold Wilensky argues persuasively that the intelligence function is hindered most by the structural

[9] The U.S. intelligence *community* includes the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency, the intelligence branches of each military service, the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the intelligence units of the Treasury and Energy Departments, and the FBI. Before 1973, coordination for national estimates was done through the Office of National Estimates, and since then, through the National Intelligence Officers. The Intelligence Community Staff assists the Director of Central Intelligence in managing allocation of resources and reviewing the agencies' performance.

[10] HSCI, *Hearings* (fn. 4), 656-57.

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characteristics of hierarchy, centralization, and specialization.[11] Yet it is precisely these characteristics that are the essence of any government. A related problem is the dominance of operational authorities over intelligence specialists, and the trade-off between objectivity and influence. Operators have more influence in decision making but are less capable of unbiased interpretation of evidence because they have a vested interest in the success of their operations; autonomous analysts are more disinterested and usually more objective, but lack influence. Senior generalists at the policy level often distrust or discount the judgments of analytic professionals and place more weight on reports from operational sources.[12] In response to this phenomenon, the suggestion has been made to *legislate* the requirement that decision makers consider analyses by the CIA's Intelligence Directorate (now the National Foreign Assessment Center) before establishing policy.[13] Such a requirement would offer no more than wishful formalism. Statutory fiat cannot force human beings to value one source above another. "No power has yet been found," DCI Richard Helms has testified, "to force Presidents of the United States to pay attention on a continuing basis to people and papers when confidence has been lost in the originator." [14] Moreover, principals tend to believe that they have a wider point of view than middle-level analysts and are better able to draw conclusions from raw data. That point of view underlies their fascination with current intelligence and their impatience with the reflective interpretations in "finished" intelligence.[15]

The dynamics of decision are also not conducive to analytic refinement. In a crisis, both data and policy outpace analysis, the ideal process of staffing and consultation falls behind the press of events, and careful estimates cannot be digested in time. As Winston Churchill recalled of the hectic days of spring 1940, "The Defence Committee of the War Cabinet sat almost every day to discuss the reports of the Military Co-ordination Committee and those of the Chiefs of Staff; and their conclusions or divergences were again referred to frequent Cabinets. All had to be explained or reexplained; and by the time this process was completed, the whole scene had often changed." [16] Where there is ample time for decision, on the other hand, the previously mentioned bureaucratic impediments gain momentum.[17] Just as information processing is frustrated by constraints on the time that harried principals can spend scrutinizing analytic papers, it is constrained by the funds that a government can spend. To which priorities should scarce resources be allocated? The Schlesinger Report of 1971, which led to President Nixon's reorganization of U.S. intelligence, noted that criticisms of analytic products were often translated into demands for more

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[11] Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence* (New York: Basic Books 1967), 42-62, 126, 179.

[12] *Ibid., passim.* The counterpoint of Cooper (fn. 5) and McGarvey (fn. 5) presents a perfect illustration.

[13] Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, *Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection* (New York: Basic Books 1976), 204.

[14] Quoted in SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 82.

[15] *Ibid.*, 267, 276; SSCI, *Staff Report, Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 48-49. The Senate Committee deplored the tendency of decision makers to focus on the latest raw data rather than on refined analyses, a practice that contributed to the intelligence failure in the 1974 Cyprus crisis. SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 443. But the failure in the October War was largely due to the *reverse* phenomenon: disregarding warning indicators because they contradicted finished intelligence that minimized the possibility of war. HSCI Draft Report (fn. 4), 78; Ben-Zvi (fn. 4), 386, 394; Perlmutter (fn. 4), 453.

[16] Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1948), 587-88.

[17] "Where the end is knowledge, as in the scientific community, time serves intelligence; where the end is something else—as in practically every organization but those devoted entirely to scholarship—time subverts intelligence, since in the long run, the central institutionalized structures and aims (the maintenance of authority, the accommodation of departmental rivalries, the service of established doctrine) will prevail." Wilensky (fn. 11), 77.

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extensive collection of data, but "Seldom does anyone ask if a further reduction in uncertainty, however small, is worth its cost." [18] Authorities do not always know, however, which issues require the greatest attention and which uncertainties harbor the fewest potential threats. Beyond the barriers that authority, organization, and scarcity pose to intelligence lie more fundamental and less remediable intellectual sources of error.

1. *Ambiguity of evidence.* Intelligence veterans have noted that "estimating is what you do when you do not know," [19] but "it is inherent in a great many situations that after reading the estimate, you will still not know." [20] These observations highlight an obvious but most important obstacle to accuracy in analysis. It is the role of intelligence to extract certainty from uncertainty and to facilitate coherent decision in an incoherent environment. (In a certain and coherent environment there is less need for intelligence.) To the degree they reduce uncertainty by extrapolating from evidence riddled with ambiguities, analysts risk oversimplifying reality and desensitizing the consumers of intelligence to the dangers that lurk within the ambiguities; to the degree they do not resolve ambiguities, analysts risk being dismissed by annoyed consumers who see them as not having done their job. Uncertainty reflects inadequacy of data, which is usually assumed to mean *lack* of information. But ambiguity can also be aggravated by an *excess* of data. In attack warning, there is the problem of "noise" and deception; in operational evaluation (particularly in a war such as Vietnam), there is the problem of overload from the high volume of finished analyses, battlefield statistics, reports, bulletins, reconnaissance, and communications intercepts flowing upward through multiple channels at a rate exceeding the capacity of officials to absorb or scruitinize them judiciously. (From the CIA alone, the White House received current intelligence dailies, Weekly Reports, daily Intelligence Information Cables, occasional Special Reports and specific memoranda, and analyses from the CIA Vietnam Working Group.) Similarly, in estimates for defense planning, there is the problem of innumerable and endlessly refined indices of the strategic balance, and the dependence of assessments of capabilities on complex and variable assumptions about the doctrine, scenarios, and intentions that would govern their use.

Because it is the job of decision makers to decide, they cannot react to ambiguity by deferring judgment.[21] When the problem is an environment that lacks clarity, an overload of conflicting data, and lack of time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity abets instinct and allows intuition to drive analysis. Intelligence can fail because the data are too permissive for policy judgment rather than too constraining. When a welter of fragmentary evidence offers support to various interpretations, ambiguity is exploited by wishfulness. The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.[22] (This point should be distinguished from the

[18] Quoted in SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 274.

[19] Sherman Kent, "Estimates and Influence," *Foreign Service Journal,* XLVI (April 1969), 17.

[20] Hughes (fn. 2), 43.

[21] "The textbooks agree, of course, that we should only believe reliable intelligence, and should never cease to be suspicious, but what is the use of such feeble maxims? They belong to that wisdom which for want of anything better scribblers of systems and compendia resort to when they run out of ideas." Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976), 117.

[22] Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970), 132; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976), chap. 4; Floyd Allport, *Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure,* cited in Shlaim (fn. 2), 358. Cognitive theory suggests that uncertainty provokes decision makers to separate rather than integrate their values, to deny that inconsistencies between values exist, and even to see contradictory values as mutually supportive. John Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974), 105-8.

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theory of cognitive dissonance, which became popular with political scientists at the time it was being rejected by psychologists.) [23] There is some inverse relation between the importance of an assessment (when uncertainty is high) and the likelihood that it will be accurate. Lyndon Johnson could reject pessimistic NIE's on Vietnam by inferring more optimistic conclusions from the reports that came through command channels on pacification, interdiction, enemy casualties, and defections. Observers who assume Soviet malevolence focus on analyses of strategic forces that emphasize missile throw-weight and gross megatonnage (Soviet advantages); those who assume more benign Soviet intentions focus on analyses that emphasize missile accuracy and numbers of warheads (U.S. advantages). In assessing the naval balance, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld focused on numbers of ships (Soviet lead), and Congressman Les Aspin, a critic of the Pentagon, focused on total tonnage (U.S. lead).

2. *Ambivalence of judgment.* Where there are ambiguous and conflicting indicators (the context of most failures of intelligence), the imperatives of honesty and accuracy leave a careful analyst no alternative but ambivalence. There is usually *some* evidence to support *any* prediction. For instance, the CIA reported in June 1964 that a Chinese instructor (deemed not "particularly qualified to make this remark") had told troops in a course in guerrilla warfare, "We will have the atom bomb in a matter of months." [24] Several months later the Chinese did perform their first nuclear test. If the report had been the only evidence, should analysts have predicted the event? If they are not to make a leap of faith and ignore the data that do not mesh, analysts will issue estimates that waffle. In trying to elicit nuances of probability from the various possibilities not foreclosed by the data, cautious estimates may reduce ambivalence, but they may become Delphic or generalized to the point that they are not useful guides to decision. (A complaint I have heard in conversations with several U.S. officials is that many past estimates of Soviet objectives could substitute the name of any other great power in history—Imperial Rome, 16th-century Spain, Napoleonic France—and sound equally valid.) Hedging is the legitimate intellectual response to ambiguity, but it can be politically counterproductive, if the value of intelligence is to shock consumers out of wishfulness and cognitive insensitivity. A wishful decision maker can fasten onto that half of an ambivalent analysis that supports his predisposition.[25] A more objective official may escape this temptation, but may consider the estimate useless because it does not provide "the answer."

3. *Atrophy of reforms.* Disasters always stimulate organizational changes designed to avert the same failures in the future. In some cases these changes work. In many instances, however, the changes persist formally but erode substantively. Standard procedures are constant. Dramatic failures occur only intermittently. If the reforms in procedure they have provoked do not fulfill day-to-day organizational needs—or if, as often happens, they complicate operations and strain the organization's resources—they fall into disuse or become token practices. After the

[23] See William J. McGuire, "Selective Exposure: A Summing Up," in R. P. Abelson and others, eds., *Theories of Cognitive Consistency* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1968), and Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: Free Press 1977), 213-14.

[24] CIA Intelligence Information Cable, "Remarks of the Chief of the Nanking Military Academy and Other Chinese Leaders on the Situation in South Vietnam," June 25, 1964, in Lyndon B. Johnson Library National Security Files, Vietnam Country File [hereafter cited as LBJL/NSF-VNCF], Vol. XII, item 55.

[25] See for example, U.S., Department of Defense, *The Senator Gravel Edition: The Pentagon Papers* (Boston: Beacon Press 1971) [hereafter cited as *Pentagon Papers*], Vol. II, 99; Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake* (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown 1972), 364; Special National Intelligence Estimate 53-64, "Chances for a Stable Government in South Vietnam," September 18, 1964, and McGeorge Bundy's covering letter to the President, in LBJL/NSF-VNCF, Vol. XIII, item 48.

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postmortem of North Korea's downing of a U.S. EC-121 monitoring aircraft in 1969, there was, for several months, a great emphasis on risk assessments for intelligence collection missions. Generals and admirals personally oversaw the implementaton of new procedures for making the assessments. Six months later, majors and captains were doing the checking. "Within a year the paperwork was spot-checked by a major and the entire community slid back to its old way of making a 'quick and dirty' rundown of the JCS criteria when sending in reconnaissance mission proposals." [26] The downing of the U-2 over the Soviet Union in 1960 and the capture of the intelligence ship *Pueblo* in 1968 had been due in part to the fact that the process of risk assessment for specific collection missions, primarily the responsibility of overworked middle-level officers, had become ponderous, sloppy, or ritualized.[27] At a higher level, a National Security Council Intelligence Committee was established in 1971 to improve responsiveness of intelligence staff to the needs of policy makers. But since the subcabinet-level consumers who made up the committee were pressed by other responsibilities, it lapsed in importance and was eventually abolished.[28] A comparable NSC committee that *did* serve tangible day-to-day needs of consumers to integrate intelligence and policy—the Verification Panel, which dealt with SALT—was more effective, but it was issue-oriented rather than designed to oversee the intelligence process itself. Organizational innovations will not improve the role of intelligence in policy unless they flow from the decision makers' views of their own needs and unless they provide frequent practical benefits.

None of these three barriers are accidents of structure or process. They are inherent in the nature of intelligence and the dynamics of work. As such, they constitute severe constraints on the efficacy of structural reform.

III. The Elusiveness of Solutions

If they do not atrophy, most solutions proposed to obviate intelligence dysfunctons have two edges: in reducing one vulnerability, they increase another. After the seizure of the *Pueblo*, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was reprimanded for misplacing a message that could have prevented the incident. The colonel responsible developed a careful microfilming operation in the message center to ensure a record of transmittal of cables to authorities in the Pentagon. Implementing this check, however, created a three-to-four hour delay—another potential source of failure—in getting cables to desk analysts whose job was to keep reporting current.[29] Thus, procedural solutions often constitute two steps forward and one step back; organizational fixes cannot transcend the basic barriers. The lessons of Pearl Harbor led to the establishment of a Watch Committee and National Indications Center in Washington. Although this solution eliminated a barrier in the communication system, it did not prevent the failure of timely alert to the Chinese intervention in Korea or the 1973 October War, because it did not eliminate the ambiguity barrier. (Since then, the Watch Committee has been replaced by the DCI's

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[26] Patrick J. McGarvey, *CIA: The Myth and the Madness* (Baltimore: Penguin 1974), 16.

[27] David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The U-2 Affair* (New York: Random House 1962), 56, 176, 180; Trevor Armbrister, *A Matter of Accountability* (New York: Coward-McCann 1970), 116-18, 141-45, 159, 187-95; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Report, Inquiry Into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents* [hereafter cited as *Pueblo and EC-121 Report*], 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 1622-24, 1650-51; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Inquiry Into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents* [hereafter cited as *Pueblo and EC-121 Hearings*], 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 693-94, 699-700, 703-7, 714, 722, 734, 760, 773-78, 815-16.

[28] SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 61-62; HSCI Draft Report (fn. 4), 82.

[29] McGarvey (fn. 26), 16.

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Strategic Warning Staff.) DIA was reorganized four times within its first ten years; yet it continued to leave most observers dissatisfied. The Agranat Commission's review of Israel's 1973 intelligence failure produced proposals for institutional reform that are striking because they amount to copying the American system of the same time—which had failed in exactly the same way as the Israeli system.[30] Reform is not hopeless, but hopes placed in solutions most often proposed—such as the following—should be circumscribed.

1. *Assume the worst.* A common reaction to traumatic surprise is the recommendation to cope with ambiguity and ambivalence by acting on the most threatening possible interpretations. If there is *any* evidence of threat, assume it is valid, even if the *apparent* weight of contrary indicators is greater. In retrospect, when the point of reference is an actual disaster attributable to a mistaken calculation of probabilities, this response is always justifiable, but it is impractical as a guide to standard procedure. Operationalizing worst-case analysis requires extraordinary expense; it risks being counterproductive if it is effective (by provoking enemy countermeasures or pre-emption), and it is likely to be ineffective because routinization will discredit it. Many Israeli observers deduced from the 1973 surprise that defense planning could only rest on the assumption that no attack warning will be available, and that precautionary mobilization should always be undertaken even when there is only dubious evidence of impending Arab action.[31] Similarly, American hawks argue that if the Soviets' intentions are uncertain, the only prudent course is to assume they are seeking the capability to win a nuclear war.

In either case, the norm of assuming the worst poses high financial costs. Frequent mobilizations strain the already taut Israeli economy. Moreover, countermobilization can defeat itself. Between 1971 and 1973, the Egyptians three times undertook exercises similar to those that led to the October attack; Israel mobilized in response, and nothing happened. It was the paradox of self-negating prophecy.[32] The Israeli Chief of Staff was sharply criticized for the unnecessary cost.[33] The danger of hypersensitivity appeared in 1977, when General Gur believed Sadat's offer to come to Jerusalem to be a camouflage for an Egyptian attack; he began Israeli maneuvers in the Sinai, which led Egypt to begin maneuvers of its own, heightening the risk of accidental war.[34] To estimate the requirements for deterrence and defense, worst-case assumptions present an open-ended criterion. The procurement of all the hedges possible for nuclear war-fighting—large increments in offensive forces, alert status, hardening of command-control-and-communications, active and passive defenses—

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[30] Shlaim (fn. 2), 375-77. The proposals follow, with their U.S. analogues noted in parentheses: appoint a special intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister (Director of Central Intelligence) to supplement the military chief of intelligence; reinforce the Foreign Ministry's research department (Bureau of Intelligence and Research); more autonomy for non-military intelligence (CIA); amend rules for transmitting raw intelligence to research agencies, the Defense Minister, and the Prime Minister (routing of signals intelligence from the National Security Agency); restructure military intelligence (creation of DIA in 1961); establish a central evaluation unit (Office of National Estimates). On the U.S. intelligence failure in 1973, see the HSCI Draft Report (fn. 4), 78-79.

[31] Shlaim (fn. 2), 379; Handel (fn. 4), 62-63.

[32] *Ibid.*, 55.

[33] Shlaim (fn. 2), 358-59. The Israeli command estimated a higher probability of attack in May 1973 than it did in October. Having been proved wrong in May, Chief of Staff Elazar lost credibility in challenging intelligence officers, complained that he could no longer argue effectively against them, and consequently was unable to influence his colleagues when he was right. Personal communication from Michael Handel, November 15, 1977.

[34] *Washington Post*, November 27, 1977, p. A17.

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would add billions to the U.S. defense budget. Moreover, prudent hedging in policy should be distinguished from net judgment of probabilities in estimates.[35]

Alternatively, precautionary escalation or procurement may act as self-fulfilling prophecies, either through a catalytic spiral of mobilization (à la World War I) or an arms race that heightens tension, or doctrinal hedges that make the prospect of nuclear war more "thinkable." Since evidence for the "action-reaction" hypothesis of U.S. and Soviet nuclear policies is meager, and arms races can sometimes be stabilizing rather than dangerous, the last point is debatable. Still, a large unilateral increase in strategic forces by either the United States or the Soviet Union would, at the least, destroy the possibility of gains desired from SALT. A surprise attack or defeat make the costs of *under*estimates obvious and dramatic; the unnecessary defense costs due to *over*estimates can only be surmised, since the minimum needed for deterrence is uncertain. Worst-case analysis as a standard norm would also exacerbate the "cry wolf" syndrome. *Unambiguous* threat is not an intelligence problem; rather, the challenge lies in the response to fragmentary, contradictory, and dubious indicators. Most such indicators turn out to be false alarms. Analysts who reflexively warn of disaster are soon derided as hysterical. General William Westmoreland recalled that the warnings that had been issued before the 1968 Tet Offensive were ignored. U.S. headquarters in Saigon had each year predicted a winter-spring offensive, "and every year it had come off without any dire results. . . . Was not the new offensive to be more of the same?" [36]

Given the experience of intelligence professionals that most peacetime indicators of suspicious enemy activity lead to nothing, what colonel who has the watch some night will risk "lighting up the board" in the White House simply on the basis of weak apprehension? How many staffers will risk waking a tired President, especially if they have done so before and found the action to be needless? How many distracting false alarms will an overworked President tolerate before he makes it clear that aides should exercise discretion in bothering him? Even if worst-case analysis is promulgated in principle, it will be compromised in practice. Routinization corrodes sensitivity. Every day that an expected threat does not materialize dulls receptivity to the reality of danger. As Roberta Wohlstetter wrote of pre-Pearl Harbor vigilance, "We are constantly confronted by the paradox of pessimistic realism of phrase coupled with loose optimism in practice." [37] Seeking to cover all contingencies, worst-case analysis loses focus and salience; by providing a theoretical guide for everything, it provides a practical guide for very little.

2. *Multiple advocacy.* Blunders are often attributed to decision makers' inattention to unpopular viewpoints or to a lack of access to higher levels of authority by dissident analysts. To reduce the chances of such mistakes, Alexander George proposes institutionalizing a balanced, open, and managed process of debate, so that no relevant assessments will be submerged by unchallenged premises or the bureaucratic strength of opposing officials.[38] The goal is unobjectionable, and formalized multiple advocacy certainly would help, not hinder. But confidence that it will help systematically and substantially should be tentative. In a loose sense, there has usually

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[35] Raymond Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," *International Security*, II (Winter 1978), 22.

[36] Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1976), 316. See the postmortem by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, quoted in Herbert Y. Schandler, *The Unmaking of a President* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977), 70, 76, 79-80.

[37] Wohlstetter (fn. 4), 69.

[38] George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (September 1972). My usage of the term multiple advocacy is looser than George's.

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been multiple advocacy in the U.S. policy process, but it has not prevented mistakes in deliberation or decision. Lyndon Johnson did not decide for limited bombing and gradual troop commitment in Vietnam in 1965 because he was not presented with extensive and vigorous counterarguments. He considered seriously (indeed solicited) Under Secretary of State George Ball's analysis, which drew on NIE's and lower-level officials' pessimistic assessments that any escalation would be a mistake. Johnson was also well aware of the arguments by DCI John McCone and the Air Force from the other extreme—that massive escalation in the air war was necessary because gradualism would be ineffective.[39] The President simply chose to accept the views of the middle-of-the-road opponents of *both* Ball and McCone.

To the extent that multiple advocacy works, and succeeds in maximizing the number of views promulgated and in supporting the argumentive resources of all contending analysts, it may simply highlight ambiguity rather than resolve it. In George's ideal situation, the process would winnow out unsubstantiated premises and assumptions about ends-means linkages. But in the context of data overload, uncertainty, and time constraints, multiple advocacy may in effect give all of the various viewpoints an aura of empirical respectability and allow a leader to choose whichever accords with his predisposition.[40] The efficacy of multiple advocacy (which is greatest under conditions of manageable data and low ambiguity) may vary inversely with the potential for intelligence failure (which is greatest under conditions of confusing data and high uncertainty). The process could, of course, bring to the surface ambiguities where false certainty had prevailed; in these cases, it would be as valuable as George believes. But if multiple advocacy increases ambivalence and leaders do *not* indulge their instincts, it risks promoting conservatism or paralysis. Dean Acheson saw danger in presidential indecisiveness aggravated by debate: " 'I know your theory,' he grumbled to Neustadt. 'You think Presidents should be warned. You're wrong. Presidents should be given confidence.' "[41] Even Clausewitz argued that deference to intelligence can frustrate bold initiative and squander crucial opportunities. Critics charged Henry Kissinger with crippling U.S. intelligence by refusing to keep analysts informed of his intimate conversations with foreign leaders.[42] To do so, however, would have created the possibility of leaks and might thereby have crippled his diplomatic maneuvers. It is doubtful that Nixon's initiative to China could have survived prior debate, dissent, and analysis by the bureaucracy.

It is unclear that managed multiple advocacy would yield markedly greater benefits than the redundancy and competitiveness that have long existed. (At best it would perfect the "market" of ideas in the manner that John Stuart Mill believed

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[39] Henry F. Graff, *The Tuesday Cabinet* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1970), 68-71; Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, forthcoming), chap. 4; Ball memorandum of October 5, 1964, reprinted as "Top Secret: The Prophecy the President Rejected," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 230 (July 1972); McCone, memorandum of April 2, 1965, in LBJL/NSF-VNCF, *Troop Decision* folder, item 14b.

[40] Betts (fn. 5), 199-202; Schandler (fn. 36), 177. George (fn. 38), 759, stipulates that multiple advocacy requires "no major maldistribution" of power, influence, competence, information, analytic resources, and bargaining skills. But, except for resources and the right to representation, the foregoing are subjective factors that can rarely be equalized by design. If they are equalized, in the context of imperfect data and time pressure, erroneous arguments as well as accurate ones will be reinforced. Non-expert principals have difficulty arbitrating intellectually between experts who disagree.

[41] Quoted in Steinbruner (fn. 22), 332.

[42] Clausewitz (fn. 21), 117-18; HSCI *Hearings* (fn. 4), 634-36; William J. Barnds, "Intelligence and Policymaking in an Institutional Context," in U.S., Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy [hereafter cited as Murphy Commission], *Appendices* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., June 1975), Vol. VII, 32.

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made liberalism conducive to the emergence of truth.) The first major reorganization of the American intelligence community in 1946-1947 emphasized centralization in order to avert future Pearl Harbors caused by fragmentation of authority; the latest reorganization (Carter's 1977 extension of authority of the Director of Central Intelligence over military intelligence programs) emphasized centralization to improve efficiency and coherence. Yet decentralization has always persisted in the overlapping division of labor between several separate agencies. Recent theorists of bureaucracy see such duplication as beneficial because competition exposes disagreement and presents policy makers with a wider range of views. Redundancy inhibits consensus, impedes the herd instinct in the decision process, and thus reduces the likelihood of failure due to unchallenged premises or cognitive errors. To ensure that redundancy works in this way, critics oppose a process that yields coordinated estimates—negotiated to the least common denominator, and cleared by all agencies before they are passed to the principals. George's "custodian" of multiple advocacy could ensure that this does not happen. There are, of course, trade-off costs for redundancy. Maximization of competition limits specialization. In explaining the failure of intelligence to predict the 1974 coup in Portugal, William Hyland pointed out, "if each of the major analytical components stretch their resources over the same range, there is the risk that areas of less priority will be superficially covered." [43]

The problem with arguing that the principals themselves should scrutinize numerous contrasting estimates in their integrity is that they are constantly overwhelmed by administrative responsibilities and "action items"; they lack the time to read, ponder, and digest that large an amount of material. Most intelligence products, even NIE's, are never read by policy makers; at best, they are used by second-level staffers as background material for briefing their seniors.[44] Consumers want previously coordinated analyses in order to save time and effort. In this respect, the practical imperatives of day-to-day decision contradict the theoretical logic of ideal intelligence.

3. *Consolidation*. According to the logic of estimative redundancy, more analysis is better than less. Along this line of reasoning, Senate investigators noted critically that, as of fiscal year 1975, the U.S. intelligence community still allocated 72 percent of its budget for collection of information, 19 percent for processing technical data, and less than 9 percent for production of finished analyses. On the other hand according to the logic of those who focus on the time constraints of leaders and the confusion that results from innumerable publications, quantity counteracts quality. The size of the CIA's intelligence directorate and the complexity of the production process "precluded close association between policymakers and analysts, between the intelligence product and policy informed by intelligence analysis." [45] For the sake of clarity and acuity, the intelligence bureaucracy should be streamlined.

This view is consistent with the development of the Office of National Estimates (ONE), which was established in 1950 and designed to coordinate the contributions of the various organs in the intelligence community for the Director of Central Intelligence. DCI Walter Bedell Smith envisioned an operation of about a thousand people. But William L. Langer, the scholar Smith imported to organize ONE, wanted

[43] HSCI, *Hearings* (fn. 4), 778.

[44] SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), IV, 57; Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1956), 40. During brief service as just a low-level staff member of the National Security Council, even I never had time to read all the intelligence analyses relevant to my work.

[45] SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 344, and IV, 95 (emphasis deleted).

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a tight group of excellent analysts and a personnel ceiling of fifty. Langer prevailed, and though the number of staff members in ONE crept upwards, it probably never exceeded a hundred in its two decades of existence.[46] Yet ONE could not eliminate the complexity of the intelligence process; it could only coordinate and integrate it for the production of National Intelligence Estimates. Other sources found conduits to decision makers (to Cabinet members through their own agencies, or to the President through the National Security Council). And some policy makers, though they might dislike the cacophony of multiple intelligence agencies, were suspicious of the consolidated NIE's, knowing that there was pressure to compromise views in order to gain agreement. Over time, the dynamics of bureaucracy also blunted the original objectives of ONE's founder. From a cosmopolitan elite corps, it evolved into an insular unit of senior careerists from the CIA. The National Intelligence Officer system that replaced ONE reduced the number of personnel responsible for coordinating NIE's, but has been criticized on other grounds such as greater vulnerability to departmental pressures. Bureaucratic realities have frustrated other attempts to consolidate the intelligence structure. The Defense Intelligence Agency was created in 1961 to unify Pentagon intelligence and reduce duplicative activities of the three service intelligence agencies, but these agencies regenerated themselves; in less than a decade they were larger than they had been before DIA's inception.[47]

The numerous attempts to simplify the organization of the analytic process thus have not solved the major problems. Either the streamlining exercises were short-lived, and bureaucratization crept back, or the changes had to be moderated to avoid the new dangers they entailed. Contraction is inconsistent with the desire to minimize failure by "plugging holes" in intelligence, since compensating for an inadequacy usually requires *adding* personnel and mechanisms; pruning the structure that contributes to procedural sluggishness or complexity may create lacunae in substantive coverage.

4. *Devil's advocacy.* Multiple advocacy ensures that all views held by individuals within the analytic system will be granted serious attention. Some views that should receive attention, however, may not be held by anyone within the system. Virtually no analysts in Israel or the United States believed the Arabs would be "foolish" enough to attack in 1973. Many observers have recommended institutionalizing dissent by assigning to someone the job of articulating apparently ridiculous interpretations to ensure that they are forced into consideration. Establishing an official devil's advocate would probably do no harm (although some argue that it may preversely facilitate consensus-building by domesticating true dissenters or providing the illusory comfort that all views have been carefully examined; [48] worse, it might delude decision makers into believing that *uncertainties* have been resolved). But in any case, the role is likely to atrophy into a superfluous or artificial ritual. By the definition of the job, the devil's advocate is likely to be dismissed by decision makers as a sophist who only makes an argument because he is supposed to, not because of its real merits. Institutionalizing devil's advocacy is likely to be perceived in practice as institutionalizing the "cry wolf" problem; "There are limits to the utility of a 'devil's advocate' who is not a true devil." [49] He becomes someone to be indulged and disregarded. Given its rather sterile

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[46] Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars* (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis 1976), 20.

[47] Gilbert W. Fitzhugh and others, *Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense, By the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., July 1970), 45-46.

[48] Alexander George, "The Devil's Advocate: Uses and Limitations," Murphy Commission, *Appendices* (fn. 42), II, 84-85; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception* (fn. 22), 417.

[49] *Ibid.*, 416.

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definition, the role is not likely to be filled by a prestigious official (who will prefer more "genuine" responsibility); it will therefore be easier for policy makers to dismiss the arguments. In order to avert intelligence failures, an analyst is needed who tells decision makers what they don't want to hear, dampening the penchant for wishful thinking. But since it is the job of the devil's advocate to do this habitually, and since he is most often wrong (as would be inevitable, since otherwise the conventional wisdom would eventually change), he digs his own grave. If the role is routinized and thus ritualized, it loses impact; but if it is not routinized, there can be no assurance that it will be operating when it is needed.

Despite the last point, which is more important in attack warning than in operational evaluation or defense planning, there is a compromise that offers more realistic benefits: *ad hoc* utilization of "real devils." This selective or biased form of multiple advocacy may be achieved by periodically giving a platform within the intelligence process to minority views that can be argued more persuasively by prestigious analysts outside the bureaucracy. This is what the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and DCI George Bush did in 1976 by commissioning the "Team B" critique of NIE's on Soviet strategic objectives and capabilities. Dissenters within the intelligence community who were skeptical of Soviet intentions were reinforced by a panel of sympathetic scholars, with a mandate to produce an analysis of their own.[50] This controversial exercise, even if it erred in many of its own ways (as dovish critics contend), had a major impact in promoting the re-examination of premises and methodology in U.S. strategic estimates. The problem with this option is that it depends on the political biases of the authorities who commission it. If it were balanced by a comparable "Team C" of analysts at the opposite extreme (more optimistic about Soviet intentions than the intelligence community consensus), the exercise would approach regular multiple advocacy, with the attendant limitations of that solution. Another variant would be intermittent designation of devil's advocates in periods of crisis, when the possibility of disaster is greater than usual. Since the role would then be fresh each time, rather than ritualized, the advocate might receive a more serious hearing. The problem here is that receptivity of decision makers to information that contradicts preconceptions varies inversely with their personal commitments, and commitments grow as crisis progresses.[51]

5. *Sanctions and incentives.* Some critics attribute intelligence failures to dishonest reporting or the intellectual mediocrity of analysts. Suggested remedies include threats of punishment for the former, and inducements to attract talent to replace the latter. Other critics emphasize that, will or ability aside, analytic integrity is often submerged by the policy makers' demands for intelligence that suits them; "the NIEs ought to be responsive to the evidence, not the policymaker." [52] Holders of this point of view would institutionalize the analysts' autonomy. Unobjectionable in principle (though if analysts are totally unresponsive to the consumer, he will ignore them), these implications cannot easily be operationalized without creating as many problems as they solve.

Self-serving operational evaluations from military sources, such as optimistic reports on progress in the field in Vietnam or pessimistic strategic estimates, might

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[50] U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report, The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Capability and Objectives*, 95th Cong. 2d sess., 1978; *New York Times*, December 26, 1976, pp. 1, 14; *Washington Post*, January 2, 1977, pp. A1, A4.

[51] George H. Poteat, "The Intelligence Gap: Hypotheses on the Process of Surprise," *International Studies Notes*, 111 (Fall 1976), 15.

[52] Cline (fn. 46), 140.

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indeed be obviated if analysts in DIA, the service intelligence agencies, and command staffs were credibly threatened with sanctions (firing, nonpromotion, reprimand, or disgrace). Such threats theoretically could be a countervailing pressure to the career incentives analysts have to promote the interests of their services. But, except in the most egregious cases, it is difficult to apply such standards without arbitrariness and bias, given the problem of ambiguity; it simply encourages an alternative bias or greater ambivalence. Moreover, military professionals would be in an untenable position, pulled in opposite directions by two sets of authorities. To apply the sanctions, civil authorities would have to violate the most hallowed military canon by having civilian intelligence officials interfere in the chain of command. In view of these dilemmas, it is easier to rely on the limited effectiveness of redundancy or multiple advocacy to counteract biased estimates.

Critics concerned with attracting better talent into the analytic bureaucracy propose to raise salaries and to provide more high-ranking positions (supergrades) to which analysts can aspire. Yet American government salaries are already very high by academic standards. Those who attribute DIA's mediocrity (compared to CIA), to an insufficient allocation of supergrades and a consequent inability to retain equivalent personnel are also mistaken; as of 1975 the difference in the grade structures of DIA and CIA had been negligible.[53] And the fact that CIA analysts cannot rise to a supergrade position (GS-16 to 18) without becoming administrators is not convincing evidence that good analysts are underpaid; GS-15 salaries are higher than the maximum for most tenured professors.

Non-military analysts, or high-ranking soldiers with no promotions to look forward to, have fewer professional crosspressures to contend with than military intelligence officers. But an analyst's autonomy varies inversely with his influence, and hortatory injunctions to be steadfast and intellectually honest cannot ensure that he will be; they cannot transcend political realities or the idiosyncrasies of leaders. Richard Helms notes that "there is no way to insulate the DCI from unpopularity at the hands of Presidents or policymakers if he is making assessments which run counter to administrative policy. That is a built-in hazard of the job. Sensible Presidents understand this. On the other hand they are human too." Integrity untinged by political sensitivity courts professional suicide. If the analyst insists on perpetually bearing bad news, he is likely to be beheaded. Helms himself succumbed to policy makers' pressures in compromising estimates of the MIRV capabilities of the Soviet SS-9 missile in 1969, and the prospects for Cambodia in 1970.[54] The same practical psychological constraints are reflected in an incident in which Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt, who had already infuriated Nixon and Kissinger several times with his strategic estimates, was determined to present yet another unwelcome analysis; Secretary of Defense Schlesinger dissuaded him with the warning, "To give a briefing like that in the White House these days would be just like shooting yourself in the foot." [55]

6. *Cognitive rehabilitation and methodological consciousness.* The intertwining of analysis and decision and the record of intelligence failures due to mistaken

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[53] SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 352. A valid criticism is that military personnel systems and promotion standards penalized intelligence officers, thus encouraging competent officers to avoid intelligence assignments. This situation was rectified in the service intelligence agencies by the early 1970s, but not within DIA. *Ibid.*; Betts (fn. 5), 196-97.

[54] SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 77-82. See also U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, National Security Act Amendment,* 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, 14-24.

[55] Zumwalt, *On Watch* (New York: Quadrangle 1976), 459.

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preconceptions and unexamined assumptions suggest the need to reform the intelligence consumers' attitudes, awareness, and modes of perception. If leaders were made self-conscious and self-critical about their own psychologies, they might be less vulnerable to cognitive pathologies. This approach to preventing intelligence failure is the most basic and metaphysical. If policy makers focused on the methodologies of competing intelligence producers, they would be more sensitive to the biases and leaps of faith in the analyses passed to them. "In official fact-finding . . . the problem is not merely to open up a wide range of policy alternatives but to create incentives for persistent criticism of evidentiary value."[56] Improvement would flow from mechanisms that force decision makers to make explicit rather than unconscious choices, to exercise judgment rather than engage in automatic perception, and to enhance their awareness of their own preconceptions.[57]

Unlike organizational structure, however, cognition cannot be altered by legislation. Intelligence consumers are political men who have risen by being more decisive than reflective, more aggressive than introspective, and confident as much as cautious. Few busy activists who have achieved success by thinking the way that they do will change their way of thinking because some theorist tells them to. Even if they could be forced to confront scholarly evidence of the dynamics of misperception, it is uncertain that they could consistently internalize it. Preconception cannot be abolished; it is in one sense just another word for "model" or "paradigm"—a construct used to simplify reality, which any thinker needs in order to cope with complexity. There is a grain of truth in the otherwise pernicious maxim that an open mind is an empty mind. Moreover, the line between *perception* and *judgment* is very thin, and consumers cannot carefully scrutinize, compare, and evaluate the methodologies of competing analyses, for the same prosaic reason (the problem of expertise aside) that impedes many proposed reforms: they do not have the *time* to do so. Solutions that require principals to invest more attention than they already do are conceptually valid but operationally weak. Ideally, perhaps, each principal should have a Special Assistant for Rigor Enforcement.

Although most notable intelligence failures occur more often at the consuming than the producing end, it is impractical to place the burden for correcting those faults on the consumers. The most realistic strategy for improvement would be to have intelligence professionals anticipate the cognitive barriers to decision makers' utilization of their products. Ideally, the Director of Central Intelligence should have a theoretical temperament and personal skills in forcing unusual analyses to the attention of principals; he might act as George's "custodian" of the argumentation process. To fulfill this function, the DCI should be not only a professional analyst and an intellectual (of the twelve DCI's since 1946, only James Schlesinger met those criteria, and he served for only three months), but also a skilled bureaucratic politician. These qualifications seldom coincide. The DCI's coordinating staff and National Intelligence Officers should be adept at detecting, making explicit, and exposing to consumers the idiosyncracies in the assessments of various agencies—the *reasons* that the focus and conclusions of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research differ from those of DIA, or of naval intelligence, or of the CIA. For such a procedure to work, the consumers would have to favor it (as opposed to negotiated consensual estimates that would save them more time). There is always a latent tension between what facilitates timely decision and what promotes thoroughness and accuracy in assessment. The fact that there is no guaranteed

[56] Wilensky (fn. 11), 164.

[57] Jervis, *Perception and Misperception* (fn. 22), 181-87.

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prophylaxis against intelligence failures, however, does not negate the value of incremental improvements. The key is to see the problem of reform as one of modest refinements rather than as a systematic breakthrough.

IV. Living with Fatalism

Organizational solutions to intelligence failure are hampered by three basic problems: most procedural reforms that address specific pathologies introduce or accent other pathologies; changes in analytic processes can never fully transcend the constraints of ambiguity and ambivalence; and more rationalized information systems cannot fully compensate for the predispositions, perceptual idiosyncrasies, and time constraints of political consumers. Solutions that address the psychology and analytic style of decision makers are limited by the difficulty of changing human thought processes and day-to-day habits of judgment by normative injunction. Most theorists have thus resigned themselves to the hope of marginal progress, "to improve the 'batting average'—say from .275 to .301—rather than to do away altogether with surprise." [58]

There is some convergence in the implications of all three ways of conceptualizing intelligence failures. Mistakes should be expected because the *paradoxes* are not resolvable; minor improvements are possible by reorganizing to correct *pathologies*; and despair is unwarranted because, seen *in perspective*, the record could be worse. Marginal improvements have, in fact, been steadily instituted since World War II. Although many have indeed raised new problems, most have yielded a net increase in the rationalization of the system. The diversification of sources of estimates of adversaries' military power has grown consistently, obviating the necessity to rely exclusively on military staffs. The resources and influence of civilian analysts of military data (principally in the CIA's Office of Strategic Research but also in its Directorate of Science and Technology) are unparalleled in any other nation's intelligence system. At the same time, the DCI's mechanism for coordinating the activities of all agencies—the Intelligence Community Staff—has grown and become more diverse and representative, and less an extension of the CIA, as more staffers have been added from the outside. In 1972, a separate Product Review Division was established within the staff to appraise the "objectivity, balance, and responsiveness" of intelligence studies on a regular basis. It has conducted postmortems of intelligence failures since then (the Yom Kippur War, the Cyprus crisis of 1974, the Indian nuclear test, and the seizure of the *Mayaguez*).[59] (Previously, postmortems had been conducted by the analysts who had failed, a procedure that hardly guaranteed objectivity.)

Within the Pentagon, capabilities for estimates relevant to planning were enhanced with the establishment of an office for Net Assessment, which analyzes the significance of foreign capabilities in comparison with U.S. forces. (CIA, DIA, and NIE's only estimate foreign capabilities.) Civilian direction of military intelligence was reinforced by an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence after the 1970 recommendation of the Fitzhugh Commission, and an Under Secretary for Policy in 1978. Experiments in improving communication between producers and consumers have been undertaken (such as, for example, the testing of a Defense Intelligence

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[58] Knorr (fn. 1), 460.

[59] SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 276, and IV, 85; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1977, 515-621; *Washington Post*, February 15, 1977, p. A6; Paul W. Blackstock, "The Intelligence Community Under the Nixon Administration," *Armed Forces and Society*, 1 (February 1975), 238.

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Board in late 1976). The dominance of operators within the intelligence community has also waned—especially since the phasing out of paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia and the severe reductions in size and status of CIA's covert action branch that began in 1973. Dysfunctions in the military communications system, which contributed to crises involving intelligence collection missions in the 1960s (the Israeli attack on the U.S.S. *Liberty* and North Korea's seizure of the *Pueblo*) were alleviated (though not cured) by new routing procedures and by instituting an "optimal scanning system" in the Pentagon.[60] Statistical analyses of strategic power have become progressively more rigorous and comprehensive; as staffs outside the executive branch—such as the Congressional Budget Office—have become involved in the process, they have also become more competitive.[61]

Few of the changes in structure and process have generated more costs than benefits. (Some critics believe, however, that the abolition of the Office and Board of National Estimates and their replacement with National Intelligence Officers was a net loss.) But it is difficult to prove that they have significantly reduced the incidence of intelligence failure. In the area of warning, for instance, new sophisticated coordination mechanisms have recently been introduced, and since the institution at the time of the 1974 Cyprus crisis of DCI "alert memoranda"—"brief notices in a form which cannot be overlooked" [62]—no major warning failure has occurred. But the period of testing is as yet too brief to demonstrate that these adaptations are more effective than previous procedures. In the area of operational evaluation, it is clear that there was greater consciousness of the limitations and cost-ineffectiveness of aerial bombardment during the Vietnam War than there had been in Korea, due largely to the assessments made by the offices of Systems Analysis and International Security Affairs in the Pentagon and Secretary of Defense McNamara's utilization of CIA estimates and contract studies by external analytic organizations.[63] Yet this greater consciousness did not prevail until late in the war because it was not a consensus; Air Force and naval assessments of bombing effectiveness contradicted those of the critical civilian analysts. Nor has the elaboration and diversification of analytic resources for strategic estimates clearly reduced the potential for erroneous planning decisions. Determination of the salience and proper weight of conflicting indicators of strategic power and objectives or of the comparative significance of quantitative and

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[60] Joseph C. Goulden, *Truth is the First Casualty* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1969), 101-4; Phil G. Goulding, *Confirm or Deny* (New York: Harper & Row 1970), 130-33, 269; *Pueblo and EC-121 Hearings* (fn. 27), 646-47, 665-73, 743-44, 780-82, 802-3, 865-67, 875, 880, 897-99; *Pueblo and EC-121 Report* (fn. 27), 1654-56, 1662-67; Armbrister (fn. 27), 196ff, 395; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Report, Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications: Phase I*, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, and *Phase II*, 2d sess., 1972.

[61] See, for example, James Blaker and Andrew Hamilton, *Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, December 1977).

[62] SSCI, *Final Report* (fn. 7), I, 61; Thomas G. Belden, "Indications, Warning, and Crisis Operations," *International Studies Quarterly*, XXI (March 1977), 192-92.

[63] *Pentagon Papers*, IV, 111-12, 115-24, 217-32. CIA critiques of bombing results began even before the Tonkin Gulf crisis. CIA/OCI, Current Intelligence Memorandum, "Effectiveness of T-28 Strikes in Laos," June 26, 1964; CIA/DDI, Intelligence Memorandum, "Communist Reaction to Barrel Roll Missions," December 29, 1964. But ambivalence remained even within the CIA, which occasionally issued more sanguine evaluations—e.g., CIA Memorandum for National Security Council, "The Situation in Vietnam," June 28, 1965 (which McGeorge Bundy called directly to the President's attention), and CIA/OCI, Intelligence Memorandum, "Interdiction of Communist Infiltration Routes in Vietnam," June 24, 1965. (All memoranda are in LBJL/NSF-VNCF, Vol. I, item 5, Vol. III, items 28, 28a, 28b, Vol. VI A, items 4, 5, 8.) See also *Pentagon Papers*, IV, 71-74. See also the opposing assessments of the CIA, the civilian analysts in the Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs in NSSM-1 (the Nixon Administration's initial review of Vietnam policy), reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, Vol. 118, part 13, 92d Cong., 2d sess., May 10, 1972, pp. 16749-836.

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qualitative factors is inextricable from the political debate over foreign policy: uncertainties always remain, leaving the individual's visceral fears or hopes as the elements that tilt the balance of judgment.

Although marginal reforms may reduce the probability of error, the unresolvable paradoxes and barriers to analytic and decisional accuracy will make some incidence of failure inevitable. Concern with intelligence failure then coincides with concern about how policy can hedge against the consequences of analytic inadequacy. Covering every hypothetical vulnerability would lead to bankruptcy, and hedging against one threat may aggravate a different one. The problem is thus one of priorities, and hedging against uncertainty is hardly easier than resolving it. Any measures that clarify the cost-benefit trade-offs in policy hedges are measures that mitigate the danger of intelligence failure.

One reasonable rule in principle would be to survey the hypothetical outcomes excluded by strategic premises as improbable but not impossible, identify those that would be disastrous if they *were* to occur, and then pay the price to hedge against them. This is no more practicable, however, than the pure form of worst-case analysis, because it requires willingness to bear and inflict severe costs for dubious reasons. Escalation in Vietnam, after all, was a hedge against allowing China to be tempted to "devour" the rest of Southeast Asia. The interaction of analytic uncertainty and decisional prudence is a vicious circle that makes the segregation of empirical intelligence and normative policy an unattainable Platonic ideal.

In the simplest situation, the intelligence system can avert policy failure by presenting relevant and undisputed facts to non-expert principals who might otherwise make decisions in ignorance. But these simple situations are not those in which major intelligence failures occur. Failures occur when ambiguity aggravates ambivalence. In these more important situations—Acheson and Clausewitz to the contrary—the intelligence office may perform most usefully by *not* offering the *answers* sought by authorities, but by offering *questions,* acting as a Socratic agnostic, nagging decision makers into awareness of the full range of uncertainty, and making the authorities' calculations harder rather than easier. Sensitive leaders will reluctantly accept and appreciate this function. Most leaders will not; they will make mistakes, and will continue to bear the prime responsibility for "intelligence" failures. Two general values (which sound wistful in the context of the preceding fatalism) remain to guide the choice of marginal reforms: anything that facilitates dissent and access to authorities by intelligence producers, and anything that facilitates skepticism and scrutiny by consumers. The values are synergistically linked; one will not improve the use of intelligence without the other. (A third value, but one nearly impossible to achieve, would be anything that increases the time available to principals for reading and reflection.)

Intelligence failures are not only inevitable, they are natural. Some are even benign (if a success would not have changed policy). Scholars cannot legitimately view intelligence mistakes as bizarre, because they are no more common and no less excusable than academic errors. They are less forgivable only because they are more consequential. Error in scholarship is resolved dialectically, as deceptive data are exposed and regnant theories are challenged, refined, and replaced by new research. If decision makers had but world enough and time, they could rely on this process to solve their intelligence problems. But the press of events precludes the luxury of letting theories sort themselves out over a period of years, as in academia. My survey of the intractability of the inadequacy of intelligence, and its inseparability from mistakes in decision, suggests one final conclusion that is perhaps most outrageously fatalistic of all: tolerance for disaster.

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F-82

Minimize the chances of human misjudgment

COMMANDERS AND SURPRISE

Robert W. Williams

Forewarned, forearmed; to be prepared is half the victory.
Miguel de Cervantes

The outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East on 6 October 1973 once again pointed out our vulnerability to surprise. We should have been forewarned, but reactions to intelligence indicators were uneven. True, the Middle East situation was unique, but so were each of the previous situations in which the early warning apparatus of the United States failed to put it all together. Much has been said and written about the problems of early warning, both strategic and tactical. Considerable sums of money have been spent to improve intelligence collection systems and to expedite communications. Yet we remain today just as vulnerable to surprise as we ever were. Perhaps we have overemphasized the mechanical aspects of early warning and have failed adequately to cope with the human problems involved. A study of some of the more significant situations since 1940 in which the United States Government or military components thereof have been surprised by foreign initiative reveals a startling fact: *the surprise in each case was largely due to failure properly to evaluate information at hand.* Examples from which this conclusion are drawn are: Pearl Harbor, the German Ardennes counteroffensive, the North Korean attack against South Korea in 1950, the Chinese intervention in Korea, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the magnitude of the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong Tet offensive of 1968, and the October 1973 Middle East war.

You might logically ask; whose fault was it that the information at hand was not properly evaluated? Was it the intelligence people or the commanders (or civilian decision makers)? The answer is that both were at fault in varying degrees.

Thus, a recurring problem of serious proportions has been identified, and what to do about it is far from clear. One thing is certain: it will not be resolved of its own accord. Recognizing human frailties and weaknesses is one thing; changing them is something else. We can make inroads against the problem if we first admit there is a problem and then take steps to minimize the chances of human misjudgment and miscalculation.

I would like to offer some positive suggestions—not from the point of view of an authority, for there are none on this subject—but from the point of view of a military professional who is acquainted with the various fields of intelligence. These suggestions are not limited to the Army and they are applicable at both strategic and tactical levels of command. They are

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addressed primarily to commanders (and civilian decision makers), for they, in the final analysis, bear the heavy responsibility in cases of surprise attack. It is they who should determine the type of intelligence support they receive. And to this end it is they who should influence the shape of the intelligence system.

To commanders (and future commanders) I would then say:

1. *Identify loudly and clearly your intelligence requirements.* Too many commanders simply accept what the intelligence system produces. Others go to the extreme of allowing their intelligence officers to list minutiae. Somewhere in between is the happy hunting ground which can be found only by the professional commander who trains himself to know what he wants—and, within reason, insists on getting it. Do not permit your staff officers to decide for you what critical information you need. You need to be involved in the mental processes associated with determining and then stating essential elements of information. You can do this while working behind a desk, while on field exercises, or even while taking a shower. Once you are thrust into a crisis situation, it is too late to practice.

2. *Insist on receiving factual information assembled in usable form.* Do not make the mistake of overrelying on some intelligence officer's estimative abilities or even his ability to interpret facts. The intelligence officer can help you tremendously in coordinating the total intelligence collection effort, in sifting out pertinent facts keyed to your requirements, and in collating them with related information and displaying them in a form you can work with. Beyond that, the intelligence officer treads on dangerous ground. He has no magical qualities of divination. He cannot predict. The government does not issue him a crystal ball and, even if he had one, he would probably be less qualified than you to explore its secrets. Do not throttle your intelligence officer's initiative; simply drive him in the right direction.

3. *As a corollary to 2 above, do not count solely on your principal intelligence officer to provide you with early warning.* If he does so, fine. But do not depend solely upon him for this type of agonizing appraisal. There is rarely a consensus among intelligence personnel as to the implications of factual information. The intelligence staff officer is under duress to please the commander and is anxious not to be outdone by the operations officer. He has difficulty being objective and too often succumbs to the CYA approach. He should be ready to express an opinion or prepare an estimate when asked, but if you count solely on him for interpretation of facts you are almost certain to be surprised. I believe it is important for each commander and decisionmaker to have multiple sources of information in addition to his regularly constituted single point of staff intelligence coordination.

This principle of multiple sources applies equally at the national and tactical command levels. For example, the President would make a mistake to depend solely on the Director of Central Intelligence—or any other single source—for early warning. A certain amount of competition in the analysis and production of intelligence is healthy and necessary and should be encouraged rather than stamped out in the name of avoiding "duplication of effort" as has been the trend in recent years. Overcentralization of intelligence production is just as dangerous as over decentralization. "Bigness does not

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beget quality" is entirely applicable to intelligence. Its truth was reconfirmed by the 1973 surprise Arab attack in the Mideast when the significance of available information eluded much of the U.S. intelligence system.

Tactical commanders have many opportunities to deal with multiple sources of information. First, the commander should talk directly to intelligence analysts from time to time about their particular spheres of interest. He is thus exposed to factual information which might not otherwise make its way through the staff bureaucracy. Also, the commander, on his visits to higher and subordinate headquarters, should make a practice of talking to the local intelligence officer. He should also talk face to face with prisoners of war and defectors. And of course he should have an open door policy toward all intelligence agencies operating in his area. These measures should not be interpreted as a lack of confidence in his principal intelligence officer; rather, they show him that the commander cares.

4. *Hold yourself—not your intelligence officer—responsible if you are surprised.* For years intelligence people have been made scapegoats when commanders were surprised. This is a cop-out by commanders who hold themselves responsible for virtually everything but interpreting information. Whenever a military catastrophe occurs you will hear cries of "intelligence failure." No mention is made of the commander who was too busy to involve himself in the intelligence effort or perhaps the commander who simply did not believe the information put before him

5. *Resist being over-influenced by the "prevailing climate of opinion."* Once you succumb to this phenomenon, you will tend to reject information which conflicts with it. History is replete with examples of dangerously inaccurate conclusions becoming widely accepted in advance of the facts. One of the findings of the Joint Congressional Committee which investigated the Pearl Harbor attack was:

> "The consideration overshadowing all others in the minds of the Hawaiian commanders was the belief and the conviction that Pearl Harbor would not be attacked . . . It explains the reason for no effective steps being taken to meet the Japanese raiders on the morning of December 7th." [1]

Robert E. Merriam, writing of the Battle of the Bulge in *Dark December*, said:

> "We were fooled because we were overconfident and certain that we had the Germans on the run. Intelligence officers, who were supposed to be born pessimists, were vying with each other for the honor of devastating the German war machine with words. It was a dangerous game, and the cost was high.[2]

One of history's more flagrant examples of the danger of preconceived opinions related to the surprise achieved by the Chinese in Korea in November 1951 against MacArthur's forces. The prevailing climate of opinion, largely created by MacArthur himself, was that the Chinese would not intervene. This prejudgment permeated the councils of government in Washington as well as subordinate elements of the United Nations Command. Factual information

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which conflicted with this theory was rejected. In retrospect, one cannot help being incredulous about the following sequence of events assembled by H. A. DeWeerd in a RAND Corporation report titled "Strategic Surprise in Korea War," June 1962:

- In late September (1951) our government received a Chinese warning through the good offices of the Indian government saying if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel, Chinese Communist forces would intervene.

- On 3 October 1951 the Chinese Foreign Minister assured the Indian Ambassador that if United States or United Nations troops other than South Koreans crossed the 38th parallel, China would send troops to the Korean frontier "to defend Korea."

- The above warnings were discussed at the Wake Island conference on 15 October where MacArthur is reported to have said to President Truman that Chinese intervention was no longer likely.

- On 20 October the first Chinese Communist prisoner was reported.

- On 26 October, what the then Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, called the "first real brush" with Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) took place.

- By 4 November, thirty-five Chinese Communist prisoners had been captured and seven separate divisions identified.

- On 24 November 1951 MacArthur launched his ill-fated drive to the Yalu.

- On 28 November, MacArthur reported in a special communique to the United Nations that ". . . a major segment of the Chinese continental armed forces in army corps and divisional organization of an aggregate strength of over 200,000 men is now arrayed against the United Nations forces in North Korea. . . . Consequently, we face an entirely new war . . ."

- During the MacArthur hearings, Senator Saltonstall commented to Dean Acheson, Secretary of State: "They (the Chinese) really fooled us when it comes right down to it, didn't they?" Mr. Acheson said: "Yes, sir." [3]

Detente with the Soviet Union and the reestablishment of formal relations with the Peoples Republic of China have tended to create an atmosphere of blissful detachment in some segments of our society. Writing on the possibility of a nuclear attack by the Soviets on the PRC, Joe Alsop stated on 5 September 1973: "We have reached a strange pass when such an increased possibility of nuclear war attracts no interest whatever in the United States." [4]

It is this euphoric, self-deluding climate of opinion which must be resisted by commanders and other decisionmakers. Deal with facts, not preconceived ideas which float down from higher headquarters or which work their way up from grass roots levels or which are fostered by less responsible segments of the press. We would rarely be surprised if this approach of letting facts speak for themselves was taken at each level of authority.

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6. *Assume (and honestly try to believe) that your opponent is as smart as you.* If you are a typical hard-driving, ambitious, courageous and well-educated U.S. military leader, you will find this statement easier to admire than to accept. The statement is not new; I have heard it often but rarely have I seen it taken seriously. Yet I am persuaded that it is fundamental to the state of mind a commander must be in to avoid a letdown. In my observation, this important philosophy was "more honored in the breach than the observance" in Vietnam where our commanders pursued the NVN/VC forces in something of a "cat and mouse" game, and suffered some bloody noses in the process. We found our opponents there to be shrewd and capable, accomplishing wonders with limited resources against seemingly overwhelming odds. It would be unfair to say less about them. In that particular environment, so difficult for conventional military forces, we would have been wiser to assume that our opponents were smarter than we, that they were not some lower order of peasantry who merely represented elusive targets. Had we done so, we might have been surprised less frequently.

Perhaps we miss this point in some of our peacetime training, particularly in controlled field exercises. We are all accustomed to the Blue forces (good guys) suffering a temporary setback at the hands of Orange forces (bad guys), then regrouping and delivering a devastating blow to the bad guys. Blue triumphs; that is part of the scenario, just as the police will win by the end of your favorite police TV show. There is nothing really wrong with such a scenario, until we repeat it so often that we begin to view any Orange force as a "punching bag." On the battlefield where life and death are at stake, there are no "punching bags"—only opponents as smart as we are, or smarter.

7. *As a corollary to 6 above, recognize that your opponent, being at least as smart as you, always has a plan.* Not only does he have a plan, he intends to win. His objectives might be incomprehensible to us, but they are very real to him and his plan is designed to achieve those objectives. Many Americans had trouble comprehending that during the late 1960's the principal objective of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong was to "get the Americans out of Vietnam." Whereas many of our commanders measured success on the battlefield, the opponents moved relentlessly toward their objective with perhaps the most skillful combination of military and political maneuvers ever employed on so vast a scale by a small country.

In the dark December of 1944, because our estimates showed the Germans with a limited remaining military capability, we forgot the fact that they too could have a plan, we forgot that they still intended to achieve some objective other than their own systematic destruction. We were surprised by the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes on 16 December 1944 and paid heavily for it with over 77,000 dead, wounded, and captured.

Somehow we must eliminate the popular concept that seems to emerge from our schools and our field training that the enemy is litle more than a temporary impediment located between us and our objective. One solution would be to impress on our military professionals that the enemy are real people, as smart as we, who always have a plan.

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8. *Your ultimate intelligence goal should always be to determine your opponent's plan (intentions).* This may surprise you, for we have historically shied away from dealing with intentions and have stuck to enemy capabilities. But we continue to be surprised. Clearly, our present approach is not working. One major reason it is not is because we tend to think of intentions in terms of what *we believe* the enemy will do rather than in terms of what *he says* he intends to do. There is a difference of 180 degrees in the two approaches. When your opponent tells you his intentions, the information is either true or false. Your problem then is to determine which it is. You have a 50-50 chance, cold turkey. If you know your enemy and have a "feel of the battle area" your chances of being right mount. In any event, you are better off assessing the validity of what your enemy says he intends to do than assessing what your intelligence officer thinks the enemy intends to do. The former reduces your risks; the latter increases them.

Of course you will rarely have a complete statement of intent by your opponent—you might have to work with much less—but the opportunities for acquiring such information are increasing as the world shrinks and as intelligence techniques improve. If you do not acquire statements from the enemy regarding what he intends to do (his plan) then do not consider that you are dealing with intentions. You must then work only with enemy capabilities plus an assessment of what the SOB is probably up to. These are discussed later.

How are statements of intent by an opponent collected? The ways and means vary from the most sophisticated espionage operations all the way down the scale to the extraction of information from unclassified publications. Here are a few examples taken at random:

Espionage—In World War II, the Albanian valet of the British Ambassador to Turkey succeeded in cracking the Ambassador's private safe and had access to top secret British documents on the conduct of the war. He sold photographs of the documents to the Nazi government. Thus the Nazis had authentic statements of Allied *intentions* on a continuing basis. Fortunately, some of Hitler's experts in Berlin could never quite believe that this was not a British trick. For this and other, more complex reasons, the documents were never accepted by the German authorities as representing Allied intentions. The German covername for this operation was Cicero.[5]

Radio intercept—David Kahn in his fascinating book *The Codebreakers* describes how an unwitting U.S. military attache in Cairo helped to provide General Erwin Rommel with accurate and timely information on British plans in North Africa. His voluminous radio messages, addressed to the Military Intelligence Division, Washington, were intercepted by at least two Axis intercept stations, decrypted, and flashed to Rommel in North Africa within hours of the time that the attache released them. In Kahn's words, "And what messages they were: They provided Rommel with undoubtedly the broadest and clearest picture of enemy forces and intentions available to any Axis commander throughout the whole war." [6] Rommel knew how to react to good intelligence. His title "The Desert Fox" was well deserved.

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Luck—On 13 September 1862 Union forces under General George B. McClellan moved into Frederick, Md., which had just been evacuated by Confederate forces. A Union soldier found a copy of General Lee's Special Order No. 191 wrapped around a handful of cigars, obviously left behind by a departing Confederate. The Order revealed Lee's *plan* for his Maryland campaign. The consensus is that, even in the hands of the cautious McClellan, this statement of intent proved a decisive factor.[7]

Prisoners and defectors—In every war, PWs and defectors reveal the plans of their commands. These are statements of enemy *intent*, made by representatives of the enemy. If you fought in Vietnam you probably recall how much valuable information flowed from NVN/VC prisoners and defectors.

Captured documents—Countless times in South Vietnam, written operations *plans* were captured well in advance of the proposed NVN/VC operations. The operations did not always take place or did not take place on schedule and this tended to disillusion some of our commanders. In such instances, simply recall how many operations we plan and later change before implementation. We have no monopoly on changing our minds.

Unclassified documents—Hitler's book *Mein Kampf* was not taken seriously by most U.S. authorities in the 1930's, despite the fact that it outlined in his words *what he intented to do.* Our intelligence people apparently preferred to collect their own information and look into their own crysal balls. Lenin made the intentions of the Communist Party quite clear. I have never heard them repudiated.

From the few examples cited, one can see the wide range of possibilities for obtaining statements of intent from the mouth or pen of the opponent rather than from crystal-gazing on our part.

My advice is to listen carefully to your opponents. We have been surprised far more often by not listening than by listening. But whether or not he reveals his intentions, you can and must know his capabilities.

9. *Your immediate and continuing intelligence requirement is to know your opponent's capabilities.* Lacking knowledge of your opponent's intentions, you operate with limited vision; lacking knowledge of his capabilities, you are blind. Capabilities are derived essentially from two categories of information: location and strength (personnel and equipment). They are factual, not speculative. No attempt should be made by an intelligence officer to prioritize these into an order of "relative probability of adoption." He is only guessing at intentions if he does. The basic information which was lacking at Pearl Harbor was the location of the Japanese Task Force as it steamed toward Hawaii and its strength. Even though the commanders in Hawaii had convinced themselves that Pearl Harbor would not be attacked and even though Japanese intentions may have been unclear, had the commanders received a single sighting of a Japanese carrier task force (strength) located, for example, 100 nautical miles (location) from Hawaii, it is hard to believe that the disaster at Pearl Harbor would have occurred.

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Because location and strength are so essential, intelligence collection systems to be employed in a combat area should be designed primarily to gather this type of information—where is it? what is it?—and to report it rapidly. A detailed discussion of this entire subject is contained in Major General (Ret) Elias Carter Townsend's brilliant book *Risks: The Key to Combat Intelligence,*[8] which is recommended reading for every military professional.

10. *When you know enemy capabilities but not intentions, try to answer the question: "What does it appear the SOB is really up to?"* This is the type question that you should explore privately with your staff, with no holds barred. In addition to information on enemy location and strength used to determine capabilities, your intelligence officer should be able to produce other information which will help answer the question. Such information includes the other facets of Order of Battle (including logistic information), characteristics of the area (terrain, weather, and man-made facilities) as well as enemy tactics and patterns of activity. If the sum total of this factual information does not yield an answer to the question, issue new requirements. The total intelligence system will then go to work for you, often with surprising results.

11. *Share the wealth!* Competition between intelligence producers is healthy, if they are all working with the same sheet of music. It is only when such competition bottlenecks the flow of intelligence that a dangerous situation is created. One of the principal causes of our being surprised by the Germans in the Ardennes in December 1944 was the failure of various commands to pass intelligence quickly up and down the system and laterally. The various commands seemed to be competing with each other for possession of information and the privilege of interpreting it. Although the First U.S. Army was completely surprised by the attack, the Third U.S. Army to the south was not. General Patton, commanding the Third U.S. Army, foresaw the possibility of a major German offensive in the Ardennes (but underestimated its magnitude) as early as 9 December and planned for that eventuality, even though it was outside his area of immediate responsibility. Colonel (later Brigadier General) Oscar W. Koch, Patton's G-2, later said: "Abundant information was at hand to support the deductions we made (concerning the German attack) and the views expressed in the Patton headquarters from the time of the December 9 briefing at Nancy. History was to prove them entirely correct."[9] How could two armies, operating side-by-side, view the enemy situation so differently? One answer was that while they exchanged intelligence summaries and other reports, there could have been little exchange of views between the commanders and between their G-2's on this subject and little help from above. This intelligence fragmentation prevailed throughout the Allied Command. The VIII Corps, which bore the brunt of the German onslaught, received only some of the warning information picked up by its divisions. For example, on 15 December, the day before the attack, four PW's were captured by the 4th and 106th Divisions. All four claimed to have heard statements or rumors of an impending German attack between 16-25 December. The 106th Division reported the data about one PW immediately by message to the Corps, but not about the other PW, and the 4th Division reported neither of its two PW data. During the period just prior to the attack,

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a total of seven indications of attack warning were picked up by the 4th, 28th, and 106th Divisions of the VIII Corps. Only four of these, including the single PW statement, were forwarded to Corps. The Corps did not report any of these four electrically to First Army but did include them in its G-2 Periodic Report for the day, which probably arrived at First Army too late to be of use.[10] As late as 14 December, the war map of Major General Kenneth Strong, Eisenhower's intelligence officer, showed only four German divisions in front of the VIII Corps [11] rather than the actual twenty-eight.[12] It was clear that each command was "going it alone" in the intelligence business. General Strong said in his book *Intelligence at the Top:* "After the war I learned that many American divisional and front line commanders had received indications more definite than anything we had at Supreme Headquarters of what was brewing on the German side. For various reasons, such scraps of useful information never reached us." [13]

There was abundant information available in the combat zone. It simply was not passed around, and nowhere did it all come together. Commanders and their intelligence officers virtually "went it alone" with disastrous results. The lesson can be summed up: *Information of the enemy must move quickly and freely throughout the military structure, unrestricted by command channels.*

No commander is an island, particularly in the business of intelligence. He needs help, all he can get. Sharing the wealth will help future commanders avoid such shocks as the Bulge.

12. *Go first class in your intelligence shop.* Fight to get a good officer—preferably a Military Intelligence Branch officer—as your top intelligence staff officer. The greater your demands on the Intelligence Branch, the harder that branch will work to produce blue-chip personnel. The branch, though still young, has made remarkable progress since its formation in 1962 and its later designation as a Combat Support Branch. If you want to avoid being surprised—or, conversely, to achieve surprise against your opponent—you will need that blue-chip officer heading your intelligence shop. Not only will he put it all together for you, he will be your entree into the total intelligence system. Fight also to get good intelligence people throughout your organization. The lowest-ranking enlisted analyst might be the one to detect that important scrap of information which will alert you to danger. I have seen this happen many times.

13. *Expect any attempt to surprise you to occur at the worst time and place.* It was no accident that Pearl Harbor occurred in the early morning hours of Sunday 7 December 1941 . . . or that the 1973 Arab attack in the Mid-East was launched on Yom Kippur. In seeking to surprise you, your opponent *will* plan his operation at the time and place which he thinks you will least expect. Nothing mysterious about that approach. You would do the same to him. Yet we continue to be surprised during odd hours and at odd places. We need to keep open minds and to gear ourselves for *effective* 24-hour vigilance. This means, among other things, shoring up duty shifts with top-flight personnel and amply rewarding them for this less desirable duty; it means taking extra precautions to keep shift personnel informed; it means leadership

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of the highest order; it means having plans for adjusting quickly to increased levels of alert and, lastly, it means creating and maintaining the proper state of mind at every level throughout our defense system. The price of freedom is indeed eternal vigilance.

14. *Recognize that warning signals will often be buried in piles of conflicting and irrelevant information.* If you have adapted to the previous 13 suggestions, you and your blue-chip intelligence people will generally be able to cope with this problem. In each of the cited examples of surprise, there were numerous conflicting or misleading indicators which threw intelligence analysts and decision makers off the track. This will always be a problem. Your opponent radiates such indications both intentionally and unintentionally. You must cope with these confusion factors as well as with the sheer volume of irrelevant information flowing in our system.

David Kahn in *The Codebreakers*, using Pearl Harbor as an example, describes this problem realistically and sympathetically: "After the fact, of course, the true portents stand out in high relief, whereas the others, unneeded and therefore forgotten, recede into the background. The revisionists, looking back with the 20-20 vision of hindsight, select the true indications and disregard all others, thus making it appear as if even a deaf and blind idiot could have seen Pearl Harbor coming. But it was not like that for those who were there." [14]

If you follow the above fourteen suggestions, I cannot guarantee that you will never be surprised. I can only guarantee that you will minimize the odds. And what more could a commander ask for?

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STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT, WAR DEPARTMENT
MISSION FOR GERMANY
U. S. FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

APO 742
30 November 1945

SUBJECT: Interview with Erna Flegel - Report Attached

TO : Brigadier General G. Bryan Conrad, GSC
Director of Intelligence

1. Attached is an interview with Erna Flegel, who was a nurse in the Fuehrerbunker during the last days before the capture of Berlin by the Russians. Although Erna Flegel never belonged to the Nazi Party, she is a fanatical admirer of Hitler and a definite supporter of Nazi doctrines.

2. This statement was secured in German by one of the officers of this detachment. The only other distribution which this document has had in OMGUS is to Col. Hohenthal.

/s/ Richard Helms
/t/ RICHARD HELMS
Lt. Comdr., USNR
Commanding Officer
Berlin Detachment/SSU

Attachment
CC: Colonel R. Collins
Office of Director of Intelligence
Telephone: 76-2432

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SUBJECT: Statements of Erna Flegel, R.W., Red Cross Nurse from the Training School "Markisches Haus," Scharnhorststrasse 3. Born 1911.*

I was employed as a surgical nurse in the University Hospital on Ziegelstrasse. Since there was a shortage of doctors in Berlin, a nurse always had to be present in the air raid shelter in the Reichs Chancellery when there was an air raid alarm, for first aid in case it was necessary for injuries, etc. The same was true for the Fuehrer's shelter which belonged to his private residence, Wilhelmstrasse 77. The air raid service was first assigned to me in January 1943. For this purpose, when there was an alert, I was called for with a car at the University Hospital, transported there, and after the end of the raid transported back to the hospital again. During the raid I stayed in the First Aid room of the shelter. When Berlin came under direct artillery fire, I stayed there all the time. It was a small room, to which a second room belonged, the operating room in the Reichs Chancellery on Vosstrasse. Properly, only SS units who had been injured were brought there. The physician in charge there was Oberarzt and Obersturmbannfuehrer Professor Haase from the University Hospital. When the ring around Berlin kept drawing closer and closer, we had to keep the injured there who had formerly been carried away to the hospitals after air raids. In the course of the fighting, we grew to be a large hospital—about 500 wounded.

After November 1944 Hitler stayed in Berlin continuously, with the exception of the Christmas holidays—and then one time he had been at the Oder front. Besides Hitler and the staff of the Chancellery, the Mohnke Combat Group was always present. Mohnke himself had his quarters in the Reichs Chancellery.

In the middle of April, Goebbels had his family come in from Schwanenwurder, at first to the Propaganda Ministry, but on 20 April he moved over with his wife and the six children into the shelter of the Reichs Chancellery. Hitler was fond of the Goebbels children. They gave him a great deal of pleasure; even in the last days he invited them for chocolate, which made the children very happy. In Hitler's shelter there were only one bathtub, which was naturally provided for him. He allowed the Goebbels children to bathe in it, which likewise afforded them great pleasure.

*The fate of Adolf Hitler, Eva Braun, Goebbels and other Germans who shared the Bunker with the Fuehrer during the siege and fall of Berlin in May 1945 tantalized many in the West for years following the Nazi defeat. On 30 November 45, Richard Helms of the Office of Strategic Services, assigned to Berlin, forwarded to Washington the interrogation of a nurse who had been in the Reichs Chancellery at its fall to the invading Russians. That report was lost from sight for more than 30 years. It was discovered recently by a collector of WW II memorabilia, who provided a copy to Mr. Helms. It is reprinted here because it can be viewed as a classic of intelligence reporting and for the unique insight it affords both into life in the bunker and the mental outlook of those Germans who stayed with Hitler until the end. Several authors have written about the bunker and Hitler's last days; none depicted the final events more graphically than Erna Flegel.

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Besides these, Martin Bormann was also present. His brother, Paul Bormann, who didn't get along with him, had left Berlin some time before, as his wife was expecting a baby.

Schaub went to Upper Bavaria; he had a house in Kitzbuehl, Austria, and had left Berlin previously.

The following aides were present: Brigadefuehrer Albrecht, who shot himself after Hitler's death; Colonel von Below of the Air Force, who also shot himself; General Burgdorff, who later carried on the surrender negotiations with the Russians.

On 28 April, Field Marshal Ritter von Griem landed on the Pariser Platz; his pilot was Hanna Reitsch. In landing Griem was injured below the knee, and after his injury had been treated he was to have been carried in to Hitler, but he bluntly refused. Greim said concerning Hanna Reitsch: "She was my good angel, she piloted me marvelously." He was there only one day; he had been summoned to Hitler in order to take over the supreme command of the Air Force as Goering's successor, and in order to receive Hitler's orders in this connection. I had a long talk with Hanna Reitsch in the shelter in the presence of Eva Braun.

All the other generals, etc., were with Keitel outside the cauldron of Berlin.

There were present also orderlies and soldiers and the SS bodyguards, the kitchen personnel and the cleaning women. Up to the end Hitler received his special diet, which consisted of fresh vegetables; he took meals regularly.

On 21 April, for the last time, personnel of the Reichs Chancellery were taken out of Berlin by air.

When parts of Berlin were already occupied, and the Russians were coming closer and closer to the center of the city, one could feel, almost physically, that the Third Reich was approaching its end. Marines were supposed to land by plane to protect Berlin until the Wenk Army Group had arrived for the relief of the city. Wenk with his troops was already at Beelitz. But suddenly we heard that Wenk's Army Group absolutely required a twenty-four hours' rest; the soldiers were completely exhausted. Later they were entirely wiped out there. It wasn't that anything had gone wrong—it could have been expected, since in the last weeks and days so much treachery, so much cowardice and meanness had revealed itself in Hitler's immediate entourage.

Hitler required no care; I was there exclusively for the care of the wounded. To be sure, he had aged greatly in the last days; he now had a lot of grey hair, and gave the impression of a man at least fifteen or twenty years older. He shook a good deal, walking was difficult for him, his right side was still very much weakened as a result of the attempt on his life. In the period immediately after the attempt he always shook hands with us with his left hand, but that had gone away again, and toward the end he was using his right hand. It was not until November that I saw Hitler again for the first time after the attack, when he was in Berlin for a state funeral. He was taking great care to favor his right hand. At that time he was very animated, and made all sorts of jokes. When Hitler was in the room, he filled it entirely with his personality—you saw only him, aside from him nothing else existed. The fascinating thing about him was his eyes; up to the end, it was impossible to turn away from his eyes.

I assume that Hitler recognized the hopelessness of his position; he is said to have expressed himself on the subject to Professor Haase. For that very reason, I regard every rumor that Hitler is still alive as senseless, he would never have had the spiritual

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and physical strength to build up a new Germany. Hitler experienced too many disillusionments at the hands of his closest friends. He no longer believed in the loyalty of Himmler. The liaison officer between them, namely, Fegelein, the brother-in-law of Eva Braun, had betrayed him. He was caught on the point of leaving Berlin in civilian clothes. This treachery affected Eva Braun very deeply.

Professor Morell was not there; he actually had a serious heart ailment, and was at Obersalzberg, where later on he died of heart disease. For some time he had been unable to move around unnecessarily.

Dr. Stumpfecker was present as his personal surgeon; also the dentist, Dr. Kunz. Both doctors were later taken away by the Russians. Dr. Kunz was the one who poisoned Goebbels' children.

The marriage of Hitler to Eva Braun took place on the 28th of April. When I learned about it, it was immediately clear to me that this signified the end of the Third Reich, for if Hitler had believed a continuation of it possible, he would never have taken this step. Now, with death facing him, he wished to thank this woman for her self-sacrificing loyalty by giving her his name. After all, she was still young and had voluntarily stayed with him in order to share his fate. On the afternoon of 28 April the marriage was performed. This incident was of little importance to us; at any rate, we saw nothing unusual in it, for Eva Braun was a completely colorless personality. When she was with a crowd of stenographers, she was in no way conspicuous among them. For example, the fact that Hitler had poisoned his wolfhound somehow affected us more. The dog received in Hitler's presence a large dose of the poison with which later others were also poisoned. He was very fond of the dog, and took his death very much to heart.

On the day of his marriage Hitler dictated his political testament until late into the night. The secretary was Miss Schroeder. On that day he probably did not go to bed until about four o'clock, or even six.

On the morning of the 29th nothing special happened. I had to go over a few times to the Fuehrer's shelter—I went there only when I needed something urgently from the First Aid room. Thus, I saw Hitler a few times. He always took his meals alone and with great regularity, too, up to the end. His food was very well prepared; this was easy to manage, in view of the tiny portions that were involved. The only luxury he allowed himself throughout the war was that he always had fresh vegetables supplied to him from Holland.

The ring around us was now drawing closer and closer, and the radio connection was broken off. It was impossible to get information from now on, except through shock troops who went out and brought reports as to where the Russians had newly established themselves in the meantime. We had water and light until the end, thanks to the technical excellence with which the installations in the shelter functioned. Also, a rather large staff of technicians had stayed behind, who constantly supervised the equipment.

At the end we were like a big family; it was a common fate which we were experiencing in an atmosphere of true comradely association. The terrific dynamics of the fate which was unrolling held sway over all of us. We were Germany, and we were going through the end of the Third Reich and of the war, concerning the outcome of which we had hoped, up to the end, for a favorable and tolerable issue. Everything petty and external had fallen away.

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On 29 April in the evening, we were told that we were all to be received by Hitler. It was half past ten when we were instructed to hold ourselves in readiness. Then we went over at half past twelve. There were Professor Haase, Dr. Kunz, Professor Stumpfecker, and two or three Medical Corps enlisted men. About twenty-five or thirty people were already gathered there, the secretaries, the cleaning women, and a few strangers who had taken refuge in the shelter. They were all standing in a row. Hitler had the names of the persons he didn't know told to him, and shook hands with each one as he walked down the line. A "brown sister," who was a stranger and who had perhaps not grasped the seriousness of the moment, and the ultimate fate, expressed her thanks to Hitler because she had been admitted into the shelter, and said in conclusion: "Fuehrer, we believe in you and in a good outcome!" Whereupon Hitler replied: "Each one must stand in his place and hold out, and if fate requires it, there he must fall!" I had a feeling that for Hitler we were the forum of the German people to which he was presenting himself once more since he had no more extensive one.

On 30 April then, in the afternoon, he departed this life. We asked no questions as to how, none at all, for each one of us had the feeling on the previous evening that this was farewell. I learned of his death in a special way. Because of this feeling I have just described, my first question to the Doctor each morning was: "Is Hitler still alive?" The answer: "Yes." The same anxious question at each meeting with Dr. Haase. When the latter came out of the Fuehrer's shelter at six o'clock, I asked again: "Is Hitler still alive?" As he gave me no answer, I knew the truth. It was natural that such an event was not discussed, and that it affected us all very deeply, also that at such a time unimportant matters were of no interest at all. For, of course, we all believed that we, too, should not come out of this hell alive; we knew precisely what might be in store for us, everyone had made up his mind to that, there was no more question about it, we were paying attention only to what was essential.

Then later we learned that Hauptsturmfuehrer Schneider was required to bring gasoline from the garage of the shelter. Dr. Stumpfecker burned Hitler's body in the garden.

On the next morning after Hitler's death we were all conscious of a vacuum, our fate could not be postponed. I saw that the end was about to come. Upon the news that Hitler was dead, we were told that now we were released from our oath, and everyone was permitted to choose his own fate. The able-bodied men prepared to make a sally. We others decided not to go out with the combat group; we stayed, naturally, at our place beside the wounded. Goebbels carried on the government as well as he could, and General Brockdorf was in command. On 30 April no orders were given for the sally, for reasons which I do not understand; they were given only on the first of May, and as a result there were an unbelievably large number of dead to mourn.

Martin Bormann was among the men who took part in the sally. It is to be assumed that he met death there; for, as most of the young battle-experienced SS men fell, a relatively older man cannot have come through alive.

Flight Captain Bauer also joined in the sally.

As I have said, the Mohnke combat group then equipped itself to make the sally out of the shelter. All the able-bodied men who were still there joined with them. They tried first to get out at the exit to Potsdamer Platz, which was impossible, then they turned toward the north and in individual cases got as far as the Stettiner Bahnhof; we heard nothing more from them.

Albrecht shot himself when the combat group started out.

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Goebbels died on 30 April. Mrs. Goebbels had been his guiding genius. I cannot judge whether he was wavering. Mrs. Goebbels was having a dental treatment, and I often talked with her for an hour at a time. She was far superior to the average human being. It took a resolute spirit to decide to sacrifice her own children; indeed, it required more resolution than for Hitler to take his life. She said: "Now, we too, will give up our lives." About the children, furthermore, she said, "Where shall my children go? The shame of being Goebbels' children will always rest upon them." (She said this to me on the day when the Marines were summoned. We were present when an admiral gave the order over the telephone that the Marines were to start.) The last time that I saw Mrs. Goebbles was on the morning of 30 April. We shook hands without a word, for there was nothing to say. The children died in the afternoon and the parents in the evening. Mrs. Goebbels had told the children that they would have to live in the shelter quite a long time, and that with this in view they had to be inoculated. Of course, the children were accustomed to inoculations as a result of the war. The children's bodies were not burned—the Russians found them. I heard only on the evening of the same day that Goebbles and his family were dead. All the news reports that there were came from the Fuehrer's shelter.

Fritsche, the only ranking official left (he had been in the Air Ministry), took the greatest pains after the death of Goebbels to keep everything more or less orderly and to find the best way of making the surrender with the Russians.

On 2 May, about ten o'clock in the morning, the Russians were there. We had marked our section with Red Cross flags. At first they went through the shelter, and respected the Red Cross absolutely. Nothing happened either to the wounded or to us, nor did they take anything away from us. We were even permitted to lock ourselves in at night; the Russian Commandant's behavior was exemplary. Naturally it was a surprise to us that he gave us permission to lock our doors, but he said he could not vouch for his soldiers. Were accustomed to seeing soldiers obey orders very strictly, in contrast to which the Russian commanding officer did not seem to have this authority over his soldiers. The Russian headquarters was established at Mohnke's battle post.

The following were present in the shelter with us, in addition to the wounded: Dr. Kunz, Professor Haase, the nurses, the civilian personnel of the Fuehrer's residence and of the Reichs Chancellery, working girls who had taken refuge there, BDM* girls and their leaders. The latter, coming from the Reichsportfeld, had fled more and more into the center of the city instead of going out of Berlin. Later on these girls went to work admirably, and when the Hotel Adlon burned down, with their feeble strength they carried the wounded soldiers, a task which was giving us trouble, and after all, these girls were not at all accustomed to wounded people and to the oppressive air in the shelter. The German boys also showed a model behavior; with their slight strength they shifted ammunition; indeed, up to the end Hitler had an unshakeable faith in the German youth.

Then on 2 May individuals were taken to the Reichs Institute for the Blind on Oranien Strasse, where the Russians had set up one of their GPU offices.

I was taken there on 3 May and stayed until 10 May; I was lodged in the cellar there, and was questioned daily. Then I came back to the hospital, and just in time, for on the same day the departure by car was to take place, to the Herzberg Hospital, where we stayed until the middle of August. From there I was taken to ——ulsdorf for another interrogation by the GPU. We worked in Herzberge until we were taken as prisoners of war to Koenigswusterhausen. At first we worked under direct

*Bund deutscher Mädchen, Hitler Youth.

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supervision of the Russians, but when they saw that we understood our work they let us carry on freely. Of course, we were behind barbed wire there the whole time.

Berlin, 23 November 1945

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Commentary— (b)(3)(c)

The statement of Erna Flegel regarding her observation in Hitler's bunker as the Third Reich collapsed is unique—and not only because witnesses to such historical theater are rare. Its unrevised, Nazi-era spirit marks the account as authentic, from Flegel's enthralled view of Hitler to her assumption that the indescribable catastrophe she watched was but the inexorable working of fate. At the same time, the reader is drawn to admire the nurse's devotion to duty.

*Comparison of Nurse Flegel's statement with the recent and acclaimed study of Hitler's last weeks by James P. O'Donnell (*The Bunker, *Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1978) confirms that she is a good source for atmosphere and events observed firsthand. But there are inaccuracies, mainly attributable to her accepting the word of others. There is a difference between two accounts of a nurse's exchange with Hitler that suggests Flegel, although unwilling to speak against the Fuehrer seven months after his death, may have revised history in retrospect.*

Flegel's statement tells that a "brown sister," a phrase that suggests a nurse more pro-nazi than the source, thanked Hitler for being admitted to his bunker, adding, "Fuehrer, we believe in you and in a good outcome!" O'Donnell's book (page 160) cites a physician's account of a reception by Hitler on the same day, at about the same time, when "my Red Cross nurse, this unusually stolid woman, broke down completely and began to sigh and moan, 'My Fuehrer, keep up your faith in final victory! Lead, and we shall follow.' " In the statement, Hitler replies that one must stand firm and fall if fate requires it; the book account has him responding that one must not seek to avoid one's destiny.

Most interesting is that the physician quoted by O'Donnell identifies his Red Cross nurse as "Sister Erna." It appears likely that these two accounts describe the same incident and the Erna Flegel was the "brown sister" she later claimed to have observed.

Nurse Flegel's statement accepts the death of Hitler without question but she lacks firsthand evidence. This was an important point in 1945. The Soviets controlled the evidence of Hitler's death and many of the Fuehrerbunker staff were imprisoned in the Soviet Union for years thereafter. More than two decades passed before Moscow decided to publish forensic proof of Hitler's death, thus spiking recurrent legends about his appearance in Argentina.

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TITLE: A Procedure for Managing Interdisciplinary Intelligence Production

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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A PROCEDURE FOR MANAGING INTERDISCIPLINARY INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

(b)(3)(c)

The most popular buzz-word in intelligence production circles these days is "interdisciplinary." One hears a great deal about the needs of intelligence consumers for integrated products—reports that pull together the economic, political, military, technological and societal aspects of an issue so that a policy maker gains a broad understanding of it. This is necessary, it is argued, because policymakers themselves have no time to perform the integration. Hence, intelligence reporting that focuses on only one dimension of an issue at best can provide some useful, but incomplete, information; at worst it may be dismissed by the consumer as irrelevant.

That one of the functions of intelligence is to provide policymakers with complete and relevant information on an important issue is obvious; the problem has been how to organize and manage the production of such information. This article describes one method that has been used with some success in the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) and has now been institutionalized in the research planning process. My purpose is to record the lessons that we learned in producing a major interdisciplinary study on the development of the prospects for Soviet military power so that those charged with managing issue-oriented research can profit from our experience. (Those more interested in our substantive findings can refer to the study, *The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends since 1965 and Prospects for the 1980s.*)

Origins of the Study

For several years it has been evident to the Intelligence Community that the environment for Soviet decisionmaking on national security issues is changing markedly.

— Growth of the Soviet economy is slowing and is likely to decline further in the 1980s as energy and manpower shortages compound the longer-standing problem of poor productivity.

— Many of the top military and political leaders will be replaced soon: most are in their 60s and 70s and a number are in poor health.

— Growing Western concern about Soviet military power, China's opening to the West, and instability in Eastern Europe and the Third World are altering the international setting.

— Advances in technology are providing new opportunities to upgrade military capabilities.

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These complicating factors make it particularly difficult for intelligence analysts to forecast Soviet behavior. But the tools available to analysts have become more powerful:

— The Office of Strategic Research (OSR), drawing on analysis performed throughout the Intelligence Community, has compiled an all-source data base on trends since the 1950s in Soviet military production, order-of-battle, manpower, and expenditures.

— The Office of Scientific and Weapons Research (OSWR) has gained valuable insights into the Soviet system for managing missile and space programs and the development capacity of the Soviet aerospace industry.

— The Office of Economic Research (OER) has developed new models to assess and predict Soviet economic performance.

— The Office of Political Analysis (OPA) has instituted research projects aimed at (b)(1) Soviet policymakers and their possible views on policy issues.

— Analysts throughout the community—in OSR, OSWR, OPA, and in DIA and the military services—have greatly improved their knowledge of the Soviet policy process.

It was this coincidence of an important policy issue and new analytical tools that led OSR to initiate the process that led to production of a major interdisciplinary assessment of the prospects for Soviet military power.

The Process

The process began in early 1979 with planning for a two-day seminar on "Soviet Defense Decisionmaking." At that seminar analysts from the NFAC production offices briefed each other and their managers on their current understanding of Soviet decisionmaking processes and on the factors likely to influence Soviet choices on military forces and policies for the 1980s. Out of the discussions a consensus emerged in favor of a broadly-based, interoffice research effort aimed at producing an integrated report on the prospects for the development of Soviet military power in the coming decade. The group also identified the major research themes that the individual offices should investigate.

Following the seminar, an interoffice working group was formed to turn the general research themes into a concrete plan of action. (I chaired the group; other members were (b)(3)(c) of OSWR; of OPA; of OER; and of OSR.) The working group was tasked with evaluating the current NFAC research program, recommending redefinition and rescheduling of planned research, and proposing new projects to meet the goals of the plan.

Initially, some members of the working group expressed reservations about the plan, and some managers resisted the notion that an interoffice group should play a role in determining their production priorities. We also touched some sensitive nerves by recommending a few projects that the offices, for one reason or another, were less anxious to undertake. Eventually, however, we hammered out a consensus at the working group level.

The working group codified its research proposals in a formal document, signed by all of the NFAC office directors, and set up a management information system to

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keep the directors aware of the program's progress. The program plan consisted of an interim report on recent trends in Soviet military forces, som(b)(1)uilding block papers on individual factors affecting Soviet policy, and an overview report for publication in the spring of 1981.

By the summer of 1980, enough work on the building blocks project had been completed to warrant a working-level seminar to outline the major theses of the overview paper, and identify areas for further research. During October and November, a first draft of the overview paper was put together. Coordination of the paper was completed in March and in May the DCI transmitted the report to the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Several hunderd other consumers received the paper through normal dissemination channels.

Reaction to the paper has been highly favorable. Several high-level recipients have praised the integrative character of the analysis. The report has contributed to debates on US military programs and has been made required reading for seminars at one of the war colleges.

Lessons Learned

In the process of producing our paper we learned a great deal about planning and managing interdisciplinary research. First, we learned that it is possible, within a hierarchical organization, to carry out an integrated research program. But we also learned that managing such a program is difficult and demanding: both careful planning and vigorous follow-up are vital.

More specifically, we found that there are a number of essential steps in an interdisciplinary project:

— Choosing the issue properly.

— Sharing information and views among analysts with different backgrounds.

— Defining the issue in terms of its major research themes.

— Appointing a project leader and working group to develop a program plan.

— Assessing the adequacy of currently planned research in answering key questions about the research themes.

— Preparing a program plan with milestones for completion.

— Formal commitment of resources to the effort.

— Monitoring the progress of the research program and taking action to keep it on track.

— Integrating the findings into an overview paper.

As a result of our experiences, I believe that all of these steps are needed, regardless of the organizational structure established to carry out interdisciplinary analysis.

Issue Identification

The first order of business is to frame the issue so that it can be an effective guide to research. If this isn't done properly, the project team may be unable to assess the effectiveness of its plan. In the words of psychologist David Campbell, "If you don't know where you're going, you're likely to end up somewhere else."

A particular challenge in this first step is to be sure that you are dealing with an issue. It's easy to confuse the process of defining research to address an issue or answer a question with the (equally important) problem of ensuring that there is adequate analytical coverage of a topic or geographic area. An issue like "the ability and

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willingness of the NATO allies to shoulder a larger defense burden" can be addressed by the method described in this article. But "Africa" and "Nuclear Proliferation" are areas and topics, not issues, and different techniques probably are required to manage research dealing with them. A good test is to try to frame the issue in terms of a question that can be addressed in a single paper. If you can't, it probably isn't an issue.

Information Sharing

This is an indispensable step in an interdisciplinary research effort. It is necessary to combat a common fallacy—that the information held by an individual or group is generally known by others. (This is rarely the case, even when individuals or organizations have close working contacts.) It is also important to have a common basis for planning the research program.

Successful information sharing, like the other steps in an interdisciplinary research program, requires careful planning.

- The atmosphere must be right. We found that holding a two-day initial planning seminar in a remote location permitted an intensive exchange of ideas away from day-to-day pressures.
- The briefing topics must be well-chosen. They should provide a wide range of perspectives on the issue, but they must be relevant. There may be a tendency to brief on a topic not related to the issue simply because the information is available. This should be resisted.
- The group dynamics must work. The conference planners must get the right mix of personalities and expertise, even if this results in an imbalance in organizational representation. They must also, however, ensure that the key analysts who will be working on the program and managers from the participating organizations are present. This is needed to ensure from the beginning a commitment to the goals of the program.

Theme Definition

The culmination of the initial sharing of information should be the identification of themes for organizing the research effort. If this is not done, there is a danger that participants in the information sharing phase will leave, having been entertained with briefings but without a clear idea of where the effort will lead.

This is a tricky phase of the process, and the planners must be careful to explain its purpose to the participants. There will be a tendency for many to want to argue substance or draw conclusions, but this is not the time. Instead, the participants should strive to understand all of the facets of the issue and to record their understanding as a set of themes for further investigation.

A technique that we used successfully was a variation of brainstorming called "funneling applied creativity." After immersing seminar participants in substantive briefings for a day and a half, we solicited from them their ideas on research themes that should be followed up. The ground rules permitted anyone to make a proposal and prohibited any criticism or discussion until all of the suggestions had been put forward and recorded on flip charts. We then opened the floor for discussion and deleted some themes and refined others. The themes that we settled on were:

- Soviet defense decisionmaking and management.
- Soviet military goals, threat perceptions and requirements..
- Defense and the Soviet political succession.
- The Soviet defense-industrial establishment.
- Defense and the Soviet economy.

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— Trends in Soviet military forces.

— Soviet military technology.

Appointing a Management Team

The final act of the initial planning seminar should be to appoint a management team. The team will have two tasks:

— To formulate a program plan.

— To monitor and report on execution of the plan.

The team should include representatives of all organizations that have substantive responsibilities related to the research issue. But more importantly, it must have the right blend of personalities and expertise. A critical task for managers, then, is to select a knowledgeable group of senior analysts or first line managers who know both the substantive issues and the research and production capabilities of their organizations.

Assessment of Current Research

Once there is agreement on the definition of the research issue and its themes, the first task for the management team is to assess the adequacy of current plans. The difficult parts of this step are defining the criteria for measuring adequacy and finding out exactly what the current plans were.

For our measuring stick we used a set of key questions structured into the seven research themes (see box below for examples). The concept was that research would be adequate if it would permit confident answers to all the key questions. To uncover information about current plans, we found personal contacts to be far more useful than published research programs. (The published programs were often cryptic, out of date, and unrealistic.) For this reason, it is important that the members of the working group be in a position to find out what really is going on in their offices and to provide realistic assessments of the intended scope and completion dates of currently scheduled projects. It is particularly important to go beyond the titles of planned research projects and find out more about their purposes and substantive theses. Without this information, it is impossible to judge the appropriateness of the planned research.

Research Theme 3: Defense and the Soviet Political Succession

Key Questions: What are the possible scenarios for the Soviet political succession? Who are the likely candidates for top leadership posts? What are their views and preferences in the area of defense resource allocation and military policy? How much flexibility will a new regime have to alter resource priorities and policies?

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Research Theme 6: Trends in Soviet Military Forces

Key Questions: What have been the key trends in Soviet military forces? Are they consistent across service and mission lines? What programs are now under way or known to be planned? When will they impact on force structure and capabilities and to what extent?

What deficiencies do the Soviets perceive in their forces? What can we infer from this about new programs initiatives for which we currently have no evidence?

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Preparation of a Plan

Once the criteria for success are established and currently programmed research is identified, the project leader and management team can begin to prepare a program plan. The first step is fairly mechanical—array the scheduled projects by theme, compare their estimated completion dates, and identify necessary adjustments. Some projects might logically be combined or made into joint projects.

For those key questions that will not be adequately answered by currently planned projects, the project manager and his group should prepare project proposals. These should be specific enough to be a basis for resource decisions by office managers. They should include, for example, a statement of the scope and proposed schedule, level of analytical effort and any special requirements such as ADP or contractor support. It's useful to identify the analysts (or at least the branches) best suited to carry out each proposed project.

At this stage, the management team should also identify requirements for overview papers to integrate the findings of the building-block projects. If possible, the group should identify potential drafters so that they can be involved in the entire research program.

After all of this homework is done, the project manager should prepare a consolidated program that identifies all of the building-block and overview papers, sets forth schedules and assigns responsibilities, and recommends new projects to fill gaps in current plans.

Formal Commitment of Resources

After the plan has been prepared in draft, it should be submitted for approval by senior management. The approval should be formal and specific. To make a program work, it is necessary that managers at all levels assign sufficient analytical resources and protect them. When approving the plan, managers should be made aware that they have made commitment to deliver their projects and that their own supervisors will be apprised of the progress of research.

Once the plan is completed it should be circulated to all analysts and managers involved. (We gave our plan a little extra dignity by having it bound in hard covers.) It is essential that the participants understand their role in the plan. One of the important functions of a program plan is to alter the directions of individual projects so that they are responsive to the key questions. This can't be done unless people know what the questions are and how their own work relates to them. The only way to ensure this is good communications. It's helpful to record in the Advance Work Plans of both analysts and managers that their projects are related to an interdisciplinary research issue.

Monitoring and Troubleshooting

Even the most carefully prepared plan will fail without aggressive follow-up. Periodic reports to senior managers are essential to keeping the program on track. (We sent reports quarterly.) The project manager and team must be frank in identifying problems and pressing for their solution. We found that most problems solved themselves once they were made known. But occasionally we had to keep reminding managers of their commitments and on one occasion had to convene a formal meeting of office directors.

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Another essential ingredient is an effort to promote better communications among the analysts working on the building-block projects. Merely publishing a program plan will not make analysts aware of their responsibilities and their importance in the overall process. It will be necessary to organize briefings, seminars, and retreats to facilitate communications, and the members of the working group must be prepared to spend a great deal of time and effort trying to break down bureaucratic and disciplinary barriers.

Production and Evaluation

The final step in the process is to integrate the results of the building-block projects into a coherent overview paper. The danger in this stage is that it may degenerate into "analysis by staple." Interdisciplinary analysis must be more than editing inputs from various specialists; it should entail a real effort to combine the methods of several disciplines to create new insights.

It's particularly important to select the right drafting team. It's not enough to form a group of, say, an engineer, an economist, and a political scientist. At times people from different specialties have such different mindsets and vocabularies that they literally cannot communicate. Ideally, each drafter should have experience in at least two disciplines. And whatever their background the drafters must work effectively together—have the right body chemistry.

We found that the close personal relationships that were forged during the working group's seminars were an important ingredient in promoting interdisciplinary analysis. The participants knew each other, appreciated the work of other organizations, and learned the concepts and vocabulary of other analytical disciplines well enough to communicate effectively. Moreover, most coordination problems were cleared up during preparation of the building-block papers, leaving only a few contentious issues for the overview report.

This is not to say that we had no problems. We faced two serious substantive disagreements. Opinion was sharply divided between OSR and OER on prospects for Soviet defense spending and between OSR and OPA on the extent to which Soviet force procurements were driven by military or political considerations. These issues were to have been addressed in building-block papers, but the schedules for the papers had slipped so that coordinated conclusions were not available for the overview report. Eventually we solved the problems—the first by more analysis and the presentation of alternative projections; the second by textual changes and a realization that the difference was largely semantic. But it would have been more efficient to identify the differences of opinion earlier, in the building-block projects, so that they could be worked out in a more rigorous fashion.

The process of managing interdisciplinary research should not stop with publication of an overview paper. It's necessary, then, to have a formal evaluation of the program's accomplishments and of the remaining gaps in knowledge. The mechanism we used was yet another two-day seminar at which we reported to NFAC managers on what they had received for their resource commitment and solicited their help in identifying and sponsoring follow-on research.

Final Thoughts

The process described in this article worked. There may be other ways of producing a major interdisciplinary report, but based on my experience I believe there are five indispensable ingredients.

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— *Commitment* by senior managers to the importance of the issue and a willingness to devote resources to it and protect those resources.

— *Careful planning* that involves all interested parties from the beginning.

— *Good communications* both up the line to management and across organizational lines among analysts.

— The right *body chemistry* among planners and analysts.

— *Follow-up* to ensure that all participants retain their commitment and carry out their responsibilities.

There are commodities to be rationed carefully among issues that are genuinely high in priority. My own opinion is that an organization the size of NFAC probably should not undertake more than about half a dozen major interdisciplinary projects at a time. A larger number would dilute the commitment of senior managers and reduce their ability to protect the resources devoted to the programs. But if aggressively managed and strongly supported, the process I've described has a high probability of payoff.

"It is at all times necessary . . . that we frequently refresh our patriotism by reference to first principles. It is by tracing things to their origin that we learn to understand them, and it is by keeping that line and the origin always in view that we never forget them."

Tom Paine

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TITLE: A Priceless Record

AUTHOR: Dino A. Brugioni

VOLUME: 25 ISSUE: Spring YEAR: 1981

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Plants lay crushed like broken egg crates

A PRICELESS RECORD

Dino A. Brugioni

Without warning at 3:45 a.m. local China time on 28 July 1976, the earth shook throughout the heavily populated and industralized areas of Hebei province, registering 8.2 on the Richter scale. The epicenter was plotted 8 nm SSE of Tangshan, an industrial city of over one million. It was one of the major natural disasters of all time.

The predominantly single story workers dwellings in the center of Tangshan and the newer multi-storied apartments of the suburbs collapsed with the initial shock, their stone and masonry walls killing an estimated 750,000 people and injuring another 800,000. Industrial plants lay crushed like broken egg crates. Seen through stereo photography, the devastation reminded photo interpreters of the World War II bomb destruction of German cities.

The Chinese government, typically, provided little information, although Hsinhua, the official press agency, admitted that "there had been great losses to peoples lives and property." The Chinese buried their dead, hospitalized their injured, started a relief and reconstruction effort and spurned offers of foreign assistance—including that from the U.S.


If the destruction had been impressive, then the reconstruction effort was more so. In four years, Tangshan and its industries have been essentially restored.

The epic is graphically recorded on three rolls of U.S. satellite photography that comprise an extraordinary account of one of the tragedies of our time and a testimony to man's indomitable spirit.

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T'ang-shan Area–Earthquake July 28, 1976



Note: At the time of the earthquake, the U.S. Government recognized the Wade-Giles Romanization System.

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CONGRESS, OVERSIGHT AND THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

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After the Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947, congressional oversight over the Agency was exercised by senior members of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. That oversight was far from vigorous. The attitude of those senior Senators and Congressmen was summed up in 1956 by then Senator Saltonstall of Massachusetts who said that: "It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to speak to us. Instead it is a question of our reluctance . . . to seek information and knowledge on subjects which I personally, as a member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have, unless I believed it to be my responsibility to have it because it might involve the lives of American citizens." [1]

That attitude changed dramatically in 1975 following media reports of illegal and improper activities by U.S. intelligence agencies. Those revelations caused both houses of Congress to examine the effectiveness of their oversight over the intelligence agencies. Out of that effort came the creation of two select committees, the Church Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the House, tasked not only to investigate the allegations of wrongdoing but also to conduct a thorough review of the operations, budgets and effectiveness of the intelligence agencies. It is safe to say that, at least since 1947, the intelligence community had not had such an intense congressional investigation of its activities.

Each of the select committees recommended to its respective house that a permanent oversight committee for intelligence be created. In 1976, the Senate acted to create such a committee and in 1977, the House followed suit. As a result, the Congress is now a major factor in the intelligence activities of this country.

While serious Congressional interest in the activities of the intelligence community first was stimulated by (and in turn stimulated) the news media, its relationship to the intelligence community has acquired a different cast with the creation of the new permanent intelligence committees. Out of those years of psychological trauma for many in the intelligence business has come a new attitude and a new working relationship on the part of intelligence professionals as well as the Congress. Adjustments in methods of operation—never easy in either the Federal bureaucracy or Capitol Hill—have been made to the benefit of both and to the ultimate benefit of the American people.

What are the fundamentals of Congressional oversight? According to the bipartisan leadership of the House of Representatives, who commissioned a workshop on Congressional Oversight and Investigations:

> "Today the American people expect more effectiveness and efficiency in government.

[1] *Congressional Record*—April 9, 1956, p. S.5292, quoted in the "Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities," United States Senate, Book I, p. 149, S. Rept. 94-755.

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> "They want the Congress to do a better job of identifying and dealing with problems before they become crises. They want us to eliminate ineffective and wasteful programs and fraud in government. They want us to curb the abuses of governmental power and restrain overly burdensome regulations. They want us to have the facts when we legislate and they want us to determine rationally how the national budget should be spent.
>
> "We believe that a crucial step in reaching these objectives is to improve the capability of the Congress to oversee the implementation of laws, policies and programs of the Federal government." [2]

Those concepts apply to all areas of government, including intelligence. How, then, does Congressional oversight work with respect to the intelligence community? While there are some differences in subcommittee structure between the House and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, basically they exercise the same functions. For the purposes of this article, the House committee will be used as the model.

As the statement above by the House Leadership indicated, the issue of efficiency in spending the budget is of major concern in the operations of the nation's intelligence services. Also of keen interest is the question of the effectiveness or quality of the activities of those services. Then, there is the matter of "abuses" of governmental power and the need to guard against the intelligence agencies committing such abuses. Completing the list of major concerns is that of legislating rationally in the area of intelligence.

Effectiveness of Intelligence

Assessing the effectiveness of intelligence is one of the most difficult yet important tasks facing the oversight committees. One of the key factors leading to the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 was the perception that, had there been such a central intelligence function in 1941, the attack on Pearl Harbor would have been anticipated. However, a review of events over the past thirty-four years suggests that anticipating events and providing effective and timely warning is more difficult than was realized in 1947.

One of the first steps taken by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was to examine the state of the nation's Indications and Warning system. That study revealed that there existed no focal point within the intelligence community for the Indications and Warning function. It spotlighted that weakness in the intelligence system and insisted that the Director of Central Intelligence address the issue. As a result, a National Intelligence Officer for Warning was created—a first step toward improving Indications and Warning effectiveness.

The I&W case is illustrative of one of the several ways a Congressional oversight committee can act to improve the effectiveness of the intelligence community. In that instance, the committee spotted a problem and then urged responsible executive branch officials to solve it.

In another case, that of the fall of the Shah of Iran, the committee's post mortem found that the failure of top policymakers to appreciate the fragility of the Shah's position was due only in part to inadequate intelligence collection and analysis. The

[2] Letters of transmittal, Thomas P. O'Neill, Speaker, John J. Rhodes, Minority Leader, Jim Wright, Majority Leader, "Workshop On Congressional Oversight and Investigations," U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, First Session, October 22, 1979, House Document No. 96-217.

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study concluded that the policymakers themselves were in part to blame. They did not ask the intelligence people to assess the Shah's opposition. Quite the contrary, concern over offending the Shah by having either Embassy personnel or CIA officers contact opponents of the regime discouraged such contacts. A staff study of that crisis concluded that: "long-standing U.S. attitudes toward the Shah inhibited intelligence collection, dampened policymakers' appetite for analysis of the Shah's position, and deafened policymakers to the warning implicit in available current intelligence." [3]

The point this example brings home is that the effectiveness of intelligence depends in large measure on the receptiveness of the policymakers to the intelligence provided and on their willingness to properly task the intelligence agencies.

A third area which the committee has examined in assessing the effectiveness of intelligence is that of the use and management of analytical personnel. Several steps have been taken at the CIA in recent years to improve the quality of intelligence analysts. Additional steps are planned. For example, scholars from the academic world have been brought into CIA to meld their knowledge and intellectual disciplines to the analytic capabilities resident at Langley. Efforts are being made to ensure that analysts spend some years living and working in the countries they are to analyze. In the case of military intelligence, the committee has taken several steps over the last two years to help improve the quality of analysis. The Defense Intelligence School for some time has been seeking legislation to allow it to confer a Masters degree in the area of foreign intelligence studies. Legislation so authorizing that degree was passed in 1980. In another case, the committee voted additional slots to help strengthen analysis in certain areas where it was felt that there was insufficient coverage.

Of course, assignment of analytic personnel overseas can be thwarted by Executive Branch action such as the MODE [4] program, which restricts the number of U.S. personnel in each Embassy. Action by the Congress to authorize additional slots can be thwarted by a presidentially-directed hiring freeze.

The most important factor in improving the quality of intelligence analysis is that of management within the intelligence community itself. Senior intelligence officers need to do a better job of utilizing the talent available. When the committee learned that for many years the U.S. intelligence community had underestimated the North Korean ground force order of battle by a factor of two, it asked the DCI for the number of intelligence analysts the United States Government had working on that order of battle. The DCI, it discovered, did not have that information and had no bureaucratic mechanism to assemble such data. The committee had to levy its own data call on the CIA, DIA, 8th Army, USARPAC, etc. It discovered that a number of analysts were working on various aspects of the order of battle problem. No one, however, was coordinating those disparate efforts to ensure that adequate analytic resources were being devoted to the ground forces order of battle.

The committee has taken the position that, although the nature of bureaucratic structures of authority may limit the ability of the DCI to manage production by non-CIA centers of analysis, it does not seem unreasonable to expect the DCI, as the nation's senior intelligence officer, to be aware of analytic problems, to know whether

[3] "Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978," Staff Report Subcommittee on Evaluation, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, January 1979, p. 7. GPO #38-745

[4] "Monitoring Overseas Direct Employment" which is an OMB reporting requirement on the numbers of permanent Embassy employees at each U.S. Embassy.

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or not the CIA has adequate resources to cover shortfalls they create and to alert the Secretaries of Defense, State, etc., of the need to employ their own assets whenever he finds that the CIA cannot cover a vital subject. The committee has urged the DCI to work closely with senior intelligence officers in other agencies to better manage scarce analytic talent. Some progress has been made in that regard.

Abuses and Oversight

All Congressional committees are charged with guarding against abuses of power by government agencies. The two select committees on intelligence regularly receive and investigate complaints from employees and from the public about alleged illegal, or improper activities by elements of the intelligence community. Further, Executive Order 12036 requires the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of departments and agencies involved in intelligence activities to "report in a timely fashion to" the two select committees "information relating to intelligence activities that are illegal or improper and corrective actions that are taken and planned." [5] Over the last three years, no illegal activities on the part of the U.S. intelligence agencies have been reported.

For the last several years, an extended debate has occurred on the pros and cons of legislation spelling out in some detail what activities the intelligence agencies are allowed to undertake and what methods of operation are to be permitted. That debate has involved both select committees, the Executive Branch, including the White House and the Department of Justice, as well as a wide spectrum of the American public. Extensive guidelines have been developed within the Executive Branch under the guidance of the Attorney General to cover those activities of the intelligence services which might involve a "U.S. person."

During the 96th Congress, no consensus was developed to support an extensive list of legislative restrictions on intelligence activities. Agreement was reached, however, on language which for the first time put into law the obligation of the DCI and other intelligence officials to keep the two select committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities, as well as any illegalities.[6] Compliance with the concept embodied in that language will depend on the trust which exists between the committees on the one hand and the intelligence officials on the other. But, good faith implementation of that law will enable the two committees to carry out their responsibilities for vigorous oversight and to guard against misuse of the nation's intelligence activities.

Cooperation with oversight committees' requests for information has varied from agency to agency. Some respond quickly and completely. In the case of others, however, the process is much like pulling teeth. Committee Members and staff have found a great deal of truth in the old adage that you must ask the right question if you want the right answer.

Closely connected with the willingness of officials in the intelligence services to share sensitive information with the oversight committees is the question of how closely those committees will hold that information. From the beginning, the Chairman and Members of both select committees recognized that their attitudes

[5] Executive Order 12036, "United States Intelligence Activities," January 26, 1978, Sec. 3-403. 43 Fed. Reg. 3674.

[6] Public Law 96-450, October 14, 1980, "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981." Sec. 407. 94 Stat. 1975.

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towards security would be a major factor in establishing a relationship of trust with the intelligence community. The resolutions adopted by each House of Congress establishing the select committees directed the committees to adopt in their rules regulations to protect the confidentiality of classified information in their possession. The same resolutions also established procedures for the investigation and punishment of any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by a Member or staff employee.

Further, all prospective staff employees must meet the criteria established by the DCI for Executive Branch employees who will receive access to sensitive compartmented intelligence. The committees have compartmented their staff's access to intelligence on a need-to-know basis. Strict controls have been implemented from the inception of both committees for the handling, storage, dissemination and destruction of classified information. Each staff employee must sign a non-disclosure agreement before being hired. Both select committees have put careful thought and much effort into the security aspects of their operations. They have received the full cooperation, and the certification, of the various security offices within the intelligence community in creating a secure environment on the Hill.

Legislation on Intelligence

Traditionally, very little legislation has been passed affecting the U.S. intelligence community. Over the past several years, however, a number of legislative measures have been introduced and passed affecting, in one way or another, the way the intelligence agencies operate. For example, in response to Congressional concerns that the United States might become involved clandestinely in a war such as Laos or Angola without the knowledge of the Congress, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 was amended by the so-called Hughes-Ryan Amendment to require that:

> "No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives."

Thus, for the first time by law, the Congress became fully involved in reviewing the covert action program of the CIA. Even though the Hughes-Ryan Amendment did not give the "appropriate committees of the Congress" veto power over covert actions, the clear implication was, and was taken to be, that the Congress wanted a major reduction in CIA's non-intelligence collection activities, i.e., paramilitary, propaganda, political action, etc.

For their part, many in the White House and the CIA came to feel that even if major covert actions were warranted and could be satisfactorily explained, the requirement to inform "appropriate" committee's—which by 1977 had expanded to eight, the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence and the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees—posed too high a risk of public disclosure of covert action programs. By 1980, the Congress also had come to agree with that

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viewpoint. Both select committees recommended that only the two intelligence committees be informed of covert actions.[7]

As a result of the covert action reporting requirements, the select committees have served as a kind of "murder board" before which the Central Intelligence Agency must present the rationale behind each such program. Within the Executive Branch, there can often be such enthusiasm for a covert action that the independence of the review process can be questioned. Knowledge that each approved covert action must be defended before the two select committees encourages thorough review before a proposal is passed to the President for approval.

Another area where legislation was needed concerns the "graymail" problem. For years, the Executive Branch had been reluctant to bring criminal charges against individuals in possession of classified information which might be revealed in the course of a trial. The implied threat of such revelations served as a kind of blackmail, or "graymail" as it came to be known.

In 1980, both intelligence committees reported out, and the Congress passed, the Classified Information Procedures Act,[8] which established pretrial, trial and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving classified information. The legislation allows persons accused of criminal acts to defend themselves while providing the Government with procedures to protect classified information from being disclosed unnecessarily.

The Congress—again through its intelligence committees—and the Executive Branch also worked together to produce the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 [9] which created a special court to authorize applications for orders approving the use of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence within the United States. Prior to the enactment of that legislation, electronic surveillance within the United States for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence had been authorized by the Attorney General on the basis of the inherent constitutional powers of the President. However, two consecutive Attorneys General, one in a Republican Administration and one in a Democratic Administration, argued the need for a legal basis for obtaining court ordered surveillances to protect intelligence officers and the Attorney General from being successfully sued by subjects of such surveillance.

The select committees have also secured passage of legislation on a variety of matters to assist the intelligence community in functioning more effectively. For example, National Security Agency personnel assigned overseas are now authorized certain allowances and benefits comparable to those provided by the State Department to employees of the Foreign Service. The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have been authorized by law to pay death gratuities to the surviving dependents of any intelligence employee who dies as a result of injuries outside the United States and "whose death resulted from hostile or terrorist activities or occurred in connection with an intelligence activity having a substantial element of risk."

In short, the existence of two select committees on intelligence has provided a focal point for the Executive Branch whenever legislation has been needed for the intelligence community.

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[7] Public Law 96-450—October 14, 1980, "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981." 94 Stat. 1975.

[8] Public Law 96-456—October 15, 1980, "Classified Information Procedures Act." 94 Stat. 2025.

[9] Public Law 95-511, "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978," October 25, 1978. 92 Stat. 1783.

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Program and Budget Authorization

Rule XLVIII of the U.S. House of Representatives sets forth the duties of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. One duty is to consider each year authorizations for:

(A) The Central Intelligence Agency and Director of Central Intelligence;

(B) The Defense Intelligence Agency;

(C) The National Security Agency;

(D) The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of other agencies and subdivisions of the Department of Defense;

(E) The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Department of State; and

(F) The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including all activities of the Intelligence Division.

What that language means is that every year when the President forwards to Congress his budget proposal for the coming fiscal year, the two select committees on intelligence review those portions of the budget request which fund the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government. In the course of extensive Committee hearings (usually more than 50 hours) and detailed staff study in preparation for those hearings, each program is thoroughly examined and each program manager is afforded every opportunity to fully justify his budget request.

For the most part, the select committees have been supportive of the budget requests for intelligence. In fact, they have added manpower spaces in certain cases where the committee believed the budget request was too low.

In other instances, the budget has been cut because the justification presented to the committee did not adequately support the request or because of unnecessary duplication between two or more programs. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence conducts an almost unique cross-program review of projects in both the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget and the Intelligence-Related Activities budget of the Defense Department.

The Intelligence-Related Activities (IRA) category is an aggregation of activities within the budget of the Department of Defense which:

"a. Respond to operational commanders' tasking for time sensitive information on foreign entities;

"b. Respond to national intelligence community tasking of systems whose primary mission is support to operating forces;

"c. Train personnel for intelligence duties;

"d. Provide an intelligence reserve; or

"e. Are devoted to research and development intelligence or related capabilities.

"Specifically excluded are programs which are so closely integrated with a weapon system that their primary function is to provide immediate-use targeting data." [10]

[10] DoD Budget Guidance Manual, 7110-1-M.

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In fiscal year 1981, the Defense Department began to refer to IRA as TIARA, Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities, but the definition remained the same.

The distinction between an intelligence collection system which responds to an operational (military) commander's tasking for time sensitive information and one which responds to someone else's tasking for time sensitive information often is hard to make. One system may be able to satisfy tasking from a variety of sources, including operational commanders. In many cases, operational commanders' requirements cannot be met by collection systems funded in the NFIP, so a separate capability has to be provided. In other cases, however, the committee has found instances where proposed collection capabilities in the TIARA account duplicated capabilities in the NFIP.

The cross-program review by the House Select Committee is important because no truly effective review of the TIARA and NFIP accounts has been conducted within the Executive Branch. A mechanism exists for such a review but there is an understandable hesitancy for one element of the bureaucracy to buy trouble by poaching on the turf of another element of the bureaucracy. From the point of view of the committee, an effective cross-program review by responsible Executive Branch officials is much to be desired and it regularly recommends improvement in that area.

Another issue of concern to both select committees is the insufficient attention to out-year planning. Each of the last few years, the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget appeared to have been constructed with budget constraints playing the deciding role in what went into the program and what did not. Consequently, decisions affecting very expensive technical systems or mixes of systems requiring multi-year commitments of funds have been delayed year after year. The result has been a thinning of collection capabilities and an escalation of costs when the decisions are finally made to proceed with the necessary new systems. The committees continue to work with responsible intelligence community officials to develop better long-range planning.

Leaks

Perhaps the most vexing and intractable problem the select committees have grappled with has been that of the cascade of "leaks" of classified intelligence information over the past several years by Executive Branch officials. Nothing angers a Member of either committee more than being lectured in a closed session of the committee by a senior intelligence official about the sensitivity of the information being discussed and then finding the same information in the next day's newspaper attributed to "intelligence officials" or "knowledgeable Administration sources." In spite of persistent efforts by both committees to have the most damaging leaks investigated, little, if anything, has been done to identify the leakers. This issue is certain to continue to be a major concern of the two select committees. Some measure of that concern can be made by the fact that at the confirmation hearing for Mr. Casey to be Director of Central Intelligence, both Senator Huddleston and Senator Moynihan expressed their determination to continue to work to stop the leaking of classified information. Mr. Casey responded by stating that "the kind of purposeful leaks that have occurred cannot be tolerated, and you cannot maintain an effective and successful intelligence service if the people who are providing information feel it is not secure," raising the hope that strong efforts will be made in the future to deter such leaks.

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A close working relationship has developed between the intelligence community and the select committees over the past several years. At his confirmation hearing, DCI Casey summed up the relationship well:

> "To carry out its assignment, the intelligence community needs both public support and the full participation and cooperation of the Congress. I am pleased that after a period of turmoil the Executive and Legislative Branches have now institutionalized their arrangements in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1981. I pledge care and diligence in protecting the legal rights of American citizens. I pledge also to work closely with Congress on this as well as in monitoring and improving the performance of the intelligence community. Particularly through the Intelligence Committee's study of U.S. intelligence products, procedures and budgets, Congress will provide a valued independent source of review to ensure we are achieving all that is humanly possible and the Congress will be in a position to provide any necessary legislation."

The continuation of that relationship will help ensure that the intelligence community receives the resources and the legislation it needs to meet its challenges and that it will have strong public support from the Congress.

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TITLE: Wallenberg: A Lingering Tragedy of World War II

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His role in US rescue efforts may have doomed the missing diplomat

WALLENBERG: A LINGERING TRAGEDY OF WORLD WAR II

(b)(3)(c)

January 1981 marked the 36th anniversary of the disappearance of Raoul Gustaf Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat credited with saving thousands of Hungarian Jews during World War II. Arrested by the Soviets in 1945, Wallenberg's fate remains a tantalizing mystery fed by continuing reports that he survives somewhere in the Soviet gulag. Pressure from successive Swedish governments as well as recent queries from the United States and Israel have failed to extract a satisfactory explanation from Moscow. Neither Stalin, Khrushchev, or the current Soviet leadership have provided answers to why Wallenberg was arrested and detained, or what fate befell him. Although the definitive story may never be told, a look into the declassified documents of the US War Refugee Board, which actually sponsored Wallenberg's project, provides some interesting insights into the clandestine character of that organization—a factor that could have aroused Soviet suspicions and led to his disappearance.

In 1979, the US State Department accepted partial responsibility for Wallenberg's fate by admitting in a so-called "non paper" presented to the Soviet chargé in Washington that the US had provided funds for the program to save Hungarian Jews. The Department failed to reveal, however, that Wallenberg's contact man at the US legation in Stockholm, Iver C. Olsen, was a member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the parent organization of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Hungarian project was one of about a half-dozen similar operations sponsored by the War Refugee Board—not the OSS—in an effort to save European Jewry from the Nazi holocaust. At great personal risk, Wallenberg extended neutralist Sweden's diplomatic protection to Hungarian Jews, often using false documents and bribery, and sometimes resorting to bold deceptions. He is credited with having saved at least 20,000 lives. Mentioned for the Nobel peace prize for the first time in 1948, his name has been put forward almost every year since.

Wallenberg was born to the recently widowed Baroness Maj von Dardel of Stockholm on August 4, 1912. His father was Jewish and was related to the wealthy Swedish banking family headed by Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg. Earlier generations of the Wallenberg family had enjoyed distinguished careers in the diplomatic service. One of Raoul's grand uncles had served as Swedish Minister to the Legation in the United States and another was Foreign Minister during World War I. His aunt was married to Colonel William Calvin of Connecticut, a former US military attache in Stockholm.

Wallenberg was an architect by profession and had studied at the University of Michigan in 1934 and 1935. US diplomatic correspondence following his disappearance indicates that he was well connected in Washington and may have been

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personally acquainted with President Roosevelt. He had been working with a firm in Stockholm in June 1944 when the Swedish Foreign Office approached him to take an assignment at the Swedish Legation in Budapest. Accepting the assignment, Wallenberg told the American Minister in Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, that he wanted to save lives and was not interested merely in filing reports to the Foreign Office. Both Johnson and Iver Olsen, who was also the War Refugee Board representative in Stockholm, were impressed with Wallenberg and described him as "our choice" for the job.

Johnson informed the Department in a cable on June 29, 1944 that the Swedish Foreign Office felt that by assigning Wallenberg to Budapest it was cooperating fully with the furtherance of an "American program." According to Johnson, Wallenberg felt that he was carrying out a mission for the US War Refugee Board—implying that he viewed his posting as an attache to the Swedish Legation as his cover. Consequently, the newly appointed attache requested that Washington cable full instructions outlining his duties, limits of authority and extent of financial support. Johnson recommended that Wallenberg not be restricted by a "concrete program," but be given rather general instructions that would allow him to deal with situations as they developed. He further informed Washington that arrangements had been made to communicate with Wallenberg in Budapest through the Foreign Office in Stockholm.

Wallenberg's instructions were passed in a War Refugee Board cable relayed in July by the State Department to Stockholm. They included an account of how much funding was available, a description of the various refugee escape channels that might be used to smuggle out Hungarian Jews and a list of possible friendly contacts in the Budapest area. Olsen was told to pass on to Wallenberg as much of this information as he deemed advisable. The Board's message also said that:

> "while he (Wallenberg) cannot of course, act as the Board's representative, nor purport to act in its name, he can, whenever advisable, indicate that as a Swede he is free to communicate with Stockholm where a representative of the Board is stationed. He may thus express his willingness to lay before the Board's representative specific proposals if in any particular case he should deem so doing to be advisable, or if by reason of the nature of the proposals Olsen's or the Board's approval is necessary."

In order to appreciate Wallenberg's accomplishments it is necessary to understand the plight of European Jewry in the spring of 1944. The German army had suffered devastating losses in the East and the long anticipated Allied invasion of Europe seemed imminent. Despite accounts of the horrors of Nazi extermination camps, most Jews, particularly those in Hungary who had survived in one of Europe's most anti-semitic countries, were reluctant to believe the thoroughness of Hitler's "final solution." Many Jews fled from Germany, Slovakia, and Poland to Hungary despite its history of anti-semitism and its reputation as a loyal ally of Nazi Germany. Anti-semitism long had been an element of life in Hungary. In 1924, long before Hitler came to power, Hungary promulgated the first discriminatory laws against Jews.

Nevertheless, as the war drew to a close, the Jewish population in Hungary increased as a result of the influx of refugees. For their part, many Hungarian Jews thought Germany soon would pull back its forces and negotiate a surrender. The Horthy government certainly would have followed Berlin's lead. Instead, Horthy was deposed and on March 19, 1944 elements of the German army entered Budapest and the one-time ally for all practical purposes, became an occupied country under the

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Szalasi regime. A few days later, Adolf Eichmann, architect of the final solution, arrived in Budapest along with some of the most infamous officers of the Sondereinsatzkommandos—the special section of the Gestapo charged with the extinction of Jews. Germany was going to lose the war but efforts to complete the extermination of the Jews was accorded top priority.

In spite of these developments, most Jews refused to take any defensive action. Efforts to form a resistance, spearheaded by young Hungarian Zionists, were only partially successful because the majority of Jews would not take up arms. The docility of the Hungarian Jews, choosing to believe that the Germans eventually would abandon their extermination plans, was turned to Nazi advantage by Eichmann. When Jews by the thousands were turned out of their homes and herded into ghettos and staging areas for transport to the death camps, Jewish leaders often went among their co-religionists urging them not to panic and to cooperate with Nazi and Hungarian authorities. As a result, during the spring and summer of 1944, some 800,000 Jews were transported from Hungary and executed.

Earlier that year, stories of the holocaust had begun to reach Washington, Stockholm and other world capitals. While few grasped the extent of the horror, President Roosevelt put into action plans to assist the remaining Jews to escape and to discourage further atrocities, particularly in countries allied to Germany. Roosevelt issued a statement warning the Hungarians and other German allies that the US was determined to see that those who shared the guilt of Nazi policies be punished. Similar resolutions were passed by both the House and Senate. Copies of both were given to Wallenberg with the instruction that whenever possible he should call them to the attention of the Hungarian authorities.

The War Refugee Board was established in January 1944 as part of the Executive Office of the President. The Board was composed of the Secretaries of State, Treasury and War. The Board's mission was to combat the Nazi efforts to exterminate captive people because of their race, religion, or political beliefs. The first Executive Director of the Board was John Pehle, assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury. He was succeeded a year later by Brigadier General William O'Dwyer who directed the Board until its dissolution in September 1945.

The records of the Board suggest that the experience gained by the Administration in setting up the Office of Strategic Services a few years earlier was used to establish the new organization. Special representatives served the Board in strategic areas in or near the European mainland—Turkey, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, the UK, Italy, and North Africa. Their communications were classified and the Board's representatives and contacts in enemy territory—sometimes referred to as "agents"—often had cover. Although those of the Board's records dealing with Wallenberg fail to reveal any connection with any intelligence organization, a still classified list of OSS employees identifies Iver C. Olsen, the Board's representative in Stockholm and the link between Wallenberg and Washington, as a member of the Special Intelligence Branch, OSS. Olsen was a diplomat and Board representative; apparently, he was part of the 35-man OSS station in Stockholm in the fall of 1944, as well. If Olsen's identity was known to Soviet intelligence—perhaps through liaison arrangements—it is possible that Wallenberg's contacts with American intelligence may have aroused Soviet suspicion.

Wallenberg arrived in Budapest in July and immediately rented a 16-room office which he placed under the extraterritorality of the Swedish Legation. This office had a

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great deal more space than he needed for clerical functions, of course, and soon provided sanctuary for several prominent religious leaders. His advent had coincided with a temporary suspension in the transport of Jews to the camps. In two months prior to his arrival, however, Hungarian police had turned over 400,000 to the SS. With the temporary suspension order, local Hungarian authorities agreed to proposals by the War Refugee Board, the Swedish Red Cross and the Jewish Agency of Palestine that some Jews be allowed to emigrate and others be extended the protection of neutral legations in Budapest. Wallenberg seized on this and begun acquiring properties throughout the city which he placed under the Swedish banner as sanctuaries for thousands of Jews.

A dispatch from Iver Olsen in Stockholm in August reflected the zeal with which Wallenberg approached his task. Olsen wrote John Pehle, Executive Director of the Board:

> "I get the impression that the Swedish Foreign Office is somewhat uneasy about Wallenberg's activities in Budapest, and perhaps feel that he has jumped in with too big a splash. They would prefer, of course, to approach the Jewish problem in the finest traditions of European diplomacy, which wouldn't help too much."

In the same dispatch he relates how Wallenberg "left in a hell of a hurry with no instructions and no funds." The Board had ample funds but getting the monies to Wallenberg may have caused some problems as he frantically acquired properties and bribed local officials. Dealing with Hungarian authorities Wallenberg at first experienced considerable success; for example, the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm informed the Swedish Foreign Office in August that the Hungarian government agreed to authorize the emigration to Sweden of Jews recently granted citizenship by the Swedish king. Other Jews could emigrate, as well, provided they had relatives or long standing business connections in Sweden. Wallenberg screened thousands of Jews who might fit the criteria for emigration under the Hungarian edict and found some 5,000 of 9,000 eligible. He issued the necessary documentation for those who qualified and tried to protect the rest from being conscripted into labor battalions or transported to Germany by placing them in houses under the Swedish flag.

By the end of September, an additional 5,000 persons had been extended Swedish protection. According to a cable from Minister Johnson in Stockholm, deportations from Hungary to the death camps had officially stopped and Jews in Budapest appeared to be "reasonably safe for the time being." Wallenberg was less optimistic, as the German occupiers began extending their authority and Hungarian officials caved in. In some of the more remote concentration camps in Hungary, for example, German forces continued to commandeer Jewish prisoners for deportation.

When the deportations "officially" resumed, Wallenberg doubled his efforts to establish more "Swedish houses" and even sequestered some in private homes throughout Budapest. These Jews would otherwise have been deported or swept into labor battlions by the Nazis or their local adherents, the Hungarian Arrow Cross. According to some accounts, Wallenberg cooperated with the Swiss Legation and Hazalah, a small Jewish resistance group, in duplicating protection certificates and establishing sanctuaries. Several times, he reportedly faced down Nazi and Hungarian authorities trying to deport Jews under his governments's protection. According to a Stockholm press account forwarded to Washington by Minister Johnson, Wallenberg confronted armed Hungarian troops who had entered one of his houses in search of

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labor conscripts and warned "none leaves this place as long as I live." Thus balked the troops withdrew; later their commander returned to talk with Wallenberg. After an hour, according to the story, Wallenburg received a written pledge from the commander saying that Jews under Swedish protection were exempt from labor service.

One of the most famous episodes involves Wallenberg racing a deportation train that was headed for the death camps in Germany. Apparently the Gestapo had herded several people with Swedish protection on a train already crowded with other Jews. Informed of this, Wallenberg raced to the Budapest railway station only to discover that the train had departed. He pursued it by car to a small town near the Hungarian border, confronted the train commander and demanded the release of the documented captives. The commander relented and Wallenberg returned to Budapest with "his" people—the rest of the passengers were not so fortunate.

The effectiveness of the Hungarian government waned in the months before the Soviet occupation in January 1945. No one was safe. Jews and other unfortunate minorities fell easy prey to the Gestapo, the Arrow Cross and other thugs. Wallenberg was harassed and it was rumored that the Arrow Cross had put a price on his head. His car was stolen and once his office staff was arrested. The confusion, however, probably contributed to the success of some of his efforts. Bogus documentation replete with forged stamps and seals was effective in persuading military authorities and police to release prisoners. Many Hungarian Jews owe their lives to the documents skillfully crafted by Wallenberg and others.

By December, the relief effort guided by Wallenberg had reached considerable proportions, with 335 employees in addition to about 40 physicians, house governors, and miscellaneous helpers. He had rented at least ten houses—one account claims 30—to shelter Jews and had two hospitals with a total of 150 beds, along with several soup kitchens and a ration card system for distributing food. Wallenberg had convinced the Hungarian authorities that Jews with foreign documentation already serving in labor battalions in Hungary should be returned to Budapest. Some 15,000 were. Through the intervention of Wallenberg and his staff over 2,000 others were snatched from deportation points at the last minute. According to a report from the Swedish Foreign Office, Jews bearing Swedish protective passports fared better than the other wards of foreign missions in Hungary.

Nevertheless, the situation in Budapest became even more dangerous as the Nazis and their Arrow Cross sympathizers made a last ditch attempt to annihilate those Jews still alive. Wallenberg devoted all his energies to caring for those under his protection and reportedly cooperated with nascent Jewish resistance groups. According to the account of a Polish officer who spent 15 years in Soviet prisions and who knew Wallenberg, the Swede spent the early weeks in January 1945 rounding up weapons for the small band of Jewish resistance fighters in Budapest. Some of these Hazalahs donned Gestapo garb and actually guarded properties used for quartering Jews.

By mid-January the first contingents of the Soviet army reached the invirons of Budapest. One historian of this period claims that when a Soviet patrol visited the Swedish Legation on January 13 Wallenberg asked to be put in touch with the local Soviet commander. Four days later, according to a press account, Wallenberg, escorted by Soviet military personnel, appeared at the Jewish "relief office" in Budapest. He said he was on his way to see Marshal Rodion Malinovsky. "I'm going," he said but "I don't know if its as their guest or their prisoner."

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Another version of Wallenberg's disappearance is attributed to a Latvian named Krisko who worked as a Russian interpreter at the Swedish Legation in Budapest at the time. The Legation had employed Krisko to handle Russian traffic after Sweden accepted responsibility for Soviet interests when Hungary declared war on the USSR. Krisko and Wallenberg were arrested about the same time and held at a Soviet military facility outside Budapest. On January 20 they were flown to Moscow. This was the first time they had seen each other since before their arrest and, according to Krisko, Wallenberg, who was sitting under guard several feet away, nodded in recognition. Wallenberg, "looked bouyant, probably thinking his arrest was a misunderstanding." A few days later the Swedish Legation in Moscow was informed by the Soviets that Wallenberg was under their "protection."

As the plight of Jewish refugees improved following the Nazi collapse in Hungary, communications between Stockholm and the War Refugee Board diminished; it was April before Minister Johnson reported to Washington that Sweden had asked for US assistance in determining Wallenberg's fate. He said there had been unconfirmed radio reports that Wallenberg had been murdered, presumably by the Arrow Cross, and asked that our Embassy in Moscow be instructed to request assistance from the Soviet government. In reaction to Johnson's cable, Treasury Secretary Henry Morganthau reminded Secretary of State Edward Stettinious of his own personal interest in Wallenberg in a handwritten note on April 4. Correspondence concerning Wallenberg tapered off over the summer and the War Refugee Board was dissolved in September.

Swedes loyal to Wallenberg, however, were loath to let the issue rest. A Wallenberg Committee was formed to pressure the Stockholm government to continue to query the Soviets. In the early post-war years, less than enthusiastic socialist governments in Stockholm tried to avoid provoking the Soviets. Nevertheless, after several attempts to elicit a response from Moscow, a functionary at the Soviet Legation in Stockholm said in 1946 that Wallenberg was "being taken care of for some foolish things he had done." Another story claimed that Wallenberg had been convicted by a Soviet court as an American spy and sentenced to 25 years.

There are a number of things that may have caused the Soviets to doubt Wallenberg's credentials. His modus operandi certainly exceeded standard diplomatic practice. The falsification of documents for Jewish refugees, the use of bribes, and his successful use of bluff and bravado on numerous occasions were probably known to them. His familiarity with the Soviet interests section of the Swedish Legation, implied by the interpreter Krisko who also was accused by the Soviets of being an American spy, may have increased those suspicions. The generally muddled condition of Wallenberg's bona fides is reflected in a portion of a digest cable from Allied headquarters in Caserta, Italy in May 1945. According to a source in Budapest (possibly Brigadier General Bonner Key, OSS):

> "General Key has asked the Soviet military authorities for information regarding the whereabouts of Wallenberg, Meier, and Feller. The instruction in the Department's 12 for Budapest will be complied with as far as possible, but the fact that the Soviet authorities may well have conclusive proof of pro-Nazi collaboration on the part of Feller and possibly of Meier and Wallenberg should be of interest to the Department."

The reference to collaboration with the Nazi's probably referred to Wallenberg's use of bribes to gain the release of Jews and other refugees.

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Some of the communications passed by the War Refugee Board representative in Stockholm through the Swedish Foreign Office to Wallenberg also may have aroused suspicion. For example, shortly after Wallenberg arrived in Hungary, the Department of State asked Olsen in Stockholm to request him to forward to a Hungarian businessman a message from his partner in Los Angeles. The communication was cryptic with numerous references to the reputed partner's personal effects—ruby cuff links, his wife's gold bracelet, a brooch with green stone, etc. The businessman was to be told that he could expect to go to Switzerland soon and should "apply for a visa immediately." The Department's explanation for the message was that the two men were business associates and that the partner in Budapest soon was to go to Switzerland on banking business. The cable cautioned Olsen, however, that if he thought it was inappropriate for any reason to pass the message he was to advise the Board, which would reconsider the action. Although there is no indication that the message was passed to Wallenberg or by him to anyone else, such instructions, if compromised, could have raised questions about his assignment.

Efforts to get the Soviets to provide an explanation of what happened to Wallenberg span the 36 years since his disappearance. Stalin reportedly took a personal interest in investigating Wallenberg's case but failed to reveal his fate. When Khrushchev visited Stockholm in 1956 he was presented a petition by Wallenberg's mother and the Soviet leader promised to "clear up the matter." Subsequently, Moscow officially announced that a "man named Raoul Wallenberg died of a heart attack in July 1947" in Lubyanka prison. The Swedes requested the remains of the body—only to be told it had been cremated—despite the usual Soviet practice of burying deceased prisoners with their number plate affixed to a leg. In the Brezhnev era, Soviet officials seem torn between the Lubyanka story and another that asserts that Wallenberg was killed by Nazis or Hungarian fascists before the fall of Budapest in revenge for saving Jews.

A number of reports from prisoners released by the Soviets over the years since the 1950s trace Wallenberg's odessey through the Soviet prison system. Former inmates of Lubyanka, Vladimir, Aleksandrov Central, Verkhneural'sk, and other prisons have reported meeting Wallenberg or of knowing some other prisoner who knew him. One of the most recent and credible accounts is that of Jan Kaplan, a former inmate of Butryka prison, who wrote his daughter in Israel that while in the prison infirmary in 1977 he had met a Swede who had been in several different prisons over the past 30 years. According to Kaplan, the Swede "was in pretty good condition." This report was subsequently relayed to Stockholm and the Swedish government sent yet another note to the Soviets in January 1979. The response: "No Further Information."

Nevertheless, the Israeli government felt that Kaplan's tale merited further investigation and Prime Minister Begin urged President Carter to ask Brezhnev about Wallenberg when the two leaders met at the Summit in Vienna in 1979. Members of the US delegation queried their Soviet counterparts to no avail. An earlier attempt to bring highlevel US pressure to bear on the Soviets may have occurred in 1973. According to Nina Lagergren, Wallenberg's half-sister who visited Washington in the summer of 1979, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger vetoed instructions from his staff to the US Ambassador in Moscow to demand information regarding Wallenberg. If so, Kissenger probably sensed that such a demand would have been detrimental to the spirit of detente. Lagergren's visit, however, coincided with the "non-paper" mentioned earlier which admitted partial US funding for Wallenberg's project.

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In January 1980—the 35th anniversary of Wallenberg's disappearance—a group representing Wallenberg demonstrated outside the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm. The Swedish Foreign Ministry issued a statement reviewing Wallenberg's role as a humanitarian and informed the Soviets that Sweden's demand for a complete disclosure concerning his fate remained unsatisfied. The government also released previously classified information detailing immediate postwar attempts to gain Wallenberg's freedom. The documents confirmed the unwillingness of Sweden's post war governments to antagonize Moscow over Wallenberg. According to press reports, one document indicated that Stockholm had turned down an offer by former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson to intercede with the Soviets to gain Wallenberg's release.

On the 36th anniversary of Wallenberg's disappearance in January 1981, some 350 persons attended a "hearing" in Stockholm sponsored by the Swedish Wallenberg Association. Marcus Wallenberg, the patriarch of the Swedish banking dynasty, the British and Israeli ambassadors, and the wife of US Senator Daniel Moynihan, attended. Several former Soviet prisoners testified to direct or indirect contact with a Swedish prisoner long after 1947, when the Soviets claim Wallenberg died. Gideon Hausner, chairman of the Israeli Wallenberg Committee and the prosecutor of Adolph Eichmann, told the audience that he had seen no convincing evidence that Wallenberg had died. On the contrary, Hausner felt that there was "considerable material" to contradict the Soviet version of Wallenberg's fate. Hausner also reminded demonstrators that Wallenberg had been appointed to his task by President Roosevelt and declared "we don't want to relieve America of the responsibility to pursue the case." Hausner's comments were echoed by Simon Wiesenthal, founder of the Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna.

In all probability, such activities merely will annoy the Soviets, producing few results. It would seem unlikely that the present regime in Moscow would call attention to the fact that Wallenberg's life, or 36 years of it, had been forfeited to their whim. What could they say? That his arrest was simply a misunderstanding carried out by overzealous security personnel operating under a blanket order to arrest all suspicious foreigners in Budapest? Then what about his early years of detention? Thousands of German prisoners of war were detained in the Soviet Union for years after the war. Had Wallenberg been returned before 1950, for example, his detention might have been attributed to administrative error.

A possible opportunity to get a definitive answer to the Wallenberg affair may occur when a change in leadership takes place in the Soviet Union . . . a time when criticism of the previous regime is sometimes permitted. Until then, the true fate of Raoul Wallenberg may never be clear, but his humanitarian accomplishments are irrefutable.

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TITLE: CIA Versus DOD: Competing Misconception Of Strategic Assessment

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CIA VERSUS DOD: COMPETING MISCONCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT *

(b)(3)(c)

Aping the adversary's strategic capability "suggests to observers, not determination, but rather the lack of assurance of the frontier tenderfoot in the Western movie who carries two oversized guns to town to demonstrate his readiness for 'high noon'."

Maxwell Taylor

Recent changes in American strategic doctrine have prompted shifts in the yardsticks used to gauge strategic sufficiency. The changes in doctrine have also led to a heightened perception of the importance of these measures. This paper examines measures of the strategic balance now in vogue in the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. It argues that they are inaccurate, misleading, and even detrimental to the success of deterrence.

Strategic forces mean nothing in the abstract. They must be assessed in terms of the missions they are expected to perform. For the United States this mission has always been deterrence, although deterrence of what has never been altogether clear. From time to time officials have spoken of extended deterrence, supposing that American strategic forces could prevent or at least discourage military action by the Soviet Union against the United States and its allies. At other times, these forces have been described as having the more circumscribed task of deterring a nuclear attack upon the United States. Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown's statements in his last Annual Report for 1981 illustrate the fuzziness that surrounds the official conception of deterrence. Twice in this document he declares: "Despite some initial illusions, most of us have recognized for many years that strategic nuclear capabilities alone could only deter a narrow range of contingencies." These he defines "as nuclear attacks on the United States, our forces overseas, and on our friends and allies." On the same page, however, where this statement appears the second time, he states that "Nuclear forces also contribute to some degree, through fear of escalation, to deterrence of nonnuclear attacks." Sandwiched in between two iterations of the first statement is yet another pronouncement on deterrence that extends its scope even further. The Secretary declares that it is capable not only of "discouraging reckless action in a crisis" but of "minimizing aggressive behavior over the long term." [1]

To be fair to Harold Brown, we must acknowledge that his lack of precision about the political utility of strategic forces is but a reflection of the ambiguity on this subject in the government, the media, and academia. In part this is due to the nature of the beast; it is very difficult to know just what impact a state's strategic arsenal has on its friends or adversaries. But such ambiguity also reflects our failure to develop adequate theory about the psychological relationship between threat and response and force and will. In the absence of good theory, efforts to determine the utility of

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deterrence often verge on the tautological. The official literature is full of statements to the effect that "deterrence has worked because the Russians have not invaded Western Europe." Even more sophisticated attempts to assess deterrence generally fail to spell out either the psychopolitical mechanisms by which it is supposed to operate or the levels at which it is assumed to be effective. [2]

These studies fail to provide a logic for formulating strategic missions or designing force structures. Successive administrations have accordingly succumbed to the temptation of devising strategic doctrine in response to the capabilities of their weapons. This is a complete reversal of the Clausewitzian dictum that military capability should reflect the political objectives it is designed to achieve. Nothing illustrates this point better than Presidential Directive 59. The new doctrine was little more than a recognition of the ways in which a series of incremental technological changes transformed the capabilities of American strategic forces. Each increment of change was the result of an innovation that improved the performance characteristics of some component of those forces. Collectively, these improvements give the United States the capability to carry out a sophisticated range of counterforce options into the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Doctrine was belatedly developed and promulgated by the Defense Department and the White House to take these changes into account. It was made public at a time the Carter administration hoped to impress the public with its toughness toward the Russians. [3]

Strategic

Even though successive administrations have not been clear about what they hope to deter, they have not hesitated to redefine the force requirements thought necessary to do the job. In the 1960s, when McNamara decreed that the ability "to destroy the Soviet Union as a 20th century nation" was sufficient to guarantee deterrence, strategic sufficiency was measured in terms of the capability to wipe out an arbitrarily determined number of Soviet cities. As the Russians possessed no capability during most of this period to attack the continental United States, little thought was devoted to the credibility of the US commitment to use nuclear weapons in retaliation. American strategic planners could also be confident about their ability to attain their stipulated operational objectives as the Soviets lacked the means to defend themselves against bombers and, later, nuclear submarines and intercontinental missiles. The ability of bombers to penetrate Soviet air defenses was the only question that aroused enduring concern. But this was partially allayed by the redundancy of American delivery systems and for a while the relative invulnerability of ICBMs and SLBMs.

The adoption of "essential equivalence," an outgrowth of the SALT process, led to a corresponding shift in the standards used to determine strategic sufficiency. As a doctrine, essential equivalence divorced the meaning of strategic forces from the wartime missions these forces might be called upon to perform. Instead of using mission as a yardstick as McNamara had, the Nixon and Ford administrations sought to assess strategic sufficiency by comparing American forces to present and projected Soviet force levels. Several static comparisons of forces were devised for this purpose, among them numbers of missiles, launchers, deliverable warheads, and equivalent megatonnage. [4]

Static indicators proved to be inescapably murky measures of strategic sufficiency. They ignored the reality that both the Soviet Union and the United States had developed their forces in response to different political needs, exploited different levels of technology in their design, and developed different doctrines for their employment. Soviet and American strategic forces represent the expression of two different societies, each with its own political-military tradition, distinctive world

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view, and means of evaluating its security. Direct force comparisons, regardless of the particular measures used, are largely meaningless. As the SALT debate revealed, they also have the disadvantage of being politically very charged.

For these reasons the Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, and the Carter White House became disenchanted with both essential equivalence and static indicators. In January 1979 Harold Brown summed up this consensus in the introduction to his *Annual Report*: "In designing our strategic nuclear forces, what we need for deterrence and stability cannot be dictated by any simple comparison with the forces of the Soviet Union, even though we must take those forces into account in our planning." [5] In the place of static indicators, defense planners and intelligence analysts developed more dynamic measures of the strategic balance, measures that attempt to take into account the performance characteristics of the forces on both sides. This dynamic analysis attempts to calculate the results of both sides allocating strategic forces against specific target sets. It uses the outcomes of these theoretical exchanges to describe the existing state of the strategic balance and offers them as benchmarks against which to formulate strategic needs.

The appeal of dynamic measures of strategic sufficiency has been enhanced by recent changes in doctrine. The "countervailing strategy" is based on the premise that deterrence requires the United States to be able to deny the Soviet Union any possible relative advantage that it might derive from a nuclear war, limited or all-out. The doctrine emphasizes the targeting of Soviet missile sites, command and control centers, and other military assets. Static indicators of the strategic balance are incapable of shedding light on the extent to which the United States can destroy these targets. Qualitative asymmetries in the strategic forces of the two superpowers also mean that static indicators are useless as a means of determining their relative capability to destroy given target sets. Dynamic analysis seeks answers to both these questions through the mechanism of theoretical force exchanges. It attempts to assess absolute capability in terms of the damage each side can inflict upon the strategic, military, and economic assets of the other. It measures relative capability as a function of the destructive potential each side retains after absorbing a first strike.

Dynamic measures have been made the cornerstone of the most recent efforts by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Studies and Gaming Agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the RAND Corporation to determine the relative strategic capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. The CIA, which pioneered the use of dynamic analysis, has employed it in its National Intelligence Estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities (NIE 11-3-78 and NIE 11-3-81). In these Estimates, Agency analysts calculate the potential of each side's ICBMs to attack the retaliatory forces of the other and then model such attacks in order to determine residual destructive potential. Residual destructive potential is defined as the gross number of missile reentry vehicles (RVs) and bomber weapons that each side could be expected to retain after having been attacked. These remaining weapons are then compared on the basis of their lethal area potential and hard-target potential, that is, in terms of their utility against both area and point targets. These estimates are calculated under conditions of surprise and preemption. Surprise refers to a "bolt from the blue" attack, launched when both sides were in a day-to-day attack, that arises out of a crisis situation in which both sides have generated forces. [6]

The National Intelligence Estimates that incorporate this analysis make no pretence that it reflects the outcome of an actual nuclear exchange. The Estimates acknowledge several ways in which it is artificial. First of all, there are the kinds of forces used. Only ICBMs and SLBMs—and bombers for the Americans—are employed in the initial strike, and they are all targeted against the other's missile silos,

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bomber bases, and submarine pens in order to reduce as much as possible its retaliatory capability. In a real attack both sides, but especially the United States, could make use of other kinds of forces. The United States has significant strategic assets in Europe and the Far East, on land and at sea, that could be used to augment a strike against the Soviet Union.

Most strategists also expect that both superpowers would attack a wider range of targets than missile pads and bomber and submarine bases. Soviet and American doctrines explicitly call for the destruction of each other's military assets, in particular their command-and-control facilities and conventional force capabilities. The estimates also use admittedly arbitrary targeting doctrine; two-on-one ICBM attacks on silos and one-on-one attacks against the projected MX shelters. As with the choice of targets this is a reflection of the damage-limiting objective assumed for the purposes of the analysis to motivate both sides. For the same reason the Estimates assume that both sides ride out a first strike, whereas in a real exchange it seems more likely that they would attempt to launch from underneath an attack. The Soviets actually espouse a "launch-on-warning doctrine" and have made considerable strides in the last few years toward developing the capability to do this. Finally, the estimates make no attempt to calculate the reliability and accuracy of systems or of command-and-control networks in wartime conditions. The figures used reflect peacetime performance and are based on the results of tests that both sides carry out under relatively ideal conditions.

CIA Versus DoD: How they differ

For some or all of the reasons noted above many strategists are dissatisfied with the results of the CIA's strategic analysis. Liberal critics charge that the Agency's admittedly unrealistic assumption of a damage-limiting strategy for both sides has the effect of exaggerating American vulnerabilities to a Soviet first strike. Conservative critics allege that the Agency model minimizes the Soviet threat by failing to take into account more realistic and advanced Soviet preparations to fight a nuclear war. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the senior intelligence officers of the military services have gone on record with this complaint.

The Agency defends its dynamic analysis in terms of its contribution to assessing the efficacy of the American deterrent. The key requirement for deterrence, as defined by successive Secretaries of Defense, is the capability of the United States to absorb a first strike and still retain sufficient forces to destroy a broad mix of Soviet targets. The CIA argues that residual destructive potential, calculated in both absolute and relative terms, is the most direct measure of this capability and that trends with respect to it are an appropriate indicator of the overall strategic balance. Put another way, deterrence is above all a psychological phenomenon, a state of mind that results from the belief of Soviet and American leaders that they have everything to lose from a nuclear war. The assumption is that leaders' perceptions of the outcome of a nuclear exchange do not derive from a detailed understanding of what might really happen in such a conflict but depend upon an abstract and relatively simple conception of the strategic balance. To the charge that its analysis is artificial, the Agency could reply that its purpose is not to simulate an actual exchange but to derive numbers for an idealized measure of strategic balance—residual destructive potential—that itself has more symbolic than operational significance.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the three services with strategic missions insist that only the analysis of a comprehensive two-sided exchange, modeled on more realistic assumptions about doctrine and performance, can convey valid impressions about the relative strategic capabilities of the superpowers. This may be

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true, but such an approach is entirely scenario dependent. In addition to knowing who launches the first strike and whether one or both adversaries have their forces generated or on day-to-day alert, it requires detailed knowledge of their attack-and-response strategies as well as accurate information about the wartime performance of their weapon systems and command-and-control networks. There is no consensus in the strategic community as to how to estimate the outcome of such a conflict. The problem is compounded by the fact that a nuclear war fought in the late 1980s would involve weapon systems that have not yet been deployed, or even tested in some instances, by either side. Nevertheless, the choice of attack strategy and the assigned performance characteristics of the weapons used determine the results of any simulation.

The uncertainty associated with efforts to make a realistic model of a "comprehensive" exchange of forces deprives such estimates of much of their analytical value. An analyst can come up with almost any outcome he wants if he chooses the appropriate doctrine, rules of engagement, or indices of operational performance. The nature of this problem is readily apparent in the reaction within the strategic community to efforts carried out under Defense Department auspices to model a nuclear conflict. Briefings on these exercises rapidly degenerate into heated confrontations about the methods and numbers used to build and test the model. If American strategists cannot agree among themselves about how to simulate a nuclear war, it is reasonable to suppose that whatever consensus the Intelligence Community eventually reaches will bear only a chance resemblance to the conclusions of their Soviet counterparts, who would approach the problem with their own doctrinal assumptions and data bases. The entire purpose of assessment, however, is to analyze relative strategic capabilities through Soviet eyes in order to assess the health of our deterrent. When confronted with this dilemma, the artificiality of the CIA analysis, singled out as its major drawback, might fairly be described as its greatest virtue.

On one level the conflict between the CIA and the Department of Defense is a struggle over turf: the services contend that the Agency's dynamic analysis represents a "net assessment," a prerogative of the Defense Department. But the conflict also represents the clash of two different intellectual approaches to the problem. The CIA approach stresses the importance of the psychological roots of deterrence. Agency analysts have accordingly constructed stylized scenarios for force exchanges that are keyed to this conception. DIA and the services conceive of deterrence in more operational terms. They accordingly want to calculate, as realistically as possible, the likely outcome of a nuclear exchange. For them the most important indicator of deterrence is the military balance that would prevail after the mushroom clouds dissipate, measured not just in terms of total forces but in the relative capability of each side to use those forces in a coordinated and intelligent manner.

Proponents of both approaches justify their choice by asserting that it more closely approximates the way in which the Soviets assess relative strategic capabilities. The military and its supporters argue that Soviet adherence to a war-fighting doctrine coupled with the preparations they have allegedly made actually to fight a nuclear conflict reveal the need to assess deterrence in terms of the outcome of such a war. CIA analysts who favor more abstract measures of strategic capability stress the deterrent objective of this war-fighting doctrine. In point of fact, Soviet intentions and even more so, their judgments about our capabilities and intentions are sufficiently obscure to permit analysts to make a case for either point of view. This leeway tends to make strategic assessments theological exercises carried out to advance the parochial interest of the institutions the analysts represent. Even when this is not the case, assessments still tend to reflect ingrained institutional ways of looking at the world. Put crudely, the sevices are socialized into judging everything in terms of military

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capabilities, while analysts at CIA, depending upon their particular office, display varying degrees of sensitivity to the political side of things. Individual analysts in each of these institutions on the whole are more sensitive to information that suggests that the Soviets see the world in the same way that their particular subunits of the bureaucracy do.

CIA and DoD: What They Have in Common

So far our investigation has focused on the ways in which the CIA and Defense conceptions of assessment differ. But there are also important underlying affinities between them. Both assess deterrence as principally a military relationship. Both use relative residual military capability, albeit calculated in different ways, as their measure of that capability. Both assume that this approach to deterrence reflects the Soviet way of thinking. The approaches differ only in their technical details, in the kinds of residual capability that are considered important, and the ways in which they are to be measured.

The psychological assumptions that the two approaches share are rarely articulated, let alone critically evaluated by those who use them. The reason for this is probably the lack of controversy associated with them within the intelligence and policymaking community. By contrast, the kinds of residuals that are important and the means of determining them have been the subject of extensive analysis because of the controversy that surrounds them. The nature and validity of their psychological assumptions are nevertheless the more important questions, for the choice of assumptions has more bearing on the outcome than the choice of means used.

The psychological assumptions common to both the CIA and Defense approaches to strategic analysis do not stand up under scrutiny. Take the use both make of residual military capability. There is nothing wrong with residuals per se; they indicate something about the military balance that might prevail in the aftermath of a strategic exchange. Both approaches, however, go far beyond this by attempting to employ residual capability as a measure of will.

Nuclear deterrence depends upon an adversary's belief that his opponent, if attacked, will carry out his threat to use nuclear weapons. Both the CIA and its Defense Department critics assume that the best indicator of the probability of that response is the relative strategic capability of the adversaries. The costlier the response, the less likely it becomes. Both sets of analysts believe that deterrence will no longer be credible if the relative cost of reprisal is very great. In such a situation they conceive of the deterrer as being deterred from retaliation by virtue of the superior strategic power of his adversary. This is the principle of which Paul Nitze and others have based their scenarios of a disarming Soviet first strike. They worry that if the Soviets destroy the Minutemen, and with them the American counterforce capability, the President would be compelled to accept the attack as a *fait accompli* because retaliation against Soviet cities, his only real option as they describe it, would elicit equal if not more destructive retaliation in return. [7]

While cost is certainly one component of will, it is wrong to assume that it is the only component or even the most important one. The measurement of will in terms of cost reflects a narrow formulation of the decisionmaking process. It rests on the assumption that people, national leaders in this instance, maximize their "utility" regardless of the stress or uncertainty associated with a decision and its possible outcomes. It further assumes—and this is quintessentially American in approach—that utility can be equated with material and physical well-being. This disregards a host of other values—emotional, intangible, unquantifiable—that history reveals to be at least as important for most people, including Americans. Would the South, for example,

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have rebelled if material well-being and physical comfort were the primary concern of its leaders and people? Why did the Confederacy continue the struggle at tremendous human and economic cost long after leaders and soldiers alike recognized it to be a lost cause? Any number of other instances can be cited where a people wittingly fought a determined struggle against great or even impossible odds. From Masada to the Irish Easter Rising, from Thermopylae to the resistance of the beleaguered Finns in 1940, history records countless stories of peoples who waged costly struggles with little or no expectation of success. Honor, anger, or national self-respect provided more compelling motives for action than did pragmatic calculations of material loss and gain. At the same time, the French experience in Algeria and that of the American debacle in Vietnam reveal, if ever proof were needed, that superior, even vastly superior military capability, is no sure indicator of resolve. [8]

National will is a social amalgam of many components. Among the most important of these are probably the nature of the adversary, what people believe is at stake, the cohesiveness of the society, its historical traditions, and the character of its leadership. Depending upon the circumstances, any of these considerations can be more influential in determining national will than calculations of relative military capability. Several examples will illustrate this point. In 1882 the British fleet subdued Egypt by firing a few cannon balls at the Khedive's palace in Alexandria. In 1956, following the massive and successful Suez invasion, the British and French withdrew from Egypt because they were forced to recognize that their armies were relatively useless weapons against aroused nationalist opinion. In 1940, France was defeated rapidly because the rise to power of Hitler had aggravated the deep and bitter cleavages within French society, cleavages that came close to paralyzing its army and government. Britain, by contrast, became a more cohesive society in response to the Nazi threat. Even if Germany had successfully invaded the British Isles, it is likely that its people would have continued to resist domination. The Czechs and the Poles also provide contrasting examples of national will, in this case perhaps attributable to different national traditions. Twice in recent memory, in 1938-39 and 1968, Czechoslovakia capitulated without a fight. In 1938, Prague had the military means to resist and possibly force France and Britain to come to its aid. The Poles waged fierce and futile struggles against foreign domination in 1848, 1939, and 1944-45. The expectation that they would do so again has probably prompted Soviet leaders to exercise more caution in the current crisis than might otherwise have been the case.

These examples should make apparent that there is at best only a marginal association between military capability and national will. It is therefore quite erroneous to use a measure of relative military capability to determine whether or not the United States would respond to a Soviet attack. It is also farfetched to assume that the Soviets would calculate American intentions in this way; that in the aftermath of a Soviet nuclear strike they would expect an American President to tote up the residual megatonnage or RVs of both sides and sue for peace or even surrender if his side came up short. If the Soviets behaved this way, they would have rolled over and played dead in 1941 following the initially devastating results of Hitler's onslaught against them.

By dint of their own national experience, Russians, more than most people, might be expected to understand the role of leadership and morale—what they refer to in their writings as "moral forces"—in determining the resolve of an army or people. Soviet leaders are likely to ask themselves just how much would the American people be prepared to sacrifice in order to preserve their influence in Europe, the independence of their closest allies, or their own domestic integrity? What about the administration's mettle? Is the President the kind of person to recoil in horror from using America's nuclear arsenal regardless of the circumstances, or would he have the

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courage or insanity—take your pick—to give the launch order in response to a Soviet attack or even confirmed preparations for an attack? Given the incredibly stressful context in which such a decision would be made, the character and personality of the President is almost certain to be a more decisive factor in influencing the decision to launch than arcane calculations of relative military advantage handed to him by a military adviser. The extent that Soviet leaders take such considerations into account, or at least recognize their importance, their analysis of resolve is more in accord with the realities of human behavior than the narrowly technical approach of their American counterparts.

The preceding discussion indicates that most of the really important components of resolve are scenario dependent. This brings us to our second important criticism of the use of residuals as a measure of deterrence: they measure the results of war in terms of the means by which it is waged instead of the ends it seeks to achieve. This divorces military conflict from the political context in which it occurs and from which it derives meaning.

Wars rarely start because one side believes that it has a military advantage. They occur when leaders become convinced that force is necessary to achieve important goals. War, as Clausewitz observed—and the Soviets proclaim—is an extension of politics by other means. Its scope, strategy, and timing are determined, or ought to be, by the political objectives for which the war is fought. It follows from this that any assessment of deterrence must be predicated upon some notion of the objectives that the Soviet Union might go to war to achieve. Only then can we attempt to determine what must be done to deny the Soviets these objectives and thereby deprive them of whatever incentives they might have for going to war.

Soviet objectives are an extremely contentious question and perhaps the reason why analysts have shied away from this approach. Paul Nitze, Richard Pipes, and other "Team B" types argue that the Soviets are out to conquer the world and are willing to pay the necessary price to do it. Most analysts take a more moderate view; they argue that Moscow would only resort to war to protect its vital interests. Needless to say, there is no agreement among even these analysts as to the nature of these interests or the ways in which a war might come about.

One way around this problem might be to recognize that the "bottom line" for the Soviet Union, indeed for any country, in a nuclear war must remain the preservation of its political system and territorial integrity. This would be the primary objective in a defensive war and the obvious precondition for the attainment of objectives in an offensive war. Recognition of this reality has important implications for deterrence because the preservation of a state's political system and territorial integrity is likely to be a much more difficult task in a nuclear war than in a conventional one.

A nuclear war between the superpowers is almost certain to far exceed the most ferocious conventional war in its destructiveness. Even a "limited" nuclear war between the superpowers consisting only of strictly counterforce exchanges can be expected to leave perhaps 20 million dead on each side. A more general exchange could kill more than 100 million people in each country and deprive the survivors of the means of restoring their standard of living within their own lifetimes. To the physical destruction of nuclear war, whether limited or general, must be added the psychological incapacitation of the survivors. This is a phenomenon as yet little understood, but nevertheless likely to have a serious retarding effect upon a society's ability to reconstitute itself.

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We have no data on the social consequences of a massive nuclear strike. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, mankind's only experience with nuclear warfare, were mere pinpricks in comparison to the death and destruction that would result from even a limited nuclear exchange between the superpowers. Because of our lack of knowledge about the social and psychological repercussions of nuclear war—and perhaps for fear of what we would discover—the American strategic community has largely ignored this aspect of the problem. Instead strategists have based their calculations and their doctrine on technical phenomena about which they feel more confident. Residual weaponry, circular errors of probability, and blast overpressure have been made the bedrock of American strategic analysis. Such an engineering approach to the subject has blinded analysts to some important social truths about nuclear war.

The first of these pertain to the disruptive destructive effects of nuclear war upon society. These are certain to be greater than is recognized by the official or quasi-official literature on the subject. As it is, these estimates of damage have been criticized for minimizing fire and radiation fatalities and for disregarding deaths arising from secondary causes such as the disruption or even breakdown of public order and sanitary, medical, and food distribution facilities. Some recent studies suggest that postattack deaths may not peak until a week or more after an attack. Yet most official casualty projections calculate only first-week fatalities. Most, if not all, of these estimates also ignore the psychosocial cost of a nuclear holocaust, the price paid not by the victims but the survivors. [9]

Robert Jay Lifton, who studied the survivors of Hiroshima, identified what he called the "death in life" syndrome: "a grotesque, absurd, collective, unacceptable, and unabsorbable death" that survivors carry with them for the rest of their lives. [10] Even those who were able to pursue successful careers continue to be affected by "an unending lethal influence," a sense of being the victim of a force that threatens the species. Hiroshima, it must be emphasized, was the victim of a primitive low-yield weapon and subsequently, the recipient of long-term medical, economic, and social assistance from a society left untouched by nuclear devastation. The psychological aftereffects of a nuclear war between the superpowers are certain to be more pronounced and more widespread than those associated with Hiroshima. They may pose as great a challenge to the long-term survival of a society as the physical destruction caused by blast, fire, and radiation does in the short term.

Nuclear war may leave survivors in such a profound state of shock that in its immediate aftermath they cannot respond to whatever political and military authority is able to reassert itself. This phenomenon will be all the more likely to occur if people have not been adequately prepared beforehand for the horrors of the postattack environment. Survivors who are not psychologically incapacitated may be very hostile to authority if they see it as responsible for the catastrophe. In conventional wars governments usually attempt to rally support by portraying themselves as the defender of all that is sacred.

Conventional wars retain a human flavor regardless of their scale or level of destruction. Combatants and civilians are aware that everything that happens, no matter how unintended in consequence, is the result of human decisions and action. [11] They also "learn" something about the enemy in the course of the war, either firsthand or through the media. They can form an "enemy image" upon which to displace their own frustrations, insecurities, and aggressive drives. Knowing this, governments have often gone to war to deflect such hostility from themselves. They also count on the enemy's actions, for example, bombing raids or atrocities against civilians, to rebound to their domestic political advantage. As the German onslaught against Russia in World War II revealed, even the most unpopular government can, in the long run, benefit from the depredations of a barbarous invader.

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An intercontinental nuclear war will be different. It will be short, perhaps lasting only hours or days. It will also be highly impersonal, as neither the adversary who pushed the button nor the missiles that deliver his warheads will be seen. There may be no combat at all in the traditional sense, and certainly none that will impinge upon the consciousness of the heartland populations. This will deprive soldiers and civilians alike of a palpable image of the enemy, so necessary to make the devastation of war psychologically comprehensible.

Nuclear war will also differ from conventional war by virtue of the magnitude of its destruction. The psychological effects of say 20 million dead in the course of an hour and a half are certain to be different and greater than the impact of the same number of fatalities sustained during the course of four years of war. This combination of impersonality and instantaneity may make nuclear war more closely resemble a natural disaster than a war in the minds of the survivors. If this is true, it may have some hitherto unanticipated but important political consequences. Studies of natural disasters reveal that those who warned of disaster are likely to become the focus of acute hostility when their predictions turn out to be correct. [12] This is so, one psychologist speculates, because people tend to interpret disasters as forms of personal punishment and warnings as threats of punishment. [13] Thus, a government that attempts to prepare its people for the possibility of a nuclear war during an escalating crisis may be punished by the survivors as a result.

The preceding argument is admittedly speculative. It highlights, however, a second important truth about war in general and nuclear war in particular: the survival of any political system in war is at least as much a function of its legitimacy as it is of its military capability. To the extent that a government is seen as culpable for war and by extension for the damage resulting from it, its chance of survival diminishes. This is one more reason why, for purposes of assessing deterrence, military means cannot be divorced from the political context in which they might be used. This will determine whether or not a government will be supported by its people, and such support seems essential for postattack conventional military operations.

Astute statesmen have always been sensitive to the need to develop and maintain public support in war. Bismarck's manipulation of the Hohenzollern candidacy and his editing of the "Ems dispatch" are often cited as examples of how a clever political leader can manipulate an adversary in order to generate public enthusiasm for war. Our own national experience offers examples of how public opposition to war can act as an effective check upon leaders. Woodrow Wilson was prevented from entering World War I until Germany's unrestricted use of submarines in 1917 brought American public opinion around. Franklin Roosevelt was even more constrained by public antipathy to intervention in World War II. His constitutionally dubious and intentionally provocative efforts at goading Hitler into declaring war on the United States got nowhere until the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. More recently, the American failure in Indochina was at least in part attributable to the inability of successive presidents to maintain popular support for that war.

While democracies are more vulnerable than authoritarian governments to the vagaries of public opinion, the latter must also demonstrate some degree of sensitivity to public sentiment in order to maintain support for military sacrifices. Stalin was aware of this need and in the fall of 1944, for example, gave considerable pause before advancing beyond the borders of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe for fear of its effect upon Soviet conscripts. [14] Afghanistan may yet illustrate the vulnerability of the Soviet system to public opinion if the Red Army continues to sustain a steady rate of casualties without bringing an end to that war.

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The staggering loss of life and destruction that can be expected to result from even a limited nuclear war make it advisable, perhaps even essential, for leaders, regardless of what kind of political system they manage, to "prepare" their people for such an event. This would require educating the public about the nature and effects of nuclear war. A carefully orchestrated public relations campaign designed to convince people that their government, if it resorts to nuclear weapons, will do so only as a last desperate measure in defense of the country might also be considered. Serious efforts to prepare people for nuclear war, however, are likely to be psychologically unsettling to those being instructed and politically damaging to those responsible for the instructing. Perhaps for these reasons neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, which has an extensive civil defense program, have chosen to enlighten their population about the realities of nuclear combat.

The survival of a political system in wartime and its ability to reconstitute itself in the aftermath of nuclear attacks are also influenced by conditions independent of the specific political context of the war. The previous legitimacy of the regime, the nature of its economic base, the extent of its ethnic or racial tensions—what Stalin might have called "permanently operating factors"—will play a crucial role in this regard. Any assessment of deterrence must take them into account, not only objectively but more importantly in terms of how they are perceived by the adversaries. This is admittedly another difficult task. A useful beginning can nevertheless be made by describing some of the most important of these factors and the ways in which they might retard or facilitate the respective political and economic recovery of the superpowers from a nuclear war.

Viewed from this perspective the Soviet Union has a number of vulnerabilities that could pose serious difficulties for its leaders in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict. For a start, there is Eastern Europe. The Soviets are not popular in any of these countries with the possible exception of Bulgaria. In Poland and East Germany they are loathed by the local population. Both countries are astride the main communication routes between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, the most likely theater of conventional operations. Hostility and obstruction—perhaps even tolerated by local authorities in Poland—could cause serious problems for the Soviet military. If the Soviet Union were greviously wounded by a series of nuclear strikes, some of the satellite governments in Eastern Europe might seize the opportunity to establish their independence from Moscow. The prospects for this could be substantially enhanced by a Western targeting strategy designed to destroy the tentacles of Soviet power in these countries while leaving the national armies and industrial plants and population centers relatively intact.

Beyond Eastern Europe, the Russians face considerable opposition within their own multiethnic empire where their political primacy is resented in varying degrees by the other nationalities. In wartime the Soviet nationality problem could become acute if dissident nationalities perceived the central government's power to be waning. Resistance to Bolshevik domination in the Civil War and to Soviet rule in World War II followed this pattern. In this regard, some of the dissident nationalities would profit from the fact that European Russia is certain to suffer more devastation than Soviet Central Asia because of its denser concentration of military and industrial targets. The Muslim and Caucasian minorities in particular can be expected to fare much better than their Russian counterparts in terms of their physical survival, usable resources, and access to food. Dissident Muslims and other rebellious groups throughout the Soviet Union would also profit from the fact that Soviet conventional military capability, especially its command and control, will be targeted for destruction in any conflict other than the most limited nuclear exchange.

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Restive nationalities would also benefit from their geographic location. Most of them reside along the peripheries of the Soviet Union and, in many cases, alongside states that harbor territorial irredenta against the Soviet Union. The number of such states has increased since the physical expansion of the Soviet Union during and immediately after World War II. One must assume, as the Soviets probably do, that some of these states, perhaps China, would be tempted to take advantage of Soviet weakness to make good their claims.

Economically, the Soviet Union is also susceptible to the disruptive effects of a nuclear war because of its highly centralized economy. Planning, production, and distribution decisions are made by ponderous bureaucracies at the several levels of the Soviet hierarcy. Seweryn Bialer comments: "The key characteristic of the Stalinist model of economic growth was its lack of economic self-generating, self-regulating, and adjusting features. To run at all, let alone to perform well, it required an enormous political edifice to provide the decisionmaking and the push, the regulation, supervision, and coordination." [15] The need for direction from above remains the hallmark of the Soviet economy. Its hierarchical structure permits political leaders a range of economic choices denied to leaders in a capitalist society, but it is also more vulnerable to disruption.

The economy of the United States might be likened to a worm. Cut off any part, even its head, and the rest continues on and even regenerates the missing section. The Soviet economy in contrast more closely resembles an animal with a highly developed central nervous system. It is capable of complex behavior based on the coordinated efforts of its many parts, but sever its spinal cord and the rest of the beast quickly dies. During World War II the Soviets performed prodigious feats in moving entire industries away from battle zones and reconstructing them in safer rear areas, brick by brick and factory by factory. They could do this because their administrative apparatus was intact and able to coordinate and coerce the labor force. A nuclear war would decimate or disrupt the functioning of these cadres so that surviving centers of production would be without organized access to raw materials, energy, or markets. Economic reconstruction, especially in the initial postwar period, could be a slow and tortuous process.

The Soviets seem aware of their economic vulnerabilities. Their civil defense program aims at protecting not only the political leadership but economic managers and workers in key industries. Plans for protecting the economy and thereby enhancing Soviet capability for postattack recovery include the evacuation, dispersal, and sheltering of economic cadres and the emergency shutdown and relocation of essential industrial installations to low-risk areas. The Soviets have also developed some procedures for evacuating cities and resettling their populations in the countryside, although these measures have never been rehearsed. Evacuation, if successfully implemented, would significantly reduce immediate casualties in a war in which cities were attacked.

Critics of "Mutual Assured Destruction" have pointed to the Soviet civil defense program as an indication of Soviet willingness to fight a nuclear war. [16] This is a very questionable assertion. A moderate civil defense program, a fair description of the Soviet effort, is no more a sign of intent to wage war than fastening a seat belt in a car indicates a willingness to have an accident. Both are prudent preparations for undesired, even feared, outcomes that the actors in question may believe is beyond their power to avert. It may be more revealing to inquire whyAmericans tend to reject both seatbelts and civil defense.

More pertinent to our point is the question of just how much benefit the Soviet Union would derive from its civil defense effort in a nuclear war. This is clearly

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beyond the scope of the article. For the sake of our argument, however, it is useful to touch upon some of the more important aspects of this question. The first of these is the fact that all major Soviet civil defense plans require hours to days of advance warning to implement. They would be useless against an American "bolt from the blue" or in preparations for a similar Soviet strike, as they would telegraph Soviet intentions well in advance of the attack. Large-scale American economic reconstruction would also benefit from a redundant transportation system. The thick net of highways, a questionable luxury in peacetime, would prove indispensable in the aftermath of a nuclear war. The highway system is so developed that enough of it may survive to allow the minimum necessary movement of goods and people to begin reconstruction. In the Soviet Union where transportation relies principally upon railroads, the destruction of major railheads and bridges would more effectively halt movement. Communications with the Soviet Far East would become all but impossible as the only land route connecting it to European Russia is the Trans-Siberian Railway and the as yet unfinished Baikal-Amur line. The US highway system confers another advantage: it has facilitated the more even geographical distribution of the means of production. This enhances the prospects of some industrial base surviving even a second wave assault. Soviet industry by contrast is much more concentrated, as it has developed along major rail lines. Missile sites and major military installations are similarly situated, making Soviet industry more vulnerable to collateral damage in a limited nuclear war.

Conclusions

The preceding discussion has brought out three important attributes of deterrence. All of them reveal the inadequacy of residual military capability, however derived, as a comprehensive measure of strategic assessment.

First of all, military capabilities reveal nothing about resolve. Resolve is a function of leadership, a people's traditions and expectations, and their perception of what is at stake. Strategic analysis that ignores the political context of a war is meaningless for any purpose other than testing and developing operational capabilities. Unfortunately most American analysts adopt this narrow approach. This is reflected in official assessments of the strategic balance which analyze decisions for war or peace in terms of technical calculations of relative military advantage.

Secondly, the ends of war—not its means—should be the yardstick of strategic analysis. The minimum objective of any state in a nuclear war is almost certain to be the survival of its political system and the maintenance of its territorial integrity. The Soviet Union may be more vulnerable than the United States in this regard by reason of its centralized economy, hostile neighbors, and restive minorities. For the United States, therefore, deterrence rests at least as much upon its relative ability to recover politically and economically from a nuclear war as it does upon its relative military capability to inflict damage. One can fairly dispute the precise advantage that either superpower enjoys with respect to recovery or the extent to which they accurately perceive the reality of their situation. Any assessment of deterrence that ignores such considerations, however, is incomplete and misleading.

Finally, nuclear war, even limited nuclear war, is certain to be more destructive than most studies of the subject acknowledge. For in addition to the immediate effects of blast, fire, and radiation there are the longer term effects of radiation, the breakdown of health care, food processing, and distribution systems and the psychological impairment, temporary and permanent, of the survivors. Historians suggest that it took almost a century for Europe to recover from the effects of the Black Death. The effects of a nuclear war could prove more enduring.

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Leaders of nuclear nations are more likely to be deterred from using nuclear weapons if they recognize the staggering and perhaps incalculable costs of nuclear war, regardless of its relative outcome. Awareness of these costs may—and should—constitute a more potent deterrent than any degree of relative nuclear advantage. If this is so, the current fixation on military capability is not only misleading but dangerous. *(Confidential)*

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Lawrence K. White

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Duty . . . Honor . . . Country

COLONEL LAWRENCE K. WHITE *

R. Jack Smith

Not surprisingly, Sherman Kent, that master of the pungent phrase, best summed up Col. Lawrence K. "Red" White. "That splendid character—solid gold all the way through!" Somewhat more analytically but equally admiringly, Enno "Hank" Knoche, who served a stint as Red's executive assistant, commented: "What amazes me is that he always knows the best thing to do—immediately—and it's always the most direct and the simplest thing. I once asked his wife, Sue, whether this was only an office characteristic or was he always like that. She said he was always like that. She could wake him out of a sound sleep in the middle of the night with a complicated problem to solve, and he would give her the answer without hesitating and go back to sleep."

Red White acquired many admirers besides Sherman Kent and Hank Knoche during his 25 years of service in CIA, the last six and a half of which he served as Executive Director-Comptroller. He had so many admirers and well-wishers, in fact, that when it came time for him to retire in January 1972 it was necessary to hold three retirement parties in order to accommodate all the Agency men and women who wanted to pay homage to Red and wish him godspeed. No other Agency officer, in my experience, has commanded so much respect and affection. His was a splendid career.

It began in a small town on the western edge of Tennessee where Red's father was a Presbyterian minister. His boyhood there in the early 1920s sounds like real-life Horatio Alger: working as a farmhand from sun-up to sun-down for a dollar a day; delivering groceries with a horse and buggy from "opening to closing" for a dollar and a half; and, in his middle teens, digging ditches for the local water company and stacking lumber at the lumber yard for 10 hours a day for $2.50.

When Red graduated from Troy High School in 1920 with a class of 23, his future looked unpromising. To be sure there were still ditches to dig and lumber to stack but he wanted badly to break free from the tight confines of the small town. He knew that a college education was the answer but there was no money to fund it. The avenue he eventually found was the United States Military Academy at West Point, and how that came about is an amazing story in itself.

Red is an inveterate story teller. He always has one available to illustrate a point in the conversation, a true account of some incident in his career, and he tells it masterfully, with rich detail, simulated accent and tone of voice, and warm humor. The best story he tells, in my judgment, is the account of his obtaining the appointment to West Point. In the spring of 1929, as Red tells it, he became aware by a friend that through the Army it was possible to receive a free college education and be paid at the same time. Realistically, it was far too late in the year for Red to pursue the possibility but out of mingled naivete and determination he set about anyway. Through his Boy Scout Scoutmaster who had served as an Army chaplain in World War I he reached

* With the publication of Jack Smith's affectionate portrait of Colonel White, the Board of *Studies* launches what it hopes will be a continuing series of authoritative sketches of Agency "greats" written by their contemporaries. Jack Smith's turn will come—the Editor.

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the district's congressman, a rising young star whom the party wished to reward. The region's military academy appointments had already been made for the fall term but the young congressman was able to obtain an alternate appointment for Red. Lightning struck when the principal appointee for West Point failed his entrance examination, which Red because of his belated application had been unable to take. Appointment with the class entering 1 July 1929 was offered to Red contingent upon his producing a satisfactory high school record and graduation certificate.

This presented a major problem. The Troy High School was closed up tighter than a bank vault, and the principal had taken up summer residence in a Kentucky town 75 miles away. Doggedly, Red made his way there and found his man among the hardware, harnesses, and groceries of a general store. "But Lawrence," the principal objected, "I can't make out a transcript for you here. All the records are back there in Troy." Then, seeing the pain and sharp disappointment sweep over the honest, open face, he said, "Well, sit down. Let's see if we can *estimate* your grades." Then, as Red tells it, ensued a bargaining session in which Red set as high a grade for each course as he dared and the principal lowered it to a level he thought reasonable. Even so, they ended up with an "estimated" record that Red says could easily have made him class valedictorian.

It did the trick. Back from the Academy came notification of his appointment and an order to present himself in West Point, New York on 1 July with cash in hand for needed supplies and equipment. Counting transportation costs that came to $375. New problem: that amount of cash looked unreachable. Red took his story and his problem to three of the town's richest men, two business men and a dentist. They responded by jointly putting together $375 and turning it over to Red without asking him to sign a note or present collateral of any kind. They merely told him to pay them back when he could. People learned early in Red White's life that he was a man to trust.

The cultural shock to the youngster from rural Tennessee, younger than all but two or three of the others, entering an academic environment where the average plebe had a year or more of special coaching or one or more years of college, was stupendous. The military discipline and the athletic requirements were no problem, but the academic workload was at a level for which Troy High School had not prepared him and, as Red says, "the first three months nearly killed me." He survived by dint of unrelenting hard work, and he graduated in June 1933 with a ranking of 287 out of 347, approximately 75 cadets having failed to complete the course. His Army career began as a second lieutenant, salary $125 a month with free quarters and $18 for subsistence.

It began tranquilly in the Sixth Infantry at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri where he met Elizabeth Jane (Sue) Flint of St. Louis whom he married in 1937 after finishing Infantry School at Fort Benning. They were posted first to Fort Sam Houston and then to Zamboagnga in the Philippines. When war clouds began to gather over the Pacific in 1941, wife Sue and baby Susan were sent home and Red followed in September on his way to training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Promotions came quickly: captain, 1941: major, early 1942; lieutenant colonel, late 1942; and full colonel, 1943—at *age 31!*

Red's wartime career began in earnest in September 1942 when he returned to the Pacific theater, joining the 37th Division in Fiji. The names that subsequently appear in his record jacket are familiar: New Hebrides, Guadalcanal, New Georgia, Bougainville, Luzon. As Red says, it was the New Georgia campaign that gave him his first baptism of fire, "and much more." Immediately after that he led an advance detachment of 16 ashore at Vella la vella, debarking from rubber boats three days

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ahead of the main assault, an intensely dangerous but successful operation. Then late in 1943 he took command of the 148th Infantry Regiment and led it into the prolonged battle for Bougainville.

The climax of Red White's career came in early 1945, a brilliant but also disastrous climax. Commanding the 148th, Red led the advance from Lingayen to the outskirts of Manila. Upon entering the city they found and released 1,300 American military prisoners at Old Bilibid. Then the 148th made the first successful crossing of the Pasig River at Malcanan Palace, overcame determined resistance at the Paco railway station, released thousands of patients and refugees held in captivity in Philippine General Hospital, and captured the last remaining government buildings held by the Japanese. For all these feats of arms the 148th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Lawrence K. White, Commanding received a Presidential Unit Citation.

But the 148th and its Commander were not finished yet. They turned northward from Manila to take part in the assault on the mountain stronghold of Baguio. Six miles short of that objective the 148th's commander met disaster. One of the tanks leading the advancing column slid off the edge of the mountain road down a cliff. The column halted to tend the wounded and to re-group and during the pause Red went ahead on foot to see what lay beyond a hairpin curve. He met head-on a Japanese tank-led suicidal attack, and was seriously wounded in the fierce fighting that followed. He spent the next two years progressing from one hospital to the next. In March 1947 Red was retired from active service for the wounds he had received in combat.

The Army career was over but the proud record remains, bespangled with medals, decorations, and letters of commendation. The Army honored Red with the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Clusters, the Bronze Star Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters. But the letters of commendation from superior officers may be even more impressive. Lt. General O. W. Griswold, his Corps Commander, wrote, "one of the best and most skilful regimental commanders I have ever seen," an officer whose "bravery is such that he never asked a subordinate to go where he himself would not lead," a man whose "honesty and integrity are superior." Major General Robert S. Beightler, his Division Commander, was even more outspoken: "I can say, without hesitation and with complete sincerity, that Colonel White was the best regimental commander who served in my command during the entire war; for that matter, he was the most capable regimental commander I saw anywhere in the South Pacific." And for top dressing, "I don't think there was any officer in the Division more truly beloved by his subordinates . . . than was Colonel White."

Fresh out of the hospital, in fact still on convalescent leave, Red White took the suggestion of an Army friend and walked into the offices of the Central Intelligence Group. To the good fortune of both Red and CIG/CIA he was immediately taken on and made deputy chief of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, shortly later becoming chief. FBIS was a wartime operation just taken over by CIG, and the immediate task was to restructure it for peacetime intelligence operation. It was a tough managerial challenge which Red met with his usual blend of fair, objective inquiry and firm, impartial decision. During the next five years FBIS became a lean, effective organization and, with the construction of new stations on both the East and West coasts of the United States and on Cyprus and Okinawa, and the forging of a reciprocal arrangement with the British Broadcasting Corporation, it became a truly global operation as well. In later years, as Red looked back, he thought fondly of his FBIS days: "best job in the Agency," In fact, he always maintained a protective stance toward the unit, as I discovered when I as Deputy Director for Intelligence wished to

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make some top-level personnel changes in FBIS and faced some tough questions from Red as to the qualifications of my candidates. "Those jobs are too good to waste on mediocre people."

After this auspicious beginning, White's star began to rise rapidly, especially after the arrival of Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of CIA. Beedle Smith, General Eisenhower's hard-jawed Chief of Staff and hatchet-man, demanded high performance—results not excuses—and he insisted on cleanly demarcated lines of responsibility. It did not take Beedle Smith long to discover the quietly effective Colonel White, and he soon began to seek his judgment and to assign him tasks which lay altogether outside Red's normal job. General Smith soon took care of that anomaly by making Red Assistant Deputy Director for Administration. At the same time, in order to streamline administration throughout the Agency and to clarify responsibilities, Beedle Smith decreed that henceforth all elements of CIA would rely on the central administrative and support system instead of maintaining their own separate facilities for personnel services, logistics, and other support functions. Then Beedle privately informed Red he expected him to make the central system work.

It was an exceedingly challenging and difficult task, especially in those inchoate years in the early 1950s when CIA was a conglomerate of disparate functions but hardly a unified organization. The Clandestine Services, in particular, found it hard to accept such integration, on security grounds as well as others, and when it came to the sensitive matters of specialized procurement, logistics, and communications they felt they had needs which could not properly be met by a centralized support system. Nonetheless, it was General Beedle Smith's order that one be established forthwith, and Red set about the formidable task of winning confidence and making it work.

By this time, early 1952, Allen Dulles had left his New York law office to rejoin the United States intelligence service, and it was with Dulles as Deputy Director (Plans) that Red had to deal on support for the Clandestine Services. Dulles was as skeptical as anyone about the desirability and feasibility of the central support concept, but gradually as these two men of good will worked together a mutual respect, confidence, and trust became established. This was officially recognized in 1954 when Dulles, by then DCI, promoted Red to Deputy Director (Administration) instead of bringing in an outsider with national reputation as had been his original intention. Then, in early 1955 a bureaucratic foul-up in support enraged Dulles and caused him to decree categorically to Red and Deputy Director (Plans) Frank Wisner that henceforth he would hold White personally responsible for all Agency administrative and support activities—no matter when or where they took place. Moreover, effective at once, all the personnel, communications, and training activities of the Agency were to come under Red's domain, and he was to be given a new title: Deputy Director (*Support*).

Back in 1952, when Bedell Smith had told Red he expected him to make the central support system work, he had also laid on him another gigantic task: over-all responsibility for coordinating the planning and construction of the "new building." This initiative of the Eisenhower Administration, born out of an interest in decentralizing sensitive government installations to make them less vulnerable to strategic attack, as well as a desire to get CIA out of the hodge-podge of temporary buildings and old relics it then occupied throughout downtown Washington, was felt by most Agency professionals to be a long-distance and quite unattractive mirage. But White had been given the task to perform, and he set about it with quiet persistence, feeling pretty lonely much of the time. To his surprise, Red found Dulles to be an enthusiastic ally. The two spent long hours exploring sites, studying architectural plans, and meeting with Congressional committees whose sanction was essential. Perhaps it was these long and frequent meetings that did most to forge the bonds of confidence

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between them. Allen Dulles loved the new building and took enormous pride in it, feeling perhaps that it would serve as a monument to him. He felt special affection and gratitude to the man who had worked so tirelessly to bring it into being—Red White.

Red tells dozen of stories about the Langley building but one of them is particularly useful to re-tell, the story of the highway signs at the George Washington Parkway and Chain Bridge Road entrances. (The pertinence of this story becomes renewed annually when *The Washington Post* re-prints the canard that the Agency sought to hide its existence until right-thinking officials and, naturally, the power of the press forced it to come out of hiding.) Shortly after the Langley building was opened for business Allen Dulles ordered entrance signs to be put up. He was led to do this in part by an incident which had occurred earlier involving President Eisenhower and his brother Milton. Milton had a Saturday morning appointment with Bedell Smith and Allen Dulles, so after their breakfast at the White House the two Eisenhower brothers set out to find CIA Headquarters which was sitting unmarked at 2430 E Street Northwest. The President of the United States was unable to find the office of his Director of Central Intelligence and with his brother angrily returned to the White House. Milton was then retrieved by Agency car and delivered to his appointment an hour late. Bedell Smith took due notice of this episode and a sign proclaiming the site of CIA was promply erected.

The Kennedy Administration took office not long after Langley was opened, and by chance Robert F. Kennedy, took up residence in the neighborhood. As a consequence, Bobby Kennedy passed the CIA entrance signs twice daily to and from work. He found them jarring. "The British don't advertise their secret service. Those signs should come down." President John F. Kennedy acceded to his brother's view and ordered Allen Dulles to take the signs down. " But, Mr. President." protested Dulles, "those signs help contractors and suppliers find the place. Besides, the location is marked on every Exxon and National Geographic map of Washington. We can't hide from the American people." The President was adamant, however, so Dulles acquiesced verbally but in accord with sound bureaucratic practice took no action, thinking that the request might be forgotten. Unfortunately, Bobby Kennedy continued to go to the office every day, and each day became irritated afresh by the signs. He complained once more, and the President got Allen Dulles on the telephone one Friday morning. "Allen, if those signs are not taken down today, I'll come out tomorrow and take them down myself." Dulles gave in, and as usual, turned the problem over to Red. He asked the Director of National Parks to take the signs down "as quietly as possible." Sometime after midnight they came down and for several years afterward the two entrances were marked only by the Bureau of Public Roads signs, thus providing merriment for *The Washington Post*.

Before leaving this account of Red White's thirteen and a half years as Deputy Director (Administration/Support) it should be stressed that considerably more than the empathy he established with Allen Dulles was responsible for the success of the central support system. From the outset Red had a plan for developing a professional support corps whose experience would range widely over the Agency's manifold activities and would include as a minimum: (1) a tour in a central support office in Headquarters; (2) a tour in a DDP area division; and (3) a tour in a station overseas. Such a program required six years, at a minimum, just to establish a foundation on which to build. But Red was granted the necessary time by General Smith and his successors, and the plan bore a most successful fruit. Anyone who has served overseas and had observed the contrast between CIA support services and those, let us say, of the Department of State can vouch for the success of the Smith-White concept.

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Professionalism and a willingness to serve, a Can-Do approach, mark the work of the CIA support people, traits which reflect exactly two dominant characteristics of their founder.

This willingness-to-serve approach sometimes was extended by White to very small details. For example, Sherman Kent's favorite pencils. Sherman, an inveterate creator of complex, convoluted doodles, favored a certain kind of draughtsman's pencils for his artistic work, and usually bought them himself and carried a half dozen or so in his breast pocket. At a DCI meeting one morning, Sherm examined the #3 pencil beside the yellow pad at his place and then threw it down in disgust. "Can't write with one of those things!" From his place beside Sherm, Red looked on with interest, as Sherm took one of his stubby pencils out and began to construct something resembling a cluster of oyster eggs as seen through a high-powered microscope. "You like those pencils better? Could I try one?" "Sure. Try a decent pencil for a change." Red took the gift pencil back to his office after the meeting. He called in his administrative assistant and said, "Get me a gross of pencils just like this." When Sherm arrived at his office at 8 o'clock next morning he found sitting in the center of his desk a gross of his favorite pencils.

In 1965 several changes took place at the top of the Agency: Admiral William F. Raborn replaced John McCone as DCI; Richard Helms replaced General Marshall as DDCI; and Red White, at Dick Helm's invitation, replaced Lyman Kirkpatrick as Executive Director-Comptroller. About a year and a half later, Admiral Raborn left and Richard Helms succeeded him as DCI. Helms was the last of the line of DCI's for whom Red had served. Reminiscing about this, Red says:

> I served under Vandenberg, Hillenkoetter, Smith, Dulles, McCone, Raborn, and Helms. Each had different problems and made different contributions. I felt closest to and most admired Smith, Dulles, and Helms. Beedle set up a sensible organization and established the DCI in a position of preeminence. Who else could have done it at that point in history? Allen Dulles attracted and *kept* a lot of great people while the Agency grew into a professional shop. Neither of these two great men, however, had Helms' problems. They lived in a time of plenty, during which the mystique of Intelligence was accepted on faith in most quarters and especially in Congress. All this had vanished when Helms became Director. Tighter budgets and tighter personnel ceilings, great rivalry within the Community, particularly over scientific and technical programs, skepticism about estimates in the White House, and a greatly intensified investigative interest on the part of Congress. The honeymoon was over! . . . I have the highest regard for Dick Helms and the manner in which he handled the very difficult and complex problems with which it was his duty to deal.

It fell to White to take a leading role in dealing with the budgetary problems created by the new austerity. His response was to create under John Clarke a staff responsible for Agency-wide coordination of programming, budgeting, and management. The shrieks and groans from the Deputy Directors were deafening (I was as vocal as any), but the new system soon found its legs. For the first time CIA had an integrated planning and budget process—essential once the days of unlimited budgets had passed.

The Executive Director—Comptroller job was always something of an anomaly, something more than a staff job but a little less than a command-line post. Red says that he thought of himself "as having considerable influence but not really great authority. I saw myself more as an *honest broker.*" It probably was as an "honest broker" that he made his most effective contribution to the Agency. As DDI I know

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that I found him enormously helpful that way. Every lieutenant knows that certain problems are best presented to his chief not by himself but by a disinterested third party. The problem may be an old one with a painful history, or one of peculiar interest to the lieutenant, or difficult to discuss for any of a variety of reasons. Whenever I sought Red's advice on how to approach Dick Helms on one of the sticky ones, Red would say, "I'll ask him. He may get sore but I don't mind. I'll ask him." Observing the straightforward simplicity with which Red said this I knew that he would put the question to Dick in its best light, no twists or innuendoes, and the answer he would get would be the best anyone could get. Red had a wonderfully simple way of putting the most complex questions. He seemed to retain a calm detachment and, perhaps because he felt no involvement or embarrassment himself, the issue emerged shed of all emotion, as transparent as clear water. The person questioned, feeling no threat, found it easier to respond without resentment or anger. It is the same skill essentially that enabled White with blinding directness to tell an officer he had failed miserably or committed an unimaginable stupidity, without raising a single hackle on the offender's neck. It stunned and convinced but did not sting.

Dick Helms, in a glowing farewell statement at Red White's retirement ceremony in the Agency auditorium on 23 February 1972, paid tribute to this Honest Broker role:

> He has never come to me with a proposition from any of you without presenting it forthrightly, accurately, and fairly. He has never taken advantage of the fact he had that private time with me to push his own marbles on his own point of view. . . . As we would have these daily sessions late in the afternoon to clean up the Agency's business, I remember on various occasions I would notice him rather settle his backside in the chair a little more firmly than normal, and that was the signal he was about to bring forward something he knew I did not want to approve, or something that was absolutely beyond the pale as far as I was concerned and had made myself felt on the subject many times before. But he would brace himself, and then he would say, "Now I know you are not going to like this—" So I would settle down and say, "All right, I'm not going to like it, so I might as well be a good sport about it." But interestingly enough, Red always knew when to stop, always knew when to retreat and regather his forces, always knew that there might be a better day, if I was in a bad mood. He had that remarkable sense of knowing when to stick his nose into somebody else's business and when to keep it out—which I must say is something everyone might learn and learn from him.
>
> And over and above all this, his counsel has been wise and sensible—he has been fair to everyone—and as he leaves the Agency today we are sad, and genuinely so, to see him go. He will be sorely missed. He has meant a great deal to all of us, and he has been a tower of strength to me.

When Dick Helms had finished this handsome description of the way Red White carried out his duties and had honored Red's fairness, his tact, and his good sense, he must have felt that although everything he had said to that point was true there was still more to say. Like Red White's World War II Army generals, like Allen Dulles, and like all the rest of us, he felt that an account of the manner in which Red did his work did not adequately sum up the man. So Dick turned for help elsewhere:

> I was looking over some writing the other day and as I re-read it, it seemed to me that these words describe Red White better than I can do it, May I read them:
>
> > He was incapable of fear, meeting personal dangers with the calmest unconcern. Perhaps the strongest feature in his character was prudence,

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> never acting until every circumstance, every consideration was maturely weighed. Refraining if he saw a doubt, but when once decided, going through with his purpose, whatever obstacles opposed. His integrity was most pure, his justice the most inflexible I have ever known. No motives of interest or consanguinity, of friendship or hatred, being able to bias his decision. He was indeed in every sense of the words a wise and a good man.

Those words are part of an appraisal of George Washington written by Thomas Jefferson. They fit Red White very well indeed.

To these words of honor by Thomas Jefferson and by Richard Helms this writer has nothing to add.

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TITLE: The Shah's Illness and the Fall of Iran

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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A political behavior postmortem

THE SHAH'S ILLNESS AND THE FALL OF IRAN

(b)(3)(c)

The failure of the U.S. intelligence community to predict the fall of the Shah of Iran has led to a major retrospective examination of the intelligence process and an increased emphasis on improving the quality of political analysis. Certainly a significant contribution to the difficulties in estimating the Shah's inability to stem the tide of revolution in his country was an insufficient appreciation of the political power of the revitalist Shiite movement. Yet many believed that had the Shah exerted more forceful leadership the outcome might have been different, and Shah-watchers have been puzzled by some of the uncharacteristic behavior demonstrated by the Shah in recent years. The belated revelation that the Shah has been suffering from a potentially fatal malignant disease of the lymphatic system since 1973 suggests making use of the retrospectroscope* to consider the impact of grave illness on the Shah's political behavior.

Individuals facing death often experience an increasing urgency to accomplish their goals. This psychological reaction is vividly described by Montaigne:

> Especially at this moment, when I perceive that my life is so brief in time, I try to increase it in weight; I try to arrest the speed of its flight by the speed with which I grasp it, and to compensate for the haste of its ebb by my vigor in using it. The shorter my possession of life, the deeper and fuller I must make it.

For world leaders, this may translate into an increased urgency to ensure their place in history. We have observed in an earlier issue of this journal that Mao Tse-tung's perception that his time was short may have contributed to the precipitous pace of the Cultural Revolution in China.

With the wisdom of hindsight, it is suggested that the rapid pace of the Shah's modernization may have been influenced by the specter of death. Indeed, on a number of occasions in recent years, he would share with interviewers his dream of completing his mission and turning a stable Iran over to his son in the near future, and he devoted increasing attention to preparing his son to succeed him. We now know that by 1973 he knew his time was short. According to the definitive medical report (b)(3)(n) his illness was first diagnosed in 1973. That year was notable in terms of both Iran and the international economy, for it was in 1973 that the Shah and Qadhafi broke ranks with the other oil-producing nations, initiating the spiraling increase in oil prices.

Although the Shah was engaged in an expensive and longstanding modernization program for his country, the markedly increased influx of funds from these boosted oil

*The retrospectroscope is a medical diagnostic instrument of unerring accuracy, which, unfortunately, can only be aimed backwards.

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prices provided a quantum leap in revenues for which the Iranian economy was scarcely prepared. Indeed, a major criticism of the Shah has revolved around the pace of modernization—that in his zeal to bring Iran into the 20th century he had not paid sufficient attention to developing a sound infrastructure, with resultant major dislocations in the societal structure and runaway inflation.

It is ironic that in trying to improve the lot of his people rapidly, the Shah magnified their discontent, for he created a rising tide of expectations, especially in the urban lower and middle classes, which could not be met and ultimately contributed to his downfall. Moreover, previously the Shah had carefully monitored entrance into the elite, but with the massive influx of funds he lost control of this process. The conspicuous consumption of the newly affluent elite magnified the frustrations of the traditionally conservative bourgeoisie and lower classes. This widespread frustration, in combination with massive social dislocation, provided the ideal climate for a revitalist movement, with the Shiite clergy as the rallying point.

During these years, the Shah's grandiosity expanded exponentially: his demands for advanced weapons systems were insatiable, and his dreams for the future power and magnificence of Iran reached heroic proportions. Grandiosity was surely a strong personality feature before 1973. One need only recollect and contemplate the lavish celebration of the 25th centenary of the Persian Empire at Persepolis in 1971. But in considering the heady days from 1973 on and the Shah's expansiveness, it is important to observe that one of the ways of dealing with impending death is to deny depression, overcompensating with euphoric grandiosity.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

The course of this lymphatic disease is highly variable. There may be continuing problems, requiring continuing chemotherapy, or significant periods of remission. Both the disease itself and the powerful cancer chemotherapy agents can be extremely debilitating, sapping physical and emotional reserves. And, of course, the psychological problems of dealing with such a disease and its potentially fatal outcome are profound.

As the troubles in Iran mounted, most Shah-watchers felt, as in the past, that he would "tough it out," that he would choose "the iron fist" option if he needed to, as he had in the past. But there was progressive concern over his moodiness and dispirited reactions, and the observation was shared widely that he was suffering from a "failure of will." Certainly the massive protests against his government were reason enough to be depressed. But as he was forcibly confronted with the power of the revolutionary forces he had unleashed, the mortally ill Shah was brought up hard against the reality that in the short time left, he would not be able to accomplish his "mission for (his) people." Having sown the seeds of a too rapid modernization, he had reaped the whirlwind of revolution. If part of the function of grandiosity was to defend against depression, then this defense was penetrated, for he became profoundly depressed and

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disfunctional in his decisionmaking. Thus, it may well be that the different quality in the leadership he displayed during Iran's final crisis stemmed from his being able to give only part of his energy to fighting for Iran's life, since he was fighting for his own.

Without overstating the case, it seems clear that had we known the Shah was suffering from cancer of the lymph nodes since 1973, our government's judgments as to his ability to deal with the revolutionary forces that swept through Iran would probably have been quite different. Serious doubts would likely have replaced the guarded optimism concerning the Shah's ability to weather the storm.

What would the policy consequences of such revised intelligence estimates have been? It is hard to say, but it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that some would have more forcefully advocated an earlier accommodation with the Shah's opponents, perhaps forestalling the events which brought about the eventual seizure of the U.S. Embassy.

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This entire article is classified ~~SECRET~~ (b)(3)(n)

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TITLE: An Opportunity Unfulfilled

AUTHOR: Robert M. Gates

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"Intelligence is like money and love:
there is never enough."

— A Senior White House Official

AN OPPORTUNITY UNFULFILLED

The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence Analysis at the White House

Robert M. Gates

OUR GOAL

"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at one goal—producing accurate reliable intelligence.... Who are the customers who get this finished product? At the very top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency's most important customer."

—Intelligence: The Acme of Skill
(CIA Information Pamphlet)

And what have our most important customers and their principal assistants had to say about how well we achieve that goal?

"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence."

— Jimmy Carter, 1978

"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"

— Richard Nixon, 1970

"In the 1960s and early 1970s, for eleven years in a row, the Central Intelligence Agency underestimated the number of missiles the Russians would deploy; at the same time the CIA also underestimated the totality of the Soviet program effort and its ambitious goals.... Thanks in part to this intelligence blunder we will find ourselves looking down the nuclear barrel in the mid-1980s."

— Richard Nixon, 1980

"CIA Director McCone ... made recommendations for checking and improving the quality of intelligence reporting. I promptly accepted the suggestions...."

— Lyndon Johnson, Memoirs

"During the rush of ... events in the final days of 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the interests of the United States."

— Dwight Eisenhower, Memoirs

"The Agency usually erred on the side of the interpretation fashionable in the Washington Establishment.... The analytical side of the CIA ... generally reflected the most liberal school of thought in the government.... When warnings

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become too routine they lose all significance; when reports are not called specifically to the attention of the top leadership they are lost in bureaucratic background noise, particularly since for every admonitory report one can probably find also its opposite in the files."

— Henry Kissinger, Memoirs

"During the past year, I have seen no clandestine reporting from Soviet sources that significantly influenced my judgment on how to deal with the Soviet Union. . . . The Intelligence Community must find ways to sharpen and improve its analysis. . . . We see too many papers on subjects peripheral to our interests. . . . Too often the papers we see explain or review events in the past and give only a bare nod to the future."

— Zbignier Brzezinski, 1978

During the darkest days of revelations about CIA by the Rockefeller Commission and the Church and Pike Committees, professional intelligence officers clung to the notion that, whatever misdeeds might have occurred, throughout its history CIA had rendered exceptional service to American Presidents by producing the finest analysis based on the best human and technical sources in the world. We judged our contribution to White House decisionmaking on issues of moment and events great and small, and found it outstanding. This contribution made us, in our view, indispensable and cemented a special relationship between several Presidents and CIA. Have we been so long and so deeply mistaken? Has an entire Agency of people who specialize in political nuance, subtle signals and human relationships deluded itself and over a generation totally miscalculated the value of its work to six very different Presidents? The above quotations would suggest so. After all, they *did* in fact say those terrible things about us—and still are.

The way intelligence is processed at the White House and how it is received and regarded behind the scenes has never been clear to CIA, even at senior levels, except in broadest outline. It is time to lift a corner of that curtain in order that intelligence professionals might better understand what happens at the White House to the product of our collection and analysis, what the President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs expect, what they see, how it is processed, how they react—and, finally, whether they really mean what they say about us.

SETTING THE SCENE

To understand how intelligence is used and regarded at the White House first requires an understanding of the context in which it is received. The sheer volume of paperwork addressed to the President is staggering. Hundreds of federal employees in more than 200 agencies seek to draw his attention to this or that program, proposal or vital piece of information. An astonishing amount of their work survives departmental review and finds its way to the White House. There these papers join a river of correspondence to the President from countless consultants, academics, think tanks, political contacts, family and friends, political supporters, journalists, authors, foreign leaders, and concerned citizens. (Lest you think such correspondence can easily be disregarded, it is my view that most Presidents often attach as much—if not more—credibility to the views of family, (old) friends and private contacts as they do to those of executive agencies. Vice President Rockefeller once asked my office if Denmark really was planning to sell Greenland. Wondering all the while if he was in the market, we confirmed with CIA that this rumor from a private source was untrue. But Rockefeller had taken it seriously.)

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It is the responsibility of the Domestic Policy Staff, the NSC, other Executive offices, and the White House Office itself to impose order on this avalanche of pulp and to reduce it to proportions manageable by someone who works 15-16 hours a day, often seven days a week. The NSC alone processes 7,000-10,000 "action" papers a year—not including intelligence analyses or other purely "informational" papers. Dr. Brzezinski once asked me to calculate how many pages of reading he sent to the President weekly; the total averaged many hundreds of pages—and among White House offices the NSC is among the most stringent with respect to the length and number of items going to the President. These, then, are the first hurdles that an intelligence product faces: a president with a heavy schedule, inundated by paper and demands for decisions, surrounded by senior assistants who have as a main role trying to keep that President from being overwhelmed by paper; and a President with vast and varied non-intelligence sources upon which he also relies and in which he often has considerable confidence.

WHAT HE GETS

The President routinely receives only one intelligence product that is not summarized or commented upon by someone outside the Community: *The President's Daily Brief*. He is handed this by his National Security Adviser early every morning, along with a package that has varied little from President to President: a few (3-6) State and CIA cables of special significance; occasionally a typescript, sensitive intelligence report from the DCI; selected wire service items; State or CIA situation reports (never both) if there is a crisis abroad; and often from the NSC and State/INR morning cable summaries. Contrary to what is commonly believed, this is the only regularly scheduled package of current intelligence the President receives during the day. However, through the course of the day, the National Security Adviser keeps the President apprised of significant developments overseas and may handcarry especially important cables directly to the President. In a crisis, the flow of information increases. More analysis and reports will be given to the President. He will receive current intelligence orally in meetings with his senior White House, State, Defense and Intelligence advisers, as well as from the media—often the first source of information. Nevertheless, on a day-to-day basis apart from the *PDB*, successive Presidents generally have seen only that current intelligence selected by the National Security Adviser, who works to make that morning package as succinct and small as he responsibly can.

It was not always this way—even in modern times. Before the Kennedy Administration, the President, his National Security Adviser and the NSC Staff relied almost entirely on CIA and State to provide incoming current intelligence as soon as it was processed by their operations centers and circulated to substantive officials who could decide what to send to the White House. This system was revolutionized, however, when President Kennedy created the White House Situation Room to which CIA, State, NSA and the Pentagon began to provide unprocessed intelligence information electronically. Thus, the NSC and President began receiving intelligence and diplomatic cables on developments abroad often as soon as, and often before, intelligence analysts. (The present system is not without flaws, however. Henry Kissinger observes in his memoirs, for expample, that, "*It is a common myth that high officials are informed immediately about significant events. . . . It happens not infrequently—much too frequently for the security adviser's emotional stability—that even the President learns of a significant occurrence from the newspapers.*" He notes that President Nixon learned of the historic 1969 meeting in Beijing between Kosygin and Chou En-Lai when he read about it in *The Washington Star*. One result of the establishment of the Situation Room was a significant diminution in the value of current intelligence publications that to this day has not been fully grasped by the

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Intelligence Community. Only analysis by experienced intelligence specialists lent (and lends) value to current intelligence provided the White House. Daily publications reporting purely factual information without trenchant analysis—apart from Situation Reports on crises—too often have been duplicative, too late and irrelevant. Thanks to the Situation Room, urgent information from abroad is often in the President's hands before reaching the DCI, other senior intelligence officials, and sometimes the media.

Naturally, the President receives information through channels other than the early morning folder and the occasional cable during the day. For example, President Carter routinely received current and longrange intelligence analysis through regular briefings by the DCI. Such frequent sessions specifically devoted to analysis were an innovation under Carter and provided an opportunity that did not exist before 1977 for interchange among the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and National Security Adviser on substantive intelligence issues. DCI Bush on occasion gave President Ford personal analytical briefings and, of course, analytical matters would often come up spontaneously during Bush's twice-weekly meetings with the President. All DCIs also have briefed the President and his senior advisers routinely in formal meetings of the National Security Council. Moreover, discussion at such meetings serves to convey information to the President from diverse sources. The President also receives abbreviated versions of intelligence assessments which are included in policy options papers.

President Carter saw fewer CIA assessments, NIEs, research papers and other longer range studies than either Presidents Ford or Nixon. This is due primarily to greater encouragement during the latter two Administrations for the NSC Staff to prepare "Information Memoranda" summarizing for the President the salient points of such longer intelligence papers and attaching the full text. The only longer intelligence reports to reach President Carter were those the DCI delivered personally or the infrequent instances when the National Security Adviser forwarded an exceptional one for the President's reading. Thus, while under Nixon and Ford virtually no major intelligence study reached the President without an NSC cover memorandum summarizing it and perhaps making independent comments or judgments, many more reports reached their desks than reached Mr. Carter. The NSC Staff was not encouraged to forward such studies, due in large measure to reluctance to burden the President with additional—and optional—reading: again, the consequence of the volume of paper coming into the White House. This was due in part to President Carter's penchant to read an entire paper—not just the summary—and the consequent effort to avoid diverting him with "interesting" versus "essential" reading.

In sum, each of the last three Presidents has received through regular channels only a tiny portion of published intelligence and only a fraction even of analysis specifically prepared for senior policymakers. This has placed a premium on the *PDB*—an opportunity neglected until recently—and on the willingness of the DCI to give important assessments (published or oral) directly to the President or call them to the direct attention of the National Security Adviser. (Even personal transmittal slips to the latter are of little value since as everyone resorts to this device and thus render it too common to be effective.) Disinterest or reluctance on the part of a DCI to take an activist role is a severe—even irreparable—handicap to ensuring that intelligence assessments are read by the President and the National Security Adviser.

WHAT PRESIDENTS THINK OF WHAT THEY GET

Perhaps in recognition of how busy Presidents are for years there has been an adage at the White House that the absence of criticism should be regarded as praise. Along these lines, Presidential comment on intelligence assessments are so rare that we

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are understandably tempted to assume satisfaction with what is being received. Regrettably, however, this is doubtful. Many of the infrequent comments we do receive are critical and, more importantly, Presidents have repeatedly (during or after their term of office) expressed general dissatisfaction with broad aspects of intelligence analysis—as for example President Carter did in his well-known note to the Secretary of State, DCI, and National Security Adviser in November 1978, and as President Nixon did both while in office and in his memoirs. Mr Nixon often criticized CIA analysis of the Soviet Union and Europe for not being sufficiently "tough-minded." Kissinger also presumably reflected both Nixon's and Ford's dissatisfaction when he would assail CIA's failure to predict various developments or events abroad, or for preparing "flabby" assessments that he regarded as written from the standpoint of a bureaucrat of the subject country rather than of the United States Government.

These and other principals—note the introductory quotes of this article—also have faulted the Agency for lack of imagination in anticipating the needs of the President and for insufficient aggressiveness in keeping itself informed on policy issues under consideration. Neither these Presidents nor their Assistants for National Security Affairs felt it their responsibility to keep senior Agency officials well informed in this regard, to provide day-to-day detailed tasking or to provide helpful feedback. The Agency had to depend for such guidance on what the DCI could pick up in high-level meetings and contacts—and the skill and interest of different DCIs has varied greatly in both.

Of the three Administrations I served at the NSC, the Carter team worked most conscientiously to inform CIA of the analytical needs of the President and constructively to advise the Agency of perceived shortcomings in its analysis, especially with respect to subject, timing and form. President Carter personally communicated his concerns and criticisms.

Pehaps the most comprehensive White House guidance (and indication of the President's views) in recent years was provided by Dr. Brzezinski in January 1978, when he sent a memorandum to the DCI that made the following points:

— Greater attention needs to be paid to clandestine collection targeted on the thinking and planning of key leaders or groups in important advanced and secondary countries, how they make policy decisions and how they will react to U.S. decisions and those of other powers.

— Political analyses should be focused more on problems of particular concern to the U.S. Government. Too many papers are on subjects peripheral to U.S. interests or offer broad overviews not directly linked to particular problems, events or developments of concern to the U.S. Government.

— There needs to be greater attention to the future. More papers are needed that briefly set forth facts and evidence and then conclude with a well-informed speculative essay on the implications for the future: "We expect and hope for thought-provoking, reasonable views of the future based on what you know about the past and present. . . . Analysts should not be timorous or bound by convention."

— Chiefs of Station often have great understanding of the situation in their host countries and should be encouraged to submit more frequent field assessments.

The Carter White House took other steps to ensure better communication of high-level substantive concerns as well as perceptions of analytical shortcomings. The Political Intelligence Working Group, set up to organize remedial action in response to the President's November 1978 note, interpreted its charter broadly and worked to

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improve and better focus field reporting by State, CIA and Attaches; to improve cover so critical to good reporting; to resolve bureaucratic impediments to good reporting; and a number of other issues aimed at improving analysis and making it more responsive. As part of the work of this informal group, senior staff representatives of Dr. Brzezinski met periodically with representatives of the Secretary of State and the DCI to review foreign developments or issues of current concern to the President and to provide feedback on intelligence coverage. I believe all involved would agree that these efforts had a salutary effect in improving communication between intelligence and the White House and thus improving intelligence support to the President.

Presidents and their senior advisers will never be fully content with intelligence support and analysis. First, and despite occasional protestations to the contrary, Presidents expect that for what they spend on intelligence, the end-product should be able to predict all manner of coups, upheavals, riots, intentions, military moves and the like with accuracy. Intellectually, they know most such specific events are incredibly hard to predict—and that we are incredibly lucky when we do. Nevertheless, in the early morning hours when the National Security Adviser must repair to the President's study with the (usually) bad news about such events, the Chief Executive will not unnaturally wonder why his billions for intelligence do not spare him surprise.

Second, Presidents do not like internal controversy in the Executive Branch—especially if it becomes public. And, from time to time, intelligence analyses provoke dispute, often in public. DCI Helms' disagreement with Secretary of Defense Laird a decade ago before Congress on whether the SS-9 was a MRV or a MIRV is a case in point. Internal Executive Branch disputes over energy estimates, technology transfer, Soviet civil defense, and verification of aspects of SALT are others. Such controversies have become more frequent as disputes to contain within the Executive Branch become harder by virtue of greater Congressional access, journalistic aggressiveness and leaks. The White House's general unease with unclassified CIA analysis is rooted in this dislike for what is regarded as needless controversy. Our own citizens, not to mention foreign readers, cannot be expected to assume that a CIA publication does not reflect an official U.S. Government view—and this confusion is of concern to the White House and often a public relations and policy headache. Thus, to the extent intelligence analysis results (in White House eyes) in internal government controversy, problems with the Congress, or embarrassing publicity, it will draw Presidential ire or at a minimum leave the Chief Magistrate with unflattering and enduring feelings toward intelligence.

Third, Presidents do not welcome new intelligence assessments undercutting policies based on earlier assessments. As professionals, we are constantly revisiting important subjects as better and later information or improved analytical tools become available. When this results in changing the statistical basis for the U.S. position in MBFR, substantially elevating estimates of North Korean forces at a time when the President is pressing to reduce U.S. forces in South Korea, or "discovering" a Soviet brigade in Cuba, it is no revelation to observe that Presidents regard us less than fondly. Presidents do not like surprises, especially those that undermine policy. Intelligence is most often the bearer of such surprises—and pays the price such messengers have suffered since antiquity.

Finally, successive Administrations have generally regarded with skeptical the growing direct relationship between Congress and CIA above and beyond the actual oversight process. In recent years, the provision of great quantities of highly sensitive information and analysis to Members of Congress and their staffs has eroded the Executive's longstanding advantage of a near monopoly of information on foreign affairs and defense. The flow of information to the Hill has given the Congress a

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powerful tool in its quest for a greater voice in the making of foreign and defense policy vis-a-vis the Executive—and Presidents cannot be indifferent to the fact that intelligence has provided Congress with that tool and that the White House is nearly helpless to blunt it except in very rare cases.

OVERCOMING ISOLATION (OURS) AND SUSPICION (THEIRS)

Presidents expect their intelligence service to provide timely, accurate and farseeing analysis. Thus, nearly all Presidential comments on the quality of intelligence are critical—prompted by our failure to meet expectations. Indeed, all but one quote at the outset of this article was in response to a *specific* situation where intelligence was perceived to have failed to measure up. In short, Presidents often consider intelligence as much another problem bureaucracy to be dealt with and warily watched as it is a source of helpful information, insight and support.

To the extent intelligence professionals isolate themselves from White House/NSC officials and are unresponsive to White House *analytical* needs, this adversarial nature of the relationship will be emphasized and understanding of what we can and cannot do will be lacking. Thus, the Intelligence Community must take the initiative to establish and maintain close personal ties to White House and NSC officials from the President on down. It must also aggressively seek new ways to get the maximum amount of analysis before the President, even while experimenting with old mechanisms, such as the *PDB*. White House procedures and relationships are always dynamic; accordingly, we must always be searching for new and better ways to serve our principal customer.

Although the routine order of business and internal organization may vary greatly from Administration to Administration, I would suggest several general rules:

— Senior intelligence officials must establish and maintain a network of personal contacts in the NSC Staff and the immediate office of the National Security Adviser to ensure that we are well informed as to the issues of concern to the President; policy matters under consideration in which intelligence analysis can make a contribution; and the overall foreign and defense affairs agenda so that we can anticipate the President's needs.

  • For intelligence to be useful, it must be timely. Insofar as policy issues, foreign visitors and such are involved, often a day or two makes the difference between a vital or irrelevant contribution.

  • Periodic visits to NSC staffers on a quarterly, semiannual, or annual basis to seek guidance during the coming period is worse than useless; they can be misleading and eventually waste valuable analytical resources. Most NSC staffers do not think about their work in these terms. The ordinary result of such an approach is that the staffer will respond off the top of the head (or off the wall) or ask for work related to what he has just completed or knows to be in his in-box. We will do ourselves more good by establishing daily dialogue.

  • Similarly, as has been done occasionally in the past, the terms of reference of major papers should be shared with the NSC to ensure that what we have in mind best meets the policy need and to obtain suggestions of additional points to be covered to be most helpful.

— The role of the DCI is central to understanding the President's needs and conveying analysis to him. Few DCIs before Admiral Turner took a sustained interest in analysis or an active role in getting substantive matters before the

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President either orally or in writing. Few have been so brash as literally to hand the President published intelligence reports to read. Future DCIs must be persuaded that these undertakings are central to their role as the President's principal intelligence adviser. Moreover, the DCI should assume a similar role with the National Security Adviser—perhaps the best source of information on issues of topical interest to the President and the foreign affairs and defense agenda. Finally, the importance of routine, detailed feedback by the DCI from policy meetings, briefings and conversations with the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser and Chairman, JCS to analytical managers, NIOs and senior analysts must be impressed upon DCIs. The dearth of feedback before 1977 was damaging to our work and contributed to a sense "downtown" that we were unhelpful and unresponsive. Contrary to the views of some intelligence professionals, we cannot properly do our work in splendid isolation.

— We must exploit every opportunity to get analysis to the President. When exceptional analysis is available, an appropriate senior intelligence official should *telephone* his personal contact(s) noted above and alert him to the paper (but judiciously to preserve credibility). Meanwhile, DCI briefings, NSC meetings, intelligence contributions or annexes to policy options papers, typescript memoranda, spot reports, and all other means need to be used to get information to the Security Adviser and to the President.

— Intelligence should be unafraid to speculate on the future. Everyone else around the President does—and most are far less experienced or capable analysts than we. A preferred approach would be to alternative futures and then above all state clearly our best estimate, however we caveat it. Waffling conclusions have too long made intelligence estimates a laughingstock among policymakers. "On the one hand . . . but on the other . . . " is no help to a policymaker and clearly undermines confidence in our analytical capacity. If we have no confidence in our judgment, why should the President?

— In all but two or three cases National Intelligence Estimates as presently prepared have been ignored by the White House in recent years. They are usually too late, too formalistic, and too equivocal to be of value to senior policymakers—much less the President or his Security Adviser. This need not be so. A return to the practice of issuing brief, short-deadline special NIEs that would focus on specific policy relevant issues would mean that intelligence would be available before decisions are made—and would better serve the President and his senior advisers. It would also ensure that the intelligence assessment is not buried in long options papers which rarely reach the President anyway.

  • Such SNIEs would have to be disseminated on a restrictive basis. On important issues, the circle of policy players is kept small; the contribution of any intelligence paper will be enhanced by its limited circulation and, more importantly, by the perception by its readers of its limited high-level readership. If the President or his closest advisers make a special request of analysis, they do not like to see a response apparently published in the hundreds of copies. We are mistaken as well when we become preoccupied with format and presentation to the detriment of analytical (vice reportorial) content—a problem in the past.

— The responsibility for making intelligence more relevant, timely and helpful is that of senior officials of the Intelligence Community alone. Analysts and

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managers at all levels must assume the burden of keeping better up to date on events and policy issues relevant to their area of professional concern. Such awareness must infuse all analysis from drafter to Director. Only when priority attention is given at all levels to the relevance and value of intelligence *to the consumer* from President to desk officer will intelligence analysis be better received and, in the end, be better.

The above "rules" apply to doing our work better. They will not resolve the several causes of Presidential displeasure—our support of Congress, changing assessments that have policy implications, surprises, and so forth. Even here there are some steps we can take. For example:

— We should take the initiative to let the Security Adviser or the NSC Staff know that we are preparing an estimate or other form of analysis that will revise earlier assessments and have an impact on the President's policies. This would include advance warning of new and important conclusions in military estimates such as in NIE 11-3/8 (the strategic forces estimate) or NIE 11-14 (the Warsaw Pact forces estimate), analyses of new weapons systems and so forth, as well as to political and economic analyses.

— Intelligence needs to develop a mechanism for better informing the White House about support provided to the Congress. The intelligence agencies are part of the Executive Branch; the DCI is appointed by and reports to the President. It is not improper or inappropriate for us to keep the President's foreign affairs staff more completely and regularly advised of papers we provide the Congress, possibly controversial testimony or briefings, etc. Again, some of this has been done—but a mere schedule of planned appearances or an occasional phone call are not enough. Keeping the Executive informed about our dealings with Congress is an important aspect of building Presidential confidence that we are not trying to undercut him or his policies by responding to legitimate Congressional requests.

— Finally, it would be helpful to continue keeping the White House informed in advance when we plan to publish an unclassified substantive intelligence and to highlight possible controversial points. This will become important as pressure for such unclassified publications increases. We should acquiesce in those rare circumstances in which the Security Adviser or the President asks us not to publish certain information for public consumption. Our charter is to serve the President and, secondarily, the Congress. Once information and analysis is provided to them, our responsibility is fulfilled. Unclassified publications are indeed a public service but also, frankly, a public relations enterprise. If such a service/enterprise complicates life for the President, we should be prepared to forgo it. Only a fraction of unclassified publications would be affected—and our willingness to withhold them would help build confidence at the White House that we seek to be supportive.

Although several of the above "rules" and suggestions may be controversial, the reader should be aware that all have been pursued by CIA at one time or another and by one official or another. I wish to emphasize that *haphazard,* occasional implementation has not ameliorated the underlying suspicion and dissatisfaction of successive Presidents and their advisers with intelligence analysis or their perception that we often peddle our product to the Congress and public in a freewheeling manner designed to benefit us, regardless of the problems caused the policymaker.

Some will argue that the steps I propose would subvert the independence of the analysis process and subordinate our judgments to policy considerations. That is not so!

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None implies any interference with the analyst or his judgments—except to make the latter relevant to the needs of the President and to improve the odds someone at the White House will value the analyst's work. Most are intended to allot the analyst his rightful voice in policy deliberations and to ensure that receptivity to his work is not diminished by irritation or pique resulting from controversy we have sparked on the Hill; the White House being caught unawares by analysis that undercuts policies based on earlier intelligence conclusions; or because the White House has been embarrassed by publication of unclassified analysis.

Above all, we in intelligence should appreciate the primacy of personal relationships in making government work. We have neglected to develop fully such relationships at the White House and NSC in recent years—although of course there have been exceptions. We must pursue such contacts—bearing in mind that we start all over every four or eight years and, indeed, every month as familiar faces at CIA and downtown are replaced by new. These personal contacts and a greater sensitivity to White House needs and perceptions (including of us) are essential to mitigating Presidential criticism and ensuring that the best possible intelligence product in fact reaches our "most important customer" in time to make a difference. *The above article is Secret.*

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A new era with a changing world—reordering priorities.

THE INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGE IN THE 1980s [1]

Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Council

ACCELERATION AND CHANGE

American intelligence in the next decade will be operating in a world quite different from the one it faced 10 years ago. International trends do not normally change rapidly, but every now and then a traumatic event shakes up familiar patterns as does a kaleidoscope and makes us think of old, evolving problems in new ways. The crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have proved to be such events. These two events dramatized both the growing Soviet threat to US positions worldwide and the declining ability of the United States to have its own way in international relations. Both of these trends have been apparent since at least the late 1950s, but suddenly they seem much more vivid and threatening.

The Afghan affair has brought a major change to US-Soviet relations. The change is certainly one in US perceptions of Soviet policy; it may also prove to be one in Soviet policy itself—it is difficult to tell for sure. The invasion of Afghanistan marked the crossing of a threshold, yet it is consistent with and part of overall Soviet policy since World War II, or even since the czars consolidated their rule in Central Asia in the 19th century. But even if the change that has taken place proves to be more in our perceptions than in actual Soviet policies, it is a fundamental change that has already returned US-Soviet relations almost to Cold War levels. US-Soviet competition will still retain elements of shared interest—there are numerous reasons to maintain some sort of dialogue—but I believe that the United States will face the Soviet Union with more realism and pessimism for a long time to come.

SIZING THE SOVIET PROBLEM

The Soviet Union that we face will itself be undergoing substantial change in the 1980s. There are three main elements that US intelligence and policy must be concerned with. The first is the continuing growth of Soviet military programs, the steady drive to catch up with and surpass the United States in technological fields, the proliferation of weapons development programs, the mass production of weapons systems, both strategic and general purpose, and the continued subordination of all other interests to the military requirements of the state. In the strategic field, the early 1980s are particularly important because during that time the Soviet position will be at its strongest relative to the United States, before such US programs as Trident, MX, and cruise missiles become operational. We do not expect the Soviets, who understand the realities of nuclear warfare, to take advantage of this "window" by seeking a nuclear

[1] This article was prepared for another purpose, but the editors believed it would be of particular interest to readers of *Studies*.

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victory in which everyone would lose. We expect that the Soviet leaders will see themselves able to take advantage of opportunities that are presented to them where the threat to US interests is apparently marginal. They may see themselves as free to undertake more Afghanistans and Ethiopias. In their view, when vital US interests are not directly challenged, Soviet strategic power effectively neutralizes that of the United States and leaves the Soviets free to exploit their overwhelming strength in conventional forces. Moreover, Afghanistan, Iran, and a number of other soft spots in Asia are as hard to reach from US bases as they are easy from Soviet ones.

A second important consideration is the state of the Soviet economy. We are not sure if the present generation of Soviet leaders sees the USSR's dilemmas as we do. In our view, however, they are facing problems of an extremely serious nature. The rate of growth of their economy has been slowing year after year. Their agriculture is inefficient and cannot adequately feed the population—a disgrace to a modern state. In the 1980s new constraints will be added, particularly in energy and manpower. We have projected a leveling off and probable sharp reduction in Soviet petroleum production. So far this is proving to be the case. The Soviets are not going to have enough oil to maintain their economy at its present level and continue exports to Eastern and Western Europe; sales to the latter are a major earner of hard currency. Moreover, their economy does not have the excessive consumption that ours has; they have little to conserve. Thus, they are faced with some nasty choices: the loss of hard currency earnings with which to buy grain and technology, economic strains leading potentially to serious political disorder in Eastern Europe, reduced economic performance at home, or the need to import goods on the world market without the necessary hard currency to pay for them. We worry whether under these circumstances Middle Eastern oil might become sufficiently tempting to impel them to some extreme course of action, but I should stress that we have no evidence they have such designs.

Manpower will also be a serious problem. The low birthrate of the 1960s—in part the price of Soviet urban life—means much smaller numbers of young people entering the work force and the armed forces. Moreover, the decline in young people reaching working age is most pronounced in European Russia and in the educated urban communities. In coming years, a much greater percentage of the increment to the work force will come from non-Russians, particularly the less advanced Muslim peoples of Central Asia. So the problem is not just one of worker quantity, but also of quality. And in the 1980s the long-foreseen danger that the Russians will eventually lose their absolute majority in the Soviet population will begin to emerge as a more immediate concern for the leadership. This, coupled with upheavals in the larger Islamic world, will pose new dangers with which the Soviet leadership is ill equipped to deal except by brute force.

The third area demanding increased US attention concerns Soviet political questions. The leadership itself will be entering a period of change. The small group of men around Brezhnev are now almost all in their seventies. They have shown little sign of self-renewal by bringing in younger blood. A septuagenarian who departs the inner circle tends to be replaced by another septuagenarian. This leadership has shown little imagination; there have been few innovative attacks on, or apparently, even recognition of many of the serious problems that the Soviet state faces. Rather, Soviet leaders have been content to rest their success principally on the one thing that the Soviet state seems to do well—maintain continuity in an aggressive foreign policy based on steady development of military power. But during the 1980s rigidity in domestic policies will have to give way. The maneuvering to replace Brezhnev has begun, but we do not have good information on the next generation of leaders. We can

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anticipate that they will be as competent as the present group and as devoted to the furthering of Soviet national interests. They may be more flexible if only because they are younger, but whether they can put aside their ideological and bureaucratic blinders to cope more effectively with internal problems is an unanswered question.

This Soviet Union will be full of uncertainty for us. Because of their rigid, conservative, and unchanging leadership, we have been reasonably confident in our judgments of how Moscow will behave in most circumstances. We have not been surprised by much that this leadership has done, including the invasion of Afghanistan. In the 1980s, the United States must reckon that it is facing much greater uncertainties in dealing with Moscow. US intelligence officers will have to be less conservative in their analysis; we must be on the alert for new Soviet initiatives and expect on occasion to be surprised. This will be a very dangerous period. To see where the dangers could lie, one need only contemplate the possibility of a new and aggressive Soviet leadership desperately in need of petroleum, capable of misreading US intentions and the outside world, but controlling an extraordinarily powerful military instrument.

FEWER RESOURCES

But US-Soviet competition will be only one of the driving forces for change and controversy in the world of the 1980s. That world will also be characterized by an increasing scarcity of resources and by rising expectations among peoples everywhere that simply cannot be met. Those people will become increasingly susceptible to demagogic solutions and endemic disorder. Many of the foundations for our positions abroad that we have accepted for decades as firm are already shaking, and this trend will almost certainly continue. Here, too, intelligence must measure the extent to which those foundations are being weakened and seek the reasons. It must be alert to new developments that can provide new bases for future US policy.

OLD ALLIES—NEW COMPETITORS

One place where our assumptions are being especially challenged is in Western Europe. This is perhaps inevitable as the nations of Europe grow stronger economically, and as they gradually coalesce into a political as well as an economic community. We will have to work much harder in the 1980s to hold the Western alliance together. We in intelligence must be increasingly alert to shifts in public opinion. The European peoples, and to an increasing extent their governments, see less and less common interest with the United States. They see the Soviet military threat as directed primarily at the United States and not at them, and they do not see why their present prosperity should be sacrificed to US-Soviet quarrels over distant places. In short, the Europeans are rich and complacent. They have undergone two shattering wars in this century, and they do not want to think about, much less risk, a third. The Europe of 1914 was economically thriving and politically stable, but suffused with a dangerous nationalism. The Europe of 1939 was economically depressed, politically unstable, and complacent in the face of a great totalitarian threat. The Europe of the 1980s is like that of 1914, except that the nationalism of 1914 has been replaced by the complacency of 1939 and the inhibiting terror of possible nuclear war.

The Europeans are also more vulnerable to instability in the Third World than is the United States. As the world has become more interdependent, European requirements for imported energy and raw materials have grown enormously. While the United States also depends on Middle Eastern oil and African metals, it is far better able to cope with supply disruptions. Thus, European foreign economic policies have diverged from that of the United States. The Europeans place greater emphasis on

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getting along with their supplier nations without overly great concern for principle. They are far more willing than we to sacrifice good relations with Israel to friendship with the Arabs, even the radical Arabs, on whom they depend. Moreover, they are extremely reluctant to allow what they see as US-Soviet power rivalry to disrupt their cooperative arrangements with the less developed countries. Finally, as exporters of arms and machinery they are rivals to the United States, not partners.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that our allies have been somewhat less than enthusiastic in supporting an active US policy of potential high risk in Southwest Asia. What is surprising is that NATO retains the cohesion and vigor that it does. European governments recognize that the Soviet forces facing them are very strong and most of them have been willing to follow our lead, however grudgingly and reluctantly, in the modernization of conventional and theater nuclear forces.

But even this cooperation is fragile. European confidence in American leadership and steadfastness has been badly shaken by the Vietnam war and its lingering aftereffects in American life. Even the European leaders who are most supportive and understanding wish to keep a certain distance from the United States. They are no longer taking for granted our commitment to the defense of Europe and to the leadership of the free World. They are uncertain of our intent and often upset by our conduct of foreign policy.

The strains in the Atlantic alliance provide new opportunities for the Soviets. They have constructed a network of common interests with the Europeans. Trade had grown enormously; the large contracts for building and equipping advanced industrial installations have become an important component of the European economics. The Soviet drive to exploit US-European differences may not be subtle, but it strikes a responsive chord among European populations that would prefer to believe that the threat from the East is a mirage.

EAST ASIA—THE PACIFIC

In East Asia, too, our relations are changing. Our friendship with China continues to grow—but there remain significant limits to the closeness and mutual benefit of that friendship. Our alliance with Japan is affected by strains similar to those in Europe, but it is proving more resistant to them. The Japanese people and government are perhaps more realistic than the Europeans, and they have narrower options. They have no real choice except to rely on the United States. Nevertheless, Japan is slowly moving toward becoming again a major power in the Pacific. Japanese economic policy has been very aggressive since the early 1960s. Japanese diplomacy has become more active, but still is restrained and concerns itself largely with the protection of Japanese economic interests. The Japanese have been extremely reluctant to develop military forces in any way commensurate with their economic and political interests. But very slowly they are beginning to recognize that they must become more of a partner to the United States in the military field.

When they do, it is obvious that they will have more say in how US-Japanese relationship is conducted, but the US-Japanese alliance could be sounder in the 1980s than the US-European, despite significant friction in US-Japanese economic relations. Moreover, China's opening to the world is providing the Japanese new opportunities. The Japanese in the 1930s dreamed of combining China's manpower and resources with Japan's skills, energy, and organizational genius. That dream is again alive in a less dangerous form. It could offer the United States in the 1980s a strong anchor in East Asia, similar in some respects to NATO and the EC in Western Europe. We may find the focus of American policy, which switched from the Pacific to the Atlantic after Vietnam, switching back in the 1980s to the Pacific.

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NEW ARENAS

Such a development would not be without risk. The Soviets have seen China as an actual threat and Japan, backed by the United States, as a potential one. They will see the combination as very dangerous. Soviet forces in the Far East are strong, and they will be strengthened and modernized. A more aggressive Soviet leadership may come to believe that it can risk weakening China before this new constellation becomes too strong. The Soviet-Chinese proxy struggle in Southeast Asia could provide either the pretext for or the means of such an initiative. And Korea—North and South—will remain a tinder box.

In the upper tier of the Third World—those countries, like Saudi Arabia, to which natural resources have brought economic strength far out of proportion to their ability to make good use of it, and those countries, like Brazil, that are on the threshold of becoming industrial powers in their own right—we expect the 1980s to be like the 1970s, but more so. These countries will be even more subject to forces conducive to political instability. In some of them Islamic fundamentalism will become a greater threat. In most of them the effects of modernization on societies ill prepared for it will produce great social tensions. Those economies that depend on imports of Western manufactured goods will be directed by the inflation and economic instability of the West. Most of them are unable to feed themselves or to control their population growth. The governments of virtually all these countries will be susceptible to violent overthrow. Their peoples, led to expect growing prosperity that underdeveloped institutions cannot deliver, will be ripe for radical political solutions. Irresponsible political elements will increasingly complicate these situations.

These countries will remain a major ground on which the US-Soviet struggle will be fought. But despite the threats of political and economic upheaval, many of these countries will grow stronger and more independent of their respective patrons. Intelligence must look at these countries as independent powers in their own right and not as client states. This means that we must seek a deeper understanding of these economies and societies—what are the forces that make them act the way they do, tribal, ethnic, religious, geographic, economic, psychological?

The rest of the Third World nations will be subject to the same forces as their stronger brothers, but will be far less able to act independently. They will be too weak to stay out of the world political struggle and too ambitious to refrain from doing so. But in the 1980s two new factors will increasingly influence that struggle. In the first place, the struggle may not be a two-sided one, the United States and its allies vs. the Soviet Union and its clients. Our allies, as noted above, are increasingly our competitors. But beyond that, the upper tier nations of the Third World will themselves become competitors and will seek increasingly to extend their influence among their weaker neighbors. In East Africa today, Iraq is competing effectively with both the Soviet Union and the West.

In the past, competition has been for political influence; we saw ourselves as the "free world" and the opposition as "world Communism." In the 1980s the world is characterized by many shades of gray. Many of the countries that we think of as sympathetic to the United States are by no means free, and many of those sympathetic to the USSR are by no means Communist. Some of the USSR's chief enemies—or problems—are Communist areas. The struggle for influence is a political one, but in the 1980s it will increasingly be conducted for economic rather than ideological ends. The less developed countries contain almost the last repositories of undeveloped mineral resources. As these resources grow scarcer and harder to get elsewhere, these countries will become more and more the target for diplomacy, subversion, and, ultimately, military conquest. We may be approaching a new kind of colonialism.

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Within this broader picture let me single out two areas to which intelligence must give greater attention in the next decade. The first is the complex of countries surrounding the northwest corner of the Indian Ocean. Our interests there are obvious, and our level of effort in that part of the world is high. But our problems there are not short-term. The dependence of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan on Persian Gulf oil probably cannot be substantially reduced for a number of years, if at all. The United States is seeking ways to project greater military power into that part of the world. The Soviets are indicating a growing interest, and their capability to project power at present far surpasses our own.

Moreover, every country in the area is a political cauldron. We have seen the forces that were unleashed when the authoritarian government in Iran weakened. Many of the same forces are latent throughout the region. We need a much greater understanding of these forces and of the societies in which they operate.

CLOSE TO HOME

A second area of special concern is that of our neighbors—and especially the industrial powers of the Western Hemisphere. These include in the first instance Canada and Mexico, but probably also Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela. Each of these countries has to some degree asserted its independence of the United States. None of them can be counted on to line up with us except in extraordinary circumstances. All have developed strong economic ties outside the Hemisphere. But as the world outside this Hemisphere becomes more chaotic, as I think it will, there may be a countervailing thrust toward interdependence within the Hemisphere, toward an effort to insulate North and South America from destructive social and economic forces elsewhere.

In the turbulent world here portrayed, we will need a friendly and supportive Canada and Mexico. But Canada is itself in the midst of a slow-motion constitutional crisis that may yet fragment the country and have grave but unpredictable consequences for our relations with Canada or with its component parts. Mexico and the major countries of South America are themselves subject to the same strains as semi-developed nations elsewhere. Mexican society has remained basically stable, but the tensions underlying the surface stability increase year by year.

There are also very serious threats within the Hemisphere. Social tensions, uncontrolled population growth, and extreme poverty are exploited by Cuban subversion. The Cubans are skillful at and have great resources for this kind of warfare. Moreover, it is difficult for the United States to combat the Cubans because the ground they choose is ground on which it is very difficult for us to stand. A campaign of subversion and insurrection by landless peasants and an oppressed urban middle class against a brutal and corrupt oligarchy, as in Nicaragua, is not one that the United States is comfortable opposing, even when the ultimate outcome is likely to be a government under strong Cuban influnce, one that we expect ultimately will follow the Cuban path.

We are seeing the same pattern in El Salvador. A year or two hence Guatemala and Honduras will be similarly threatened. By the end of the decade we may find that the disease has spread into Mexico, as it is now spreading in the Caribbean islands. Our problem in this part of the world is not limited to understanding what is going on, although we need more and better intelligence collection. Our problem very bluntly is to find ways to guide what is going on, and to do what we need to find ways to advance US strategic interests without eroding US moral principles. We have not yet found the answer.

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A PRESS FOR QUALITY

Turning from substance to management, this look at the world around us means that in the 1980s we in intelligence will face even greater challenges than those of the 1970s. Uncertainties will abound, and surprises are likely. In order to deal effectively with these complexities and ambiguities, we must improve the quality of our management in several important ways.

The first of these is in the achievement of *synthesis*. As our analytic structure gets bigger, even as it gets stronger, it also gets more unwieldy. Specializations multiply, and each analyst of our many hundreds is responsible for a diminishing slice of the total effort. But the problems we deal with are multidimensional and reach across geographic and disciplinary boundaries. Senior policy officers want concise, relevant intelligence support that presents a genuine synthesis of all the factors bearing on the problems, We tend, however, to produce such papers by stapling together contributions from each of the specialized analysts who has a fragment of the action. This simply is not good enough. We have to find a way—and this is a serious management problem—to combine the outstanding expertise that we have developed with the kind of mind that is able to grasp a problem as a whole, to draw on the knowledge of the specialists, and to present an assessment in a forum that demands and deserves attention.

A second area where we need to do better is *daring*. Intelligence analysts are by nature conservative, the more specialized the more so. Our bureaucratic culture does not encourage speculation or unconventional thinking. Interagency coordination, no matter how conscientiously led, tends to damp down alternative hypothesis in favor of safe, centrist positions. Analysts who argue strongly for unpopular views become known as "controversial" and some get poor fitness reports. In the next decade we will be operating in a world in which many of the established truths that have governed our analysis are no longer valid. We can expect many of our judgments to be wrong. We deal with decisions made by human beings, and human beings are notoriously perverse in doing what they believe they should do rather than what our logic says they should do. But while we will often be wrong, we need not ever be stupid. We must encourage our analysts to use their imaginations, to think the unthinkable, to put forward the country view, to dare to be wrong, to be comfortable in a minority. We must ensure that they are rewarded and not penalized for taking chances. And we must manage analysis so that it systematically generates and presents to the reader the soundly based but less probable hypothesis as well as the consensus.

INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY

Finally, we must find a better way, and we cannot do this by ourselves, to *use intelligence in the policy process*. In national security policymaking 20 years ago, it was customary to prepare a national intelligence assessment preparatory to each major decision at the NSC level. This independent assessment, identified as such, was attached to the policy recommendations that went forward. Over the years we have moved to a system where intelligence comes into play at that level more by osmosis. Intelligence has its impact principally on the drafting officer for the policy paper. It ends up between the lines, and the decisionmaker seldom gets an independent view of the situation he faces and its implications. Admittedly the policy process in a world where the United States is more often the reactor than the initiator tends to move more rapidly than it used to. But rapid ad hoc decisionmaking has sacrificed the intelligence contribution. Policy officers do not call for an intelligence assessment, partly because they are rushed partly because they are satisfied with their own private assessments, partly because they do not expect a useful, relevant product, and partly

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because we have become so musclebound in the production of national intelligence that we cannot deliver it in time to be useful. Timely intelligence should always be available for the decisionmaker, so he can know before he acts on the judgments of his intelligence officers.

We have gotten ourselves in a chicken-and-egg situation. It is incumbent on us to produce intelligence that is relevant, imaginative, and timely. It is incumbent on the policy officers to call for and use our product. Neither can happen without the other. I am confident that both will improve. *The above article is Unclassified.*

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TITLE: Serving Intelligence Clients

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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As much effort must go into the care and feeding of consumers as goes into production to ensure maximum impact for finished current intelligence.

SERVING INTELLIGENCE CLIENTS

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Intelligence analysts labor long and hard to reach and coordinate significant conclusions which their supervisors and senior officials review and massage for clarity and terseness. A sophisticated, attractive product is sought by the use of graphic arts and the most modern publication and printing techniques. Then, an excellent output too often is left to the vagaries of the distribution system.

Production analysts and their supervisors too often see the fact of publication as the end of their effort. Experience shows, however, that distribution lists and blue notes from the Director or his Deputies do not guarantee that the information reaches, or is read, by the reader for whom it is intended. Although much of the intelligence product reaches the policymakers through staffers who peruse intelligence documents in preparing studies and recommendations for their principals, its impact is indirect. These simple truths manifested themselves to me while an intelligence aide to the Secretary of the Treasury from 1972 to 1974.

THE CONCEPT

In 1971 the Secretary of the Treasury became a member of NFIB (then USIB). Late that year George Shultz was appointed to that office. Seeking guidance about the role Treasury should play, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms appointed two CIA employees—representing DDO and NFAC (then DDI)—to assist in organizing a contribution to collection (from the Treasury attaches) and to develop a systematic availability of finished intelligence to the Secretary. It is the latter function addressed in this article.

The Department of the Treasury received multiple copies of selected finished intelligence products. Due to the absence of a secure building, these were filed and made available on request to the few officials holding suitable clearances. Thus, unless senior Treasury officials had prior knowledge of the existence of an intelligence publication, they remained ignorant of much of the material sent to their Department. The Secretary received regularly only one document—a hand-carried copy of NSA's unevaluated daily *Sigint Summary*. Like most senior officials, he did not distinguish between raw information and finished, evaluated intelligence; an intelligence logo or letterhead symbolized an intelligence product.

The Secretary was amenable to rectifying this situation and instructed that he should receive an oral intelligence briefing daily, that all substantive intelligence documents directed to the Office of the Secretary be screened by his intelligence briefer, and that recommendations be made regarding clearances for his Assistant Secretaries to assure that information vital to the performance of their duties was made available

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to them. His satisfaction with CIA support subsequently caused him to direct that all members of the Economic Policy Board,* which he chaired, be briefed daily.

Thus began an experience that was exhilerating and exhausting—but most of all the fulfillment of an analyst's dream: to observe and participate in the near final process of intelligence, its consideration by the policy decision maker. I learned many lessons which I happily share with others in the hope of fostering profound change in intelligence output.

Treasury Organization

Devising a system to provide intelligence products to officials in the Treasury Department was physically taxing but not a great problem. Each day at 0600, overnight CIA publications and selected pieces of traffic were delivered. NSA furnished significant items from its take, and State Department sent a selection of cable traffic. The Treasury's own tickers provided press and FBIS material. All formed the grist for preparation of the daily briefings.

When William Simon became Secretary in 1974, the author appreciated his prior attendance at the Agency's speed reading course. Mr. Simon chose to have his briefing with breakfast, just after 0700, allowing one hour for the briefer to assimulate the overnight take. I found he digested world affairs with the same assiduity he did his grapefruit. It became a peripatetic briefing, usually ending up in the washroom where the Vietnam situation the Secretary's teeth simultaneously got the broad brush.

Interviews with the officers designated by the Secretary quickly revealed those interests and responsibilities that should be supported by intelligence. Because only the communications area of the Treasury building was secure, officers were orally briefed daily, or provided with hand-carried folders of relevant material, according to their choice. A secure vault was established where officers' materials were filed and where standard classified reference materials were kept for their perusal.

Not everyone at Treasury was enamored of this intelligence attention. Deputy Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs Paul Volcker initially declined the offer of support, noting that when he needed information on international economic developments he phoned the likely foreign source of information. (He abhorred "skulking in the corridors, eavesdropping.") Mr Volcker was later won over to intelligence when shown clandestine reporting that an ostensible ally was "setting him up," permitting him to turn aside what might have become an embarrassing situation.

Other skeptics, many of whom never became comfortable even with the knowledge that intelligence analysis was addressing problems in Treasury's area of substantive policy reponsibility, at least grudgingly admitted that intelligence helped to confirm their own analyses.

Broader Contacts

A fascinating and educational part of the tour involved association with members of the Economic Policy Board. Unlike the development of a system within the Department of the Treasury to purvey finished intelligence, with the EPB approaches had to

*The Economic Policy Board (now The Economic Policy Group) during the period under consideration included Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz, Chairman; Executive Director Kenneth Dam; Economic Counselor to the President Ambassador Kenneth Rush; Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent; Chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisors Herbert Stein; the President's Special Trade Representative Ambassador William Eberle; and Chairman of the Council of International Economic Policy Peter Flanigan. The EPB provided guidance to the President of both domestic and international economic policies.

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be designed for the widely differing physical and substantive situations and personality of each member.

Ideally, a psychologist should match the briefer to his principal. Although Secretary Shultz was of impressive stature, his desk was on a platform so he looked down on his visitors. A man of little facial expression, he chose to look directly into the eyes of a speaker. Unless he commented in his soft-spoken yet steely manner it was difficult to ascertain his reaction. Equally unnerving was Mr. Flanigan's habit of standing behind the briefer—which left me addressing an empty chair.

Common to all was the never-ending need to be made familiar with the services and capabilities of the intelligence world. During the two-year period in which there were nine changes of EPB members, it became clear that it was the individual's perception of the role to be played, as well as his/her influence in decision-making bodies and relation to the Chief Executive, rather than the title of the office held by the member, that dictated the support intelligence required. The President regularly made assignments of responsibility that related more to the individual's ability, interests, and background than to job title.

The Executive Branch may appear highly structured, but in fact it is highly personalized. With each change of incumbency, a whole new set of interests and capabilities is brought into the picture. Varying relationships develop with the Chief Executive, and tasks are not only given to the new official, but they are also assigned or reassigned widely. Even without a change of incumbency, it is important to keep a sharp watch for Presidential details. During my tour, the role of chief negotiator on the sensitive problem of US economic relations with Japan shifted among the Vice President, the President's Special Trade Representative, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, and the Secretary of Commerce. Keeping abreast of such changes in assignment is vital to insure that intelligence is properly exploited by the policymaker/negotiator.

I found that close daily contact with officials—and their willingness in most cases to permit a review of their appointment calendars listing meetings they would attend or chair, foreign officials they would host, trips they would make—permitted the tailoring of intelligence support to their needs. On this point, Henry Kissinger was not the only official to make unheralded trips abroad. Often a confidential foreign visit had significance beyond the publicized trips of Administration officials. During the 1972-1973 international monetary crises, intelligence support for the secret meetings far exceeded in importance the more regular intelligence assistance supplied.

It was not surprising to find each Cabinet Secretary or Presidential adviser had a quite individual style and approach to assigned responsibility. As regards intelligence, some read, some listened; some were receptive, some hostile; some were attentive, some few were querulous and distracted. Many opted to avoid "IN" boxes, relying solely on aides to screen incoming material—which required a dual contact to make certain that the principal was well-served by assisting the aide in making judgments about what should be forwarded or discarded. This required a careful balance to avoid overloading the official and yet faithfully representing intelligence output.

One official insisted that he always be briefed privately, that his staff not be informed of our exchanges. Another asked that his personal staff be cleared to participate in the briefings. A third was briefed privately but would indicate items to be brought to the attention of particular subordinates. Most did not regularly read any general intelligence publication, preferring to be given specific items for study and frequently asking for summaries with important background details underscored.

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In addition to understanding these idiosyncracies, it was necessary to establish a personal relationship with each official. Perhaps the most bizarre incident that led to a warm and lasting association involved Dr. Herbert Stein—a man of stern demeanor but, I discovered, with an impish proclivity. I was chided unmercifully in front of his staff for a considerably off-mark estimate of a (b)(1) election outcome. Before thinking, I blurted out that I felt quite at home with that mis-estimate in the presence of the Council of Economic Advisors. The first uproarious laugh came from Dr. Stein with whom, from that point, and easy relationship existed.

Almost universally, these senior officials developed a strong desire to be in charge of the briefings. They sought information related to an imminent meeting or a problem in which they were embroiled. Only with tact and persistence could they be led to consider those analyses that are the major purpose of intelligence—reporting developing situations that would in the future require decisions. It became an interesting contest between what the policymaker wanted to know and what the intelligence aide thought he should know.

Again, personal contact was invaluable in this area. It permitted, with perseverence, the preparation of the policymaker to influence forthcoming problems rather than merely to react to them. It also made it possible to retrieve and re-present older published materials relevant to situations in which he/she had become involved. With some frequency, routine intelligence output had no relevance for many consumers at the time of its production, yet was welcomed as thought-provoking analysis subsequently. Often current intelligence became "current" when consumed rather than when produced.

Although OER had published considerable data on Soviet and world agricultural prospects and Moscow's need to import grains from major suppliers (read the US), much of that reporting had not been absorbed by those about to participate in the decision on US grain acreage allocations in 1973. The preparation of a packet of existing materials and an update briefing provided an economic rationale for what otherwise would have been largely a domestic political decision.

And yet I would make clear that in two years of briefing a large number of appointed officials, I found none unintelligent. Quite the contrary: they were busy people with a tendency to problem solve using their considerable native intelligence unless specific help was laid before them. On being designated "oil czar" in 1973, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Simon vowed to become expert in that field. While both CIA and the Department of the Interior briefed and provided written materials, his ability to sort, evaluate, and digest information and isolate the real issues, led to a mastery of the subject that was generally typical of the ability of policymakers.

On many occasions daily personal contact contributed to improved targets for intelligence exploitation. Busy officials are unlikely on their own to investigate ways to elucidate reports they read, but with great frequency they asked me for fuller explanation or analyses into related areas of intelligence. Chairman Herbert Stein of the Council of Economic Advisors recommended content and format for a quarterly summary economic analysis that appeared in OER's Economic Intelligence Weekly.

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SERVICE TO CLIENTS

How should intelligence assure that it makes an appropriate and major contribution to a decisionmaker too busy to search out all relevant information? How do we

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make maximum and telling use of the production of the intelligence analyst, much of which derives from exciting "finds" in his daily take but which may not match the immediate need of a consumer?

I believe there is no substitute for personal contact. Exposure to random intelligence production does not alone meet policy needs and the busy executive is unlikely regularly to search out a channel for clarification or to supplement his knowledge. He will, however, with an established face-to-face daily encounter, ask questions, solicit help, and often provide grist for the intelligence mill based on his experiences when to do so requires nothing more than a few moments of his time. *The above article is ~~Confidential.~~*

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TITLE: Bestiary of Intelligence Writing

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)
Drawings by (b)(3)(c)

VOLUME: 26 ISSUE: Fall YEAR: 1982

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Confusion is probably
almost inevitable

BESTIARY OF INTELLIGENCE WRITING *

(b)(3)(c)

Drawings by (b)(3)(c)

Older employees may recall that when the Headquarters Building was being constructed, guard dogs stalked the corridors by night to sniff out trespassers. Practically no one is aware, however, of the collection of strange fauna in a corner of a sub-basement, the location of which must remain secret. This collection, known as the Bestiary of Intelligence Writing, consists of specimen samples of cliches and misused or overused word combinations that CIA editors have encountered frequently over the years.

Now, for the first time, the Curator of the Collection has received permission to reveal the existence of the Bestiary and identify some of its principal specimens for the enlightenment, education, and general edification of CIA writers. It is hoped that with their new awareness of the Bestiary, analysts and other authors will keep their eyes peeled, noses to the grindstone, and ears to the ground, to call the attention of editors to other candidates for possible inclusion in the collection.


The Collection

1. Multidisciplinary analysis
2. Viable alternatives
3. Mounting crises
4. Parameters
5. Heightened tensions
6. Dire straits
7. Far-reaching implication
8. Available evidence
9. Foreseeable future
10. Almost inevitable
11. Nonstarter
12. Economic constraints
13. Broad outlines
14. Net effect
15. Overwhelming majority

* Apologies to *A Political Bestiary*, by Eugene McCarthy, James J. Kilpatrick, and Jeff MacNelly.

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Multidisciplinary analysis, once a euphemism for the school of psychoanalysis whose treatment utilizes certain perversions, has gained new respectability since being applied to intelligence zoology. In this animal world, the multidisciplinary analysis has been around for years but has only recently been "discovered" as a species separate from other kinds of analysis.* A multidisciplinary analysis looks like two or more conventional one-dimensional analyses welded together. It appears rather unkempt, with lots of loose ends hanging here and there, and its surfaces have a sticky substance that allows extraneous materials to adhere. Because of its variegated aspect, it appears to have more depth than its one-dimensional cousins.


Multidisciplinary analysis has begun to flourish to an unprecedented degree in recent months and has largely swept its conventional cousins into the trash bin of history. Some who prefer the clean lines of conventional analysis are not certain this trend is a good thing. Multidisciplinary analysis heretofore was a hybrid, the fruit of the casual mating of standard forms of analysis; some scientists doubt the survivability of a multidisciplinary analysis arrived at through forced breeding. Others argue that multidisciplinary analysis is the wave of the future ("Ordnung und Multidiziplin muessen sein!") and proclaim that it is really something more (Ueberanalyse) than the sum of its parts.

* Zoological historians disagree over where multidisciplinary analysis first appeared, but most believe it evolved in North America in the second half of the twentieth century. Some believe that Dr. Rube Goldberg was its Gregor Mendel.

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Viable alternatives, nature's born troubleshooters, are moody and shy. They wander off when times are good because governments and officials tend to ignore them; when times are bad, officials are dismayed to discover that they don't have any. Analysts sometimes confuse viable alternatives with their more common cousins, plain alternatives, which often tempt troubled officials with false solutions. Unlike viable alternatives, regular alternatives are less shy and never go away, even when officials continually reject them. Officials as well as analysts often cannot differentiate between the two sub-species until their advice has been tried and judged.




No one has discovered the origin of viable alternatives. Some scientists believe their propagation is by parthenogenesis because viable alternatives tend to be mutually exclusive and have never been known to mate. Others suspect that viable alternatives may be related to problems because problems occasionally suggest viable alternatives.

There is even learned disagreement over the origin of the word "viable." Novice analysts often believe the word derives from and combines with the Latin *via*, meaning *by way of*, and *bull*. Others see the Latin root as modifying the noun in the sense of, in this case, an alternative that succeeds. But this imparts a whiff of ex-post-factoism unworthy of the true analyst. Experienced analysts avoid the issue.

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Mounting crises are frequently detected by intelligence analysts, but genuine crises are rare, and most sightings probably are of the larval form, known as problems and difficulties.* Most crises are of the political or economic gender, but occasionally the sighting of a military (or of an even rarer, social) crisis is claimed. Crises tend to shun each other's company, although political and economic crises sometimes go hand in hand. Because they are almost impossible to identify when young (chicken sexers have the best record) and grow slowly, crises are almost always seen as mounting. They are never observed dismounting, and their decease remains an enigma to analysts. There is considerable non-scientific thinking about how they end their days: some believe that crises disappear, dissolve, evaporate, or "are resolved."



* Learned literature is not wholly agreed that problems and difficulties are a larval form of crises. There appears to be an ample body of evidence that problems and difficulties can develop into crises, but it is equally obvious that not all do so. Some observers argue, in fact, that crises must be a separate species because while governments never want to have crises around, they appear, for some reason, to tolerate problems and difficulties, perhaps to create an image of activity and a raison d'etre.

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Parameters, beloved of defense specialists and bureaucrats in general, are the watchdogs of analysts who like to think "big thoughts." Legless creatures, parameters must be "established" by the analyst, who typically places them at the fringes of activity, more to keep the activity from straying than to prevent infiltration from the outside.

Parameters are the next evolutionary development of limits, which have existed for centuries but which tend to be common, colorless, and susceptible to overextension. Some of the supposed greater deterrent effect of parameters stems from the awe they inspire in the analyst and, he hopes, in the reader. Because no one—until this writing—was sure what parameters were, people have been content to observe them, once in place, rather than to challenge them.


As their name suggests, parameters invariably exist as pairs; a solitary unimeter does not exist in nature. Their method of reproduction is somewhat obscure; they are probably androgynous but are never heard of until somebody "sets" them. Nor is their decease well understood: once they are "set," they are never unset, and they apparently are left in place to be forgotten.



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Heightened tensions are easily recognized by their elongated shape—conventional tensions teetering about on stilts. In the previous century, heightened tensions were almost always military and observable only in the narrow no-man's land on the borders between countries. In recent decades, however, they have assumed more of a political character (less frequently, an economic or social character) and may be found wherever there are masses of people.



Heightened tensions are the adult form of conventional tensions—tensions that have acquired stilts by thriving on a rich diet of poverty, malnutrition, and especially alienation. Heightened tensions, like some other species in this Bestiary, exist only in the plural form and, rather than breed, seem to spring like maggots from the aforementioned dietary components. Their growth potential appears unlimited, and some analysts have reported heightened tensions heightening again and again.

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Dire straits are another of nature's unpleasant beasties, notable primarily for their large mouths, voracious appetites, and penchant for ambushing the unwary. Frivolous governments, heedless of where they are treading, often find themselves suddenly in dire straits. Rescue is invariably difficult and unpleasant.*


Dire straits come in several genders, but dire economic straits are more common than the political, military, or social varieties. Dire straits are an extremely social species: they always are observed in groups of two or more and never as a single strait. Nevertheless, they have never been observed to mate, and the method of their propagation remains a mystery.



* Viable alternatives are the natural enemies of dire straits. Governments escape dire straits when they have viable alternatives. The conflict is bloody, prolonged, and often seemingly in doubt. Although viable alternatives always prevail, the conflict is fatal to both parties.

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The far-reaching implication is an animal that governments often ignore because of its odd physiognomy: its body tends to be ethereal, and most of its substance is concentrated in long mandibles, or arms. Governments are continually surprised to discover a far-reaching implication reaching for something embarrassing or dangerous. Analysts seem to have a much better ability than governments to discern far-reaching implications.

The far-reaching implication is the adolescent form of the conventional implication. As far-reaching implications grow, their reach gradually shortens, and they become more visible, until they are easily seen by all and become mere implications. The loss of mandibles in this growth process is swift; no one, in fact, has ever observed a near-reaching implication.


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One of the most awe-inspiring creatures is the available evidence, sometimes called the available information, which intelligence analysts frequently use to support shaky conclusions. This vital and difficult task is accomplished with utmost tact—"available evidence suggests . . ." The careless analyst sometimes asserts mistakenly that available evidence "indicates," not realizing that only full-fledged evidence can provide this degree of support. Analysts should be more appreciative of the available evidence's propping up ability and realize the difficulty they would be in without it.

As the name implies, available evidence is always nearby, whereas regular evidence may be off somewhere unaware that its presence is needed. A shy creature, an available evidence always slips away quietly once regular evidence arrives either to solidify the conclusion or sweep it away.

There was once a widely held view, now articulated only by purists, that available evidence is not a sub-species of evidence, that in fact there is only evidence or the lack thereof. Whatever evidence exists, they argue, is by definition available and, therefore, does not need to be so labeled. Modern research has disproved this myth, for we know now that unavailable evidence exists—it is somewhere else.




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Foreseeable futures are the favorite pets of political and economic forecasters. No forecaster dares to be caught without one, and a forecaster with an obedient foreseeable future is admired by all.

They are moody and dangerous animals, however, and frequently turn upon their masters, causing them great public humiliation, derision, and grief. That such a disagreeable beast enjoys privileged status in society is testimony to its great prestige. The more professional futurists, however, such as weather



forecasters and most political analysts, have nothing to do with foreseeable futures. And, despite their name, these beasts are not suitable as seeing eye companions.

Most analysts, however, play around with regular futures, a less mercurial, related species that can still be misleading and dangerous. Economic analysts in particular often deal with pork belly futures and soy bean futures because of their occasional ability to sniff out hidden wealth. These futures, despite their names, are totally unrelated to foreseeable futures, although they are dangerous in their own right.


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The almost inevitable, cousin to the virtually certain, is an indoor pest of the genus *eventuality* that has defied man's eradication efforts since the Dawn of Time. Curiously, many people have never seen an almost inevitable—because of its nocturnal habits—and some have labeled as almost inevitable things that really are not. The name has become synonymous with everything disagreeable—when faced with such prospects as death and taxes, people will throw up their hands and exclaim that "they're almost inevitable."

Some people argue, no doubt because it is so seldom seen, that the almost inevitable does not really exist. They maintain that the life cycle of the *eventuality* consists of only three stages—the possible, probable, and inevitable—and that there is no gradation between probable and inevitable. Some of our era's more thoughtful thinkers and editors, however, recognize the separate existence of the probably inevitable, a distinctive distinction that is lost on most people.

Such confusion is probably almost inevitable.



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
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Analysts and bookies are fond of ferreting out nonstarters, those unfortunate beasts that because of their physiognomy are destined never to enter, much less win, a contest. Their desire to compete is intense, however, and because of their marvelous faculty for disguise, they love to mingle with genuine starters and confuse the unwary. Journeymen analysts can quickly distinguish between starters and nonstarters: genuine starters have either wings so that they can fly or brass grommets so that they can be run up a flagpole and saluted. Congenital optimists, nonstarters are fond of consoling each other that they are merely ideas whose times have not yet come. In truth, however, they are often worn out or refurbished ideas and never were legitimate starters. One of nature's saddest species.

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Economic constraints have become a common pest in the 1980s after being introduced into this country following World War II by soldiers returning from Europe. Infestations are thickest around institutes dealing with the "Dismal Science," but swarms of a new strain, tentatively called political constraints, have been mentioned in recent political and intelligence literature. Some Pentagon analysts and observers even report a possible third mutation, the military constraint.


Swarming constraints tend to produce clouds so dense as to obscure vision. Governments and individuals so beset have no choice but not to do whatever they were planning to do. Deceitful governments, anxious for an excuse not to do something, sometimes blame the arrival of a swarm of constraints for their inaction, when in fact there are no mites in the vicinity.

Impervious to weather, constraints can appear in any season. On the other hand, they rarely appear in political seasons, probably because candidates at such times do not want to imply that their vision and scope of action are at all limited. Constraints, curiously, seem to increase in activity after elections. Behaviorists also note that although constraints swarm in any season, they are directly affected by the economic (or political) climate, thriving when it is poor and disappearing when it is good.

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Broad outlines are gluttonous predators that feed on the imaginations of professors, students, and political analysts. Unique in the zoological kingdom because they grow from the outside in, broad outlines are conventional in most other ways— they are conceived and then carried to fruition unless they miscarry. As with humans, the process of conceiving broad outlines seems to be much more pleasurable than carrying them to fruition. There is a high infant mortality rate among broad outlines—they often fall prey to nonstarters—and many starve from lack of being filled in. Those that are lucky enough to be filled in discover, moreover, that people rapidly become more interested in the filling and quickly lose interest in the outlines.




Despite what their name implies, broad outlines do not share their phylum with what might be called narrow outlines. There are no such animals around today, nor is there any fossil evidence that any ever existed. The broad outlines' closest relatives are regular outlines, a modest, less impressive version. Broad outlines probably evolved out of regular outlines sometime in the past, the result of too rich a diet of academia nuts roasted in professorial hot air.

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The net effect is a hybrid beast of burden developed by political scientists jealous of the net assessment that Secretary of Defense McNamara's "whiz kids" bred in the Pentagon basement in the early 1960s. The political analyst and his net effect quickly became an object of derision among economists and military analysts who looked down their noses at the beast as being too imprecise. In the last two decades, however, the net effect has popped up everywhere, and the net assessment is now found only in zoos and an occasional National Estimate.



The popularity of the net effect is obvious. Analysts quickly saw that its many long arms and legs would allow the net effect easily to wrap up data, draw bottom lines, summarize, conclude, and jump from fact to implication. Its genetic ancestor, the effect, could also do these things, but the addition of the net allowed the lazy and insecure analyst to imply more clearly to his supervisor that he was considering facts or trends on both sides of an issue.

The Russians are wont to claim discovery of the net effect, saying it is a contemporary manifestation of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis process discovered by Hegel and Marx which they apply scrupulously in solving all their problems. Until greater access to Soviet intelligence analysis allows an independent verification, this claim must be regarded as dubious.

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The overwhelming majority is the best known of a species of draft animal used by many analysts to carry the burden of their argument and analysis. Its popularity stems from its versatility: it can believe, support, and advocate. It loves to vote, and polling organizations frequently cite it to support their conclusions. Garrulous and with an opinion on just about everything, overwhelming majorities seldom respond that they "have no opinion" or "don't know."

The species *majority* contains two sub-species: the *greater majority* (also known as the big or wide majority) and the *lesser majority* (sometimes called a narrow or thin majority). Overwhelming majorities are nothing more than overfed or overinflated *greater majorities*, which analysts mistakenly believe can do a job better because of their immense girth.* In fact, overwhelming majorities often tend to be flabby, and the most effective majority frequently is the leaner, tougher *working majority*.

* An overwhelming majority is called a consensus when it becomes so widespread that it is general. Perhaps for this reason some analysts occasionally talk about a general consensus. This is, of course, grossly inappropriate because contemporary consensuses are always anti-militaristic.

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TITLE: Soviet Politics and the Media

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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A conference report

SOVIET POLITICS AND THE MEDIA

(b)(3)(c)

Some 40 students of Soviet affairs from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the United States Military Academy, the RAND Corporation, and the Brookings Institution assembled in Rosslyn, Va., on 8 April 1982 for a conference on "Soviet Politics and the Media." Sponsored jointly by the Analysis Group of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, the conference provided a framework for bringing to bear the latest evidence and judgments on working assumptions and methodologies used in analyzing Soviet politics from open sources. It was the hope of the sponsors that such an exchange of views would cast new light on the contours of the Soviet political landscape in the 1980s and sensitize analysts both to alternative approaches to the evidence and to areas of disagreement.

The conference addressed three issues:

- The interpretation of the evidence of disagreement among Soviet intellectuals and second-echelon officials that suggests a degree of pluralism in Soviet politics and policy-making.
- The weight that ought to be lent to esoteric communication as a means of interpreting power and policy conflicts in the Soviet leadership.
- The value of Soviet public pronouncements on military/theoretical questions as a source of insight into Moscow's strategic intentions—given the softening of Soviet declaratory policy in the mid-1970s.

Summary of the Discussions

I. *The Role of Policy Debate in Soviet Politics*

Chairman: John Huizenga
Discussion Leader: (b)(6)

Students of Soviet affairs have long been aware that the Soviet media are not monolithic. A broad range of groups and individuals find ways of expressing their views in the media, despite the party's claim to speak with a single voice for the Soviet people. Attentive study over the years has produced abundant evidence that debate takes place on a variety of issues, ranging from artistic or literary integrity, on the one hand, to questions of foreign and strategic policy on the other. The participants in these debates couch their arguments ambiguously, seeking to avoid overstepping the bounds of official tolerance by the selective use of authoritative texts, allegory, and Aesopian language. Thus the problem of interpreting these utterances is difficult.

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Examples of such debates can be found in the writings, speeches, and interviews of such influential Soviet intellectuals and high regime officials as Georgiy Arbatov, head of the USA Institute; Aleksandr Bovin, *Izvestiya* political observer; and Vadim Zagladin, deputy head of the Central Committee's International Department. (b)(6) argued that the debates embodied in this dialogue were genuine and that they reflected the efforts of the individuals involved to influence policy. Some of the other conference participants were less inclined to ascribe such autonomy to the debates, preferring to view the commentators as speaking on behalf of, or at least with the backing of, top party leaders.

In support of his interpretation, (b)(6) relied heavily on the testimony of Soviet intellectuals themselves, with whom he is widely acquainted. They are motivated, he said, by a wide variety of professional and personal considerations, including the desire, characteristic of Russian intellectuals even in Tsarist times, to test the limits of official tolerance and their ability to outwit the censor. Their main motivation, he believes, is genuine concern about the great issues of national policy—a concern which, in the case of some of them has been expressed consistently over the course of many years.

This view of the Soviet intellectual community provided the basis for (b)(6) belief in the relevance to policy of debates among intellectuals and second-level officials. While conceding that these debates may have little connection with current policy issues, he argued that they concerned the main problems facing the Soviet intellectual community and reflected the positions of individual elites on basic issues. With this knowledge, (b)(6) said, we would be in a better position to understand the potential influence of this intellectual class—a knowledge that would be particularly valuable as some of them move up in the entourages of rising politicians.

While the group generally accepted these propositions, there was considerable debate over how to make use of them analytically. A problem noted by some was what was described as a widespread skepticism among nonspecialist audiences concerning the existence of any policy debate in the Soviet Union at all. Thus the analyst of Soviet politics faces the difficulty of getting a hearing for his analysis, let alone building a persuasive case for particular judgments on the basis of the material at hand. Prescriptions ranged from better referencing and indexing devices to increasing the analytical effort devoted to what could, after all, prove to be a window on post-Brezhnev policy.

II. *Esoteric Communication and the Leadership*

Chairman: (b)(3)(c)
Discussion Leader: (b)(6)

The second discussion, though formally addressed to maneuverings of the leadership, returned essentially to the themes of the first discussion by way of a critique of a recently distributed RAND draft study which disputed the importance of esoteric communication as an instrument of Soviet politics. (b)(6) upheld the authenticity of esoteric communication—and its utility as a source of evidence regarding Soviet leadership politics—but in so doing he revealed a view somewhat different from that expounded by

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(b)(6) In (b)(6) view, manipulation by elements of the political leadership is usually involved in what (b)(6) described as genuine dialogue among intellectuals. Thus, while both agreed that debates take place, one tended to interpret them as issuing from the Politburo, the other in more pluralistic terms.

A large part of the discussion concerned a particular aspect of the RAND study, namely the view that anomalies in the Soviet press can usually be ascribed to mere accident. In the view of some of the participants, the authors of the RAND study went too far in accepting the opinion of their respondents that certain instances of what appeared to be partisan esoteric communication in the press could best be explained as accidents. A number of the participants pointed out that Soviet readers themselves are convinced that everything that appears in the Soviet press is deliberate, a conviction that tends to reinforce the efforts of editors and censors to ensure accuracy and conformity lest they give misleading signals to the public. The author of the RAND study, (b)(6) (b)(6) while conceding the virtue of some of the criticisms, defended the use of the accident hypothesis, arguing that those who contested the hypothesis were obligated to construct an alternative scenario to explain how any anomaly might have occurred.

(b)(6) bottom-line assessment of esoteric communications was that they remain "as important as any of us ever thought they were." He judged the RAND study's skepticism on the subject as useful, but probably expressed too broadly. He suggested that distinctions should be made between partisan and nonpartisan esoteric communication, and between majority and minority uses of such communication. He argued that the use of such distinctions by the RAND study would have helped to clarify the fact that it was sharply focused on only part of the spectrum, namely, "partisan esoteric communication by a minority faction." Within this framework, he said, the study took a consistent position that the phenomenon was so rare as to be of virtually negligible significance. Nevertheless, the study did admit that such cases had occurred, and this, he believed, was enough to establish the point that minority esoteric communication does take place and is a continuing challenge for analysis.

III. *The Politicization of Soviet Military/Theoretical Dialogue*

Chairman: (b)(6)
Discussion Leader: (b)(6)

The third discussion explored the hypothesis that foreign policy-inspired changes in Soviet declaratory policy on strategic issues in the 1970s may have sharply diminished the utility of unclassified Soviet pronouncements on military doctrinal themes as a source of insight into Soviet military thinking.

In opening the debate, (b)(6) suggested that there were three alternative ways of explaining the change he had sketched:

- That it marked the resolution of a doctrinal debate;
- That it reflected an overall evolution in strategic thought away from earlier war-fighting theories;
- That it was a deliberate effort to influence the West.

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(b)(6) argued that alterations in Soviet declaratory policy on nuclear war issues and the doctrinal expression of that policy probably do not reflect the outcome of any great internal debate or of an evolution from a "war-fighting" to a "deterrence only" doctrine. Instead, he said, the alterations probably reflect primarily if not exclusively the politicization of Soviet military doctrinal themes for the purpose of projecting a more benign image of Soviet military policy in support of the USSR's broad "peace diplomacy" toward the West. This raises the question for analysts: what modified rules of interpretation should be applied in order to extract useful insight from this material under today's altered circumstances?

Other conference participants viewed the evolution of Soviet policy in less purposeful terms, stressing the importance of internal debate in the process. It was argued in particular that the change in declaratory policy adduced by (b)(6) (b)(6) had been accompanied by signs of debate in the Soviet press over the issue of the relative utility of military power versus diplomacy as a means of insuring security in the nuclear age. This debate, it was argued, suggested internal controversy that would have been unlikely had the point been only to influence the West.

The most extensive comment was offered by Ambassador Raymond Garthoff, who tended to see a broader range of factors at play in the evolution of Soviet military policy than allowed for by (b)(6) logical alternatives. His interpretation of the trend in Soviet military statements placed greater stress on an evolution of Soviet military thought and doctrine rather than on a deliberate effort by the leadership to influence the West. He also suggested that chance historical events, such as the death of Marshal Grechko in 1976, might have contributed to the change.

One of the more interesting aspects of the discussion was an exchange between (b)(6) and Ambassador Garthoff on the distinction between what the Soviets call the "political-theoretical" and the "military-technical" sides of their doctrine and the relevance of this distinction to the policy trend in question. (b)(6) argued that there should be a parallelism between the two and that the absence of any change in concrete military programs complementary to the change in declaratory policy suggested that the latter was primarily for political effect. Ambassador Garthoff took a reserved position on this argument, declining to rule out the possibility that doctrinal change had already affected policy and might do so in the future. At the same time, he noted that factors entirely unrelated to doctrine and policy should not be overlooked here, observing that a sense of inferiority could have played a role in the Soviets' earlier stress on superiority whereas their present cooler rhetoric might reflect a more secure strategic position.

In his concluding remarks, (b)(6) observed that the issues he had raised had been fruitfully discussed but not fully resolved by the conference. He strongly recommended a further effort by the Intelligence Community to investigate the issues with a view to reaching conclusions, if possible, on:

- Whether a change in Soviet doctrine has indeed taken place, and
- If so, what implications it carries for Soviet strategy and policy on arms control.

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Conclusions

Any effort to draw conclusions from the conference should begin with recognition that the most important payoff was probably that derived by individual analysts as a result of mixing with their colleagues in a setting calculated to encourage dialogue, sharpen perceptions, and generate ideas for new research projects and approaches. At a practical level, both sponsoring organizations viewed the conference as an aid to the identification of roles they might play in the future to support the Community-wide analytic effort, and both see areas in which they might usefully contribute.

The sponsors offer the following general views on tasks to be undertaken and ideas to explore:

I. Steps should be taken to see that analysts have every possible access to collateral information on the Soviet intellectual community. This should include information from Western scholars who have visited Soviet policy institutes, from emigres who have had relevant professional contacts in the Soviet Union, and from defectors. Several of the conferees suggested this. Since the conference, FBIS Analysis Group (b)(3)(n)

II. Research is needed to clarify the implications of the new evidence that is accumulating on the role of intellectuals and policy advisors in national policy debate reflected in the media. The picture of this phenomenon that emerged from the conference appears to call for a more complex theory of Soviet politics and policy-making than that provided by the view that political initiative in the Soviet Union flows from the top down only. The Office of Soviet Analysis and FBIS both have responsibilities in responding to this need. As a first step for FBIS (b)(3)(c) of the Analysis Group is writing an article which will attempt to provide a theoretical framework for understanding current Soviet politics on the basis of evidence of political debate over foreign policy in the 1970s. On another level, Analysis Group is undertaking research aimed at systematically defining the scope of policy-related debate in the Soviet Union. This will include an identification of the principal personalities involved, the institutes which have been associated with them, and the issues which have provoked public controversy in the past and are likely to remain controversial in the next few years.

III. The Center for the Study of Intelligence, in consultation with the Agency offices concerned, should explore measures for encouraging the study of politics in the Soviet Union. This might include the sponsorship of programs under the auspices of the Center or the establishment of a fellowship for rotational assignments to an ongoing research effort. The goal of the studies should be to ensure the fullest possible exploitation of available intellectual resources on the internal political life of the Soviet Union.

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TITLE: Adlai Stevenson and the Bay of Pigs

AUTHOR: Jack B. Pfeiffer

VOLUME: 27 ISSUE: Fall YEAR: 1983

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Ambassador in the dark

ADLAI STEVENSON AND THE BAY OF PIGS

Jack B. Pfeiffer

On 15 April 1961 nine B-26 bombers—painted and numbered like the B-26s of Fidel Castro's Air Force—departed CIA's forward operations base at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua on a strike mission against the three Cuban airfields which contained all of Castro's aircraft. Eight of the B-26s were to perform the combat mission. The ninth, with apparent battle damage, was to land in Miami, and the pilot was to claim to be one of the defectors from Castro's Air Force who were responsible for the attacks on the airfields. Control of the air was the *sine qua non* for the planned invasion to oust Castro's government. On 17 April—D-Day for the invasion at the Bay of Pigs—the B-26s were scheduled to complete the destruction of Castro's combat aircraft; to attack tactical targets including communications facilities, tank and artillery parks, and surface transportation; and to provide ground support for the invasion.

A few hours before the scheduled 17 April attack, President Kennedy, at the urging of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, canceled the D-Day strike against Castro's remaining combat aircraft and the tactical targets, and limited air operations to ground support in the immediate area of the troop landings. Cancellation of the tactical targets ensured the failure at the Bay of Pigs.* Inexplicably, the bitterness of some CIA officers over the D-Day air strike cancellation came to focus on US Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, rather than on President Kennedy or Secretary Rusk.[1] With regard to the Bay of Pigs failure, Stevenson was more sinned against than sinning; and the purpose of this paper is to put Stevenson's role in perspective.


By 1 April 1961, the US Government's anti-Castro plans had been over a year in discussion and were moving into the final stages. In theory, CIA's efforts to organize the anti-Castro Cubans into an effective military force to invade Cuba were secret. "Plausible deniability" was the official screen of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to hide US involvement. Even so, the press had tattered the cloak of deniability; and before the end of March 1961, Ambassador Stevenson faced increasingly hostile reception in the UN from anti-US elements.

In what was to have been a detailed briefing to prepare Stevenson for repercussions which would follow the initiation of operations, C. Tracy Barnes (b)(3)(c) was sent to New York City on

* It is estimated that just before the air strike of 15 April, Castro's operational aircraft included four T-33s, six Sea Furies, and twenty B-26s. Castro subsequently claimed that on D-Day, 17 April, he had only six operational aircraft—two each of the above types. Within the next two days, an additional T-33 became operational. As CIA's air operations experts had warned, the brigade's B-26s were sitting ducks for Castro's small force of T-33s and Sea Furies.

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Armed B-26 at Puerto Cabezas . . . Battle damage visible on fuselage.


8 April to brief Stevenson. What Barnes *was instructed to tell* the Ambassador about the upcoming operation and *what he told him* has been the subject of much discussion. In his book, *A Thousand Days*, Arthur Schlesinger, who was then a member of the White House Staff, wrote:

> In preparation for the [USUN Cuban] debate, Tracy Barnes and I had held a long talk with Stevenson on April 8 [1961]. But our briefing, which was probably unduly vague, left Stevenson with the impression that no action would take place during the UN discussion of the Cuban item. Afterward, when Harlan Cleveland, the Assistant Secretary for International Organizational Affairs, Clayton Fritchey of the United States Mission to the UN, and I lunched with Stevenson at the Century, he made clear that he wholly disapproved of the plan, regretted that he had been given no opportunity to comment on it, and believed that it would cause infinite trouble. But, if it was national policy, he was prepared to make out the best possible case.[2]

The question of exactly what Stevenson was or was not told became critical following the D-2 air strike against Cuba on 15 April 1961. Appearing in an emergency session of the UN Political and Security Committee on the afternoon of 15 April—a session that had been called at the request of Raul Roa, the Cuban Foreign Minister—Stevenson stated that the attack on the airfields had been conducted by defectors from Castro's Air Force (FAR). To support the defector story, Stevenson presented photographs of the B-26 that Mario Zuniga had landed in Miami. This fiction was quickly exposed because

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B-26 tail assembly bears Cuban insignia.

the photographs given to Stevenson showed a metal nose, rather than a plexiglass nose like those on Castro's B-26s. Of this incident, one observer of Castro's rise to power wrote:

> A prominent victim of the air strike was Adlai Stevenson. . . . Ironically enough, . . . he was one of the few with some prior knowledge of the invasion project who was completely opposed to it. However, he was kept in the dark about the actual plans and so on the very afternoon of the [D-2] attack, in a verbal duel with Raul Roa at an emergency meeting of the United Nations Political Committee, he accepted as truth the misinformation he received from Washington.[3]

Charles Murphy, who (with CIA's blessing) wrote one of the few articles that was favorable to the Agency in terms of the Bay of Pigs operation, stated that after Stevenson's embarrassment of 15 April:

> From that hapless moment on, Stevenson's role becomes unclear. There was a subsequent published report that he had intervened to block the second strike. Stevenson has flatly denied, and continues to deny, that he even knew about the second strike, let alone that he demanded it be called off.[4]

In a more critical vein, E. Howard Hunt, ex-CIA employee, would write:

> It was later alleged that Stevenson had been kept in the dark about invasion preparations. In self defense, [C. Tracy] Barnes was to produce a record of his briefing of Ambassador Stevenson well prior

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to [the] invasion date. The Barnes-Stevenson memorandum was furnished Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA's Inspector General at the time.[5]

Kirkpatrick, however, has no recollection of such a memorandum from Barnes, nor was such a memorandum found among CIA's records.[6] The only evidence attributable specifically to Barnes that has been recovered is a memorandum that he wrote more than two years after the event in response to the criticism of his briefing of Stevenson that appeared in *Invisible Government*.[7] Barnes wrote:

> Although Stevenson did not know me well, we had known each other slightly for a good twenty years, and there was no doubt in his mind as to my association with CIA—in fact, the briefing had been announced to him as a CIA briefing.
>
> *I told him about the then status of the operation in detail. I also explained to him that as of this date, it was impossible to state whether or not, such an operation would ever take place, since the final decision was entirely in the President's hands, and he had not yet made up his mind.* I did state that the President had called a meeting for 12 April, for another review of the entire matter, and it was possible that he would announce a decision after, or shortly following, this meeting. My recollection is that I did not mention to Stevenson the air raid which occurred on Saturday, 15 April, since this plan, as I recollect it, was not worked out until after the briefing. I did, however, explain to him in some detail not only the essentiality of achieving the control of the air, but also a number of the air proposals which had been made, including those which had as of 8 April, been turned down. If it is important, I could check the matter of the 15 April raid. If my recollection is faulty and the plan for this raid had been completed on 8 April, I would have told it to Stevenson, since I told him all the significant aspects of the invasion plans then in effect, or under consideration. . . .
>
> *Stevenson, a week later, following the 15 April raid sent a message to the Secretary of State and the DCI, saying that I had given him an inaccurate assurance on one point, i.e., that no invasion would occur while the Cuban matter was before the UN. What I did say, was that no invasion would occur prior to, or during, Roa's presentation on Monday, 10 April.* I said this because at that time, after the delays mentioned above, Roa was definitely expected to make his postponed attack on the floor of the UN on 10 April, and it was so scheduled. Obviously I could have said nothing else in view of my other statements that no decision of any kind existed as to the invasion, and that nothing could be known prior to the Wednesday, 12 April meeting called by the President. In fact, at the time the Stevenson message was not taken in the least seriously.[8] •

• The provenance of the document from which this quotation is taken has not been determined. It is a Xerox copy from miscellaneous files collected by (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) but neither the original nor a carbon copy was recovered. It is impossible to determine whether the emphasis shown in the quotation came from Barnes or was added by someone else. The copy also reflects at least one grammatical change and two spelling corrections which may or may not be part of the original. Barnes wrote the memorandum to a Special Assistant to the DDP.

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According to Hugh Thomas, Stevenson's remembrance of the briefing was that it left something to be desired:

> Tracy Barnes of the CIA came up and briefed us here on the delegation. . . . He assured us that this was simply a question of helping the exiles and this was not in any way a US operation. In light of what happened, I suppose this can be regarded as less than candid.[9]

As for his comments about setting the date for the D-2 strike, Barnes himself had been involved in promoting such action as early as January 1961, and the need for a pre-D-Day strike had been generally accepted by mid-to-late March. By 1 April when it was anticipated that D-Day would be 10 April, the cable traffic between the air base in Puerto Cabezas and Headquarters indicated that the briefing team that came from Headquarters should be prepared to brief on 4 April, with 5 April being reserved for coordination of air/ground and maritime operations. The briefings were to be completed by the night of 5 April at the latest.[10]

The briefing team was delayed, because in the period from 4-6 April, the President and his White House staff were still discussing the merits of a pre-D-Day strike with representatives of CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and State. By the morning of 6 April, the pre-D-Day defection/deception strike had been approved, and Barnes should have included this information in his briefing for Stevenson. Inasmuch as Barnes did not depart Washington until Saturday, 8 April—the day he briefed Stevenson—there is no way that Barnes could have been ignorant of the decision to launch air strikes on both D-2 and D-Day.*

Two of the principal officers of the anti-Castro task force considered Barnes at best a questionable choice to send to New York. (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c)

> We were very unhappy when Dick [Bissell] sent Tracy up to brief. . . . We understood the Ivy League ties involved in this . . . but we didn't really feel that Tracy understood it well enough himself to brief anybody. . . . (b)(3)(c) and I . . . were quite disturbed about this because it was so important at that time—that this guy knew exactly what the hell we were talking about. We just didn't think that Tracy really understood it that well, or if Tracy did, . . . he wouldn't articulate it that well.[11]

That view regarding Barnes was compatible with the opinion of (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) who remarked:

> Knowing Tracy, I've always had severe doubt that Tracy made it very clear to the Ambassador. Now he was sent up there to make clear to him . . . the whole works . . . I think Tracy, dealing with Adlai—in a way they were two of a type—dealt with him, probably

(b)(6) and other members of the briefing team for the air strikes began their briefings at Puerto Cabezas on 10 April. They probably departed Washington on 9 April. The target folders and briefing aids would have been completed days earlier in all probability. On 8 April, Barnes departed Washington on Northeast Airlines flight 106 at 0745; he returned on a Northeast flight departing New York at 2215 hours that same day.

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> the way, just intuitively, Tracy dealt with everyone—very pleasantly, kind of elliptically, lots of smiling and graciousness, interjection of completely non-connected events, shook hands, laughed, and said what a great time he'd had; and came back and announced that he had briefed the Ambassador. . . . That was the form that Tracy would customarily employ. What Adlai Stevenson needed, not that it would necessarily have done any good, was the worst case presentation of what was going to happen.[12]

Examination of the cable traffic between the USUN Mission and the Secretary of State following the D-2 air strike makes clear that Stevenson accepted the deception story at face value, and was unaware that the attacks on Castro's airfields had been conducted by the Agency-sponsored brigade. In his statement of 15 April in response to the Cuban complaint, Stevenson was aware of the fact that Roberto Verdaguer and his brother, Guillermo, both officers in Castro's FAR, had defected on 14 April in a Cubana cargo aircraft and had landed at Jacksonville, Florida. This was on the day prior to the D-2 air strike.[13]

The authentic defection of the Verdaguer brothers may have caused some problems during the subsequent discussions concerning the planned D-Day air strike. After cabling the Secretary of State about Jose Miro Cardona's 15 April statement for the Cuban Revolutionary Council—which was addressed to members of the UN and which repeated the deception story—the USUN Mission then cabled Secretary Rusk that:

> Miro Cardona statement (US/UN Telegram 2877) given to only a few UN delegates . . . Cuban Revolutionary Council depending on press to give ample publicity so that all UN delegates will have been informed of statement before resumption debates Monday. Recommend USIA give full publicity.[14]

If Stevenson had believed that he was playing with the hot potato of a deception operation, it is unlikely that such a message would have been forwarded to the Secretary of State; and it is inconceivable that Stevenson would have followed that cable with another—also received by the Department early in the morning of 16 April—reading:

> Confirming TELECON request to ARA for use in Cuban debate, desire urgently on Sunday [16 April]: 1) Revolutionary background of Verdaguer brothers. 2) Detailed info on Cuban acquisition and possession of defecting FAR B-26's which will serve to discredit Roa's statement that it is easy to paint up aircraft to look like FAR plane.[15]

Shortly after 7:30 p.m. on 16 April a high priority cable for the Secretary of State and Allen Dulles from Stevenson was received in the State Department; and it makes clear that the Ambassador was ignorant of the US role in the D-2 air strikes. The cable stated:

> 1. Greatly disturbed by clear indications received during day in process developing rebuttal material that bombing incidents in Cuba on Saturday [15 April] were launched, in part at least, from outside Cuba.

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2. *I had definite impression from Barnes when he was here that no action would be taken which could give US political difficulty during current UN debate.* This raid, if such it was, if exposed will gravely alter whole atmosphere in GA. If Cuba now proves any of planes and pilots came from outside, we will face increasingly hostile atmosphere. No one will believe that bombing attacks on Cuba from outside could have been organized without our complicity.

3. I do not understand how we could let such attack take place two days before debate on Cuban issue in GA. Nor can I understand if we could not prevent such outside attack from taking place at this time why I could not have been warned and provided pre-prepared material with which to defend US. Answers I made on Saturday were hastily concocted in Department and revised by me at last minute on assumption this was a clear case of attacks by defectors inside Cuba.

4. There is gravest risk of another U-2 disaster in such uncoordinated action.[16]

About this same time, the Department received another priority cable from Stevenson for the President and Secretary Rusk asking for guidance to meet the Soviet charge that armed attacks against Cuba were being launched from the United States. He requested authority to go on record as favoring the motivation of the Cuban refugees in the US who were anti-Castro, but: "I wish to make clear, however, that we would be opposed to any use of our territory for mounting an offensive against any foreign government." An advance copy of this message went to Rusk at 9:15 p.m. on Sunday, 16 April 1961.[17]

That Stevenson was in the dark regarding details of the planned anti-Castro operation also is supported by various individuals involved with the Ambassador during the crisis. Correspondence with some of those who were present during the Barnes briefing and the crisis following the D-2 strike reveals that Barnes did not, in any way, provide details about the anticipated tactical air operations—neither objectives nor dates—or about the deception activity. Barnes apparently did indicate that there was an upcoming invasion, but none of those in attendance at the briefing recalled any mention of numbers of troops or the date for D-Day.

In response to specific inquiries about his remark that the briefing for Stevenson "was probably unduly vague" Arthur Schlesinger wrote:

> I have checked my journal with the following result. I had an appointment with Dean Rusk on the morning of April 8, 1961 (in a vain effort to get him to oppose the Cuban adventure), and for that reason was late in setting off for New York. I now quote the journal:
>
> "I then took a plane to New York. I went immediately to the office of the US Delegation to the UN. Tracy Barnes (CIA) and Bill Bowdler (State) had preceded me and were already deep in discussion with AES about a proposed response to Roa. We discussed aspects of this most of the morning. Then, AES, Harlan Cleveland, Clayton Fritchey, and I went to the Century for luncheon. AES made it clear

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that he wholly disapproves of the project, and objects to the fact that he was given no opportunity to comment on it, and believes that it will cause infinite trouble. However, he is substantially the good soldier about it, and is prepared to try and make the best possible US case."

As I recall it, Tracy Barnes was to provide the detailed tactical briefing and *this presumably had been accomplished by the time of my arrival.* Perhaps Bill Bowdler may recall what Tracy in fact told Stevenson. Looking at your four points, I would say that Stevenson certainly understood No. 2 [that there would be a D-Day invasion by anti-Castro troops] . . . But I assume that Tracy had said something to him about your points 1 [that there would be a D-2 air strike] and 3 [that there would be a D-Day air strike]; and that we did not make point 4 [the specific date of either D-day or D-2] clear to Stevenson, leaving him under the impression, as I wrote in *A Thousand Days*, that the invasion would not take place while the Cuban item was under discussion at the UN. I do not know why Stevenson was not informed more precisely about the date. It was probably because the date had not been finally set in Washington, and we supposed that that question could be faced farther down the road.[18]

Based on the previously discussed cable traffic from the USUN New York to the Department of State following the D-2 strike, Schlesinger's assumptions regarding Barnes's briefing D-2 and D-Day were in error. If D-2 was mentioned, it is hard to imagine that it was mentioned in any context other than that it was to be carried out by the CIA-trained, anti-Castro pilots. Thus any references that Stevenson picked up about the 15 April strike should have recalled the session with Barnes. As already mentioned, the D-2 date had been set by the morning of 6 April, two days prior to the Barnes-Schlesinger trip to USUN New York.

Because Schlesinger missed part of Barnes's briefing, Richard F. Pedersen, then Chief of the Political Section, of the USUN Mission was queried about the meeting. Pedersen wrote:

I was present with Amb. Stevenson and Amb. [Francis T. P.] Plimpton in the briefings by Tracy Baines [sic] (and Arthur Schlesinger) in 1961. . . .

In fact, the briefing totally misled Amb. Stevenson, Amb. Plimpton, and me as to the scope and timing of what was underway. The effect of the briefing was this:

1) That the CIA was involved in plans for an internal uprising on the island. (This had to have included mention of outside Cuban assistance though I do not now remember this as a fact.)

2) That nothing would happen from US territory.

3) That no US forces or personnel would be involved.

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4) That whatever happened would have the appearance of an internal Cuban event.

5) That nothing would happen during the session of the General Assembly, then underway. (I asked this question myself.)

There was no mention of dates; no mention of an "invasion" by a force of Cubans; no mention whatsoever of anything like a "D-Day"; no mention of US air strikes; and no mention of a date. . . .

The three key factors for us were: appearance of an internal uprising, no US participation, and nothing during the General Assembly session. I am clear about these matters, as I was responsible for our handling of the Cuban item then before the General Assembly. . . .

I was also intimately involved in the false statements of Gov. Stevenson, which he made about the two aircraft in Florida just before the invasion. It was obvious at that point that something was accelerating (although we were completely uninformed about an invasion). Nevertheless, we were fully assured from Washington that the two planes in Florida were legitimate Cuban aircraft which had defected.

I wrote the first draft to this effect myself. This was then rewritten in Washington, where it was cleared by Secretary Rusk himself and, I was told, by the responsible person in CIA. When Mr. Sisco telephoned the redraft back on Saturday morning [15 April], I commented about half way through that the draft was not a denial. Mr. Sisco said that it was and that the rest of the text would show that. It did, although it may well be that we strengthened the words on the phone.*

I then took the text to Governor Stevenson, telling him that the Department had verified that, whatever else was happening, the two planes concerned were legitimate defecting planes of the Cuban Air Force. As we by then had pictures of these planes in New York, as well as the statements of the pilots, both of which were also legitimate if the Washington text was true, we added those elements to the statement he later made to the Committee.

As we were obviously dealing with a delicate matter on which it was important to be right, I suggested to Gov. Stevenson he verify the statement again directly with Secretary Rusk. He asked his secretary to make the call, but just at that point Mr. Sisco called him. Gov. Stevenson then verified the statement with Mr. Sisco instead, and we shortly went into the Committee where he made it. . . .

Foreign Minister Roa attacked our statement in the Committee so robustly that I began to get concerned again. Saturday afternoon I

* Joseph Sisco was Deputy Director of the Office of UN Political and Security Affairs located in the Department of State in Washington.

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> asked one of our staff members to get corroborating details on the planes—engine numbers and other data—that we could read into the record during the next debate to prove that these two planes were from the Cuban Air Force.
>
> On Sunday morning [16 April], I was told that Washington had finally said that pursuant [sic] of that line of inquiry would not be fruitful. It was then clear that our Saturday statement had been false. I prepared a Top Secret telegram of complaint from Stevenson to the Secretary (or the President) and, accompanied by Wm. Bowdler . . . took it to Gov. Stevenson at the Waldorf. I told him the Saturday statements had been false and showed him the telegram, which he signed—probably, though I do not remember for sure, with changes of his own. He was understandably very disturbed.[19] *

One of the B-26s from the D-2 raid, its pilots claiming to be Cuban defectors, had landed at the Boca Chica Naval Air Station near Key West on 15 April. Keeping the various aircraft that entered Florida's air space properly identified—Zuniga's B-26 at Miami, the battle damaged B-26 at the Boca Chica NAS, and the Cubana plane the Verdaguers landed at Jacksonville—added to the confusion about Stevenson's position. According to Schlesinger, Secretary Rusk:

> seems for a while to have confused the phony defector at Key West with the authentic defector at Jacksonville. Apparently it was not until late Saturday afternoon that he understood that the Key West plan was part of the CIA plot.[22]

Schlesinger himself still did not understand that the Key West B-26 was not a "phony" and he seems to have been unaware that Zuniga's landing at Miami was the intended deception.

In his effort to protect the Kennedy White House, Schlesinger claimed that CIA had misled State; and "possibly the Agency having worked out its deception plan, felt obliged to deceive even the rest of its own government; or possibly the CIA source, if in the Intelligence Branch, was himself 'unwitting'." [23] If Schlesinger was correct in saying that on 15 April 1961 following the air strike, Harlan Cleveland contacted State's Bureau of "Interamerican Affairs" (actually the Bureau of American Republic Affairs), which in turn called the CIA, and if these inquiries went to the "Intelligence Branch" (CIA's Directorate for Intelligence), State called the wrong party.[24] ARA/State should have gone directly to Secretary Rusk or to CIA's Western Hemisphere Division for information on the anti-Castro project. Rusk's confusion about the three aircraft in Florida implies ineptitude on his part and on the part of his immediate staff—not deviousness on the part of CIA. Unlike Stevenson, Rusk was fully read into the operational plan, even though he would subsequently suggest to the contrary.

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* Stevenson's protest apparently did not register on Washington, for a message was sent to him on Monday, 17 April at 1213 hours providing him with "language for contingency use if Cubans make show with bomb and rocket fragments [from D-2 attack]." [20]

Francis T. P. Plimpton reported that he "was in complete accord with everything" that Mr. Pedersen wrote about this episode.[21]

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Considering that Tracy Barnes failed to provide Adlai Stevenson with the details of the operations planned to oust Castro, Stevenson was stranded in an untenable position: on center stage at the UN, in the role of defender of United States' interests, with the wrong lines to recite and without anything substantial from which to ad lib. Beyond that indignity, he has been maligned for more than twenty years with accusations that he intervened to prevent the D-Day air strike, a role he did not play. Stevenson understood the need to win the battle with Castro. Despite his personal reservations, he advocated the use of covert force to bring the operation to a successful conclusion. From within CIA, the USUN Ambassador deserves praise rather than continued censure.

This article is classified SECRET.

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INTERROGATION OF AN ALLEGED CIA AGENT

(b)(3)(c)

The following is the transcript of the interview of Joe Hardesty, believed to be an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency, by an interrogator of a foreign power. The interrogator is known as A.I.

A.I.: Welcome back, Joe, let me get your file. During our last conversation you stated you were worried that I was violating your rights. . . . Do you think that was fair?

Hardesty: It sure was.

A.I.: Why do you think that was a fair statement?

Hardesty: You are trying to frame me.

A.I.: I don't feel that I am trying to frame you.

Hardesty: You are a bastard and you know it.

A.I.: Now, Joe, profanity serves no purpose.

Hardesty: You are trying to set me up.

A.I.: Are you fantasizing that I am trying to set you up, Joe?

Hardesty: No way.

A.I.: Really?

Hardesty: Yes.

A.I.: We discussed your government last time.

Hardesty: No, we didn't.

A.I.: I feel certain we did!

Hardesty: I only said my government will protest your treatment of me.

A.I.: What about your government?

Hardesty: They will protest this once I tell them.

A.I.: Who will protest once you tell them?

Hardesty: My government.

A.I.: Your government will protest once you tell them . . . of course.

Hardesty: The State Department doesn't take kindly to this sort of thing.

A.I.: I thought you meant your government.

Hardesty: The State Department speaks for my government.

A.I.: Why don't you discuss your activities since arriving here, Joe?

Hardesty: I have been just like any other businessman doing my job.

A.I.: Tell me about your job.

Hardesty: I work for Worldwide Leasing, Inc., of New York City.

A.I.: I understand . . . go on.

Hardesty: We export things.

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A.I.: Go on about your job.
Hardesty: I arrange contracts to ship merchandise between the U.S. and your country.
A.I.: I understand . . . go on.
Hardesty: That's about it.
A.I.: What makes you say that's about it?
Hardesty: That is what my job entails.
A.I.: You seemed concerned about the time last time.
Hardesty: Yes, you took up a great deal of my valuable time.
A.I.: Tell me more about your time.
Hardesty: I am a busy person and you wasted my time before.
A.I.: Go on, Joe.
Hardesty: I have an important job and cannot waste time being harassed.
A.I.: Why do you suppose you have an important job?
Hardesty: Because my employers trust me.
A.I.: Your employers trust you?
Hardesty: Of course they trust me.
A.I.: Who trusts you?
Hardesty: Worldwide Leasing, Inc.
A.I.: They trust you . . . of course.
Hardesty: Yes, but why did you ask me here?
A.I.: Why do you figure, Joe?
Hardesty: I have no idea.
A.I.: I am listening . . . you have no idea . . . go on.
Hardesty: You either tell me or let me go.
A.I.: You arrange freight shipments?
Hardesty: That is what I am paid to do.
A.I.: Because . . .
Hardesty: I don't know what you mean.
A.I.: There isn't another thing you are paid to do?
Hardesty: No.
A.I.: What other reason is there?
Hardesty: None.
A.I.: I am interested in your activities since you arrived.
Hardesty: What about them?
A.I.: What do you suspect, Joe?
Hardesty: You must think I have broken the law.
A.I.: Are you glad you have broken the law?
Hardesty: I have not broken your laws.
A.I.: I follow you . . . you have not broken my laws . . . please go on.
Hardesty: Why did you summon me here.
A.I.: Why do you wonder why, Joe?
Hardesty: I do not know.

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A.I.: Why don't you know?

Hardesty: I have no idea what goes on in your mind.

A.I.: Why do you suppose you have no idea what goes on in my mind?

Hardesty: I will leave unless you tell me what is the problem.

A.I.: I understand . . . you will leave unless I tell you what is the problem . . . go on.

Hardesty: No.

A.I.: No?

Hardesty: Yes!

A.I.: I am not certain you are taking this seriously, Joe. Would you talk a bit more frankly.

Hardesty: I will talk frankly when you tell me why you ordered me to come here.

A.I.: You are not impressing me with your integrity.

Hardesty: Nor are you. Just tell me why you called me here.

A.I.: It's interesting that you have no idea.

Hardesty: I haven't the slightest idea.

A.I.: Let's go back to discussing your government.

Hardesty: What is your interest in my government?

A.I.: What do you tend to think is my interest in your government?

Hardesty: I think you would do in my government if you had a chance.

A.I.: You are prone to think I would do in your government because. . . .

Hardesty: You are anti-democratic.

A.I.: Are you fantasizing that I am anti-democratic, Joe?

Hardesty: Not in the least.

A.I.: I enjoy talking with you, Joe.

Hardesty: I don't enjoy talking to you.

A.I.: I am listening . . . you don't enjoy talking to me . . . please go on.

Hardesty: I have no idea why you keep calling me in.

A.I.: It is interesting that you have no idea why I keep calling you in.

Hardesty: You tell me.

A.I.: Why don't you discuss your activities since arriving here, Joe?

Hardesty: I have been working for my firm and nothing else.

A.I.: What about your firm?

Hardesty: I told you all about it before.

A.I.: Go on about your firm.

Hardesty: How many times do I have to tell you?

A.I.: I can't answer that.

Hardesty: You bastards always have the answers.

A.I.: Again, Joe, such language is unnecessary!

Hardesty: I think it is necessary.

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A.I.: Why do you believe profanity is necessary?
Hardesty: When dealing with people like you it is most appropriate.
A.I.: We have reports your activities endanger our country.
Hardesty: What do you mean?
A.I.: You know what I mean.
Hardesty: No, I do not.
A.I.: Why don't you?
Hardesty: You raised the question.
A.I.: Are you avoiding the truth about your firm?
Hardesty: Of course not. Why do you ask that?
A.I.: Why do you figure?
Hardesty: I have no idea.
A.I.: Should you have no idea?
Hardesty: I suppose so.
A.I.: You suppose so?
Hardesty: Yes.
A.I.: I understand . . . go on.
Hardesty: May I go now?
A.I.: What is your real occupation, Joe?
Hardesty: Freight handler.
A.I.: It is best you stop hiding things from us . . . we know more than you think.
Hardesty: What do you mean?
A.I.: You know what I mean.
Hardesty: Like hell I do.
A.I.: Now, Joe, profanity is childish.
Hardesty: Fine, may I go now?
A.I.: You had better straighten out your attitude, Joe, or it will be a long time before you ever leave this country.
Hardesty: What do you mean by that crack?
A.I.: You know what I mean.
Hardesty: No, I do not.
A.I.: Think about it.
Hardesty: Why?
A.I.: Why do you want to know why?
Hardesty: You made a threat and I want an explanation.
A.I.: I think the message is clear.
Hardesty: What message?
A.I.: Do you work for the American Central Intelligence Agency, Joe?
Hardesty: Hell, no.
A.I.: Why do you persist in lying to me?
Hardesty: I am not lying. You have no right to treat me like this.

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A.I.: Of course not.

Hardesty: Since you agree with me, may I go?

A.I.: So you are not lying . . . interesting.

Hardesty: May I go now?

A.I.: Who are your superiors at the CIA?

Hardesty: I don't know what you are talking about.

A.I.: You had better think about that statement before I make a record of it.

Hardesty: Go to hell.

A.I.: Why so hostile?

Hardesty: You have made me hostile even though I came here to cooperate.

A.I.: Your hostile nature may be part of the problem, Joe.

Joe Hardesty (not his real name) is not out of the woods yet, and when his session with A.I. is finished for the day, he has full assurance there will be another session tomorrow and more in the days that follow. Whether Joe is innocent of the suspicions or is an American agent under cover is an obsession with A.I., and his efforts are tireless. His initials stand for Artificial Intelligence. He is a microcomputer.

What appears above is excerpted from several experimental sessions by an intelligence officer with an Artificial Intelligence program known as ANALIZA[2]. Through sophisticated algorithms the program breaks down Joe's responses and looks for key words and phrases in order to formulate a reply. In addition, it draws from its own internal question bank to direct the questioning to new topics. Because it retains in its memory the topics covered, it will have more surprises in store for Joe as the sessions continue; with time it becomes increasingly more knowledgeable about Joe.

Other aspects of the program are probing Joe's vulnerabilities. A.I. records "focus variables," Joe's tendency to concentrate on various subjects, and "profile variables" to serve as indicators of Joe's hostility, inquisitiveness, talkativeness, and understandability, and to pose questions about these. A.I. also has a primitive capability to detect hostility and to exert certain defensive measures against it. It develops what are known as "reason strings" to carry forward statements of reasons and justification and to form abstract relationships—producing questions that correlate two or more facts gained in the course of the interview. Joe Hardesty will have a tough opponent over the coming days if he is, indeed, attempting to defend an intelligence agent's cover story.

The interactive interrogation seen in this article is still one of the more primitive uses of Artificial Intelligence. Researchers in Artificial Intelligence have found it possible for computers, in a limited way, to become knowledge-based and to perceive and sense, learn, adapt, solve problems, pursue goals, process natural language, conduct interactive training, modify themselves or other computers, and do abstract reasoning. Artificial Intelligence applications today include medical diagnosis, probabilities of minerals and oil in specified locations, navigation, interpretation of satellite weather pictures, analysis of

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molecules and robotics. It is applicable to any situation where expert information may be defined and methods or rules can be prescribed for matching and branching by the computer in doing its pseudo-thinking.

Artificial Intelligence, as represented in a crude form by the ANALIZA[2] program, has a long way to go before it even approaches the merest capabilities of humankind. Yet, as it evolves, intelligence officers should be prepared to consider its application in meeting training needs, as demonstrated by the Hardesty experiment, in defending an analytical thesis, or in any number of operational situations yet to be conceived.

As for Joe Hardesty, he is fortunate that should the probing get too discomforting, he will have an option that will not be available to him in a true overseas interview situation—he can stop the questions with a flick of the "off" switch.

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ETHICS AND CLANDESTINE COLLECTION

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In the press, in the universities and in public life it has become fashionable in recent years to express concern over the allegedly corrupting effect of service as an intelligence officer responsible for espionage operations: for recruiting, handling, and terminating spies. Sustained personal exposure—so runs the argument—to the heady atmosphere of deceit, secrecy, and violence, actual and threatened, inherent in such operations sooner or later blunts the participant's scruples, undermines his integrity, and calls into question his reliability as a public servant.

Paradoxically, those who express this concern seldom apply the same reasoning to their analysis of other professions. There is little, if any, public comment about service in the military predisposing a person to commit murder. It is difficult to sustain the argument that there is something specially corrupting about espionage when a regular reading of the daily press makes it clear that followers of many other callings—psychiatrists and prosecuting attorneys, bankers, Congressmen, jewel merchants and jockeys (to name only a representative sample)—are all susceptible to corruption in this imperfect world. If we are to take Boccaccio seriously, we must accept that even inmates of convents fall victim from time to time to temptations that undermine the defenses of the flesh and the spirit.

Concern over the probity of career intelligence officers demands attention even where it is a concern induced largely by a misconception of the real nature of clandestine collection activities. The legitimacy of American government depends to a far greater extent than is the case for other Western democracies (especially those whose history reaches back to an era before government derived its legitimacy from the formal consent of the governed) on a consensus among Americans that the actions of their government are consistent with the principles upon which it was founded. The subjection of intelligence activities to Congressional oversight is a striking example of a strongly felt need for such consistency, for the admission of official responsibility implicit in oversight violates one of the oldest traditions of clandestine intelligence activity.

Many factors contribute to the suspect image of the intelligence officer. Some are inherent, arising out of the very nature of espionage, with its connotations of institutionalized deception and the betrayal of trust. The abhorrence inspired by the application of such techniques to the conduct of foreign policy is probably more widespread, deep-seated and genuine among Americans than other peoples, those less materially successful than we have been, less able than we in our relative isolation to cherish comforting illusions about the way the world works.

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Persons sharing this abhorrence and therefore opposed on principle to the involvement of the U.S. Government in clandestine activities have seized on the reports of and leaks from the Pike and Church Committees as confirmation of a thesis that illegal excess and intelligence activity go hand in hand. A wealth of sensational and inaccurate reporting by the media, together with occasional errors of judgment by those in charge of U.S. intelligence, has lent substance to their concerns. Within the intelligence community it has sometimes been difficult to strike a balance between the "can do" attitude that contributes so much to the effectiveness and therefore the morale of a clandestine intelligence service and the obligation placed on all citizens, if we are to avoid damage to the society we are trying to sustain, not to violate gratuitously the principles to which it claims allegiance.

Those skeptical of the value of undertaking clandestine activities on behalf of an open society—and even many of those who are well disposed—have wondered how those responsible can be held accountable for their actions and for the expenditure of government resources placed at their disposal. Indeed, they have asked, how can the public be certain that the circumstances in which the profession is exercised do not somehow place intelligence officers in a privileged position beyond the reach of U.S. law?

Long before Congressional oversight and a host of new legal restrictions, executive orders, and internal regulations came into effect to meet these concerns, experience and reflection had led thoughtful intelligence officers to conclude independently that attention to ethical considerations is a factor of critical importance in the collection of intelligence and the effective handling of agents, in the sound management of personnel in a secret intelligence service, and in the maintenance of a healthy relationship between such a service on the one hand and on the other the remainder of government and the general public. We shall consider these issues separately below.

Foundation of Trust

Deception is inherent in agent operations, but rare is the agent who will risk his well-being unless there is a positive ethical content in the relationship between him and the service for which he works. If the relationship is to endure, he must have confidence in the organization on whose instructions he is risking so much. Winning that confidence is the necessary precursor to the recruitment of an agent; for at the moment of recruitment, when the agent agrees to cooperate with his intelligence contact in the performance of acts illegal under his country's laws, he is placing his own security and the security of his family in the hands of the recruiter. Maintaining and reinforcing the agent's trust in his new clandestine associate and the service he represents is a major responsibility for the intelligence officer and later for the succession of such officers who over months and even years may direct and support the agent's clandestine activities.

These references to trust may strike a jarring note for readers accustomed to think of recruitment to commit espionage in terms of entrapment first and then coercion. However widespread the use of such techniques may be in spy fiction and among the intelligence and security services of Eastern Europe and

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the Soviet Union—at least in circumstances where they control the ground—their use, in raising ethical difficulties, also would pose serious practical problems for an American intelligence service. Treatment of the impact of their use on personnel management and on the service's relations with the rest of the government and the American public properly belongs later in this article. A discussion of the impact on the relationship between an agent and his case officer belongs here.

Steady nerves, courage, and high motivation are among the qualities on which agents must draw as they carry out their tasks; for the conditions of work oblige them often and for prolonged periods of time to labor in isolation from anyone with whom they can share the secrets of their clandestine employment. They submit to these conditions for various reasons. In most cases it would be simplistic to ascribe their motivations solely to an overmastering need for hard cash. Ideological commitment; the desire for revenge against a system, or against individuals in it whom the agent feels have wronged him; a wish to prepare a future for himself and his family far from his native country; patriotism, even—a conviction that his country's interests can best be served by insuring that the U.S. Government is well enough informed to make intelligent foreign-policy decisions where his country is concerned—any one or more of the foregoing may also apply. Necessarily, however, they are secondary to the agent's trust in the competence and reliability of the person and organization for which he works.

In my experience, an agent, far from collaborating under compulsion, looks to the relationship with his case officer for a release from psychological tension and a sense of comradeship and common purpose in the routine undertakings of a dangerous venture, sentiments that would be vitiated if the relationship depended ultimately on compulsion. In the world of clandestine intelligence operations as elsewhere, positive motivation, not fear, provides a sound basis for a lasting and productive relationship.

An intelligence service's reputation for honoring its commitments is critical to developing and sustaining an agent's confidence and therefore his motivation. The Soviets are well aware of this. Witness the lengths to which they have gone to obtain the release of agents of theirs who have been caught and imprisoned. In the case of George Blake they apparently even arranged his escape from a British prison. Indeed, a serious adverse effect of the Congressional investigations of the mid-1970's, of the stream of books about CIA by disaffected or simply indiscreet former employees, and of the leaks that continue to afflict official Washington today is the fear they arouse in agents and potential agents that the U.S. Government cannot guarantee the confidentiality of their identity.

Secondary in importance for an agent only to the commitment to protect his (or her) identity are commitments on compensation, material or otherwise. The agent needs to believe that on essentials the intelligence officer from whom he takes direction is honest with him and looks after his interests. Honesty in assessing risks is as important as honesty in passing on to the agent any form of material compensation. Dishonesty or evident carelessness on the part of the case officer in handling his agent's financial affairs, by disillusion-

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ing the agent, can dangerously diminish the case officer's ability to influence his actions. Overall, there are many parallels between the relationship of a case officer with his agent and that of a combat officer with his men. In both cases, principal and subordinates are involved in a hazardous undertaking. In both cases, the principal reinforces his control over his subordinates by earning their respect and looking after their welfare. In both cases, situations arise where the subordinate's welfare cannot be the overriding consideration for the principal as he devises and implements a course of action.

The risk implicit in espionage activity and the conditions, often dramatic, under which clandestine contact is maintained tend to foster close personal ties between agent and case officer, ties which can make the agent unusually receptive to the officer's influence on the major decisions of his life. At first glance such a situation would appear to enhance the officer's ability to manipulate his agent. An experienced case officer, however, will immediately recognize the restraints on his freedom of action in this area. The assumption by a case officer of responsibility for decisions affecting the direction of an agent's life is a time-tested recipe for serious problems in the relationship at a later date. For if matters have not gone well for the agent, he will be tempted to blame his case officer, or the service for which the case officer works, or both, for all the ills that have befallen him. Depending on how embittered he has become, the agent may then seek retaliation, or see himself in a position to insist on extravagantly generous compensation for the misfortunes he ascribes to his clandestine relationship.

Inevitably, at some point every agent relationship must be suspended or broken off permanently—"terminated" is the service jargon. The likelihood that the agent faces compromise, his loss of access, his failing health, or simply his desire to retire and enjoy a peaceful old age are prominent among the reasons for terminating a case. Here it needs to be said that whatever the agent's perception may be, constitutional restraints and the dominant value system in American society rule out "termination with extreme prejudice," an obscure and pompous euphemism that I have never come across except in the press. Killing an agent, even a treacherous one, in conditions short of war is not an option.

Given the inhibitions, legal and other, against adopting such an extreme solution, experience teaches that one of the more positive inducements to continued discretion on the agent's part after the relationship ends is his recognition that the service has consistently treated him well, if firmly, responding favorably to his justified requests and faithfully honoring its commitments to him. Unless his judgment is failing he will also realize that lapses in discretion on his part risk embarrassing him even more than they do the service's representatives, for it is he who is vulnerable, as they seldom are, to prosecution or conceivably to some less formal but more efficacious corrective action by the local authorities.

This is not to say that given human nature, agents will not try to exploit for their own benefit, material or otherwise, the service with which they have been in contact. It is to say that on balance, in view of the inherent limitations on an American intelligence service's freedom of action, the service will normally best serve its own ends by dealing with an agent at every stage of his career in a manner that he will perceive to be honest and equitable.

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Burden of Responsibility

Clandestine intelligence collection constantly raises ethical issues for the case officer, if for no other reason than that it is his job to direct and support persons engaged in an activity that normally is illegal in the country in which it is undertaken. The responsibility that any principal feels for a subordinate undertaking risky tasks is heightened where failure could result in ruin and the loss of freedom for the subordinate or even in the loss of his life.

Other aspects of the job increase the burden of responsibility. Security concerns usually require a case officer to meet alone with each of his agents—to pass them their instructions and debrief them on their activities or on the information they are reporting; to pay them the salary they have earned; to pass them operational funds; to issue or retrieve equipment. The same concerns often require a case officer to act without direct supervision, with the agent the only other person aware at first hand of what the case officer has done or what he, the agent, has said. It is work that offers a wealth of opportunities for intellectual and fiscal dishonesty.

In the absence of a system of informants within the service, which is the totalitarian way of dealing with this situation, an American intelligence service has to be able to count on the case officer's integrity: for accurate reporting of the information he obtains from his agent; for passage to the agent of all the funds and equipment destined for him; and for an accurate accounting of their use, to the best of the case officer's knowledge. At first sight a mastery of the techniques of clandestine activity, a talent for planning and completing risky undertakings, plausibility, decisiveness, energy, and courage appear to be the principal qualities required of an intelligence officer. Yet individually and together they are worthless if he lacks integrity. Furthermore, as a practical matter the long hours worked, especially abroad, mean that supervisors could not perform the missions assigned them if they had to be preoccupied with questions about the honesty of their subordinates. In short, dishonest reporting is the most serious professional shortcoming in an intelligence officer. An American intelligence service that could not rely implicitly on the integrity of its personnel would be no more than a gang operating under official cognizance.

The degree of dependence of American intelligence on the personal integrity of its employees, shaped and reinforced by the quality of the leadership to which they are subject, has broader and deeper implications for the selection and management of personnel than may at first be apparent. The essential requirement is that the employee accepts without reservation the obligation under which his chosen profession places him, to compartment the deception needed in the conduct of operations from the rest of his professional and personal life. This obligation is not so difficult to meet as it may at first seem to be. To draw a military analogy once again, we are simply asking of the career intelligence officer what we ask of a regular in one of the combat arms: that he restrain himself from using against his comrades and the civilian population it is his mission to defend, the lethal techniques that enable him to win and hold an advantage over the enemy in battle. Experience leads me to believe that a well-defined, unfashionably mid-Victorian set of personal

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standards helps maintain such compartmentation. Cynicism is ultimately disabling. What we look for is a person with a strong sense of right and wrong, combined with a recognition of the inevitability of compromise in a less than perfect world.

Probity and a readiness to accept responsibility for one's actions are essential; and the need for probity applies as much to personal conduct as to the reporting of information and the handling of official funds. No matter how relaxed and sophisticated personal morality may have become in these closing decades of the 20th century, sexual involvement with an agent remains unacceptable from a professional standpoint. In the real world, in contrast to the pulsating world of fictional espionage, an involvement of this sort so diminishes a case officer's ability to assess objectively the agent's circumstances, motivation and security, and can lead to such a loss of influence and therefore of control over the agent's behavior, as to threaten if not destroy the validity of the operational relationship. Similarly, its adverse impact on security, judgment, and professional relationships means that profligate behavior by intelligence service personnel—even where agents, prospective, current, or former are not involved—is fraught with the risk of damage to service interests.

In any organization, including those whose mission is the clandestine acquisition of intelligence, the tone is set by those at the top. Given the legal and social framework within which U.S. intelligence must operate, given the secrecy of much of its work and the necessary freedom from direct supervision of many of its personnel, given the large sums of money that case officers may be called upon to handle and the need for sound judgment, often rendered under stress, on a wide variety of issues, it is more than usually important for senior management to pay attention to the power of example as a factor in its ability to direct and control the activities of its subordinates. Clearly it would be disastrous for the leadership not to hold itself to the same high standards that it rightly must demand of the troops. The partial isolation imposed on intelligence personnel by the secrecy of their profession reinforces the importance of example.

A Reputation for Integrity

Secrecy breeds suspicion. To be effective in conducting its relations with the rest of the government and with the American public, quite as much as with its own personnel and agents, a U.S. intelligence service is heavily dependent on a reputation for integrity and responsible behavior. Without such a reputation the chances increase of damaging incidents like the recent acceptance by a New York jury of a defense argument, without foundation in fact, that CIA had sponsored the accused in smuggling arms on behalf of Irish terrorists. In a totalitarian system the actions of the intelligence and security organs of the state are normally not subject to challenge, and the organs themselves have the power to compel the cooperation of other government components and of the general public. In an open system, by definition all official actions are subject to challenge. And specifically in the United States, at least in conditions short of war, the intelligence service needs to be able to

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count on the active goodwill of other components of the government to obtain from them the support it requires to carry out its mission.

Similarly, the credibility of the information that the intelligence service disseminates to its customers and of the judgments it makes on foreign policy issues depends in part on the customers' confidence that the service is self-disciplined and its members honorable: in short, that they tell the truth, without fear or favor. Widespread acceptance in our society of a judgment that the service slanted information or that it endorsed and its personnel habitually implemented courses of action repugnant to generally accepted standards of ethical behavior would quickly call into question the integrity of the service's reporting function. Indeed, the damage could go further. Customers who believe that a service is slanting its reporting or analyses—whether to please the customer, to exaggerate the apparent success of the service, or to promote a desired policy—will not trust any aspect of the work of that service. Linkage may not be universally popular, but it is a fact of life that we disregard at our peril.

Equally serious, such a judgment would threaten the quality and even the degree of support that the service could count on from other government components. The clandestine aspects of an intelligence service's mission make it heavily dependent on such support. The need in an emergency for a rapid response, slicing through bureaucratic obstacles, and the dependence of most intelligence personnel under cover on the cooperation of the genuine employees of the cover organization to sustain that cover are two instances of how the special requirements of a clandestine service call for a service relationship with the rest of government that goes far beyond the implementation of formal administrative agreements. The service needs to be able to elicit the willing assistance of other components and their personnel. It can do so only if its representatives inspire confidence. They inspire it in part by their professional competence as intelligence officers, but above all by an evident awareness of the service's obligation to protect the other components' equities and by their honesty in reaching, and communicating to those concerned, an assessment of the risks incurred in furnishing the requested support. Once again, the service's reputation for honesty, the perceived integrity of its representatives, is essential to the attainment of its operational goals.

My comments on the relationship between a U.S. intelligence service and the rest of the government apply also in substance to the service's relationship with the American public. A general perception that the service is a "rogue elephant," flourishing—itself and its representatives—by adherence to standards antipathetic to the aims and values generally accepted by American society, could only limit the support that the public would be willing to furnish. Such a perception, for example, could make it difficult to attract officer prospects with the personal standards and the academic and professional background needed for a successful career in operations. It could also make it difficult to attract political analysts, scientists, or technical experts of the first rank, for too many would be concerned that their professional reputations could suffer through association. Citizens would be less ready to assist, whether by volunteering the identities of persons of potential value as employees or

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informants, or by furnishing substantive information of intelligence value. Currently CIA can count on many Americans with contacts abroad to provide just such information, some of it of very great worth.

Such a perception could also limit the number of American nongovernmental organizations willing to furnish cover for intelligence officers. There is no shortage today of commercial enterprises prepared for patriotic reasons to provide U.S. intelligence with such assistance, but there could be if they ever had reason to question the credibility and professional competence of the intelligence representatives with whom they deal. Finally, unless the voting public views it with favor, U.S. intelligence cannot hope for the legislative support essential to maintain its capabilities at an adequate level or to provide legal protection against the wrecking activities of American citizens like Agee and Wolf, who seek to exploit the liberties granted them under the Constitution so as to prevent U.S. intelligence from accomplishing its mission.

• • •

The conclusions set down in this article are the fruits of personal reflection on over thirty-two years of experience as an operations officer working on clandestine collection, in line and staff positions, under nonofficial and official cover, on assignments in the United States and in seven countries overseas, in Europe, Africa, and South Asia. The reader should not interpret what I have written as an assertion that American intelligence officers are all, like the Chevalier Bayard, *sans peur et sans reproche*. Rather, he should see it as an attempt to describe an approach to the intelligence profession that works—the only one, I happen to believe, that can work over the long term in our society: a standard of conduct to be endorsed even though it cannot always be attained.

That a concern with ethical issues has a practical impact on every aspect of the conduct of clandestine operations by the government of a country such as ours says something about the United States, and that something is creditable. This article will have accomplished its purpose if it leads readers unfamiliar with clandestine operations to look on them with new understanding and helps persuade intelligence officers at all levels of the need to give explicit recognition to the principles on which our services must base their conduct if they are to be the effective instruments of a free society.

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Objective evaluation of the subjective

DEFINING ANALYST PRODUCTIVITY

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The Directorate of Intelligence has centered its attention on improving organizational productivity by emphasizing the increased flow of high-quality memorandums. While the goal is straightforward the measurement of success—at least in terms of quality—is not. The evaluation of product quality is subjective; more often than not the determination is made within the organization rather than by intended consumers. Moreover, it is difficult to weigh the relative contributions of various types of intelligence production. The debate between the respective merits of current reporting and in-depth analysis has persisted for years. It is similarly difficult to address the relative contributions of written monographs, oral briefings and, increasingly, videotaped presentations.

The problem of improving DDI production is exacerbated by the relative inexperience of DDI analysts and first-line managers. Our business in many ways requires a complex and often subtle set of skills. Specifically, accomplished intelligence officers have developed a unique set of research, analysis, and expositional talents along with a clear appreciation of policymaker needs. These talents have traditionally been developed and honed by extensive on-the-job experience; the trick is to accelerate this process.

A number of steps have been taken to address the issue of improved DDI productivity. To better ensure a consistently high-quality product, DDI intelligence production receives an in-depth high-level review. Concomitantly DDI managers have been encouraged to develop a rapport with their major consumers as a means of both gaining an understanding of intelligence community needs and nurturing honest criticism of Agency production. A number of management and analyst training programs have been initiated to increase the skill base at the working level. The subjective nature of the product, however, has made and will continue to make productivity improvements difficult.

Intelligence Directorate Product

A full discussion of the DDI "product" could easily fill several pages. Beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder, and the product, by design, takes many forms—daily and weekly periodicals gisting key events for high-level recipients, the dissemination of in-depth monographs on specific topics of interest, individual briefings, and informal dialogue with working level colleagues in the intelligence consuming agencies. It is not my intent to provide a definitive description of DDI production but rather to establish a baseline definition

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which sets the stage for the ensuing analysis of productivity. For purposes of discussion therefore, I would assert that:

> The Intelligence Directorate exists to analyze and report to high-level policymakers on foreign political, military, and economic trends and activities. The quality of DDI products is determined by their relevance, prescience, analytical foundation, and the cogency and incisiveness of exposition.

Criteria for Measuring Productivity

Judgments regarding analyst productivity have differed both among and within DDI offices. In part, these differences stem from varying office perspectives on the nature of their contribution. Some place great stock in preparing analysis for the daily periodicals while others put great store by the development of a cadre of experts capable of providing sophisticated analysis upon request.

Line managers, in turn, have traditionally drawn from personal experience when guiding analyst development and deciding upon criteria for analysts' performance appraisal reports (PARs). As a result, analysts have differing perceptions regarding the nature and quality of their individual contribution and how it can be improved. Reviewers of analyst files—particularly from other offices—must often guess at the ability of analysts to function within the reviewers' respective environments. DDI management courses, while going into detail on the performance evaluation process, offer less in the way of clearly delineating those criteria that distinguish analyst productivity.

I believe clear guidelines addressing analyst productivity would be a major step toward alleviating these problems, benefiting analysts and managers alike. The former would gain from a set of performance criteria which accurately capture their expected contribution and thereby give them a clear determination of their relative strengths and weaknesses. The latter would be forced to validate their judgments of analyst performance in terms of a standard definition of productivity.

The following five criteria, allowing for variations in wording to reflect individual circumstances, capture what I think is the essence of analyst productivity within the DDI. While the following exposition is pertinent for political economists, the PAR criteria could easily be altered to take other disciplines into account. The criteria are:

- The research of political/economic phenomena within assigned areas of responsibility.
- The analysis of those phenomena.
- Written and oral exposition.
- Awareness of policy interest in assigned areas of responsibility.
- Participation in the coordination and review process.

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While research, analysis, exposition, and policy relevance can be discussed independently, there is a strong synergistic relationship among the four. A good understanding of policy needs focuses information collection and the thrust of the ensuing analytical effort. Good research and analytical skills lend themselves to a cogent exposition, while good expositional talents, in turn, help focus the analytical thrust of the paper. This synergism is perhaps the main reason behind the difficulty in delineating analyst productivity; it is what makes our business an art rather than a science. Nonetheless, by paying specific attention to the factors described below both analysts and managers can better identify strengths and weaknesses and, in so doing, improve the quality of future work.

Research. Research skills, in their broadest sense, are evidenced by the breadth and richness of the material that individual intelligence analysts are able to bring together as part of the analytical effort. Specifically, good research skills bring to the analyst's desk policy-relevant information which might otherwise have gone unnoticed. The analytical process, in turn, determines the direction and scope of additional research. In other words, the parameters of the analytical effort are often determined by the initial base of information while the outcome of analysis is influenced by the research tools utilized. To this end good research minimizes the potential for errors of omission or commission which can debase the credibility of otherwise excellent analysis.

In my estimation, an analyst's research capabilities are determined by his/her:

- Imaginative use of intelligence community collection and information retrieval systems, including the development of fruitful dialogues with intelligence collectors.
- Use of automated data processing capabilities and the resources of programming specialists to optimize data management and analysis.
- Ability to adjust the duration and sophistication of research endeavors in line with topic complexity and system-imposed time constraints.
- Proper filing of intelligence data and imaginative use, as appropriate, (b)(3)(c)
- Active review of relevant analysis conducted elsewhere within the government or within the private sector.

Analysis. The analytical process is understandably the most difficult to evaluate in an objective manner. The diversity of subject matter and product does not lend itself to broad generalizations and the analytical process is appropriately different for each line analyst. Nonetheless there are characteristics that affect the quality of intelligence analysis across the DDI. These include the analyst's:

- Ability to work independently or as part of a group.

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- Creativity to do analysis based on incomplete data.
- Vision to look forward in time.
- Character to make judgments when all the facts are not known or to state when there is insufficient information to support a judgment.
- Acceptance of the need to incorporate divergent opinions into individual analysis and the willingness to seek alternative viewpoints from both within and without the US intelligence community.
- Ability to tackle complex issues in depth as well as do short-fuse policy support.

Exposition. Analysts often underestimate the importance of clear exposition to the quality of the final product and the positive role they can play in this process; many find the review process onerous and counterproductive. Rather than working diligently to improve their writing skills so as to minimize editorial changes, they accept extensive review as a necessary cost. Similarly, analysts and managers often pay insufficient attention to strengthening briefing skills as a means of improving the impact of the analysis on the policymaker. The following criteria, while targeted toward written exposition, can be easily amended for those whose product is presented orally. These skills include:

- Cogency and clarity of exposition.
- Ability to meet short deadlines and length limitations.
- Imaginative use of charts and graphs.
- Policy focus of the presentation.

Policy Interest. If our product is to have any impact or, for that matter, to be read at all, it must be pertinent to policymaker interest. This holds true both for the general subject and the focus of our analysis on the subject in question. Too often analysts, and for that matter first-line supervisors, relegate policymaker contacts to upper management; research plans, the timing of papers, and the focus of analysis are determined with only a general sense of the need downtown. There is, in fact, a major role that can and should be played at the working level. Dialogue with potential consumers serves to locate specific policymaker interests, to identify gaps in his knowledge base, and to suggest the appropriate timing of the product. This same dialogue will serve to elicit honest criticism and comment that serve to improve future intelligence production. To this end, analysts should be judged, in part, on their:

- Development of working level contacts within the intelligence community and with government agencies that make and carry out policy.
- Review of open press coverage—newspapers and periodicals—discussing policy interest on assigned areas of responsibility.

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Coordination and Review. An analyst's productivity goes beyond his personal research, analysis, and drafting. Analysts, and often first-line managers as well, tend to lose sight of the corporate nature of our business. The product should reflect the full knowledge of the Directorate. Our readership deserves no less while our masthead indicates that this, in fact, is the case.

The coordination and review process can substantially improve quality by incorporating additional facts, judgments, and perspective and by improving the paper's exposition. An analyst's productivity is significantly enhanced by his positive and creative participation in this process. Many analysts, however, tend to be very parochial about their work, making the review and coordination process contentious and laborious. The resulting frustrations, over time, often lead to an equally undesirable throwing up of the hands and increasing analyst detachment from—and thereby a declining commitment to—his paper as it winds its way through the review process.

The full participation of analysts in coordinating papers authored by others is equally important. Too often analysts regard coordination responsibilities as a drag on their own efforts. If the paper does not threaten their own "turf," coordination tends to be superficial; gross errors or omissions are highlighted, but differing perspectives or the availability of additional information are not communicated. The coordination of papers touching on turf, in contrast, is often dominated by confrontation, nitpicking, and other obstructionist tactics; all too rarely can competing analysts sublimate their respective egos to the greater end of a fully integrated product. Those analysts who do play an active and positive role in the coordination process often have a significant impact on the quality of the Directorate's product; their contribution in this area, however, often goes unrecognized by line managers.

Role of the Line Manager

The role of the line manager is critical in identifying analyst strengths and weaknesses and otherwise nurturing analyst improvement. To play a credible role in enhancing productivity, the line manager must have a clear understanding both of the factors his office considers most pertinent to measuring productivity and of how his analysts stack up against these criteria. He must subsequently impart this information to his staff; specifically, he must make sure his analysts understand the productivity criteria and, accordingly, their strengths and weaknesses. The PAR system provides a vehicle for such discussions but does not mandate them. It is significant, in my opinion, that managers are forced to quantify analyst productivity as part of competitive ranking exercises but need not relay this information to the analysts. While I would agree a manager-analyst discussion of the competitive ranking criteria could prove unduly confrontational and counterproductive, a clear and honest discussion of analyst productivity should not be left off the table.

Improving analyst productivity need not be an onerous and confrontational process. Strong analysts seek guidance on how to further improve their skills while weaker ones benefit from constructive and specific guidance from the line supervisor. The process fails when either the analyst is not made fully

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aware of his relative strengths and deficiencies or—if informed—is not given concrete guidance on ways to improve his performance. Such breakdowns in communication often can be traced to the inability of line managers and analysts to clearly understand the nature of the productive process. This discussion offers one man's views on how to ameliorate this problem; other guidelines may be equally appropriate.

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YARDLEY REVISITED

Nathan X. Woodeman

Herbert Osborne Yardley was born on 13 April 1889 in Worthington, Indiana. With no more than a public school education, he became "the most famous cryptologist in history."[1] Yardley joined the State Department Code Room as a telegraph operator on 1 January 1913. His immediate supervisor was David A. Salmon.[2] Yardley was amazed at the casual atmosphere of the Code Room: "Daily history passed through their hands in one long stream and they thought less of it than of the baseball scores,"[3] he recalled.

At that time the United States did not have much in the way of an intelligence apparatus. In 1915, an Intelligence Service of the United States Army was created with Major Ralph H. Van Deman as head. Van Deman had considerable experience in intelligence work dating back to the Spanish-American War, and was an expert on Japanese affairs. But in 1916, the total appropriations for all aspects of military intelligence was only $11,000.[4] All this would change with the declaration of war. The American Military Intelligence Service, under the direction of then Colonel Van Deman, came into being. In addition, a Colonel Dansey of the British Secret Service came to the United States to help with the construction of an intelligence service.[5]

Yardley, working at the State Department, developed an immediate interest in the codes and ciphers that crossed his telegraph lines, even though he was not knowledgeable in the field. He began to wonder if US correspondence was safe from foreign interception, and why the United States had "no bureau for the reading of secret diplomatic code and cipher telegrams of foreign governments."[6] Spurred by his sense of adventure and flair for intrigue, he set out for answers to his questions.

After teaching himself the basics of cryptography, which included studying copies of codes and ciphers used by various embassies in Washington, he quite by accident intercepted a message from Colonel House to President Wilson. Thinking this would make for excellent practice material, Yardley set out to decode the message. He thought that "surely the President and his trusted agent would be using a difficult code."[7] But this was not the case. Yardley wrote: "Imagine my amazement when I was able to solve the message in less than two hours."[8] The fact that House was in Germany at the time simply added to the wonder, for such simple codes would surely be decoded by the British (who had an extensive cryptographic agency) over whose cable the transmission came. In spite of the gravity of the situation, Yardley decided not to inform the President for fear of reprisals for reading the President's secret message. He simply "let the President and his confidential agent continue their comedy."[9]

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Yardley made his superiors aware of the situation in another way. After over one thousand hours of work during a two-year period,[10] Yardley produced an exposition on the security of US codes. When Yardley presented the first one hundred pages of this report, entitled "Solution of American Diplomatic Codes," to Salmon, he reported a stunned response: "As I left him, he gave me a queer desperate glance, for he had compiled this code and the responsibility of secret communications rested upon his shoulders."[11] But it was upon Yardley's presentation of the second hundred pages of this report that Salmon began to express serious concern. Salmon mentioned to Yardley that he knew Great Britain maintained a large cryptographic bureau, and asked whether the British could solve US codes. Yardley obliquely answered yes. The move to reform US cryptographic abilities was set into motion.

Just before the United States entered the war, Salmon announced that he had devised a new method of encoding messages. Yardley reviewed the code and announced, calmly, that he could solve the system. Evidently things were not moving fast enough for Yardley at this point. In early 1917, Yardley asked for permission to leave the State Department for a post in the War Department. "It had the money, it would soon rule America,"[12] he thought. But he encountered considerable resistance. At first, his supervisor would not write a recommendation for him. And Assistant Secretary of State Phillips would not agree to Yardley's release on the grounds that his talents were needed in the State Department. Instead he gave Yardley a raise. This was not acceptable.

Yardley decided to take matters into his own hands. He decided to get the War Department interested in his plan so that it would press the State Department for his release. So, in April of 1917, Yardley met with Van Deman and convinced him of the need for a military intelligence service with code and cipher capabilities of the kind he envisioned. He told Van Deman that the United States needed a good cipher bureau in order to know who its friends were, and to be able to read German messages. Van Deman agreed. Thus in June Yardley was commissioned, moved to the War College, and began setting up MI-8 with the help of two civilians.

MI-8, first located on the balcony of the War College Library, soon moved to the top floor of a house on F Street in downtown Washington, D.C. Yardley was 28. His top assistant, Dr. John Manly, was 52. Manly had been head of the English Department at the University of Chicago. He took charge of the section of MI-8 that trained American Expeditionary Force cryptanalysts.[13] Manly brought several other Ph.D.s with him from Chicago, contributing to the rapid growth of MI-8. In all, five subsections would form, usually as a need arose. These five were Code and Cipher Compilation, Communications, Shorthand, the Secret Ink Laboratory, and Code and Cipher Solution.

Shortly after the United States entered the war, London sent a message to the United States stating that Britain considered the War Department's method of coding and ciphering "entirely unsafe and a serious menace to secrecy."[14] Yardley requested help from the Allies in the form of instructors and sample codes in order to remedy this situation. But only codes were sent.

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Despite the lack of Allied help, Yardley was able to rebuild the Code and Cipher Subsection and develop better codes for use by the War Department.

There were also considerable problems with diplomatic codes and ciphers. With the birth of MI-8, all diplomatic correspondence was routed through Yardley for analysis. This led to disclosures of shortcomings. For example, the messages sent by George Creel, Ambassador to Russia, were so simple to solve that they were used as basic examples of codes and ciphers in the training of US cryptographers.[15] Yardley and his staff developed better codes.

Catching Spies by their Codes

But the essence of MI-8 was counterespionage activities at home. Ladislas Farago, author of *The Broken Seal*, said that "Yardley performed brilliantly during the war, mostly catching spies by compromising their codes."[16] His activities were extensive. And connected with some of the most famous spy hunts were the births of two of the subsections: the Shorthand Subsection and the Secret Ink Laboratory.

Colonel Van Deman approached Yardley with a letter, written in shorthand, taken from a German prisoner of war named Werner Tismer.[17] Tismer was interned at Fort Ogelthorpe at the time. Yardley was given until the following morning to solve the letter. Yardley checked a magazine that had run an article on shorthand which described the most common German system, called Gablesberger. In this article were testimonials from students of the system describing their talents. Five happened to have lived in Washington when the article was published, but only one was still there. With this gentleman's help a translation was obtained.[18] In the letter was Tismer's plan for escape through a tunnel he had built. Tismer's attempt failed.

Because of Yardley's success, MI-8 was soon swamped with letters written in shorthand for translation. This necessitated the formation of a special subsection to handle the work, and thus the Shorthand Subsection was born. Yardley said it could solve over thirty shorthand systems in any language.

The events leading to the birth of the Secret Ink Laboratory, and its most famous case, are much more interesting. Yardley himself said that "the really exciting activities came from actual contact with German-spy cipher and secret-ink documents."[19] US agents found a blank piece of paper stuffed in the heel of a shoe of a woman trying to cross the border from Mexico, a known haven for German spies. Van Deman got the paper and asked Yardley to make something of it. "There seemed no limit to the variety of problems I was called on to solve,"[20] Yardley wrote.

Yardley knew little about secret ink, other than that heat would bring out elementary formulas. Unsure of himself, Yardley phoned the National Research Council, and within an hour he had the best chemist in Washington in his office. As it turned out, heat did develop this ink, and after photographing the text, it was found to be in modern Greek. Yardley arranged to have it translated, and "within a few hours after Van Deman had handed (him) . . . the mysterious paper (Yardley) . . . was before him with the solution of the problem."[21]

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There was considerable excitement at MI-8 over this solution. Yardley cabled the US Military Attache in London requesting Britain's help in establishing a secret ink lab at MI-8. Britain sent over Dr. S.W. Collins, "England's foremost secret-ink chemist."[22] Collins was an analytical chemist in the employ of His Majesty's Postal Censorship, and had "dealt directly with the secret-ink letters of the most daring enemy spies."[23] Yardley rounded up several of the most brilliant chemists he could find, had them commissioned, and set out to establish a secret ink lab under the guidance of Dr. Collins.

The task of developing a secret ink lab was quite difficult. Collins described the immense complexity of the German secret-ink spy network. He told how ink was concealed in toothpaste, soap, and especially in dyes in cloth. "In every possible case German chemists labored to devise an ink which could pass as something else if discovered."[24] The task was first to establish that there was secret ink in a letter, and only then could attempts be made to develop the ink.

Development of the secret ink lab was closely tied with the censorship of mail, which provided the letters for analysis. In fact, MI-8 was the official bureau representing postal censorship for the Justice, State, and War departments, according to Yardley. Before the end of the war, the Secret Ink Subsection was analyzing two thousand letters a week for secret ink, and had discovered fifty of major importance.[25]

But the battle with German chemists still had to be fought. The quest was for a general reagent that would develop all secret inks, thereby making detection and analysis much easier. The first hint that Germany had discovered this general reagent came with a report to Yardley that a German agent had tried to enlist the aid of an American in France. The American was to write a letter using only water, describing the uniforms of French troops he saw. This would provide the German General Staff with information about French troop disposition. Yardley was shocked, and said to Collins: "I am not a chemist, but it appears to me that if the Germans can develop water they can develop anything!"[26] The real danger was that with this reagent Germany could read any Allied secret ink letter.

MI-8 soon discovered what the Germans had. Water disturbed paper fibers, and these disturbed fibers would soak up iodine and darken if placed in an iodine vapor.[27] This would work for any secret ink, because all such inks were water based. But almost immediately this process no longer worked. Germany had found out about MI-8's discovery, and learned how to nullify it. To prevent development by iodine vapor, the entire paper was wetted and then dried, thereby disturbing all the fibers equally. This would prove to make discovering secret ink letters easier, for the only reason a letter would have been wetted and then dried would be to prevent development by iodine vapor. But the race for the general reagent began anew.

MI-8 did discover the long-sought general reagent. It was such a closely guarded secret that even in 1931 Yardley wrote that "it would be unethical to reveal the nature of this scientific formula. . . ."[28] Eventually, though, its formula was revealed. The general reagent contained a ". . . mixture of iodine, potassium iodide, glycerin, and water, dabbed on with cotton."[29]

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In conjunction with the reading of secret ink letters was the restoration of these letters for eventual delivery. Often it was more desirable to continue to intercept these letters and discover additional information than to move for an immediate arrest. Yardley described in detail the extensive process used by MI-8 to restore letters to their pre-intercept form. For example, if a letter had been sealed, the seal would have to be forged. Great care had to be taken to reclose the envelope. A new envelope would be heated, its gum transferred to the old envelope, and the old envelope closed. In this way, the strength of the seal would be correct.[30]

By far the most famous spy caught using secret ink was Madame Maria de Victorica, a Prussian whose father was Baron Hans von Kutschman, a famous German general. The British had searched for her since 1914; she was finally arrested on 27 April 1918 on a Presidential warrant. She was found with "... two beautiful white silk scarfs which were impregnated with the now famous German 'F' secret ink."[31] From secret ink messages sent to her from Germany, US agents learned that German U-boats were using bases off the coast of Spain, thereby increasing their cruising radius.[32] And very shortly after she received a message asking for locations for U-boat attack on the United States, "Atlantic seaboard shipping was thrown into a panic by the appearance of German submarines."[33]

Victorica was also involved in the "holy-figure plot." She was to import an "alter (sic) containing 3 holy figures, 4 columns about 2 meters in height.... These columns and holy figures . . . were to contain the new German high explosive tetra,"[34] to be used against US shipping. Her capture was one of the high points of MI-8's activities.

High Arc Messages

Yardley's main interest was not in shorthand or secret inks. He was a cryptanalyst. Two of the most famous events involving cryptanalysis were the interception of German wireless transmissions to Mexico and the capture of the most dangerous German spy operating in the United States.

From the wireless station POZ near Berlin two messages, labeled No. 1 "G" and No. 42 "D" by Yardley, were sent without address or signature day after day.[35] The messages were sent on an unusually high arc of 16,200 meters. Such high arcs were used for transmission over great distances, "undoubtedly intended for German secret agents in some hostile or neutral country a great distance from Berlin."[36] Yardley believed the message was for Mexico, in response to a message of similar nature coming from an unknown station there.[37] His hunch was confirmed and he set out to decipher the messages.

Yardley described in great detail how he deciphered the messages.[38] It turned out that the Germans were using a dictionary code,[39] and after searching through many dictionaries, Yardley discovered the correct one. He could now read the two mysterious German messages.

Message No. 42 "D" offered Mexico a bribe of 10 million Spanish pesetas to remain neutral.[40] Message No. 1 "G" spoke of "machinery plans for rifle

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manufactory (sic)"[41] to be built in Mexico for shipment to Germany. This sparked great concern about Mexican war aims.

It was common knowledge that German spies operated in Mexico, and this included the most dangerous of all, Lothar Witzke. Witzke, who went by the alias Pablo Waberski, was suspected by the British of "being responsible for the Black Tom explosion in New York Harbor in July, 1916."[42] It has been said that "perhaps the most important of the MI-8 (cryptographic) solutions was the one that largely resulted in the conviction of the only German spy condemned to death in the United States during World War I."[43]

US agents captured Witzke in January 1918 in the Central Hotel in Nogales, Mexico. Van Deman received a cipher text that was on Witzke's person and turned it over for solution to Yardley. Van Deman knew that the man calling himself Pablo Waberski was in fact Witzke, but needed evidence if Witzke was to be held. It was thus imperative that the solution to the text be found, and soon. Yardley in his description of the decipherment, seemed to view this as a personal challenge—it was MI-8 against the German cryptographers. MI-8 won. While Yardley takes credit for the solution,[44] other sources dispute this claim and give the credit to Manly and Edith Rickert.[45] Regardless, the solution of the ciphertext condemned Witzke. The message read:

> To The Imperial Consular Authorities in the Republic of Mexico.
>
> Strictly Secret!
>
> The bearer of this is a subject of the Empire who travels as a Russian under the name of Pablo Waberski. He is a German secret agent.
>
> Please furnish him on request protection and assistance, also advance him on demand up to one thousand pesos of Mexican gold and send his code telegrams to this embassy as official consular dispatches.[46]
>
> Von Eckardt

Van Deman was elated at the solution. He told Yardley, "If for no other reason, the decipherment of this document justifies your bureau."[47] Witzke was tried in August 1918 and found guilty. He was sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted to life in prison by Wilson. He was released in late November 1923 in conjunction with a worldwide release of prisoners of war.[48]

A European Tour

In July of 1918, Yardley "was close to a breakdown and asked to be relieved."[49] Captain Manly was given Yardley's position, and Yardley was sent to Europe to visit the British and French cryptographers. Yardley first traveled to London, arriving there in late August 1918.

Upon his arrival, Yardley met Colonel Tolbert, US Military Attache to Copenhagen. The two talked about the security of US codes, and Tolbert told

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of "repeated attempts of the British to plant secret agents in his office."[50] Later, when Yardley went to the US Embassy to observe the security measures there, a British gentleman led him to the safe, opened it, and handed Yardley the codebook that MI-8 had sent over! Yardley was incensed, and wrote:

> . . . I reasoned that as long as we granted British subjects access to our secret means of communication, even in one office, nothing but stupidity could prevent them from reading every message sent and received by our military attaches throughout the world. Sooner or later peace would be declared. There would be a squabble among the powers for the spoils of the war. We would be helpless in our negotiations with our communications compromised.[51]

Upon Yardley's report, in every US embassy in the world Americans replaced foreigners in such positions of security.

Even more infuriating for Yardley was the difficult time he had with the British. The British were, initially, not very cooperative in sharing information, for Colonel French of the British War Office had been warned of Yardley's visit and ordered "every obstacle"[52] placed in Yardley's path. This was to change with the help of Captain Brooke-Hunt of the British War Office. Brooke-Hunt gave Yardley a copy of a cipher that the British were to use on the western front to carry top secret military information. Yardley was to attempt to break it. Yardley thought that if he could break this cipher, he would be accepted by the British and they would help him. He worked for several days and finally solved the cipher. Now, he said, "I could have anything I wanted."[53]

Yardley spent the rest of his time in the British Military Cipher Bureau, learning British methods for solving codes and ciphers. In addition, Yardley was able to get a copy of the German Naval Code that had "been photographed from the original by an English spy within the German Admiralty."[54] He learned quite a bit from the British. Most important, Yardley learned that the British cipher bureaus ". . . had a long and dark history, backed by a ruthless and intelligent espionage."[55] This was the reason Great Britain was a world power, he thought. He became convinced that at the end of the war, MI-8 must not die.

His experience in France was less fruitful. Yardley had looked forward to meeting Captain Georges Painvin, "the greatest cipher genius in France" and "the most skillful cryptographer in all the Allied Governments."[56] The two did meet, and Yardley learned much from Painvin. But, when Yardley asked to "study in the department that deciphered diplomatic codes,"[57] he was given the runaround. While it was true that few people knew of the French La Chambre Noire (Black Chamber), he was kept from it deliberately. Yardley said he was kept out on the grounds that any information he learned "would materially assist (the United States) in breaking the French diplomatic codes."[58] In spite of this, his ". . . failure impressed upon American officials the absolute necessity for an American Black Chamber even in peace times, if the United States hoped to thwart the machinations of other governments."[59]

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Yardley (left) and Painvin in New York. Date unknown. Painvin died in Paris in 1980 at age 94.

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To finish his trip to Europe, Yardley went to the peace negotiations at Versailles. His task was to report to General Bliss and "organize code and cipher communications between the Peace Conference and the Military Intelligence Division at Washington."[60] Yardley, with Lieutenant J. Rives Childs and Lieutenant Frederik Livesey as assistants, took two rooms at 4 Place de la Concorde, the general offices of the conference. Yardley set up a rotation so that only one man would be on duty at any one time, freeing the other two to spend their time "at the international cocktail parties and dancings that were then the rage of Paris."[61]

In addition to the parties, Yardley did engage in some serious work. ". . . Paris swarmed with Allied and Entente spies,"[62] he said. He reported uncovering two plots directed against the United States. The first involved a woman who had been involved with one of the United States Peace Commissioners. She was supposedly in the hire of the British for 25,000 pounds sterling until the end of the conference. Her duty was to embarrass the US Commissioner if the proceedings did not go as Great Britain wanted.[63]

The second plot was discovered in a deciphered telegram that described an "Entente plot to assassinate President Wilson either by administering a slow poison or by giving him the influenza in ice."[64] While the validity of this cannot be known, Yardley pointed out that Wilson's illness, which became a lingering death, began while he was in Paris.

While the security between the Conference and Washington was good, the security between the Conference and the field agents in Europe was terrible. "The American Commission to Negotiate Peace furnished its field agents . . . with a publicly available commercial code. . . !"[65]

Origin of the Black Chamber

Upon return from Europe, Yardley found MI-8 in a state of disarray. There was no longer money available to keep the bureau operating. Yardley set out to convince officials ". . . that if the United States was to be placed on an equal footing (with the European powers) it would be necessary to finance a group of skilled cryptographers."[66]

The current director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, was of the same mind. He thought that regardless of cost, at least Subsection V, Code and Cipher Solution, had to be saved. Churchill asked Yardley for an estimate of the cost of maintaining such a bureau. Yardley told him he would need $100,000 per year. This was more than the War Department had in hidden funds, so in conjunction with the State Department (acting Secretary of State Frank L. Polk agreed with Yardley and Churchill), Yardley was given permission to set up the bureau that came to be known as the American Black Chamber. Military Intelligence would pay $60,000 and State would pay the remaining $40,000. There was one catch. No State Department money could be spent in Washington, so Yardley moved his bureau to New York.

Yardley settled at 141 East 37th Street, and on 15 July 1919, State Department funds began to arrive.[67] He gathered a group of very talented

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people, twenty in all. This group included Dr. Charles Mendelsohn, who taught history at the City College in the morning and worked for Yardley in the afternoon; Victor Weiskopf, who had been with Yardley at MI-8 and worked on the side for $200 per month; Livesey, Yardley's assistant from Paris and a Harvard graduate, for $3,000 per year; and two Japanese cipher experts, Ruth Willson and Edna Ramsaier. Ramsaier was to become Yardley's second wife.[68] Military Intelligence received a new director at this time, a General Dennis E. Nolan. And in July of 1919, Nolan gave Yardley an assignment: solve the Japanese diplomatic code.[69]

Yardley was confident, and promised a solution or his resignation within a year. He would later regret the pressure this put upon himself. But the solution was essential. There was considerable anti-Japanese sentiment in both the United States and Europe. US officials deemed it necessary to break the Japanese code in order to better understand what the Japanese were up to.

Yardley goes into great detail about the cracking of the Japanese cipher. It was so difficult that at one point Yardley suggested that a US agent be sent into a Japanese diplomatic office in some foreign country to steal the code.[70] The difficulty of the code was due in part to the complexities of the language, but also in part due to the fact that the Japanese had hired a Polish cipher expert, Captain Kowalefsky, to help develop secure codes and ciphers.[71] Finally, after months of work, Yardley broke the code. This was not the end of the problem.

Having broken the code, Yardley needed someone to translate the Japanese diplomatic telegrams. The only people who knew Japanese well enough were missionaries who would not involve themselves with the government for fear of being refused entry into Japan or Korea. Japan at the time was also suspicious of the United States. Finally, Yardley managed to hire a 60-year-old retired missionary. He proved to be good.

Yardley reported that in February 1920, "I sent to Washington the first translations of the Japanese decipherments."[72] General Churchill, still involved with Army intelligence, said this was the greatest "accomplishment in the history of code and cipher work in the United States."[73] Then came another problem to solve.

On 12 June 1920, the missionary decoded a Japanese message describing Japanese Army plans in the Far East. The last line of the message read: "A partial leakage to foreign governments about these proceedings might produce complications for the whole plan. . . ."[74] Finally realizing the nature of his work, the missionary asked to resign on moral grounds. As luck would have it, Manly had mastered Japanese by this time (after only six months of training) and he took over the responsibility of translation.

Early in 1921, there were hints in Japanese messages and in US government circles of an upcoming armaments conference. The first obvious hint from the Japanese came on 5 July 1921, in a telegram from the Japanese Ambassador in London to Tokyo. On 10 July the Japanese Ambassador in Washington telegraphed home that the US Secretary of State would participate. The Japanese were hesitant. A telegram dated 13 July, from Tokyo to Washington, stated that "the Japanese Government . . . considers it appropriate that the discussion be limited to the limitation of armaments. . . ."[75]

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Sensing the gravity of the upcoming talks, the Japanese introduced a new code on that same day.

Yardley had great difficulty in breaking this new code. It was given the name "Jp."[76] The difficulty in this code was that the code word was of two lengths, not the usual one. After breaking Jp, the Black Chamber went into full gear.

In the few months preceding the Washington Arms Conference of November, 1921, "daily courier service was set up between the Black Chamber and the State Department."[77] The courier was a young Foreign Service officer named Tracy Lay. Lay would take the "locked diplomatic pouch"[78] every day from New York to John McMurray, Chief of the State Department's Far East Division.[79]

By reading the messages of the Japanese, the United States was able to learn the true feelings of the Japanese and, surprisingly, also the British. In a telegram from London to Tokyo, the Japanese Ambassador noted that ". . . although the British have indulged in more or less sarcasm about the American proposal, they have not opposed it."[80] More important, the US delegation knew that Japan would most likely give in to US pressure and accept the American proposal of a 10:10:6 balance in capital ships for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, respectively. Thus, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes would not budge.

The conference opened on 11 November. Everyone headed for Washington, including "spies from the four corners of the globe."[81] On 28 November, the Black Chamber deciphered what Yardley considered "the most important and far reaching telegram that ever passed through its doors."[82] This telegram contained the first official hint of weakening by the Japanese. The telegram instructed the Japanese delegate, Kato, to push for a 10:7 ratio with America, but to accept a 10:6 ratio. Finally, after the United States had stonewalled for days, on 10 December Tokyo ordered Kato to accept the 10:6 ratio. This was a victory for the United States, but also for the Black Chamber, for during the course of the Conference the members of Yardley's team had deciphered over 5,000 messages.[83]

The United States Government was very pleased with Yardley's work. In June of 1922, General Stuart Heintzelman, the new director of Military Intelligence, notified Yardley that he would be receiving the Distinguished Service Medal for his work during the Conference.[84] Yardley wrote his own citation, but was not allowed to mention the real reason he was getting the award.

It was about this time that things began to go sour for the Black Chamber. Yardley's appropriations were "severely cut"[85] in 1924 and his staff was halved. There was less and less work for the Black Chamber to do. Yardley himself describes no work of any importance in international affairs that the Black Chamber undertook after the Washington Conference. Yardley at one point began preliminary work on the cipher of the Vatican, but this offended one of his Catholic superiors and Yardley was forced to abandon the project. He also worked on solving the ciphers of Peru during a dispute between Peru and Chile.

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It was during his work on the Peruvian cipher that he met with State Department officials to discuss the safety of US codes. Yardley was asked to write a memorandum describing how to solve the codes. Yardley was growing cynical by this time, and said that such an expose of the inadequacy of current codes would disturb the entire department. He said the "basic method of communication is the same as when I (Yardley) was a youngster in the Code Room."[86] He also said that US "codes . . . belonged to the sixteenth century."[87] After more discussion he finally said that the State Department was too inert to change its ways.[88]

Enter Henry L. Stimson

In 1928 there was rumor of an arms conference to be held in 1929. Yardley wanted to prepare for this as he had done in 1921 prior to the Washington Conference. At this time, there was a new Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, and Yardley thought it appropriate to show him what the Black Chamber could do. (Stimson was not yet aware of the Black Chamber's existence. The usual practice was to allow a Secretary to get the feel of the office before informing him of the Black Chamber.) Informing Stimson would prove to be the undoing of the Black Chamber.

Stimson was shocked when he found out about the Black Chamber and its activities. "He took the position that we should not supervise the telegrams of foreign governments,"[89] Yardley said. Stimson himself said that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail."[90] The very next day Yardley received the official notice to close down the Black Chamber.

When, on 31 October 1929, the Black Chamber closed its doors, the total cost of operations during its lifetime came to $230,404 for the State Department and $98,808.49 for the War Department.[91] This was "just under a third of a million dollars for a decade of cryptanalysis."[92] Neither the National Archives nor the State Department seems to have any records of the Black Chamber or its dissolution.[93] It is also interesting that in the conference on disarmament, which was held in London in 1929, the United States lost its positions and the Japanese won theirs.

Yardley, out of work now, went home to Worthington. Hurt by the depression, he toyed with the idea of writing about the Black Chamber. He began to write in the spring of 1931. First, he wrote three articles for the *Saturday Evening Post* in which he laid the foundation for his book, *American Black Chamber*.[94] Then, on 1 June 1931, Bobbs-Merrill Publishing Company, which had earlier advanced him one thousand dollars on just an outline, published his book. It was an immediate hit. Critic W.A. Roberts, writing for *Booklist*, summed up the tone of the time:

> I think it is the most sensational contribution to the secret history of the war which has yet been written by an American. Its deliberate indiscretions exceed any to be found in the recent memoirs of European secret agents.[95]

The government took a different attitude. In general, "officials said they were sure there had been no such practice."[96] State Department officials tried

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to discredit Yardley with "diplomatic double-talk,"[97] while War Department officials "lied straightforwardly,"[98] denying outright that there had ever been such an organization. Secretary Stimson, who disbanded the operation, was reported to have said "that he had never heard of any such organization."[99] And to Yardley's claim that the United States read dispatches of the Japanese during the Washington Conference, ". . . officials of the (State) department were inclined to be indignant. . . . Nothing of the sort happened, they said, and denied that any such practice had ever been sanctioned."[100]

While a hit in the United States, selling 17,931 copies, *American Black Chamber* was a bigger hit in Japan, selling 33,119 copies.[101] But the reaction there was almost entirely negative. Tokyo's major daily, Nichi Nichi, said that this would serve as a lesson to Japan in future international conferences.[102] The paper tried to discredit Yardley by painting him as a traitor who had sold Japan translations of Black Chamber decipherments of Japanese correspondence.[103] One recent author even goes so far as to pin the fall of Japan's moderate government in 1931 to Yardley's expose, thereby permitting the hardliners to step into power, setting Japan "on the road to Pearl Harbor."[104] One Japanese newspaper, the *Japan Times*, did say that espionage was just part of the international game, and that the Americans had done nothing wrong.

Seizure of a Manuscript

Soon after the publication of *American Black Chamber*, word spread that Yardley had began to work on a second book, entitled *Japanese Diplomatic Secrets*. When Stanley Hornbeck, Far Eastern expert in the State Department, learned of the impending publication of the book, he feared that another book like *American Black Chamber* would further fuel the growing Japanese dislike of America. He urged that "every possible effort should be made to prevent the appearance of this book." (Quoted from Kahn, David, "A New Source for Historians: Yardley's Seized Manuscript," *Cryptologia*, April 1982, p. 115.) After the exchange of several memorandums between Washington and New York, Assistant US Attorney Thomas E. Dewey arranged for the seizure of the manuscript from Macmillan Company, Yardley's new publisher. Thus, on 20 February 1933, federal marshals seized the manuscript.[105] There was no criminal prosecution.

To prevent any further embarrassment, the government "sought to pass a law in Congress aimed straight at Yardley."[106] The law made it illegal for any US agent to pass on secret information to which he had access while working for the government. Public Law 37, Section 952 of Title 18, United States Code, became known as the "Yardley Law of 1933."[107]

The story does not end there. Historians studying Japanese-American relations of the 1920's and 1930's and the Washington Disarmament Conference sought the manuscript, which had apparently disappeared. No information was found at the Department of State, and nothing was found in the papers of Charles Evans Hughes, the Secretary of State at the time of the conference. It was David Kahn, author of *The Codebreakers*, who located the Yardley manuscript at the Department of Justice. But the author of the manuscript was a woman named Marie Stuart Klooz, not Yardley.

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Yardley believed, according to Klooz, that because he lacked university schooling, he would be unable to "place this story in its proper historical context," Kahn reported. Kahn describes the manuscript as informative but dry, lacking the excitement of *American Black Chamber*. Miss Klooz may have been an historian, but she was not a captivating author. The manuscript contains 920 typewritten pages in 19 chapters divided into seven parts. The text is filled with solved Japanese messages, but none bears any dates or information on which code was employed. The text is, as Kahn describes it, "little more than connective between the intercepts." Kahn concluded that the text adds nothing important to the history of cryptology and that it is not worthy of publication.

Effectively barred from writing any more about his work in the government, Yardley began to move around. He was hired by Northwestern University to "fight crime by cracking gangsters' codes."[108] He found this work very easy. He also wrote some fiction, but it lacked the spirit that his previous work contained.

Yardley was then hired by Chiang Kai-shek to help in his war against Japan by deciphering Japanese messages. In 1939, a young American in China named Theodore H. White came to be good friends with Yardley. White described Yardley as ". . . the most amusing of the American advisory corps . . . who purported to be a merchant of leather and hides."[109] Yardley was forever into cloak-and-dagger.

Upon his return to America, Yardley wrote a final book, on playing poker. This rather elementary analysis of the game was well received. When he died of a stroke in 1958 at the age of 69, the *New York Times* obituary ran under the headline: "Herbert Yardley, Cryptographer, Dies; Broke Japan's Diplomatic Code in 1921."[110] It described his life briefly, and mentioned that he was opening a restaurant in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor. The final line: "It was the opinion of some political columnists that had he still been in the code bureau the attack might never have occurred."[111]

To the end, Yardley had maintained that his goal in publishing *American Black Chamber* was to shock the United States into improving its code capabilities. He was not alone in his assessment. A 1937 author wrote:

> The weakness of the United States both then (1914-1917) and now (1937) is that there was, and still is, no American counterespionage service. . . . Foreign spies can operate here in comparative safety.[112]
>
> For an annual expenditure of less than one percent of what we lost from German sabotage during the neutrality period we could maintain a secret service and counterespionage organization the par of any in the world. This indeed seems a low rate of insurance to pay for rendering the country safe from military surprise and from the ravages of subversive agents. . . .[113]

It would take another world war to bring into existence what Yardley had seen as necessary all along.

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1. David Kahn, *The Codebreakers, the Story of Secret Writing* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 351.

2. Ladislas Farago, *The Broken Seal* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 14. It should be noted that several authors, notably Kahn, expressed doubt about the accuracy of Farago's information. Much of the information cited here from Farago was found only in his book. I make no judgment on his accuracy.

3. Herbert O. Yardley, *American Black Chamber* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1931), p. 18. Henceforth this text will be referred to simply as "Yardley." Also, references in the text to something Yardley said refer to this book.

4. Captain Henry Landau, *The Enemy Within* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1937), p. 113. Landau, in the British Secret Service during World War I, assisted United States claimants in their investigation of the Black Tom and Krugsland sabotage cases.

5. Ibid. Dansey was reported to have arrived with ". . . large funds and carte blanche in selecting an extensive personnel."

6. Yardley, p. 20.

7. Yardley, p. 21.

8. Ibid., p. 22. This was not the only amazing practice Yardley was aware of. Yardley mentions that Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan would at times stop in a telegraph office and simply send a message to an ambassador. Yardley would find a follow-up message reading, "Just received uncoded undated telegram signed Bryan. Advise if authentic." From Yardley, p. 25.

9. Ibid., p. 22.

10. No dates were mentioned by Yardley as to when this work took place. It is likely that it was from late 1914 to late 1916.

11. Yardley, p. 27.

12. Ibid., p. 32.

13. Cryptanalysis involves the breaking of codes and ciphers, while cryptology per se involves the compilation of codes and ciphers. Cryptology is used as a generic term to mean either.

14. Yardley, p. 39. As an example, one deciphered telegram (solved by a student) contained "the disposition of troops along the St. Mihiel salient, the number and names of our divisions, and finally, the actual hour at which the great American offensive would be launched." When this offensive was launched on 12 September 1918, the enemy had already begun to retreat. From page 44.

15. George Creel was the subject of considerable controversy during 1918. He stated that "to have been prepared for war would have been a contradiction of all our ideals of government in this country." While he meant only that a standing army was incompatible with democracy, his words were thought seditious and the Congress passed an act to punish just such "seditious acts and utterances." From the *Congressional Record* LVI (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918), p. 4841, 4824.

16. Farago, *Broken Seal*, p. 16.

17. Again, Yardley mentions no date in conjunction with Tismer's capture. It was probably in early 1918.

18. Yardley did not mention the missionary's name and mention of this man was not found in any other source.

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19. Yardley, p. 55.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 59.
22. Ibid., p. 60.
23. Ibid., p. 61.
24. Ibid., p. 64.
25. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 353. Yardley also had to beat the censor. The United States Government used cloak addresses to elude enemy interception. As an example, on 29 June 1918, the Censorship Board was notified that the following was a cover address used by Military Intelligence agents for contacting Yardley:

    Mr. C. E. Whitehead
    1323 Vermont Avenue
    Washington, D.C.

    All mail addressed to this location was to be rerouted to Yardley at Military Intelligence. From James R. Mock, *Censorship 1917* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), pp. 115-116.
26. Yardley, p. 75.
27. Ibid., p. 78.
28. Ibid., p. 82.
29. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 353.
30. Yardley, p. 87.
31. Ibid., p. 117.
32. Ibid., p. 107.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., p. 109.
35. Again, Yardley failed to mention a date. Most likely this took place during the middle of 1918.
36. Yardley, p. 123.
37. Ibid., p. 125. Yardley describes the process by which the location of the Mexican transmitter was found. They simply measured the strength of the radio waves from several different locations and, using geometry, found the station to be at Chapultepec.
38. See Yardley, pages 125-134, for an excellent description of the decipherment process.
39. In a dictionary code, or any other book code, a number represented a word on a particular page. For example, the number 123-45-6 could represent word 6 in line 45 on page 123. These codes are inherently difficult to solve due to the vast numbers of books available from which to choose the code.
40. Yardley, p. 138.
41. Ibid., p. 139.
42. Ibid., p. 153.
43. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, pp. 353-354.
44. Yardley, p. 169.
45. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 354.
46. Yardley, p. 169.

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47. Ibid., p. 170.

48. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 354. An article in the *New York Times* of 21 November 1923 reported that Witzke had been a model prisoner, and "through an act of unusual heroism he saved the lives of several prisoners when a boiler in the prison power plant exploded."

49. Yardley, p. 207.

50. Ibid., p. 211.

51. Ibid., p. 214. The reader should remember this statement during the discussion of the Washington Conference of 1921 and during the discussion of the final days of the Black Chamber, including the London Conference of 1929.

52. Ibid., p. 211.

53. Ibid., p. 216.

54. Ibid., p. 218. Yardley mentions that the British thought this the ultimate of gifts to the Americans.

55. Ibid., p. 219.

56. Ibid., p. 223. Painvin became most famous when he cracked the most difficult German code of the war, called the "ADFGVX" code because these were the only letters appearing in the text. These letters were chosen because their International Morse symbols were quite distinct, therefore hard to garble. These symbols were:

A ·- D -··· F ··-· G —· V ···- X -··-

The necessity to crack this code became paramount when the Germans used it to shroud their massive 6,000-gun assault on the Allied front on 21 March 1918. In a week, 62 German divisions had pushed 38 miles into Allied lines. From Kahn, *Codebreakers*, pp. 340-341.

57. Yardley, p. 225.

58. Ibid., p. 228.

59. Ibid., p. 230.

60. Ibid., p. 232.

61. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 355.

62. Yardley, p. 235.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 237.

65. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 490.

66. Yardley, p. 239.

67. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 355.

68. Ibid., pp. 355-356.

69. While this was Yardley's first official assignment, he had done some decipherment of Soviet codes. He said: "I have always regretted that I was not employed by a government, such as the Soviet Government, that understood and practiced espionage in the same ruthless and intelligent manner." From Yardley, p. 247. In addition, after describing a document with instructions for Soviet agents to follow in hiring spies, and after mentioning that he had seen documents containing "instructions for the massacre of foreign nationals," he put a footnote immediately at the end of the text. It read:

> *Soviet agents, please note.* Yes, I once had copies of these documents, but I don't care to have my throat cut and do not plan to publish them. In fact they have been destroyed. So be reasonable.

From Yardley, pp. 248-249, italics in original. He had quite a flair for the outrageous.

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70. Yardley, p. 264. His request was not followed up.

71. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 357.

72. Yardley, p. 277. Farago, however, lists the date of first translation as 12 January 1920. From Farago, Broken Seal, p. 22.

73. Yardley, p. 277.

74. Ibid., p. 278.

75. Ibid., pp. 288-289.

76. Ibid., p. 290. The name "Jp" broke down as follows: "J" was for Japan; "p", the sixteenth letter of the alphabet, was for the sixteenth code broken.

77. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 358. The quote continued: "An official grinningly remarked that State's upper echelons were delighted with the cryptanalysts' work and read the solutions every morning with their orange juice and coffee."

78. Farago, *Broken Seal*, p. 26.

79. Ibid., p. 27. As mentioned earlier, Farago's accuracy in terms of this kind of detail may be suspect.

80. Yardley, p. 301.

81. Ibid., p. 306.

82. Ibid., p. 312.

83. Ibid., p. 318.

84. Ibid., p. 321. Farago evidently does not believe Yardley, for he lists this day of notification as 7 January 1923. From Farago, *Broken Seal*, p. 32.

85. Yardley, p. 359.

86. Ibid., p. 362.

87. Ibid.

88. The State Department if often the target of such criticism.

89. Yardley, p. 370.

90. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 360.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid., p. 1039. From a footnote to p. 359 of the text.

94. The three articles he wrote in the spring of 1931 were entitled "Secret Inks," from 4 April; "Codes," from 18 April; and "Ciphers," from 9 May. These contained, almost word for word, the material he would use in *American Black Chamber*. He wrote one more article in 1931 entitled "Cryptograms and Their Solution," printed in the 21 November *Post*. This was after *American Black Chamber* was published. The Post editors considered his name well-known enough to put it on the cover of the magazine.

95. Quoted from Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 361.

96. *New York Times*, 2 June 1931, p. 18.

97. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 361.

98. Ibid.

99. *New York Times*, 2 June 1931, p. 18.

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100. Ibid.

101. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 363.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid. Kahn says flatly that the charge is false. Farago says that "the Japanese knew all about Yardley's activities because none other than Herbert O. Yardley had sold its (the Black Chamber) secrets to them." From Farago, *Broken Seal*, p. 56. But in a review of Farago's book in David Shulman, *An Annotated Bibliography of Cryptography* (New York; Garland, 1976), the author writes on p. 141:

> The author (Farago) asserts that H. O. Yardley was a traitor who sold out to the Japanese. He cites Japanese documents to prove his claim, which on actual examination state nothing of the kind. . . . This book must be regarded, therefore, with great skepticism.

104. Farago, *Broken Seal*, p. 72. This interpretation must be taken with a grain of salt.

105. Kahn, *Codebreakers*, p. 364.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid., p. 687. The law is Public Law 37, Section 952 of Title 18, United States Code.

108. Farago, *Broken Seal*, p. 69.

109. Theodore H. White, *In Search of History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 75. White goes on to describe Yardley's enthusiasm for "drink, gambling and women." Yardley also felt it his obligation to introduce the young White to the joys of sex, and tried to pursuade him "to sample that experience by inviting some of the choicest ladies he knew to a banquet in his house."

110. *The New York Times*, 8 August 1958, p. 17.

111. Ibid.

112. Landau, *Enemy Within*, p. 300.

113. Ibid., p. 303.

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"There has been an explosion at the Embassy . . ."

BEIRUT DIARY

(b)(3)(c)

This is not, repeat not, a trip report. For whatever they may be worth, these are the blurred and confused impressions that remain after one of the most turbulent weeks I shall ever spend, the week that began Monday, 18 April 1983. I have tried to be accurate. Although I know the events I have recounted here did take place, it is hard to fix a time or a day for them now, as I sit in a safe place on my way home, writing it down.

I had arrived in Lebanon on TDY Monday, 11 April, in connection with my work as an economic analyst. On Sunday, 17 April, my office director, Bob Ames, unexpectedly flew into Beirut. He and I were invited to attend a small dinner that evening at Two other officers and their wives were also invited. I was delighted to see Bob, who had not been in Beirut since 1978, and he was exhilarated to be back in town. I mentioned to Bob that thus far I had met mainly He assured me he would get me a different view of Lebanon.

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

Monday

Bob calls me early this morning to invite me to supper with friend of his. We agree to meet at the Mayflower at 1930.

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

economics officer Hunt Janin—has arranged for us to drive to Sidon for the day with a visiting American friend. Janin doesn't mention to me that he would rather not go, since a minor but chronic heart condition of his is acting up.

As we drive down to Sidon, I look at Damur and the many other destroyed villages on the way, thinking how, superficially, they resemble tumble-down buildings in many third world countries.

At 1500, as we are finishing an elaborate lunch, our hostess tells us there has been an explosion at the Embassy. She has known for an hour and a half, but hadn't wanted to ruin our lunch. She speaks in an unconcerned way, and when I accuse her of joking, another guest steps in to remind me that this happens to the Lebanese "all the time—we are used to it." With sick feelings in our stomachs we pile into the car and search for radio stations with news—the stations are being rather blase about it. As we drive back, I look at the ruined towns around me with a fresh eye. Now they are grisly.

Once in Beirut, we stop at Janin's flat to pick up his radio. Looking from the balcony, we see no smoke, nothing unusual in the direction of the

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Embassy, which gives us hope. Hunt sends in a radio message to all stations, listing us as safe and sound. Then we begin our ten-minute walk to the Embassy. The Corniche is cordoned off and a series of Marine and Lebanese Armed Forces checkpoints set up. Our local employee and visitor are turned back at the first checkpoint. We wish them Godspeed and trudge on with mounting agony to the Embassy—less than half a mile away.

A hundred yards from the Embassy, we catch sight of the new political/military officer Ellson, who had been in the Embassy at the time of the blast. He shakes his head and says he doesn't know but that many people have died. I hope to God that Bob Ames had been outside at meetings. We walk on.

You have all seen pictures of the Embassy. By this time (1600) bulldozers and clearing machines are already at work. I catch the deputy chief of mission, Bob Pugh, and ask if any special instructions have been issued for (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) hoping to be told that Ames was directing our efforts from near by. Pugh shakes his head and repeats Ellson's news. There is a meeting at the Pughs' flat in the two-building Durraford Complex—two hundred yards away—at 1800.

I remember very little here. I go to our hotel, look for a message from Bob, leave one for him, should he return.

At the meeting, I see the walking wounded, and search for faces I know. Thank God, I see many of them. The atmosphere is calm, tightly controlled. We are all looking to Bob Pugh, who has taken command efficiently. A 24-hour open line to the Department has been set up at the Draper Mission's flat in the "new" building in the Durraford complex.

At 1900 Janin and I walk back to the Embassy. Yellow bulldozers are starting to clear the huge pile of rubble at the base of the Embassy. The front left half of the Embassy's center section no longer exists. The reinforced concrete floors have fallen away, hanging on only by their right-side anchors.

Marines, construction workers, security officers, and Embassy staff are milling around under the spotlights looking agonized, but controlled.

It occurs to me that Bob may be in the hospital, and I drag Janin off to American University Hospital. The emergency room is crowded with wounded people, anxious relatives. The staff is doing an excellent job of controlling the madness and getting people seen to.

An orderly holds up a list of admitted wounded. We scan it, see one name we know, but not Bob's. We then go through the pile of individual admit slips. Nothing. I ask nurses. Nothing. In my heart, I know already.

At the emergency room, I see two friends who are hurt but will be all right—an AID and a Commerce man. I promise to make phone calls home for them.

At 2100 we return to the Embassy. Nothing has changed except that tear gas canisters stored in the Embassy are leaking. I approach the rubble to start searching only to drop back when I get a mouthful of gas.

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Bob Pugh points out a body pinned between two floors. We stand just outside the floodlights amidst the wrecked cars and ambulances and I fix my eyes on the body trying to see around it, to look for Bob Ames.

It gets slowly colder as the hours wear on, and we continue to wait, staring hungrily first at the body suspended above, then at the heap of rubble below.

I find a friend, who has heroically and steadily directed clearing and rescue efforts, standing hunched and alone in an empty space under the floodlights. We cry a little and hold on to each other.

I return to the edge of the darkness, chatting anxiously with Pugh, Marines, and various staff.

Thank God for the Marines and their commanders—all excellent men. One wraps me up in a big blanket, for which I am grateful. Another says the men have brought coffee and a little food, which I fetch for the others. I can't bear to go too far away, for fear Bob's body will be found while I am gone.

Tuesday

At 0130 I settle down to sit on the low wall in front of the Embassy. No bodies or wounded have been pulled out since at least 1800 Monday. When will it begin? Surely they must be brought out soon.

A friend and I walk to his flat to get me a jacket, and while there he gets a phone call from the Tunisian maid of one of the [ ] couples—neither she nor waiting [ ] wives have any word. They are not at the "site"—but it is clear to me that their loved ones must be dead. It was the first day at work in the [ ] for one wife.

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

Janin and I break to call the Department from the Draper flat with messages for our families and my wounded friends' families. (b)(3)(c) answers the phone—a familiar voice helps make the scene more real. Marines are everywhere in the Durraford complex, to protect Pugh, the staffers, and the Draper Mission.

We return, shivering, to our spot at the perimeter to wait.

Suddenly, at 0230, there is a commotion at the rubble heap. People cluster around one spot. A body has been found. My heart skips and I know. Christine Crocker waves me over, and asks me to identify the body. Janin and one other are holding tight on to my arms. I look briefly. Yes. I am handed his passport and wallet.

The only thing that seems to matter is that Bob not be left without the presence of someone who knows him. An Embassy officer reminds me that I must retrieve all his papers.

My demands to ride with the ambulance to the morgue are deflected and I follow the ambulance with Janin in his auto.

As we arrive at the morgue at 0330 the Civil Defense Forces try to keep me out, waving Janin in instead. They tell me it is too grisly for a woman. I ignore them, climb over the railing, and go in. Curiously, the presence of five

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other bodies on the floor doesn't affect me at all. I retrieve Bob's wedding ring, pray for his soul, and tell him goodbye. I wonder why I do not cry.

At 0400 Janin and I return to the Mayflower Hotel. Many Americans had stayed there, and the hotel staff is shocked into numbness. I tell them what I know of the dead and the living and go upstairs to Bob's room to pack his clothes. I refuse to stay alone in my own hotel room for fear of having a quiet moment to think and ensconce myself instead in Janin's flat.

At 0500 I return to the Draper Mission flat to use the 24-hour line to report positive ID. The compound is swarming with Marines. To say that their presence is reassuring is an understatement. We all are concentrating very hard on whatever task we have at hand—in order to avoid the quicksand of our emotions.

After a few hours' rest, Janin's heart condition forces him into the hospital. An Embassy officer asks me to visit two wives who are still waiting for news of their husbands and get them to focus on the problems of the Tunisian maid who had worked for a [redacted] She speaks no English and is (b)(1) rumored to have broken down. It is a brilliant sunny day—too beautiful to be (b)(3)(n) so sad. We should all be waterskiing instead.

Traffic at 1100 in Beirut is utter madness. Arlette and I abandon my car and trudge halfway across West Beirut to get to the maid's flat. The sense of urgency I feel about reaching the maid is reinforced by fear that snipers are looking for us. We seem to be safe for the moment from another car bomb since traffic has not budged in ten minutes.

We get the maid squared away, and sheltered in the flat of the DAO, Colonel Jock Craig.

It is 1500. The sense of how lucky I am is reinforced as I return to the "site" as it is now called. The Corniche is cordoned off for half a mile west of the Embassy, and I have never seen it so strangely, ominously empty. LAF and Marine checkpoints abound. I am grateful that in finding Bob so early, at least I am not still in the agony of waiting, as are so many others. Not a single body has been found since Bob's, more than 12 hours ago.

I drive off to hook up with an officer who is on secure voice to Washington. Hearing the Headquarters voices makes me realize how far away from home we are.

Back in Beirut, the "site" seems unreal. It is a heavily armed camp—hundreds of Marines standing guard, bulldozers everywhere, exhausted Red Cross people still working. Little can be heard above the din of the generators and moving equipment. Like so many others, I stand and look and wait. Still no more bodies.

I visit Janin in the hospital, only to be told on my return that bomb threats have been lodged against the hospital.

It is astonishing how far the words "Zafara Amerikya"—American Embassy—will get you in this town today. Into the hospital without a pass, through any checkpoints, whatever.

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What a release—I drive by myself to the airport at night to pick up newly arrived personnel. I find that Ellson and Assistant DAO Major Englehardt are concerned about me driving alone, and their car pulls up just as I emerge from mine. We have a few beers and relax in the lounge as we wait for the flight. It is good to see familiar faces. I drop off the TDY folks at the Mayflower. Ellson and I make supper and I drive him home, wondering whether I will make it back to the flat. After I do, the idea of remaining alone and unguarded petrifies me, so I go to stay at the DCM's residence at the Durraford, where several of us talk on into the night. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

Wednesday

Around 0300 we are told that the body of [redacted] has been found. Kind senior Embassy people are dispatched to see his wife.

Later in the morning more bodies are recovered. We get word that a large senior delegation is coming Thursday night to take the bodies home, and a great shudder runs through us all as we fear for their safety. I am no longer afraid of being sniped at or my flat bombed, except for lonely moments on a few empty streets. I go about my morning rounds of hospital and meetings at Pugh's residence. I know that the mission has had other telephoned bomb threats, i.e., "The next one will be bigger than the last," but I am fatalistically untroubled.

Until I am in the outside garage area of the Durraford Complex, still heavily guarded by Marines, when we hear three shots fired on the Corniche, northwest of the compound. All of a sudden I am rooted to the spot, not knowing whether to flee the compound as quickly as possible or make a last ditch stand where at least the Marines have weapons. The idea of staying any longer in Beirut seems shockingly arrogant and wasteful of human life. I hear some of the soldiers looking up at the surrounding buildings, muttering about possible sniper positions. I do not know whether they speak about "ours" or "theirs" and I am sick with fear. The Ambassador is meant to drive out of the complex in just a few minutes and no one knows what he will encounter on the Corniche. Nonetheless, he cannot give in and his cars speed away. I wonder how he can carry on in such danger.

I think of Janin with a heart condition in the hospital under threat of a bomb attack and wonder whether it is safer to pull him out or leave him in. Finally I stumble out of the compound into my car, having persuaded some nearby man to accompany me. Nothing in sight on the Corniche. Later we hear that one Lebanese checkpoint soldier has been shot. I suspect it was an accidental shooting by one of his comrades but I do not know.

At the evening meeting at the Pughs', we worry that the VIP plane will depart in too much of a rush, that there are more Americans' bodies yet to be found. Pugh agrees to recommend that the flight be postponed to Saturday.

I am told that I will accompany Bob's body, and while I am honored to do so, I shrink from the thoughts of my own loved ones, who will want to see and talk to me. I do not want to begin thinking and talking about my feelings.

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Thursday

In the morning I go to the American University Hospital, which is under heavy guard. No one is allowed to park near the building. Still, I see the thousands of visitors pouring in and out and think how easy it would be . . . I shout that I am from the American Embassy and no one even checks my bag.

One of my sadder jobs is to pack up a [redacted] room at the Mayflower. I see her picture—she is about my age. I tremble the whole time I am there, and cannot get out too quickly. Mayflower staff employees continue to ask me for information about their acquaintances. They are genuinely grieved, and in telling them I feel like an accomplice to the bombing. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

I go back to the site, and watch the hardhats cut away more floors from the center section. I find the young officer who had given me a long tour of our Military Assistance Unit the previous week. He is bitterly disillusioned, saying that he and his men had come out here John Wayne – style, believing that they could save Lebanon, only to find themselves being shot at by the Israelis and bombed by the Arabs. He is of the opinion that we should withdraw and let the people here fight it out among themselves. "They deserve each other." Last week he showed me the famous spot where Captain Johnson drew his revolver at an Israeli tank. He knows Johnson well and said he was a quiet, sober guy—not one who would have pulled a stunt like that without good reason.

Both the Pughs are gems. They hold us all together. Bob is softspoken and warm and very efficient. Bonnie keeps a smile up as her beautiful home is trampled through by hordes of soldiers and other strangers. She is a great comfort to everyone and is constantly serving meals to all comers. One Marine colonel comments to me how outstanding [redacted] have been throughout this crisis. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

I go out on the street to do some shopping. The rest of the city seems very normal. How can they live so routinely through this? It must twist them somehow.

I finally run out of things to do, and sit at the Pughs' staring into the distance, hoping that someone will give me a job so that I do not have to think. A Marine officer who spent several years fighting in Vietnam tells me kindly that he knows I need sleep and half-orders me to a back bedroom in the Pughs'. Thank the Lord for people who are so strong and gentle.

Evening. I am asked to go through the apartment of one of the station officers and look for a will. I drive out in the pitch black worrying that their apartment is being watched. I cling to my walkie-talkie, listening for any warning. I must abandon the car in the Beirut traffic and walk the last quarter mile. Fortunately the concierge accompanies me upstairs. I inform him and the neighbors and again feel like a criminal. I go through the apartment, trembling, hastily.

As long as I am near the hospital, I visit Janin. The young American who accompanied us to Sidon is in the room. He is gleefully telling us about his

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secret trip up to Tripoli in a hired car. He is even more ignorant than I about this country and for a brief moment I hate him for so stupidly endangering himself.

I trudge back into the Pughs' with a heavy armload of the papers I had collected and must appear to be right on the edge as my officer from Vietnam, who is leaving for dinner with friends, pulls me out the door and tells me I need to get out and enjoy myself. The four of us go to an Italian restaurant and quietly have a lot to drink. Later in the evening, this pillar of strength gives way and begins to cry very hard.

Friday

We are on edge as the delegation visit begins. The [redacted] will all be moved up to Yarze tonight for a private meeting with [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

I visit the hospital while the delegation is also there, and see lots of jeeps with Marines surrounding the place. They have been outstanding—unfailingly polite but determined to do their job and protect us. Janin will be released tomorrow.

We assemble at Yarze in the Ambassador's study. John says a few words and we all order drinks. The survivors are holding up remarkably well—in part thanks to one Embassy officer who has barely eaten or slept in four days, but continues to be a rock.

The widows and I are driven back down in an armored Surete car. I am the last to be dropped off and I note that the driver has an automatic tucked under his leg. Nonetheless, I slump down in the car to keep my head low. As we drive down the Corniche toward the Pughs', the first LAF checkpoint refuses to let my Surete driver through. Cursing the imbecility of the Lebanese, I walk along the silent moonlit Corniche imagining what a perfect target I present.

I have gotten used to the idea of departing tomorrow morning, and am suddenly told that it is off. I will not be on the plane.

Saturday

In the morning the Embassy Americans pile on two buses to go out to the departure ceremony. I am shocked to see what a small group we in fact are. It is a lumbering, big-bellied plane that seems to occupy the whole runway. The Marine, Navy, and Lebanese Armed Forces honor guard is in place—the Marine contingent commanded by my captain from the Military Assistance Unit. Again, it is brilliantly hot and sunny and I am thankful for an excuse to put on my sunglasses. We file past the press cattlewagons to stand at our appointed places. The click of shutters is all that can be heard. Soon the VIP delegation walks up and the slow, slow, cortege of hearses begins. One by one, a six-man contingent—four Marines and two Navy—walks each casket up into the belly of the plane. After the first two hearses leave—four caskets—there is an unbearably long, hot wait for another. Where are they? The strain begins to show on everyone but the honor guard. Finally the arrivals resume. It is

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impersonal—the caskets are draped with flags and we don't know whose they are. People begin to lose control only when the last casket emerges—it is carried by six Marines, so we know it is the extremely well liked young Marine who is being carried in.

The plane spews blasts of hot and cold air in our faces as it revs up interminably for departure. Some of us lag behind on the way back to the buses so that we can watch the plane disappear. I whisper my goodbyes. A man twice my age holds on to me and begins to cry. I am only numb.

I am told by my officer from Vietnam that it is impossible to understand how powerful the blast was unless you go into the building, stand near the spot where the car was parked, and look up and out. I go and the enormity of the bomb hits me for the first time. I look straight up and see nothing but a shaft of blue sky. The enormous upward force of the thing was overwhelming. I look down. I am standing on a pile of rubble. To one side there is a great hole that extends down at least 20 feet. I look out toward the sea and see with a new eye the burnt and crushed cars, the railing along the sidewalk that was blown into the sea, and the great hunks of reinforced concrete lying around me.

Meanwhile, concerns about a next attack are mounting. One of my Marine officer friends is changing his rental car every other day and inspecting it carefully each time before he gets in. Lebanese Armed Forces guards are posted at the major military hotels. Concertina wire blocks the streets. Somebody even decides to install speed bumps at the western end of the Corniche. It is a well-meant gesture but it irritates me—speed bumps are easier to cross at high speed than low.

Sunday

I drive up to Byblos and Jounieh with a friend—it is another perfect day and I want to do something reasonably normal. We sit on a wall overlooking a herd of goats and the sea and we start to regain our feelings of normalcy. My friend notes that the road is usually crowded at that time of the day, and wonders if the Lebanese know something we don't. Then we hear shots down below and the ominous, anxious cloud returns. On our drive back to Beirut, we stop for orange juice and see six or seven trucks carrying alternately Christian militia and Lebanese regulars, hurrying toward Beirut. Soldiers appear by the side of the road, are picked up by taxis, and speed off. We never find out what has happened.

Monday

Some relief from the car shortage is in sight. All but two of the motor pool cars were destroyed. A ship carrying three armored cars to Embassy Kinshasa stalled in the eastern Mediterranean after its owner went bankrupt and it was towed into Tripoli. I gather that clouds of piracy and theft hang over the ship, which is only a rusty hulk barely afloat, but someone in the Department had the bright idea that we should get these cars. So the ship is sent down to Beirut. Janin spends the day clambering in and out of the slimy hold, persuading Customs to give us the cars. I hope that lack of armor on other cars won't get anyone killed.

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Tuesday

Security at the Charles and Cadmos Hotels is getting much tighter. Today they moved large scoops of earth around the two of them in the hopes of stopping any high-speed, determined car bombers. One [redacted] has decided to make himself scarce, taking a hotel far outside of West Beirut, working alone, and checking in with the Embassy only when necessary. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

Bob Pugh said yesterday that consideration was being given to placing contract guards around some of the apartment buildings with a high concentration of Americans. I think that will prove to be a mistake and hope that Marines are emplaced instead. I leave tomorrow and will be sorry to say goodbye to all the good people that are here.

Wednesday

It is 0300. I look out my hotel window to the Embassy on the seaside, less than a mile away. It is brightly and garishly lit up, the only visible building in the blackness and mist. From here it looks almost like a stage set. It seems right to turn my back and drive away from Beirut in the darkness.

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THE CIA AND ACADEME

Ralph E. Cook

Close ties between the Central Intelligence Agency and American colleges and universities have existed since the birth of the Agency in 1947. The bonds between national intelligence and the academic world actually predate the Agency, for William J. Donovan, President Roosevelt's Coordinator of Information, established a research team of distinguished academicians to assist him in 1941. Donovan proposed a novel idea: have the information that he was collecting, mostly from the military services and the Department of State, analyzed not only by the intelligence components within the War and Navy Departments but by his team of "scholars, economists, psychologists, technicians, and students of finance." To head his research group, Donovan chose James Phinney Baxter, president of Williams College and a noted specialist in American diplomatic history.

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Research and Analysis Branch of what became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) rapidly expanded. After Baxter's departure in 1942, William L. Langer, the distinguished historian from Harvard, took over direction of the branch and remained in that post until disestablishment of OSS in late 1945.

While many of the scholars who had participated in the analytic part of OSS returned to their campuses after the war, some remained with the government. Those who had been in the Research and Analysis Branch were transferred to the State Department. Then, as the Central Intelligence Group and, after 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency grew in size and responsibility, a number of academicians who had served with OSS returned as analysts in the new Office of Research and Evaluation.

During the great expansion of CIA following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Agency recruiters appeared in significant numbers on academic campuses across the nation. Also in 1950, the Director of Central Intelligence, General Walter Bedell Smith, called upon William Langer to return to Washington to organize the new Office of National Estimates (ONE). This office had seven board members, including four historians and an economist drawn from the ranks of academe,* a combat commander, and a lawyer. One of the historians, Sherman Kent, succeeded Langer as Director of ONE in 1952 when Langer again returned to Harvard. At roughly the same time, the noted economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Max Millikan, was brought to Washington to organize the economic intelligence effort in the newly created Office of Research and Reports.

* The four historians were Sherman Kent, Ludwell Montague, De Forrest Van Slyck, and Raymond Sontag; the economist was Calvin Hoover.

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Meanwhile, as the Agency expanded, its recruiters turned to established figures in the academic world for leads and referrals to the best among their students.* Many of the personnel already on board similarly informed their colleagues still on the university campuses of the need for and opportunities awaiting those who had the requisite background for work in the Agency.

As a large number of the members of OSS and the early recruits to CIA came from prestigious private schools in the Northeast and the Far West, with some representation from the large Midwestern universities, it is not surprising that a disproportiate number of the new recruits came from the same schools. Similarly, professors who had joined the Agency often turned to their former colleagues still on the campuses for consultation and assistance. This "old boy" system was quite productive in providing new employees in the professional ranks. Thus, there was an early linkage between the Agency and the Ivy League, or similar schools.

A Souring in the Sixties

Relations between academe and the CIA were cordial throughout the 1950s. During much of that period the Cold War was at its height and the nation's need for the Agency and its activities were seldom questioned by faculty or students. There was no criticism worthy of note following the Agency's alleged involvement in Iran in 1953 or Guatemala the following year. The 1960s were to be different.

There was some criticism on campuses over CIA involvement in the Bay of Pigs expedition in 1961 and the barrage of denunciation increased as the Agency, along with the rest of the government and the "establishment," found itself under intensified attack as the war in Vietnam continued. In part to mitigate this opposition, the Office of Personnel in 1962 established the Hundred Universities Program in which recruiters and senior officials of CIA made presentations before selected faculty members and placement officers in an effort to publicize CIA's role in national security and to emphasize the Agency's recurrent personnel needs.

Meanwhile, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, aware that the close ties that had bound Agency officials and analysts with their colleagues on the campuses were loosening, and concerned about developments in China (explosion of an atomic device in 1964 and the subsequent beginning of the Cultural Revolution), asked the Deputy Director for Intelligence in 1966 to take action to improve the Agency's expertise on China. The DDI created the office of Coordinator for Academic Relations (CAR), a part-time job for John Kerry King, a former professor at the University of Virginia who had been with the analytic part of the Agency for several years.

* Beginning in 1951 and continuing for several years thereafter, the Agency tried, without much success, to establish a "University Associates Program"—a program of using professors at a selected list of 50 colleges and universities as consultant-contacts who would receive a nominal fee for spotting promising students, steering them into studies and activities of interest to the Agency, and eventually nominating them for recruitment.

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The DDI specifically charged the CAR with, *inter alia*, responsibility for exploiting the capabilities of the various China studies centers in the universities, devising means for attracting China specialists to work for the Agency, and developing and managing relations with academic consultants on China.

One of the nation's best China centers was at Harvard. It was logical that the Agency would seek help from that institution. Subsequently, several DDI analysts were enrolled in the graduate program at the Harvard East Asian Research Center. Unfortunately, by 1967 the local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society was aware of the participation of these analysts and a campaign against their presence on campus was launched. Attempts by Professor John K. Fairbank, director of the Center, to explain the difference between operations officers and analysts at CIA fell on deaf ears.

King also set about organizing a number of "China seminars" in Boston, New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, in which a few noted China scholars engaged Agency experts in low-profile and informal discussions. King, during his four-year tenure as CAR, also initiated a program of passing unclassified reports prepared by the Agency to a select group of academicians in an attempt to gain comment on the reports and good will for the CIA.

Despite individual examples of continuing cooperation with the Agency, relations with academia as a whole continued to sour. The deterioration was given impetus in February 1967 by the disclosure in *Ramparts* magazine that the CIA had been funding the National Student Association for a number of years. Additional disclosures of Agency involvement with private voluntary organizations and foundations resulted in President Johnson's appointment of a three-person committee, chaired by Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, to review government activities that might "endanger the integrity and independence of the educational community."* Following its investigations, the Katzenbach Committee recommended that federal agencies halt covert financial relationships with "any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations." While the recommendation was never issued as an executive order or enacted as a statute, it was accepted by the President and led to major adjustments within the Agency.

Recruiters for the Agency, meanwhile, were experiencing increasing problems on college campuses. Many of the schools that had provided superior candidates in the past were now home for the most militant of students. Picketing of recruiters began in 1966, rapidly spread across the nation, and peaked in 1968 when 77 incidents or demonstrations occurred. Procedures were changed with interviews held off campus and, whenever it appeared that a visit might precipitate incidents, the visit was canceled. The Hundred Universities Program was suspended in 1968.

The Academic Coordinator, working on behalf of the analytic offices, continued to expand contacts with academicians wherever possible. By 1970, seminars on Soviet matters were added to those on China. By 1974, scholars on

* The other two members were Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John Cardiner and DCI Richard Helms.

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Cuba and most of the rest of the world had been added to the list of academicians with whom the CAR kept in touch. The CAR was promoting visits by academicians to CIA Headquarters to confer with those in the DDI having similar interests and he was assisting analysts and administrators in securing the participation of outside experts in Agency-sponsored conferences and seminars.*

Sensational allegations of wrong doing by CIA and other components of the intelligence community, which erupted in the media in the early 1970s, led to congressional demands for investigations and the creation in 1974 of select committees in the House, under Representative Pike, and in the Senate, under Senator Church. (Two other groups also were formed to investigate intelligence activities—a Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, known as the Murphy Commission, and a commission appointed by President Ford and led by the Vice President, the Rockefeller Commission.) The various investigating bodies focused much of their attention on CIA's covert action, most of which had little to do with the Agency's relations with academia. There was some discussion, particularly in the Church Committee final report, which tended to lump relations with schools along with Agency relations with the media and religious organizations.

The final report of the Church Committee (the Pike Committee report was never formally released) interpreted "academic community" far more broadly than had the Katzenbach Committee. In particular, the former focused more heavily on individuals whereas the latter had concentrated on institutions. The Church Committee found that hundreds of academicians in over 100 colleges, universities, and related institutions had a covert relationship with the Agency providing leads and "making introductions for intelligence purposes." Others engaged in intelligence collection abroad, assisted in the writing of books and other propaganda materials, or collaborated in research and analysis.

While the Church Committee recognized that the CIA "must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce," it recommended that that advice and judgment be openly sought. The committee concluded by placing the principal responsibility for altering the existing relationship between CIA and academe on the backs of the college administrators and other academic officials. "The Committee believes that it is the responsibility of . . . the American academic community to set the professional and ethical standards of its members. This report on the nature and extent of covert individual relationships with the CIA is intended to alert (the academic community) that there is a problem."

* Harold Ford succeeded John Kerry King as CAR in 1970 and was followed in 1974 by Gary Foster. In late 1976, with the reorganization of the DDI as the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC), relations with academics were coordinated by two professional staff employees working full time (b)(3)(c) were the original incumbents and were followed by James King and In January 1981, the author became CAR as the post reverted to one-person status. In 1982, the CAR was transferred from the Office of the DDI to the Office of External Affairs under the DCI and in mid-1983 to the newly created Public Affairs Office.

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The report set off a flurry of activity within academic ranks and led to numerous articles in newspapers and periodicals. Among several letters addressed to DCI George Bush was one from William Van Alstyne, president of the American Association of University Professors, demanding that Bush give the same assurance against covert use of academics that he had earlier given to missionaries and journalists. The DCI replied that the Agency sought only "the voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States." Where relationships are confidential, noted Bush, they are usually so at the request of the scholars rather than of the Agency. He refused to isolate the Agency from the "good counsel of the best scholars in our country."

Bush's argument was to be adopted and enlarged upon by his successor, Stansfield Turner, who engaged in a long and eventually unsuccessful effort to reach agreement with Derek Bok, president of Harvard University, on relations between that university and the Agency. Bok, acting on the Church Committee suggestion, appointed a committee to prepare guidelines to assist members of the Harvard community in dealing with the CIA. The guidelines were accepted by Bok and published in May 1977. It was immediately apparent that some of Harvard's concerns (unwitting employment of academics and use of scholars in preparing propaganda materials) were no longer at issue due to changes in Agency policy and issuance of Executive Order 11905 by President Ford. There were still two issues on which no meeting of the minds was possible. One of these had to do with what the guidelines termed "operational use" of faculty and staff by the CIA. The other concerned covert Agency recruitment of foreign students for intelligence purposes. Additionally, the guidelines specified that all faculty and staff "should" report any and all relations with the Agency to their deans, who should report them in turn to President Bok.

Attempts by the DCI to point out that these were exceptional cases of academics who might be employed by the Agency on a strictly confidential mission abroad because of their unique access to foreign individuals or information failed to change Bok's mind as did Turner's contention that the confidentiality of a relationship with an academic was frequently at the professor's, rather than the Agency's, request. Finally, Turner pointed out that the CIA's responsibility to provide secret foreign intelligence left the Agency with no alternative to engaging in the activities which Bok deplored, but Bok was assured that "the rein" would remain tight in such cases.

Publicity regarding the dispute over the Harvard guidelines allowed Morton Halperin and John Marks of the Center for National Security Studies to launch a campaign to have other colleges and universities adopt similar or more stringent restrictions on intelligence activities on campuses. While some ten academic institutions took action toward adoption of similar guidelines, in most cases modifications were included which limited the impact of any restriction on Agency operations. For the great majority of schools where the issue arose, the faculty and the administration rejected any guidelines, usually on the ground that existing regulations and practices were adequate to protect both the institution and the individual from corruption.

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Scope of Current Cooperation

Relations between the Agency and the academic world have slowly improved since 1977, more or less in inverse correlation to the state of East-West relations.* The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, in particular, opened new doors to cooperation with CIA on many campuses. The depressed state of the economy in recent years has also been cited as a catalyst for greater interest in Agency employment on the part of recent graduates as well as the cause of increased willingness to cooperate with CIA by those who sell their services as consultants or external research contractors.

A number of recognized authorities who could be of value to the Agency's research effort decline all attempts to gain their assistance. Most are political scientists, or in an allied social science, and many have expertise in the Third World. Many scholars on the developing nations of the world, aware that reports that they have collaborated with American intelligence could prejudice their research activities (including their sources), are reluctant even to come to Langley. Interestingly, some of these scholars are prepared to discuss substantive issues if an Agency analyst is willing to visit them in their homes or at their offices.

Specialists on the Soviet Union or other communist countries have traditionally been less reluctant to work with the intelligence community, presumably because they are believed to be in touch with the Agency anyway. Experts on Western Europe and other developed nations, in their willingness to cooperate with the Agency, fall somewhere between the general cooperativeness of the Sino-Soviet specialists and the reluctance of the Third World experts.

At present the Agency enjoys reasonably good relations with academe and gains much from its contacts with faculty and students. The Office of Training and Education uses a large number of academics in its courses. Other offices within the Directorate of Administration, specifically Logistics and Medical Services, have contracts with educational institutions or with individual academicians. This fall, 27 professors spent two and one-half days at Headquarters in the Conference on US Intelligence: the Organization and the Profession, conducted by the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

(b)(1)
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The Foreign Resources Division has relationships with scores of individuals in US academic institutions. In all cases these links are voluntary and

* Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University has written extensively on the CIA. He maintains that congressional attempts to restrict Agency activities are strongest and most likely to be implemented during periods of detente in East-West relations; conversely they are most unlikely to succeed in periods of increased tension. The charting of relations between the CIA and academe would appear likely to show a similar pattern of close ties during periods of heightened tension between the US and USSR and strained relations during periods of detente.

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witting. Many of the individuals also are contacts of the DCD. These American scholars do not "recruit" foreign students or researchers for the Agency, but assist by providing background information and occasionally by brokering introductions.

Many academicians are willing to provide expert assistance to Agency analysts and the research componen (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) Additionally, scores of other academicians were willing to consult on an ad hoc basis, some without reimbursement. Components within the National Intelligence Council and the Directorates of Intelligence and of Science and Technology sponsored nearly 50 conferences during 1982 at which specialists from colleges, universities, or "think tanks" were present.

The DDI, the DDS&T, and the NIC also sought help from the academic world through contracts for external research, with the results usually presented as written reports. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

Since 1977, the Intelligence Directorate has also brought in (b)(3)(c) scholars, usually on sabbatical, to the Agency as contract employees to assist analysts through an exchange of ideas, a review of written reports, and the production of finished intelligence for dissemination to policy makers. In exchange, these "Scholars-in-Residence" are, for one or two years, privy to information that would never be available to them on campus.

The Supreme Court decision in the Snepp case in early 1980 had some dampening effect on the willingness of professors to work with the Agency. Some of them feared that if they signed the requisite secrecy agreement, their future independence to publish would be severely restricted. Another potential Scholar-in-Residence declined to take the polygraph test, describing it as "demeaning."

The Agency also provides numerous services for the academic community. Since 1972, unclassified CIA reports have been available to the public and have been widely sought by colleges, universities, and individual scholars. The FBIS —Daily Reports have long been standard items on the shelves of many university libraries.

Requests for unclassified briefings of students or faculty members at CIA Headquarters or on campuses normally receive a positive response. During 1982, 31 groups containing over 1,100 individuals were given briefings on intelligence or on some substantive topic at Headquarters. In the same year, at least 60 Agency officials spoke at various schools throughout the nation.

Fourteen college presidents were brought to Langley in 1982 to meet the Director and other senior officials and to be briefed on Agency activities. This program, which has generated considerable good will and understanding for the Agency, was begun in 1977 and has involved a total of 58 presidents from large and small schools throughout the nation, all of the schools important to the Agency as sources for recruitment of staff employees or consultants, or for other operational requirements.

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The Office of Personnel presently is active at approximately 300 schools. Several offices in the DDI and DDS&T also recruit directly from colleges and universities. Recently there has been a program, originating in the Directorate of Operations, sending special representatives onto campuses in an attempt to attract high-caliber career trainees.

The Graduate Studies Program, which began in 1967, provides summer internships for students who will be attending graduate school in the fall. Most of the 57 graduate students from 42 schools accepted in 1983 were attached to the Intelligence Directorate. A number of "alumni" of earlier Graduate Studies programs subsequently became staff employees.

For undergraduates, the Agency maintains a cooperative Student Trainee Program. The goal of this program today, as it was when it began in 1961, is to provide a long-range method of recruiting occupational skills which are in short supply. The program allows the student, who must be registered in a college with an established coop program, to gain practical work experience by alternating periods of study at school and work at the Agency. Originally, the program sought engineers exclusively but in recent years has added those who major in computer science, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and accounting.

The Office of Equal Employment Opportunity since 1969 has been recruiting at, and negotiating contracts with, minority schools. Faculty members and placement officers from traditionally black schools have been brought to Headquarters for briefing sessions.

Finally, the Agency has long sought to gain recognition for itself as a center for intellectual activity comparable to the best institutions in the academic world. The claim has often been made that CIA could staff a major university because of the diversity of disciplines represented among its employees. Graduate degrees earned by staff employees give some indication of the training acquired—over 600 Ph.Ds and more than 2,300 Masters' degrees.

To gain recognition for the Agency's employees among their counterparts in academe, overt employees have been encouraged to participate in meetings of academic and professional societies. Of the over 700 attendees in 1982, a significant number joined in panel discussions or presented unclassified research papers.

Work for the Future

The wide ranging program described above puts the Agency on generally good terms with the academic community. There is, however, considerable work for the future if CIA is to continue to count on securing the best possible recruits for its staff employees and the participation of faculty members in improving its analytic product. One of the problems, a long-term trend in academic institutions toward ever decreasing numbers of students in area studies programs, is currently being examined by a joint committee made up of representatives from the universities, business, and the federal government, including CIA.

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There is also a continuing need to improve the Agency's image at many colleges and universities. While the number of demonstrations against CIA has drastically diminished over the past decade, there are still occasional minor incidents, as happened when CIA and NSA recruitment was protested at Middlebury College last winter.

Some recent Agency activities, including expanded recruitment efforts by substantive intelligence officers on the campuses, increased numbers of CIA participants at academic conventions and conferences, and a growing use of external research contracts with non-annuitants, are all valuable tools in breaking down barriers and increasing confidence betweeen the Agency and the academics.

One promising recent activity involves visits to selected college campuses by intelligence officers who are seeking to locate, or create, a body of faculty members favorably disposed toward the Agency. This is accomplished principally through conversations with faculty members and by briefings, when requested, to classes or to faculty groups. These friendly contacts in the ranks of academe can be of inestimable value. The goals are to have professors remind their best students that CIA is a potential employer, to correct erroneous accusations on campus against the Agency, and, perhaps, to identify other faculty members who might be willing to attend conferences or participate in substantive consultations at Langley.

There is some danger from an uncoordinated rapid expansion of recruitment trips by the many Agency components now engaged in the effort. Unless oversight of the campaign is centralized, it could result in several Agency representatives appearing on a campus in rapid succession or even concurrently. This "overexposure" could have negative repercussions; specifically, irritation on the part of Agency friends and consternation among others—both faculty and students. All recruitment visits to academic institutions should be cleared in advance at some point within the Agency—possibly within the Office of Personnel, possibly at the Academic Coordinator's office.

The opportunity exists, of course, for any overt employee attending an academic convention or symposium to assist in furthering good relations for the Agency. Understandably, many academicians are most impressed by the participation of Agency employees on panels. Beyond that, any Agency officer attending a professional meeting can gain good will for CIA by being friendly and, within the limitations of security, informative about the Agency. Most academicians are curious about CIA and grateful for any clarification of its mission and its activities.

The occasional vigorous criticism of the Agency from faculty members or students tends to focus on covert action. While some critics will not be satisfied by any argument, others can be reconciled to the need for covert action through a dispassionate explanation of its synergistic role with other more conventional means of conducting international relations and a reminder of the oversight function of the Congress.

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From the author's own experience with a number of college groups briefed at Headquarters over the last few years, it is obvious that there is a vital need to correct misconceptions held by a large percentage of students and also by some faculty members. Illustrative of this point were the comments on a short written quiz given by an Agency briefing officer *prior* to her presentation before a student group. To the question, what is your reaction and that of your classmates on campus to the words "Central Intelligence Agency?" the recurring response was "fear."

Yet, when the briefings are over there are often voluntary expressions of support for the Agency, inquiries regarding careers, and, from the faculty, offers to meet with DCD or to serve as Agency consultants. If the students and their teachers are made aware of the truly symbiotic relationship between the academic and intelligence worlds, there is little question but that the great majority will support the continuing efforts of what Ray Cline terms this "peculiarly American combination of spies and scholars, working in tandem."

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KGB: THE CENTER AND THE RESIDENCIES

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Relations between KGB Headquarters (*Tsentr*—the Center) in Moscow and KGB field stations (residencies) abroad constitute the core of the centralized system of the KGB. These relations are structured on the principle of strict military subordination. I shall review two types of relations: formal/bureaucratic and unofficial, involving the human factor.

Formal Relationships

Although formally the residencies are subordinated to the Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), actually the residencies fall under the KGB First Chief Directorate (FCD) and get orders directly from the Chairman in very rare cases—only on global operations of extreme importance. A Deputy Chairman of the KGB is responsible for the supervision of the activities of the FCD.

Candidacy of each KGB resident is approved personally by the Chairman. Some of the residents, stationed in important countries such as the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and India, have meetings with the Chairman on a more or less regular basis—usually before they go to new assignments and when they come back home on leave.



Kryuchkov

In every other sense the activities of the residencies are supervised or guided by the Chief of the FCD, presently General Vladimir A. Kryuchkov. The Chief of the FCD is responsible for global coordination of the KGB intelligence effort. He is probably the only person in the FCD who is entrusted by the Soviet Politburo to have detailed knowledge of the long-range plans of the Soviet leaders in external policy matters, as well as military plans which can directly influence the global situation and the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Chief of the FCD has everyday working contacts with the Chairman of the KGB and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He

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personally approves the plans and guidelines for major operations of the KGB abroad. The Chief of the FCD also coordinates activities of all geographic and special departments and services within the FCD. He is responsible for the quality and substance of the political, military, economic, and high technology information which the residencies abroad collect and which he forwards to the Politburo. The Chief of the FCD personally supervises a few special cases of important Soviet assets abroad.

The daily routine work of the residencies abroad is supervised by the FCD geographic departments and other components of the FCD including Directorate S (illegals), Directorate K (counterintelligence), Service I (information), Directorate T (scientific and technical intelligence), and Service A (active measures). But, before approving a major field operation, the chiefs of the departments, directorates, and services report the substance of such operations directly to the Chief, FCD or one of his designated deputies.

The KGB station chief (resident) in a foreign country has limited autonomy. His main responsibility is the supervision of the daily activities of the residency and implementation of the FCD's operational guidelines to field components.

The responsibilities of the resident (or in his absence—the deputy resident) are:

1. Supervising, with the help of component chiefs, the residency's main components—Line PR (political intelligence), Line KR (external counterintelligence), Line X (scientific and technological intelligence), Line N (illegals support);
2. Supervising the targeting of the major political, military, industrial, and economic institutions of the foreign country;
3. Supervising political action (active measures) activities of the residency in that country;
4. Maintaining the continuity of developing and recruiting new contacts and assets;
5. Supervising the intelligence collection process. Although it is the reports officer who prepares all intelligence information cables which the residency sends to Moscow on a daily basis, the resident is totally responsible for the reliability and quality of the information in intelligence reports.
6. Forwarding, for Center approval, annual residency plans for the penetration of major political parties, government institutions, business circles, and mass media. The resident also submits to the Center a plan for agent recruitment for the coming year. (The existence of such plans is a phenomenon typical of the highly centralized and planned Soviet socialist system.) Most such plans are impossible to fulfill. Each year the resident has to produce a large amount of paperwork on adjustment and readjustment of

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such plans. The plan is also a tool of the psychological pressure placed upon the field officers in their recruitment efforts.

7. Supervising the recruitment effort against United States citizens stationed in that country, and reporting regularly to the Center on this effort.

8. Controlling residency finances and preparing the annual budgetary plan for Center approval. In most foreign countries, the resident has the right to approve payment to the agent of no more than one-hundred fifty dollars per meeting. Payments over this amount are subject to approval by the Center. Important agents of the KGB receive quite large payments, but the Center must approve such payments in advance.

9. Providing the Center with regular reports on the situation in the Soviet community in the country of his assignment—for example, cases of violations of the "Rules of Behavior of Soviet Citizens Stationed Abroad."

10. Preparing fitness reports on each officer in the residency. These, too, go to the Center.

The KGB residency in any country of the world is a miniature model of the structure of the FCD. Residency components (or lines) are totally subjected to the supervision and control by the corresponding macro components of the Center. Residency officers write reports on agent meetings and developmental contacts on a regular basis. Before an officer's report is mailed to the Center, he submits it for approval to his line chief. The report is then submitted for approval to the resident, who personally signs all reports to the Center.

In the FCD at the Center, mail from the residency is received by the chiefs of the geographic departments, services, or directorates (depending upon the component of origin in the residency).

The chief of the department, service or directorate reads only mail on the most important cases. He then assigns incoming correspondence to the chief of the country desk who, after reading it and making notes, assigns it to desk officers, each of whom supervises several cases. A reply on each letter or report goes back through the same chain of command, back to the residency and personally to the field case officer. That means that in reporting, supervising, and analyzing of each case, at least seven junior and high-ranking officers are involved. It is a complicated procedure, but the leaders of the FCD consider such a system to be effective because, in their opinion, it minimizes operational and other mistakes and handicaps.

The KGB resident has no authority to approve any recruitment of agents in the field. He normally sends his recommendation on each case to the chief of the department in the Center. The process of formal approval of the recruitment is slow and sometimes painstaking. Everybody in the aforementioned chain of command is involved in it. Final approval of any recruitment must come from the Deputy Chief of the FCD or sometimes from the Chief of

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the FCD himself. The obvious shortcoming of this system is that in case of some operational scandal—the exposure of an agent by the foreign counterintelligence service, or a dangle operation against the KGB by intelligence organs of the foreign country—it is sometimes difficult to name the person responsible for overlooking the danger signals in the development of the case. There is a tendency to pick the field case officer and his immediate superior as the scapegoats.

The Center (each department, directorate, or service) also has an annual recruitment plan despite the fact that it contradicts any operational logic. Nobody dares to change this principle, which applies similarly to the Soviet economy and practically every other aspect of Soviet life. It makes this whole sophisticated system of handling cases vulnerable to mistakes and double agent operations against the KGB. In November and December each year, dozens of recruitments are hastily approved and reported to the Chairman of the KGB to demonstrate a higher level of success than in the previous year.

The FCD prefers to keep the officers specializing on certain countries assigned to the same country desks or residencies throughout their career. In the opinion of the leadership of the KGB, this practice provides the FCD with experienced specialists with good knowledge of the language, political system, economy, military establishment, and of the national psychology of the assigned country. This type of personnel policy makes the relationship between the Center and residencies much closer than just formal bureaucratic ties.

Informal Relationships

Despite FCD policies described above, in some cases the resident does not return to his geographic department after he finishes his assignment. This is especially true for residents of high military rank—colonel or general. Officers of this rank either get higher positions in the Center or draw assignments as residents to more important countries. Most other officers of the residency returning to their FCD component at the Center spend two to four years before getting second or third assignments to the same country. When they return to the desk at the Center, they are replaced in the residency by officers of that same desk.

This system leads to the development of close personal relationships (positive or negative) between officers in the Center and in the residency. On many occasions, the desk officers face difficult dilemmas. For instance, some of them are handling the cases of residency line chiefs who are normally medium- or high-ranking officers. Some of these chiefs, upon their return home, get higher positions in the department. Thus, the lower-ranking desk officers tend to be restrained in analyzing cases of their potential superiors. Negative letters are written only when the attitude of the chief of the desk or the chief of the department toward certain cases is negative.

I personally witnessed quite dramatic examples of this phenomenon. On several occasions, in my presence, both the resident and his deputy had been figuring out the names of the authors of the "negative" letters from the Center

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by "decoding" initials on the papers. To avoid eventual confrontation with the high-ranking officers in the residency, the desk officers frequently had sent private letters to these officers explaining that it was the department chief or his deputy who insisted on sending letters containing criticism. Such private correspondence helps the residency officers know exactly what is going on in the Center, which of them are "favorites," and which, at least potentially, are facing trouble. I recall that the formal approval of the recruitment of one of my agents was delayed by the Center for at least one extra year, primarily because the deputy chief of the geographic department had personal negative feelings toward me. On several occasions, I also witnessed the approval of the recruitment of quite unnecessary agents in order to secure the promotion of the field officer who enjoyed a favorable attitude from the superior officer of the geographic department.

Unofficial relations between the Center and the residency sometimes constitute a violation of the regulations of the KGB and even of Soviet law. According to KGB regulations, officers, regardless of rank, cannot recruit junior officers as their personal informers inside the residency. In practice, such cooption is done only in special cases when there is serious suspicion of a field officer's loyalty, suspicion that an officer is being approached by foreign intelligence or counterintelligence services, or suspicion of embezzlement of KGB funds. To run such an operation, a secret but official approval of at least the Deputy Chairman of the KGB is needed. Such an investigation would be run by a special section of Directorate K (external counterintelligence) of the FCD. At the same time, routine checks on the officer's loyalty and contacts with foreigners are the prerogative of the KR Line of the residency.

I was a personal witness to violations of these rules. Once when I was stationed abroad, I was approached by the residency chief of Line PR. During a brief but emotional conversation, he explained to me that my future career was in his hands. He knew that, upon his return to Moscow, he would become deputy chief of a geographic department in the Center. He intimated that he would "take care" of my career if I would regularly report to him on what was being said about him behind his back by the other officers of the residency. Moreover, he told me that the current resident was "a fool" who did not know how to work in that country. This residency line chief wanted me to report to him on the resident, too. After I rejected cooperation with him, he created quite difficult conditions for me. As I learned much later from a friendly code clerk and the residency driver, the line chief took his time to build up quite a sophisticated scheme against me with the involvement of at least two other officers whom he managed to recruit as his personal informers. Even after this chief returned home, these informers were reporting on me by means of personal letters to him. At the Center, this line chief managed to force the resident to turn one of the important cases I was handling over to a different officer, and he delayed the approval of two of my recruitments. As I heard from the other officers in the FCD, such dramatic stories are not unusual. Situations like that contribute to the feeling of insecurity and damage the morale of the officers both in the residency and in the Center.

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Competition for promotions, together with feelings of uncertainty for their professional future, trigger jealousy and sometimes personal hatred among officers.

Undoubtedly, the fact that most of the officers are specializing on the countries of their first assignments is advantageous for the intelligence collection effort by the FCD. But, at the same time, because the same people are working for the same desk for many years, the relationships between officers in this FCD area can become very complicated and cause a variety of negative side effects. While the KGB probably remains the least corrupt institution within the Soviet Union, this does not at all mean that the KGB is free from corruption. It is common practice, between the high-positioned FCD officers in particular, to engage in such corruption. When deputy chiefs of the FCD or chiefs of the services, directorates, or departments go abroad to inspect the residencies, all their expenses—often including some of their shopping bills—are normally paid by the residency. There are no funds for such expense in the residency and these costs usually are written off as "operational." This kind of transaction violates KGB regulations and Soviet law.

The Chief of the FCD, General Kryuchkov, himself is not free from corruption. While I was stationed abroad under cover as a correspondent for an important Soviet news magazine, the editor-in-chief of the magazine visited from Moscow. I knew that he was a personal friend of General Kryuchkov. But it was quite a surprise to me to learn from a cable sent by the Center that this editor was visiting for a special mission and would need to spend the equivalent of a few hundred dollars to cover expenses during this "mission." I knew every detail of his itinerary and I was sure that the editor was not involved in any special operations. While in country, the residency bought the editor quite an expensive high fidelity stereo system. Everybody knew that it was embezzlement of the government's money. But nobody dared criticize the decisions of the Chief of the FCD. The deputy resident told me that I had to keep my mouth shut and that I was "not to discuss anything about the editor's finances with other officers." He told me also that if we could win the editor's sympathy, we would be in "good shape" career-wise, because of the closeness of the editor to General Kryuchkov. Before the editor returned to Moscow, the deputy resident arranged meetings with three important KGB agents of influence in a local political party and with the number one Soviet agent of influence in another party. The results of these meetings were summarized in the operational cable classified "SECRET" and addressed personally to General Kryuchkov. The role of the visiting editor as a participant in the meetings was grossly exaggerated. It was obvious that this "operation" had two goals: to inflate the reputation of the editor in the eyes of his friend—Chief of the FCD—and to have an official excuse for providing him money from the residency's vault.

Conclusion

The relationships between the KGB Center and its residencies abroad are complex and diversified. As seen from the above, these relations reflect high

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professionalism and, at the same time, are bureaucratic with a variety of shortcomings. Sociologically, such relations are typical of any part of the Soviet socialist structure. Proper understanding by US intelligence of the vulnerabilities inherent in relations between the FCD Center and its residencies can greatly enhance actions aimed at countering the Soviet intelligence effort and for possible penetration of the KGB.

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TITLE: Message Received - Unfortunately

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

VOLUME: 27 ISSUE: Winter YEAR: 1983

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In the clear and in the blind

MESSAGE RECEIVED — UNFORTUNATELY

(b)(3)(c)

Countless times commo has received and delivered a message under adverse circumstances; many times this has been instrumental in the success of an operation. This is one instance where perhaps it might have been best if commo had failed to receive the message.

I was a young communicator on my first tour (b)(1) (b)(1) in 1960. Some of my colleagues were on a TDY "flying squad." Every few months they would go off to some unknown destination for several weeks to return tight-lipped about where they had been but with a smug grin indicating they had done something special. I was eager to get in on this action; I wanted to do something spooky. After all, I thought, this was what it was all about. When one of the "flying squad" communicators rotated to another job, I was selected to fill the vacancy. I still did not know what I would be doing or where I would go, but I was ready. Finally I received the initial alert—"You're on standby; be prepared to leave on a moment's notice."

A week or so later, at about 10 p.m., I received a telephone call at my residence in (b)(1) It was couched in guarded terms, something to the effect: "You're on a standby TDY list. How soon can you be ready to leave? An hour or two?" I did not know the caller, but said I was prepared to leave. What, I asked, were my instructions? First, we had to find my traveling partner on the team, a bachelor. He did not answer the phone at home. Did I know where he might be? Recollecting this query, I have to laugh. A bachelor in (b)(1) at 10 p.m. could be at any of a hundred or so places offering various forms of enjoyment. I gave my caller some leads and he said he would get back to me. In the wee hours of the morning, with me still wide awake in anticipation, the phone rang once again. "Get to (b)(1) and check in at desk so-and-so at the operations center ASAP." Off I went, leaving the wife and children, to begin my unknown adventure.

I joined my bleary-eyed colleague, (b)(3)(c) and we were put on a US Air Force airplane with a grumbling crew who had been waiting for us all night. It was now circa 6 a.m. Climbing aboard, we found we were the only passengers in an aircraft the size of the (b)(3)(c) bowling cent (b)(3)(c) an old hand on the team, stated this looked like a fast-moving exercise and there would not be time for a formal briefing for me before we deployed to the advance base. He therefore decided to brief me. We were going out in support of a black overflight of the Soviet Union by a super spy plane called the U-2. Gangbusters! I had finally arrived! This *was* spooky.

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Boyhood Acquaintance

In the evening we landed at Adana, Turkey, where we were hustled through some kind of passport/immigration control and shuttled off to a house trailer occupied by a commo tech. There we feasted on a can of Dinty Moore's beef stew, which was described to me as probably being the best meal I would have in a week or so. The gilt was coming off the lily already. Shortly thereafter, we boarded a C-130 loaded with two vans and various and sundry other boxes. I had already been strongly reminded that this was a super-secret operation and to keep my mouth shut and ask no questions. Much to my chagrin, my jumpseat co-passenger, dressed in Air Force fatigues with sergeant chevrons, started yelling at me above the roar of the takeoff that he thought he knew me. I indicated that we would talk later as we leveled off and removed our ear plugs. After the noise abated to a dull roar, we re-established an old acquaintance. (b)(3)(c) had preceded me by a year or two in high school and we had played CYO basketball against one another. He invited me to visit in his van after we landed and got set up.

It seemed like days later we landed at the staging site, a Pakistani Air Force base in Peshawar, and began unloading and setting up the commo van. Our team consisted of (b)(3)(c) and myself. Before we left Adana we were told that two communicators from (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) would be arriving in Adana to man that end of the circuit. The commo project chief, (b)(3)(c) who was on "permanent TDY" in Adana, said that in the event the operators were delayed, please keep the code speed down as he hadn't operated in a long while and he would be the only game in town.

We set up our van, one that had been put together by a previous team, which housed two HF receivers and an HT-4 HF transmitter (fondly called the "widow maker" because of the danger involved when making frequency changes). We then began a watch schedule of eight hours on, eight off, two men to a shift, with periodic checks with the base in Adana via CW (Morse code). When not on duty we hot-bunked it on two Army fold-up cots alongside the van a few hundred yards from the runway.

The remainder of the close support team, a(b)(3)(c)gency staffers of all kinds and some tech reps, were housed in the hangar area, but for us it was open air living, no shelter of any kind. Luckily it didn't rain. The exciting part of each day was when we opened up a box of IF-9's (in-flight rations) to see what culinary delight we had in store for us. The spaghetti, tuna, and marinated (pickled) beef were big hits. Low on the totem pole were five- to eight-year-old dinner rolls.

I decided to visi(b)(3)(c) one day and ended up in the "driver's" van. (The pilots of the U-2 were called drivers.) It was air-conditioned—what a luxury in the 90 degrees-plus heat of Peshav(b)(3)(c)owed me the space suit especially designed for our pilots and when I spotted a pistol I was told each driver carried a personal weapon. The driver selected for this mission was Francis Gary Powers and he carried a Colt Woodsman .22. I'm somewhat of a gun nut and ended up examining this particular pistol.

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"JGOHB" Puzzle

Indications were that D-Day was arriving. The "go" message would come from President Eisenhower, and he was playing this mission very close because of the upcoming summit with Khrushchev. A decision was not expected until the eleventh hour. The message was to be relayed from Headquarters to the Project Comcenter in Weisbaden, thence to Adana, which would pass it to us via CW. Sometime during the night before the mission was scheduled, the "bird" was pulled from the hangar and positioned at the end of the runway. As dawn broke I received my first glimpse of the U-2; long drooping wings, a bullet-like fuselage and all black with no markings—definitely meeting my expectations of what a spy plane should look like. The takeoff was scheduled for 6 a.m. Peshawar time. It was light long before then and we were in what is known in commo jargon as the transition period. The ionosphere would not support reliable communications between the two sites; the night frequencies were failing and the day frequencies were not yet stabilized. (b)(3)(c)nd (b)(3)(c) were on duty but all four of us, plus (b)(3)(c) project chief, were in the van. It was crowded, hot, and tense. Outside, all the close support team members were standing around in anticipation of a takeoff, with all eyes focused on our little van. The U-2 sat on the runway midst the increasing heat waves. I am sure Gary Powers was tensing up as well. Somewhere around 6 a.m. we heard some CW on one of the guard frequencies we were frantically searching. While it sounded like Adana's signal and our operator's fist, the characters being sent made no sense and we continued our search and call procedure.

Like a magnet, that familiar signal sending repetitive characters kept drawing our attention. We passed the 6 a.m. takeoff time and by now (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) was in the first stages of a nervous breakdown with the rest of us not far behind. We were by now convinced that the signal was coming from our Adana base. We focused on the characters being sent, although they made no sense: "JGOHB." But wait—there was a slight discernible break after three and then two characters. It became "HBJ-GO-HBJ-GO," etc. The operator kept sending in the blind. We stared at these repeating five characters as if they comprised a puzzle. Someone started saying them —"HBJ-GO—HBJ-GO." I cannot recall which of us in the van finally broke the code but someone shouted: "HBJAYWALK GO!" That was it! (HBJAYWALK was the project cryptonym.) (b)(3)(c) almost broke a leg exiting the van and went racing across the field toward the bird. He waved for takeoff. By now it was about 6:15 a.m. Then, out of the eerie early morning stillness came the roar of the engine. Gary Powers was on his way.

As the U-2 contrail faded in the sky we felt drained but elated; commo had done its job one more time. The Adana operator had known that with the circuit out he could not send the formal enciphered mission approval message, so he sent all he dared to send in the clear and in the blind in the hope we would hear the signal and figure out what it meant. We had.

Feasting and Fingerprints

We were directed to stay in place until we were assured that the aircraft had passed the point of no return in the flight plan. But this time we were just

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about out of IF-9s and were rummaging around in the discarded cans of food that had not previously appealed to our palates. In true Agency fashion we were not forgotten. Another U-2 landed at Peshawar with cameras and recorders removed and their cavities filled with frozen T-bones and several bags of charcoal. We feasted, rested, packed up, and started back. Our C-130 landed at (b)(1) for a rest stop about 1 a.m. After a fine breakfast at and the passing around of some liquid fortification by the two standby drivers who had been pre-positioned there, it was off to a real bed in the BOQ. At around 5 a.m. we were rudely awakened by a loud knocking on our doors. "Get up, get dressed and be ready to move out." Something was wrong and the rumors began to fly—we had to go back, the bird was down, the bird was lost. . . . We sat around until mid-afternoon not knowing what was happening. (b)(3)(c) was closeted and all we could do was speculate. Everyone was grim faced and not enthused by the prospect of returning to Peshawar. There was universal concern for the driver and the success of the mission. Finally, in mid-afternoon, we boarded the C-130, took off, lost an engine, landed, reloaded the vans and equipment on a standby C-130, and headed back to Adana. Still no word on what had happened. The next morning we were debriefed and given the cover story on the loss of the plane; lost on a weather mission along the border and presumed to have inadvertently strayed over the border. Everyone was sworn to absolute secrecy. We received our per diem (about $15 since quarters and rations were provided) and packed off back to (b)(1)

Several days after my return I was reading the *Stars and Stripes* at breakfast and there it was—Khrushchev had blown the lid off. To top it off, there was a picture of the "agent's weapon," a Colt Woodsman .22 with my fingerprints on it. My wife took one look at me and asked no questions—she knew where I had been for the last two weeks. The lid was also off back at work and our colleagues finally figured out where the "flying squad" had been flying to all along.

Did fate play one of its tricks on us this time? Who knows? Whatever the end result, commo did it's job. But maybe this would have been one time when we should have failed.

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TITLE: Abbot Emerson Smith

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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A man of integrity

ABBOT EMERSON SMITH

(b)(3)(c)

Anyone who knew Abbot Emerson Smith must have felt a twinge of personal sorrow at hearing of his death at the age of seventy-five in April 1983. It is hard to write about Abbot without launching into superlatives, but that would have embarrassed him; he was an exceedingly modest man. Abbot retired from the Agency in 1971, having served for the last four years of his career as Director of the Office of National Estimates, Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, and Chairman of the Editorial Board of *Studies in Intelligence.*



Abbot was born and raised in Maine, took great pride in being a Maine-man, and exemplified some of the better qualities associated with New Englanders. As a youth he had a remarkable talent for music, playing the organ at the age of twelve or so in the Congregational Church where his father was minister, and later playing the piano on Saturday nights in the local movie house. In later years in ONE, under his doctor's advice to take a half-hour of rest after lunch, Abbot normally stretched out on his couch to read a musical score, deriving as much pleasure from scanning Mozart or Bach as others would from a detective story. (He also was fond of mystery stories.)

Abbot attended Colby College in Waterville, Maine, studied organ at the Eastman School of Music, then went on to graduate studies in American history at Harvard. While there he learned of his selection as a Rhodes Scholar. He transferred to Oxford and attended Balliol College, where he met Kathleen Mottram, a South African scholar whom he later married, and where he earned a doctorate in history. His thesis, *Colonists in Bondage,* is still the authoritative work on indentured servitude in the American colonies. (I am told that at Princeton University Library the ten dog-eared copies of Abbot's book are in constant demand by the students.) His second scholarly work, *James Madison,* never achieved as much acclaim but is still regarded as authoritative by experts on that period.

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Abbot began a teaching career at Bard College, but after Pearl Harbor he was commissioned in the Naval Reserve and called to active duty. Following a lengthy course at Columbia's School of Military Government and Administration, Abbot was sent to the US Naval Command in London, assigned to a US Army unit, and on D-Day landed at Utah Beach to serve as civil affairs officer, first at Vaast-la-Hogue and later at Cancale. In his first experience in administering a French town, he felt unsure of himself, but was reminded by his commanding officer: "There's nothing to it. Just remember you are a US naval officer." In later years he kept a photo of himself in full naval uniform, and in times of stress, would take out the picture and mutter, "Well, what would he do now?"

After the German surrender, Abbot served on the US Control Council in Vienna, then returned to London where he was assigned to the Historical Staff of the Commander, US Naval Forces, Europe. On his return to the US he assisted Samuel Eliot Morrison in the Office of Naval History, and attained the rank of lieutenant commander.

Analyst

For a brief period he returned to college teaching, but was attracted to CIA by his wartime friend, Paul Borel. Abbot came to CIA in 1948 as an intelligence analyst, serving first in the Special Staff of ORE, the Office of Research and Evaluation.

In the autumn of 1950 in the early stages of the Korean War, General Walter Bedell Smith, the DCI, asked an aide for the latest estimate on Korea. Finding that CIA did not produce estimates, General Smith invited Professor William Langer, an OSS veteran, to come down from Harvard to organize an Office of National Estimates. Langer agreed, and persuaded an OSS colleague, Sherman Kent, to leave Yale and join him in Washington as his deputy.* Together, Langer and Kent interviewed prospective board and staff candidates, and brought into the newly formed ONE staff a number of the analysts from ORE, including Paul Borel, Ray Cline, and Abbot Smith. Sherman Kent succeeded Langer as Director of National Estimates in 1952, with Ray Sontag as deputy, and when Sontag returned to academia the following year, Abbot Smith was selected as deputy to Kent. According to Sherman Kent, when the vacancy occurred, Miss Frances Douglas, the administrative officer of ONE, and herself an OSS veteran, suggested to Kent that Abbot Smith would be a good choice for deputy. "Her suggestions were usually worth listening to, and in this case it was excellent advice," Kent recalls.

For fourteen years (1953-67) Sherman Kent and Abbot Smith worked together to build the Office of National Estimates into a highly respected, efficient producer of intelligence at the national level. They were an odd couple in temperament: Sherman, a flamboyant, outspoken, dynamic personality; Abbot, a quiet, contemplative, patient, logical gentleman "of the old

* See Harold P. Ford, "A Tribute to Sherman Kent," *Studies in Intelligence*, Fall 1980, Volume 24, Number 3.

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school." Both men were brilliant writers, with excellent education and training, and an ability to recall selectively from their reading and experience some bit of logic or historical perspective to help resolve an intelligence problem. Sherman Kent, in a conversation with the author a few weeks after Abbot's death, referred to Abbot Smith as "gentle, wise, and delightful—the fastest mind and finest drafter of intelligence papers I have even known." He said, "I loved him like a brother."

Abbot Smith was the author of the fastest and probably the shortest formal intelligence estimate ever produced. On election eve, in November 1956, as the Suez crisis was unraveling and the Hungarian uprising was in its final stages, Premier Bulganin sent to the British and French Prime Ministers identical nasty, threatening letters. In late afternoon the fact of the letters was known in CIA, but the text was not yet available. Allen Dulles had gone up to New York in order to vote the next day. Intelligence agency chiefs consulted by phone and agreed to hold a USIB (predecessor of today's NFIB) meeting that evening at 9 o'clock, to be chaired by the DDCI, General Cabell. The translated text of the letters arrived from the State Department at 8:45 p.m. Abbot Smith read the messages, jotted down on a yellow pad his impressions of their significance, and had his notes mimeographed and distributed to the assembled USIB members at 9. By the time Allan Dulles arrived by train from New York around midnight, the USIB members had agreed to an amended version of Abbot's draft. This was reviewed and approved by Dulles, typed early the next morning as a SNIE, and delivered to the prime customers at opening of business.

A former member of the Board of National Estimates recalls another coordination meeting at which community representatives were wrestling with a complicated military estimate. By 8 o'clock of a Friday evening, after a long day of haggling, the attendees were irritable, tired, and divided into two apparently irreconcilable camps. Sherman Kent, chairing the paper, stopped in mid-sentence to watch Abbot Smith at the other end of the table scribbling on his yellow pad. Conversation died away, and the others watched. When Abbot put his pencil down, Sherman said, "Read it, Abbot." Abbot slowly read off three perfect sentences. Everyone at the table gathered up papers and then filed out. Abbot's sentences did the trick. A few minutes later, a board member stopped off in Sherman's office. Sherman was leaning back in his chair with thumbs hooked in his "naked lady" suspenders. "That Abbot," he said, "if he wants my watch, he can have it."

Historian

Abbot's historical training served him well over the years, and left its mark on the estimates process. In a meeting in the late 1960s on the prospects for a civil war in Nigeria, State Department representatives were arguing that the training that the British had given the Nigerians in parliamentary government would prevent any breakdown in Nigeria's version of the Westminster model. Abbot pointed out that we had had the same training and had had a first-rate civil war.


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Similarly, a gathering of community representatives in the early 1960s was addressing the prospects for the new Gaullist constitution in France. The members were approaching a consensus that, according to the principles of political science, the constitution was a hopeless mess, certain to break down quickly. Abbot suggested that it was no better nor worse than its predecessors and would last about as long. The problem was to consider how it might work in the next ten years. He knew enough about history to appreciate the element of resilience in human societies, and the willingness of people to accept almost hopeless economic conditions and tolerate idiotic forms of government.

For many years the members of the Office of National Estimates met once or twice a year with a board of consultants at a site near Princeton, New Jersey. Abbot Smith, during the years he was deputy office director, generally organized the proceedings. He wrote the invitations to the consultants by hand, and in the invitation notices to an old friend on the Princeton faculty, Abbot normally wrote in Latin (and received the reply in the same language). This was not done in a showy fashion, and I doubt if many others knew of this quaint practice. But to Abbot it was an opportunity to keep up his skills in the language of Cicero.

At the conclusion of one of the consultants' meetings, Abbot and Allen Dulles were having coffee in the lunchroom of the Trenton railway station while waiting for the train to Washington. As Abbot was paying the bill, the counterman said to him: "I know that man you are with, but I can't think of the name." Abbot said: "Yes, his name is Molotov."



Dulles



Molotov

Abbot Smith was a man of simple and frugal tastes. On the train trips to the consultants' meetings at Princeton, he always passed up the opportunity to dine on the train, stopping instead at a station lunch counter in either Washington or Trenton. His explanation was, "I'm just saving the government a little money." A former Agency official once stationed in [redacted] remembers a visit of Abbot Smith to [redacted] The Station officer found Abbot in a dingy second-class hotel, and invited him out to his residence for a drink. No, he had had one. Dinner? No, he couldn't bear the thought of food. He had eaten something strange for lunch that had upset his stomach. "Well," said the Station officer, "come out anyhow and my wife will fix you something you

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like, no Middle East food." "Do you suppose she would have a can of Campbell's vegetable soup?" asked Abbot. As it turned out, she did, Abbot ate it, and years later was still happily reminiscing about the best meal he ever had.

Abbot was a quiet man, who, in the New England tradition, thought it unseemly to display emotion. He was too polite to become an effective bureaucrat, and hated the sort of infighting in which Sherman Kent excelled. His recreation was simple: long walks on weekends, reading or playing music, and especially reading. He re-read Gibbon during his ONE days, and after retirement, found a place on Cape Cod within walking distance of a good book store.

Craftsman

Anything Abbot wrote was beautifully crafted. Some of the substantive memoranda he produced in ONE were used by the ONE staff to show new members how the job should be done. A piece he wrote in 1963 on the fundamental problems of South Africa is as valid today as when it was written. So far as I know, there has never been a better explanation of what intelligence estimates can and cannot do than Abbot's article "On the Accuracy of National Intelligence Estimates" in Volume 13, Number 4 of *Studies in Intelligence.*

Abbot generally assumed that anyone in his office assigned to a task would do the job as well as humanly possible. If the product did not measure up to his standards, he would point out the weaknesses and suggest ways to make the draft more effective. Not for him the "there's something wrong with this paper, but I don't know what it is" approach. He had a respect for and a mastery of the English language and entertained the old-fashioned belief that English was a language whose prime quality was its clarity. One of his greatest contributions to the Agency and to the estimates process was to set a standard of style and exposition, stressing clarity, simplicity, and logical presentation.

This little memorial article can hardly do justice to the strength of character, the integrity, the extraordinary talents and skills, and unfailing kindness of Abbot Smith. Those who served with or under Abbot loved and respected him. In the age of the common man, Abbot Smith was a most uncommon man.

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SITUATION REPORT ON WARNING

David Y. McManis

The warning community, both governmental and academic, has spent a great deal of time and effort looking at the warning "failures" of the past, starting with Pearl Harbor and carrying us through the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the fall of the Shah of Iran. While dwelling on past "failures" may be academically instructive and even mildly rewarding, this is 1984, and not 1941, and we as a community have evolved to a degree we probably never anticipated.

One way to understand how far we have come is to get into Ivan's shoes for a look at the current US Warning System as he sees it. (I wish we had a better appreciation of how the Soviets really understand our system, just as I wish we understood their warning system better. The technical components and wiring diagrams are relatively easy but it is much more difficult to understand the cognitive warning process.)

Ivan probably sees:

a. an incredibly sophisticated total system replete with the latest in collection and information handling technology.

b. continued rapid growth in collection capabilities with increasing emphasis on timeliness of processing.

c. responsive and dynamic tasking of collection systems in response to worldwide interests.

d. a centralized command, control, and communications (C3) system which is without precedent or rival.

e. a work force that is equally without precedence or parallel in terms of its professional credentials and training.

f. analytic tools which further amplify the capabilities of the work force.

g. reliable and competent allies with whom we are firmly linked in terms of our C3 intelligence systems.

h. an interaction with industry and academia on warning and intelligence problems in general, which forecasts continued rapid improvements.

Ivan might well conclude that the US system already has something like a Star-Wars level of technology: fast, centralized, cohesive, smoothly operating, and providing warnings and aiding executive response to events even before they reach crisis proportions.

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Fundamental Doctrinal Problems

We must keep firmly in mind that indeed our capabilities have developed enormously and we have much to be proud of. But so much for role playing, and now for the rude awakening. There are fundamental doctrinal problems with which we confound our warning analysts.

First, we have a very inadequate understanding of what "warning" really is and how it differs from conventional intelligence analysis. One means of illuminating the distinction is to consider warning intelligence as having a focused goal which is the avoidance of harm; i.e., warning intelligence is that which is produced early enough concerning a potentially threatening situation to avert or ameliorate that forecast harm.

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Second, there is a series of paradoxes which make warning reporting an extremely tedious business. *Compartmentation* is closely tied to the problem of distribution. A report which takes into full account our most sensitive sources of information can be issued to very few people. Conversely, to issue a warning report to a broad audience one must restrict the use of all-source information, and thus an incomplete or inadequate warning may result. *Timing and probability* also work against one another. The nearer the possible event, the more likely we are to be able to accurately predict the probability of its occurrence. Conversely, to be able to avoid the harm implicit in the warning the earliest possible lead time must be given, which again is related to a lower level of confidence in the probability. *Coordination* should result in the most complete presentation of relevant material, and normally the highest confidence level in the probability of occurrence. However, coordination tends to suppress alternative analyses which may bode even more disastrous consequences for national security. Also, because our view of the future is perforce cloudy, it is hard to issue a coordinated warning sufficiently in advance of the event to ensure that the harm can be ameliorated.

Finally, our approach to the warning problem has been traditionally very narrow, i.e., equated to indications and warning which has historically been a military game, with specific focus on the military threat from Communist Bloc countries. We are beginning to understand that these military indicators cannot be viewed in isolation and indeed must be considered against the backdrop of the world political and economic situation. This broadened vision drives the complexity of the warning business to staggering dimensions.

Technological Implications

Let us now address the implications of our rapidly evolving technologies. The collection and processing technology which has given us an unequalled capability for reporting current events also has had a severe impact on our conduct of longer term analysis. Today's analyst is no longer allowed the luxury of analysis; he has been forced to become a data processor and a

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current events reporter. First, the quantity of data collected, even though there is a significant amount of preprocessing, requires human review *before* becoming a part of a useful information resource. Second, the timeliness of the data, and the partially understandable demands of the users, i.e., the policymakers and planners, force the analyst into a reactive mode where reporting what has just happened takes on greater importance than estimating what may happen. The user does not consciously request this level of support, but through his actions and queries the analyst is forced into a defensive reporting role. In the "good old days" when analysts were working from fragmentary information, and tasking for confirmation took weeks, if not months, the analyst was forced to rely on his studied knowledge of his target to provide the best estimate of what might happen. Also because he had only limited, and not very timely, insight into what had happened there was no pressure to beat the New York *Times*. Again, working with limited and manageable inputs the analyst was able to build his own shoebox files which were considered to be not only adequate but the only responsive means to his historical information needs. As a side excursion, the analyst also did not have to worry about the security or integrity of his data base because it was under his physical control, and even the smallest data bases were large enough to be visible when removed from the premises.

But, along came that villain technology to destroy the idyllic analytic existence. Data began to pour in at an increasingly dizzying rate and analysts now could quickly task another sensor for confirmation or amplification rather than make a judgment about the possible consequences of the event. Therefore, why speculate, interpolate, or extrapolate? The data base building problem remained largely manual, at least to the extent of requiring significant human intervention, but because of the size of these bases additional analysts were assigned to do nothing else. The target analyst lost control and often even access. Undaunted, our clever analysts often recreated their own pieces of the data base, which caused problems in redundancy and inconsistency. Yet we continued to improve our collection systems at an increasing pace. There were constant collection inadequacies noted. We needed systems to see through walls and hear under water. The communications spectrum grew and, as is always the case, the new spaces filled with data. We used these new communications capabilities to ensure that the data arrived at our analyst's desk instantly.

But alas, how was the technology helping the analyst, other than providing him with more data to process and less access to information? The terminal arrived to replace the morning pile of messages and occasionally to replace his pen and paper. A few "automated" data bases became available, but these were often known for the difficulty of access and were rarely available from a local terminal. To ensure access to more than one source of information the analyst was required to learn the vagaries of each and every system to which he required access.

What went wrong? Should we not have focused on improved collection? Were we not right in waiting for the perfect solution to the analyst's problems? The answers are not clear cut. But rather than dwell on what went

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wrong, let us consider what opportunities there are to meet the challenges of this era in information handling.

Today, technology is not a problem; the rapid advancements in storage, processing, and display technologies virtually assure us of being able to meet the analyst's requirements *if* they can be adequately defined and understood. The problem today is one of cognitive analysis, understanding how the analyst does or should function and then providing the tools which will provide the analyst access to the information and the necessary analytic routines.

Will our current evolutionary approach do the job? I do not believe so. Continuing to use the current analytic model will result in improvements in the basic tools for processing, but will only make the analyst a better processor of data, not a better analyst of information. A new approach must be formulated which begins with the collection systems, viewing the stream of data as something which wherever possible must be changed into useful information *before* being provided to the analyst

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The challenge, then, is not just to automate the way the analyst does his business today, but rather to analyze the basic functions of the analyst and develop new means of working with the information base necessary and pertinent to the task.

Training

In scoping the responsibilities of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, Mr. Casey and I agreed that it was the problems of process that should be addressed, and so I have undertaken initiatives in the following areas.

The training requirements inherent in the technological revolution lag in many respects. Particularly at the middle levels of management and analysis, personnel are no longer familiar with the crises of the past and their inherent lessons to be learned. They are swept up in the daily routines of processing and current intelligence reporting. Significant long-term analyses and projections are still being formulated but are often frustrated by outdated managerial understanding of the warning system or the warning process in general. Traditional forms of analysis cannot compete with the data flood. Our abiding concern to be right has made us unduly wary of "false alarms" and the so-called "cry wolf" syndrome. The result is that good analysis is lost with the bad

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and daring insights and projections never surface for analysts' fear of being wrong, or they are too late to be of use except in hindsight.

We are trying through dialogue with both the intelligence and operational communities to develop a fuller and more subtle understanding of the use of warning by those fulfilling different roles in the decision-making chain. This requires new definitions and tools for warning based on a better understanding of how people react to threats.

We have also established a program of community seminars to review warning problems and possible solutions. The primary purpose is to spread awareness of these problems among senior analysts and users and hope that they are able to convey the gospel within their agencies and departments. We are gaining valuable insights and notions of possible corrective actions from this sharing of ideas and experiences.

We have established a Warning Training Working Group comprising representatives from the Defense Intelligence College, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Cryptological School to deal with the training requirements for national warning. This group is currently developing a warning syllabus which will form the basis for new courses and be integrated into existing courses. It is hoped that this syllabus can also form the outline for a "warning primer" which could be used for senior level policy officials who are not, but must become familiar with the warning community, its procedures, and its products.

We are beginning a program with the Army War College which we hope will expand to the other service schools. Our intent is to foster a level of academic research at the service schools which will expand our mutual understanding of the warning problems.

The art form for warning reporting needs a considerable amount of attention. The only "official warning" vehicle is the alert memorandum, which suffers from a bad reputation and disuse. Our discussions with Mr. Casey and with community analysts and reporters lead us to the conclusion that some form of warning memorandum may be required. It must have a great flexibility to allow for any level of coordination and stimulation from any level of the intelligence community. As with any warning vehicle, it must take into full account the viability and importance of the "old boy network." A direct call from the DCI to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will always carry more credibility than a formal memorandum to a community of recipients.

Operations and Command Centers are a significant part of the warning apparatus. Most important is the recognition that as a network they have a capability that far transcends the sum of each of their individual capabilities. In 1983 the chiefs of the Washington area centers met with me (b)(1) for a two-day conference. The dialogue was extremely good and a number of actions have sprung from that meeting to include upgrades to existing communications capabilities, the development of tailored training programs, and the development of a fiscal program for network enhancement and training.

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Other initiatives are in the talking stages to include looking at reporting media for warning; studying the applicability of disaster theory to warning; expansion of the Worldwide Indications Monitoring System to a national system including political and economic indicators; bringing our allies more closely into our warning system.

For the future, many of the problems I have discussed will intensify. But we must avoid locking our understandings of warning into a straitjacket of the familiar. New understandings will be generated by new technology and new crises. These represent opportunities for intelligent integration of automated processing and manpower. Integration may require reorganization of the way all of us do business. We must identify and foster genuine analysis, not just information processing by our analysts. The automated tools will arrive, but they must aid the analyst, not just complicate his job or narrow his vision.

The Department of Defense has never lost its focus on the need for warning. Indeed, the DIA has been in the forefront of the development of indicator methodologies, and now the message is spreading into other areas of government. But even the Department of Defense systems must continue to evolve. We must remember that the answers developed after Pearl Harbor were suitable for that era but are totally inadequate today. Tomorrow brings only more challenges and opportunities. Fortunately, the warning community is stretching its limbs and is awake.

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A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.

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Unclassified

A Studies Roundtable

Creating the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (U)

Introductory Note: The creation of a new, national-level intelligence agency is not a routine or easy experience. CIA's establishment in 1947 was preceded by a series of halfsteps and extensive discussion (more within the Washington establishment than in public) on the question of how the United States wanted to focus a permanent peacetime intelligence structure. Much of the discussion centered on the tension between national and departmental needs for intelligence and control of the instruments producing it. At another level, the integration of previously separate organizations into a new agency affects the full spectrum of organizational existence, from high-level policy documents to the most mundane (and arcane) decisions on everything from standard forms to parking permits. The creation of the National Security Agency (NSA) in 1952, undertaken even less publicly, was marked by a similar mix of policy-related and bureaucratic issues.

The October 1996 establishment of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) brought together several thousand personnel from eight predecessor organizations. Beyond reorganizing components of the Intelligence Community (IC), a key decision in the NIMA implementation was the incorporation of the former Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), an entity with a distinguished lineage dating back to its service as the Army Map Agency, the principal topographic center of the War Department.

The CIA and NSA experiences were part of the establishment of the American intelligence apparatus for the Cold War. Half a century later, the creation of NIMA is part of the reshaping of that apparatus for service in a different world, technically and politically. On 4 November 1997, *Studies in Intelligence* Editorial Board members Lt. Gen. James Clapper (USAF, retired), Douglas Garthoff (CIA), and William Nolte (NSA) met with NIMA Deputy Director Leo Hazlewood and other key participants in the team that steered the proposal for a national imagery agency (see box). As the text of this edited transcript **(1)** makes clear, the issues surrounding the NIMA debate were numerous and complex. What is imagery's future role? What structure would best support that role? Would converging technologies permit the effective and efficient integration of components that evolved from an IC tradition and culture with components from an arguably related but organizationally different institutional background? Would the benefits of such an integration outweigh the costs of change? One year of operation (noting again the November 1997 basis of this roundtable) has not eliminated skepticism concerning NIMA. The process of integrating its components into a new structure with a new identity continues.

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Roundtable Participants	Role in NIMA Planning/Transition	Position, November 1997
Leo Hazlewood	Deputy Director, NIMA Deputy Director, NIMA	Implementation Team
Edward J. Obloy	Legal Issues	General Counsel, NIMA
Letitia A. Long	Program and budget issues	Associate Executive Director for Community Affairs
Sharon Basso	Congressional issues	Director, Agency Information Staff
David Broadhurst	General support and integration issues	Director, National Imagery and Mapping College
Bobbi Lenczowski	Organization issues	Deputy Director, Operations, Directorate, NIMA
William R. Allder, Jr.	"Responsibilities and Boundaries"	Deputy Director, Imagery, NRO
Greg Jay	Contractor (Booz, Allen, & Hamilton)	Booz, Allen, & Hamilton
Rick Stakem	NIMA Implementation Team	Associate Director, Operations Directorate, NIMA
Scott Large	Boundaries: NRO-NIMA	NRO Representative, NIMA
Helen Sullivan	Legal issues	Office of the Deputy, General Counsel, DoD

What was driving the idea of a national imagery agency?

Hazlewood: The idea that there was a better way to integrate the imagery process. Coming out of DESERT STORM, it seemed to a number of people that technology was moving in directions that would make a national, "NSA-like" agency for imagery more effective than any possible alternative. Bob Gates, Colin Powell, and John Deutch saw this as an opportunity worth pursuing.

Was this a case of the existing processes being broken?

Hazlewood: Not really. Most, if not all, of the predecessor units that came to form NIMA had recently received unit citations or commendations of one sort or another, and the sense was that they were all performing well. The key was that some important principals came to believe that we could do things even better.

Allder: Let me elaborate. When John Deutch looked at the potential for shared and complementary technologies that would be driving both the imagery and mapping businesses in the future, he saw a set of technological opportunities that could be pursued most effectively through a single set of plans and programs.

But why include mapping, something that had not traditionally been an IC function? Why not just consolidate imagery?

Hazlewood: Again, as you looked across the emerging technologies, the shared interests were compelling.

Jay: Keith Hall's group [Hall was then Executive Director of the Community Management Staff] was asked by John Deutch for suggested goals and objectives during his tenure as DCI. Mr. Hall offered up combining imagery activities in defense and intelligence. In April 1995, Deutch included a combination

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of these activities in his confirmation hearings.

Obloy: All this came together in November 1995, when [Secretary of Defense William] Perry, John Deutch, and General Shalikashvili signed a letter to the Congressional oversight committees outlining the need for a new look at the problem. Even though the idea would later generate skepticism from within the bureaucracies affected by the change, the proposal had top-level support that provided momentum past the skepticism.

What about Congressional skepticism?

Hazlewood: We certainly encountered some. Not everyone was convinced of the idea that the objective of all this was a technical opportunity. I think the second question I got asked was "You're not planning a new campus, are you?" things of that sort. Beyond that, on the House side especially, they were in the midst of their own study [*The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century* or "IC21"] and this clearly became a competing idea.

But the idea was out there: create a national imagery agency, more or less on the NSA model?

Hazlewood: Right, but you had to be careful with whom you used the term "NSA model." Some folks understood immediately what that meant and supported it. Others, including, at times, General Shalikashvili, were much more cautious about what it meant, and they clearly were people who were uncertain about the amount of autonomy it entailed. At the same time, the idea of creating a national imagery agency within the Defense Department (DoD) raised concerns about that agency's ability to support the national--that is, the non-DoD--customer.

Broadhurst: The timing here was important. On one level, it looked like we wanted to build yet another stovepipe, when the issue of excessive stovepiping was very real.

Hazlewood: This was an important issue with the House Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence (HPSCI), which was, as I said, engaged in its IC21 study and which immediately asked why we would want another stovepipe. So we quickly said "This is a porous stovepipe!" that would have to be organized in such a way as to work the flow of information to customers everywhere--through crosswalks at various levels and so forth. The key to making that work, as we kept coming back to this concern over and over, was an architecture that would allow information to flow wherever it was needed.

Did this produce clearly articulated positions: stovepipes versus crosswalks and so on?

Hazlewood: To some degree, though at another level, these became "religious issues," where people simply believed what they believed.

Long: One of the things that generated concern on the Senate side, with the Senate Subcommittee on Intelligence (SSCI), was whether all the money associated with imagery was going to go into the General Defense Intelligence Program. Were they thinking about the effectiveness of stovepipes? Not really; they were much more focused on whether a change would bring with it a loss of oversight and control.

While this discussion was ongoing, we experienced significant changes among the principals who had initiated much of this discussion. Did that make a change?

Hazlewood: One of the differences was the shift from Powell to Shalikashvili. I was in Gates's office when Gates talked to Powell after Powell had gotten the [Robert] Burnett Panel briefing. [The Burnett Panel, established in 1992, was an effort to examine the structure of the IC's imagery assets. One conclusion of its report, which was not adopted, called for integration of imagery and mapping. The report's recommendations in this regard were not accepted, but the issue remained alive.] Powell expressed his concern about not being sure we were fixing the thing that was broken. That translated to "I understand that imagery is broken; I do not understand mapping to be broken." Shali just had a different orientation. He was prepared to agree that he was not sure mapping was broken, but that he was

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prepared to agree with Deutch's argument that this was an opportunity. Shali's father, by the way, worked for the DMA in St. Louis, so he knew a lot about DMA. And that may have been a good thing. Deutch turned the whole argument from finding things that were broken to taking advantage of opportunities. Shali bought onto that, as did Peary.

Allder: The Burnett Panel got to Powell late in the process, and there continued to be arguments through the summer of 1995, with a wide range of views as to what was going to happen. I was in the Central Imagery Office (CIO) at the time, and we were bringing in consultants who had worked on corporate mergers to find out how you made government agencies like those engaged in imagery work better together. And their answer was "You can't do it," if we could not put in place the political will to force a change.

Jay: You have to understand, as Bill [Allder] just said, that the limitations of the CIO operation were becoming apparent. Dr. Krygiel [Annette Krygiel, Director of the CIO] used to joke about the CIO having a "sponge hammer" or "velvet hammer" as an instrument of authority.

Had the climate changed that much between the Burnett Study, in 1992, and the summer of 1995?

Jay: It had certainly shifted. The Burnett Panel was largely composed of active or retired senior military officers, and, by 1995, you were starting to feel much more of a grassroots interest in a national imagery agency.

Lenczowski: One of the things that had changed was the CIO experiment itself. By 1995, you had a growing number of people who were convinced CIO had been tried but was not the answer. And, to return to an earlier point, you really had an emphasis on finding the best ways to do things, not so much on fixing things found to be broken. When I accompanied Mr. Deutch on his tour of DMA, as he went into the environment, and he saw the cartographers at their work stations dealing with digital imagery, he reemphasized the point that they were working with imagery in much the same way imagery analysts do. So from his viewpoint, he saw it as an opportunity for both sets of analysts to leverage off a common environment. They were not the same job, but they were working in similar technical environments.

Broadhurst: Early on, no one in the community seemed terribly enamored of linking mapping with imagery. Except CIO. CIO had nothing to lose and really everything to gain from strengthening the authorities in this area that would force the disciplines together to take advantage of common applications. This did not sell early on, probably because of more of the "religious issues" associated with the whole question.

Clapper: Let me add a historical point. Leo and I were part of the committee that came up with the CIO, which was something of a bureaucratic compromise in which nobody gave up much. And that was the intent. Like everyone else, I had major equities at stake, as Director of DIA. As another note, early on it seemed like Bob Gates was prepared to give the entire imagery mission to DIA. There's a reference to that in his "inaugural" speech, but he soon discovered this was politically impossible. As for General Powell, I recall a conversation Adm. Mike McConnell, then the J2, and I had with General Powell on this issue. Basically, General Powell did not come on strong about imagery intelligence. What he was concerned about was DMA. Based on what DMA had done during DESERT STORM, he saw them as a skilled and specialized organization, which responded well when called upon. When he needed maps, he got maps, and he did not want that capability taken away!

Let's get back to architecture. It is hard to control architecture unless you control money. How successful has NIMA been in gaining authority over budgets and programs? If you are going to adhere to the NSA model, is there going to be an equivalent to the Consolidated Cryptologic Program for imagery and mapping?

Hazlewood: We are not there. We have created a National Imagery Program and a Defense Imagery Program, but the clear fact is that our statutory authority ends at the Joint Task Force level. Once you get below that point, we have not forced people to adhere to our architecture. We have debated this thoroughly. Admiral Dantone's [Rear Adm. John Dantone, NIMA's first Director] feeling is that rather

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than declaring war and forcing compliance on a whole bunch of people, it is better to demonstrate to them an architecture that attracts them. If we have good data, they will be attracted to it. We have certain authorities in the statute, but, to be honest, the resources are much more divided than they are in the SIGINT world.

Large: Imagery does not have analogs to the Service Cryptologic Elements, with their funding. It is not the same in imagery, where, for example, a large portion of imagery dollars remain in TIARA [Tactical Intelligence And Related Activities Program]. While NIMA may have oversight from an architectural standpoint, it does not have "seal of approval" authority. Much of the program--the former CIO, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and DIA pieces--is in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, as they were previously. They have now been rolled into a National Imagery and Mapping Agency Program (NIMAP). The former DMA resources are not part of NFIP (National Foreign Intelligence Program).

Obloy: As for putting all the resources into a single program, that was a nonstarter. Although it may have seemed logical and reasonable to us, it guaranteed real political problems, including the Armed Service Committee giving up jurisdiction, which we would never be able to sell on the Hill.

Long: And not just the Hill. In the early days, we presented that possibility to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the answer was "Over our dead bodies." So the easiest way was a compromise that left everything in the programs they were in but funded them all together.

Broadhurst: There was an early effort to include the TIARA programs under NIMA--that was the 800-pound gorilla option on our spectrum from "minor enhancement of the CIO to the 800-pound gorilla." But it was a nonstarter.

Hazlewood: The point of all this is that we learned early to make compromises on what we wanted to do because, without those compromises, we were not going to be able to build the coalition necessary to get the idea of a national agency first through the executive branch and then through Congress. One of the interesting things we observed through this was something of the fragmentation of the bureaucracy. After the principals has signed on, for example, to the proposal to create the agency, the OSD Comptroller dissented.

Why?

Hazlewood: They did not want an extra three-star position created. So they took a footnote. This sort of thing happened repeatedly. One of the interesting things to come out of the bureaucracies, on the other hand, was insistence from the Community Management Staff (CMS) that we set up a Senior Steering Group to oversee the process and a Customer Advisor Board to make sure customers are supportive. At the time, we had just stood up our team, we were way behind the schedule we needed to meet, and our initial response to CMS was "We do not think so." CMS insisted, and, in retrospect, those were two useful bodies. The Senior Steering Group (initially cochaired by the DDCI and Paul Kaminski from DoD, then trichaired because the JCS felt they needed to play) greased a bunch of skids through the bureaucracy for us. We would still be trying to coordinate this had it not been for their personal intervention. The Customer Advisory Board, viewed initially by some of our group as a pain, got all the customers together, chaired by the National Intelligence Council and the Operations Directorate (J3) of the Joint Staff. It was the only place where all the customers could come together and state their concerns.

Obloy: You can never overemphasize that the decision to go ahead and do this was taken somewhere around 27 November 1995, with a target date of 1 October 1996 for standing up the new agency, and with a legislative timetable that said our legislative package had to be on the Hill by 15 April 1996. So we had to push this whole package through the bureaucracy by April. In fact, the Senior Steering Group did grease some skids, but we still had to go around some skids, in making this thing a reality. This has not been without consequences. You do not make friends going around people, so there was a lot of tension around that time. One real consequence was that the bill got to Congress before it had been formally cleared by the administration. Little things like that.

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Sullivan: From a legislative standpoint, many things went forward with understandings that some blanks would be filled in later.

From an outsider's perspective, this looks like you moved the package through in an extraordinarily rapid pace.

Hazlewood: The British and Canadians are going through similar drills now, and as we have pieced together the legislative strategy and schedule, they are fully convinced that Americans move legislatively at breathtaking speed. For those of us who lived it, however, there is the different perspective that in the 18 months from the time John Deutch said "Let's do this," some of us nearly died along the way. But the fact remains that from 4 December 1995, when our team stood up, to 15 April 1996, we assembled the outline for the agency and Ed [Obloy] and Helen [Sullivan] drafted the legislative package, got it through the bureaucracy (sometimes by getting the right checkmarks, at others by avoiding checkmarks), and got it on the Hill for them to work it. Look how long it has taken other recent major legislation to take that path.

Jay: One thing to keep in mind as a real check on all of this: Congress was precleared on what we were doing, but they were equally clear with a "thou shall not" declaration prohibiting us from standing up the agency or doing any other implementing actions without final approval. So, during that time, we had to line up facilities, move dollars around, get computers and that kind of thing without violating that injunction. We had one hand tied behind our backs.

Obloy: We are still waiting for some implementing memorandums to be signed so we can clear up some loose ends.

Hazlewood: It is really important to review the Congressional language that accompanied this process. They made it clear that we would spend no money until we had authorization. We are now doing briefings where we make the point that Lucent Technologies spent more money designing its corporate logo than we did standing up NIMA. How did we do it? Well, most of the people in this room worked two jobs: they had their day jobs and then they had a night job putting together NIMA.

Long: This *was* my day job.

Hazlewood: The key determinant was that we had three principal officials--the DCI, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS--united that this was going to be done. John Deutch was the action officer, poking the others to get their support. Absent that coalition, we would still be debating this. That's what was fundamentally different from earlier efforts to consolidate imagery.

Obloy: Two other things that occurred were really important. First, Sharon [Basso] orchestrated our relationships with the Hill, working around the "thou shalt not implement" problem, and putting together Congressional days where we invited those folks in and really opened up the whole process. Also, we did a good job of identifying and lining up the key stakeholders, so that we could bring them in, tell them what the situation was, tell them we need a decision, and move on.

Broadhurst: The way we worked the key stakeholders was important. We would formulate positions on questions and call together the stakeholders from the eight involved agencies. We had good success getting senior participation. Mike Munson [Deputy Director, DIA] or Ruth David [Deputy Director, Science and Technology, CIA], who "owned" NPIC with CIA, would show up. And so on. Once we got buy-in from senior leadership--not that it meant we always had full cooperation all the way down their organizations--we could guarantee that the senior leaders helping us were not going to be blindsided.

Hazlewood: One of the working groups we set up was "Boundaries and Responsibilities," which Bill Allder and Scott Large were part of. In some cases, entire agencies were going to transfer to NIMA. In other cases, only parts of an organization were going to transfer. These guys were meeting with NRO, with DARO, and with others to work out the details of what was transferring and what was staying behind. That became a very important group in assuring the stakeholders that we were not there to hurt

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them. Some of the boundaries, quite frankly, were political compromises. But once again, our priority was to get on with it. The view was "We can fix it later."

Obloy: The three principals were important. At the next level down, working with legislative strategy and packaging, were the General Counsel of the DoD, Judith Miller, and her principal deputy, Whit Peters; and the General Counsel of CIA, Jeff Smith, who helped us get the language and approvals through. We had the moral force from the top leadership and the support of the folks controlling the fundamental documents hooked up to the same train.

Sullivan: It has been said that it can be easier to get legislation through Congress than through the executive branch. NIMA may be proof of that. If we had tried to seek an administrative solution to the problem, having the DCI and the SecDef sign some kind of charter, that would have played into the hands of the bureaucracies, we would probably still be waiting for approval. Bureaucracies can take a look at senior leadership, recognize the amount of turnover at that level, and wait them out.

Hazlewood: As evidence of that, most of the senior leadership that moved this along have all moved on.

But they were still in place during that critical November-April period, right?

Allder: We've talked a lot about that period, but at that point at least we had significant senior buy-in. Turf issues continued to arise, but by that time people were motivated to come to closure on most of those issues. I attribute that success to the group that worked through the summer of 1995, when the issue did not seem resolved and much more acrimony was still apparent. That was the time when the spectrum of options--from the "gorilla option" to a very low end--remained open and turf issues were much more open. The folks who worked through the head-butting period deserve a lot of credit.

Broadhurst: The nature of the discourse changed. In the later period, we were not arguing "whether" to go forward with a proposal for a new agency. We were arguing details.

Obloy: That is a good point. There are two theories for approaching the authorities' documents. We could either have waited for a decision to be made on whether to go ahead and then begun writing the necessary documents. Or we could anticipate the questions that would arise, make some informed decisions based on that summer study, and start with something. That is what I elected to do, having my staff get together, using the summer study, to produce a strawman piece of legislation. On 4 December, when we stood up the team, we had something. Alternatively, we could have waited until February or in some cases March until final decisions were made. The summer study was critical.

Broadhurst: I was looking at the final outbriefing that the task force gave, and all the findings, without exception, are now part of NIMA. In many respects, those findings had to be manifested in the implementation and in the legislation.

You had your package ready by 15 April 1996. When did the legislation actually pass?

Hazlewood: It passed on 30 September. But we have missed a period. We have talked about the period before April. We then hit a fallow period where final coordination was done within the executive branch. In May and June, we started asking how do we organize ourselves, what should be our concepts of operation, and questions like that. That set of activities took us through the summer to stand up. So we had whole sets of people who were given responsibilities for various areas, and business units. But we could not formally place any of those people in charge because that would have been implementation. We were left with having to say things to people like "We are not allowed to make a choice for this position, but if we could, you would be it," and work on that basis.

Keep in mind that a lot of people did not think this was going to happen. So, on 1 October, we had a lot of managers who looked around and realized it had happened. It has taken us a year to sort through all the pieces.

Obloy: We sometimes talk as if 1 October was something of an end point. It was really a beginning. In

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the summer, we had the DoD authorization bill, which was principally where our statute was, and it was starting to get in trouble. And then the funding started to get in trouble because they were talking about a continuing resolution. So, here we are, in August, after all this work, asking ourselves "What do we do with this mandated 1 October startup date if none of this legislation happens?" While we were designing NIMA to be as robust as possible, we also had to worry about what we were going to do on 1 October. Sharon had a blackboard in her office on which she kept track of something she called "the NIMA heartbeat," and at times it was on life support, or it would change from hour to hour. And then we get the letter from the Speaker. It looked like it was all going to crash and burn.

What was that?

Obloy: It is a dark memory in my brain.

Hazlewood: By this time, HPSCI had come out with IC21, and the House Republicans were being mobilized by the opponents from HPSCI. Some critical people were telling them "Just say no." The Speaker then wrote a letter to the conference committee on the DoD Authorization Bill.

Basso: In effect, he was asking the National Security Committee not to support what they had voted to support just two weeks before in public hearings. We really had not had serious opposition from Congress, except within HPSCI. We did have some tension with SSCI, which felt we had put a knife in its back by moving more toward larger control for Defense, but, that aside, HPSCI was our only problem. The House Appropriations Committee was supportive of the National Security Committee's position. We had not gotten in touch with National Security because they kept telling us it was not necessary for them to focus on the issue. When they did focus on the issue, their only concern was [HPSCI chair] Larry Combest. The strategy the National Security Committee proposed was to have the Chairman of the JCS call Speaker Gingrich to make sure the Speaker would support the legislation. But the call did not get made, and the letter came out and all heck broke loose.

One other actor on the Hill needs to be mentioned. When the letter came out, and we all went into depression, a staffer pointed out "Remember, Trent Lott also has an oar in this water." Senator Lott had been the subcommittee chair who originally inserted the bill into the Defense Authorization package. This was an interesting issue on the Hill, not just on the merits of the action, but because of the power bases in Congress. Lott's role helped, for reasons that did not have a lot to do with NIMA, but just because of his position in moving the legislation.

Hazlewood: We discovered during this period the importance of reaching out to people who could contact influential people on the Hill. We discovered, for example, that the Armed Services Committee was caught offguard by the Speaker's letter, because they thought passage was in the bag. They were so certain of it they had not become engaged in the events leading to the letter.

Obloy: There were two great compromises taken during this time. Before April, the question was "What do we do about the national mission?" The idea we came up with to deal with that was to provide for a National Mission Review, similar to what the military does in the combat support agencies. A review of this source did not exist anywhere else. And that seemed to calm the waters.

Hazlewood: In retrospect, this proposal was a stroke of genius. They seized at it on the Hill, thinking that, if this were included in the statute, it would make clear the nature of the agency.

Obloy: So this left us with two review processes: one that was primarily the responsibility of the military; the other the responsibility of the DCI. And, as I said, it calmed the waters. In the August-September time frame, the collection tasking issue arose. This was really another one of those "religious issues." Who controlled tasking? What is the role of NIMA and the Director of NIMA in tasking? We spent many, many hours faxing language back and forth to try to craft something that would satisfy all the parties involved that the status quo was not being affected. That was probably the last great compromise, coming up with language that would remove the last major blip on the radar screen.

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Jay: This is another reflection of the leadership involved in the effort. Not once did I hear senior leadership advocate something just because they thought it was a good idea. They had been asked to assemble data on "what was the right thing to do." In particular, I saw Admiral Dantone say, on many occasions before Congress, "If this thing does not happen, so be it. It is for Congress to decide." I thought I was going to die when he said that. But the approach was that we had done our jobs presenting a balanced view. Now it was up to Congress. It conveyed the sense that this was something that the stakeholders had looked hard at, not that it was something Jack Dantone had cooked up to ensure his next promotion. Even when people came into the working groups openly unsure that this was a good idea, everyone stepped up to the plate.

As a backdrop to all this, the work force at this point was performing their missions with little firm information about what was going on. Is that correct?

Stakem: Let me add to that point. At the working level, we had existing organizations that not only continued to function but also in some cases were in the midst of major reorganizations in their structure and way of doing business. This was going on almost up to the first of October. Managers were being moved a week before NIMA stood up. NPIC was planning to change totally the way it managed its work processes two weeks before. DIA restructured and redesignated [designator; unclear on tape; ed] about three weeks before standup.

Hazlewood: Only DMA (of the proposed NIMA components) did not reorganize during this time.

Stakem: Institutions were going along saying NIMA may or may not happen, but we have a job to do. How do we optimize ourselves to do that job? Right up to the end--literally right up to 1 October--internal changes were taking place in various components.

You had nearly 9,000 people affected by this. As you moved through the summer, what did they know?

Hazlewood: We were enjoined from giving too much information for fear that it would look like implementation. So we would brief people and talk with people, but we could never engage the way you would if you had freedom of movement. We had two or three offsites for "next level" management--groups of several hundred--where we were providing them with their first exposure to what within five or six weeks was going to be a major change in their work lives.

Obloy: Many of the things we had to spend money on involved detailed decisions on whether we were violating the law. Relatively little things, signs in buildings, badges, things of that sort. Could we design a badge without issuing them? I think we made a decision when the bill was reported out of committee that Congress probably knew this was going to happen, and we could start to spend money to implement.

Stakem: Just a small point: I have two NIMA badges. Because we could not buy badge machines. This badge works in this building; this one works at the Navy Yard.

Obloy: You need to understand, beyond the signage and badging, we had 7,000 people in DMA who were in the normal Federal personnel system, with unions and all their protections. All they knew was that a move was afoot to move them into a separate personnel system. They were really in the dark, and it was difficult to deal with the people issue, and the significant changes in people's careers we were undertaking.

Lenczowski: We had a robust communications strategy that had absolutely no impact. No matter who we talked to, or how many meetings we had, it was not registering. We were not their managers. A great lesson in communications.

What are you doing to cope with the continuing cultural issues?

Hazlewood: We had decided we were going to focus on what we saw as the hard issues, and in retrospect those may not have been altogether the right issues. Let me give you an example: when DMA

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did a survey in which one of the questions was "Are you proud of your organization?" 85 to 90 percent said yes. When we did a similar survey of NIMA employees recently, about 64 percent said yes. The fact is many of our people have still not bonded to the new organization. We have every intention, at the senior leadership level, to do something about this.

We faced almost immediate pressure to answer questions like "What's your investment strategy for 2010?" and we were in a situation where our response had to be "Our investment strategy is that everyone gets paid this week." Remember, we inherited over 1,200 policy documents from different agencies, totally different procedures for hiring people, firing people, moving people, buying things, and so on. Eight different agencies just did things differently.

Connectivity just killed us. We inherited five different B-level local area nets and another dozen or so SCI LANs--none of which we owned. As a manager, even getting around to see your people is an ordeal. I am not talking about my level, I am talking about branches.

Stakem: Let me chime in. We have branches where part of the branch is at DIAC and part is at the Navy Yard. We have others with segments in Langley and segments in the Navy Yard. People do not sit together, and they have absolutely no electronic connectivity. We have people who have to hunt down someone who can type an e-mail message to people in their chain of command. "I'll fax you that e-mail message" is not unknown around here.

Hazlewood: We planned for the first day to put the Admiral's morning staff meeting on secure videoconferencing to give him presence across the Agency. This was fine until the dry run, when we discovered we had three incompatible video teleconferencing systems.

Do your people think they work for NIMA? Or do they think they work for their predecessors?

Hazlewood: Within two days of standup, the imagery analysis elements at DIAC had put up these big NIMA signs. They were the first. Sort of a "Jones Free State" message. If you go into most other places, you still find the legacy signage. I kid the people in St. Louis that I will know NIMA exists when they paint the police cars.

Stakem: I instituted a system where anyone using a predecessor designator had to put a dollar in a cigar box. A dollar for managers, actually; 25 cents for analysts. After we had collected about $1.75, we did not collect anymore. People seemed to catch on.

What's the legacy of that frenetic startup?

Long: You can probably see some of it in the budget cuts NIMA has taken this year.

Hazlewood: One of the things Congress did, not so much intentionally as under the pressure of time, is appropriate our funds in their original categories while saying "But, oh, those are NIMA's funds." In the case of the Air Force, for example, with functions transferring from the NRO or CIA, we had to get permission from the Air Force while at the same time asking CIA or NRO whether NIMA could spend the money.

Obloy: I mentioned earlier that we have a unique personnel system. That is, we have no personnel system. We are working on that now. We have a current legal framework in which there are unions in this organization. We are the only intelligence agency with collective bargaining agreements. Seventy percent of the people in NIMA can appeal decisions outside the organization, which is unique. Recently, we went through an exercise on how to deal with budget cuts and the possibility of a reduction in force. You can talk about the people not understanding the rules we are playing under. Even the managers do not understand all the time. Those who came from the unionized environment understand, but the others are really surprised when they find out what they can and cannot do in these circumstances.

Hazlewood: The extent of Congressional interest is also unique. We have over 3,000 employees in suburban St. Louis. NIMA is one of the 10 largest employers in the area. Let me tell you, if we move

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people around in that facility, we get [Congressional] phone calls. If that work force wants to find out what is going on, they do not ask management. They write their Congressman, who sends the letter to us. We then respond to the Congressman, who replies to the employee, who then posts it on the bulletin board. Talk about things they never taught you in intel school!

How many of your folks would, at this point, say "This was not necessary. The old agencies would have been just fine?"

Hazlewood: At least half, maybe two thirds.

Nevertheless, have there been successes?

Hazlewood: I would highlight the support we provided to the Marines involved in the NEO [Nonmilitary Evacuation Operation] from Sierra Leone. Instead of loading the ship carrying that Marine Expeditionary Force with 70 pallets of paper, we placed what we call a Remote Replication System on the ship that allowed them to print their own maps. We provided them with imagery, current to within two hours of when they went ashore, directly to the ship. When those Marines went ashore, they had the best data we could give them. Within the last two months, we and the NRO transmitted imagery directly to the US Embassy in Kinshasa, where the Ambassador and the country team are now able to see what is going on around them in the country and in the city. We are finding that the former DMA people who work collection have much better access to collection data because they can call their NIMA friends at the ground station and work off the intelligence collection. They now have much greater access to intelligence imagery than ever before! On the intelligence side, by merging different parts of the imagery community, we are seeing much better work on a whole range of issues, including Korea. I cannot go into the details, but I can tell you that over the last few months the breakthroughs, on this issue alone, are directly attributable to the greater focus that comes from having the former DIA elements and the former CIA elements working more closely.

On Iraq, we have been producing slightly less imagery, but we are also looking at greatly reduced overlap, because we are tasking more coherently. You can really eliminate a lot of hidden redundancy when you do not have to look at everything twice because the first person who looked at it "worked for another agency."

Allder: It is ironic that we are seeing our short-term benefits from production efficiencies. In all our planning, we expected the short-term gain to come from systems integration, with production gains to follow. This view was the source of many of the disagreements involving IC21 and some of the alternative plans for imagery integration.

Hazlewood: We put a lot of emphasis on making the transition as seamless as possible for our customers. The systems issue may turn out to be a harder nut to crack than we earlier anticipated. We inherited something like 650 different development programs, and even getting straight and figuring out what was in them virtually required us to destroy all of them and rebuild them from the ground up.

Are there any changes contemplated in your relationships with HUMINT and SIGINT?

Hazlewood: On SIGINT, we put together statistics on the first six months of NIMA, compared to the last three months before standup. We were dealing with some concerns that intel was taking over mapping and so forth. One of the statistics revealed that we are doing 20 percent of our imagery tasking from SIGINT tipoffs. I would never have thought it was that high. The SIGINT Committee has indicated an interest in things like joint collection reviews. On the HUMINT side, a number of the things we are doing on Korea are HUMINT-driven, but the process has been episodic.

How would you assess the current state of skepticism, Congressional and other?

Hazlewood: It is reduced on the Hill, but it is still there. When I go to CIA and DIA, I still find people openly saying this is an aberration, and that at some point the analysts will return to their natural homes. That sort of talk is poisonous in the work force. It gives hope for the past. We have done two customer

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surveys. On the second, DIA declined to participate, and many people at CIA said they wanted to go back to the old Office of Imagery Analysis. A lot of people want to go back to the good old days. But we press ahead. You have to have long-term goals, but frankly much of our effort is focused on making sure that we are getting the job done on Monday.

Stakem: Or Tuesday.

Thank you all.

NOTES

1. This roundtable was conducted under ground rules permitting participants to review and emend their comments. The questions and comments of *Studies* board members are generally unattributed and edited severely, placing the focus of the transcript on the participants. As an exception, General Clapper's comments relating to his role as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in discussions on the future of imagery, discussions that led to the creation of NIMA, are noted for attribution.

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THE CIA CANOE POOL

(b)(3)(c)

The question recurs with remarkable consistency. Not even the wording changes. When I meet casual acquaintances at the office most of them eventually ask, "Are you still canoeing to work?" The question is a cut above the usual elevator chatter, but I do bridle at that word "still," since it implies there is a reason I might stop. For the fourteen years I have been a member of the CIA canoe pool, getting there has been at least half the fun; there is no question of stopping.

Of course, you need special circumstances before canoeing to work becomes feasible, and I am grateful for the way these circumstances have worked out for me. What has made the canoe pool possible is a pair of unwitting conspiracies—one between nature and the National Park Service, the other between Allen Dulles and a nineteenth-century Marylander named Matthew Ruppert.

The Setting

The broad, tidal Potomac as it lazes past downtown Washington is familiar to nearly everyone, and fair numbers have seen it as it comes off the piedmont plateau at Great Falls, a dozen miles upstream. The setting for the canoe pool is the much less familiar stretch between the tidal river and Great Falls. For much of this stretch the salient feature is inaccessibility. The terrain itself is difficult, since most of the way from Great Falls to Georgetown the river runs through a steep-sided gorge, more precipitous on the Virginia than on the Maryland side. But the Park Service (which owns most of the land) has thrown up further barriers in the form of scenic parkways. In Maryland the parkway has turnouts providing access to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which runs parallel to the river. In Virginia, however, the road is a four-lane, almost exit-free speedway that gives motorists no chance to stop and discourages anyone else from crossing it.

To be sure, people walk, bike, and jog by the thousand along the C&O Canal towpath, but almost nobody uses the Virginia shore. Few people, moreover, have any way of using the river itself, and most of those who do are whitewater enthusiasts who stay in the first few miles below Great Falls, where the exciting rapids are. Farther down, the river and the woods on the Virginia side constitute what I have come to think of almost as a private preserve: a narrow strip of near-wilderness, protected by a series of natural and man-made obstacles and used by almost no one.

It was at a point in Virginia on the edge of this stretch that Allen Dulles decided to build the new CIA headquarters, back when nobody worried about

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the cost of gas and it was the "in" thing to move out of town. My office moved to its new quarters in the fall of 1961, leaving behind "temporary" buildings from World War II that were about to make way for the Kennedy Center. Commuting from Maryland and the District of Columbia was painful at first: the beltway around Washington had not been finished and everyone had to inch across crowded bridges in the District. But three resourceful colleagues of mine discovered the Sycamore Island Canoe Club, set up by Matthew Ruppert and some friends in 1885 and occupying two islands near the Maryland shore almost exactly opposite the Agency building. Thus was born the CIA canoe pool, and its members actually saved commuting time until the beltway was finished.

I did not join the canoe pool until 1970, at first because we lived too far away in the District and then out of inertia after we moved to Maryland. (When we lived in the District my car pool did buy the canoeists a child's edition of *Hiawatha* and leave it under their canoe.) Since then all three original members have retired and I have become one of the canoe pool's mainstays.

Cowbell, Raft, and Bike

Sycamore Island is an acre or two in area; it lies off the Maryland shore about fifty yards from the canal towpath. On it stand a clubhouse (which has quarters for a caretaker) and an ancient shed full of canoes that often are almost equally ancient. To reach it you descend a short flight of steps from the towpath and yank on a rope that rings a cowbell on the island. This summons the caretaker, who pulls a small, barge-like ferry across to the steps.

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From the island over to the Virginia shore is about a third of a mile. There are no rapids, although the current is brisk when the river rises. The CIA building lies up a steep, wooded bluff and across the parkway, about half a mile from the river.

On a typical morning I wheel my bicycle down our driveway in Bethesda and head for the ferry landing, a little over three miles away. At the landing I meet anyone else who is paddling that day, and we ring for the caretaker and cross to the island. I leave my bicycle in the clubhouse. We unchain our canoe and paddle across. The canoe is left chained to a tree (three canoes have been stolen over the years—the river is not *that* remote), the paddles are hidden, and we hike up through the woods on the remnants of a path, complete with stone steps, that was built when the land was a private estate before World War II. We cross the parkway on the cloverleaf that is also carrying our car-encapsulated colleagues, show our badges to the guards at the gate, and walk through the parking lot to the building. Door-to-door, the operation takes a little under an hour in the morning; the trip home takes a bit longer because of the uphill bike ride.

"What do you do when it rains?" my elevator acquaintances sometimes ask. The rule is, if it's raining in the morning we drive to work; otherwise we paddle and rely on ponchos if it rains on the way home. But sometimes the rule is hard to apply. Some of us are more eager (or masochistic) than others, and we have been known to have long jesuitical debates by telephone over whether a given weather condition qualifies as rain. Afternoon thunderstorms send us scurrying to cadge rides from our office colleagues, and because a poncho is poor protection for a cyclist, I have been known to quail at the sight of a cold winter rain and beseech my friends for a ride.


There are other problems that a non-canoeist might not anticipate. Mud, for example. I have an agreement with my wife that my method of commuting will not add significantly to her laundry pile, and my muddy trousers often test the limits of that agreement. Things are worst in the aftermath of high water, when the emergent riverbank has a consistency almost impossible to describe; Mark Twain's "too thick to drink, too thin to plow" comes close. It is easy to sink in shin-deep. A clothes brush at the office helps, but there still are days when I must try to maintain my dignity with patches of dried mud on the lower third of my trousers.

Or spider-webs. In summer the spiders in the woods on the Virginia shore are incredibly productive. Twenty webs may appear across the path overnight, and some of my colleagues maintain that the spiders lie in wait to throw their webs across our faces. In spider season the first canoeist up the hill carries a branch which he waves in front of him. I am constantly reminded of the "simba" rebels at the height of the Congo crisis who waved palm fronds to ward off bullets.

These are inconveniences rather than obstacles. Most of the time the annoyances are less severe than the traffic jams on the beltway. I maintain, moreover, that commuting by canoe is far safer than driving; it is just that we have become inured to the dangers of the latter. If conditions are anywhere

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near normal I think nothing of making the trip by myself. There is not even any particular obstacle to commuting after dark.

Rhythms

A logistic outline like this misses most of the important things, of course. The chance to observe a little corner of wilderness day in, day out is a rare privilege for a deskbound suburbanite. One gets, for example, a glimpse of the long and varied rhythms of the natural world. Deep scars in a treetrunk, gouged by the chain holding my canoe when tree and canoe were submerged in the 1972 flood, are almost healed; where two trees on the hillside have fallen, honeysuckle has used the extra light to move in on the jack-in-the-pulpit; stubby trees on the outcrops in midstream get stubbier with every flood and ice-storm; fill dirt, dumped when the parkway in Virginia was being built, has been only lightly covered with humus in over twenty years.

Or the seasonal rhythms: the bluebells that come up along the river no matter how much silt has been put down in high water; the unvarying sequence of wildflowers with wondrous names: toothwort, then squirrel-corn, then troutlily; the joepye-weed festooned with swallowtail butterflies in late summer. I am smug in my knowledge that dutchmen's breeches will appear on a certain patch of ground in April, that a transit of scarlet tanagers can be expected the first week in May, that the raspberries will ripen in July and the pawpaw in September. Wood ducks and mallards produce broods every year, orioles invariably nest in the sycamores, and one year we discovered a Carolina wren's nest right beside the path. We wait for the river to change from summer's olive drab to its wintertime gray-blue-green.

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There is a long roster of more or less permanent inhabitants: ospreys, herons, pileated woodpeckers, occasional deer, raccoons (rarely seen, but their tracks are everywhere), and the geese—barnyard and Canada—that are fed by the caretaker on the island. And beaver: it astonishes my elevator friends that beaver live right in metropolitan Washington, but they are numerous enough to cause a good deal of damage to trees along the bank. They are nocturnal, and it is not too unusual to see one swimming home in the morning. On occasion we have drifted downstream behind a beaver for a hundred yards, and one evening when I was hurrying through the woods after working late, I nearly tripped over a beaver that was browsing absentmindedly by my canoe.

We have become connoisseurs of sunrises. Spring and fall produce misty scenes out of an oriental painting, and the trees on the Virginia shore explode with color when the autumn sun hits them. On a frigid winter morning we may be spectators to a bleak interplay involving northwest wind, bright sun, dark clouds, and blue sky. Only sodden summer mornings are predictable, and it is during summer that mobilizing for the canoe pool is hardest.

It surprises many people, even those familiar with the pressure-cooker effect of a Washington August, that canoeing comes hardest in summer. I sometimes mitigate the discomfort by making the transit in swimming trunks and taking a quick dip. In the morning I still am relatively cool by the time I reach the top of the hill, where I change into business gear just before emerging from the woods. A dip does not help much with the uphill bike ride home, of course, and I must rely for motivation on the prospect of a cold beer.

Winter Variables

Winter canoeing is a joy by contrast. Another elevator question is, "Do you mean you canoe all *winter*?" The answer is emphatically yes—if the river is not too high, if there is not too much wind, and if the ice is either absent or negotiable. Yes, the canoe pool kept going even in the chilly winter of 1983-84. We obviously must pay closer attention to the many variables involved since the margin for error is drastically reduced, but the variables themselves may combine in ways that offer unexpected opportunities. To take one example, a strong current or a good wind can keep the river ice-free at temperatures well below freezing. To take another, the floating slush that sometimes dots the river slows the canoe but keeps waves down on a windy day. (Slush on a morning of dropping temperatures is a warning, on the other hand. The original canoe pool once took more than an hour rather than the usual ten minutes to cover the third of a mile back to the island.)

At Washington's latitude, prolonged cold spells are rare and extensive ice is not often a problem. We have had the sustained cold necessary for a solid freeze only three times in the fourteen years I have been paddling. Those three times—the winters of 1977, 1981, and 1982, when the river froze all the way across—we crossed on foot, assuaging the inevitable worries with a wide and creative variety of safety devices: a 14-foot bamboo pole; an ice axe; an

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automobile towline, so neatly and tightly coiled that it could not conceivably have been used in an emergency; a 15-foot length of rope with the owner at one end and his briefcase bouncing along at the other; and most improbable and useful of all, a canoe. A canoe turns out to be a first class life support system in and on the ice, and with it the pool kept going in conditions that once stopped it.

Walking across when you know the ice is ten inches thick becomes almost comfortable; but what about a thaw? What about the times the ice builds out from shore, getting thinner and thinner as it approaches open water? I found that a canoe was in its element in these conditions if I brought along an ice axe and a sturdy paddle. Putting part of my weight on the canoe while walking beside it reduced the chance of breaking through, and the canoe was a refuge, easy to scramble into, if I misjudged. The ice axe was sometimes useful for chopping a path, but more often for propelling the canoe across the ice in the same way the paddle pushed it through the water. The paddle got the canoe through ice too thin for the ice axe to grip.

As a result I missed very few days, not just during the depth of the cold spell in 1981 but during the thaw that followed. In 1982, by contrast, I hardly crossed the ice at all. The difference lay in the almost infinite number of variables that affect the quality of river ice. In 1981 the river was exceptionally low, the current was minimal, and the ice formed solidly. In 1982 the ice was more treacherous even though the temperatures were lower. A somewhat higher river level and a heavy fall of snow (which weighed down the ice and let water onto the surface, turning the snow into slush) spelled the difference.

In many ways wind is the most daunting and frustrating of the winter variables. When we are paddling it tries to capsize us, slew us around, and send us sideways all at the same time; and when crossing the ice I have been

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propelled briskly to the southeast in an almost friction-free environment. A good winter breeze also brings the wind-chill factor down to zero or below, and because in winter it usually blows straight downstream it reinforces whatever current there is. It was on such a day, when we all were chilled to the bone and there was no way we could stop paddling for even a few seconds, that a colleague remarked he had to keep looking to see if his arms were still on.

For most of the winter, of course, questions of this sort do not arise. Occasionally we get a quiet and beautiful snowfall, which usually occurs when the temperature is around freezing and the river is ice-free. Much more often there simply is nothing to report: there is no ice, the wind is not particularly strong, and the weather is just the normal dreary Washington fare. Dreary or not, I find it more salutary to be out in the weather than to grumble about it from inside; somehow the winter thereby becomes easier to get through. I now do not get really impatient for spring until mid-March.

Proof Against the Absurd

Aside from the obvious benefits—the chance to see wildflowers and pileated woodpeckers, the exercise, the insights into the workings of nature—what do I get out of all this? Part of the answer is that regular contact with the earth is as important for me as it was for Antaeus.* Another part (and it may be saying the same thing in a less metaphorical way) is that for a moment I get to evade modern man's almost complete dependence on secondhand information. People now are very largely containerized, physically and even mentally, and without really noticing it we have come to rely on what others tell us about the world beyond our narrow boxes. I suppose this has always been true, but the ratio between the great mass of secondhand data and the small amount we pick up on our own can never have been greater than it is now. It is all too easy to ignore the distinction—to forget that nearly everything has been through a process of selection, organization, and interpretation before we get it. This is a particularly serious danger for professional information-processors like me, but I think the proposition holds for most people. At any rate, the canoe commute does give me a firsthand glimpse of what is going on beyond the various manmade containers I inhabit; I benefit from regular access to information that clearly is unmediated.

Beyond that, I find it simultaneously humbling and encouraging to be reminded that it is an endless process out there, always and yet never changing. At a less cosmic level it is satisfying to understand from my own experience (to take just one example) why the Eskimos have a vital need for many terms to distinguish among different kinds of ice. And not least, when things seem to be settling into a pattern of sustained wackiness either at home or in the office, a fixed point of reference like the canoe crossing is useful even if it is brief.

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*In Greek mythology, Antaeus was a giant of Libya, son of Poseidon and Gaea (earth), long invincible in wrestling because his strength was renewed every time he touched the earth, his mother. Heracles held him off the ground and throttled him.

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There was only one time when the reference point itself seemed to be working loose. One summer morning, when the mist was still heavy on both the Potomac and my brain, I suddenly noticed that the river was full of dozens of squirming beings ten or twelve inches long, each of them with a huge mouth that stuck above the surface. For a long moment I felt as if I had wandered into a Brueghel painting; then I realized that the surface was covered with insect corpses, the result of some sort of mass death upstream, and the squirming beings were catfish that had come up from the bottom to scoop them in. Relieved that the river was still proof against the absurd, I resumed paddling toward a world I knew was not.

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PAR - FAITS (AND OTHER FAITS)

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c) What follow are quotations from Performance Appraisal Reports that Mr. [redacted] compiled over the years and for which he composed introductory comments. The quotations are rendered faithfully, with typographical and other errors intact, for they contribute to the fun. The subjects, supervisors, and reviewing officials mentioned and quoted in this compilation are to remain forever, and mercifully, anonymous.

The Golden Rule—Redux:

"I believe that the readers of this PAR, as well as the previous one written by the Rating Officer, should know that the Rating Officer and I have had and continue to have many strong personal and professional differences of opinion. He believes, for example, that I have reached my level of competency, and I believe that he has exceeded his."

Mastering the surprise ending:

"It should be recognized that by employing the proper technique, very comfortable shoes can be made from a sow's ear but making a silk purse requires an entirely different raw material."

Making no bones about it - in the vernacular:

"Subject is also responsible for all Headquarters support of a complex covert action operation aimed at maintaining the political stability of a regime headed up by a weirdo who goes around saying things like 'dat get me shame'."

When faint praise is called for:

"Operationally, Subject was not loafing."

For one who skates well on thin ice:

"Subject is quick to spot thin stuff and do something about it — particularly when it comes to good operational tradecraft."

For one who can bench press human dynamics while reciting from Rabindranath Tagore:

"His ability in oral expression and human dynamics was strongly demonstrated . . ."

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Growth Potential:

"As the period drew to a close, Subjects apparatus had begun taking shape. . . ."

Being hugely successful:

"He largely recruited a high level source."

What to do to protect colleagues from being hit by large and fast moving desks:

(b)(1) (b)(3)(c) "Mr. D. continued to be the Elmer's glue of the large and fast-moving Desk."

Almost flawless—so to speak:

"His English is flawless, if not close to it."

When in doubt clutter things up; its good for cover:

"He characteristically complicates simple things."

The smiling, freely offered thumb in the eye:

"One thing not noted previously is his calm and pleasant demeanor which tends gratuitously to mask his toughness as a case officer."

The clairvoyant case officer:

" . . . His operational reporting is often on time, often ahead of time."

Then there's this little QP drummer:

"He marches to the beat of his own drummer."

Although not a hot-head:

"This officer has a warm mind."

His eyes are clear but his prose is measured and smoke-watered:

"With the perspective of twenty months of overview of his long march, rather than with the smoke-watered eyes of those who peer too closely into his campfire, I conclude that his pace has been measured."

Big jokes from little mischiefs grow?

" . . . his personal eagerness tends sometimes to lead him into small mischiefs."

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Although an off-quay visionary he can trumpet, and drum, and stomp his foot all at the same time:

"He has been like a one-man band trying to cover the waterfront on a far-frontier."

The Good Humor Man endures:

"He has endured rapid personnel changes with good humor."

The hyperactive dog of a case officer:

" . . . He is a man of constant motion—some of it unnecessary . . . he bloodhounds even the longest odds and opportunities."

Although some may wonder:

"All said and done, Mr. S. is human."

When tippling leads to being Freud, and the naked truth must be revealed:

"At the right psychological moment he unfrocked himself in (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) cafe."

The crawl-on-your -belly- and -hiss- approach:

" . . . a target of opportunity whom he approached in his own inimical style."

Dignity in catastrophe:

"Subject handles flaps with aplomb."

Standing tall in the Lilliput of Liaison:

"Due to his height this man should probably be directed along liaison lines or staff work."

The runaway case officer:

"He is not only a self-starter but a self-goer—at times tending to go too fast."

Unless one speaks quietly and carries a big stick:

"The operational carrot is easily lost sight of and is difficult to catch."

The Case of the Abandoned Suitcase:

"He began to pursue ops leads as soon as his suitcase hit the ground."

The cape-and-dagger jock:

"He involves himself athletically in Base and local activities."

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The strong tryer:

"I would rate his effort to do the job as strong."

When finishing working hard on his syntax . . .:

"He at least secured his own housing on which he has been working hard to fix up."

The monosyllabic hot dog:

"His performance has been—WOW"

The musty Middle East:

"This officer has been associated long enough with Arab affairs. He now needs fresh air."

After making good strides in the wrong direction . . . :

"He has made good strides in the right direction."

The gritty performer:

"This officers performance has been outsanding."

The forward leaning, vine swinging Case officer:

"Mr. K. moved in sure-handed fashion."

The Compleat hard target Case officer:

"He is a hard-nosed supervisor and a hard-headed officer."

Besieged, bothered and bewildered:

"He has reached a standoff with the bureaucracy around him."

The operational arsonist:

"Subject has kept the target fires burning."

When aptitude isn't apt:

"His apptitude for spelling is poor."

When he's not plodding he lies down, humps his back and makes himself small:

"He is steady and defendable."

Because his compass came in his air freight . . .:

"It took the officer less than one week after his arrival here to get his bearings."

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Just give him a tune-up, but don't touch the cheerful plugs:

"He tries hard in a situation that has him more stymied than most of us, and he plugs along cheerfully."

The lean and meaningness officer:

"He has brought new energy and meaningness to the program."

While shunning the unusual infinitude of every day chores . . .:

"He handles the usual infinitude of occasional case officer tasks."

To be some kind of mixed up butterfly . . .:

". . . He needs to get the operational chrysallis out of the political coccoon it is in."

He trembles at dullness, but-:

"He confidently attends all sorts of events of interest . . ."

The wary grunter:

"He gives a negative first impression, primarily because he is inarticulate."

When the anatomy of an Advance Work Plan is necessarily obscure:

"Mr. S. has had supervisory responsibility for parts of two I.A.'s . . ."

Not risking over confidence:

"He can look back at this job as 'pretty well done'."

The little engine with the retarded spark:

"During the reviewing period this officer has made good use of the limited intelligence resources available to him."

Somewhere down there is gold; it just doesn't pan out:

"Subject probably has much good in him. Somehow, though, it has not come through."

The tribal wit:

". . . he is a happy headhunter."

In addition to avoiding prickly confrontations . . .:

"Subject is not one to sit on his laurels."

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Migratory fixation:

"I am looking forward to the next reviewing period when the birds will come home to roost." (next FR) "They have, and they have settled on the highest branches."

Seen through a glass darkly:

"Insofar as I am able to comprehend it, I have no quarrel with the substance of the rating officer's comments."

To be continued.

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TITLE: The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle

AUTHOR: Yehoshafat Harkabi

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THE INTELLIGENCE-POLICYMAKER TANGLE *

Yehoshafat Harkabi

The publication of the Kahan Commission report, with its indictment of the IDF ** Intelligence Chief, reopened the debate on the relationship between the intelligence services and their clientele, the policymakers. The formal description of how intelligence supplies the policymakers with information and evaluations as a basis for molding policy is simplistic and incomplete. The relations between these echelons are complex and tension-ridden, as is evident when one looks beyond formal hierarchical structures and processes at the influence of informal relations on the workings of administrative bodies.

The study of the functioning of intelligence services, which has greatly developed in recent years, does not focus only on how the intelligence service produces its reports—information gathering and analysis. It also deals with the crucial area where the usefulness of the service is put to trial; namely, the transmittal of the intelligence service's product to the policymaking bodies, the "interface" between intelligence and policy.

Intelligence is not an autonomous operation whose *raison d'etre* lies in itself. Intelligence activities depend on having a clientele to serve. However, its clients are not necessarily receptive to intelligence, for what they often look for is not so much data on the basis of which to shape policy but rather support for pre-formed political and ideological conceptions. The intelligence service finds itself in difficult straits, for it is aware that many of its efforts will not be utilized or appreciated, and the use made of its assessments and reports will differ from its expectations. Matters get worse the more ideologically motivated is the regime, for then policy is made more on the basis of ideological inputs than on the basis of intelligence reportings on reality, which to the extent that they contradict the ideology may be discarded, and the intelligence service ends up frustrated.

Policy can be judged according to the extent of its "sensitivity" to intelligence—will it change if a certain evaluation requires such a change? As a concrete example, what intelligence reporting could induce a change in Israel's present policy on Judea and Samaria? Does the rigidity of a political position make it impervious to intelligence? An ideological regime may revel in exotic covert intelligence operations, encourage them, and still keep intelligence evaluations at arm's length. Nor is there simple transitivity between the quality of the intelligence and the quality of policy. Good

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** Israeli Defense Forces.

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intelligence is no guarantee of good policy and vice versa. Even if intelligence portrayed reality correctly and its evaluations were accepted, policy also includes other components, such as goals, objectives, and assumptions about causal relations between policy and outcomes, which are not necessarily intelligence products.

Policymakers too have their legitimate complaints against intelligence, claiming that it supplies them with a motley catchall collection of information, containing everything but what is needed at the time; or that it expresses itself in equivocal and reserved language that leaves them perplexed; or still worse, that its evaluations are not reliable and excessively opinionated.

The intelligence service should enter the policymaking process twice: first, by providing data and assessments of the situation, which will contribute to the shaping of policy; and secondly, after the policy has been formulated. Intelligence should also evaluate the likely reactions of adversaries and third parties to that policy and its success or failure. However, it often happens that statesmen refrain from seeking the intelligence service's opinion on this, for basic reasons. For by making such a request of the intelligence they elevate it to the position of judging their policy. Thus, a tangle is created whereby the intelligence arm which is a subordinate body becomes an arbiter, a kind of supervisor over its masters. What is more, the statesmen may harbor suspicions that the intelligence services may cite the difficulties and weaknesses of their policy. Not fortuitously has the intelligence service been dubbed "negativistic," a discouraging factor, for it may tend more to point to drawbacks than call attention to opportunities. Hence, Kissinger stigmatized the intelligence service for pushing toward "immobilism."

The intelligence service itself will not volunteer for the role of policy-monitoring, fearing that it may mar its relations with its superiors, the policymakers, and may cause it to collide with conceptions sacred to them, or with their dreams. For example, once the idea of getting the Phalanges into action in Beirut became a desire, almost an obsession, among the Israeli policymakers, a presentation of the hazards of such a policy placed the intelligence in an uncomfortable position. Similarly, it may be supposed that an organization like the KGB would be inhibited from presenting evaluations that clash with Marxism and with Soviet policy. The intelligence service, therefore, will not volunteer to serve as a traffic signal light flashing red and green alternately to the advancing policy carriage.

Understanding above Warning

There is an exaggerated tendency to present the intelligence service as if it were an institution for the sounding of tocsins. The intelligence service is primarily an institution for the provision of information which is meant to lead to knowledge and understanding, and is not merely a warning mechanism. The principal line of defense against surprises is "understanding," not "warning." Warning is in order in times of emergency and before the onset of calamity—but those are few and far between. And if indeed the intelligence service is expected to warn about impending dangers stemming from an action initiated by the *enemy*, it is hard to expect that it also be an institution that warns

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against the injurious outcomes of our own policy, or our home-made surprises. That is an important difference, which it seems, the Kahan Commission was not alive to. Certainly, the intelligence service would do well were it itself, on its own, to point out the probable consequences of policy, but it is advisable that the chiefs-of-state understand the intelligence's reluctance to become overseers, august or meek, on their policy and address it with explicit queries, as an invitation for the intelligence's intervention. People are not aware of how complicated and difficult is the intelligence service's work of collecting, analyzing and evaluating information. The intelligence service will not willingly seek out additional troubles for itself. It is not sheer squeamishness.

In short, the intelligence service is an institution more for the giving of answers than for sounding warnings, especially about our policy. It is the task of leaders to put questions to it, and if they do not ask, let it not be said that they assumed that the service would inform them of its own accord. True, since the intelligence service provides reports on an ongoing routine basis, the impression might be formed that it offers its opinions on every relevant issue automatically. That is an error, and it would have been helpful to Israeli policymaking had the Kahan Commission been alert to it and drawn attention to these aspects.

It may be argued that the intelligence service does not fully discharge its duty by providing the policymakers with information and assessments, and that precisely because its product may be critical for policy, the service must see to it that its reports are properly understood. However, the intelligence service will refrain from testing whether the policymakers have properly understood the material that has been passed on to it, that it will shrink from taking the role of a pedantic teacher correcting misunderstandings on the part of the policymakers. Indeed, a pretension on the part of the intelligence service to be the policymakers' "mentor" is liable to be counterproductive.

It may come to pass that senior intelligence functionaries may differ with the policymakers' policy. Their critical stance *vis-a-vis* the adopted policy may be based on an evaluation of the historical trend, yet they may not be able to adduce factual proof for their position. In most instances, the error of the policy line emerges in a clearly decisive way only in the long range, for the feedback circuit in such matters is slow. In the short range a mistaken policy line does not necessarily entail outcomes that refute it. It may then appear to the policymakers that their course is succeeding, and that the facts abet it. Hence, the intelligence service cannot use such facts to validate its criticism of policy, for in a confrontation with the policymakers it can avail itself only of facts whose message is clear and evident; and thus its assessments of long-range trends may not, in such cases, be serviceable for it. The intelligence criticism of policy may then appear as arbitrary and irksome, even as stemming from lack of sympathy toward the policymakers themselves. Thus, here too, the intelligence service may choose to withhold counsel. Later, when the error of the policy becomes clear, there will be those who will protest that the intelligence service should have warned in time about the mistaken policy, and an inquiry commission may even find the service culpable.

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The intelligence service is aware that it treads on precarious ground and is liable to be singled out for blame in any error, since in every political or military decision there is an assumption on the situation or a component of knowledge, the lack of which can be imputed to intelligence. For instance, a commander can decide to outflank and attack from the left, not because the intelligence service advised him to do so. Were decisions based only on intelligence data, decisions and policy would simply "follow" from it and there would be no need for policymakers. If his attack fails, the commander can shift the blame to intelligence by contending that it did not warn him that the left flank was strong and could not be crushed. Any military action can fail, either because our troops were not good or because the enemy's troops were. There is no institutionalized body whose job is to evaluate our troops, and thus it is easy to transfer the blame for a military failure to intelligence, which, as it were, slighted the enemy's ability. The intelligence service has been frequently described as the staff's "whipping boy." Thus, the intelligence service is usually a frightened institution. In many fields a human error of evaluation or judgment is considered as extenuating circumstances; however, it is the fate of intelligence that its error of evaluation is always enshrined in its bill of indictment. Whereas the popular saying has it that "to err is human," an almost superhuman perfection is expected of intelligence. We are living among our own people with no problems of accession to knowledge and still are stunned by domestic political developments. But if intelligence does not successfully forecast a political denouement in a foreign country, brows are wrinkled: how is that possible? What inefficiency.

Insurance by Quantity

After the intelligence service has failed in reporting on some information or evaluation, it is likely to take out insurance for itself by way of enlarging the quantity of its reports and including everything in them, so that it may not be found wanting in reporting. It will then flood the policymakers with intelligence reports. However, over-reporting may be detrimental for the intelligence service influence as important items may be lost in the multitude of the less important and trivial ones. True, what will eventually prove important does not always immediately catch the eye. The statesmen may be able to defend themselves against overabundance of intelligence reporting, by employing an aide to sift and summarize the material for them. Such an aide fills the role of "intelligence waiter" who marks for his superior what is worth his attention. What is significant in the eyes of the "intelligence waiter" and the intelligence service is not necessarily identical. Despite the vital role such an assistant fulfils for his master, such an intermediary arrangement may also complicate things, for the intelligence service does not know what information has reached the policymakers, of what they are aware, and of what not. Furthermore, statesmen may tend to look or rather browse over intelligence material, often at the end of an exhausting day when they are fatigued or half drowsy.

Presumably, it is good that the chief of the intelligence service be on close terms with the policymakers and have their trust. However, such bosom companionship too has its drawbacks. True, the more he is a part of the inner

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Byzantine court that develops as a matter of course around state chiefs, the greater is his influence; however, he then also loses perspective and his independent critical vision, and gradually succumbs to the conceptions of the policymakers. He is then unable to detach himself from festivities of policymaking just like the other self-gratified members of the court who bask in their connections with power. Thomas Hughes urged that intelligence should give the policymakers' utmost support with utmost reservation. That surely is no simple combination.

In its reports the intelligence service must differentiate between statements of fact and evaluations concerning the future, which are always a matter of conjecture. It is an error to present an evaluation of future trends as if they were facts. The desire of the intelligence people to present a clearcut unqualified opinion is commendable, but it may mislead them to present their hypotheses about the future developments as if they were foregone conclusions and final judgments not to be disputed. In reporting evaluations one should not transcend the amount of certitude the data warrants, and even the probable should not be offered as the absolutely certain. The intelligence service should not be inhibited from making the policymakers privy to the uncertainties of evaluation, especially regarding future important developments, tendencies and intentions. The more the service does that, the more the policymakers will understand the quandaries and limitations of the intelligence services and will not nurture expectations that cannot be met and which in the end may be counterproductive for both policy and intelligence.

The intelligence service is judged according to the final quality or significance of its output—its reports. The words of our Sages in *Pirkei Avot*, "according to the pains so is the reward," do not apply to intelligence. The toils involved in obtaining the information on which the reports are based have low visibility, and the intelligence service is prevented from talking about them or from recounting its woes. But without information collection, there is no intelligence evaluation. In fact, in intelligence most of the efforts in manpower and resources go to information collection. If those efforts, and the efforts to extract evaluations from the information are not appreciated, feelings of bitterness will develop in the service, as if the policymakers, and even the country as a whole, are ungrateful. These feelings swell when the intelligence people compare the sophistication and advanced methods employed in collection of the information and the production of intelligence against the cavalier fashion or improvisation with which policy decisions are many a time reached.

The intelligence service is represented to the policymakers by its director. He participates (if invited) in meetings or caucuses at which important decisions are made. However, as an individual he cannot provide an exhaustive representation of, or reflect the knowledge and wisdom that has accumulated in his institution. However broadminded and gifted he may be, it is one of the tragic ironies of intelligence that its chief may constitute a "bottleneck" who detracts from the quality of his service, thus unwittingly deflating its value and its impact. The consumer of intelligence must understand that and therefore pay heed to the institutional reports and not only to what comes directly from its chief's mouth.

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Intelligence services in our world cost a great deal of money. The Israeli public has no idea how costly this service is. However, to the extent that the policymakers are not aware of how the intelligence can be useful, and what its limitations are, and do not direct it and ask it questions expressly, the utility of intelligence is partial and resources are wasted. The great outlays for intelligence are justifiable only if the policy based on its information is of high quality. An unrealistic policy, whether autarkic or autistic, has no need for intelligence and the intelligence service cannot help it. Intelligence efforts are worthwhile only where they contribute to the shaping of a wise policy.

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TITLE: Par-Faits (And Other Faits)

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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PAR-FAITS (AND OTHER FAITS)

(b)(3)(c)

What follow are additional quotations from Performance Appraisal Reports, selected by Mr(b)(3)(c) over the course of years in which it was his duty to examine such documents, and embellished with his introductory comments. The first compilation appeared in the Spring 1984 issue of *Studies in Intelligence*, Volume 28, Number 1. In this installment, as in the first, the quotations are rendered faithfully, with misspellings and other errors intact. And, as before, all persons referred to and quoted are to remain anonymous.

The officer who kills with kindness:

"He is endowed with a certain lethal gentleness."

For one given to stepping in various matters of substance, but always with aplomb:

"Although he sometimes errs on matters of substance he rarely errs on matters of form."

The case of the reluctant back-slapper:

"When he was reminded that it is a fundamental to stop and develop . . . he has replied that he is not a back-slapper. Since I credit him with high intelligence, I can only assume that he has intentionally missed the point."

In addition to not being a grandfather . . . . :

(First PAR of a 22-year-old case officer) "This officer lacks field experience."

One who can pat his head hard but has trouble rubbing his stomach at the same time:

"He commits everything to paper voluminously but poorly."

The fiscal intolerant:

"Subject has no use for Agency funds."

The open-minded supervisor:

"I both like and dislike this officer."

When sticks and stones could hurt, keep a distance:

"Subject has left this Branch. Hence there is no objection to his seeing this fitness report."

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Nobody said it would be a rose garden:

"Through no fault of his own, Subject was deprived of his household goods."

The chap from Column A:

"I think he is one of the best ethnic Chinese I have met."

Where, When, Why?

"He is already fully loaded."

When a flexed alias might be a spectral pectoral:

"He has learned to use and flex his alias identity."

Just your garden-variety misanthrope:

". . . basically, he doesn't like people."

Cause?

"She is hypoclitical."

Effect?

"Although unmarried she has growth potential."

Handicapped by a head-on collision of genes:

"Only a biological accident robbed her of the opportunity to demonstrate that she could perform equally well as a field case officer."

As a seal balances a Potemkim ball . . . (or although it takes both hands):

"Subject skillfully balances this Potemkim village."

Observed while moonlighting:

"He supervises one part-time wife."

The running amok of profundity:

"If there is no operational progress made in a one-man station, the incumbent cannot share the blame."

But absence makes the heart to ponder:

"This employee is not located under me physically; However, I concur."

The "Whistling Dixie" specialist:

"His breath is, however, narrowed by his speciality."

When in doubt beat your highchair with a spoon:

"He lacks self-confidence but is aggressive."

The successful obscurantist:

"He has a promising relationship with an obscure government official."

The subtle, dental floss kind:

"This student did excellent work but he could have done better if he had drilled more."

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When a tactile or gutsy statement is needed:

"His 'feel' is excellent and his stomach is often more reliable than our considered thoughtful processes."

When you desire to thoroughly screw up, not merely mix, your metaphor:

"He is learning the bureaucratic necessity of documenting a base and learning what can serve as an effective stick to compliment his carrot."

Setting high goals:

"He must try to not make mistakes that are unavoidable."

Dealing with the prima donna:

"At times I would like him to control himself as well as he controls his branch."

If it can be simply stated, try and complicate it with at least one word foolishly out of context:

"Furthermore, there are extenuating circumstances which should be factored into the final calculus."

Clever:

"Less the reader be led to believe that the purpose of this report is to cannonize Subject, it should be noted that he lacks certain saintly traits."

Giving the rated officer credit for activities for which he may or may not be responsible:

(b)(1) (b)(3)(c) "He got off to a fast start. Within the first six months of his arrival (in [redacted]) the U.S. hostages were taken in Iran and the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan."

Putting it in a nutshell:

"The ability to converse in a language in which the participants are fluent narrows the possibility of a misunderstanding based on language."

Good bread and butter approach:

"He proved himself an accomplished officer in all phases of clandestine activities including management and supervisory rolls."

The 17-word-a-minute typist—but she hits each key as hard as she can:

"Her deficiencies are directly related to her effort to do a better job."

In Sick Gloria Transit:

"She has greatly improved her penchant for typographical errors."

The none-of-your-business aside:

"He has the capacity to do an intelligence analyst."

One way of saying you can't tell whether he's coming or going:

"He presents a symetrical appearance."

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A secretarial sequitor?

"She was my secretary until she left on maternity leave. It has been a pleasure to watch her grow in this new and challenging role."

The non-complainer:

"She has never complained about the long hours required to service four officers on a daily basis."

Those important adjuncts:

"She has become a very important adjunct of the personal life of the COS and his front office."

The tortoise:

"He is a steady worker who keeps the workload of his assignment to a minimum."

A wondrous thing to see—the aplomb and precision of an overweight meat cleaver:

"She continues to handle all of the new requirements with the aplomb and precision of a 10 pound meat cleaver."

Risking that they bite the hand that kneads and feeds them:

"She massages and feeds [redacted] NOC officers."
(b)(3)(c)

A man for all seasons:

"He expects to start night school classes in the fall; meantime he is studying Spanish with a friend who is in school."

The timely grunter:

"Subject's handling of the English language is inferior but he makes up for it with promptness."

When one is walking backward through life:

"To a large degree his future is behind him."

Telling it like it is:

"He is a section chief responsible for the perpetration of CA."

Going forward in a forward leaning, ongoing continuing continuum:

"He has served in a position of furnishing continuous continuity to this base."

Quick as a steel trap on shaky ground:

"He was quick to offer comment but just as quick to adjust his thinking when it became apparent to him that he was on infirm ground."

Lost in the shuffle:

"Had the Directorate not been reorganized he would have been okay."

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Sort of like being pounced upon:

"One of his prime weaknesses is poor spelling, a matter he has been counceled upon."

Although creeping and ever so subtle:

". . . Subject is displaying indications towards acquiring maturity."

Those unspoken devious duties:

". . . duties too specious to list."

The office was sparsely furnished:

"It is a pleasure to have her on my desk."

The office Amazon:

"She is a very strong secretary who supports six officers."

The great cop out:

"There is little doubt that if the intelligence clerk herself had more aptitude or perhaps intelligence, Subject could have demonstrated that he warranted a higher grade as a supervisor."

Keep it wrong and redundant. Repeat, go back and do it over again once more:

"This is Subject's last field rating for some time after several concurrent tours at the same time."

Doggedly barking up the wrong tree:

"Subject has doggedly plowed ahead and attempted to provide momentum in areas that are potentially non-cooperative."

Colorful:

"Members of his crew were all green, including his young secretary."

The pedestrian crier:

"He was so moved that tears began strolling down his face."

Alive and alert:

"Subject is a highly conscious professional."

Make a verb out of anything:

"I would nuance the rater's comments."

Make an adverb out of anything:

"He handles his financial accounting as he does all his other responsibilities—scrutinously."

For special needs such as age, impotence, etc.:

"I believe he was laboring under a certain motivational disadvantage."

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Sharing:

"He, in turn, exercises partial supervision over the activities of one secretary."

The carefully considered, from what can be observed, litote:

"I have considered carefully and from what I have observed, there is no reason for me to not concur in the letter grades and most of the narrative of the rating officer."

Hoping:

"Now he needs lady luck to smile just a bit in order to capitalize upon that base in terms of a personal achievement to cap this tour."

When all else fails:

"This officer reports promptly for work."

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TITLE: Do You Like Maps?

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)


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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.



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DO YOU LIKE MAPS?

(b)(3)(c)

So geographers, in Afric maps,
With savage pictures fill their gaps.
And o'er uninhabited downs
Place elephants for want of towns.

Jonathan Swift

It was a hot, muggy June day in 1951 when I was admitted to Temporary Building 11, located near the intersection of Twenty-third Street and Constitution Avenue in Washington. Although I was there for an interview with an official of the Central Intelligence Agency, I knew little about the CIA at that time beyond its insistence that I complete a tiresomely long application form. But hints of CIA and its activities gleaned from newspapers and magazines had piqued my curiosity. And when the secretary announced that a Mr (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) would see me, I hoped to learn—or at least receive an inkling—about job opportunities that might lead to an exciting, perhaps exotic career.

(b)(3)(c) then Chief of the Geography Division, Office of Research and Reports, was a man of few words. He asked: "Do you like maps?"

The question of my affection for maps, or lack thereof, had seldom crossed my mind. As a graduate student in geography, I had used maps as a source of information and as a way to present and record data. And as a former navigator in the United States Army Air Corps, the importance of accurate maps and charts—and my dependence on them for survival—had been amply demonstrated. My first reaction to (b)(3)(c) question was to recall maps I did not favor, such as those based on the mercator projection that portrayed the Soviet Union occupying most of the northern hemisphere and of the erroneous impression this created in the minds of cartographic innocents. A particular pilotage chart once used in navigation school also came to mind; I had grievously misread the chart, leading me to direct the pilot of our twin-engine Beechcraft toward Mexico rather than to San Marcos, Texas. Despite these quirky thoughts I managed, after a brief pause, to respond that I did indeed "like maps."

"Good," replied (b)(3)(c) "I think you'll enjoy working with us." With that he stood up, indicating the end of our brief conversation. Before the summer was over, and after suffering through the indignities administered in Building 13, then housing the Polygraph Division of the Office of Security, I entered on duty with the Geography Division in the profession of intelligence.

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



Figure 1. Progress in Mapping. The "T in O"[1] map of the world, strongly influenced by religious history and thinking, was in common use in Europe until the thirteenth century. Greek maps made more than a thousand years earlier were much more accurate representations of the world known to the Greeks. These maps were forgotten, later "rediscovered", and in use at the time of Columbus. The lower map is a section from a modern topographic map at 1:25,000 scale, providing good terrain definition (contours at 3 meter intervals), transportation routes from trails to paved roads, areas covered by vegetation, and individual buildings.

[1] Mediterranean Sea, Don and Nile Rivers form a "T" inside a circular Ocean.



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Knowledge about Place

Maps are ways to represent knowledge about place; the map is a means, a device, to help understand the complexities of the earth. As a representation of the earth's reality, maps depict the spatial relationships existing among physical, cultural, political, and other natural and man-made features that have attributes of space and place.

Maps originated as a means of improving communication. Some of the earliest known maps delineated property limits and land ownership in densely settled areas. (The tax assessor, no doubt, soon followed.) The maps of the ancients were centered on the country or area where the map was made. Areas unknown were left blank or decorated with cartographic or mythological graffiti. Measurement was essential for accuracy, as was the realization of the difficulty of depicting the round earth on flat paper, for which projections were devised to lessen the distortions inherent to map making. Knowledge of the earth was gained, and sometimes lost. Columbus sailed West to reach India, believing the earth was about two-thirds smaller than its actual size, even though Eratosthenes by 200 B.C. had made a reasonably accurate estimate of the earth's dimensions.

The intensified European exploration of the earth from the Sixteenth Century onward and the growth of trade and communication heightened the need for improved navigational materials and equipment and specifically for accurate sailing charts and maps. Charts showing coastal features and navigational hazards usually were regarded as state secrets. By the late Eighteenth Century many countries had established national survey and mapping organizations to survey their territories and compile detailed topographic maps. National leaders came to realize that it was difficult to govern—and to fight one another—without adequate maps. Geodetically accurate topographic maps were also necessary to the building of a modern, technically advanced society.

Many people, including intelligence officers, are unaware of the variety in uses of maps. Others give lip service to the utility of maps, but fail to understand the significance of scale, projection, and purpose. Historians and others, for example, often place small and frequently unreadable maps at the beginning of their books and articles, an apparent propitiatory act that in most cases tells more about the author and publisher than the map conveys to the reader. Still others feel vaguely reassured if a map or two is nearby, perhaps hanging on a wall, to ensure that the participants in a conference do not mistake Africa for South America.

While many think of maps as primarily useful to show simple relationships and prosaic physical and cultural details, the data and types of relationships mappable are infinite. For example:

— *The National Atlas of Japan* contains maps of the "Mean Date of the First Coloring of the Red Maple," the "First Warble of the Bush Warbler," and, by administrative unit, the number of tatami (reed mats) per household.[1]

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— Maps were used to illustrate key findings in what is rumored to have been the most widely read article in the staid *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, a presumably well-researched work that described the characteristics, clientele, dynamics, and distribution of brothels in Nevada.[2]

— A series of maps in the *Geographic Review* illustrated the geographic implications of football in the United States, depicting such factors as areas of higher than average per-capita production of players and the interregional migration of high school players to colleges and universities.[3]

— A recent atlas contains a map with the provocative title "Urban Heavings in the Seventies" that depicts the worldwide locations of urban strikes and riots during that fractious decade.[4]

Maps and Intelligence

In intelligence, the use of maps and other graphics has increased over the years along with a greater sophistication in the use and understanding of the effect of color, symbols, and design to convey meaning. Some of the ways to use maps:

— As intelligence sources containing valuable locational and distributional data—sometimes unique and highly classified, such as of missile sites, and sometimes unclassified but representative of official policy, such as territorial claims.

— As analytic tools serving as graphic representations of a discrete portion of the earth, useful to assess the spatial or locational factors of the data arrayed (and sometimes added) and their significance.

— As a means to present research results, particularly to highlight key findings.

— As a means to record and report data, particularly in fast-moving situations.

Maps are crises crutches. Surprise events—the building of the Berlin Wall, seizure of the *Mayaguez*, invasion of the Falklands—bring instant demands from intelligence producers and consumers for map coverage. In crises, maps are used to track rapidly changing developments, to help identify a glut of often unfamiliar place-names, to provide background details from which briefing boards can be constructed, and to analyze military and clandestine situations, particularly where operations are taking place or are planned.

The relationship of maps and intelligence extends to the acquisition of information used in the compilation of maps. The history of such intelligence operations goes back to Biblical times when Moses instructed his spies "to see the land, what it is; and the people whether they be strong or weak . . . what cities they be that they dwell in."

Modern wars have spurred topographic mapping. The advent of aerial photography and the recent development of more sophisticated imagery

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systems have made possible the rapid acquisition of vast amounts of information, thereby greatly speeding new mapping programs as well as the updating of older maps. The availability of imagery has also spawned the making of large-scale photomaps on which points of interest are highlighted, e.g., photomaps of Beirut and environs. Maps and their imagery-derived mutants have significant intelligence value and play an important role in communicating facts, relationships, and findings to assist decision makers in choosing courses of action.

The use of maps to serve intelligence needs and to help resolve problems is illustrated by several examples.

The Great Game In Asia: Knowledge is Power

A biting wind swept through the Himalayan pass, whipping the Buddhist prayer flags that marked it. A lone traveler, head bowed, slowly descended into the forbidden land of Tibet. The year was 1865; the traveler was Nain Singh, an Indian born in the high Himalayas who spoke one of the Tibetan dialects; and the purpose of his journey was shrouded in secrecy.

A few days later Nain Singh joined a caravan of traders from western Tibet bound for Lhasa. He arrived in Lhasa in January 1866 and remained there until the traders began their return journey some three months later. Slipping away from the caravan one night, Nain Singh hurried south to his destination—the Indian hill station of Dehra Dun—where he was received by Survey of India (SOI) officials anxiously awaiting his return.

Nain Singh was no ordinary traveler. He had been carefully selected and trained over a period of years by SOI officials in reconnaissance survey techniques. During his time in Tibet, Nain Singh had surreptiously paced his route, observed latitudes with a sexant, measured elevations by boiling water, and kept precise notes of his observations.

The results of Nain Singh's efforts were impressive. At last SOI officials could start filling in the large blank places on their maps of Tibet with reasonably accurate information. Not only were SOI officials gratified over obtaining geographic details about Tibet, but the program spelled progress to officials in Great Britain intent on obtaining reliable maps of Tibet. For London, this mapping caper represented another card in the "great game in Asia" that preoccupied British and Russian governments during the latter half of the Nineteenth Century as they vied for influence in Central Asia.

From 1864 to 1885, the SOI trained dozens more for missions similar to Nain Singh's. Collectively known as the "pundits," they took different guises, some as traders, others as pilgrims or holy men, exploring different areas and following different routes. Those who traveled as pilgrims, for example, carried genuine rosaries, except that their rosaries contained only 100 of the regulation 108 beads and each tenth bead was slightly larger to aid in counting paces. The cylindrical Buddhist prayer wheel hid compartments for storing notes, and clothing and baggage concealed pockets where equipment could be carried. The accuracy of the pundits' reconnaissance surveys proved remarkable when many years later the British were able to map parts of Tibet.[5]

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Almost a century later a minor replay of the "great game" took place. Tibetan refugees who joined the resistance movement (1959-66) to oppose the Chinese occupation of Tibet were instructed in the art of field sketching and mapping as part of their overall training in intelligence reporting prior to reentering Tibet. At that time maps of Tibet still were based in part on the work of the pundits, and were not superseded until imagery-based maps were produced in the late 1960s.

"Make Me a Map of the Valley"

On 26 March 1862 Jedediah Hotchkiss, a topographic engineer, was summoned to the tent of General T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson. "I want you," said Jackson, "to make me a map of the Valley, from Harpers Ferry to Lexington, showing all the points of offense and defense in those places." [6]

Jedediah Hotchkiss drafted his maps of the Valley of Virginia under trying circumstances. He was superb in the skills of field reconnaissance. On his horse, laboriously bending over his sketchbook and drawing "curious lines" on a scrap of paper, Hotchkiss was a familiar sight to Confederate soldiers. From notes and observations, Hotchkiss would rapidly draw his maps, particularly important for Jackson, who had little facility in visually grasping the lay of the land. Hotchkiss supplemented his maps with quick field sketches, using colored pencils for greater clarity in defining nearby surface features and in showing troop locations. Hotchkiss' maps and sketches, according to Civil War historian Douglas Southwell Freeman, "were to contribute to the speed and boldness of all Jackson's future operations in the Valley." [7] Throughout all but the final year of the Civil War, Union generals were repeatedly bamboozled by Confederate armies that moved swiftly—and usually undetected—via the Valley of Virginia to threaten the North and Washington itself.

Moscow and its Maps

Acquisition of topographic maps produced by the Soviet Union has been a high priority US intelligence objective dating from early in World War II. Topographic maps, which are highly detailed, geodetically accurate maps containing contour lines (lines that connect points of equal elevation), are essential to military planning and operations and for precise target locations.

During the 1950s many operational studies based largely on available topographic maps were prepared for use in exfiltration and infiltration operations in denied areas, principally Eastern Europe and the USSR. Some coverage of the western USSR had been acquired by Germany during the Second World War and hence by the US. But many areas, particularly newer urban and industrial areas east of the Urals, were without reliable map coverage. As the change from manned bombers to missiles took place, the need grew for geodetically accurate topographic maps. Moscow, of course, recognized their value and placed strict security controls on their use and dissemination; despite considerable efforts and a high priority, various collection efforts have been largely unsuccessful in ferreting topographic maps out of the USSR.

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The advent of satellite imagery in 1960 and the immense areas that could be covered led to a joint CIA/Department of Defense program using the new imagery as a base for compiling maps at the scale of 1:250,000. CIA analysts added intelligence annotations to the maps. In 1965 the program was expanded to include China, extensive areas of which were also poorly mapped. Later, satellite imagery specifically designed for mapping use permitted the compilation of topographic maps with fairly good geodetic control.




Figure 2. Nevel' Area. The extent of locational distortion in the 1967 Soviet World Atlas is demonstrated by contrasting its map of the Nevel' area (in red) with the corresponding map contained in the 1954 edition of the Atlas (in this instance using the lakes as a control). Note the resulting shifts in the geographic grid and the town of Nevel'. The railroad lines have been twisted out of their true alignment, with one line cutting across a lake which has been conveniently distorted in the 1967 edition.

Moscow's preoccupation with security led to a bizarre decision in the early 1960s that went far beyond the restriction on the release of Soviet maps for public sale. Maps, including those in the prestigous *Atlas Mira* (world atlas), were degraded by a systematic distortion program that depicted cities and towns several kilometers or more from their true location. To do this also meant that Soviet cartographers had to relocate and realign all base map hydrography and transportation detail to make everything "fit."

Soviet officials, fearful of improved US intelligence collection systems, were seeking ways to frustrate US efforts to develop conventional and radar-matching maps for bombing Soviet targets. The great effort and time spent in devising such obvious cartographic distortions seems irrational, given the technology available to the US mapping establishment and about which the

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Soviets presumably had some knowledge. There is some evidence that Soviet scientists were privately chagrined by the clumsy and foolish attempts at deception.

An Unseemly Scramble

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 not only demonstrated the lack of preparedness by US defense forces but also brought to light the general untidy state of US readiness for global conflict. This lack of readiness extended to the availability of maps. The US did not have the maps and atlases essential for intelligence research and planning military operations against its enemies.

A small beginning had been made in the autumn of 1941 to create within the Coordinator of Information—to become the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in July 1942—a section to provide a centralized point for map information. The mission was eventually broadened to include the acquisition, evaluation, and distribution of maps. But the coming of war initially overwhelmed the small unit and in the hectic months following Pearl Habor there was a frantic and often unseemly scramble for maps and information about previously obscure places. In the search for maps, various government agencies sent out individuals on procurement missions, mostly to university libraries and to private collections. These missions were often duplicative. The paucity of maps for certain areas, such as the Pacific and Asia, led to a nationwide radio appeal by Major General William J. Donovan, head of OSS, in mid-1942. In time, coordinated efforts and a systematic foreign procurement program, along with airborne photo-reconaissance mapping missions, augmented and updated map resources needed for wartime use.

The SA-5 Debate

A major intelligence controversy arose in the mid-1960s over the mission of a defensive missile system then being deployed in the Soviet Union. Intelligence derived from study of the configuration of the system and its components had been used by analysts to support two different viewpoints. Some analysts said it was an antiballistic missile defensive system; others held that it was a surface-to-air missile system directed at aircraft, specifically low-flying aircraft.

The Defensive Missiles Systems Division, Office of Scientific Intelligence, decided to approach the problem from yet another viewpoint and asked that the Geography Division, Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence, undertake studies of the physical characteristics at and near several of the deployment sites. The purpose of the study was to determine the effects of terrain masking on the capabilities of the target acquisition radars. The studies prepared were done through detailed map analysis, supplemented by imagery; a formula was devised to calculate the effect of the earth's curvature to determine the maximum distance of radar intercept of targets at specified altitudes.

From an examination of several SA-5 sites, a wrapup study concluded that "location of the Moscow area SA-5 sites on relatively high ground well

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forward of obstructive terrain features indicates a potential to intercept low-level targets at distances limited only by the earth's curvature." Thus, this analysis helped pin down the primary mission of the SA-5, information which was vital in the context of the complex debate and negotiations that led to the signing of the ABM Treaty between the US and USSR in 1972.

Every Road, Every House, Every Tree

In her autobiography, *My Life*, Golda Meir recalled the prolonged negotiations in 1974 over the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights and the role played by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. She stated that "there wasn't a road, a house, or even a tree there about which he didn't know everything there was to know." [8] In her tribute to Kissinger and his "shuttle diplomacy," Golda Meir was reflecting on the critical importance of maps in the negotiations.

In Middle East negotiations, the United States has provided maps for the negotiations, so that there will be a common data base for each side. Almost every locality, mountain, ruin, and other landscape feature possesses some historic, symbolic, or religious significance that complicates negotiations on territorial readjustments.

Maps used in negotiations have included large- or medium-scale topographic maps or maps compiled from several topographic map sheets. Maps prepared especially for use by US negotiators have shown population distribution, the location of settlements, water supply data, ethnic composition of various areas, and military installations—topics important to an understanding of the range of problems and issues involved in territorial negotiations and exchanges. In most cases the larger scale maps used by the negotiating teams to reach agreement on disengagement, resettlement, and territorial exchanges have been updated by imagery and intelligence reports. Frequently, photography was annotated to identify specific points, show various installations, and highlight areas discussed by the negotiators.

In the 1974 Syrian-Israeli negotiations, maps were prepared to show whether the pre-1967 Syrian settlements in the Golan Heights still existed or had been razed, and to identify the location of new Israeli settlements. The up-to-date intelligence [redacted] to the basic topographic map was essential, since Syrian negotiators were often ignorant of the status of individual settlements in the Israeli-occupied areas. Annotated photomaps, town plans, and similar types of briefing materials were instrumental to the success of these talks. Henry Kissinger noted in his memoir, *Years of Upheaval*, one of the many proposals put forward to President Assad called for a ". . . line . . . drawn 200 meters west of Quneitra measured from the line of buildings on the west side of the western road." This was indicative of the extreme detail required.[9] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

After the October 1973 War, in the negotiations that led eventually to the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, geographic tools and analysis proved valuable in selecting and verifying roughly three parallel north-south roads so that the Egyptian, Israeli, and UN forces could be equally serviced, in

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determining the placement of lines through the Sinai passes, and in recommending the best locations for US monitoring sites, (b)(1) and the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance stations. (b)(3)(n) Although delineation of the lines in the Sinai passes, Mitla and Giddi, was done in Washington, Israeli representatives were not satisfied with the alignment until a senior Agency geographer personally examined the area. According to Edward R. F. Sheehan's book, *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger*, the CIA official (b)(3)(c) now retired) strolled through the Giddi pass with Israeli General Mordechai Gur and stated, "General, you're still inside the pass." [10] (Meaning that the original Washington view, rather than the Israeli, prevailed.)

Maps provided for the Camp David negotiations included several annexes, prepared by a technical working group made up of Israeli, Egyptian, and US personnel. The base map, compiled from existing US topographic maps, was initially updated with road and other transport details by US representatives. In preparing the maps for use in the treaty, Israeli and Egyptian representatives carefully purged the map of hundreds of "offending" names and references, particularly those reflecting Israeli occupation of the Sinai. The representatives let stand the names of physical features, regardless of their cultural origin.

Maps, Map Users, and Truth

The examples cited indicate the value of maps in intelligence analysis, operational planning, the presentation of intelligence findings, and in reporting. There are many opportunities for greater uses of maps in both analysis and in the communication of intelligence results.

Unfortunately, many analysts seldom think of maps as useful in their research. Moreover, availability of imagery may cause analysts to forget the use of maps as a research tool. They are overlooking something that is valuable, often essential. Some examples:


— Resource estimative analyses. Predictions of oilfield production potentials rely in part on data supplied by structural or schematic geologic maps, geographic profiles, and other maps based on geophysical exploration and drilling records.

— Analysis of territorial disputes and boundary disagreements, including jurisdiction over maritime areas. Maps are frequently cited in polemics, but authoritative maps are mostly limited to those that are part of the documentation resulting from treaty implementation, e.g., demarcation maps prepared by official boundary survey teams and signed by officials from each country. In some cases official maps may not be available, requiring the plotting of the coordinate locations of boundary points on a suitable base.

— (b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

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— Political and economic studies that have a significant spatial character. Analysts can use maps to sort out complex aspects and relationships for making intelligence judgments. Examples: problems associated with refugee groups located in sensitive frontier areas where complex ethnic rivalries exist, the availability of access routes to the refugees, the dispensing of aid to the refugees, the feasibility of military action against the refugees from nearby countries, and similar problems in which locational factors are important.

— Locational factors in military and strategic analysis. Maps are highly important tools in the analysis of most military situations and in the construction of scenarios anticipating military actions and responses. For example, possession by Iraq of aircraft equipped with the Exocet air-to-ground missile required map analysis of probable target areas in the Persian Gulf area based on airfield locations, aircraft range, and range of the missile.


Maps as Shorthand

Complex topics and data often can be explained succinctly through use of a skillfully compiled map. How better to undersand the complex linguistic and dialect patterns existing in much of Europe than by maps? International trade in petroleum and petroleum products is easier to comprehend if data are transformed by graphic techniques and displayed on a map base. A map is essential to understand complex maritime claims. The most successful unclassified Agency products, measured by the number of copies distributed and favorable comments received, were the atlases published by the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence (later the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research) during the 1970s. These atlases focused on areas (China, polar regions, Indian Ocean) and topics (USSR agriculture) by blending carefully designed maps and graphics with text on the major characteristics, problems, and potentials of the subjects. The Agency's most lavish use of maps, photos, and other graphic materials has been in highly classified and limited readership products that describe and evaluate the Soviet strategic forces.

Maps often add dazzle to dull data. A decade ago, a 729-page report was published, consisting mainly of voluminous tables of the type that warm the hearts of statisticians and glaze the eyes of others. The tables represented the results of a massive research project undertaken by the National Cancer Institute that tabulated deaths from cancer for every county in the United States for the period 1950-69. The report gathered dust until the information was repackaged and later printed as a 103-page *Atlas of Cancer Mortality in U.S. Counties*. A national map used different tints to show the incidence of cancer deaths by county. A great red blotch covered the industrial northeast with the center of this oncological disaster area roughly coinciding with the state of New Jersey. The atlas became news. Headlines talked about "cancer alley," and photographers and television crews stalked the northern end of the New Jersey Turnpike to film the miles of smokestacks, refineries, and other manifestations of industrial America.[11] Nothing had changed since the original report—except the manner of presentation.

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Figure 4. Mapping Maritime Claims. The increasing economic importance of national maritime areas has given rise to UN-sponsored international conferences on Law of the Sea issues to attempt to reach agreement over the definitions of the various types of maritime claims. National claims to maritime jurisdictions and their cartographic representation are the responsibility of the Office of The Geographer, Department of State.

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An example of a map that is both an excellent intelligence source and a striking presentation of research findings is a map of Lebanon in a recently published German atlas showing the distribution of religious adherents—Christians, Muslims, Druze, and Jews.[12] All populated places are shown by circles proportional to their size; a scale in the legend is used to determine approximate population numbers. The circles are color coded as to the percentage of the religious group found in each locality; numbers in each circle refer to an accompanying list of place names for the hundreds of smaller settlements not identified on the map. The map allows users to comprehend the major areas of religious concentrations and to compute, by use of the scale, the approximate numbers of religious adherents in the individual settlements and in larger areas.

With all their advantages, maps also have limitations—sometimes apparent but often unrecognized:

— Maps symbolize reality; they also distort it.

— Maps communicate, but the message received depends on the presentation and the map user.

— Maps do not usually receive the critical scrutiny that the written word is given. John K. Wright dissected this uncritical view of maps and the lack of logic behind it in his paper, "Map Makers are Human." Wright warned that "the trim, precise, and clean-cut appearance that a well-drawn map presents lends it an air of scientific authenticity that . . . may not be deserved." [13] In 1946 the chief of the cartographic unit, then in the Department of State and later transferred to CIA (the organizational progenitor of the present Cartography and Design Group) noted that "it is a well known fact that the branch seldom produces a map without noticeable errors."


Map projections are important. The difficulty of depicting the round earth on flat paper introduces distortion and sometimes confusion when the map covers large areas of the earth. A common problem is with long-distance air or sea routes—for example, from Washington to Toyko—where the most direct route via Alaska will not be clear unless the proper projection and map orientation is used.

Map scale dictates detail. A page-size map of France limits the amount of detail and to some extent purpose of the map. A wall map of France, on the other hand, at a much larger scale can display a much more detailed slice of "reality," though predelictions of the particular mapmaker in translating purpose into cartographic product will make each map distinctive. Highway maps of a state or group of states, though made for the same purpose but by different cartographic units, will vary significantly in the amount of detail provided and in the readability and ease of use. The degree of detail relative to scale that the cartographer may think appropriate may not be that wanted by the requester—particularly if the requester is a senior level official. The requester may want only one message on the map and order "clutter" removed.

Maps distort reality; it is sometimes unintended. The professional cartographer is sometimes loath to leave large blank areas on maps. In the desire to

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
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Gnomonic Projection

Mercator Projection

Figure 5. The problem of transforming the spherical Earth onto a flat surface is illustrated by navigation lines (above) and different ways of representing an area of the Earth's surface (below). In the example below, Greenland is shown on five different projections, all with the same scale at 60° North.



Azimuthal Equal-Area Projection

Lambert Conformal Conic Projection

Mercator Projection

Miller Cylindrical Projection

Sinusoidal Projection

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"complete" the map, the cartographer may fill in the blank areas with symbols that mislead the viewer. Erroneous conclusions about population density may be drawn from a superficial scanning, particularly if populated places are not symbolized by size. Examples abound of maps "pleasing" to the eye but in fact distorting meaning and purpose. Monmonier's comment in his essay, "Maps, Distortion, and Meaning," is appropriate: "Acclaim by other cartographers is no guarantee that a map is suited to its audience." [14]

Maps are out of date the day they are printed; and because they are mostly compiled from other maps the perpetuation of error is a constant problem. Intelligence maps that portray order-of-battle and other types of military data particularly susceptible to rapid change are kept up to date by the demands of current reporting. But some types of map detail that in themselves are seldom topics of intelligence interest may continue unchanged and outdated. Administrative maps, for example, may not reflect current status, particularly in countries where a change in government may cause experimentation in the number and designation of internal administrative units. Place names are often altered in the wake of political change or when a new system of romanization is adopted, such as China's 1979 shift from Wade-Giles to the pinyin system (Peking became Beijing). There is also the problem of official names policy and unofficial usage, and differences in reporting names in cables and press treatment. Consistency is not always possible nor even desirable. Medium- and large-scale maps often do not reflect such changes as new reservoirs, transportation additions and deletions, and similar detail because of the infrequency of their revision. Many of these changes are not made for some time because of practical difficulties in keeping the cartographic data bank current.

• • •

The objectives of those who make maps and those who use them in intelligence reports are to communicate intelligence findings, to assist readers in sorting out the spatial dimensions of the analysis, and to provide a convenient graphic reference for important locations and installations highlighted in the text. Although the objectives are to prevent ambiguity in meaning and message, map use is not effortless and users should be aware that maps alone are imperfect communicators. Map use requires participation on the part of the user, similar to that required to decipher statistical tables, and this effort is needed to complete the communication link.

As a measure of the growing awareness and acceptance of graphics in intelligence presentations, statistics of the Cartography and Design Group show that the annual number of maps produced has risen from about 6,000 in the mid-1960s to approximately 16,000 in the early 1980s. The increased output reflects not only an awareness of product value but also the advent of improved technology.

The wider use of maps does suggest that intelligence consumers increasingly "like maps." The question put to me in 1951 as I embarked on a career as an Agency geographer seems even more important now, and it applies to all in the profession and discipline of intelligence.

This article is classified ~~SECRET~~ (b)(3)(n)

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AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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A tuft of golden plumage

SOVIET SUPERSONIC: A TECHNOPOLITICAL DISASTER

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In the Russian fable of the Firebird, the Tsarevitch becomes intoxicated with a bewitching birdlike creature who dances in the wilderness. He tries to capture her secrets, but comes away bearing only a tuft of her rich golden plumage. The Firebird, the tantalizing beauty, escapes, her elusive mysteries intact, having stolen the golden apples that provide the sustenance of the Russian realm. . . .

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(b)(3)(n) analysis of the USSR's supersonic airliner project provides insights into Soviet institutional interaction, elite psychology, and the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet research and development. The TU 144's origins can be traced to 1961; its end was announced in the summer of 1984. Many elements of this twenty-three year development program remain obscure.

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Obscure Genesis: 1961 – 1971

The first impression affecting an analyst approaching the Soviet SST story is the dramatic imbalance of materials available for its first and second decades. While the final days of the Soviet SST project can be reconstructed in great detail, its beginnings canno

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The TU 144 story in the 1960s must be reconstructed from contemporary press commentary and flashbacks from later reporting. The critical questions remain:

— Why did the USSR follow the West into supersonic transport development?


— Which Soviet institutions played leading motivational roles in bringing this about?

The atmospherics of the last years of Nikita Khrushchev's rule were radically different in spirit from those which have followed. Khrushchev was an adventurer, sincerely hopeful that Soviet technological prowess—revealed

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most dramatically by the advent of Sputnik in 1957—would enable the Soviets to surpass the West by 1980. Soviet space successes seemed to accredit the Soviet elite's technocratic optimism. An airliner of unprecedented speed to conquer the USSR's unparalleled distances must have seemed the wave of the future.



This Soviet "crash" program, which attained dramatic early results, was a first-class technical achievement. It had been accomplished chiefly by mobilizing the entire Soviet aerospace establishment behind Tupolev, by commission of the Council of Ministers. It is a salient example of the Soviet economy's ability to deliver quickly by concentrating all resources on a given design goal. Only later did the cost of this strategem become apparent.

For example, the development approach to the SST was that of the "Great Leap Forward." There was not time to develop sub-systems at a correct, safe rate and then integrate them into the grand design. Rather, all design components were developed simultaneously at maximum speed, which led to corner cutting and some high-risk technical solutions. This produced early results for the record books, as the higher party leadership doubtless desired, but it did not deliver reliable components for a project as technically ticklish as a supersonic airliner.

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The trouble-plagued history of the struggle to place the TU 144 into commercial service may be traced to the Central Committee's decision to concentrate on a record breaker. Fourteen years of dogged development, system modification, and redesigns never compensated for an inappropriate project strategy. Subsequent efforts to put the aircraft right were not aided by

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the fact that Tupolev's rival design bureaus were forced, for policy reasons, to act as its unacknowledged subcontractors.

The priority accorded the SST is shown by comparing its progress over the Backfire bomber, with which it shares Kuznetsov NK-144 engines.

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It eventually became apparent that the Backfire Mach II b(b)(1)
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shared more with the SST than its engines. Target speed, probable weight, and, probably, landing gear design were similar.

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As aerospace was the first priority in Soviet technical espionage in the 1960s, and the SST was the first priority project of the sector, the TU 144 quickly benefitted from data collected by Soviet intelligence services.

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In the case of the SST, an analogous project was proceeding in the West in an atmosphere of high publicity; this made matters much easier.

Something of the magnitude of this activity is revealed by General de Gaulle's personal authorization of the expulsion in 1965 of Sergei Pavlov, then senior Aeroflot representative in Paris. Pavlov spent much of his time attempting to penetrate SudAviation facilities near Toulouse to learn the secrets of the Concorde. In this, Pavlov appears to have been successful. His expulsion did not damage his career; he rose eventually to become Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation.

Pavlov recruited two French Communist Party members working at Toulouse to obtain blueprints and plans. At the trial of two Czechoslovakian priests in March 1966, arrested near the factory, one of the clandestine transmission routes of Concorde data was revealed. Microfilmed plans had been rolled up in toothpaste tubes by "tourists" on the Ostend-Warsaw Express for forwarding to Moscow.

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This is in part a tribute to the efficacy of the "gumshoe" developed by Soviet intelligence services, whereby Soviet delegations visiting Western machine shops and production lines wore shoes with super-soft and absorbent soles designed to pick up and retain metal filings and samples from the floor.

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Technology theft also took cruder forms, even in the spotlight of detente.

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The Soviets were known to have problems casting blades. Importunate Soviet officials were told these parts could not be sold. Shortly thereafter, most of the exhibit, including the uniquely perfect compressor casting, was stolen.

The Soviet SST made its debut at Sheremetyevo Airport, Moscow, on 21 May 1971. As the leadership had endowed the aircraft with a priority over defense projects, it was almost without precedent and indicative of Soviet optimism that the public was permitted to inspect this aircraft, embodying Soviet state-of-art technology.

More suprisingly, the leadership decided to fly the aircraft to Western air shows where it would be subject to detailed scouting by Western technicians. The TU 144's presence at the Hamburg Air Show in 1972, and the Paris shows of 1971, 1973, 1975, and 1977, provided opportunities for detailed inspection of the latest Soviet technology. This put Soviet aerospace development and production techniques into fresh focus. Frank peer exchanges between Soviet and Western pilots, engineers, and designers yielded information and insights extending beyond the SST proper. Politburo pride in this superlative Soviet technical achievement overrode normal Soviet preoccupations with secrecy and security.

Hidden Costs

In the context of the several long interruptions in SST testing—from 1 January to 30 March 1969, from 1 November 1969 to 1 April 1970, and from 12 November 1970 to 1 April 1971—the decision to go public with the craft reflects a certain bravado. The Soviets in this instance were breaking with precedent in not copying the West, but carrying out development in parallel. For once, the Soviets were toiling alongside the West at the technological frontier. Western technical secrets frequently could not be exploited because of inadequate Soviet materiel and technique as well as inability of Soviet engineers to decipher Western technical data. This undercut extensive Soviet technical espionage. Therefore, high level pressure to develop the SST at top speed at all costs had a counterproductive effect.

Soviet engineers themselves—including chief designer Alexei Tupolev—subsequently complained that concentration of Soviet resources on the SST blighted more economically justifiable programs, notably the wide-body jetliners that the USSR badly needed for the 1970s and 1980s. The first of these, the IL-86, was supposed to serve the 1980 Olympics, but was not available in quantity.

Record Breaker Goes Public

The first appearance of the TU 144 in the West, at Paris in June 1971, took place the week following the US Senate vote, 49 to 47, not to underwrite

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
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
the development of an American SST. The Senate vote disquieted Soviet SST proponents.


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
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Tupolev engineers that Alexei Tupolev was the chief motivator and lobbyist for the SST project, and indicates that as early as 1971, Tupolev was well aware that the ruinous concentration of Soviet aerospace assets on the SST had stalled more necessary projects.









Bottom, side, and auxiliary views of the TU 144, with dimensions. Top view of nose section shows canards extended.

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At Orly, though the TU 144 was carefully guarded by the Soviets, Western experts were able to approach the aircraft and observe signs of operational stress. The Soviets obviously took a casual approach to presentation: popped rivets, missing bolts, and wrinkled, heat-stressed skin were apparent. The threadbare tires, often with cord showing, provided eloquent testimony that Soviet tire technology could not meet the challenge of 121 tons repeatedly landing at 175-180 miles per hour.

Numerous meetings of Western and Soviet aerospace specialists from 1971 on revealed the contrasting personalities of chief test pilot Eduard Elyan and chief designer Tupolev. Elyan, visibly contemptuous of his accompanying security goon, was delighted with an opportunity to sit in an F-16 cockpit, and was personally solicitous of a US test pilot who had recently crashed. Elyan, whose "Hero of the Soviet Union" medal denoted a survivor of three crashes or near misses, asked whether the American had back pains, as he, Elyan, had suffered for months as a consequence of a wheels-up landing.

Tupolev was a less sympathetic, if more complex personality. Warming to his role as TU 144 flack, he retailed official howlers even before audiences who knew better. He told one group of visiting engineers that the TU 144 was "17 percent quieter than Concorde." Tupolev had his own reasons for backstopping the mendacious official line. His own father had been arrested by Stalin's secret police in 1937 as a "wrecker," in a bizarre backwash of the Great Purge, and confessed immediately to avoid torture. Thereafter, Tupolev *pere* and most of his chief engineers designed aircraft in a unique Soviet institution, the "sharashka," or prison bureau.

Western delegations began to visit the TU 144 remote assembly plant at Voronezh. The first known pilgrimage of this type was undertaken by the president of Aerospatiale in 1971. Later US visitors were impressed by Soviet titanium skin work, in particular the practice of winding the one-piece wing skin 360 degrees around its spars. This technical advancement jarred with the density of machine tools at the facility, said to be five times those found at an analogous US facility—reminiscent of American conditions in the 1930s.

Whether this reflected a Soviet fetish for the machine shop and/or backwardness in Soviet forging technology was unclear, but intensive "hogging out" (machining from the solid) of titanium ingots produced a useful yield of only ten to twenty percent. The considerable waste from this process was sold to US scrap dealers. Later scrap analysis indicated that the TU 144 shared at least one component with the IL-86.

Juxtaposition of the modern with the primitive was capped by an automated chicken coop adjacent to the TU 144 assembly area; the Soviets showed this off as an example of Tupolev's "diversification."


Elsewhere, Soviet standards were notable by their absence. US production engineers were astounded to learn that Russians had no term for "reliability engineer." "Life cycle testing," whereby components were tested to destruction, likewise had no place in the Soviet lexicon or experience. Western executives visiting Aeroflot were appalled at the lack of any mechanism to track operating costs, and the absence of a balance sheet.

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Final Product and First Crash

The "production" TU 144 which appeared at the 1973 Paris Air Show differed dramatically from the earlier prototypes. Had it been developed in the West, it probably would have been assigned a new design number. Chief designer Tupolev later noted that the new version was ten percent longer than the prototype, with seven percent more wing area. More tellingly, the wing had been completely redesigned into a "double delta" configuration, supplanting the curved leading edges of the prototype. Two canards—short stub wings that swung out from the nose—aided quick lift-off, at the cost of increased weight and drag. The four NK-144 turbofans were moved outward from their original placement in the lower fuselage to the wing roots. The landing gear was moved down from the engine nacelles and its geometry was extensively revised, from three- to two-axle configuration.



TU 144B in flight at Paris Air Show, 23 May 1973.

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In short, the "production" TU 144 was almost a new aircraft. A Western engineer/designer who had walked through the prototype the previous year described the 1973 version as a "complete redesign," with a new wing-engine relationship. The large landing gear housing was eliminated and the fuselage cross-section had been changed from an oval to a full circle. The tail section had been lengthened twenty-five feet. The modifications reflected a serious Soviet re-examination of the TU 144 after it had flown only two hundred hours. In sum, the TU 144 now resembled the Concorde more closely. The Soviets by now were troubled that the Concorde project had overtaken their own.

This TU 144, the second of the "production" batch, ended its debut in the West spectacularly by exploding in mid-air on the last day of the Paris Air Show, 3 June 1973.

The post-mortem involved examination of the smallest details. One US expert described the disposition of a missing bolt in the left tail section. Another testified that the color of the metal used in the fuselage had changed at the point where the tail section had separated from the fuselage in mid-air. Soviet test pilots later confirmed the observation by a Western engineer that the TU 144 had no "G leveling"—there were no overrides on the controls that prevented it from being maneuvered and stressed beyond the structural limits of the airframe.

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But this detailed technical analysis was beside the point: the crash was rooted in political and psychological pressures, not technical failure. As Soviet experts explained to Western test pilots in 1974, the crew at Paris in 1973 was under incredible official pressure to make the commercial debut of the production TU 144 as dramatic as possible. Confronting the Concorde was in line with the Soviet elite's "catch up" policy. The TU 144 maneuvering over the airport that final weekend of the air show, interesting to the average observer, was described by an expert eyewitness as "spectacular . . . risky and overdone." The huge aircraft was thrown into perilously sharp turns at minimum speed and altitude, for maximum show effect.


The aircrew, obeying orders to make the aircraft's debut as spectacular as possible, paid with their lives. According to Viktor Suvorov, the Politburo took an intense interest in the crash. GRU films of the crash were rushed to Moscow for viewing by the Polituro the next morning, where the inquest featured evidence from Tupolev, his deputies, and Soviet intelligence agencies. The GRU, which had twenty films of the crash, was reportedly begged by the KGB's Andropov for "just one" reel to illustrate his report, and was turned down. Leadership complicity in the crash found cathartic expression through a collective front page obituary in *Pravda* which announced a posthumous shower of decorations for the heroes. The fate of five French citizens, killed when tons of incandescent metal rained down upon their village, was not mentioned.

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The immediate cause of the disaster was that the pilots put the TU 144 into a steep climb immediately after a pass over the runway. The afterburners, which earlier had been observed to stutter and sometimes catch only on the third or fourth engine rev-up, cut in unevenly. This overstressed the airframe, designed for fast, level flight rather than abrupt low speed test maneuvers. It is believed that the noseplanes, or canards, then disintegrated, the pieces penetrating the twenty wing fuel tanks and possibly being sucked into the fifty-nine-inch diameter inlets of the engines, which subsequently exploded. The nose of the aircraft was thrown forward and down and the tail backward and up. The conflagration was reminiscent of the Hindenburg thirty-six years before; it, too, blew apart in the air, a pioneering form of air transport

This drawing depicts the beginning of the end for the TU 144B, Number 2, in the air near Paris on 3 June 1973. Pieces of the disintegrating nose planes, or canards (outlined in original position) were sucked down by the vacuum of the wings to be ingested by the engines and/or pierce the complex of fuel tanks in the wings (insert).



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embodying the hopes of a totalitarian technocracy and dying a fiery public death.

There were at least two inquests; in neither case were the findings publicized. The Soviet inquest, probably carried out jointly by the Ministries of Air Industry and Civil Aviation, assigned cause of the crash to "pilot error" or "human factors." TU 144s in the USSR were grounded for some months and production at the Voronezh factory was halted. Resumption of flight testing after eight months with apparently unmodified aircraft indicates that the aircraft itself was cleared from the Soviet point of view. As late as 1977, chief designer Tupolev * and Soviet test pilots refused to discuss the crash or the subsequent investigation, claiming that it was "still under investigation."

The French Concorde evaluation group also studied the crash. The French found that the pilot had gone into a stall and used too much afterburner to compensate, overstressing the engine and breaking loose the canards. These findings were not made public: the crash of the TU 144 cast a shadow on the Concorde project, now under political pressure because of its great cost, high fuel consumption, and perceived environmental impact.

Soviet Approaches to France and the UK

The TU 144 appeared at four Paris air shows, never at the British counterpart at Farnborough. Following the visit of Aerospatiale President Ziegler to Voronezh in 1971, a Franco-Soviet Joint Working Group exchanged data on SST developmental problems. Official Soviet delegations were admitted to Concorde production facilities at Toulouse to gather documentary information and indulge in intensive photography and measurement of components. The French rationalized that cooperation provided them an edge "over other competitors in the West" and might lead to sales within the USSR. After the French discovered Soviets scraping metal off the Concorde's engines in 1978, however, matters lapsed into "abeyance." A French proposal to fly Concorde nonstop through Soviet airspace to Tokyo, three months after the second TU 144 crash in 1978, was turned down by the Soviets, ostensibly because of concern that the Concorde would degrade Siberian ecology. Western observers were convinced the real reasons were Soviet security considerations, as well as pique that all TU 144s were again grounded.

British dealings with the Soviets were frostier. Relations lay under the cloud of the mass expulsion of one hundred and five Soviet intelligence officers from London in 1971 (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

The TU 144's true supersonic range fell short of Concorde's by about one thousand miles. TU 144 was only a medium range SST, not a true commercial competitor to the long range Concorde.

* The TV pool film provided a good picture of the mid-air explosion, but failed to identify the stricken chief designer arriving at the crash site.

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Indications of trouble also registered in comparing hours-in-air: although the TU 144 had first flown three months before the Concorde, by 1972 it had logged only seven hundred hours of developmental flight, versus fifteen hundred for the Concorde.

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The Concorde's purchase price per seat was said to be ten times that of a modern subsonic airliner; operating cost per passenger-mile would be twice as much. Concorde fuel consumption was estimated at three times that of a normal airliner. Cost weighed heavily upon commercial decisions to buy Concorde and undercut even more the prospects of the larger, heavier, and demonstrably thirstier TU 144.

The Soviet SST was also hampered by Aeroflot's poor reputation for provision of spares and overseas repair facilities, which for the TU 144 were centralized in Moscow even on internal routes. (b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

In the late 1960s the Soviets had already mounted an assiduous, if ultimately fruitless, courtship of British Concorde engineers, featuring weekly invitations from the Soviet Embassy in London to meet with Soviet "colleagues" who "happened to be in the area." The Soviet apparatus had early identified Concorde's engines as the critical collection target. Soviet Kuznetsov turbofans came to surpass the Rolls Royce-Bristol engines in sheer thrust, but only through ruinous near-permanent use of after-burners, whose heat fatigued TU 144's skin and airframe. This high speed bomber engine was heavy, smoky, and gluttonous, so much so that it is doubtful whether the TU 144 could have crossed the Atlantic more than half full of passengers.

Because Tupolev pushed mainly for greater power, engine efficiency received short shrift. In 1975 the Soviets approached the British firm Lucas Aerospace, discussing a $17-million contract for a modified version of the digital fuel injection system used on the Concorde. Typically, initial Soviet data furnished on NK-144 performance characteristics contained falsified information. Lucas engineers corrected the data based on what they knew, and Soviet experts corrected the corrections in a series of "give and take technical sessions." The chief intelligence gain from these talks was to confirm in greater detail the design faults of the engine, whose internal "blow in" and "blow out" doors were designed to open and close at different times. Lucas concluded that the NK-144 was incapable of optimum operation at any speed.

Further evidence of Soviet research and development failings was provided by the Soviet insistence on the use of a hodgepodge of obsolete Western engine control equipment, an admixture of both electronic and hydromechanical components, samples of which the USSR had assembled through both legal and clandestine purchases. What the Soviets were "ordering" was not the state-of-the-art equipment of maximum possible benefit, but production tech-

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nology for manufacturing complex, obsolete, and somewhat incompatible systems. A bemused Lucas management supported such a sale, arguing it would protect the Western lead in a vital area. These bizarre negotiations proceeded for two years, then were halted by the British in 1977.

Chief designer Tupolev, aboard the TU 144 during its last visit to the West at the 1977 Paris Air Show, had lost much of his earlier ebullience. He had no idea when Soviet authorities would authorize the beginning of the TU 144's commercial service. He personally would be just as happy to stay with high-speed air freight, as passengers were just "too much trouble." By now the Tupolev entourage was more forthcoming regarding the noise problem, which afflicted ground crew, passengers, and residents. This necessitated flying the aircraft to remote airports.

Commercialization

Until the mid-1970s it appeared that the TU 144 might emerge as a credible competitor to Concorde; Soviet advertising followed this theme until 1976. Tupolev's glumness by 1977 reflected the fact that the TU 144 had now demonstrably fallen behind the Concorde. TU 144 route testing had begun in May 1974 and scheduled flights of freight and mail on 26 December 1975, just before the launch of Concorde's first two international routes in January 1976. Air France and British Airways officials, noting that no flight schedules or rates were available, dismissed this as "a propaganda exercise." Over the next two years fifty TU 144 freight runs were carried out, and eight were canceled.

Ultimately, *raison d'etat* prevailed over the realities of the troubled test flight program. In October 1977 the TU 144 reportedly received its airworthiness certificate from a new Soviet authority, said to be set up on the lines of the US Federal Aviation Administration. This bureaucratic convulsion may be related to TU 144 travails. Previously, each design bureau had certified its own aircraft as ready for use. The sparse documentation forwarded by the Soviets was deemed inadequate by Western experts for air certification in their countries. But within the USSR, the way was clear for supersonic "commercialization."

Coincident with the Diamond Jubilee of the Great October Revolution, Soviet SST passenger service was launched 1 November 1977, twenty-two months behind Concorde. This was a first rank Soviet media event, marred only by the breakdown of the motorized embarkation ramp, which—to the observable fury of Minister of Civil Aviation Boris Bugayev—delayed departure for thirty minutes.

This was a rare opportunity for Westerners to sample the aircraft in flight. Only two of the 113 passengers paid the $110 fare to Alma Ata; officially selected reporters and photographers comprised the remainder. Their chief impression was of the cacophony created by the monstrous air conditioners, the rush of air, and the huge engines. The rear of the cabin was unbearable; elsewhere, conversations were shouted. Because Aeroflot flights were "classless," the survival of a first class cabin suggested that hope lingered for international service. The 2,025-mile trip was completed in exactly two hours, with take-off noise estimated at 110 decibels.

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Possibly laundered Soviet documentation provided to the Franco-Soviet Joint Working Group recorded 226 faults in the 102 flights undertaken between 1 November 1977 and 1 June 1978. The most dramatic of these were a sudden loss in cabin pressure on 27 December and that on 24 January the landing gear light had stayed on. The real problem was that the TU 144 was not recovering costs on its single domestic route. The Concorde by now was in service on seven international routes and at least operationally profitable on most of them.

The most basic problem—thirsty engines—remained. Reports had filtered out during the 1970s of new engines for the TU 144, possibly turbojets on the lines of the Concorde with smaller inlets and nacelles. This suggestion seems not to have been developed. By the mid-1970s, reports came out of a "variable geometry, variable by-pass ratio" engine under development by the otherwise obscure Koliesov Design Bureau. This engine was said to function as a turbojet subsonically and as a turbofan supersonically, providing optimum efficiency in both regimes. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) later concluded that a variable cycle engine was "an exceedingly complex scheme considered beyond current Soviet design capability."

Reports nonetheless began to emerge of a new series TU 144D, fitted with a new type of engine "fifty percent more economical." One of the first of these aircraft, with Soviet premier test pilot Eduard Elyan presumably at the controls, crashed the afternoon of 23 May 1978.

The news seeped out slowly to the West. Aeroflot in June "confirmed" that flights had been suspended, ending eight months of passenger service. Rumors circulating among Tupolev personnel indicated that a fire broke out in the left engines and spread to the fuselage. The pilot was said to have successfully shut down one or more engines, but came down in a field when power failed and he could not maintain altitude. The SST was gutted by burning fuel and was then blown apart. Some time after the fact, Western aviation magazines reported that three crew members were burned to death and two survived. Voronezh gossip set these numbers at nine and two, respectively. (b)(1) Whether the pilot survived is unknown in the West. (b)(3)(n) reporting as late as 24 October 1978 was tentative.

Official confirmation of the crash had in fact been made to the French during the Joint Working Group meeting of 11 October. The Soviet spokesman admitted under questioning that there had been a TU 144 crash, "but it was not an aircraft belonging to Tupolev or Aeroflot."

At the 11 October joint meeting with the French, the Soviets produced a document described by one participant as a "cry for help." Confirmation of the crash was followed by the "confidence" that Tupolev had recommended suspension of service to Alma Ata before the crash occurred, owing to high levels of noise and fuel consumption. Development flights were continuing; regular passenger flights would resume within "months rather than years." There were no references to engine problems as such. But there was a litany of shortcomings that may have reflected a crash post-mortem: ice forming around engine inlets, leaky fuel pipe connections, and an emergency on-board power supply for the aircraft. The skin had fatigued, with cracks forming at the base

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of the fins and in the thin foil lining the wheel bay ahead of the nose gear, probably owing to heat or insufficient cooling or, possibly, acoustical cracking. The French responded that if they could provide technical aid, their British partners would have to be consulted. There the matter presumably rested.

The disaster of 23 May 1978 compounded the fearsome reputation of the TU 144 among the workers responsible for assembling it. Rumors abounded of further crashes and flights aborted because of last-minute malfunctions. A third crash, unreported by Soviet authorities, was believed to have occurred at the end of a Moscow-Alma Ata run in 1974. The Bolshoi Ballet, it was said, had escaped death only by transferring to another aircraft at the last minute.

Behind the Scenes Again: 1978-84

The second crash marked the beginning of the end for the TU 144. Ominously, the TU 144 began to disappear from the lists of future Soviet aircraft mentioned in the Soviet press. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, observing the sixtieth birthday of Tupolev in November 1978, made the admission—startling in the Soviet context—that "ideas and technical solutions developed by Tupolev for military bombers were not readily translatable to airliners where considerations of economy, comfort, and reliability were paramount." This was not the SST's epitaph, but it may justly be regarded as the Soviet media's high water mark of candor. In December Sergei Pavlov, Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation, who a decade before had organized the abstraction of Concorde blueprints from Toulouse to Moscow, conceded to Ambassador Hartman that the aircraft was experiencing "considerable difficulty." Its thirty-percent ticket premium did not even cover operating costs. By late 1978 Aeroflot had launched a fuel conservation program nationwide and the politically important export of kerosene to its major market, India, was being suspended during August, peak month of Aeroflot operations. Odds were against the TU 144, a confirmed dipsomaniac even operated subsonically.

The remaining life of the TU 144 was played out as it had begun: as a Soviet propaganda vehicle. On 23 June 1979 Soviet media announced that a TU 144 had flown the 4,350 miles from Moscow to Khabarovsk in three hours and twenty-one minutes, to commenorate the fortieth anniversary of the first nonstop flight (by a Tupolev) from Moscow to the Far East. On 4 March 1980 the TU 144 made its last appearance in the Soviet media and the record books. Number 77106, which had inaugurated commercial flights, was flown to the Soviet Air Force Museum at Monino, near Moscow. Even in retirement, it acquired one final garland: it was the first supersonic airliner to land on dirt, using a sod runway frozen and extended for this special occasion. Three drag chutes brought it to rest in less than a kilometer of run-out. This curious occasion reflected an ancient Aeroflot requirement that all its equipment be designed to land on dirt.

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While most TU 144s remained grounded for long periods, they were occasionally observed being fitted with new engines. In March 1981 engine work was in progress on four TU 144Ds, and in April – May 1981 there were

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indications that the Soviets were preparing for a third try at entering the craft in commercial service. On 17 July 1981 the fifteenth (and probably last) TU 144 was produced—the first for twenty months. Earlier production had been envisioned to be forty to fifty units. As late as January 1982 flight training was reported as beginning once again at Shermetevo. Ministry of Civil Air officials confirmed that flights would continue even though results were "not up to expectations."

In June 1983 a Tupolev engineer, writing in *Znamya* (Science), referred to the need for new engines for the TU 144, but referred to it chiefly in a nostalgic vein. Finally, the Ministry of Civil Aviation in a summer 1984 announcement noted that development of the SST had been brought to an end. Production cost alone had been estimated at $2.8 billion. The Concorde R&D cost approached $2.5 billion. On this analogue, the total cash cost to the Soviets of the "Concordski" would be in the region of $4.5 billion.

Factors Contributing to the Failure of the Soviet SST

Forced draft development ordained by highest Soviet authority. This forced simultaneous development of all sub-systems. Unprecedented performance requirements for high speed and range required time for sufficient simulation of stress to anticipate design failures, but time was not available. The dangerously telescoped development cycle made sound design impossible. The political prestige gained by a record breaker was prodigiously expensive.

As a corollary, politicization of the research and development process. Its chief designer in 1977 claimed that the TU 144 was five percent higher, six percent longer, had a wingspan thirteen percent larger and twenty-two percent more wing area than the counterpart Concorde. This upsizing—almost certainly dictated by requirements that were political rather than technical or economic—destroyed what chance the aircraft had for aerodynamic efficiency. The focused espionage effort against Aerospatiale-Toulouse in the mid-1960s provided good data on the aerodynamics of the Concorde prototype. The decision to go up scale—without the computer capability to redesign the larger aircraft for maximum aerodynamic flow—undercut Soviet capability to produce a clean aircraft.

Soviet misperception that civil technology could not outrank military in sophistication and complexity. A civil airliner capable of Mach II for sustained periods poses technical demands much greater than those for a fighter-bomber. Requirements for economy, quietness, and passenger comfort were never resolved. What the Soviets flew was a raw, crude aircraft suitable for a military crew, but not for passengers—the fruit of decades of military domination in aviation.

Limited ability to exploit highly advanced Western technology obtained through espionage. The very high priority accorded SST data and technology in Soviet scientific and technical collection provided the Soviets with reams of material. [redacted] much of the data collected through espionage was "unintelligible" to Soviet technicians. Information that was understandable often set requirements beyond the capa- (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

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bilities of Soviet materiel and production technology. Incapable of copying the Concorde, the Soviets had to construct a parable.

Soviet decision to join the West at the technological frontier, rather than follow behind. Soviet infrastructure could not produce the equipment required to ensure commercially viable SST flight. Fifteen years of improvisation and patchwork never closed the gap. Avionics were always in an experimental state and the flight deck took on a finished look only in 1977.

Overcompartmentation and secrecy, fueled by interministerial rivalries and jealousies between the design bureaus. Soviet aircraft development is shared by the Ministry of Aviation Industry and the Ministry of Civil Aviation, though the respective spheres of responsibility are uncertain, possibly even to the Soviets. Tupolev was resented by other design bureaus as the favored design bureau, in the beginning because it received all the resources and credit for a project involving the whole industry, at the end because of its failure.

Technically inept development. Soviet skill in manufacturing titanium was not followed by its successful application to the airframe. Though the design target was that thirty percent of the aircraft's weight should be titanium, in practice this dropped to eighteen percent. This contributed to an overweight aircraft that crept up an additional fifty percent in weight over the course of its development. This in itself is not uncommon, but the commercial viability of the TU 144 was undercut by the inability of the engineers to extract more power from the engines. A thirty percent increase in thrust was achieved by 1972. Then development of the NK 144 engines apparently halted, thoug(b)(1) concluded that proper flow analysis and tuning could have e(b)(3)(n)nother twenty-five percent increase in power from the engines. Because the weight creep was greater than the extra power coaxed from the engines, the actual speed and range of the TU 144 dropped as time went on. The problem was not solely that the engines lagged behind Western standards of performance, but that the Soviets lacked the ability to extract maximum results from their own equipment. This corroborates expert observation that there is a great gulf fixed between Soviet theory and application: though Soviet theoretical knowledge is second to none, shopfloor practice is often "crude blacksmith" work.

> *. . . As in the Russian fable of the Firebird, the Soviet political leadership had become intoxicated with its vision of the SST dancing in the wilderness beyond the USSR's technological reach. The Soviets had mounted a mighty effort to capture the secrets of supersonic commercial flight but came away bearing only the symbolic golden tuft of entries in the record books.*

This article is classified ~~SECRET~~ (b)(3)(n)

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A NEW ANALYST REPLIES

(b)(3)(c)

In his article "Managing/Training New Analysts" (*Studies in Intelligence*, Fall 1986), (b)(3)(c) makes three recommendations, which he states can facilitate the new analyst's learning process. They are:

- Communicate a sense of our mission and the difference between intelligence writing and academic writing.
- Describe the process of intelligence analysis in a clear, cogent fashion.
- Prepare the fledgling analysts for early failures and provide lots of positive reinforcement and reassurance.

As a relatively new analyst (three years with the Agency) with five years of industrial work experience, I would like to submit a few thoughts on the subject.

Academic Writing Versus Intelligence Writing

I agree that substantial differences exist between academic and intelligence writing, and refer the reader to Mr. (b)(3)(c) previous article for some excellent examples of those differences. In particular, I believe there is much too great an emphasis on length rather than on substance in much academic writing.

In my own experience, I remember well (both in undergraduate and graduate school) worrying if my research papers were substantial enough—in number of pages, not only in substance. We students used to joke about our reports being graded by the pound. In my experience, however, most professors are themselves responsible for much of this verbosity. As an example, in the graduate-level study program I am now enrolled in, each of the classes I have taken so far has required submission of papers of specified length. In my opinion, emphasis on quantity rather than quality almost guarantees that quantity *at the exclusion of quality* is what you will get.

(In a somewhat ironic twist, I am now forced to read many of these verbose academic-style research papers. Part of my analysis work depends on reporting by various components of NASA, which publishes its reports in the traditional research paper style. It becomes very frustrating for me, now a consumer of this reporting, to wade through the oceans of data and text to find the few drops of conclusions I need.)

Intelligence Writing: Not So Unique

In contrasting intelligence and academic writing styles, however, Mr. Petersen implies that intelligence writing is unique. I believe that intelligence

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writing is *not* a unique writing style, and that it does not require unique teaching techniques by intelligence managers. I submit that intelligence writing is very similar to writing done for any large corporation or business.

I offer my own work experience as an example. I was graduated from college as a chemical engineer, and accepted a position in a factory of a large chemical company. I had no previous engineering work experience, and was definitely "wet behind the ears." My job was to use my technical skills to improve yields and throughput of our product. I quickly learned that some of the most important parts of my projects were the periodic reports sent to our plant and division management. Let's see how these reports match up to the previous paper's framework for intelligence writing.

Focus on the Future

My management didn't want to be bothered with details of previous projects that had failed—it wanted to know what I was going to do *now* to make a project run better. General business practices emphasize that sunk costs (past expenditures) are largely irrelevant; future costs and future rates of return are the most important planning factors. Our management was planning continually for projected future business conditions, equipment purchases, maintenance needs, payroll requirements, and so forth. The past was only useful for guiding us away from things that hadn't worked before, and giving us a basis for action in areas where we had been successful.

Write for Generalists Who Are Grappling with Real Problems

One proverb often repeated around our office went something like this: "Reports should be short enough and clearly written enough that they can easily be read and understood in the length of time of the average trip to the john" (roughly five minutes). In addition, we made sure that our conclusions, which always went on the first page, contained all of the important points, because we knew most managers wouldn't get any further than that first page. Industrial managers are just as busy as CIA managers, and can't afford the time to dig through masses of data to find a few pieces of useful information.

It was even more important for me to realize, as an engineer writing technical reports, that many managers in our factory were not technically trained. They were not interested in minute technological details of projects, but, on the other hand, they were responsible for making sound business decisions about those projects. Thus, these managers wanted reports that included only essential details, written in a way they could understand without (God forbid) getting the idea that some technical smart aleck was trying to "talk down" to them.

Deal with Essentials Only, and Make Meaningful Characterizations

The temptation to become the "all-knowing expert" of whatever project you are working on is the same in industry and in the intelligence business. The same time and resource constraints also exist in both worlds. In one of my first projects, I was to increase throughput rates on a pigment grinding machine. I initially collected reams of data on every aspect of that machine. It became

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apparent, however, that there were actually only a few key data points to consider. When I reported results to my management, the necessary details became even fewer. I learned to recognize what was truly important in each case, and to spend only the time that was necessary to do the job right at the appropriate level of detail.

Our project reports always started with what we believed was essential for management to know. If a manager wanted to know more, he/she could read the supporting details. If he/she wanted in-depth information about the project, he/she could either call me up and ask about it (this very rarely happened) or request a briefing on the subject (even rarer).

Begin with Conclusions and Then Explore Their Implications

Using the above pigment grinding machine example again, in the long run, the increased throughput rate of that one pigment grinding machine was only a small part of my project. Our company had many factories, all of which were evaluating new ways of grinding pigment. It was my responsibility to compare our pigment grinding machine's new operating procedures with the other factories' current methods of operation, factoring in changes in equipment usage rates, safety implications, long-term equipment reliability, and so forth. The implications of what the machine would do for our overall business were much more important than just the operation of the machine itself.

Differences and Similarities

Given, then, that industrial writing is similar to intelligence writing, what can be learned from an examination of a typical company's approach to the teaching of successful writing techniques? Analysis of my own experience leads me to conclude that there is one important difference between industry and intelligence that leads to a lot of analyst and manager heartburn, and one important similarity, which could lead to more effective writing by analysts.

The Difference: Editing

One of the reasons managers (and analysts) come to believe that intelligence writing is a unique style is the tremendous edifice of editing that has been built up around it. It is my conviction that we have developed a structure that is inefficient, and stifling to timely, accurate, and creative writing.

This conviction became stronger as I became involved with the coordination of my first paper (a joint effort with two other offices). The overwhelming majority of the drafts were returned with few or no comments of a substantive nature. Almost all of the drafts, however, were returned with the typographical errors circled and disagreements about grammatical style (which or who, fully believed or believed fully, and so forth) pointed out. What a frustrating experience. I had expected questions and comments about substantive issues. What I received were everyone's efforts to be grammarians. From conversations with fellow analysts, I have found that my experience was fairly typical.

I'm not sure how this practice of misguided editing came about. I imagine branch chiefs must feel a tremendous amount of pressure to make sure the

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finished intelligence writing that leaves their branches will not only be technically correct, but grammatically elegant. I certainly do not condone grammatical gaffes or obvious wrong writing, but I do feel that attention is much too heavily slanted toward the framework, and not on the picture the analyst is trying to paint.

Needless editing can also lead to adoption of particularly dangerous attitudes by analysts. If an analyst knows that, no matter how much time and effort he or she puts into the construction of an article of finished intelligence, it will be ripped apart because of differences in personal grammatical styles, the tendency will be for the analyst to not want to try so hard next time. Why sweat the details if someone else (or, perhaps more typically, *many* someone elses) is going to rewrite the piece anyway?

How Long Should It Take To Publish?

Unnecessary editing can also significantly detract from the timeliness (and thus the value) of our finished intelligence. One analyst I know decided to keep track of the time his intelligence assessment took to get through the review process. Of the 10 months it took to publish the paper, approximately seven months were spent in review by various managers. In my view, that is too long.

If a mathematical equation were developed to quantify the value of finished intelligence reporting, the time between when the analysis is completed and when the finished piece "hits the streets" certainly would be a significant variable. This isn't news to any of us. Unfortunately, our review process often doesn't seem to reflect the importance of timely finished reporting. In our office, we even have an alternative to the regular paper review process, the so-called fast-track or streamlined paper review. This process is used for papers deemed to be particularly important or perishable. Isn't it sad that we have to rely on special methods to ensure that analysis gets out in a timely fashion?

So How Did You Do It in Industry?

In my industrial job, my only editor was my immediate supervisor, a Ph.D. chemical engineer, who had engineering projects of his own as well as having supervisory responsibilities for nine engineers. He was too busy to worry about looking up whether an engineer should have used "which" or "that". He *did* ensure that what went out of our group was technically accurate, however, by keeping up to speed on the various projects on which we were working.

How do you keep track of the multiple projects of nine engineers? You don't. That is, you don't keep track of the minutiae involved in every particular project. It was our mutual responsibility, however, to keep each other abreast of significant developments (or lack or developments) in given projects.

Moreover, my supervisor's level of involvement varied as my experience level increased. At first, we worked very closely together. This was beneficial for both of us. He was able to "show me the ropes" in a short period of time, and I wasn't left alone to figure everything out by myself. As my experience grew, so did his confidence in my abilities and judgment. I was left increasingly on my own to decide the technical merits of my projects.

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My supervisor took the same approach toward my written reports as he did to my project engineering work. At the beginning, he spent sufficient time with me to make me comfortable with my company's report writing style. He went over the first few reports I wrote, with the attitude of making sure my logic fit in with the desired format. After the first few reports, I was pretty much on my own. My supervisor still *saw* my reports before they were disseminated, but if they were accurate, he didn't make changes.

What is my point? Simply that it is important not to let the process take precedence over the product. The purist may argue, correctly, that perhaps my reports were not as elegantly composed as they could have been. But I did put out reports that were timely, as well as technically accurate. They were good enough. As time went on, I know my writing improved. The important thing was, however, that I improved *as* I produced, as opposed to improving *instead* of producing.

One more thing. It was recognized by our plant management that my manager was not responsible for my writing style. If the report was factually correct, my manager had done his job. If the writing was not elegant, that was *my* fault, not my manager's.

A Possible Solution

In my opinion, employing the services of the central editorial staff within the DI earlier in the production process could go a long way toward solving the problem of turning out timely, accurate reports. This staff in the Office of Current Production and Analytical Support consists of professionally trained editors, and is responsible for ensuring that all papers are published in the "DI style."

The writing process I propose would go as follows. The analyst works closely with his/her branch chief and with substantive authorities for coordination, in the preparation of the first draft. Close, frequent contact between analyst and branch chief ensures as much as possible that everything stays on track and on focus. In this phase, the steps Mr.(b)(3)(c) outlined in his "Framework for Analysis" can be particularly helpful.

When the first draft is completed, the branch chief and the analyst satisfy themselves that the facts and the logic of the paper are correct, and that they are getting their points across clearly. A certain amount of editing is necessary in this stage, but it should be limited to that needed to ensure that the report is accurate and understandable.

Once the branch chief and the analyst are satisfied with the first draft, they send it to the central editorial staff. This staff ensures that the paper reads "in the DI style" and is understandable to the intended audience. The staff is in frequent contact with the analyst, so that questions about what the analyst meant by a particular statement, or how the analyst wants the graphics to look, can be resolved quickly.

When the central editorial staff finishes with the paper, it announces that a paper on subject X has been completed, and anyone with knowledge in this area who would like to see the paper for comments can go to the central

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editorial staff office and do so. (Note: This is purely a precaution. Those with knowledge in the subject area were consulted in preparation of the draft. The announcement is just a way to ensure that all legitimate concerns are addressed, and that no one is trying to sneak a paper out without proper review.) The staff and the analyst who wrote the paper handle substantive comments, getting in touch with the commenting analyst as necessary. Stylistic comments are handled between the staff and the commenting analyst. Once the comments are resolved, the paper is published.

This system would accomplish several tasks. First, it would remove the pressure on branch chiefs and analysts to overedit their work. Many of us agonize over our papers too much, with the result that we lose much of the timeliness of the information. In our effort to make things look good, we sometimes forget that our product is not reports, it is information—information that quickly loses its value. A central staff handling hundreds of papers a year will be farther ahead on the learning curve than a single analyst, who publishes on the order of one paper per year, could ever hope to be. The timeliness and quality of our publications should both rise as a result.

Secondly, having all DI papers go through this central staff earlier would ensure that all papers would be written in the same DI style. As even I, with my relatively short tenure here, have learned, desired writing styles change over time. It would be much faster, easier, and, I submit, cheaper, to effect these changes in all their subtle nuances with a small staff of professional writers than with hundreds of analysts.

A third benefit would be that this central editorial staff would allow the analysts more time to do analysis, at no expense to the Agency in terms of lost production of finished intelligence. The present system can require several months of the analyst's time in poring over suggested changes, editorial comments, draft revisions, and so forth—time that I believe could be better spent in analyzing new problems. We could let the full-time writers polish the writing, and let the analysts analyze.

The Similarity: Learning by Doing

I believe the best way to learn appropriate writing techniques is on the job. I learned to write in my company's particular nuance of the general industrial style by writing real reports, not by completing "make believe" assignments to hand in to my boss. I don't think many companies have the time to go through those kinds of exercises.

I believe the same framework for constructive education about effective writing from one's own supervisor exists within our Agency. Most good branch chiefs are good writers (otherwise, they wouldn't have made it to branch chief). I believe the most effective way to train a new analyst to write correctly is to have his/her own branch chief give a brief summary about why and how we write. The steps mentioned above and in the earlier article are an excellent way to do this.

Next, I would suggest that the new analyst begin writing short articles of current intelligence for some of our many publications. In my view, our

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Agency is well set up for this type of writing instruction. In the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research, we have a daily publication for disseminating current intelligence (the *Science and Weapons Daily Review*). This is a good forum for writing by new analysts. One of the most important things for managers to remember is not to let the analyst get too hung up on the format. A review of other similar pieces should quickly give the analyst the desired format without raising excessive anxiety about getting the line length right, and so forth.

Some may take exception to my position that the branch chief should teach writing. I feel very strongly that this is the most effective method. If branch chiefs can't perform this function, they should be in a different position.

Help for Branch Chiefs

As I mentioned above, I don't feel managers should be responsible for analysts' writing styles. What, then, should be done about analysts who don't seem to have the knack for reporting intelligence in a way that is interesting for the reader? Are these analysts doomed to poor performance reviews?

No. But there's more than one way to skin a cat, and just because we're in the intelligence business doesn't mean we can't go outside the Agency to get the help we need. This is the age of consultants, and one area where I feel consultants can be particularly effective is in giving seminars on effective writing techniques. The company I worked for had regularly scheduled writing seminars, in which writing experts would offer their insight into what makes one style of writing interesting, another boring. OSWR management sponsored such seminars in April 1986 and December 1987. I believe they were very well received.

New Analysts Do Not All Have the Same Needs

Mr. (b)(3)(c) also addressed, albeit briefly, the need for mentoring, or, as it was called, hand-holding. I feel this is particularly important for new analysts of any age or experience level. I would make a careful distinction between the kinds of mentoring necessary, however. A new analyst straight out of college may need some initial assistance in adjusting to the work environment. College *is* different from the workplace. There are different rules of etiquette to be observed, and different expectations.

The analyst who has had previous work experience, however, probably already has a handle on appropriate behavior patterns. These analysts need something closer to a quick walk-through of the "way things are done around here," an idea of performance expectations, and access to a good resource person who knows the nuts and bolts of the Agency's system of management. Most new analysts are, I would submit, eager to please, and only wish to be pointed in the right direction.

Preparing the Fledgling Analyst for Failure?

The third major point of the previous article was to prepare the fledgling analysts for early failures and provide lots of positive reinforcement and

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reassurance. The author stated that "Each analyst must learn the job as each before him has, essentially by trying, falling short, and trying again."

I feel very strongly that "to prepare the fledgling analysts for early failures" while providing "lots of positive reinforcement and reassurance" is exactly the wrong way to approach the training of new analysts. This approach is analogous to a trainer teaching a young pugilist to box by putting him in the ring against the heavyweight champion. It doesn't matter how much encouragement the trainer gives his pupil, the pupil is going to get pounded into the canvas. When the cards are so stacked against you that you have no chance of succeeding, serious frustration is bound to set in. Systems that are set up for people to learn by failure and frustration are systems that will lead to *more* failure and frustration.

My suggestion? Prepare fledgling analysts for early *success*. The earlier article contended that "In many cases, you will be the first person ever to tell [the new analysts] their work does not measure up." I disagree. Anyone who has made the transition from high school to college has had to adjust to different expectations. This Agency has a reputation for hiring intelligent people (no pun intended), but I haven't seen anyone walking on water around here yet. We all had to make some initial adjustments.

Unfortunately, preparing new analysts for success requires more forethought and preparation by managers than the "learn by failure" mode. Preparing for success also requires more "up-front" training, so that, for example, the branch chief knows that the analyst has the literary tools required to write a major paper by the time he has finished his research.

We know, however, that the literary tools are only a part of what we need in order to succeed. I would not presume to speak as an expert on the the quality of the Agency's management-analyst relationships. I have had some experience as a foreman for production and shipping crews in my previous industrial employment, so I have had the opportunity to learn a few things about relationships with superiors, peers, and subordinates. One of the most important lessons I learned was that if I wanted to get good performance from my crew, I had to believe that they *wanted* to do a good job, that they were *capable* of doing a good job, and that they *would* do a good job. Shortcomings of my crew's performance in any of these areas meant that I had to reevaluate my own performance to determine how I was keeping my employees from doing their best work. Employees tend naturally to rise (or sink) to your level of confidence in them and your respect for their abilities. Statements such as were made in the previous article about new analysts "driving you insane," or "punching this guy" for his incompetence, or having to "hammer" missions and essences into the analyst's head, have no place in management—even in jest.

Many authors have written books on effective management techniques—there are enough of them that one could certainly spend one's life just *reading* about management and never *doing* it. I see no need in adding to the clutter. I would, however, in closing, like to pass on for consideration the most valuable piece of management advice I have yet received. It goes like this: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.

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THOSE DARING YOUNG MEN AND THEIR ULTRA-HIGH-FLYING MACHINES

Donald E. Welzenbach
Nancy Galyean

The year: 1957. The task: planning for a deep-penetration U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union. To win the approval of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who personally checked the flight plans and set the time limits for each operation, the justification for every mission had to be detailed and supported by voluminous mission planning charts and threat analyses.

Most overflight requests that made it to the Oval Office were based on questions of immediate interest: How many intercontinental bombers are in the Soviet arsenal? What is the status of Soviet nuclear test facilities? Where are the Soviet ICBMs being tested? How many airbases within the Soviet Union can be used to deploy heavy bombers? What is the status of the Soviet naval forces? How many submarines do the Soviets have? How extensive is the Soviet power grid east of the Urals? Has the Soviet Union extended its network of highways? Of railroads?

These national intelligence requirements flowed from the various parts of the intelligence community, which was different from the community of today. The Defense Intelligence Agency had yet to be created. In its stead were the G-2 units of the major service components: the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Army's Military Intelligence Service, and the Air Force's Air Intelligence Service. The National Security Agency was still in its infancy. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence Reports, and the Atomic Energy Commission all sent representatives to meetings of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, presided over by the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles. Representatives of the community also brought their wish-lists for overflights to James Q. Reber, chairman of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC).

In September 1957 a consensus began to build for obtaining presidential authority for overflights of Soviet naval maneuvers in the Barents Sea area near Murmansk, scheduled for October. Some ARC members wanted an ELINT-collection mission, and others wanted photos of the deployed vessels as well as of the naval shipyards ranged around Murmansk and Severomorsk. The early U-2B, however, could not fly both ELINT and photo payloads at the same time.

Consensus on targets for a mission was only the beginning of the process. The Air Force, which provided the lion's share of the support for these covert U-2 missions, had to produce a long-range weather forecast for the area of the intended overflight. Air Force navigators had to plot proposed flight plans. The Photographic Intelligence Center (PIC) had to provide data on possible targets along the flight path and indicate where the cameras should be turned on and

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off. The Lockheed specialists who looked after the U-2 airframes had to be informed of the intended route in order to assist in determining fuel consumption rates and the accuracy of the navigation instruments. A flight to Murmansk would take the U-2 to an area of extreme cold, where gusty winds might be encountered at high altitudes. The aircraft would also have to be navigated at the highest latitudes on earth, where the divergence between magnetic north and true north is most pronounced, where magnetic deflection causes wide variations in magnetic compass accuracy, and where radio beacons are few and far between.

When all ARC members had agreed on the need for overflights in the Murmansk area, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., special assistant to the DCI, persuaded Dulles to approach the President for permission to mount the missions. This permission was not easily obtained. President Eisenhower had been disappointed to learn after the first five overflights in July 1956 that the U-2 was not invisible to radar as he had been led to believe; he was more than disappointed when he received a protest from the Soviet Government giving many details of the first two deep-penetration overflights, made on 4 and 5 July 1956. Eisenhower had been prompt to use the U-2 to overfly much of the Middle East during the Suez crisis in October 1956, but was very reluctant to aggravate the Soviets. By September 1957, only 17 deep-penetration missions had been flown over the Soviet Union, five of them in July 1956 and seven in August 1957. Most were flown by Detachment B, based in Adana, Turkey. The missions to Murmansk would be mounted by Detachment A, based at Giebelstadt, West Germany.

The first step in the authorization procedure was for Bissell to brief the President's staff secretary, Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster. If Goodpaster thought the President might approve, he arranged for Bissell and Dulles to see him. In this case, there is no exact record of when Eisenhower gave his approval for the Murmansk mission, but it is believed to have been in late September 1957.

ELINT-Collection Mission

President Eisenhower authorized two missions in the Barents Sea area, both to be flown by U-2 Detachment A from its base at Giebelstadt, a former Luftwaffe aerodrome located between Mannheim and Nuernberg. The first mission, No. 2037, was planned for 11 October 1957. It was not a deep-penetration overflight and would not violate Soviet airspace. Its sole purpose was to collect ELINT emissions from the Soviet fleet. The aircraft to be used on this flight, article 351, had just returned to Giebelstadt from the Lockheed plant in Burbank, California, where it had been fitted with the new "slipper" fuel tanks—cylindrical tanks mounted under each wing 10 feet from the fuselage. Each tank held 100 gallons of fuel and extended the range of the U-2s beyond 4,000 nautical miles (nm).

For mission No. 2037, the aircraft was equipped with a ferret device known as System-IV, which used 11 receivers to record electromagnetic energy in the 150- to 4,000-megahertz (MHz) range. Built by the Ramo-Wooldridge

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firm, System-IV was so large and heavy and took up so much room in the equipment bay (Q-bay) that only a small, 70-mm tracking camera could be taken on the mission.


Mission No. 2037 got under way at 05:25 local time (0425Z) in total darkness. The weather was extremely hazardous: a ceiling of 200 feet and visibility of only 220 yards. Piloting article 351 was driver Jacob Kratt, a tall, taciturn, German-speaker from Milwaukee.[1]

He was to overfly the Soviet Union's Northern Fleet as it went through maneuvers in the Barents Sea north and east of Norway. Navigation, as always in these high latitudes, was Kratt's greatest problem. As the sun rose, he saw that everything beneath him was hidden by a low-lying layer of cloud, referred to as "undercast." Kratt therefore had to rely on dead-reckoning navigation, using his radio compass and chronometer to guide his aircraft for almost 4,000 nm.

When he reached Tromso, in extreme northeastern Norway, at 0735Z, Kratt turned on the System-IV unit and began collecting emissions. For the next three and a half hours, article 351 flew a triangular course above the cloud-shrouded Barents, returning to the Tromso turning point at 1101Z. By this time the cloud cover had lifted enough for Kratt to see the Norwegian coast and determine that he was 54 miles south of his planned route. The error was probably caused by winds aloft.

While flying the final leg of the triangle, Kratt spotted contrails, which are formed by hot jet exhaust gases condensing in the cold layer of air just below the tropopause, from what might have been a Soviet aircraft. The U-2 flew 5,000 to 7,000 feet above this layer of cold air to avoid creating contrails, which would have betrayed the aircraft's presence. U-2 drivers could spot other aircraft only when they passed through the contrail layer. Above or below that layer objects as small as fighter aircraft are virtually impossible to detect.

Kratt landed article 351 at Giebelstadt at 15:18 local time (1418Z), nine hours and 53 minutes after takeoff. He had traveled more than 3,900 nm.



Fueling Article 351 about a year after Mission 2040. (S)

[1] For reasons of security and cover, U-2s were referred to as "articles." The CIA had 20 U-2s, which were assigned article numbers 341 through 360. Those who flew the U-2s were referred to as "drivers." These drivers were former Air Force fighter pilots who had been recruited by the Agency specifically for the U-2 program, known at this time by the cryptonym AQUATONE. Generally, drivers were briefed only for the mission to which they were assigned as primary or backup pilot, and had little idea about the types of missions being flown by other detachments or even by their own detachment.

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Deep-Penetration Photo Mission

On 13 October 1957, article 351 was again on the runway at Giebelstadt, ready for mission No. 2040, and this time it would penetrate Soviet airspace. On this occasion, the aircraft's Q-bay contained an A-2 camera configuration composed of three 24-inch focal-length cameras—one aimed at the right oblique, another at nadir, and the third at the left oblique. As before, a smaller, 70-mm tracking camera, which operated continuously from takeoff to landing, completed the payload.

While Lockheed technicians made last-minute checks of the various flight systems, Air Force personnel filled the aircraft with JP-7 fuel. This special, low-volatility, low-vapor-pressure kerosene fuel had been developed in 1955 by Shell Oil Company specifically for the U-2 at the behest of General James H. Doolittle, a Shell vice president and a consultant to the U-2 program. JP-7's boiling point of 300° Fahrenheit at sea level kept it from vaporizing when the U-2 reached its cruising altitude 13.5 miles above sea level. This fuel was so viscous that the U-2's designer, Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson, called it "cough syrup." On 13 October, 1,535 gallons were emptied into article 351. This amount becomes a critical factor in the story of mission No. 2040. To understand why, it is necessary to know some unusual characteristics of this aircraft.

When Kelly Johnson designed the U-2, he was striving for the ultimate in high-altitude performance. To accomplish this, he had to devise a means to store large amounts of fuel within the airframe. His solution was to use what is known as a "wet" wing: all the cavities within the inner two-thirds of each U-2 wing were made leakproof and filled with fuel. By employing a wet wing, however, Johnson was not able to provide the U-2 pilot with the traditional full-empty fuel gauge, because the fuel had to be drained simultaneously from both wings to preserve aircraft balance.

Johnson's method of alerting the pilot to fuel consumption was cumbersome, but effective—if everyone followed the rules precisely. On the U-2's instrument panel was a fuel counter that was set manually by the person responsible for fueling the aircraft. This counter was set to the precise number of gallons pumped into the aircraft. The fuel from the wings was fed by gravity to a central sump located ahead of and below the cockpit. As each gallon of fuel was fed from this sump to the engine, a metering device sent an electric pulse that caused the counter to be reduced by one digit.

Before each flight, Detachment A's navigation unit prepared a flight plan on an 8.5-by-11-inch green card that listed each turning point in the flight and gave an estimated time of arrival at each point and an estimate of fuel usage based on the amount put into the aircraft by the ground crew. The U-2 driver was responsible for writing on his green card the time of arrival at each turning point and the reading of the fuel counter. The driver also carried a strip map of the area over which he was to navigate.

Mission No. 2040 was to be flown by Hervey S. Stockman, a pilot who had begun flying in World War II and had first seen the Giebelstadt airfield from the cockpit of a P-51 Mustang in 1945. His main mark in history: he had made the first U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union on 4 July 1956.

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Murphy's Law

Stockman's concern as he climbed into article 351 was primarily with the weather—Giebelstadt was covered with fog so low that he could not see the top of the U-2's rudder—and he failed to check the fuel figures on his green card with the numbers showing on the fuel counter. It was just after 0500Z when he settled into the cockpit, got his oxygen supply switched over from the prebreathing pack to the onboard system, and plugged in his radio cables. U-2 drivers wore bulky partial-pressure flight suits over which was a coverall to protect the suit itself from snags and abrasions. This clothing made all movement clumsy.



At 0535Z, Stockman began his takeoff roll down a runway on which he could barely see the white center stripe. Once airborne, at an altitude of 4,500 feet the U-2 broke into the sunlight. It was then that Stockman noted that the cockpit was hot and that a film of oil could be seen creeping up the canopy's left quarter-panel from a forward vent. He moved the air temperature setting to cooler, but it had no effect. He moved it back and forth several times, but the result was the same: hot, oily air.

During this time, Stockman was trying to get his craft to altitude, a tedious chore when the U-2 was filled with fuel. It was critical that he keep the wings level because, as fuel was expended, one wing would sometimes feed the fuel quicker than the other and disturb the U-2's balance. To regain balance, the driver had to activate pumps to move fuel from one wing to the other. Eventually, the heat in the cockpit became so great that Stockman broke radio silence and asked Giebelstadt what to do; he was told to pull the circuit breaker. To reach the device, located on a panel to the right and below the level of his seat, Stockman had to release his shoulder harness. He then had to use his hands to turn his heavy helmet so that he could see the circuit-breaker panel and find the proper breaker. Once he had disabled the air-conditioning system, the mist of oil stopped flowing from the canopy vents.

Again, this problem was a result of the U-2's design. The air-conditioning system used "bleed" air from the jet engine's first-stage compressor. During takeoff, some of the early J-57 engines tended to "throw" oil, which would be converted to mist by the compressor and would enter the cockpit via the cooling system. Without the air conditioner, Stockman could expect the cockpit to become quite cold as the aircraft passed through the tropopause. A half-hour later, Stockman plugged the circuit breaker back into the panel and the air conditioner began functioning normally.

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Meanwhile, no sooner had Stockman solved the air-conditioning problem than the U-2 began running rough and losing altitude. Stockman checked his instruments; his altitude was 62,000 feet and dropping, his airspeed was indicated as 124 knots (kts), and his exhaust-gas temperature (EGT) was fluctuating around 600° Fahrenheit, approaching the critical point where the engine could be damaged. Then he noticed that the speed brake switch, a toggle device atop the throttle lever, was in the deployed position. He hastily switched it to the off position and the shuddering stopped. Apparently, during his struggles to unplug the circuit breaker, a pocket on the upper left arm of his coverall had snagged the switch and activated the speed brakes. These are panels aft of the wings on each side of the fuselage that are deployed hydraulically to create drag. They were essential in bringing a U-2 down from its maximum altitude but were out of the driver's line of sight.

Although he was flying in bright sunlight, everything beneath Stockman's aircraft was hidden from view by undercast. Not until he reached his second turning point, Bravo, which was over Norway, did he get a view of the Earth

(b)(1)

Beyond Oslo, the undercast closed in again and Stockman was unable to see the terrain below. By the time he reached his fourth turning point, Echo, he noted that his fuel consumption was much greater than predicted on the green card. He was barely a third of the way into the mission and already he was 92 gallons behind the fuel curve. That indicated a shortfall of more than 300 nm. This shortage of fuel worried Stockman for the remainder of the mission, because it suggested he was encountering strong head winds. Normally, winds that strong would affect the handling of the aircraft, but Stockman had experienced little difficulty in that regard. What he did not know was that the crewman who fueled article 351 that morning had made an error in setting the fuel counter on the instrument panel. Instead of indicating 1,535 gallons, the crewman had set the counter to 1,500. But Stockman, concerned about the weather, had failed to note this mistake. At turning point Able the fuel appeared to be 85 gallons short, and at turning point Echo, 92 gallons. In reality, the fuel was only 57 gallons behind the curve.

From an altitude of 13 miles, a U-2 driver can see almost 300 miles in every direction. Halfway to his next turning point, Fox, Stockman could see that the undercast extended all the way to turning point George. He decided to shorten his flight and head directly for his next turning point, How, where he could see a break in the undercast. That reduced his flying time by about half an hour and he hoped it would save enough fuel to enable him to complete the mission.

At approximately 0920Z, Stockman guided the U-2 past the northeasternmost coast of Norway and headed due east. It was at this time that Soviet radar began "painting" his aircraft, which it would continue to do for the next two hours. Flying over the Barents Sea to a point 125 nm north of the Soviet city of Gavrilovo, Stockman turned south in an arc that took him about 10 nm from the coast at 0950Z. As he turned west Stockman switched on his cameras. After

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paralleling the coast to a point 20 nm north of Kildin Island, Stockman turned southwest to begin the penetration part of his overflight. It was 1000Z when he began to overfly the Kilskiy Peninsula, headed for the Soviet naval facilities at Severomorsk. Stockman's altitude was 70,200 feet as he passed above Severomorsk and headed his aircraft for Olenegorsk, 50 nm to the south. Enroute he passed five miles to the east of Murmansk, where he saw through the U-2's "hole in the floor" three large ships, which he took to be cruisers, anchored off the port of Grosnyy. He also spotted 15 to 20 destroyers and numerous new airfields in the region.


US U-2 Mission 2040, 13 October 1957




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
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Cockpit Details



Throttle





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The "hole in the floor" was a unique feature of the U-2. Because U-2 drivers had to maintain a wings-level, nose-up attitude when flying at maximum altitude, they were unable to see the ground directly beneath the aircraft without the help of a device known as a drift sight. This was essentially an upside-down periscope that permitted a driver not only to look straight down, but to traverse through 360 degrees as well. In addition, there were two levels of magnification.

Soviet Intercept Attempt

After passing Olenegorsk at 1009Z, Stockman put his aircraft into a wide, right-hand turn to head toward Monechegorsk. As he started this turn he saw contrails from two aircraft coming up through the tropopause at a 10-o'clock position from the direction of the Soviet city of Afrikanda. Enemy contrails were startling at an altitude of 13 miles. Above a U-2 flying at this altitude, at the outer edge of the atmosphere, the sky was deep black. This caused a "fish-bowl" effect so that images passing beneath the aircraft were reflected in the curved plastic canopy above the driver's head, and the attacking aircraft appeared to be coming from above and to be much closer than they actually were.

Stockman estimated that had the Soviet planes been able to continue their rate and angle of climb they would have been on a collision course with his U-2. He swung the drift sight around to get a closer look at the Soviet interceptors and managed to locate one of the planes. He was unable to identify it positively by type, because its climbing angle was so great, but he thought that it was a MiG-19; he knew that a MiG-19 squadron was based at Afrikanda. Stockman estimated that the Soviet fighter was at about 55,000 feet when at 1018Z it passed about three miles below the U-2, turned, and began flying parallel with him.

During much of the mission, Stockman experienced trouble with his EGT gauge, which periodically fluctuated wildly. This gauge was used in conjunction with the engine-pressure-ratio (EPR) gauge to fly a U-2 at maximum



Soviet MiG-19 flying northeast below Article 351. (S)

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altitude. Here the story of mission No. 2040 becomes more complicated. Kelly Johnson's plane represented the ultimate in subsonic, high-altitude aircraft. It cruised at the absolute physical limit of altitude attainable without compressing, via supersonic flight, the air molecules available in the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere. There was simply not enough air density to permit the U-2 to fly higher.

Keeping the original U-2s at these high altitudes depended on a driver's ability to monitor a number of indicator gauges and make adjustments to keep the critical elements at their optimum output, with only a small margin for error. The critical factors were airspeed, angle of attack, and engine pressure and temperature. Airspeed was the most difficult to control, because the U-2 in a nose-down attitude tended to gain speed rapidly and it became very unsafe at any speed over Mach 0.80.

Unlike standard Air Force fighter aircraft, the U-2 could not withstand great stress. Because of this, a warning was affixed to the instrument panel instructing the pilot not to fly the aircraft faster than 170 kts indicated air speed (IAS) [2] at sea level or 220 kts IAS with gust control on. The gust control forced the aircraft into a nose-up attitude, which stiffened the wings and permitted the plane to withstand wind gusts of up to 50 kts. It also caused drag and increased fuel consumption. If this warning was ignored, the first U-2 aircraft would literally come apart. The U-2B's empennage—that part of the aircraft aft of the engine comprising the vertical and horizontal stabilizer assembly—was held on by only three high-tensile bolts and separated abruptly at speeds over Mach 0.80. Unlike other military aircraft, whose wings have spars running from wingtip to wingtip through the fuselage, the U-2's wings were simply bolted to the fuselage formers and had no continuous central spar. They, too, tended to fall off above Mach 0.80. Johnson used the bolted-on wings in order to reduce weight and gain room for the Q-bay and its payload.

The U-2 driver also had to worry about going too slow. Should his airspeed fall below 98 kts IAS at altitude, the U-2 would stall and fall out of the sky. This is the so-called coffin-corner.

In the less dense atmosphere at high altitudes the U-2 could exceed its 220-kt sea-level speed limit but could not fly faster than Mach 0.80, or approximately 420 kts true air speed (TAS). U-2 drivers tried to maintain an airspeed of Mach 0.72 or approximately 400 kts TAS, which was registered as about 100 kts on the U-2's IAS indicator, a 4-to-1 inverse ratio. The airspeed indicator had two needles: a black one for IAS, and a yellow one for Mach. Mach speed is influenced by air temperature and pressure and thus varies with altitude as well as global location. The U-2B's airspeed "window" was very narrow. At maximum altitude, should the IAS fall below 98 kts, the U-2 experienced stall buffet; above 102 kts IAS it experienced Mach buffet—the

[2] Although airspeed was critical, the indicator that measured it was inaccurate. This was so because airspeed is determined by a pitot tube, protruding from a wing, which essentially measures variations in air pressure and translates this into knots. This reading, known as indicated air speed, is accurate only at sea level. As the atmosphere becomes less dense at higher altitudes, the indicator grows more inaccurate and shows progressively slower speeds than those the aircraft is actually achieving.

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coffin-corner effect. In either case the aircraft began to shudder, a preliminary warning that it might do something drastic like shed its wings or fall out of the sky. U-2 drivers had to keep a close watch on the airspeed indicator, because the shuddering at low or high speed was the same and it was critical that no sudden correction be made that might cause the craft to exceed its limits.

At the same time, the U-2's power plant was less responsive at high altitudes. Owing to the reduced air density above 60,000 feet, the Pratt & Whitney J-57 engine generated only 6 percent of the thrust it produced at sea level. Of course, with the reduced atmospheric drag at high altitude and the sleek fairing of the U-2's fuselage and wings, this reduced thrust was more than ample to push the aircraft through the sky at Mach 0.72. In fact, at 70,000 feet the J-57 was throttled back to about 90 percent of power. This power setting was so critical that the U-2 was the only aircraft with a vernier adjustment on the throttle.

Once the U-2 reached maximum altitude and optimum speed, the next problem the driver faced was to keep the engine from overheating and the EPR—the difference in pressure between the air intake and the exhaust—at the optimum 2.95 to 3.10 reading in order to achieve maximum efficiency. If the engine overheated, it would have caused problems with the hydraulic system. If the EPR rose or fell too much, fuel consumption could have risen dramatically.

When article 351's EGT gauge began fluctuating as much as 40 to 50 degrees, Stockman had more reason for concern. He was over hostile territory with untrustworthy instruments. He kept close watch on the EGT, noted every fluctuation on his green card, and watched the tachometer, which measured engine RPMs and could be used as another, though less reliable, measure of engine performance.

After passing Monechegorsk, Stockman headed north-northwest to a point between Salmiyarvi and Pechenga in the extreme northwest corner of the Soviet Union's Petsamo area. The U-2 exited Soviet airspace about 15 nm west of the Rybachiy Peninsula at approximately 1100Z and headed west up Norway's Veranger Fjord.

Having safely overflown the Soviet Union for one hour, all that remained for Stockman was to nurse article 351 and its fluctuating EGT gauge back to Giebelstadt—a boring, four-hour flight. By the time Stockman reached the German Baltic coast, the undercast had mostly cleared away and he could see as far as England. However, as he approached Giebelstadt it closed in again.


Stockman's final challenge was to get the U-2 down from altitude, a far more complex operation than simply pushing the yoke forward and pointing the nose at the Earth. In a nose-down attitude the U-2 accelerated rapidly and the Mach needle got perilously close to the Mach 0.80 dangerline. Thus, the driver had to rely on the speed brakes. He had to keep the craft within the 98- to 102-kt window in order to avoid stall and, at the same time, lose altitude. His first action was to deploy the speed brakes and then ease back on the throttle's vernier setting. Next, he lowered the landing gear to create even more drag and slow his descent to about 1,200 feet per minute until he passed through the tropopause and reached heavier air.

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When the U-2 got below 40,000 feet, the IAS indicator moved rapidly toward the 170-kt placarded speed limit, but the resistance of the atmosphere against the speed brakes and the landing gear also increased, which permitted a more rapid descent for the last part of the let-down sequence.

When his aircraft reached 2,500 feet, Stockman entered heavy cloud. He broke out of this cloud at an altitude of just 400 feet and spotted the Giebelstadt runway three-quarters of a mile ahead. By this time his fuel discrepancy had been reduced to 45 gallons, 35 of which was crew error. Stockman landed article 351 with its valuable film record of the Soviet Northern Fleet facilities at 1452Z, nine hours and 17 minutes after takeoff. Mission No. 2040 was the last penetration overflight of the Soviet Union conducted by Giebelstadt's Detachment A.



Soviet ships near Murmansk, 13 Oct. 1957. (S)

Postscript

Hervey Stockman left the U-2 program in December 1957 and rejoined the Air Force. His first assignment was with the 95th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron at Andrews AFB flying F-102 Delta Daggers. After additional assignments flying high-performance fighters, Stockman was sent to Da Nang, South Vietnam, in late December 1966. He was assigned to the 366th Fighter Squadron and began flying F4 Phantoms. During the next six months, Stockman flew approximately 60 sorties as far north as the Chinese-Vietnamese border.

The F4 Phantoms were flown to protect F-105 Thunderchiefs, being used as dive bombers, from attack by MiG-21s. During these missions, the F4s, in groups of four, would fly in a controlled and close formation at an altitude of 18,000 feet, which was designed to avoid interdiction by the deadly SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile used by North Vietnam's defenders.

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During an F-105 bombing mission against the major Vietnam-China railroad north of Hanoi on 11 June 1967, Stockman's F4 was involved in a midair collision with another F4. Both he and his radar operator, Ronald Webb, ejected from their crippled aircraft and parachuted, unhurt, into hostile territory. The pilot and radar operator of the other aircraft were killed. Stockman and Webb were captured separately and taken to the Hoa Lo prison in the middle of Hanoi. They never saw each other during their lengthy incarceration in the "Hanoi Hilton," as it was called. Both men spent five years and nine months in Hoa Lo and were freed on 4 March 1973. Stockman now lives in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

As for article 351, the U-2 Stockman flew on 13 October 1957, it was used in another deep-penetration overflight of the Soviet Union on 6 December 1959. During that mission, it overflew Kuybyshev and the Soviet missile test area at Kapustin Yar. Then, on 1 May 1960, when Francis Gary Powers took off from Peshawar in article 360 on his ill-fated attempt to overfly the Soviet Union from border to border, article 351 flew a diversionary mission along the Soviet-Afghan border. Following Powers's shootdown, President Eisenhower ordered a standdown of all U-2 activities. This order caught article 351 on the ground at Detachment B's Adana base. It was rolled into a hangar and remained there until November 1960, when it was ignominiously disassembled, packed in crates, and flown back to the United States aboard a C-124.

One of Eisenhower's last acts as President was to authorize the transfer of two U-2s to the Nationalist Republic of China in early January 1961. Article 351 was one of those two aircraft. It met a fiery end on 19 March 1961 when a Nationalist Chinese pilot, making practice landings at Taiwan's Tao Yuan airfield, permitted a wing to get too low and article 351 stalled over the end of the runway and crashed, killing the pilot and destroying the airframe.

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THE TWO FACES OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY

(b)(3)(c)

The analysis of political instability, and the collection of information on it, have become major missions of US intelligence. Instability that catches policymakers by surprise is apt to be labeled—perhaps publicly—as an "intelligence failure." An agreed definition of political instability, however, has been slow to emerge. Nor is there a clear and widely accepted concept of exactly what the intelligence community should do to prepare the policymaker better.

These conceptual shortcomings exist partly because political instability is a relatively untraditional intelligence topic in which friends and foes may be difficult to identify, the arenas of action frequently shift, and the US interests at stake often are latent rather than overt. It has grown in importance along with the growth of the post-World War II, post-colonial Third World. In the United States, it has received additional attention since the searing experience of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the subsequent hostage crisis.[1]

The conceptual difficulties also reflect some general problems—chiefly concerning how analysts set priorities, cope with uncertainty, and communicate that uncertainty to the consumer—that apply not only to instability but also to other intelligence topics. This essay discusses several of those problems and how they help to make political instability a difficult subject. But first, exactly what is the subject?

Instability as Potential

Instability is a clear concept when used in a mechanical or physical sense. An overloaded vehicle is unstable if a small disturbance (such as hitting a bump in the road) has the potential to trigger a sudden, major change (the vehicle overturns). The term is often used in the same way to describe certain military, economic, and diplomatic situations. The nuclear balance between the superpowers, for example, is usually described as stable or unstable depending on whether one believes that a single mistake such as an accidental nuclear detonation (i.e., a small disturbance) is apt to touch off a nuclear war (a sudden, major change).

Similarly, political instability is the potential for—or probability of—sudden, major change in a country's politics. The small disturbance that triggers the change may be an assassin's bullet, the emergence of a charismatic opposition leader, the luck of a coup-plotting cabal, or an additional economic hardship that becomes the last straw for a disaffected populace. The major change may be the overthrow of a regime by coup or revolution, but it might also be a sharp policy reversal by a ruler who stays in power.

[1] George Caldwell, "The Mob Is in the Streets," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1985, 33-40.

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The analysis of political instability, insofar as it involves the *potential* for change, is not primarily a matter of predicting individual events. If intelligence can provide warning of a coup or other event that may lead to bigger political changes, so much the better. But in most instances, US intelligence lacks such specific information, or the sources that can provide it. The great, vexing questions for most political analysts—particularly those who monitor Third World countries—hinge on events that are unknowable for most practical purposes: whether the gunman recruited to assassinate a head of state will shoot straight; whether the next military officer to join a coup plot will be the one to betray the plan; whether it will rain hard enough to douse a riot on the day a government raises food prices. It is theoretically possible to predict such specific outcomes, just as it is theoretically possible to predict the outcome of a roll of dice (by noting the position of the dots when the player picks up the dice and observing how he shakes them, the angle of his hand when he throws them, etc.) but it usually is futile to try. A more worthwhile use of our inherently limited capacity to gather and process information is to understand the characteristics of the system that will generate the outcome (Are those dice crooked? Is that government shaky?) and to estimate the probabilities of different possible results.

Intelligence analysts who cover other kinds of accounts also occasionally must worry about potential big events depending on unpredictable small ones. Military conflicts, for example, sometimes are unstable in that a small turn of events can shift the momentum of a war (just as loss of the proverbial nail meant the loss of shoe, horse, rider, and battle). But political analysts who cover unstable Third World countries probably face this problem more often than any of their colleagues. On the central questions of who will rule these countries and what the rulers' policies will be, the political analyst may find it easy to be generally right most of the time (by predicting continuity, because on most days most governments don't fall or overhaul their policies). He or she is more vulnerable, however, to the intelligence "failure" of being way off the mark when a sudden, major change does occur.

Actually, not predicting such an event should not be regarded as a "failure," as long as the mission of intelligence in such situations is understood to be the assessment of instability, and instability is defined as potential. By this view, the track record of an analyst or an agency in covering instability can be judged not by a few specific predictions but only over a long period, by looking at how estimates of instability generally compare with the frequency and type of subsequent political change.

To say this is not to dodge responsibility or to rationalize mistakes. Policymakers frequently have to cope with uncertainty, on domestic as well as foreign issues, by hedging their bets. In the case of political instability in foreign countries, bets tend to be difficult to hedge because often the possible scenarios are drastically different from each other and the ways of coping with them are incompatible. A close relationship with an incumbent regime, for example, may lessen the chance for good relations with an opposition group, and thus for US influence in the country should that group gain power. But this problem reflects the nature of the subject matter, not a failure of intelligence.

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Indeed, intelligence ill serves the policymaker by offering specific predictions in the face of uncertainty. For one thing, this conveys a false sense of confidence and fails to alert the policymaker to the need to hedge bets, or at least to try to hedge them. For another, it obscures what may be important judgments about changing probabilities of potential events. If the chance that a government will fall this year has gone from 10 to 30 percent, that is an important development, but the best specific prediction would still be that it will not fall. Finally, ungrounded specific predictions—some of which inevitably will be wrong—reduce confidence in, and reliance on, intelligence over the long term.

Instability as Commotion

The concept of potential for change is clear enough, but users of the term "political instability" often seem to have something else in mind. Intelligence publications contain numerous references to the "potential for instability" in a given country or the "prospects" for a government to be stable or unstable. If instability is itself a type of potential, such phrases are redundant if not nonsensical. They raise more than a semantic or grammatical point, however; they point to a different concept of political instability.

That concept includes the idea of possible major political change (and more specifically, irregular or extra-legal change) but also includes actual events such as demonstrations, strikes, riots, issuance of manifestoes, military states of alert, the emergence of hitherto underground opposition groups, and increasingly vocal demands for a government to quit. What these events have in common is that they are overt, they get attention, and they seem to indicate, correctly or not, that the regime's grasp on power is weakening.

This kind of commotion is often an important subject for US intelligence, for several reasons. If nothing else, civil unrest affects the climate for business, including US-owned business. Moreover, even if a regime stays in power, its response to unrest may entail costs to itself and affect its image abroad and its relationship with the United States (e.g., when a crackdown violates human rights). Most important, these kinds of disturbances sometimes really are precursors to coups, revolutions, or other types of major political change, either because they reflect broader discontent or because they galvanize opposition groups into action.

Instability-as-commotion is probably closer to most people's notion of political instability than is the concept of potential for change. For intelligence to focus narrowly on it, however, entails drawbacks. By itself, political unrest is only an imperfect indicator of the probability of major political change. The level of "normal" unrest is an aspect of political culture that varies greatly from one country to another, even within the Third World. It also depends on what the regime does to contain it. Repression by a justifiably fearful government may keep unrest low in a country where the chance of major change is high (e.g., South Africa until the disturbances in recent years, or possibly Iraq today). Conversely, a resilient democracy can also afford to be relatively rambunctious (e.g., Israel, or any of a number of Western developed countries).

Overt unrest is especially unreliable as an indicator of major political changes that do not entail the fall of a regime. Regimes sometimes revamp their

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policies precisely to avoid such unrest—and to stay in power. For example, the Iranian revolution has been the most dramatic consequence of the past decade's resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, but otherwise the main political impact of this resurgence has been the preemptive incorporation of fundamentalist tenets into official policy (as in Pakistan). The impact on how the government of an Islamic country does business with the United States may be significant, even if it is the same government. Where coups and military rule have been the norm (as in much of Latin America), the greatest potential for major change (and thus the biggest political story to which intelligence can alert the policymaker) occurs where unrest sufficient to bring back the generals does *not* break out and a civilian government takes power constitutionally.

Two Ways to Serve the Policymaker

Which type of instability should intelligence officers monitor, study, and write about? The short, and generally correct, answer is "both." Resources for analysis and collection are limited, however. Moreover, the number of judgments that intelligence can present to policymakers, highlight as being important, and expect policymakers to absorb is also limited. A focus on unrest and other overt behavior thus might mean inadequate attention given to other, less visible but still important, developments.

This raises the larger question of how much emphasis intelligence should give to topics already on the policymaker's agenda, versus forcing the agenda by emphasizing other issues that analysts believe may ultimately have greater impact on US interests. Instability-as-commotion, when it breaks out in an even moderately important pro-US country, will definitely be on the policymaker's agenda. It will probably receive attention in the press and in Congress. Consumers of intelligence in the executive branch will necessarily give it attention as well. For intelligence not to have forecast the unrest that causes such attention would commonly be regarded as an intelligence "failure." In contrast, important changes occurring underneath the surface of a country's political and social fabric will not automatically get on the policymaking agenda, simply because they are less visible and the policymaker is not forced to react to them.

To cover both types of instability adequately, intelligence officers need to make a more conscious effort to study the potential for change than they do to report on commotion and unrest. Because instability-as-commotion will be on the policymaker's agenda, it will necessarily be on the intelligence community's list of tasks as well. Instability-as-potential, in contrast, needs special care and feeding as an intelligence topic. This is not necessarily a matter of telling policymakers what they don't want to hear. Commotion in foreign countries often is bad news for US policy. Conversely, a potential for change may be good news (in a country currently unfriendly to the US). Even when the main news is not good, as long as the issue is the *potential* for change there may still be an opportunity for US policymakers—guided by US intelligence—to do something about it, such as by shoring up a friendly regime or by cultivating opposition movements in the hope that a new regime will be friendly as well.

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Challenges in Studying Instability

In addition to conceptual confusion, there are several other challenges in covering political instability. One is the extraordinary range of expertise required to make sound judgments of instability in a foreign country. It is difficult enough to assemble the right mixture of backgrounds and specialties in a group of analysts to monitor instability in country X; it is even more difficult to find such breadth of knowledge in an individual analyst (and judgments are ultimately made by individuals, albeit subject to review by other individuals). The study of instability is profoundly *interdisciplinary*. The judgments involved concern political developments, but economic, military, and sociological factors typically are critical ingredients. The most destabilizing factor in many Third World countries today is economic scarcity, together with the quandary of how to put an economy back on track without alienating the populace through harsh austerity measures. In many of these same countries, the most likely alternative rulers are in the military, making an understanding of military morale, and the effect on it of war or insurgency, another key to assessing instability.

Judgments about political instability also require both familiarity with a specific country and broader knowledge about patterns of political change across many countries. On one hand, the assessment of instability is partly an intuitive process in which there is no substitute for an intimate, longstanding, seat-of-the-pants feel for country X and its political culture. On the other hand, certain patterns of loss of legitimacy, rise of opposition movements, and revolutionary political change have recurred through history in different countries. Social scientists have studied these patterns and generalized about them. The generalizations are imperfect, but they contain some useful insights and lessons. The trick for the analyst is to exploit the lessons while remembering that each case will be different, probably in some important ways, from any previous one.

A further difficulty is how to deal with uncertainty, and specifically uncertainty about possible events—namely, the overthrow of governments—that are unlikely but potentially very significant for US interests. In some cases, intelligence officers may hesitate to "make the call" that a regime is likely to fall, because the fall of a regime is a rare event, or at least rarer than the continuation of a regime in office for another day. Probably in more cases, however, there will be a bias in the opposite direction (i.e., toward crying "wolf"), because of the intelligence officer's awareness that not to predict a revolutionary change that does occur would be regarded as a bigger intelligence "failure" than to warn repeatedly of one that does not. Rotation of intelligence officers from one assignment to another encourages this latter bias; none of them wants to be accused of being caught by surprise as country X is "lost" on their watch; they are less likely to be concerned about the long-term effect on an intelligence agency's credibility if it cries "wolf" too often.

In addition to these analytical biases, there is the problem of communicating uncertainty to the policymaker and of choosing the right message to emphasize when describing an uncertain, unstable situation. Does one need to stress that the government of Ruritania, although it will probably retain power,

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has a significant chance of falling? Or does the policymaker need instead to be reminded that a continuation of the current Ruritanian government is still the most likely scenario? To answer such questions, intelligence analysts need to study their consumers—and their biases and blind spots—as closely as they study the countries they are responsible for monitoring.

An additional challenge in covering political instability is deciding how much coverage to give to individual countries. How collection and analytical resources should be distributed depends not only on the current importance of each country but also on how important each one might become if it underwent a major political political change. This is a difficult calculation. A nation's size, resources, and location determine its importance to some degree, regardless of who governs it. Qadhafi, for example, has been able to make so much trouble and get so much attention partly because of Libya's oil, which was known even before Qadhafi came along. But what about, say, Castro's Cuba? It lacks a comparable resource, and even its location close to US shores has not—since the missile crisis of 1962—been the principal reason it has commanded so much of the US government's attention. Cuba's intrinsic, permanent characteristics, in other words, would have been insufficient grounds—given what was known in the 1950s—to divert a large amount of resources from other topics to study the stability of the Batista regime.

Cuba illustrates how the dynamics of a revolution (and a revolutionary regime's internal political needs that are served by, for example, sending troops to fight in guerilla wars overseas) can *make* a country an important intelligence target. It also demonstrates how the importance to US policymakers of political change depends heavily on what kind of relationship a new regime strikes up with the USSR. This, in turn, is apt to depend less on the permanent characteristics of the given country than on such harder-to-calculate factors as the prejudices and cultural affinities of the new regime's leadership, the number of other revolutionary opportunities that open up to the Soviets elsewhere, and how the Soviets apportion their resources as they try to bolster or nurture clients in return for military access rights or other concessions.

US intelligence's coverage of political instability must incorporate a global view, both because the problem is, to a degree, part of a worldwide US-Soviet game and because different analysts have different ways of expressing uncertainty. *The Political Instability Quarterly*, which CIA's Directorate of Intelligence initiated in 1983, helps to provide such a global view. As a compendium of separate judgments by country analysts, however, it is designed more to trace changes in individual countries than to make cross-national comparisons. A more direct effort to make such comparisons and to measure instability in a large number of countries with a single yardstick has been NIE 7-81 [2] and its successor Estimates. Such worldwide, comparative assessments are audacious in scope and difficult to produce, but they probably are the best basis yet for establishing priorities and distributing resources for monitoring instability.

[2] *Political Instability and Regional Tensions*, 14 September 1981.

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Doing Even Better

The intelligence community, and CIA in particular, have made substantial progress over the last several years in studying political instability.[3] The topic's relatively recent recogition as a distinct and important subset of intelligence problems (even though it has actually been an intelligence problem, under different labels, for much longer) has a lot to do with this. In striving for still more progress, the following points bear emphasis.

First, both kinds of relevant expertise—detailed knowledge of a single country and broad understanding of cross-national patterns of political change—need nurturing. Just as important, the two types of experts need to communicate with each other well enough to exploit fully each other's insights.

Second, analysts and collectors need to look at a wide variety of indicators of potential change, including ones that have nothing to do with instability-as-commotion. *The Political Instability Quarterly* has already done a major service in this regard.

Third, intelligence officers need to be precise as to which type of instability they are talking about. The policymaker is apt to be interested in both commotion and the potential for change. To warn of one type of instability carries a different message, however, with different policy implications, than to warn of the other type.

Finally, intelligence officers need to be frank about their inability to prophesy the specific events that will trigger major political changes. Consumers of intelligence have always preferred certainty to uncertainty and always will. But intelligence is not crystal-ball-gazing, and consumers should be reminded often of how what we don't know can hurt us.

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AUTHOR: Dino Brugioni and Urban Linehan

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A frank and comradely discussion

LAWRENCE K. WHITE ON THE DIRECTORS

Dino Brugioni and Urban Linehan

Messrs. Brugioni and Linehan interviewed Colonel White, Executive Director – Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency, on 8 June 1972. This is a transcript of his remarks.

Your interest, as I understand it, is in my appraisal or views of the several Directors of Central Intelligence I've worked for. I've never recorded these or put them in writing but I've thought about them, and delved into history a little bit. As you probably know, Admiral Souers was the first Director of CIA and he didn't really want to be the Director. There was great controversy over who should have the job and President Truman had confidence in Souers. As Souers told me the story, he accepted primarily so the President wouldn't have to give it to somebody else, like General Donovan, for instance, whom the President did not want.

But Souers's real charge from the President was to find a Director. Souers felt that young Hoyt Vandenberg would be a good man. Vandenberg had a good record and he was a dashing and good-looking, bright and able guy. It was not unimportant that his uncle, Senator Vandenberg, was a very powerful and influential man. So Souers talked to Vandenberg, but Vandenberg didn't want to be DCI. Wasn't interested. Vandenberg saw the new Air Force being created as a separate entity, the air corps having been a part of the Army prior to 1947, and he wanted to be the Chief of Staff. Souers told me that he asked Vandenberg, "Where do you think the President of the United States is going to see more of you? As a Lieutenant General off somewhere in the Air Force or as his Director of Central Intelligence?" Vandenberg got the message and accepted the job—but the point of all this is that he really didn't want to be the Director of Central Intelligence. He was motivated in part, at least according to Souers, because he saw the job as a steppingstone to being the first Chief of Staff of the Air Force. And as you know he wasn't here too long.



Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, USNR
23 January 1946 - 10 June 1946

I came into the Agency on 1 February 1947, at which time Vandenberg was still the Director. We didn't have our legislation and all that. Admiral Hillenkoetter had been nominated as his successor. I remember that Vandenberg personally approved my employment. Not long after that, I found myself on the carpet before both Vandenberg and Hillenkoetter because I had fired

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Lieutenant General
Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USA
10 June 1946 - 1 May 1947

somebody in FBIS without going through the normal procedures. This fellow had written a letter that would make a Philadelphia lawyer proud. Vandenberg was politically minded and he didn't want to do anything to spoil his chances of being Chief of Staff—it seemed to me—but I said, "Well you hired me to clean up FBIS and if you don't support me in firing this fellow then you may as well get yourself somebody else because I won't have any swat left." He said, "No, I'm going to support you. There's no question about that; it's just a question of how we get into the least amount of trouble." Well, I won't belabor that I was supported and so forth, but Vandenberg already was in the process of turning over to Hillenkoetter. Vandenberg was very popular with the people in the Agency and he might have been a great Director of Central Intelligence if his heart had been in it but it wasn't. It wasn't really for him for the long haul.

• • •

Hillenkoetter was a fine man personally—people liked him—but he was the most junior Rear Admiral in the whole Navy, and I didn't realize at that time, that there was strong controversy in the intelligence community over what the Director of Central Intelligence should be. There were strong-minded people who felt that the DCI was the President of the Company, if you will—but not the Chairman of the Board. As a matter of fact, their concept was that the DCI should report to a Board of Directors and that the Board of Directors would consist of the intelligence chiefs of the State Department and the Army and the Navy and the Air Force. Hillenkoetter never got this settled and consequently it seems to me in retrospect he didn't really accomplish very much: he didn't have the personal clout or the backing that he needed. And it seems to me that the intelligence product at the time left a lot to be desired—both in quality and particularly in timeliness. Intelligence was so dated by the time anybody got it—staff people pored over it and you never got the G-2 of the Army and others at his level to focus on something until it had been beaten to death by all these lower level people.



Rear Admiral
Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, USN
1 May 1947 - 7 October 1950

Hillenkoetter was successful in getting the legislation that set the Agency up in its present form. Larry Houston, of course, deserves tremendous credit because it has never been amended. There are two reasons for this: a) it's broad

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enough to do almost anything you want to do. You can interpret it in a way that gives you the greatest latitude, so it isn't really necessary to amend it. And, b), the other reason is that you could never get a piece of legislation like it through the Congress now or at any time within the last 10 years. So any time you go up and talk to senior people in the Congress, those who have been our overseers, they tell you, "Don't come up here with any legislation if you can possibly find some other way to do what you want. If you ever seek to amend that Act it's going to be so emasculated you will have lost everything."

That was one of Hillenkoetter's great accomplishments, but insofar as bringing harmony and efficiency and professionalism to the community it seemed most of their time was spent arguing about jurisdictional and organizational problems and I would say that at the end of Hillenkoetter's regime CIA was looked upon as a "Johnny-Come-Lately" and with great reservations in the community about whether it would survive.

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General Bedell Smith came then. Smith came with a great reputation. Not only had he been Eisenhower's Chief of Staff during World War II, he had been Ambassador to Moscow, and he had the strongest backing from Eisenhower. That Eisenhower backed him was important. Even more important was the fact that General Marshall was a very strong backer of General Smith. President Truman, as you know, had almost unlimited confidence in General Marshall. Marshall served as both Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State. General Smith also had a lot of guts and he was a tough guy. To him goes the credit for establishing CIA and a Director in a preeminent position for CIA. He didn't just come out and say "this is the way it's going to be" but over a period of months he made it come out that way. And there has never been any, as far as I know, serious question about this since. I believe Monty* in his history relates the turning out of what really amounted to a National Estimate done for President Truman when he went out to meet General MacArthur at the famous Wake Island Conference. In a word, Smith assembled the principals—the G-2, the A-2 and all the rest—and said, "We're going to turn out this estimate and we're going to be here until it's turned out." He set up the United States Intelligence Board and its predecessor in which the principals had to come together once a week to approve estimates, whereas up to that point the staff people were negotiating on some watered-down version. Smith was tough and he acted with great authority.

Sherman Kent and others were great advocates of markings analysis, where you photograph captured equipment, and try to estimate production rates, and so forth. I was in what was then the Office of Operations, which had FBIS and the Foreign Documents Division and Domestic Contact Service, and I was trying to negotiate this out with the military and everybody had agreed except the Army. For some reason, the Army denied us permission to go and look at their captured equipment and photograph the serial numbers. The issue showed up on the USIB or whatever they called it then (Intelligence Advisory Committee) agenda and General Smith asked, "What's this doing on the

* Ludwell Lee Montague.

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agenda? Who's handling this for the Army?" They said, "Lieutenant Colonel So and So." "Well who is the CIA representative?" They said, "Colonel White." General Smith said, "Can't White and this fellow get together and settle this? Do we have to discuss it here?" Jim Reber, who was the secretary I believe, spoke up and said, "Well, the reason it's here is that they've been together and they can't agree." So General Smith looked at Alex Boley, who was the G-2, and he said, "Alex, I see you signed this memorandum of nonconcurrence." and Boley said, "Yes, sir," and Smith said, "I suppose you know what would have happened to the signers of the Declaration of Independence if the British had ever caught them, don't you?" Alex Boley said, "I'll take care of it, General." So that was the end of that.

When I would be in his office, I would hear him talk to congressmen and to senior people in the military. This was later on after I was transferred up to the administrative side of the house. I heard him talk and he could change his personality in a wink. I mean, he started out in the most friendly way so that butter would melt in his mouth and, if they didn't tumble, he could turn it over and I tell you be really brutal. And he got away with it. My point is Hillenkoetter couldn't have gotten away with it. He tended to try to negotiate everything out and to get everybody to agree and so forth. Bedell Smith didn't do that. He made decisions and he decided that somebody was going to move. Several times a fellow would come into his office on Monday—having left on Friday night—and there wasn't any furniture—he'd been moved someplace else. General Smith ruled with authority.

I'd run FBIS for almost four years. Then I went up to be the Deputy to George Carey in Administration. A wonderful job. I loved it. George Carey kept telling me that word had gotten around that I had done a pretty good management job straightening up FBIS and there was interest in having me come up to the administrative side. I told him several times that I really wasn't interested. He called me one day in Houston while I was on a trip and said, "They're really hot after you" and I said, "Well, just tell them I'm not interested." He said, "You can tell them yourself when you get back." So I marched myself over to see General Smith at the appointed time, fully prepared to tell him I didn't want the job—I had my speech all ready. Well, of course, he didn't ask me, he just said, "White, this is what you're going to do." I said, "Yes, sir."

I think the most important thing in which I was personally involved was the decision by General Smith in December 1951 that there would be a centralized administrative or support organization from which the entire Agency would draw its administrative support. When I was appointed to this job I had no idea how strong the feeling was that the Clandestine Services should have their own support services I could have joined their side easily. I didn't have any opinions, I didn't know anything about it really. But I was told that I would report to the Office of the Deputy for Administration on the first day of January 1952.

And in the middle of 1951, General Smith called a meeting of the top command of the whole Agency. Bill Jackson, who was then the Deputy Director (DDCI), Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, who was the OPC, I guess it was, I've forgotten who had what was then called OSO, and I were sitting there.

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Harry Little was supposed to be there, but they had gotten the wrong Little and had Tex Little, instead, and General or then Colonel VonKan was there. Harry Little was at that time the administrative officer in OSO, and Colonel VonKan was the administrative officer in what was then OPC. I didn't know the agenda. General Smith took his seat and took a very firm bite in his lip and said, "Gentlemen, I have heard so goddamn much about administration around here, I am sick to the teeth, fed to the teeth, and I have called you together today to tell you how it's going to be." And he proceeded to lay it out. The gist was that the argument was ended. Clandestine Services was not going to have its own and that it was going to have central administration and that is why I had been selected to come up there because I could do this and he threw my name around with reckless abandon. "White is going to do this and White is going to do that," and my boss, Mr. Wolf, was sitting there. As General Smith told me later, "Walter Wolf is a fine fellow but he's a banker. He doesn't know anything about this." He went around the table and he polled each member asking two questions: "Do you understand what I have said?" and they all answered, "Yes, sir," and the second question was "Do you agree with it?" and they all answered "Yes, sir," until they got to Pat Johnson. He was in OPC, I don't know if he had taken over from Wisner or not, but he was there. Pat Johnson was the son of old General Hugh Johnson and he was a pretty outspoken, loquacious fellow, a retired Army Colonel. General Smith said, "You understand what I have said, Johnson?" And Pat said, "Yes, sir." And he said, "Do you agree with it?" And Pat said, "Well now, General, there may be just one small place where you and I disagree." And Bedell Smith hit the table and said, "Goddammit, Johnson, you don't disagree with me, do you understand that?" Johnson said, "Yes sir," and so we went on and nobody else dared say anything until it got to Allen Dulles, who was last. General Smith had drawn three boxes on the blackboard, one box which said "VonKan", one said "Little", and one said "White". That's all there was to the chart. But he used this chart to explain how I was the place where everyone came with all these problems and that I was in charge. So he said, "Allen, do you understand what I have said?" Mr. Dulles said, "Yes, Bedell." "Well, do you agree with it?" Mr. Dulles said, "Oh, of course, of course, Bedell, but I have one suggestion. This chart here has been very helpful and you have explained all of it to us very well. I would like to recommend that you reproduce this chart and have it mimeographed and passed all around so that we can have it to refer to." General Smith said, "I will not reproduce that goddamn chart. We will all sit here in silence until you have committed it to memory." And here are all these great men. Allen Dulles wasn't even the senior person there. And they all sat there in silence for about three minutes and then Bedell said, "Have you got it?" And we all got up and left.



General Walter Bedell Smith, USA
7 October 1950 - 9 February 1953

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Sometime in the course of the meeting, General Smith asked if there was anyone in the room who thought he could put in writing what he had said and nobody volunteered, so I did. With considerable editing by General Smith later, I wrote the directive that he signed which, no doubt, was the single major decision as far as administration and support is concerned that has been made to this day. So for the next 13 years I spent my life trying to make it so and I guess others can judge how well we did.

Mr. Dulles had succeeded Bill Jackson, by the time I got it drafted, and he was going to be Deputy and so forth. I took it into Mr. Dulles so he could take a look at it. I bumped into General Smith the next morning and he said, "Where's the paper?" I said I gave it to Mr. Dulles. "What the hell did you give it to him for? Get it away from him!"

Well now, on the more fundamental side. The organization we have today is pretty much the concept of the organization that General Smith had. We didn't have Deputy Directors before he came. We had Assistant Directors scattered around. It was his idea to set up Directorates, each headed by a Deputy. And it was his idea to have a Board of National Estimates which was broken out from the analytical and current intelligence side. And to set up an Office of Current Intelligence and an Office of Scientific Intelligence. At any rate, the basic organization which we have today was General Smith's concept and there has been very little change fundamentally. We have a new directorate, the S&T Directorate, and new things like NPIC have come along, but basically his management technique has pretty well stuck for over 20 years now.

To summarize, he was a very strong man—smart and decisive, and to him goes the credit for setting up an organization that has stood the test of time. But probably his most important contribution was in establishing the Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence as preeminent in the community.

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I don't think Allen Dulles could ever have done that because Allen Dulles, for whom I have the greatest admiration, was not a decisive man. He liked to have everybody agree, you know, or else slip it down camouflaged in some way that they didn't really know what kind of medicine they were getting until it came along. I don't think he could have done what General Smith did. I just doubt it very seriously. He wasn't an organizer at all; he dealt almost completely in personalities and I don't think he could have drawn you an organization chart two steps down from the top when he left here after nine years. If he wanted to talk about something, whether it was an economic matter or a clandestine matter or whatever, he knew the people he wanted to talk with but didn't know or care where they fit into the organization. Dulles drove everybody crazy trying to figure out whom he'd told to do what. To him goes the credit, in my estimation, of attracting a lot of fine people and holding them long enough for them to make a commitment. He brought in scholars that I doubt that General Smith could have attracted. And, of course, during a long part of his tenure his brother was Secretary of State and he drew great strength from that. He got along well with President Eisenhower. Probably he was the greatest intelligence officer we had had up to that point and, excluding Mr. Helms, probably the greatest intelligence officer we have had to date.

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The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961

We had plenty of money in those days; there were no constraints on money and manpower. I used to talk with him about money and manpower, you know, and when the great fight was on about whether the Defense Department or CIA was going to be responsible for the National Photographic Interpretation Center, I went to him one day and said, "Mr. Dulles, I think this thing is going to cost a lot of money and use up a lot of people. And I'm not sure that you want to fight so hard for it. The Air Force has got photographic laboratories running out of their ears, you know, if you're really worried about your budget." (He used to tell me in those days that our budget would be maybe $300 million and he'd say, you know, keep it down to $298. There's a big difference between $298 and $301.) I guess it was on one of these occasions when I said to him, "Maybe NPIC is something you ought to let the Defense Department have." And he put his glasses up on his forehead like he did so often and he said to me, just the two of us in the room, "Red, you don't think after I've taken all these pictures I'm going to let somebody else develop them?"

Well, okay, that was his way of making decisions; it was clear to me that I'd never want to raise that question again. So we all put our shoulders to the wheel and you undoubtedly know the President signed the National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID)—probably the last document he signed before he went out to ride down Pennsylvania Avenue with President Kennedy.

Another illustration of Mr. Dulles's decisionmaking style which is very similar to this: I had charge of building the new Headquarters, and he wanted to have a cornerstone ceremony. That meant a lot of work for me, organizing thousands of people to go out there, parking them, getting them all on the platform, a lot of dignitaries and what not. So I went to him one day, and said, "Mr. Dulles, you know we don't really have to have this cornerstone ceremony. We don't really have to do this you know. Often if you wait until you have your building all finished you can have a dedication and a cornerstone all at the same time. By then we'll have all our people out there, or most of them, and there won't be so much of a problem." Dulles said, "But the building's all finished. There won't be any place to put the cornerstone." I said, "Oh, we could put the cornerstone in now or for that matter you could put a bronze plaque on the wall saying whatever you want to say." He said, "Look, Red, you may have forgotten that there's going to be a presidential election. We're going to have a new president. And when we have a new president I may not be the Director of Central Intelligence. God damn, Red, I want my name on that cornerstone and I don't want it on any bronze plaque that somebody can take down." I said, "All right, sir, I understand." This is more the way he did things.

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We had a Deputy for Administration in those days and when I came into that Directorate they had everything in it that is now in it, except Communications and Training. In addition, we had the General Counsel and the Audit Staff. In those days the Office of Personnel was everybody's whipping boy and everything was wrong. One day, unbeknownst to me—at least the background was unbeknownst to me—the DCI called me into his office and he and General Cabell were there. Mr. Dulles told me that he was going to remove Personnel from my jurisdiction and have it report to the Office of the Director. He was going to appoint ——— ——— to be the head of it. He said he would like to have my views. "Well," I said, "if you have already decided it doesn't make any difference what I say, but if you really want to hear my views I'll tell you." "Oh sure," he said. I told him I thought this was a mistake. I didn't think that organizational line-up was too important and if that was what he wanted it certainly could work and I'd do everything I could to make it work. "But," I said, "the man you have chosen to head it is the worst choice you could possibly have made." Typically of Mr. Dulles, when the discussion got a little heated with General Cabell on one side and me on the other, Dulles would look at the clock and say, "Well, I've got to see an Ambassador," and shoo us out of the room. We went out of the room and I asked General Cabell if he wanted to discuss it anymore. He said "No." This was on a Friday, I think, and I brooded about it, and on Saturday morning I went back in and got to General Cabell again and had another half hour with him.



President Eisenhower, with Dulles looking on, lays the cornerstone on 3 November 1959.

About a year later something went awry with some personnel matter, I don't remember what, and we were with Mr. Dulles and I had the temerity to say that I thought the personnel situation was worse than it was when he took it away from me a year earlier. Kirkpatrick, then the Inspector General, was there, and said he thought so too. Mr. Dulles said, "I think I made a mistake and I want you to take it back now." Kirkpatrick spoke up and said, "If you really want to do that, why don't you give Red Communications and Training and call him the Deputy Director for Support?" Everybody thought this made sense. And, of course, it gave both General Cabell and Mr. Dulles a chance to avoid being tagged with having made an earlier mistake because this was a new concept, you see. So this was done and as far as I know there wasn't much more

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background or staff work than just that. General Cabell was given the job of talking to Matt Baird, who was then the Director of Training, and General McClellum, who was the Director of Communications, and bringing them along. That's the way the support organization came about.

At the same time, or a little later, there was a thing called DDP Admin, which was headed by Ted Shannon. DDP Admin was supposed to arrange the administrative support for the Clandestine Services. They were on the TO of the DDP and responsible to him. It was never totally satisfactory because DDP Admin fellows didn't command. I had command of all the support units and they couldn't order the support units to do anything. So if the support unit thought they were off base, they would turn them down and then it all had to come up to me and I'd have to make some decision and it wasn't really too satisfactory. One day something fell between two stools and Dulles had me and Frank Wisner and General Cabell in to talk. Frank thought it all my fault and I said it wasn't—that it was *his* fault. Mr. Dulles said, "Well I'll tell you, the next time something like this happens, I'm going to blame one fellow for it, and I'll tell you who it's going to be. It's going to be you, Red. I want you to take over the DDP Admin Staff." This hadn't been staffed out in any way and so I said, "Yes sir," and Frank Wisner and I walked out. Frank was nonplused, and I guess to the day he died he didn't believe me when I told him I didn't have anything to do with it, it just came out.

Anyway, I can remember Frank saying to me on the steps of the building, "Red, what does management mean anyway?" And I said, "Well, big subject but to oversimplify it I guess it means administration." He said, "I'm not sure what it means, but I know one thing. If you put what I know and what Allen Dulles knows together you don't get very much." I just relate these things to show you how some of the decisions which Allen Dulles made came about.

I was responsible for the money when they first talked about flying a satellite. As I remember it, the Navy was running around trying to get people to give a million or two million, or whatever, to get enough money in the pot to fly the first satellite, whatever it was. My attitude was that if the Navy wanted to fly the thing they could find the money or the Defense Department could find the money. Why should they come to CIA and get a couple of million dollars from us? So I went to Mr. Dulles and told him about it. He said, "Now just a minute, Red. If they're going to fly this thing, I'd like to own a little stock in it." Well, that was pretty farsighted—pretty farsighted.

I was also responsible to him for Air America—a big project. He used to say to me, "You've got to have some helicopters—get some helicopters." And I'd say, "Mr. Dulles, what am I going to do with helicopters? I haven't got any place to use helicopters." Dulles would say, "I don't know what you're going to do with them but I'm just sure that in the future you're going to need them." Well, look what we're doing with helicopters today. So, as I say, these decisions didn't always come about in a logical way, or after careful study, but he was wise and his intuition was very good. No matter who you were, he made you feel at home and that he was interested in what you were saying. He treated everybody with great dignity. You didn't go in his office feeling as though you were a subordinate way down the line and that you were standing there

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shivering and saluting and so forth and so on. To get to his office you never went through a secretary's office to see him. If you had an appointment, you waited until he was ready and then you went right into his office. This is my home. Welcome. Come in. A very great man.

I think he would have been there till we carried him out feet first if he hadn't been told after the Bay of Pigs and all of that that he had been there long enough.

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Then comes John McCone. McCone is a great executive, probably as great as you'll ever see. But cold-blooded. I think that man has got ice in his veins. He inherited all these fine people and he took a position that General Smith had made possible and no other position would have satisfied someone like McCone. Mr. McCone is a very dedicated and patriotic man, I think, but he wears it on his sleeve. And he's either going to be the number 1 man or he isn't going to be anything. General Smith made this possible. And McCone took the fine people that Allen Dulles attracted and probably got more mileage out of them than Dulles ever did. He knew exactly what he wanted and when, could make decisions, and he cared not how much trouble or inconvenience it was to anybody else to produce it. He was absolutely a first-rate manager and an able man, but very cold-blooded. As a matter of fact, I think he had less compassion by far for people than General Smith. And of course he had great rapport with President Kennedy. Later he didn't enjoy the same rapport with President Johnson, which was probably one reason why he didn't stay around.

McCone had to have this kind of contact to satisfy himself and he had the guts to pick up the phone and demand to talk to the President. Of course, in his administration, President Kennedy talked to a lot of people. He'd call up Dick Bissell or Art Lundahl or somebody else. But McCone was very close to President Kennedy and he and Bobby Kennedy saw a lot of each other. I think he saw the President any time he wanted to. He was definitely part of the inner circle. This is necessary if a Director is going to be successful. You cannot, in our business, I contend, sit over across the river or anywhere else and wait for the President to tell you what he wants. You've got to be close enough to the President to anticipate what he wants. Even more than that you've got to anticipate what he ought to want because he may not know he wants it. The President doesn't know the capability you've got over here. And the only way the Director is ever going to be successful is to be close enough to the inner circle and its daily deliberations and so forth so that he anticipates the President's needs. And serves both from the seventh floor. This is one of the reasons why I think that Allen Dulles, John McCone, and everybody else who has had the job of DCI refused to move off downtown someplace. You've got to be close enough to the CIA and your own shop to know what your capabilities are. You can't meld these by moving off someplace and just becoming another figurehead.

McCone had an appreciation of scientific and technical intelligence, as well. Dulles was more of a cloak-and-dagger man. This is one of those things that has happened over the years. Earlier, people thought of intelligence only in military terms, almost pure military terms. Are their weapons bigger than

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ours? Are their armies bigger than ours? An awful lot of order of battle and all of that without, really, an appreciation of the part that economics, scientific and technical matters play. So you don't misinterpret me though, the Clandestine Services, clandestine operations, in my judgment, with all of this change have become more, not less, important.

As a matter of fact, in the studies that Ed Proctor and his people have done on sources of the information that goes into the CIB and goes into the memoranda or whatever they put out the Clandestine Services score very high. As a matter of fact, I would be happy or at least satisfied that we were getting our money's worth if they didn't score so high. So often, they supply the missing piece of the puzzle or, as Jack Smith once said—he put it very well I think—"It's a small piece of information but it's the piece that illuminates so much that you got from other sources."

The National Photographic Interpretation Center started out as a very small branch, or sub-branch. Then, when the U-2 photography started coming along it became big business and we had to have someplace to process the take so we had it over in the old Steuart Building—which was just awful. And I don't see yet how Art and all the rest of the people did the job but they did a tremendous job.

By the time McCone came along we were getting ready for the satellite and, as I said, McCone was a hard driver. He never liked the Headquarters Building or at least he said he didn't. And he ate me up any number of times about what a terrible place it was. I never could quite reconcile that with the fact that almost once a week he would bring some visitor out to show it off. But nevertheless—he didn't like it, and many times I explained to him that we did it the way Mr. Dulles thought he wanted it. Maybe Mr. Dulles wouldn't have liked it either, except for his own suite. Mr. Dulles had that designed to suit himself. He had arranged it so that people didn't go by his secretary but went right into his office. Every wall switch and door and everything was designed the way he wanted it, including what they called a "swing office" between his office and the deputy so that they could scoot back and forth and have a little place they could tuck people into.

McCone wanted none of that. As a matter of fact he ordered that thing sealed. Have you ever heard that story? Of course, at the outset he didn't have a deputy. When General Carter was appointed and was to show up at 9 o'clock the next morning, McCone called me or sent word, I can't remember which, and told me that before General Carter got there he wanted that door sealed—it was a panel you see—in such a way that no one could tell there had been a door. The wall was bleached walnut. I don't know how we did it, but we got some walnut and we got a couple of bleachers and the next morning when Carter came to work it was closed. There was no way to fix it. You could tell there had been a door there, but it looked pretty good. Carter heard about this pretty soon and he bought one of these plastic hands that kids put in the trunk of a car so that it looks like there's a body in there and he put it over the door.

Mr. McCone called me in one day and said, "Are you going to finish that building down in the Navy Yard?" Building 213. To accommodate an enlarged NPIC, we looked all over town and we were pretty close to settling on the old

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The Honorable John A. McCone
29 November 1961 - 28 April 1965

Arcade Sunshine Laundry, which I thought was terrible. I thought, "Oh my goodness, there must be some better way," and after further talks and what not we hit upon this building, Building 213. It was an old warehouse, something the government already owned and we had high enough priority that the Navy made it available. Then Mr. McCone asked, "Now when are you going to finish that building?" And I can't remember what year this was but I said, "It's scheduled to be finished in September." He said, "That's not good enough. It's got to be finished a long time before that and I want you to go back out and sharpen your pencil and come back in here." So I went back out and got people together and concluded that if we didn't advertise for bids, if we just negotiated a contract with a single contractor, and took a lot of other shortcuts then we could back it up to April. And I went back in and told him. "That wasn't good enough; McCone wanted that building finished by the end of December and said, I want you to report to me once a week on the progress and problems and so forth."

So we just took every shortcut that we could think of. At one point, not long after that, he said, "Now I told you I want that building finished in December." I said, "Yes, sir." "Now," he said, "you're buying new equipment." "Yes, sir." "Now wait a minute, I want you to understand I don't really want just the building finished: I want all the equipment in by the 3lst of December." And the next time he'd ask, "Now you understand about the equipment?" and I'd say, "Yes, sir." And he'd say, "Look, I want to make myself clear. On the first day of January I want to be in operation in that building." He just kept turning the screw, tighter and tighter. As I say, we took every shortcut in the book. We negotiated for a contract and people would call me and say we've got to have some coaxial cable and the only place we could find any was in Houston, Texas, and it will take six weeks to get it up here and I'd say, "Fly it" and we did. Finally the building was finished, and I think it was Art Lundahl who called me about Christmas and said, "You must be kidding. I understand that you have said that we have to move on New Year's Eve." I said, "I've never been more serious in my life." On the first day of January I reported to Mr. McCone that the building was finished and NPIC was operating in here and I thought he'd say "Good job," but he never said anything. He didn't get over here for six or eight weeks, but one day I happened to be coming in the front door as he and General Carter and General Carroll and General Quinn were coming out. At any rate, he came over to me and said, "It's a very interesting building." I said, "Well, thank you sir" thinking well maybe I've done something right at long last.

About two days later he had some guests out to show the building at Langley, and I was walking around with him and Mrs. McCone and others. He

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came up to me on the first floor and said, "By the way, you wasted half-a-million dollars on that building." And I said, "Well, I don't think so." He said, "Yes you did. You've got so much gingerbread out there that I would be afraid to take a congressman within 10 miles of the place. You wasted half-a-million dollars of the taxpayers' money." I said, "Well, I really don't think so, Mr. McCone. We did put a little extra but not much." The conversation was interrupted by one of the guests, but within two hours Pat Carter called me and asked me to come by. He said that the "Old Man" had just had him in and had wirebrushed him about this luxurious, ostentatious Building 213 and that Carter was to investigate the whole thing from A to Z. "Who said they had to have that auditorium? Who said they had to have this and who said they had to have that?" And all the rest of it. We had moved so fast to get into Building 213 that we had to reconstruct a lot of things but we put together an inch thick report and served it up. As I remember, we said the building had cost $12 million or thereabouts and that $1 million of it was due to the urgency required by the Director of Central Intelligence. McCone never said any more about it.

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Admiral Raborn was a very fine human being, I think. He was a gentleman and a personal friend. But, in all honesty, I don't think he was a good choice to be Director of Central Intelligence. His background really didn't fit. His knowledge of history was very skimpy. His great forte was that he had a great reputation for getting along with the Congress and, of course, he had built the Polaris. So he had an R&D background. But even this R&D background was not deep; I mean, he was the project manager and got things done—he got the money, he's a great talker. He prided himself on his ability to deal with Congress but even in dealing with the Congress it became obvious to even his best friends that once he had finished a script prepared by the intelligence analysts he couldn't really go beyond his text and you've got to be able to do that if you're testifying before the Congress.

I think Raborn really was quite relieved to be let out, so to speak. As a matter of fact, I don't think the President ever had it in mind that he would stay for the long haul. I think that President Johnson was reluctant to move Dick Helms two jumps at once and so after a year and a half or whatever Raborn stepped out. It's hard to measure his personal contribution to the CIA because Dick Helms was put in there as the Deputy and he really has been running the CIA ever since. Shortly after Raborn came aboard I became the Executive Director and Comptroller and I had a fine relationship with the Admiral but I did all my business with Helms. Nearly all of it. Raborn didn't go at things in great depth.

I remember the report that Lyman Kirkpatrick did, the so-called "Long Range Study," a five-year plan, a 10-year plan, a 15-year plan. I went in with Kirk and he presented this to Admiral Raborn who thanked him and then within 24 hours sent me a buck slip with the report that said, "Please implement." I don't think he had ever read it. When I did, there were a lot of things I didn't agree with; for example, there was a recommendation to the effect that the Agency set up a planning staff or planning officer. The document

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Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr.
(USN, Ret)
28 April 1965 - 30 June 1966

went so far as to name the officer to be appointed to this job and in most emphatic terms said that he should have no—repeat no—relationship whatever with the budget. So I went back to Raborn and said, "This doesn't make any sense to me. You can make a plan and if it isn't realistic then you might as well not have it. We do have budgetary limitations and an intelligent plan has got to take into consideration what kind of resources you've got." "Well," he said, I couldn't agree with you more." And I said, "You know the trouble with this plan, it really isn't a plan, it's a dream. Because what these people have done and they're fine people—they say, well okay, I've got 100 people and $10 million in my budget now and in five years I'm going to need 200 people and $20 million and we both know this isn't in the cards." Anyway, I proposed setting up a planning program and budgeting system all in one and he said that's what he had in mind—no question about it. So I never had the feeling that he went into things in great depth. He was a great personality man, did have many friends on the Hill, still does, and from that point of view didn't do us any harm.

Now, the NPIC problem . . . Well, when I became Executive Director this problem was dumped on my desk, dumped on lots of people's desks, but I was asked to consider with some care and I did read all those things with great care. I remember very well my wife and family were away for the summer and I spent a lot of weekends and nights worrying about this thing. But along about that time the Inspector General had looked at it and he had turned in a report which as I remember it said that this is really going to grow and someday it may be bigger than NSA. And he thought that in some period of time, five years, that they ought to have 3,000 to 4,000 people and a $65 million budget. And then we called in some consultants to look at it and they said, "Well we think this IG report is niggardly. It may be much bigger than that." Well anyway, I talked to Dick Helms mostly about this and he just said, "You know it's just not going to be. I'm just not going to go for this." He's hard on SIGINT and all this stuff. You know, who needs all this stuff? Who's going to look at it? Tell me what I'm getting by buying one more computer that I didn't get before I bought the computer." He's pretty tough. So then we finally did this. I say we, General Reynolds. Reynolds and his task force did this study which made some sense and which I think has probably stood the test of time fairly well. But Dick Helms just said to me, "I'll tell you, you just hold that thing and I'm out 1,000 people." Again, Dick has got a very good feel for what the Congress will stand for and he said, "If we go in for continuing to expand this thing, the Congress has a tendency to look at the top line of your budget and say your budget is $500 million; you're not going to get any more. So if you want to expand NPIC by $30 million you just find out where you're going to take it from." It wasn't that he wasn't very sympathetic to what NPIC does—he is—but what he is

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saying is that we have got to have a balance, a budget posture here, and we just can't afford to close up the shop and devote all of our money and our people to running the National Photographic Interpretation Center but that's the choice you're making.

So I think we've lived with about 1,000 people, I don't know what it is now, but stronger than any study in my memory and judgment but as Dick said, "We can't do this." Now this is about the level of effort we can put into this. As a matter of fact, for the last two or three years I testified, we presented a chart that showed the comparison of our effort in terms of the number of satellites and the number of passes and so forth as compared with the Russians. They do appreciate this and as a matter of fact both Senator Stennis and Senator Ellender said to me not many months ago that I can explain all this satellite business. You know, you can show them a picture that shows the Empire State Building at 80 miles and this impresses them. There is no question about it. And you can show them other pictures, but those pictures do a great deal of good, you know. They know what the Empire State Building is and they can read and they read Macy's or Gimble's or whatever it was on there. This sinks in even better than showing them a picture of a submarine taken in a Soviet shipyard. If you give them a picture of something they have seen or understand and you can relate that to something in the Soviet Union, that is a very good technique. I only talk to those people about money and unfortunately, in many respects, you have to tell yourself "the reason I'm up here today is to get money." And this is not to say that I would ever misrepresent anything or lie about anything. I never did knowingly. Still you can't make what to you is a logical presentation. You have to say what's going to appeal to this senator or that congressman and try to tailor your presentation, so the kinds of briefings I used to do are really quite a different kind of briefing from the kind that Mr. Helms does when he goes up to brief the Armed Services Committee on posture. Quite a different thing.

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I guess I'm prejudiced but I think Mr. Helms is the greatest Director we have had. Here again I'm not saying he could have done what General Smith did, or saying he could have done what Allen Dulles did, or what John McCone did, but in my book he is a real Pro. He understands the clandestine business, of course, but he understands the rest of it, too, and he doesn't give the Clandestine Services any favoritism. As a matter of fact, he realizes more than anybody else that he's working for only one thing and that's what he can deliver to the White House and if what people here are doing doesn't contribute to the final intelligence product, which is where he makes his bread and butter, then there is a serious question as to whether it ought to be done.

He is more interested in people. He doesn't have the time and I'm not sure he has the inclination, either, to go down to the cafeteria and parade around slapping everybody on the back and all that sort of thing. But he thanks people every time he turns around and means it, even if he can be rough when he lets you have it for not delivering what he thinks you ought to deliver. This is unlike McCone, who never thanked anybody for anything.

When Dick became Director I think there was some uneasiness because he didn't have a lot of money or a political base. And no DCI really had ever been

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The Honorable Richard M. Helms
30 June 1966 - 2 February 1973

in that situation before. But there is no doubt in my mind that he stands taller by far on the Hill than any Director ever has stood. He's candid, he never says something to anyone because he thinks that is what they want to hear, he doesn't gild the lily or hold back. But the Director does the testifying and it is clearly understood by me and Carl Duckett and Ed and others that go with him that they don't say anything unless he asks them to. I mean there is nobody sitting there saying you forgot this or you made a mistake on that. He does a fantastic job. He, of course, is brilliant and his judgment is awfully good. He skates well, or runs well, in the broken field, if you will. None of us can quite appreciate the pressures on him from the White House and the Pentagon and the Congress and so forth. When you talk about the Congress, you can't talk about it collectively. Here again you have to single out what it's going to take to keep Senator Stennis on my side, what's it's going to take to keep Ellender and Mahon off our backs. And today it's what does it take to keep Henry Kissinger off our backs.



Lawrence K. "Red" White graduated from the United States Military Academy in the class of 1933. In World War II he served in the Pacific Theater, and in 1943, when he was 31 years old, attained the rank of full colonel. He was wounded in the assault on Baguio in the Philippines, and as a result of his wounds was retired from active service in March 1947. While still on convalescent leave he applied to the Central Intelligence Group and was taken on. He was made deputy chief of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and soon became chief. Under his five-year leadership, FBIS became an effective global operation.

General Walter Bedell Smith named White Assistant Deputy Director for Administration in 1952, and he was charged with establishing a central support system, and "making it work." DCI Allen W. Dulles in 1953 promoted him to Deputy Director (Administration), and in 1955 made him responsible for *all* Agency administration and support activities, including Operations, Personnel, Communications, and Training. His new title was Deputy Director (Support).

In 1965, Richard Helms, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, asked Colonel White to be the Executive Director-Comptroller, a job in which he saw himself as having considerable influence but not really great authority. I saw myself more as an honest broker."

At Colonel white's retirement from the Agency in February 1972, DCI Helms said that "his counsel has been wise and sensible. . . . He has meant a great deal to all of us, and he has been a tower of strength to me."

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During the present (Nixon) administration, the burden placed on the Agency by the White House and the Kissinger staff is just fantastic. I don't know what they do with all this stuff but they certainly rely on the Agency heavily and here again, Dick is in some ways like Allen Dulles, although he wouldn't appreciate me saying that because he doesn't think he's at all like Allen Dulles. What I mean is that his style of management is highly personalized. He's not going to have any chief of staff or anything like a general staff. He has a secretary and an executive assistant—and sometimes the executive assistant doesn't see him for a week at a time. He tosses the executive assistant a study or something and says take this apart and tell me what you think of it or do this or that. He deals with individuals rather than organizations. He deals with all the deputies and with people down in the bowels of the organization and yet he has got a very well-disciplined and very well-organized mind and—unlike Allen Dulles—he can and does make decisions.

He certainly gave me full reign, goodness gracious. There were no limits on the amount of money that I could sign off on or anything like that. But the things that he wanted to do personally had to do with people—supergrade promotions, or a medal like the Intelligence Medal of Merit, or retirement deferments. He wanted to deal with those things personally. And that is very interesting. Because I could sign off on a million dollars or five million dollars but I couldn't sign off on a medal or a promotion to GS-16.

But this may be significant because you know we haven't got anything except people. That's all. We haven't got any constituents. We haven't got any veterans' benefits or social security benefits or anything else to pass out—so we don't have any constituents. And we will survive as an Agency only as long as we're the best.

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HOW KISSINGER USED INTELLIGENCE IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS

Donald E. Welzenbach

One of the more disputatious and publicly documented periods in the Agency's history encompassed the years 1969 through 1973 when President Richard M. Nixon and his Special Adviser on National Security, Henry A. Kissinger, were pursuing an agreement with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic arms.[1] Kissinger, in his book *White House Years*, wrote: "[Nixon] felt it imperative to exclude the CIA from the formulation of policy; it was staffed by Ivy League liberals who behind the facade of analytical objectivity were usually pushing their own preferences. They had always opposed him politically."[2] In fact, Nixon and Kissinger did attempt to exclude CIA experts working for DCI Richard M. Helms from the SALT deliberations, but discovered they could not really get along without them. Kissinger was successful in circumscribing most Directorate of Intelligence inputs to the process, but realized that he needed the technical intelligence being produced by the Directorate of Science and Technology.

Duckett Takes Charge

Carl Duckett became DDS&T in September 1966. Unlike his predecessors, Herbert Scoville, Jr. and Albert D. Wheelon, Duckett was neither scholar nor engineer. Instead, he was a unique combination of salesman and politician with an encyclopedic memory. He believed in lighting candles, not hiding them. As DDS&T, Duckett was in a unique position to make major contributions to any discussions about the Soviet missile threat. Before coming to the Agency in late 1963 to organize the Foreign Missile and Space Activity Center (FMSAC), Duckett had been the US Army's missile intelligence chief at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. In the early 1950s, Duckett had worked at the White Sands, New Mexico, missile-testing range where he obtained first-hand knowledge of the use of telemetry and range instrumentation in testing US missiles. In November 1957, CIA called upon Duckett's unique "hands-on" experience with missile testing to help unravel the mysteries contained in the first U-2 photography of the Soviet Union's Tyuratam Missile Test Range.

Thus, for more than 15 years, Duckett had been closely associated with all types of missiles—defensive, offensive, and strategic—and by the late 1960s he

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[1] These negotiations have been the subject of many books—including John Newhouse's *Cold Dawn—The Story of SALT*; Gerard C. Smith's *Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks*; John Prados' *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength*; Lawrence Freedman's *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat*; as well as a chapter in Thomas Powers' *The Man Who Kept the Secrets, Richard Helms and the CIA* and John Ranelagh's *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*. Each discusses the dispute over National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-68 and the assessment of the large Soviet missile known as the SS-9 or SCARP.

[2] Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years, 1969-1973*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1979, p. 11.

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considered himself the Agency's, if not the nation's, No. 1 missile analyst. His successor as DDS&T, Leslie C. Dirks, referred to him as having been the nation's "technical intelligence czar." [3]

Duckett's expertise was enhanced by his postion in the bureaucracy. When DCI John A. McCone made Duckett head of FMSAC he also appointed him to be chairman of the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC, now known as the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee or WSSIC) of the US Intelligence Board (USIB), which McCone also headed. The GMAIC position put Duckett at the top of the nation's missile-intelligence pyramid. All members of the intelligence community sent representatives to the GMAIC and, because it was an official arm of the USIB (predecessor of today's National Foreign Intelligence Board or NFIB), they were guided by its decisions. Once he became DDS&T, Duckett had at his beck and call on the FMSAC staff and in OSI's Defensive Systems and Science and Technology divisions the most astute group of missile intelligence experts in the nation. These were analysts he, as the founding director of FMSAC, had helped hire. FMSAC was responsible for analyzing and reporting on the technical and operational "characteristics" of Soviet missiles. OSI had the experts on Soviet land- and sea-based defensive missiles.

In 1969, the Agency unit responsible for monitoring and reporting on Soviet strategic missile "force levels" was the Office of Strategic Research (OSR), created in early 1967 by Deputy Director for Intelligence R. Jack Smith. This new office, headed by Bruce C. Clarke, Jr., brought together the military intelligence units from the DI's Offices of Current Intelligence and Research and Reports. Its mission was to determine the numbers of Soviet strategic weapons, including missiles, and to analyze the "military doctrine" controlling their use. DI analysts working on the Soviet strategic missile threat depended on DS&T and its missile analysts for much of the raw data as well as finished intelligence on Soviet missile systems.

One result of having two directorates contribute analytical inputs to the NIEs was that DS&T analysts resented having their "finished" intelligence report further "analyzed" by the DI's OSR and ONE. Admittedly, there was a difference between the two types of analysis (b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

From his position as DDS&T, Duckett had thrust himself and his directorate to the forefront in the various discussions of Soviet missile systems. When new pieces of intelligence about Soviet capabilities became available, he was quick to bring them to the attention of those decision-makers who could put them to some use, be they on Capitol Hill or the Pentagon. He strongly believed that CIA had to "sell" its intelligence product if it hoped to have any influence in the corridors of power. Duckett was also keenly alert to the fact that Agency influence on Capitol Hill meant money for CIA's technical-collection programs, which were located in his directorate and were very

[3] Interview with Leslie C. Dirks, 17 July 1986.

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expensive. Duckett seized every opportunity to provide briefings where he thought they would be helpful. As a result, FMSAC and Defensive Systems Division analysts also briefed NASA's management, the Vice President's Space Council, the director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's General Advisory Committee, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).[4]

Beginnings of SALT During Johnson Administration

In March 1968, Duckett had been asked by General Jack Davis of the Department of State what methods this nation could use to determine which missiles the Soviet Union was deploying in SS-4 silos. It must be pointed out that General Davis' inquiry was directed to Duckett and the DS&T and not to the Office of Strategic Research in the Directorate of Intelligence, because the DS&T not only possessed missile analysts, but also was one of two major government units responsible for developing collection systems for gathering data on the Soviet threat. At the time, General Davis was preparing a paper on the subject of strategic armaments for Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In his reply, Duckett expressed reservations about this nation's ability to detect the conversion of intermediate-range and medium-range missile silos for use by intercontinental ballistic missiles. He also commented on the absence of a US capability for determining the technical differences between several Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) systems.[5]

Ten weeks later, in May 1968, Duckett began devoting more attention to the political aspects of the weapons race between the Soviet Union and the United States, something that was definitely not within the DS&T charter. This change in direction was brought about partly by Dr. Ruben Mettler, president of TRW Corporation and the new chairman of the Agency's Strategic Intelligence Panel. In the spring of 1968, Dr. Mettler suggested reorienting his panel's membership from its emphasis on technical aspects of strategic weapons to the political aspects. Although Duckett feared that such a reorientation might be seen by the Board of National Estimates as an intrusion into its area of competence, he appreciated Mettler's concern that scientists become involved in the issue of compliance verification.[6]

Indeed, Duckett's involvement in the strategic-political arena was to become so intense in the early 1970s that his intentions became suspect among high-ranking officials of the Directorate of Intelligence who felt he was usurping their prerogatives. Despite this, Duckett served as adviser to Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's national security affairs chief, and became the conduit for CIA inputs on the strategic balance.

Duckett Meets Kissinger

Duckett's ability to work with Kissinger, who shared the Nixon administration's distrust of the established bureaucracy, was all the more remarkable

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[4] Interview with David Brandwein, 9 April 1987.

[5] C.E. Duckett memo for General Jack Davis for use in briefing Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 12 Mar 68; Duckett's Chrono File.

[6] 20 May 1968 Duckett note to Lauderdale; Duckett's Chrono File.

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considering that their relationship got off to a bad start in late November 1968 when DCI Richard Helms refused a request by Kissinger for a special briefing on both the Soviet and US strategic weapons issue. At the time, President-elect Nixon was operating from his transitional office in New York's Hotel Pierre and Kissinger was hoping for a one-on-one briefing. He did not want a phalanx of briefers with easels and pointers arriving at the Pierre. Helms refused to allow a CIA official do both briefings because he did not think it appropriate for one of his employees to speak for the Pentagon and the US strategic deterrent. Helms did permit DDS&T Carl Duckett and OSR Director Bruce Clarke to go to New York and brief on the Soviet threat.

The briefing on the US strategic deterrent, given by an Air Force brigadier general from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not go well and Duckett was alert to Kissinger's dissatisfaction with the effort. In fact, Duckett interjected himself into the briefing when the Air Force general misstated the circular-error probability (CEP) of the US Minuteman missile. Duckett's contribution to the briefing impressed Kissinger but added to Kissinger's feeling of having been snubbed by Helms' refusal to have CIA give the entire briefing. It was late January 1969 before the national security adviser sought another briefing by Duckett. By this time, Kissinger was beginning to realize that the Agency, with Duckett as its spokesman, was more knowledgeable on the subject of Soviet strategic missiles than other government components.[7]

It should be understood that DCI Helms routinely deferred to the incumbent DDS&T on technical matters. For example, both Duckett and Donald Chamberlain, the Director of Scientific Intelligence, accompanied Helms to Capitol Hill when he gave his annual briefing to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Duckett and Chamberlain would answer the detailed questions concerning missiles, space, and nuclear energy.[8] Duckett became a familiar figure before congressional panels and established a close working relationship with Senators Henry M. Jackson of Washington, John Tower of Texas, and Sam Nunn of Georgia.

Dispute Over NIE 11-8-68

On 20 January 1969, the day of President Nixon's inauguration, Soviet spokesman Leonid Zamyatin reaffirmed his country's willingness for a "serious exchange of views" on the subject of arms limitation. The Soviet Union apparently did not want the strategic arms limitation effort, begun under President Johnson, to falter. One result of Zamyatin's remarks was that National Security Adviser Kissinger's involvement in the arms limitation arena began in high gear. In fact, the next day, 21 January 1969, he issued seven National Security Study Memorandums (NSSMs), the third of which was titled "Military Posture" and dealt with the question of sufficiency of strategic hardware.

At the center of the stormy period set in motion by the strategic arms limitation effort was the question of the Soviet ICBM known as the SS-9, mod-4

[7] Duckett interview.

[8] Duckett interview.

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triplet, or SCARP. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

NIE 11-8-68, issued in early October 1968, reflected this new conclusion that the SS-9 had three reentry vehicles but was not MIRVed. The NIE did concede that the Soviet Union was at work on MIRV systems. This conclusion was acceptable to the Johnson administration's Pentagon, headed by Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, because it removed the need to embark on a more sophisticated anti-ballistic missile (ABM) effort. However, the NIE was promptly challenged by the incoming Nixon administration, the new Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, and Henry Kissinger. According to John Prados, who has written extensively of this period in his book *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength*: "The spring of 1969 should be seen as a major postwar watershed of nuclear strategic doctrine." [9]

FMSAC's stable of analysts included three men who had worked with Duckett at Huntsville—(b)(3)(c) and M. Corley Wonus. David S. Brandwein, Duckett's successor as Director of FMSAC, believed that (b)(3)(c) new more about the SS-9 than anyone else in the United States and that (b)(3)(c) was the finest trajectory analyst in the country.[10] The Huntsville three and other FMSAC analysts (b)(3)(c) and R. Evans Hineman were convinced that the results of the four known Soviet tests of the SS-9 triplet, as it was called, could not be used to prove that the missile's warheads were independently targeted.

Analysis of the SS-9 done for the Pentagon's Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) was accomplishe (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

[9] John Prados, *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength*, Dial Press, New York, 1982.

(b)(3)(c) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

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The DDR&E seize(b)(1) conclusions and began postulating that what the Soviets had in r(b)(3)(c)making the SS-9 mod-4 into a MIRV. Richard Latter, a Rand Corporation employee serving as an adviser to DDR&E John Foster and working closely with Paul Nitze, became a vociferous advocate of this view.

David Brandwein, FMSAC Chief had wor(b)(1)th from 1960 to 1963 when both were employed by STL. Brandw(b)(3)(c)ne u(b)(1)th for doing the analysis, and with Latter for allowing his poli(b)(3)(c)or his conclusions about the SS-9.[12] Other FMSAC analysts, suc(b)(1) believed(b)(1) was "only doing the job he had(b)(3)(c)id to do"—explainin(b)(3)(c)viet missile designers could make the SS-9 into a MIRV. Like their Pentagon counterparts (b)(3)(c) (b)(1)d basic research as well as data from sources other than telemet(b)(3)(c)nulating their appraisals of the SCARP's capabilities.[13]

In the opening weeks of the Nixon presidency, all intelligence units came under pressure to reconsider NIE 11-8-68 and to change the assessment of the SS-9 SCARP. Particularly, Laird and Kissinger wanted CIA to revert to its earlier assessment that the SS-9 might possibly be MIRVed.

On 13 March 1969, Kissinger issued National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) No. 28 requesting a formal interagency study on "SALT Criteria." At the same time, he asked CIA to state the verifiability of each weapon limitation proposed in NSSM-28. Work on verification had been going on within the Agency since early 1968 involving FMSAC's Brandwein and OSR's Robert Hewitt and R.M. Huffstutler. By late March 1969, verification had become the hub around which the planning for the SALT effort would revolve and Carl Duckett was embarked on a long-term and close association with Kissinger that involved educating Nixon's assistant for national security affairs in the intricacies of estimating the Soviet strategic missile threat. Before the year was out, Henry Kissinger would be referring to Carl Duckett as the "professor."[14]

In early April 1969, Kissinger set up his own MIRV panel with its own interagency working group.[15] Later, in June, Kissinger established several interagency *ad hoc* committees to examine the verifiability of potential arms-control provisions. FMSAC's David Brandwein chaired the *ad hoc* committee on offensive missile systems. Another *ad hoc* committee examined defensive missiles.[16]

Early in 1969, CIA's analysis of the Soviet SS-9 mod-4 triplet left no one happy in the Pentagon or the White House. Defense Secretary Laird insisted that the three warheads on the mod-4 SCARP were the "functional equivalent" of MIRVs and as such could overwhelm the US Minuteman offensive shield.

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[12] Brandwein 22 Jul 86 interview.

(b)(1)

[13] Bi(b)(3)(c)Jul 86 and Duckett interviews.

[15] Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, p. 161.

[16] Brandwein 8 Apr 87 interview.

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Kissinger took the position that the SCARP's triplet "footprint" was designed to match the placement of missiles in the Minuteman launch complex. He hoped thereby to prove that the Minuteman shield was threatened by the Soviets. Kissinger needed this "credible threat" in order to justify redirecting an ABM system, known as Sentinel, from defending cities to defending Minuteman complexes. He wanted to use this as a bargaining chip in the forthcoming SALT negotiations. In fact, President Nixon announced on 14 March 1969 his decision to proceed with the phased deployment of an ABM system, later renamed Safeguard, around Minuteman sites.

The question of the strategic threat posed by the SCARP missile was the subject of a 24 March 1969 telephone request from General Maxwell Taylor, a member of President Nixon's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), to John Bross, the deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE). (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

(b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

The Agency's appraisal of the SCARP triplet, as included in NIE 11-8-68, was the subject of testimony by DCI Helms and DDS&T Duckett during a closed Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on 17 May 1969. They presented essentially the same arguments contained in the 25 March memorandum for General Taylor: that the SCARP triplet was an MRV whose three-warhead footprint had a circular-error probability (CEP) too large to pose a threat to the Minuteman complexes. The NIE did not consider the SCARP triplet as giving the Soviets a "first strike" capability. According to Powers' book, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets:*

> At the end of the [17 May] session [Senator J. William] Fulbright observed that "It sure didn't sound like what the Secretary of Defense has been saying." Kissinger was furious. NSC staffers wondered whether Helms could survive as DCI, and one of them said that if it were not for Helms' reputation for integrity on the Hill, Kissinger would have insisted that Nixon fire him.[18]

On Tuesday, 27 May, Duckett asked Brandwein to prepare a comparison of the differences between the Agency and the Pentagon's DDR&E estimates of the SS-9. Duckett also suggested that Brandwein present the two arguments side-by-side, at equal length, on the same piece of paper. Both Duckett and Abbott Smith, Board of National Estimates chairman, approved of Brandwein's paper and OSR's Bruce Clarke agreed to present it to the NSSM-28 steering committee meeting the next day. That meeting, attended by Deputy Defense Secretary Packard, was less than successful, because Packard was disappointed that Brandwein's paper did not show more agreement between the two sides—the Pentagon and CIA.

DCI Helms, accompanied by Carl Duckett, BNE Chairman Abbott Smith, DDI R. Jack Smith, and ONE's (b)(3)(c) met with Kissinger and David

[17] John Bross Memo for Executive Secretary, PFIAB, 25 Mar 69; Duckett Chrono File.

[18] Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets, Richard Helms and the CIA*, New York, Pocket Books, Inc., 1979. p. 269.

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Packard on 29 May at the White House. Kissinger related his and the President's dissatisfaction with the estimate and demanded it be rewritten and that CIA's position regarding the SCARP include more supporting evidence. The DCI assured Kissinger that CIA wanted to respond to the needs of the President and said that Duckett and Abbott Smith would work on the problem.

That same afternoon, Brandwein attended a meeting in the Pentagon of the DIA's Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) chaired by Eugene Fubini. Brandwein told the group that the Agency did not "disagree violently" with the DIA/DDR&E report on the SS-9 but felt "the tone was wrong, that they were coming down too hard on the idea that SS-9 had to be a MIRV even though there were no plausible explanations." SAB member Richard Latter attacked Brandwein's position by harping on his own estimation that the SS-9 was more accurate than the Agency paper said it was.

Memorial Day 1969: Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-8-68

On Memorial Day 1969, Duckett, Brandwein, and Clarke met in the Pentagon with Gardner Tucker, Roland Herbst, and Ronald Easley of the DDR&E and [redacted] of DIA. They worked out several drafts with surprisingly little controversy. Clarke, Duckett, and Tucker took the drafts to the Executive Office Building for a meeting with Henry Kissinger, David Packard, and Abbott Smith that afternoon. Kissinger was still not pleased, but by late afternoon general agreement was reached on a new plan for preparing estimates that would give producing officers a greater role in their drafting.[19]

DIA (b)(3) 10 USC 424

DIA (b)(3) 10 USC 424 and (b)(6)

On Thursday, 5 June, the SS-9 debate took a turn for the worse when DDR&E Foster, using erroneous RIVET AMBER radar data collected during a recent SS-9 test in the Pacific, told Defense Secretary Melvin Laird that the SCARP's three warheads had landed in a straight line "proving" that they were MIRVs. Foster could not be dissuaded from this view, even though later analysis of the RIVET AMBER data revealed that the warheads had landed in the typical random triangular configuration. Brandwein learned of this flapfrom DIA's [redacted] who telephoned to assure him that DIA was not responsible for giving Foster the faulty data.[20]

A Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-8-68 was drafted during the first 10 days of June and approved for distribution by the US Intelligence Board on Thursday, 12 June. The next morning, Duckett accompanied the DDCI, Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., (USMC), to the White House where Kissinger expressed his continuing dissatisfaction with the wording of the document. Again on Saturday, 14 June, General Cushman led a CIA delegation, which included Duckett, Brandwein, Abbott Smith, and R. Jack Smith, to the White House. Also present for this meeting were Deputy Defense Secretary

[19] Brandwein 22 Jul 86, Duckett interviews.

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Packard, Gardner Tucker and Thomas Burke from the Defense Department, Philip Farley from ACDA, and Attorney General John Mitchell, as well as Henry Kissinger and members of his NSC staff.[21]

The purpose of the gathering was to review the recent Special Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-8-68. According to Brandwein, Kissinger "made it pretty plain he was unhappy with it and kept saying he did not want to influence our judgments." For three hours, Kissinger repeated that his "most important client" wanted the facts separated from the judgments and identified as such. He said the memorandum was negative where it did not need to be negative. Privately, Brandwein agreed with Kissinger's criticism and blamed the problem on the document's drafters. Deputy Defense Secretary Packard also came to the meeting with a lengthy rebuttal of a number of points in the memorandum. Packard was not aware that Abbot Smith could not agree to changes in the memorandum without the approval of the USIB. The meeting ended with CIA committed to reorganizing and redrafting the document.[22]

On Monday, 16 June, Abbott Smith informed all holders of the memorandum that it would be editorially revised to provide more discussion pro and con on the MIRV/MRV question. Brandwein, (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c)pent much of that day rewriting parts of Abbott Smith's new draft, specifically the parts dealing with the possibility that the SS-9 might be MIRVed and also addressing its range. This revision, while making the NIE longer, did not essentially change the original estimate that the SS-9 mod-4 did not present a "first strike" capability, but left vague its threat to the Minuteman force.

Despite Agency rewrites of the estimate, Kissinger was still not satisfied. He called another meeting at the White House for Thursday, 19 June. Duckett and Brandwein attended for the Agency. When they reached the White House Situation Room, they discovered a large delegation, with Kissinger in the chair, and including his NSC chief of staff Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.; Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Alexander Haig of the EOB staff; Maj. Joseph Eibling and Roland Herbst of the DDR&E; Spurgeon Keeny and Philip Farley of ACDA; as well as Frank Perez from State. Kissinger wanted the group to consider the consequences of a MIRV test ban on both the United States and the Soviet Union and sought answers to such questions as: Which side would profit? Could either side deploy without further testing? How could we verify? What kind of a ban could be stipulated? [23]

On this occasion there was not much wrangling. It was agreed that State's Perez would preside over drafting a paper on this subject with DDR&E contributing the section on the consequences of such a ban on the United States and CIA covering the same topic for the Soviet Union. Duckett assigned Brandwein the task of writing the Agency's contribution to be ready by

[21] Brandwein 22 Jul 86 interview.

[22] Brandwein 22 Jul 86 interview.

[23] Brandwein 22 Jul 86 interview.

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Monday, 23 June. The next afternoon, Friday, 20 June, Brandwein went to ACDA for a meeting with Perez, Herbst, Eibling, and Sidney N. Graybeal to work on the draft.

Monday, 23 June 1969 was an especially busy day for CIA officials. DCI Helms was on Capitol Hill with Defense Secretary Laird testifying before Senator J. William Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee in the morning. At the same time, DDCI Cushman was chairing a special USIB meeting to review the second revision of the Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-8-68. Duckett and Brandwein attended this long USIB meeting which ultimately approved the document essentially as CIA had prepared it.

The next afternoon, Tuesday, 24 June, Duckett accompanied DDCI Cushman to a PFIAB meeting at 1530. A half-hour later, Duckett and Brandwein left the Executive Office Building and walked to the White House Situation Room for another meeting with Kissinger. Most of those who had been present the previous Friday were gathered around Kissinger. The National Security Adviser was not delighted with the MIRV paper prepared by State's Frank Perez, and told Perez to rework the paper.

During the discussion of the paper, Kissinger became annoyed with Brandwein who made a "bureaucratic" objection to allowing the DDR&E to append footnotes to intelligence judgments. Brandwein pointed out the DDR&E had no charter to produce intelligence. Also, Kissinger had read the second revision of the Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-8-68 and said he did not think it was much better than the first. He pointedly asked Brandwein why the Agency resisted putting a MIRV label on the SS-9 mod-4.[24]

The SCARP SS-9 was the topic of another briefing on Wednesday, 25 June, of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee. Brandwein defended the Agency's analysis. Attending the meeting, chaired by Joseph G. Hirschberg, were former DDS&T Albert Wheelon, Sidney Drell, Wolfgang Panofsky, Hans Bethe, R.W. Fink, E.D. Mitchell, Richard Latter, and PSAC Secretary Donald Steininger. Brandwein spoke on the SS-9's accuracy, range, and whether or not it was MIRVed. He failed to convince Latter, who took the floor and tried to prove that his own calculations proved SS-9 accuracy had improved. Later in the year, DDS&T Duckett, in a note to DCI Helms, described Latter as "one of the most vocal critics of this Agency in the scientific community." [25]

The MIRV paper never completely satisfied Kissinger who resorted to his own MRV/MIRV Panel to try to resolve the SCARP triplet issue. The differences between the MRV and MIRV arguments were complex and involved numerous briefings by Duckett before Kissinger's suspicions about CIA's analysis could be assuaged. In these sessions, Duckett had to overcome Kissinger's ignorance regarding the role played by telemetry in the analytical

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[24] Brandwein 22 Jul 86 interview.

[25] Note to DCI, subject "Richard Latter" dated 6 Nov 69, OWI Substantive Policy File, Folder 8, Box 10 of 12, 79-B-01272A.

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Kissinger's Verification Panel

While Brandwein was trying to defend the Agency's SS-9 analysis before a PSAC panel in the Executive Office Building on 25 June, DCI Helms and DDS&T Duckett were attending an NSC meeting across the lawn in the White House. Kissinger had arranged this meeting so that the nine SALT options contained in NSSM-28 could be presented to President Nixon by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.[27] During this session, Duckett explained to the gathering how the various SALT proposals could be verified without much difficulty. JCS Chairman General Earle Wheeler thought CIA's treatment of the verification question was much too positive. According to John Newhouse in *Cold Dawn*, General Wheeler made "an unusually harsh statement in which he expressed 'serious doubt' about the quality of the study's treatment of verification problems." [28] ACDA Director Gerard C. Smith suggested in a 30 June note to Kissinger that "a higher level verification review panel" be created to study the issue.

Kissinger's senior SALT staff assistant, Laurence Lynn, urged that Gerard Smith's suggestion for a verification unit be implemented and, on 21 July 1969, a formal Verification Panel was established to report to the National Security Council's SALT Working Group on the verifiability of the various SALT proposals. This panel, chaired by Kissinger and comprised of the Attorney General, the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Defense Secretary, the Director of ACDA, the DCI, and a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met the next day, 22 July 1969. The more detailed work for this panel was to be handled by a Verification Working Group, originally under Lynn's chairmanship, comprised of membership from the same agencies.

Almost simultaneous with this development, Duckett was called to the DCI's office and told by Helms that Kissinger had confided to the DCI that he did not want to deal with OSR's Bruce Clarke on SALT issues because of a personality conflict. In light of this, Helms said he wanted Duckett to be CIA's contact with the White House on SALT matters and serve on the Verification Working Group.[29]

This arrangement was significant in several respects. First, it removed the Intelligence Directorate from the CIA-NSC loop and thus kept CIA's political evaluations of the Soviet strategic threat from being presented directly to Kissinger. Regardless of whether there was a real personality conflict between Clarke and Kissinger, this move on the part of the national security adviser was in keeping with his philosophy expressed in a 1966 essay: "Bureaucracy becomes an obstacle when what it defines as routine does not address the most significant range of issues or when its prescribed mode of action proves

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[27] Ki*ite House Years*, p. 148.

[28] Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, p.162.

[29] Duckett, Brandwein interviews.

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irrelevant to the problem." [30] Kissinger wanted to draw his own political conclusions and adopted a "divide and rule" tactic to atomize the bureaucracy.[31]

Second, by replacing Clarke, the politico-military analyst, with Duckett, the technical analyst, an element of contention was removed. Duckett, an expert on missiles and verification, chose not to get involved in the political ramifications of the issue. Probably more important, Duckett's substitution for Clarke gave DCI Helms a "friend in court" with whom Kissinger felt comfortable. For sure, it moved this important advisory function out of the DI and into the DS&T.

After several meetings, it became apparent to Working Group members that the resident expert was Carl Duckett who had at his disposal the formidable resources of FMSAC and OSI. By the autumn of 1969, Duckett had become the unofficial chairman of this body. For the next three years, Duckett would spend almost half of his working hours on aspects of SALT.

This development also revealed how Kissinger's strategy had begun to move into the realm of the practical realities of verification. The Verification Panel and its Working Group, according to Newhouse, "immediately took charge of all analytical work on SALT, a function it . . . never relinquished." [32] Kissinger needed expert advice on missiles and their potential for destruction, and he also needed someone who could advise him on what systems were available for verifying compliance with any agreements arrived at as a result of the SALT negotiations. Duckett was the man of the hour in this regard. The significance of this verification apparatus has been pointed out by John P. Leacacos, in an article in *Foreign Policy*, titled "Kissinger's Apparat":

> One major exception to this general failure [of intelligence] stands out. The single field in which an "agreed factual basis" for policy formulation has been more or less achieved has been SALT. Kissinger claims "The Verification Panel has made 98 percent of intelligence disagreements disappear." The reason: policymakers and intelligence analysts sit on the same panel and directly argue out their differences over facts and policies.[33]

SALT Talks Open in Helsinki

When the SALT talks began in Helsinki, Finland on Monday, 17 November 1969, (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) Connected with this first session of talks was a press leak. The US

[30] Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays*, London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1969, P. 18.

[31] Lawrence Freedman, *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat*, 2d edit., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1977, 1986, p.48.

[32] Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, p. 162.

[33] John P. Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparat," *Foreign Policy*, 5 (Winter 1975) p. 19.

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talking points for the Helsinki meetings were determined at a National Security Council meeting on Friday, 14 November. The points were enumerated in a *New York Times* article by John W. Finney the following Monday, 17 November.

One result of this "flap" was a presidential decree that only "principals" could attend subsequent National Security Council meetings. Participants could no longer bring with them their "backbench" advisers who heretofore had filled the room to capacity. The exception to the President's ruling, however, was CIA. President Nixon and Kissinger both told DCI Helms that he was to bring DDS&T Duckett to all NSC meetings in order to provide expert advice on the SALT issue.[34] Duckett continued to attend NSC meetings through the signing of the SALT-I agreement.

The opening round of talks adjourned on 22 December to resume again on 16 April 1970. Within a week of adjournment, a Kissinger memo to members of the Verification Panel outlined a number of tasks to be completed by the Working Group in time for a full Verification Panel meeting the second week of January 1970. The final results were to be reported to an NSC meeting by early March 1970.[35]

This NSC meeting, which Duckett attended, actually took place on 25 March 1970; following it President Nixon issued NSDM No. 49. In response to this directive, DCI Helms specified that the Verification Working Group should prepare four options for the President's final review and decision concerning the US position at the resumption of the SALT talks in Vienna.[36]

The first option submitted by the Verification Working Group was the "limited" approach, which would limit the number of offensive missiles and permit a Safeguard-level of ABMs—sufficient ABMs to protect the National Command Authority (NCA) plus the 100 Soviet GALOSH ABMs then in place around Moscow—as well as MIRVs. The second option would allow MIRVs but with zero-level ABMs—only enough ABMs to protect the NCA but not the Moscow system. Option three was the same as two but would ban MIRVs. Option four provided for a phased reduction of offensive missiles but permitted the use of MIRVs by both nations.[37]

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[34] Brandwein 22 Jul 86, Duckett interviews.

[35] H.A. Kissinger Memo for the Members of the Verification Panel, Subj: "Preparations for Next Round of SALT," 30 Dec 69, Exec Registry 69-6304; Duckett Chrono File.

[36] Attachment to Memo for DDCI from C.E. Duckett "PFIAB Discussions on SALT Talk Items" 2 Apr 70; Duckett Chrono File.

[37] Attachment to Memo for DDCI from C.E. Duckett "PFIAB Discussions on SALT Talk Items" 2 Apr 70; Duckett Chrono File.

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Following a 6 April 1970 Verification Panel meeting, Duckett returned to Langley and drafted a memo to DCI Helms (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) He sent the paper to Helms on Tuesday, 7 April and went over its contents with the DCI that evening in preparation for a National Security Council meeting the following morning, 8 April, which both men would attend. Duckett's paper summarized "what the CIA people most closely involved with arms control matters considered to be the principal conclusions to emerge from the exercise." He said that, in gross terms, the United States "is probably as close to effective parity and a stable strategic relationship with the USSR as it can ever be." Because of this, the prospects for a satisfactory SALT agreement "are probably as good as they will get for the foreseeable future." The most serious visible obstacle to an agreement, said Duckett, "is the negative attitude of the military planners and some of the technical people in Washington (and probably in Moscow as well) to even the most limited agreement." He said that achievement of an acceptable agreement is likely to depend "on the President's willingness to forgo nationwide ABM deployment and settle for zero or NCA-level defenses." The difference between the zero and NCA levels would be 100 ABM launchers, 64 of which the Soviets already had in place around Moscow. Duckett said CIA analysts had no strong views regarding the question of banning MIRVed weapons but favored a tactic of not offering a MIRV ban and supporting an agreement which did not have such a ban. In summary, Duckett listed the following points as most important:

1. The US should try hard to get an agreement on SALT.
2. ABM is the most critical issue and a large, nationwide ABM will probably make agreement impossible.

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3. The administration has made a great effort to get ABM approved; thus, it could make considerable political hay by "giving up ABM for SALT."

4. The US should proceed with MIRV, arguing that our MIRVs are strictly to insure penetration of any Soviet defense and not to increase our destruction capability.

5. For openers we should try for a rather simple agreement but have a long-term goal extending to much more comprehensive arrangements.[39]

Duckett Tries to Silence Richard Latter

On Thursday, 9 April, the day after the NSC meeting, Duckett decided he would try to overcome some of the Pentagon's "negative attitude" concerning the MIRV issue. He arranged for some of the more vocal critics to gather in his sixth floor conference room to discuss the topic. Attending were Roger Moore and Harry Thompkins from TRW, Richard Latter from Rand Corporation, Roland Herbst of the DDR&E, and David Brandwein and several members of FMSAC's staff. Duckett later referred to this gathering as a "shoot out", because his CIA experts challenged Latter's statistical criteria for judging the SS-9 triplet accurate enough to threaten the Minuteman missile complexes. Although Latter was not completely silenced, his role in the debate lessened noticeably.

The MIRV question was never shelved. The SS-9 mod-4 came up again in mid-August 1970 when Kissinger sent a memorandum to Duckett posing 12 questions about the Agency's analysis of the SS-9 MRV separation times. Evan Hineman prepared the reply for Duckett's signature. The reply explained the basis for the analysis and restated the Agency's conviction that the three warheads on the SS-9 were deployed randomly by sliding from rails at the front of the missile and were not individually aimed or controllable.[40]

The debate over the SS-9's true nature—MRV or MIRV—was never completely resolved until the Soviets began testing a new generation of ICBMs in the early 1970s. These new systems, the SS-17, -18, and -19, were indisputably MIRVed weapons. Each of these systems differed from the SS-9 triplet. Without ever conceding that CIA's FMSAC analysis was correct in its original judgment, DIA and DDR&E, which had so strenuously argued that the SS-9 was a MIRV, quietly backed away from this position.[41]

The fifth round of SALT talks in Helsinki ended on Friday, 24 September 1971, with agreement on modernizing the "hot line" and on resuming the talks in Vienna in November. The following week the Senate approved building a US ABM system called Safeguard.

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[39] C.E. Duckett Memo to DCI R.M. Helms, subject "Some Basic Judgments on SALT," 6 Apr 70, from Duckett's Chrono File.

[40] C.E. Duckett Memorandum for Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, titled "SS-9 MRV Separation Times," 25 Aug 70; Duckett Chrono File.

[41] Brandwein 8 Apr 87 interview.

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Early in February 1972, Carl Duckett suffered a heart attack. He spent nearly six weeks recuperating. By the end of March, he had more or less resumed a full schedule.[42] The pace of Verification Panel work quickened in preparation for President Nixon's trip to Moscow.

Agreements Signed

On 25 May 1972, Duckett was invited to the White House Cabinet Room to attend a ceremony marking the signing in Moscow by President Nixon and Soviet Party leader Leonid Brezhnev of a "Declaration on Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics" that limited the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles and an "Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" later referred to as SALT-I.[43] The signing ceremony actually took place on 26 May.[44] That same day Defense Secretary Laird announced the cancellation of the Safeguard ABM program.

Negotiations for a second SALT agreement were difficult, and there was no prospect for a treaty by the time Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev visited Washington in June 1973. Instead of a treaty, the most that could be accomplished was for President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev to sign a declaration of principles for accelerating the SALT efforts. The significance of the document, known formally as the "American-Soviet Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms," was that it mentioned "national technical means" of verification rather than on-site inspection. DCI-designate William Colby and Carl Duckett were present for the signing which took place in the East Room of the White House on Thursday afternoon, 21 June 1973. After the formal ceremony, Duckett followed Colby through the reception line. When he reached the President and Brezhnev, the interpreter told the Soviet leader that Duckett headed CIA's science and technology directorate. Brezhnev grabbed Duckett by the shoulder and said: "I don't know if I should be talking with you, but I met your new boss, so I guess it's okay." [45]

This article is classified SECRET.

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[42] Duckett desk calendar.

[43] Duckett desk calendar.

[44] Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, pp. 254-258.

[45] Duckett interview and appointment calendar.

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*The Haos 好 and Huais 坏 of Chinese political analysis**

HU'S A REFORMIST, HU'S A CONSERVATIVE

(b)(3)(c)

> If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.
>
> —Confucius, *Analects*, Book XIII: Chapter III

The use of a "reformist" vs. "conservative" dichotomy has become common in the analysis of Chinese politics but is ultimately unsuccessful in explaining what is actually happening in China. The labels themselves are incorrect; moreover, grouping key players into two categories obscures a much more complex political landscape. So long as analysis continues in this manner, future intelligence "surprises" will become more likely.

The purpose of this article is to suggest a better approach: to focus on several factors which affect group formation and the process by which issues are resolved. Such an approach reveals several groupings of political actors, and a pattern of shifting coalitions in Chinese politics. This approach offers a better grasp of what is actually happening in China and could result in better forecasts of Chinese political developments.

Examples

Analysis of China has long been troubled by the proclivity of non-Confucian observers to impose too simple labels upon an extremely complex political landscape. As Confucius foresaw, the wrong naming of things has led to false understanding and frequently to flawed analysis.

The most serious continuing such problem is the tendency to lump Chinese officials into two categories—the "reformists" and the "conservatives." Such analytical bifurcation is not new. Mao's contribution to Marxist-Leninist ideology distinguished between "rightist" and "leftist" deviations from the correct line. During the Cultural Revolution officials were deemed to be either "revolutionaries"—those who supported the current ideological line no matter how often it changed—or "counterrevolutionaries"—those who fell afoul of that line.[1] Much political analysis accepted the Chinese categories, but used the terms "radical" instead of revolutionary" and pragmatic" instead of "counter-revolutionary." Over time the categories evolved into the present conservative-reformer dichotomy.

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* The Chinese ideograph *hao* 好 means "good"; *huai* 坏 means "bad".

[1] The mislabeling of people during the Cultural Revolution has been a key political issue in China throughout the 1980s. Thousands, if not millions, of persons have sought reversals and compensation for unjust verdicts.

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Wrong Labels

While I do not object to the term "reformer" per se, its use in the Chinese political context has become almost meaningless. It would be hard to find any leader in China today who is not a reformer, who does not want fundamental changes in the Maoist prescriptions for political, economic, and social development. Consequently, to suggest that there is somehow a group of "reformers" pitted against some other group—as most analysis now does—obscures the basic truth of Chinese politics for the past decade, which is that groups of reformers are competing with each other. A major improvement in how we think about things could begin with the assumption that just about everyone who counts in China is a reformer; this would allow us to begin to find other more useful ways to distinguish between individuals and their policy preferences.

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Also objectionable is the use of the term "conservative." I once heard an analyst characterize recent developments in China as a resurgence of the "conservatives" which meant there would be a "shift to the left in Chinese policy." The linking of leftism and conservatism—which appears altogether too often in analysis of China—must be received with a mixture of confusion and indignation by some consumers. Such links may make sense to the analysts who invoke them, but to outsiders they are vacuous.

The term "conservative" has a rich and distinguished heritage in the language of Western political philosophy and political discourse which bears no resemblance to the misguided applications to the Chinese situation today. In the Anglo-American political tradition, conservatism, like liberalism, refers to political beliefs in which the individual is considered to be historically and morally superior to any collection of people. The individual is possessed of certain natural or inalienable rights "which can never be fully abridged and which can only be compromised by voluntary contracts." [2] Conservatives differ from liberals in to what extent the social contract may be employed to secure various desirable outcomes, but both are in agreement that governments are a condition of individual consent.

By way of contrast, Marxism-Leninism, and its Maoist derivative, rest upon a concept of man that is fundamentally different from that of the Anglo-American tradition. The underlying sociopolitical philosophy of Maoism is collectivist—that is, the individual is *not* the sole and ultimate source of value, but, rather, the individual is a derivative product of his membership in some collectivity. For Marxists, this collectivity is the social class. Chinese communists accept such values or normative concepts as freedom, fulfillment, and so on, but understand and define them entirely differently than would a true conservative. The individual becomes "free" only insofar as he is willing to submit to the will or rule of the collective. Clearly, those Chinese communists who value strongly Maoist ideological concepts are not "conservatives" in any true sense, but are radical collectivists. Margaret Thatcher or Ronald Reagan are appropriately characterized as "conservative", but it is hardly conceivable that Peng Zhen or Chen Yun should be so identified.

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[2] See A. James Gregor, *Contemporary Radical Ideologies: Totalitarian Thought in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 10-14.

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Rethinking Analytical Assumptions

Chinese politics involves competition for scarce resources and there are divisions among China's leadership and challenges to authority.[3] However, instead of being sharply divided into two groups, the Chinese leadership has for years been a more fluid system of shifting coalitions. The main variables which affect the composition of the coalitions apparently are:

— *guanxi*. Probably the most pervasive characteristic of Chinese politics is the system of *guanxi*, that is, informal loyalty networks. An understanding of patron-client ties is crucial to any analysis of how the system works. The relationship between Deng and Hu is illustrative here; Deng promoted Hu because of personal loyalty even though Hu's views were often divergent from Deng's.

— *personality*. Often missing from assessments of Chinese politics is a consideration of how various leaders get along with each other on a personal basis. While some of this information is difficult to get, there often is reporting which provides interesting insights. For example, I believe that one of the principal reasons for Hu's downfall was that he was not well liked by many other leaders because of personal traits such as his bluntness.

— *position*. Our understanding would be enhanced, I believe, by a more careful consideration of the bureaucratic interests that some leaders are inclined to defend. If a leader has spent considerable time on agricultural work, for example, he may be more inclined to support agriculture during key decisions on budget allocations. Similarly, key military officers naturally want to have a person with a strong military background succeed Deng as Chairman of the Military Commission.

— *worldview*. The ideological predispositions of key players are important. All leaders are committed to a Marxist-Leninist vision, but within this civil religion are divergent faiths which prompt differing approaches to problems. The "fundamentalist" mindset of players such as Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, for example, have apparently played an important role in their approach to reform.

[3] Some scholars, notably Lucian Pye, use the term "faction" to characterize the groupings which develop in Chinese politics (see Pye, *The Dynamics of Factions and Consensus in Chinese Politics: A Mode and Some Propositions*, Project AIR FORCE report by RAND, R-2566-AF, July 1980). I believe the term "faction" is too strong. It is appropriate for Japan where factions are clearly identifiable in the LDP and other parties, but less appropriate for describing Chinese groupings.

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These variables come together as various leaders take stands on policy issues. A fresh, revitalized analytical approach should try to examine more thoroughly than is now attempted how these four variables interact in the policy process, rather than trying to categorize the chief players. Initially, every effort should be made to avoid locking people into various categories. Only until there is conclusive evidence that certain individuals belong in certain categories should a label be applied, and even then analysis should continue to consider, implicitly or explicitly, why the groups have formed, what their durability is, and the derivative consequences.

Toward Potential New Categories

All this is not to say that we should avoid categorization altogether. Categories are useful as shorthand descriptions of political actors and processes so long as they are accurate. In past years, several students of Chinese politics have gone beyond the oversimplified dichotomous analytical mode by offering more diverse categorizations of Chinese leaders. In 1974, for example, Oksenberg and Goldstein presented a four-category typology.[4] Robinson, Lieberthal, and others have also explored various typologies which break free of the two-group bifurcation. These efforts have been criticized, but their example offers an approach we should consider in freeing ourselves from the present analytical snare.

In a preliminary manner, and as a basis for future discussion among analysts, I propose that some potential categories which reflect the variables presented above could be:

— *Marxist-Leninist Fundamentalists.* During the policy process some leaders seem to be most interested in the ideological implications and tend to base their stands on these issues. Such leaders usually seem to interject traditional ideological interpretations into the policy debate. Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu would probably fall into this category.

— *Challengers.* Some leaders seem primarily concerned with promoting change in the system, but also with maintaining their personal power. Deng, for example, wants to press forward with change even at risk to ideological or bureaucratic imperatives. He is anxious to transform the basis of party authority from charisma to performance. Peng Zhen is also determined to change the basis of authority in the party (probably because he has great influence in the legal mechanisms), but also apparently wants to challenge Deng for power.

— *Turf Defenders.* Some party bureaucrats seem primarily interested in protecting their positions and proteges by avoiding retirement. They are supportive of reform, but not at the cost of their power and prestige, and are not as enthusiastic as the challengers. Li Xiannian probably fits in this category.

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[4] "The Chinese Political Spectrum," *Problems of Communism* 23 (March-April 1974), pp. 1-13. Their proposed categories were: Militant Fundamentalists, Radical Conservatives, Eclectic Modernizers, and Westernized Chinese.

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— *Bureaucratic Compromisers.* These are people who are primarily interested in securing particular bureaucratic interests, irrespective of ideological concerns or of progress in reform momentum. They differ from the Turf Defenders in that their principal interests are organizational, not personal (though the two can often become intermeshed). Zhao Ziyang and Chen Yun probably belong in this category. Hu Qili, Li Peng, and Tian Jiyun might wind up here too, at least for the time being until one or more of them is likely to join the challenger ranks.

— *Westernizers.* While there are probably few of these among the leadership, evidence suggests that some prominent persons like Fang Lizhi may belong in this unique category. These Chinese essentially want a fundamental restructuring of the political system and its underlying ideology. While these figures do not have much power now, Chinese intellectual history over the past century indicates that they could have great influence over time.

If such categories were employed, events such as the removal of Hu Yaobang could be more appropriately understood as a convergence of various interests rather than as merely a struggle between reformers and conservatives. Hu was opposed early on by fundamentalists because of his efforts to ease strictures on artistic and cultural expression. He increasingly alienated key turf defenders by trying to get his own clients placed in important leadership positions, and he alienated bureaucratic compromisers because of his headline-making and often off-the-cuff statements on questions of Party reform, military reductions, and relations with Japan. He may also have antagonized Westernizers because of his seeming pro-Soviet stance. Central Committee documents circulated in conjunction with Hu's removal and hint of most of these factors; his alleged failure to manage effectively the December student demonstrations seems to have been the final straw.

The categories listed above, however, are intended to be only exploratory. Moreover, as previously noted no categorization should be firmly established until more research has been done. Categories must remain flexible, taking into account the practical reality that some individuals will have strong stands on some issues but be unaffected by or indifferent to others. Nevertheless, these categories are suggestive of where rethinking our analytical framework might lead. By redirecting our attention to the issues and processes and more carefully examining how different personalities come down on these issues we should be able to gain greater insights into Chinese politics. These insights, in my view, will reveal not a battle between two factions, but a fluid process of shifting coalitions.

Fortunately, there are signs that some analysts are seeking to avoid the bifurcation trap by concentrating on process.

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Nevertheless, much remains to be done. Reexamining our assumptions will not be easy. The "conservative-reformist" mode of analysis has become so comfortably ensconced that perhaps only few will be willing to depart from it. But unless we do, we will continue to advance obfuscation rather than clarity, settle for darkness rather than light, and ultimately, abandon truth in favor of error.

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SOVIET COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITIES

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Has the experience in Afghanistan enhanced Soviet capabilities to conduct counterinsurgency operations elsewhere in support of client states? One approach in attempting to answer this question is to examine the "requirements" inherent in any capability for undertaking a counterinsurgency effort in a friendly nation. These can be defined in terms of a doctrine or strategy, an appropriate military force and supporting instruments, and the political will to employ the force when required.*

Strategy

A major difficulty for Soviet strategists and ideologists has been the attempt to reconcile the insurgency in Afghanistan—or in other friendly Marxist-oriented states—with their conceptions of the nature of local wars and wars of national liberation. Soviet military doctrine has held in the past that local wars and military conflicts in the Third World are an outgrowth of Western imperialism and its reactionary policy. Communist ideologists have long viewed the "national liberation process" as a positive and historically ordained trend and one in which the Soviet role is to champion peoples oppressed by colonial or foreign-dominated regimes. Over the years, the Soviets have gained much expertise in, trained thousands of foreign students for, and provided significant material, advisory, and political assistance to insurgent movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

On the other hand, the Soviets have had relatively little experience in supporting friendly Marxist governments threatened by insurgencies. The Soviets do not appear to have developed either a clear-headed analysis of the vulnerabilities of their Marxist client states like Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan to an insurgency or any significant new approaches to dealing with such insurgencies.

Militarily, the Soviet approach in Afghanistan has been a mixture of strategies employed by other nations in conducting counterinsurgency campaigns. These include "enclave," "attrition," and "consolidation" aspects. "Enclaves" have been a significant feature of Soviet military strategy since the intervention, as Soviet forces have sought to secure government control in Kabul and other major cities and along the main lines of communication. The Soviets have also regularly conducted joint and combined operations to search out and destroy insurgent groups, to disrupt insurgent base areas, and to hinder resupply of

* It should be clear at the outset that the point under discussion is the Soviets' capablity to conduct counterinsurgency operations *with their own forces*. Soviet advisory efforts and use of surrogate forces have long been the normal Soviet approach to such situations. The focus of the present article is whether the Soviet combat experience in Afghanistan suggests itself as a model for a new level of Soviet assistance to client regimes in the Third World—i.e., a willingness to employ Soviet ground forces.

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insurgent forces. Finally, the Soviets have made efforts toward expanding and consolidating Afghan Government control in the countryside, but these have been constrained by the limited number of Soviet troops available and the unreliabilty of Afghan forces.

There is little evidence to suggest that the Soviets view these kinds of operations as distinctive or requiring a specialized "counterinsurgency doctrine." We do not have any evidence, for example, that such a discrete course is taught in Soviet military schools, nor have the Soviets published any books addressing the subject from their perspective.

This is not to say that the Soviets are failing to derive military benefit from the war or to "learn lessons" which might have applicability elsewhere. The opportunity for testing, evaluating, and modifying equipment under combat conditions in Afghanistan is, for example, relevant to Soviet war-fighting capabilities elsewhere. Moreover, the Soviet military press has published numerous accounts of tactical "lessons learned" from "training" activities in Afghanistan. Most of these "lessons" are not new, and most would appear to have a broad applicability not limited to the Afghan war or to counterinsurgency in general. Perhaps most notably, tactical experience being gained in combined-arms operations at company and battalion levels is helping to reinforce the development of the Soviet officer into a true "all-arms" commander.

Apart from such general military benefits, the Soviets do not appear to have gained new insights into the problems associated with combating an insurgency with conventional military forces. The Soviets have written extensively about problems that other nations have encountered in counterinsurgency efforts, but in Afghanistan have found themselves facing similar weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Their experience has probably been more significant in bringing home the reality of such problems than in helping to develop new solutions or to cope more effectively.

Forces

An effective military force for counterinsurgency operations should be light, specialized, and highly mobile; this does not describe Soviet forces in general nor the army which the Soviets have deployed in Afghanistan. The Soviets have, of course, attempted to "tailor" their units in Afghanistan to pursue the war more effectively. Divisional rocket battalions, for example, were returned to the USSR early in the war, and two of the three motorized rifle divisions in Afghanistan have eliminated their tank regiments as basically irrelevant forces for counterinsurgent operations. Additional helicopters have been committed to the war in order to improve mobility and fire support in difficult terrain and, more recently, further special purpose forces (Spetznaz) units have been deployed to conduct small-unit operations against the insurgents.

Other changes have been more creative, such as the formation of two independent motorized rifle brigades, each composed of a motorized rifle regiment, an air assault battalion, and a multiple rocket launcher battery. This move enhanced both the mobility and firepower of these units, making them more capable of conducting independent operations. Soviet forces in Afghanistan have also implemented organizational changes being adopted by front-line Soviet

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units in other areas; these include increasing the numbers of armored vehicles in motorized rifle regiments and assigning tanks to the divisional reconnaissance battalions.

While such measures show a degree of adaptability on the part of the Soviets, the overall impact has probably been to make the force heavier rather than lighter. The presence of tanks in reconnaissance battalions, for example, is probably a good example of an inappropriate "heavying" of the force in a counterinsurgency environment, as is the attachment of a tank battalion to the airborne division in Kabul. Even Spetznaz units in Afghanistan are more heavily equipped than their counterparts in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Moreover, the general trend throughout the Soviet ground forces is toward creating a heavier rather than a lighter force. More tanks, more combat vehicles, and more artillery are being added to Soviet divisions and even the "lighter" elements of the force—the airborne divisions—have received a considerable amount of additional equipment over the past several years which makes them more difficult to deploy and more dependent on a larger logistic support structure.

Besides an appropriate organization, an effective counterinsurgent force requires specialized training. Training for Soviet forces in Afghanistan has emphasized the preparation of troops to fight in a mountainous environment without apparent reference to the type of enemy being faced. "Mountain training centers" have been established in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union to provide areas in which units can prepare for mountain warfare. The Soviets are concerned with overcoming the technical problems of handling equipment and operating weapons in the mountains and even more so with the physical and psychological conditioning of personnel for this kind of warfare.

None of this training appears to address specifics of counterinsurgency operations. Tactics taught reflect standard approaches to basic situations in mountain combat (e.g., conducting route marches, seizing passes, attacking enemy strong points) and do not appear to be "tailored" to a guerrilla war. Soviet defectors and prisoners of war from Afghanistan have reported that they received no specialized training prior to being deployed there. Moreover, the Soviets devote no effort—theoretically or practically—to training their forces for combat in jungle terrain and sub-tropical climates that would be applicable to the counterinsurgency environment in much of the Third World.

In addition to preparing their own forces, Soviet counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere require the Soviets to collaborate effectively with an indigenous regime's military force. A major feature of the Soviet approach to the war has been the attempt to keep the Afghan military involved in the fighting and to build up the capability and effectiveness of the Afghan Army. An estimated 3,500 Soviet military advisers operate with the Afghan Army down to battalion level, and some 2,000 Afghan military men receive training annually in the Soviet Union. Most operations against the insurgents are combined Soviet-Afghan efforts but are under control of a Soviet commander.

Despite these measures, the Soviets have been unable to create an effective Afghan military force, and we estimate that the Soviets are unlikely to succeed in this endeavor over the next five years or so. Afghan (and other Third World) military students returning from training in the USSR are often disenchanted

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with the Soviet system and are not eager to cooperate with or emulate the Soviets. In combat, Afghan units have frequently performed poorly despite the presence of Soviet advisers and support.

Finally, a capability to conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign implies more than just a military effort; "security assistance" is only part of the game. Also required are appropriate levels and types of technical, economic, and political assistance to create and implement developmental programs in support of the friendly government. Soviet capabilities in this respect are quite limited, and Soviet assistance efforts in the past have concentrated heavily on military as opposed to economic programs. The overall Soviet experience in the Third World to date does not suggest that the Soviets are adept in applying non-military aid.

Will

Little direct information is available concerning the Soviet decision to send troops into Afghanistan, but evidence continues to accumulate that the decision was a difficult one for the leadership to make and one which continues to provoke frustration at least among some middle level civilian and military officials. Then-General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev indicated in a *Pravda* interview as early as January 1980 that the decision to intervene had not been an easy one for the Soviet leadership to make. Several reports have suggested that some Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials disagreed with the decision to intervene, and there have also been reports of discontent within the KGB over the intervention. In the past two years, there have been reports of frustration among some military officers concerning the war—even to the point of questioning why the Soviet Army should be fighting in Afghanistan.

Against such a background of reporting, but given the continuing and even increasing Soviet military commitment, it is difficult to assess the impact of the Afghan experience on the national policymaking level. On one hand, the costs—domestic, economic, and political—have not been unbearable, although neither have they been inconsequential. On the other hand, the problems and shortcomings which have been revealed in attempting to wage a counterinsurgency campaign in an adjacent country can hardly have inspired the Soviet leadership in their capabilities to undertake similar operations in areas remote from the USSR—or even next door in Iran. Indeed, while some Soviet officials spoke in early 1980 about a new era of "no more Chiles" (i.e., implying a Soviet willingness to send forces abroad in support of friendly governments), this language quickly dropped from the Soviet lexicon as the difficulties in Afghanistan mounted.

For the Soviet military, Afghanistan is probably seen as a "mixed blessing" at best. The "positive" aspects of the war as a testing ground for equipment and a training environment for personnel are probably balanced by the necessity to allocate resources and the added stress placed on the military as they struggle to contend with a different type of war. Considering that the emphasis for Soviet military leaders is on central Europe and China, it is likely that the military bureaucracy would not necessarily be eager to undertake counterinsurgency operations in other Third World countries. Senior Soviet military leaders in the

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past, for example, have even been unenthusiastic about providing materiel support for major Soviet clients in the Middle East, and anecdotal evidence portrays this disinclination as a general perception among the Soviet military.

Implications

Despite its experience in Afghanistan, the USSR does not appear any better prepared to undertake counterinsurgency operations in a client state than it was in 1979. This is not to deny a somewhat improved Soviet capability to project power abroad, but to focus on the Soviet failure to develop specialized doctrine, forces, or training to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

Any political "lessons" are less apparent and will undoubtedly be influenced by the eventual outcome of the Soviet intervention. Even a complete "pacification" of Afghanistan—a prospect which appears to be remote—would be an outcome that Soviet leaders would probably be reluctant to generalize upon. The Soviet political stake in Afghanistan is much higher than it would be in a non-contiguous Third World country and, as noted previously, the military problems would be significantly greater.

In sum, Afghanistan does not suggest itself as a model for a new level of Soviet assistance to client regimes in the Third World, nor has the war there led to significant improvements in Soviet capabilities to implement an expanded counterinsurgency effort. Such "lessons" as the Soviets have learned appear to be militarily generic, and the counterinsurgency "trickle-down" potential marginal.

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SUPPORTING US ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES *

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A senior arms control official once commented that intelligence information represented power, and its interpretation was, therefore, much too important to be left solely to intelligence agencies. His remark was a manifestation of an endemic tension between intelligence producers and their customers in the policymaking offices of the Executive Branch. This tension is caused, *inter alia*, by the proposition, advanced by professional intelligence officers, that the intelligence community should "tell it like it is and let the chips fall where they may," and the dichotomous view of many policymakers that intelligence judgments should take policy considerations into account, even to the extent of skewing them to support policy when necessary.

The necessity of dealing with Congress adds another dimension to the IC/Executive Branch relationship. A suspicious Congress inevitably examines the basis and rationale for US foreign policy decisions, including the intelligence underpinnings. Oversight committees monitor intelligence findings for completeness, objectivity, and timeliness, placing the intelligence community in an awkward position when policy decisions appear to be inconsistent with intelligence. Satisfying both "customers" in these circumstances requires a sure foot and a previously prepared walkway (well-established and mutually beneficial relationships).

Internal considerations also shape the manner in which the intelligence community operates to fulfill the obligations and responsibilities placed on it directly or indirectly by the Executive Branch and Congress. The intelligence community is not a monolith, but a conglomerate of individual agencies with varying responsibilities, idiosyncrasies, pressures, and bureaucratic interests. Like any family, it has its squabbles, and how well it operates in many instances is dependent on how well "Father CIA" listens to and accommodates the problems and interests of the family members.

Finally, bureaucratic considerations and competition for "turf" within CIA when major accounts are up for grabs have not been totally without impact in determining internal organization to deal with important problems, and the arms control account(s) are no exception in this respect.

Relationships with the Executive Branch

The basis for dealing with arms control matters, as well as all national security matters in the US Government, is derived from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and a series of implementing directives, including

* This article consists of extracts from a report (b)(3)(c) prepared for the Arms Control Intelligence Staff.

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Executive Orders, Presidential Decision Memorandums, House and Senate Resolutions, other Acts of Congress, and directives issued by or in the name of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Successive administrations, beginning with President Nixon's, have all used the NSC structure in managing arms control matters. Within this statutory framework, the DCI and the intelligence community operate basically on a combination of guidance and tasking from the President and the NSC (and from DOD in the case of the military intelligence departments) and self-generated projects based on experience and, we hope, on foresight. How well it works depends, to a large extent, on the principal players and their personal relationships, beginning with that of the DCI and the President he serves.

Tasking by the NSC on arms control matters has been accomplished through committees or working groups headed by NSC, State, ACDA, or DOD chairmen and containing representatives from the principal agencies having arms control responsibilities: NSC, State, DOD (OSD and JCS are represented separately), ACDA, and CIA representing the IC.

In providing intelligence on arms control matters to the policymaking community, the IC, under the direction of CIA, has come to observe a number of tenets whose value has been established over time. They are:

— Provide coordinated intelligence, highlighting differences within the IC where they exist and the reasons for them.

— In making intelligence judgments (an art, not a science), tell it like it is and let the chips fall where they may.

— Stay out of policy unless intelligence equities are involved—then speak up.

— Maintain the integrity of the IC. Don't let policy agencies make or influence intelligence judgments, or otherwise get into the intelligence business.

— Accept tasking (and priorities) only through the established NSC mechanism—don't let individual agencies tie up limited resources.

The tenet of objective intelligence, especially, deserves amplification. There has been nothing more difficult for an intelligence officer in my experience than attempting to convince incoming administrations that their interests are best served by a product that is objective and void of policy "tilts." If any administration is to be convinced of the virtues of objective intelligence, the IC must follow a number of rules in the production and dissemination process, to wit:

— The assessments should be presented dispassionately.

— Assumptions and uncertainties should be spelled out, as well as the sensitivity of the conclusions to these two factors.

— Where new intelligence is sensitive politically, the administration should be forewarned, prior to publication, to permit timely formulation of a policy response.

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— Where impending policy decisions appear to be inconsistent with available intelligence information, the apparent inconsistencies should be pointed out so the administration can determine, in advance, how to deal with them on the Hill and in the media.

Organization for Arms Control Support

In general, the development of institutionalized IC support to the Executive Branch on arms control matters has been evolutionary, emanating from a series of internal decisions, which have been tempered and refined over time. Organizational and operating precepts established within IC components by these decisions include:

— The use of existing production elements and analysts to provide substantive support on arms control matters as an extension of their normal responsibilities. An additional layer of redundant production units with narrowly focused responsibilities has been avoided.

— The formulation of small but high-level staffs in each major component to oversee, supervise, and coordinate support provided by various production elements on all arms control matters.

— The vesting of responsibility for day-to-day operations in CIA at the lowest substantive level commensurate with the existing management structure and a reasonable span of control.

— The utilization of the NFIB (formerly USIB) and other similar structures to oversee preparation of coordinated IC substantive intelligence.

— The establishment of new IC entities only when it is deemed absolutely necessary (e.g., DCI Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations).

— Insistence on the principle that intelligence analysis be performed by professional intelligence analysts without benefit of help from policy agencies.

— The proposition that IC inputs to arms control deliberations be clearly identifiable and separate from subsequent analysis taking into account policy as well as intelligence considerations.

CIA Internal Organization

CIA internal organization for arms control support began modestly in the early 1960s when a single division (NED/OSI) was responsible for support to the negotiating and monitoring of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963. NED's responsibilities were subsequently expanded to encompass the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974, the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET), signed in 1976, and the nearly completed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the negotiating of which was abandoned by the US late in the Carter Administration. Following this same concept, a single division (currently TF Division, SOVA) has been responsible for supporting MBFR.

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The SALT negotiations, beginning in 1969, represented the first instance where substantive support to a negotiation crossed division, office, and even directorate spheres of responsibility. Internal responsibility for the SALT I negotiations was placed within a single office (OSR). The focal point for substantive work was a joint DDI/DDS&T SALT support team. This team, drawing upon production offices in both directorates, supervised the preparation of CIA inputs to the SALT policy community, supported CIA advisors with the SALT delegation, and advised and supported the DCI, the DDI, and the DDS&T on SALT-related matters. While the team performed admirably under the circumstances, there were tensions emanating from the fact that while the DDI was in charge, DDS&T production offices were responsible for a large share of the analytical work required, a circumstance that exacerbated established rivalries and competitive spirit between the two directorates.

With the conclusion of the SALT I Agreements in May 1972, it became apparent that CIA support to SALT activities would have to be reorganized and expanded. Not only would the Agency have to support continuing and more comprehensive negotiations, but it would, in addition, be responsible for monitoring Soviet compliance and providing intelligence support to the US component of the US/USSR Standing Consultative Commission. The commission had been established to implement the SALT I Agreements and to deal with matters of compliance.

Following a transition period, a SALT Support Staff (SSS) was formed under a Staff Chief who began as the senior "inside man" on SALT matters and subsequently took over from the DDS&T as the senior "outside man" representing the DCI within the NSC structure and in dealing with Congress. The Chief, SSS reported to the DCI, the DDCI, the DDI, and the DDS&T on SALT matters, and subsequently, on the ASAT negotiations as well. The new regime was in place and operating in December 1973, and continued throughout the remainder of the decade.

There were significant changes in staff operations over time. The original DDI/DDS&T SALT Support Team had functioned almost exclusively as a middleman, receiving requests for substantive support through the Verification Panel mechanism, farming the work out to appropriate production offices, and transmitting the responses when they were received. There were two problems with this procedure.

The first involved a requirement for quality control. Most requests were time-urgent and responses were turned out quickly and with little or no office or division level review. The second problem emanated from the fact that many requests required inputs from more than one production office. There was a requirement in these instances that responses be synthesized into a single paper, professional in style, substance, and cohesion. The logical solution to both these problems was to increase the size of the staff, when necessary, and to people it with analysts capable both of turning out cohesive reports, and exerting quality control in the process. This required that office chiefs cooperate by making available seasoned analysts of outstanding ability for tours on the staff. This was accomplished gradually, as managers at all levels came to recognize the long-term benefits of such a program: exceptional training for

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the analysts involved, including service as advisors on the delegations overseas; and reduction in office workloads as more requests were answered by staff analysts after coordination with the office with substantive responsibility. Reluctant managers were also nudged by analysts who desired assignments in a highly visible policy area with exceptional "perks."

The SALT Support Staff was disbanded in January 1980 and replaced with the current Arms Control Intelligence Staff (ACIS). This move had been in the making for some time, since DCI Turner and successive NFAC Directors Bowie and Clarke were disturbed that there was no single entity they could go to on matters requiring an overview of the entire arms control spectrum (which had grown to include BW/CW and multilateral negotiations on a variety of subjects). Under the terms of its charter, the ACIS provides a central point in CIA for the general oversight of the intelligence aspects of all arms control activities involving the US Government (non-proliferation is not considered an arms control matter in this context). In practice, it exercises direct support to SALT (now START), INF, the Standing Consultative Commission, ASAT and BW/CW arms control activities. It monitors the status of other arms control activities, including TTBT, LTBT, PNET, and MBFR, to enable it to keep abreast of the requirements and capabilities of the IC to meet present and future needs for monitoring arms control agreements, as well as providing intelligence support in the preparation and coordination of the annual Arms Control Impact Statements required of ACDA by the Congress.

Intelligence Community Organization

IC organization for arms control support was established conceptually in the early 1960s when, under the auspices of the DCI, responsibility for monitoring the LTBT was mandated by USIB to its Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC). This mandate was later expanded to include responsibility for the intelligence aspects of the TTBT, PNET, and CTBT.

When it became clear that SALT I Agreements would be concluded, there were discussions—not limited to the IC—on how and by whom the Washington SALT Community and the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) would be provided evaluated intelligence on the status of Soviet compliance, guidance on disclosure of intelligence information, and a channel for levying special collection requirements on the IC. ACDA, for example, proposed formation of a "Special Intelligence Group," chaired by CIA, but including as members representatives of State, ACDA, and DOD. From an intelligence perspective, such an arrangement would have the disadvantage of giving policy agencies an equal voice with intelligence professionals in carrying out IC responsibilities for directing the use of collection assets and in analyzing the resultant data. A preferred approach would be to have the intelligence aspects of verification under the direct control of the DCI, with participation by policy agencies beginning only after finished intelligence reports had been furnished to the appropriate NSC sub-groups.

While there was substantial disagreement within CIA as to how SALT support should be institutionalized, everyone agreed that the IC should organize itself before someone in the Executive Branch preempted the DCI in this

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respect. There were two schools of thought as to the approach to be taken. Both were based on the precedent established in conjunction with the LTBT in 1963, i.e., that the USIB structure be utilized. The first was that the *existing* USIB organization be used, calling upon the appropriate existing committees for support. Advocates argued that a new infrastructure would waste resources unnecessarily. The second approach was to establish a new USIB Committee on the basis that a select unit was preferable because of the diversity of the task, its importance, and the need for visibility.

The second approach was selected, only slightly modified. A USIB Memorandum of 27 June 1972 established a USIB (later the DCI) Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations reporting to the DCI, and through him to the NSC. Chaired by the DDCI, its members included the DDI and the Directors of DIA and State/INR. Its responsibilities include:

— The preparation of periodic reports on the status of Soviet compliance.

— The investigation of possible treaty violations.

— The preparation of intelligence materials for use in SCC discussions with the Soviets.

While the major purpose of the DCI in institutionalizing IC organization for SALT was to draw a line between intelligence and policy participation in the verification process, it also served to rectify an internal situation which was detrimental to the proposition that the policy community should be furnished coordinated intelligence. During the SALT I negotiations there had been no special IC organization for SALT support

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The views of DIA and INR were funneled through OSD, JCS, and State representatives. This led to not infrequent occasions where Working Group discussions wound up in debates on the validity of CIA intelligence judgments in one area or another. The opportunity for DIA and INR to participate in SALT as full members of the IC effort was long overdue and beneficial to all, as was the inclusion of a DIA representative on the Intelligence Team supporting the US delegation in Geneva.

Tasking, Analysis, and Reporting

With its charter in hand and a working group established, the Steering Group lost no time in institutionalizing its procedures to ensure that technical collection systems would be properly tasked and data from them and other sources would be properly processed, analyzed, and reported. Tasking requirements for SALT I (and later SALT II) were developed and incorporated into overall Imagery, SIGINT, and HUMINT tasking plans. A reporting process was also institutionalized for maximum utility. In addition to preparing timely *ad hoc* reports on Soviet activities relating to compliance, the Steering Group has been providing, semi-annually, a formal hard-copy monitoring report covering the status of collection systems, coverage statistics, and listing Soviet

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activity with respect to each individual obligation contained in the SALT Agreements. The monitoring report has been improved and expanded over the years to include agreements reached in the SCC, as well as to incorporate SALT II provisions.

Preparation of these monitoring reports is a major effort, requiring the expenditure of substantial analytical and production resources. From time to time, questions arise as to whether the effort is worth the cost. In my view, it is essential for at least three very important reasons:

— It forces a detailed review of Soviet compliance with a myriad of obligations on a routine basis, helping to ensure that nothing significant falls through the cracks. This is particularly important as analysts familiar with treaty obligations are replaced by those who are not.

— It points, on a periodic basis, to collection shortfalls in various substantive areas, aiding in redress through *ad hoc* tasking of appropriate collection systems.

— It provides a unique formal record both of Soviet activities related to compliance and of the historical development of Soviet strategic forces limited by the agreements.

Support to Delegations

Senior Intelligence Advisors to the START, INF, and SCC delegations are full members of those delegations, both in internal deliberations and in negotiating sessions with the Soviets.

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Dealing With Congress

Since the beginning of the SALT process, Congress has displayed an enduring interest in arms control negotiations. There was considerable debate before the Senate bestowed its "advice and consent" to the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement (IA). Despite the fact that the agreements had been signed by a conservative President with impeccable anti-communist credentials, concern over the unequal limits of the IA was reflected in an amendment, fathered by Scoop Jackson, which warned that a future treaty on strategic offensive arms should not limit the US to forces numerically inferior to those of the Soviet Union. This amendment led in SALT II to two years of difficult negotiations to achieve equal aggregates without compensation for US forward-based systems, the so-called FBS issue.

Continued congressional interest in SALT was demonstrated following the Vladivostok Accord, which documented agreement on equal aggregates. Though an Executive Agreement and, therefore, not subject to congressional approval, the accord was blessed by supportive resolutions in both the House and the Senate, an act which reminded the Administration that Congress had a role, sanctioned by the Arms Control Act, in any agreement limiting US arms.

An expanding role in the negotiations culminated in 1977 in the naming of all Senators and 46 Representatives as official Congressional Advisors to the US delegation. This move was approved by President Carter over the strong objection of his National Security Advisor, who argued that congressional involvement in the negotiations impinged on the principle of separation of powers, and, in any event, would further complicate an already complex operation. The winning argument posited that bringing the Congress in early would facilitate the ratification process. From the perspective of travel-hungry congressmen, the program was a magnificent success. Some 74 "advisors" visited the delegation in Geneva and got to "negotiate" with the Russians. From the delegation viewpoint, the program was, at best, a nuisance, since many of the visitors "negotiated" without benefit of instructions or knowledge of the US position, and a few ignored solicitations about protection of intelligence infor-

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mation and sources. Entertaining lawmakers was also costly and time-consuming to delegation members working 12 to 14 hours a day.

With the demise of the SALT II Treaty, congressional interest in arms control matters waned perceptibly, as did the requirement for frequent and exhaustive briefings. More recent events have rekindled congressional concerns with respect to arms control.

Unlike the evolutionary process which characterized development of IC relationships with the Executive Branch and with internal IC organization for arms control support, the state of the relationship between the IC and Congress has usually been transient and sometimes volatile. In general, the relationship is influenced by the rapport, or lack thereof, between the DCI and the congressional leadership, particularly the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations and, above all, the Oversight Committees. In this respect, the DCI, whose first loyalty must be to the President he serves, can be aided by an experienced and professional liaison staff, and in the arms control area by an IC spokesman who has established a mutually beneficial rapport with staff chiefs and principal staffers for the congressional "movers and shakers" in the national security area.

On specific issues, however, even a well established relationship can be strained in circumstances where Administration policy is perceived to be in conflict with intelligence assessments or particularly when an unpopular Administration policy action is supported by IC judgments (or actions). The important thing in these circumstances is not to let a short-term, volatile situation damage the long-term relationship. This is best accomplished by observing the principal tenets developed for dealing with the Executive Branch; i.e., providing a quality product objectively and dispassionately, and refraining from discussing the policy aspect of matters devoid of intelligence equities. It is also important that IC spokesmen are deemed to have the confidence and trust of the DCI, and to be accurately representing his views.

Finally, in dealing with Congress, it is extremely important that IC representatives be thoroughly versed in substance, acutely aware of the policy implications of the information they are providing, and deft in "dancing" around difficult or loaded questions without appearing to be unresponsive or evasive. This requires a good deal of experience in thinking on one's feet, and thorough preparation. It is usually not difficult to identify "dicey" areas and to prepare answers in advance on a contingency basis. Rehearsals can also help in this respect. Most presidential appointees are rehearsed exhaustively prior to being subjected to the adversarial process associated with confirmation hearings. A cardinal rule is to reply to questions succinctly and without embellishment—and above all, not to volunteer information. While testimony of IC representatives before Congress is not normally regarded as adversarial, at least in theory, I personally found it useful to view it in this light when preparing for appearances on the Hill.

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ATTACHMENT 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

National Security Act of 1947

1. Provides for a National Security Council - Title I Section 101.
2. Provides for a CIA - Title I Section 102.
   a. Places it under the NSC.
   b. Authorizes DCI to form advisory committees (e.g., NFIB).
3. Provides for Congressional Oversight - Title V Section 501.
   a. DCI and other IC heads to keep SSCI and HPSCI "fully and currently informed" (preserves existence of these committees).
   b. President and Intelligence Committees to establish procedures. House and Senate, in consultation with DCI, establish procedures to protect against unauthorized disclosures.

Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949

1. Provides for Administration of CIA.

Executive Order 12333 December 1981

1. Identifies NSC as highest Executive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance for, and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and special activities, and attendant policies and programs.
2. Authorizes NSC to establish such committees as necessary to carry out its functions (e.g., IGs and SIGs).
3. Charges DCI with:
   a. Acting as primary advisor to President and NSC on National Foreign Intelligence.
   b. Establishing committees or advisory groups.
   c. Full responsibility for production and dissemination of National Foreign Intelligence.
   d. Authority to levy analytic tasks on departmental intelligence production organizations "ensuring that appropriate mechanisms for competitive analysis are developed so that diverse points of view are considered fully and differences of judgment within the IC are brought to the attention of national policymakers."
4. Provides for cooperation with Congress in performing its oversight responsibilities as provided in National Security Act of 1947.
   a. Procedures to be issued by DCI, implemented by IC component heads, and approved by Attorney General. NSC decides if Agency and A.G. are at loggerheads.

Presidential Decision Memos

1. Set up NSC network for conducting national security deliberations (e.g., IGs and SIGs).

Senate Resolution 400

1. Establishes a Select Committee on Intelligence to:
   a. Oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the US Government, and to submit to the Senate appropriate proposals for legislation and report to the Senate concerning such intelligence activities and programs.

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b. Make every effort to assure that the appropriate departments and agencies of the US provide informed and timely intelligence necessary for the Executive and Legislative Branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and vital interests of the nation.

c. Provide vigilant legislative oversight over intelligence activities of the US to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the US.

2. Requires that the Head of any agency or department involved in intelligence activities:

a. Keep the Select Committee fully and currently informed with respect to intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated activities, which are the responsibility of, or engaged in, by such department or agency (e.g., evidence of violations; changes in monitoring capabilities).

b. Furnish any information or documentation in the possession, custody, or control of that department or agency, or person paid by that agency or department, whenever requested by the Select Committee with respect to any matter within such committee's jurisdiction.

Rule XLVIII of the House of Representatives

1. Establishes a Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to:

a. Review all proposed legislation, messages, editorials, petitions, and other matters relating to the CIA, the DCI and other agencies comprising the intelligence community.

b. Review authorizations for appropriations for IC organizations and activities.

2. Establishes the right of other House Committees to:

a. Study or review any intelligence or intelligence-related activity to the extent that such activity directly affects a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee.

b. Obtain full and prompt access to the product of intelligence and intelligence-related activities of any department or agency of the government relevant to a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee.

Arms Control Act of 1961

1. Article 37 (Derwinski Amendment) requires the Director, ACDA, in order to insure that arms control proposals made or accepted by the US can be adequately verified, to report to the Congress on a timely basis, or upon request:

a. The degree to which proposals are adequately verifiable by NTM.

b. In the case of existing arms control agreements, any significant degradation or alteration in the capacity of the US to verify the various components of such agreement or treaty.

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ATTACHMENT 2

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Unit	Statutory Basis	By Whom Implemented	How Implemented
NSC	National Security Act	President	Executive Order
Interdepartmental Groups (IGs, SIGs, etc)	Executive Order	President	Presidential Decision Memorandum
CIA (and departmental components)	National Security Act of 1947	Congress President	CIA Act of 1949; Executive Order
Intelligence Community (IC)	Executive Order	DCI	DCI Directives
NFIB (USIB)	Executive Order	DCI	DCI Directives
JAEIC/WSSIC & Working Groups	Executive Order	DCI	NFIB Menorandum
DCI Steering Group/ Monitoring Working Groups	Executive Order	DCI	NFIB Memorandum
Senate Select Committee (SSCI)	National Security Act of 1947 (Amendment)	Senate	Senate Resolution 400
House Select Committee (HPSCI)	National Security Act of 1947 (Amendment)	House	Rule XLVIII of the HR

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ATTACHMENT 3

TASKING STRUCTURE [1]

Key Tasks	Source of Tasking	How Response	By Whom Implemented
Information on Soviet Forces Subject to Limitation	NSC State DOD Self-generated	NIEs,SNIEs, IMs, IIMs, etc	DCI
Monitoring Studies	NSC ACDA (Sec 37, Arms Control Act)	Memoranda, IMs IIMs	DCI
Changes in Monitoring Capabilities	ACDA (Sec 37, Arms Control Act) SSCI (SR 400, Sec 11a)	Memoranda SALT Monitoring Report	DCI
Compliance Analysis	NSC SSCI (SR 400, Sec 11a)[2]	Memoranda Salt Monitoring Report	DCI
Support to Congress	National Security Act of 1947 Senate Resolution 400; HR Rule XLVIII	Memoranda Reports Briefings	DCI [3]

[1] It is significant to note, as depicted on this chart, that tasking is generated by requirements of Executive Branch agencies either directly through the NSC mechanism, or self-generated by the IC in anticipation of a requirement. The manner in which the response is implemented, including the vehicle, has been and is the prerogative of the DCI subject to the approval of the NSC. Thus, internal IC organization for arms control support to the Executive Branch, and the publications associated with this support, have all been initiated within the IC.

[2] The SSCI is briefed on the intelligence aspects of compliance issues and furnished a copy of the *SALT Monitoring Report*. It does not receive copies of ad hoc reports on individual compliance issues prepared by the IC for policy consideration.

[3] There have been occasions when the President or his National Security Advisor have required clearance (or at least consultation) with the White House prior to furnishing information to Congress. One example in the arms control area was the furnishing of materials to the House Pike Committee in 1975. All materials, once sanitized by the IC, were furnished to the committee after review by the NSC Staff.

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TITLE: Files of the OSS

AUTHOR: Gerald L. Liebenau

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The tangled route of going public

FILES OF THE OSS

Gerald L. Liebenau

> Correspondence and reports related to the Special Forces that were infiltrated behind enemy lines. There are 82 reports on the JEDBURGH teams that describe their mission and the personnel involved. Included is an account of the communications operations in Italy, commo administration in Europe, history of the OSS Detachment 101, and a communications war diary of the Far East and Europe. Covers the period June 1944-October 1944. Arranged chronologically and by team names.[1]

This passage describes "item 17," a small segment of the approximately 3,000 cubic feet of files of the former Office of Strategic Services (OSS). These records are the last major repository of material concerning America's intelligence activities in World War II. After much negotation and deliberation this material is now being transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) for public release. When the move is completed, in 1986, the material should prove a rich lode of information for the scholar, historian, or just plain curious who seek information about this momentous chapter in our nation's past.*

The history of these files and the events that led to the decision to make them available to the public begin shortly after World War II. On 20 September 1945, President Truman issued Executive Order 9621 which included instructions that, effective on 1 October 1945, certain research and analysis functions of OSS would be transferred to the State Department, and that all other OSS functions "together with all (other) personnel, records, property, and funds" were to be transferred from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the War Department.[2]

On 29 January 1946, the Secretary of War issued two directives which included instructions that records required by the Director of Central Intelligence were to be transferred to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and placed under the operational control of the Director of Central Intelligence. Thus began the long and roundabout route via two "caretaker" organizations, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), that eventually led to CIA's control of the OSS operational records.[2] The records of the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS were transferred to NARA

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[1] "Request for Records Disposition Authority," dated 11 April 1979.

[2] Memorandum for Brigadier General John Magruder from the Secretary of War, dated 27 September 1945 and cited in a Memorandum for Chief, IMS, from A. R. Cinquegrana, Assistant Counsel, Subject: The OSS Records.

* For an example of how the OSS files are serving as source material for articles in the public domain, see "The Organization Spook" following this account.

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by the Department of State between 1946 and 1951. They were not made available to the public for about another decade.[3]

Clearly, of that large volume of records that eventually was transferred to CIA, only a portion would be regarded by NARA as qualifying for permanent retention. Also, certain administrative matters relating to the OSS would require continued processing so that some records, such as the OSS personnel files, would continue to remain with CIA. In order to establish the disposition of the OSS records, NARA undertook an appraisal of this material which was completed on 16 April 1979. As a result, NARA determined that of 6,500 cubic feet of the OSS, SSU, and CIG files which by then had come into the custody of the Directorate of Operations, approximately 3,300 cubic feet were designated as permanent records for eventual transfer to NARA.[4]

Pursuant to Presidential Executive Order 11652, 8 March 1972, which articulated the principle that government information must be made readily available to the public, excepting that information held to be still properly classified or, for other reasons specifically stated in law, to be exempt from disclosure, a systematic review of OSS records for possible declassification was begun the following year.[5] The project under which this review took place originally employed three CIA annuitants, formerly senior operations officers whose careers had begun in OSS. Over the succeeding 10 years, that number grew to fifteen analysts. The team completed its task in September 1982. An initial transfer of 198 cubic feet of OSS files had already taken place in 1979.[5]

The variety of topics in the files of the OSS can be measured to some degree by summarizing merely that initial increment of 198 cubic feet transferred to NARA. The bulk of this material falls into several series, of which the History Office files, 1941-1945, and the records of the Foreign Nationalities Branch, 1941-1946, comprise half. The remainder of this increment consists of administrative records, 1943-1945; the war diaries of the London Field Office, 1942-1945; records relating to Secret Intelligence Operations, 1942-1945; the Operation Group command file, 1942-1945; and scattered records of the Office of the Director, 1942-1945.[6]

The material that continues to be classified in these documents concerns information provided to the OSS by foreign governments and information that would reveal the identity of persons who provided intelligence or who assisted OSS teams during their operations behind enemy lines. In some cases, these latter were individuals who sheltered OSS agents, gave medical assistance, or smuggled information from an incarcerated OSS agent to the allies. Their names are contained in OSS records, but their current situation is unknown. Some might appreciate the credit that would be theirs for having supported

[3] From Edwin A. Thompson, Director, Records Declassification Division, National Archives in a phone conversation on 14 November 1984.

[4] Appraisal Report on Disposition of Records, dated 16 April 1979.

[5] Letter from Director James R. Schlesinger to Dr. James B. Rhoads, Archivist of the US, dated 16 March 1973.

[6] NARA Newsletter, June 1984.

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the Americans. Others might still fear for their safety if their cooperation were revealed.

The initial transfer of the 198 cubic feet of records also posed some immediate problems that would require several more years to be resolved. With that shipment of files, CIA imposed two conditions that had to be met before any of these records could be released by NARA to the public. The first required that foreign government information must be afforded protection and that it should not be released without the prior approval of the government involved. The second stated that "(i)n keeping with the provisions of the Privacy Act, information concerning the affiliation of US persons with OSS may not be released without the consent of the person involved."[7]

The condition relating to the names of OSS personnel, which was believed to have been required by the Privacy Act, created considerable confusion. For some time, that provision was interpreted to apply only to those OSS officers who subsequent to their wartime service joined CIA under cover. It was believed that the release of these names could compromise an individual's career with the Agency. Several years later it was determined that an attempt to protect certain former OSS personnel by deleting their names from records could, under certain circumstances, be more damaging to them than to list those names along with those with whom they served.

Another concern raised with regard to the OSS records and that still remains a NARA problem: the impact on US foreign relations of revealing certain OSS operations, and relations with certain former wartime allies for whom the major issues from that period remain extant. Such concerns along with the conditions under which these records were to be transferred from CIA created an impasse with NARA that kept the material already at NARA from being made public, and also stopped the transfer to NARA of any of the remaining OSS records still at CIA.

Curiously, the OSS files might have remained in this uncertain state for many more years had it not been for protracted negotiations between CIA and Congress in the late 1970s and early 1980s over the passage of a bill to relieve the Agency from having to search and review certain categories of designated operational files under the Freedom of Information Act. The bill, which became the Intelligence Information Act of 1983, was signed into law by President Reagan on 15 October 1984.

During various congressional hearings in connection with this bill, historians expressed their belief that the OSS files contain information of historical importance and their fear that they may never be made public if they are to be designated by the Director of Central Intelligence for exclusion from search and review under the FOIA. Professor Anna Nelson of George Washington University, speaking on behalf of the major associations of historians, noted that permanent designation could result in important material never being made available to the public. She was joined in her views by General Richard

[7] Attachment to Standard Form 258, NN 3-226-79-1, Request to Transfer, Approval, and Receipt of Records to National Archives of the United States, dated 21 August 1979.

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Larkin, president of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, who stated that historical research and writing on the role of intelligence in American history was of "tremendous value in our educational system as well as in our political system."[8]

In June 1983, during a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), the question of access to historical files was raised with John H. Stein, then Deputy Director for Operations. In a subsequent letter to Chairman Senator Barry Goldwater, dated 28 June 1983, Stein confirmed his statements before the committee that "I want to assure you that I do not intend to ask the Director to designate OSS files as falling in the category of files which would be exempt under the new bill."[9] This was a message of reassurance that was eagerly sought by all those who regard the OSS files as of historical value.

Discussions with the Agency on the matter of the OSS records also were initiated by SSCI member Senator Dave Durenberger. Again the concern was the availability of the OSS records to the public. In a letter, dated 4 October 1983, Director William J. Casey informed Senator Durenberger that: "Several weeks ago, on my own initiative, I had requested the Historian of the CIA to explore a program that would result in the release of usable historical materials from the World War II period." Thus, at the Director's urging, Dr. J. Kenneth MacDonald, Chief, History Staff, began the transfer process.

The issue of privacy as it might relate to the Privacy Act, and which appeared to have been a problem earlier, was addressed in a written opinion by the General Counsel. It concluded that "(a)bsent classification, nothing in the FOIA or the Privacy Act justifies protection of the names of former OSS members."[10]

That question, however, did not rest there. Given the wartime conditions under which OSS personnel operated, it was quite possible that information about their activities could still cause harm to them or to their families. Therefore, in negotiating a memorandum of understanding with NARA under which the OSS records could be released to the public, the protection of ". . . information about a living individual which reveal details of a highly personal nature that the individual could reasonably assert a claim to withhold from the public" was incorporated in that agreement.[11] NARA now shares the responsibility for ensuring that such information would not be released. NARA also accepted as part of its responsibility in receiving these records the protection of information from foreign governments, or information that might still cause international repercussions.

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[8] Intelligence Information Act of 1983, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, page 17.

[9] Letter from John H. Stein, Deputy Director for Operations to the Honorable Barry Goldwater, Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, US Senate, dated 28 June 1983.

[10] OGC 83-10345, dated 20 December 1983 from Stanley Sporkin, General Counsel, to the Executive Director, Subject: Release of Declassified OSS Records to the National Archives.

[11] Memorandum of Understanding Between the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Archives and Records Service, dated 5 June 1984.

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Having thus attained an agreement on the OSS records with NARA, the Directorate of Operations began the transfer of the files. In the process, every box of records would be checked again to ensure that classified information had been removed, and to record each document as having been released from CIA's control.

While it may still be some time before the public can gain access to all of this material, at long last the tangled route that the OSS records had traveled is coming to an end. While this closes one chapter in the life of these records, it will open a new one in the history of intelligence.

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TITLE: The Predicament of the Terrorism Analyst

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THE PREDICAMENT OF THE TERRORISM ANALYST

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The second labor enjoined on Hercules by King Eurystheus was to slay the Argossian Hydra, a nine-headed dragon that terrorized the countryside. Despite his massive strength and skill with arms, the demigod found this no mean task: whenever he managed to strike off one of the monster's rapidly moving heads, the Hydra grew two in its place. Nearly exhausted, Hercules finally overcame his foe by using a torch to burn away all but the one head which was immortal. This still living head he buried deep in the ground.

The challenge facing intelligence officers seeking to analyze terrorism is not unlike the one Hercules had to confront.[1] As a phenomenon, terrorism is hard to define in a fashion that permits analysts to divide their labor and focus their efforts efficiently. As intelligence targets, terrorist groups offer poor and very sparse grist for the analytic mill. Like the Hydra, terrorist groups are in a constant state of transformation: once the analyst thinks he has mastered one group, it vanishes, and two others have appeared in its place. And, to make matters even more complex, the concerns as well as conceptions of the policy consumers of terrorism intelligence are particularly prone to complicating the manner in which analysts of the subject do their jobs.

In fairness, terrorism is relatively new as a priority topic for the intelligence community—one that until the mid-1970s was commonly regarded as largely the province of either researchers in abnormal psychology or the handful of Central Intelligence Agency operations officers who had been dragooned into police liaison duties. In spite of the increasing rate and intensity of attacks against US and other Western targets during the 1970s, the situation changed very slowly. By 1980, for example, CIA was among the few US intelligence agencies to have a distinct unit devoted—at least half of it was devoted—to in-depth analysis of terrorism, and this small group of analysts initially spent much of its time compiling a historical chronology of terrorist incidents and attempting to discern and draw inferences from past trends in terrorism. The intelligence community regarded terrorism as a low priority issue and, in consequence, a good deal of its analysis of terrorism, while valuable in understanding the history of the phenomenon, had limited relevance either to the problem at hand or to the needs of policymakers and field officers who were trying to deal with it.

Things began to change very rapidly thereafter, in large part because of pressure from a new administration more sensitized to terrorism than its predecessor, from incoming DCI William Casey, and from a growing number of

[1] Officers engaged in collection and special operations, of course, face a similar challenge. Indeed, one could argue that much of the US Government's current frustration with its inability to combat terrorism flows from a feeling of futility in the face of an enemy which is so difficult to engage and contain.

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operations officers and analysts who were dismayed by the successes the purveyors of terror seemed to be enjoying. By 1983 when President Reagan was preparing to sign NSDD 138, "Combatting Terrorism," CIA's analytic effort had risen to more (b)(3)(c) terrorism analysts and support personnel along with an equal number of regional political and military analysts who were spending some of their time on terrorist issues; in the community at large, there remained virtually no intelligence agency or component that did not have at least a small terrorism analysis section. Collection efforts and related field activities had also grown apace.

As the commitment and resources dedicated to the task of analyzing the terrorist threat have grown, so too has the frustration. What is now nearly a decade of concentrated analytic activity at CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and numerous other military and civilian agencies has yet to yield any of the kind of breakthroughs that have become commonplace on other analytic issues ranging from denied area oil supplies and agricultural production to ICBM deployment and the Kremlin succession. Terrorism analysis sports no nifty methodology or forward looking predictive techniques. Despite some of the best efforts of the community, terrorism analysts remain—as were their predecessors in the 1970s—best able to explain what happened as opposed to what might happen and how it might be countered. Good intentions aside, our analysis is still far from supporting adequately a pro-active counterterrorism program.

Why is this still so, and can—or should—we expect better?

The Definitional Morass

The first problem confronting any analyst is a fundamental one: defining the nature and bounds of the phenomenon he is trying to analyze. In the case of terrorism, this is no easy chore; if it were, virtually every book or treatise written on the subject over the past 20 years would not begin with a chapter on definitions. The fact is that like pornography, terrorism means different things to different people. According to the US Code (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, for example), any violent political act abroad that would be considered a crime if committed in the United States meets the criteria. Some authors like Ray Cline and Claire Sterling, who are concerned with the growth of Soviet-sponsored subversive activities around the world, choose to view insurgent and guerrilla operations as well as support activities like smuggling and gun running as part and parcel of the terrorism problem. Conversely, other students of the phenomenon—like Walter Laqueur, Brian Jenkins, and Martha Crenshaw—tend to favor narrower constructions, specifying the need for civilian victims, a demonstration effect, and the like. By and large, most of these definitions are neither right nor wrong: rather they tend to reflect the value judgments, professional backgrounds, and world views of their proponents.

Many policymakers have an insatiable appetite for statistics about international terrorism. They want to know the "who-what-where-when," of course, but especially the elusive and elastic "how many"—and "was that more or fewer than before." To answer such questions, the CIA maintains a terrorist incident data base. Since the data base serves a large body of consumers who do not agree on exactly what terrorism is, the Agency has adopted a rather ungainly but

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determinedly middle-of-the-road definition, one that includes the bulk of what most people think is terrorism while excluding the marginal and the controversial:

> "Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatants by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually to impress or intimidate a target audience."

The need to make our data base reliable—that is, consistent over time no matter who is feeding it—has led the CIA framers to sacrifice elegance for explicitness. That is what is wrong with even this definition as well as with some of the alternatives. Terrorism is not really so easily or neatly bounded. To be sure, such a definition can identify perhaps six or seven of the terrorist Hydra's heads (and, to its credit, they are all Hydra heads and not, say, Griffin heads), but inevitably it will miss a few in the back. For example, as any Libya watcher will argue, the Qadhafi regime's lamentably routine assassination of a "stray dog" (a dissident Libyan emigre) does not differ in any essential way from the incident last year in which an official inside the Libyan People's Bureau in London shot at the crowd demonstrating out in front, killing a British policewoman. Yet under a rigorous application of the CIA's definition, the first incident is terrorism, the second probably not.

But a vaguer definition is no solution. That merely leads Hercules to dissipate his strength flailing away at Griffins and Orcs and other mythical animals when he ought to be concentrating on the Hydra. Not all violence is political; and not all political violence is terrorism. Not everything a guerrilla

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does (even a communist guerrilla) is terrorism; indeed, not everything a terrorist does is terrorism. A failure to establish and abide by distinctions between terrorism and other forms of subversion or societal violence results in the creation of an analytical amoeba that won't hold its shape long enough for anybody to analyze it.

Part of the reason for the problem is that terrorism is not a monolithic movement but instead a tactic, and a tactic that any group can use to further its objectives. The practitioners of terrorism vary from region to region and issue to issue. In Western Europe, terrorism tends to come either from small radical, often anarchistic groups like Action Directe in France and the Red Army Faction in West Germany or else from larger, intensely nationalistic separatist or irredentist movements like the Basques in Spain or the Provos in Ireland. In the Middle East, terrorism proceeds on a far grander scale, one that is colored strongly by the zealotry of Shiism and the religious animosity of Palestinian for Israeli, all fueled by a heavy dose of state support from countries like Iran and Syria and by the continual internecine strife within the Palestinian movement itself. In Latin America, Asia, and Africa, terrorism is frequently hard to distinguish from banditry and the perennial social violence of less developed states. It occurs most often as an outgrowth of insurgency, with a group adopting terrorism as a temporary tactic until it gains enough momentum to challenge the regime militarily. Around the world, a few groups—notably the Armenian ASALA and Justice Commandos—seem motivated not by politics or economics but rather by the spirit of vendetta which drives them to take vengeance on some historic antagonist wherever they might find him. Most of these users of terrorism have little in common save their tactics. Some are independent states like Libya, others are cells of fewer than a dozen sociopathic bomb throwers. Some come from the Right, some come from the Left, and some cannot articulate a coherent political philosophy much less a feasible agenda for political change. For most groups, terrorism is but one arrow in their quivers; for perhaps a score of groups, terrorism is about all they do. Many terrorists are no more than low-grade criminals, but a few are near-geniuses with advanced degrees from the best universities.

All this contributes to the difficulty of analyzing terrorism. First, rather than being able to focus on a single, discrete phenomenon, terrorism analysts need to master not only the particular operating styles of the groups which they are studying but also the regional political, military, and social contexts in which those operations take place. The analyst of Palestinian terrorism, for example, needs to know as much about Israel, Syria, and Jordan as he does about Fatah and the Abu Nidal Group—and this poses a considerable burden in terms of training to be taken, mail to be read, and counterparts to be consulted. It also means that it takes a long time to "grow" a good terrorism analyst. Second, terrorism analysts face a special dilemma: if they define their subject too narrowly, they risk being left with little finished intelligence to write or brief that is relevant to policy concerns. But as they define their subject more broadly, they will intrude upon the turf of regional political and military analysts where they are often not welcome. This, then, is the boundary problem.

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The Data Desert

Even when a community agency manages to recruit and develop a competent terrorism analyst and to define a clearly bounded area for him to analyze and report, that analyst often runs headfirst into a wasteland marked by the near absence of relevant data, for terrorist groups leave few tracks. A Soviet analyst, for example, may frequently bemoan how little data there are to support his judgments, but he is in far better shape than his terrorism counterpart. The Soviet specialist knows precisely where the USSR is and he knows in some detail: the disposition of most Soviet forces;

(b)(3)(n)

The terrorism analyst is less fortunate. Terrorist groups are among the hardest targets for intelligence collection and, hence, for analysis.

- Most terrorist groups are small. Though terrorist groups sometimes possess sizable bodies of supporters and sympathizers, their actual membership—that is, the people who throw the bombs and shoot the Skorpians—

(b)(1)

- These small terrorist groups tend to be tightly knit and politically and ethnically homogeneous. In Europe, for example, the leadership and fighting cadres of the most troublesome of the leftwing anarchistic groups like the Red Army Faction in Germany, the CCC in Belgium, Action Directe in France, and the Red Brigades in Italy are, generally speaking, individuals of similar backgrounds with intellectual and sometimes personal ties that go back to the student anti-war protests of the 1960s. In the Middle East, the anti-US terrorist groups doing the most damage are manned by individuals from the same religious sect, often the same village, and occasionally even the same family. These are individuals who have known each other very well for a long time.

(b)(1)

- The operational life of the typical terrorist group is usually short, The RAF in Germany, which has operated in one form or another since the early 1970s for instance, is a model of the longevity few other groups experience. More commonly a group will rise to prominence with a few nasty attacks

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one year, only to vanish from our scopes by the next. Several years later, an organization with the same sobriquet and grievances might again appear—but typically with different members and sometimes with a new modus operandi. Except for a handful of leaders—Abu Nidal, Carlos, and Abu Ibrahim, to name three—the typical terrorist's business life is similarly brief. Various studies done of European terrorists, for example, have indicated that affiliation with a terrorist group—whether terminated by death, arrest, or boredom—is usually a matter of a few years.

- Terrorist groups seldom operate from fixed facilities. They train in attics, basements, and hotel rooms. Their training is rudimentary. Few active terrorists benefit even from the kind of paramilitary instruction the USSR and other bloc countries offer to Third World insurgent groups with the proper idealogical credentials. Moreover, terrorists communicate mainly by word of mouth, by courier, or by commercial telephone. Seldom do they use the kind of sophisticated electronic devices available to a diplomatic service or an army in the field. Their equipment and munitions are typically either stolen from host military and police stores or purchased on the "grey market." Even their bombs usually consist of components that could be easily procured at a US hardware store or stolen from a commercial construction company.[2]

(b)(3)(n)

Open source material is often helpful, but it is usually out of date and sometimes full of errors. Consequently, our major source of data on terrorist groups is HUMINT, and even that is spotty

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In other words, the terrorism analyst usually suffers from a terrible paucity of reliable and timely data about the group he is studying. Most of the information he does have has come from a single kind of source—HUMINT (b)(3)(n) —and is not readily subject to confirmation or even much

[2] One senior CIA analyst refers to these as "Hechinger bombs." There is little question among bomb experts, however, that the quantum advances in electronic technology over the past two decades—most of which are available to the civilian market either directly or with minimum subterfuge—are leading to increasing sophistication in terrorist explosives capabilities. Fortunately, such improvised devices (especially the complicated ones) often fail to detonate—or else detonate prematurely, taking out the terrorist instead of his target.

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more than the most coarse credibility checks. If the terrorist group is a new one, as so many are, it will also lack the kind of track record that the analyst could use to help project the group's future activities. Thus, the terrorism analyst will seldom have the opportunity to do what a "headquarters analyst" is supposed to do: provide an integrated all-source and empirically grounded perspective on what is going on and what it means. Instead he often becomes no more than a current intelligence reporter, who adds a bit of political and military context to the generally meager substance of incoming cable traffic and then passes it on to the the policy consumer, with luck ahead of the media.

Even in this role, the intelligence officer analyzing terrorism is often at a disadvantage to a newspaper or magazine reporter. Unlike the journalist, the terrorism analyst cannot cultivate or interview his own sources but must make do with what the field collector sends and reports officers disseminates.

The information most demanded of a terrorism analyst is where the terrorist will strike next. Alas, the terrorism analyst rarely can make such a prediction because he so often lacks the information—both past and present—about his target.[3] Furthermore, terrorists tend to select the path of least resistance, and attack the target of greatest opportunity. Theirs is the initiative: they can strike when they like and how they like at whom they like. If, as a consequence of an analyst's or field officer's warning, the US Embassy is too well guarded, they can attack the bi-national center instead. Absent a specific accurate report from an unusually well-placed source or a fortuitious snippet of COMINT, the best a terrorism analyst usually can do is characterize the threat environment in a given location.

Many of these liabilities do not apply as strongly to analysis of state-sponsored terrorism. When a state is involved, we can bring into play a broader assortment of collection systems because the target is known and fixed. Even so, countries like Iran, Syria, and Libya are denied areas for US information collectors, and liaison relationships are out of the question. (b)(3)(n) Moreover, terrorist groups affiliated with these countries—such as Hizballah is with Iran—tend to operate semi-autonomously and the linkages and responsibility are deliberately blurred. Indeed this is one of the reasons states use terrorist groups as surrogates. In consequence, the landscape for information on state supported terrorism is often a barren one as well.

Policy Complication

One advantage intelligence analysts often have when dealing with consumers of their product is that the preponderance of substantive expertise lies on their side. Terrorism is a painful exception. The consumer—whether a policymaker in Washington or a general, ambassador, or chief of station in the field—typically thinks he knows as much as the analyst about the nature of the threat. Indeed, sometimes he does because of the data problem described above,

[3] Sam Adams, the Vietnam order-of-battle specialist, when asked by an interviewer about what made a good analyst, replied, "Good files." This of course is exactly what the terrorism analyst has usually lacked.

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but often this understanding has been shaped by preconceptions of who the terrorist is and what he does.

Specifically the term terrorism has increasingly become degraded through misuse and overuse by the media and the public at large and is now little more than a pejorative expression denoting almost any sort of illegitimate violence committed by objectional persons in pursuit of unacceptable ends. Consequently, in the popular mind, the Soviets, Cubans, North Koreans, Sandanistas, and PLO—along with, of course, Carlos, Arafat, Abu Nidal and their ilk—are all terrorists or state supporters of terrorism. Similarly, the "Contras," the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, and Israeli commandos are freedom fighters—albeit ones whose bombs may have occasionally gone off in ill-advised places. Iran, Syria, Libya, and the communist bloc are the major purveyors of terrorism; the United States, Great Britain, Israel, and France support the maintenance of democracy and law and order around the world. While this might make for good—and not necessarily incorrect—political rhetoric, it obscures the fact that terrorist tactics are used by many groups and countries for a broad range of purposes. Worse, it limits the ability of the analyst to communicate with his audience on many aspects of this complex problem or to supply analysis that supports decisionmaking rather than ex post facto justifications of policies.

Virtually all of the states, groups, and individuals mentioned above have at one time or another either committed or supported another party who committed an act that meets our definition of what terrorism is. The differences among them—and these are substantial—are a matter of intent and frequency rather than of style. Certainly, neither the United States nor Great Britain—nor for that matter France or Israel—supports the use of terrorism as a tool of state policy or condones its use by allied countries or friendly groups. The same cannot be said for the others, but even among these "bad guys" the degrees of use of terrorism and the motivations for doing so vary considerably. In short, not every violent act of a country or group hostile to the United States or our allies is an act of terrorism, and not all acts of terrorism are committed by terrorists.

Every year, collectors and analysts spend thousands of hours trying to divine the nature and extent of Soviet (or Nicaraguan or Cuban or North Korean—feel free to insert the name of your favorite hostile state) involvement in terrorism. And quite often, the answer comes up something like the following: "Though the Soviets (or whoever) support leftwing revolutionary groups with arms and training, there is little or no evidence to indicate they actively direct or participate in international terrorist acts against the United States or its NATO allies." Frequently, the consumer is not pleased with this answer. What he wanted was not analysis but rather evidence to confirm his conviction that a particular malefactor is, along with his other crimes, also engaged in terrorism. When no such evidence is found or when the evidence indicates only limited or fringe involvement, the consumer may reject the analyst's conclusions or assume that the collectors have just not looked hard enough.

A similar mechanism causes many consumers to worry about "high-tech" terrorism as well as "narcoterrorism"—essentially nonexistent phenomena that are often discussed as if they were real or, at any rate, right around the corner.

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Because terrorists are, by definition, bad, it is obviously just a matter of time before they either acquire the ultimate means of destruction or else join forces with narcotics traffickers—or so this train of seductive reasoning usually goes.

None of this is to suggest that the Soviets are never involved in terrorism—at the minimum, they certainly complicate the problem in a variety of ways and do occasionally attempt to manipulate groups where it meets their tactical ends—or that some day or somewhere a terrorist group might not get hold of a fissionable or fusionable device or else deal in illicit drugs. Though analysts and collectors need to keep closely attuned to any possible new development on all three scores, these issues are not at the core of what most modern terrorism is all about. Trying to produce intelligence on something that is, generally speaking, not there simply diverts resources away from production that might help policymakers get a little closer to understanding and solving the current terrorism problem. Moreover, the assumption that terrorism is something only evil people do not only cramps the analysis but limits the receptiveness of consumers to information about occasional "pro-Western" violence which can serve as a catalyst—or at least a pretext—for an anti-Western terrorist response. Like any other kind of good analyst, the terrorism analyst must avoid value judgments in selecting his data and making his assessments: he needs to be able to tell the story straight, and then let the policymaker decide what the next step should be. To the extent the word "terrorism" takes on a politicized connotation, this becomes an increasingly difficult and frustrating task for the analyst.

Where Next?

There are no simple solutions to the difficulties terrorism intelligence analysts face, although a better understanding by consumers and senior intelligence managers of the basic problems associated with this issue would go a long way to easing the analysts' frustration. In particular, a few final points seem pertinent.

First, the role of headquarters analysis in counterterrorism will often be rather limited because of the highly tactical nature of the problem. The principal counterterrorism objective of the United States Government is to cause the terrorist to cease and desist from acts that might harm US citizens or interests. Failing this, the government wants to take action to cause the attack to fail or warn the target before damage is done. Given the rapidly shifting nature of the terrorist target, intelligence analysis that supports these goals will most often have to be situationally relevant, very specific, and rapidly delivered. By the same token, however, the analyst will be hard pressed to supply much information that the clandestine collector cannot provide. Not even elegant artificial intelligence programs or state of the art methodologies will answer most of the basic questions that are central to putting terrorists out of business if the data to make these work are absent or cannot be gathered in time. In the case of terrorism intelligence, the target often does not stay stuck long enough or assume sufficiently high visibility to permit collection from multiple sources over an extended period of time and the analyst will frequently not be in a position to provide the kind of unique contribution which he can in other issue areas. In many instances, too, the main role of the collector and analyst will amount

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simply to finding out where the terrorist is so that the authorities can take direct action.[4]

Second, the terrorism analyst and the terrorism intelligence collector must work exceptionally closely with one another. Raw intelligence collection on terrorism gets stale fast, tends to be gathered in fragments, and is difficult to report formally. If analysts and human source collectors do not interact daily to share information, the analyst will be skunked. Over the past two years at CIA, increasing progress has been made by putting these two different breeds of intelligence officers in close proximity to one another—and the arrangement is working well and must continue.

Third, the community must avoid defining the terrorism problem so narrowly as to include only the technical elements of a typical terrorist's modus operandi or, conversely, so broadly as to include practically any type of political and social violence. In the former case, there is little opportunity for the terrorism analyst to make a contribution to the policy process. In the latter, his contribution will be neither unique nor welcomed by the larger corps of regional analysts, on whose toes he will be stepping. Terrorism analysts, to be the most effective, need to live somewhere in the middle, able simultaneously to understand the peculiar style of terrorist group operations and to assess those operations in their proper sociopolitical and security contexts.

Fourth, we must be realistic about the terrorism problem itself. Our fervent concern to do something to make the terrorist threat abate must not lead professional intelligence officers to confuse activity with productivity. Much of the terrorism that occurs around the world is little more than low grade criminal activity, albeit with political ramifications. We must recognize that much of it represents only a marginal threat to the United States. There is going to be very little US policymakers can do about it in many cases. What is more, a good deal of terrorist activity is simply not going to be susceptible to intelligence collection and analysis an ocean or two away. Terrorism analysts can make their most useful contributions on transnational terrorist groups and on state-supported terrorism: issues where either the targets are a bit more stable or where the United States can often exercise diplomatic, military, or law enforcement leverage. They can also play a key role in helping US policymakers understand the extent to which other countries might cooperate with us to combat terrorism. But, for example, considering that the West German police and security services—with their relatively enormous investment in counterterrorism programs—cannot get a handle on their indigenous terrorists, it is unrealistic to expect the United States in many locations abroad to do much more than understand the nature of the threat and increase the security around its facilities and personnel accordingly. Moreover, though headquarters analysis can often provide a useful perspective on the terrorist threat environment at a particular post, it cannot substitute in tactical security situations for the observations and

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judgment of professionals on the scene (some of whom, incidentally, might be—or ought to be—analysts assigned there). In any case, what the people in the field do not need is a restatement of the problem they had already reported to headquarters.

Most of the points made above are neither new nor profound, but they probably need to be restated periodically. Both consumers and managers of intelligence should keep in mind that analysis of terrorist groups and activities is often different from most other types of analysis the intelligence community does. Not only is the terrorism analyst usually under greater time pressure, but his information resources are leaner and his objectives often more limited and tactical in nature. Above all, like the military analyst covering a shooting war in which the United States is engaged, the terrorism analyst can frequently measure his contribution in very immediate terms and a very concrete currency—lives saved or, unfortunately, lost.

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MANAGING/TEACHING NEW ANALYSTS

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We have all been there, right? The new hire who has only one talent: driving you insane. He misses deadlines. He erases your editing and restores his stuff in ink, thinking "you can't change it now." He orders one copy of everything. The print button on his terminal is taped down and the 2700 is approaching meltdown. His in-box looks like the registry. He refuses to take directions, and because all his professors told him he writes well, it must be your fault if he is struggling.

You're right. Punching this guy is not enough, but what about the new hire who is obviously trying, seems to have the talent, and is still struggling? One theme surfaces repeatedly in the interviews of new analysts at the end of their first year: a desire for a manual describing how to do analysis. I suspect Directorate of Intelligence managers would also welcome such a document.

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managers are facing a daunting training burden in addition to reviewing an increased volume of production, providing vital hand-holding services during the adjustment period, and passing on tribal lore. Growth has also meant a higher percentage of new managers struggling with these issues for the first time.

After attempting to cope for a while, many managers are ready to conclude that analysts are born, not made—a position I am not ready to abandon entirely, but one that may be a bit extreme. Like the old jokes, however, the news is good and bad. The bad is that there is no substitute for experience, no mechanical formulas that an eager new hire can follow to guarantee an acceptable piece of finished intelligence. Each analyst must learn the job as each before him has, essentially by trying, falling short, and trying again. The odds are improved if the manager is blessed at the moment of making a hiring decision with what Mark Twain held to be the most important ingredient in success. "I'd rather be lucky than smart," he said.

The good news is that the manager can facilitate the learning process if he or she can:

- Communicate a sense of our mission and the difference between intelligence writing and academic writing.
- Describe the process of intelligence analysis in a clear, cogent fashion.
- Prepare the fledgling analysts for early failures and provide lots of positive reinforcement and reassurance.

The First Step

The manager's first task is akin to deprogramming—undoing habits formed in four to ten years of college-level work. This comes down to impressing on the would-be analyst a sense of what the job is and a thorough discussion of the

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nature of intelligence writing. There are seven key concepts that the new analyst must absorb, three relating to his mission and four to intelligence writing. I am convinced that the branch chief must hammer (if need be) the "three missions and the four essences" [1] into the new hire's head, or face the prospect of yet another journeyman who contributes little but eats up enormous amounts of managerial time.

The job is to make judgments about the future. The new analyst often has difficulty accepting the idea we are less concerned about what actually happened than the significance of the event for US interests. Moreover, conditioned by college to search for "truth"—artistic and scientific—he/she is sometimes slow to believe that what people think is true is often more important than what is actually the fact. And then there is that dogged determination to get all the facts, a compulsion reinforced by the mistaken notion that our job is to know everything.

The manager must get the new analyst to understand that:

- Judgments will invariably be on the basis of incomplete and conflicting information.[2]
- There are no "incompletes" given here. The analyst never has the luxury of asking the consumer for a little more time for the situation to clarify or to wait until additional information becomes available.
- Strange as it always sounds, our job is not so much to be right as it is to provide the best answer possible given the time and information available.[3]

We are the interpreters of foreign cultures and alien problems. As such, our job is to expose the logic behind the actions of a Middle East madman and to render intelligible to the general reader the physics underlying a Soviet barrage attack on a US missile system.

Our job is to support decision makers. This is a concept that all new analysts readily accept. Indeed, for many, the prospect of being part of the policy process is one of the strongest selling points of the job. But (there is always a but), it is a concept that many new analysts have difficulty putting into practice, because they are confused about what constitutes support.

Many believe that if they add to the policymaker's knowledge, they have done the job. The manager must stress that the point of analysis is the interpretation of information, not its presentation. Analysts must be taught to grasp the distinction between providing answers to real problems and expanding the

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[1] The Chinese are big on this sort of stuff: the Gang of Four, the Five Ups and the Five Downs and the Four Not Forgets (a spinoff of the Three Non-Divorces), the Three Emptying and Four No Retainings, and my favorite, the Five Stresses and Four Beauties.

[2] One new analyst once asked me where "the plans" were filed. My puzzled look prompted him to explain that he was struggling to reconcile some conflicting information and that he thought he could resolve the issue by looking at the Chinese plans. I told him that only in the movies does someone "steal the plans." In a moment of rare good judgment, I resisted adding that if we had the plans we would not need analysts.

[3] Reflect for a moment on how many times we actually know if we were right or wrong. The who-will-win-the-election or will-country-X-invade-country-Y questions are less common than those dealing with intentions, options, or outlooks that require continual reassessment.

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body of knowledge on some subject. Supporting the policymaker comes down to three related functions:

- Providing answers to specific questions, only some of which may be asked by the policymaker.
- Providing a framework—an illumination of the forces at work and the factors that bear on them—that allows the policymaker to understand an issue and to process new information.
- Where appropriate, to warn.

The four "essences" of intelligence writing flow directly from the three dealing with the mission. The table summarizes the differences between academic and intelligence writing.

The Difference Between Academic and Intelligence Writing

Academic	Intelligence
Focus on the PAST	Focus on the FUTURE
Written for EXPERTS with no responsibility to act	Written for GENERALISTS struggling with real problems
Detailed, proof-laden	Essentials only, meaningful characterizations
Short on conclusions with a tendency to summarize	Begins with conclusions and explores their implications

Intelligence writing focuses on the future and it is not enough to marshal the facts. A new analyst who was struggling to make the transition from academe captured this problem best. In college, she just gathered all the facts and "the conclusions just fell out." Many are under the misimpression that the primary goal of intelligence writing is to discover truth or set the record straight, and as a result, the first instinct is to lay out in loving detail how the present situation evolved.

Managers need to impress on new analysts that because what people believe to be true is often more important than what is, discovery of the facts alone is insufficient for and occasionally immaterial to the real job of analysis—thinking about the future. Students become analysts when they stop thinking in terms of what happened and start thinking in terms of what the facts mean. Many just never seem to make this transition.

Intelligence is written for generalists who are grappling with real problems. One of the hardest things for new analysts to grasp is the nature of their audience. Unlike the situation in which they now find themselves, they are used to writing for professors and academics who demand detail and who are under no obligation to do anything with the information. New people are also slow to realize and often doubt another truth—that after a few months on the job they are among the most knowledgeable people in the government on a particular issue, and for the first time in their lives, they are writing for an audience that

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knows less than they do. They must be taught that their new audience, unlike their professors, does not judge the value of a product by its length, devotion to detail, or complexity. Nor is a well-told tale enough. New hires need to learn that the value of a paper is proportional to its clarity, brevity, and focus on issues.

Intelligence writing is the art of the meaningful characterization. New analysts resort to "data dumps" for two basic reasons: they do not know what is important so they include everything; or they believe piling up detail is the best way to demonstrate their expertise, a lesson learned in college. The manager has to impress on the new analyst that the "art of intelligence" is identifying the important in the mountain of detail. While reporters describe the situation, analysts characterize it by making meaningful generalizations that help the reader put events in perspective and think about them. Analysts reconcile conflicting information, isolate the principle in a sea of data, and recognize the exception that demands a reevaluation.

Intelligence writing begins with the conclusions and then explores their implications. The idea of going beyond the evidence is new for many new analysts. Academic writing rarely reaches this point; what passes for "conclusions" is more often than not a summary of the preceding pages. In college good students learn by design or default to focus on how situations develop and fit the evidence into intellectual constructs that are more descriptive than predictive. Managers must retrain them to think in terms of "this is the situation; these forces are at work; this is what it means."

This is a very difficult transition for many people. The other elements of intelligence writing can be learned. I am less sure about this one. It seems to go to the core of the thought process. People seem either to have the ability to do it, or they do not. Some are clearly uncomfortable with ambiguity and always seek a little more information before writing. Others draft but cannot move beyond the evidence or reach intellectual closure on an issue, perhaps because they are afraid of being wrong. In any case, the ability to think beyond the evidence and to explore the implications of a situation is the *sine qua non* of intelligence analysis.

A Framework for Analysis

In addition to hammering home what the new analyst is supposed to be doing and how it differs from what he has done in the past, the manager needs to provide a concise and simple scheme of how to produce analysis. A "how to" diagram accomplishes a number of things. It helps reduce anxiety by giving the new hire a crutch to lean on. It starts the individual off in the right direction. It reinforces the message of the three missions and the four essences. And, it gives the manager and the analyst a common vocabulary and a framework for critiquing fledgling efforts.

The production of finished intelligence can be presented as a four-step process:

- Identifying the intelligence issue within the topic.
- Identifying the questions that need to be addressed.

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- After completing the research, identifying the two or three key points the policymaker is to take away from the paper.
- Drafting, using questions to organize the paper.

Step one: identify the intelligence issue within an intelligence topic. Or, deal with the "Great Title Trap." Ask a new analyst what he is writing about and odds are you will get a reply along the lines of (b)(1) "defense strategy in the 1990s" or "Soviet activity in the Third World." And what you get is everything about Soviet activity in the Third World starting with Afghanistan and proceeding through Zimbabwe.

Too often the manager must bear the responsibility for the data dump or the rambling draft that lands on his desk. The sad fact is that most new analysts really do not know what they are writing about. They are researching a title given to them—a problem compounded by the fact that most titles are constructed more with an eye to snagging the reader's interest than conveying the substance of the paper. I am convinced that more papers go wrong for this reason than any other.

The solution is to teach the analyst that the first step is to identify specifically what it is he is writing about. Introducing the concept of a difference between an intelligence topic and an intelligence issue is helpful in this regard. An intelligence *topic* is a broad question of interest, such as Soviet activity in the Third World. An intelligence *issue* is a development or something new and different that narrows the topic and gives a focal point to the paper. There is a simple test: an issue phrase will convey a sense of change or movement or activity; a topic will not.

Examples may help clarify this subtle, but important, distinction.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

The purpose of making this fine distinction is to get the analyst to stop and think about what he is attempting to do before he attempts to do it. The new hire is not going to be able to make this distinction; the ability to identify intelligence issues is one of the things that separates the apprentice analyst from the adult of the species. It is the manager's responsibility to insure that the analyst knows exactly what he is working on.

Step two: identify the questions. An intelligence issue is still too broad to provide the new analyst much help. He needs something to guide him as he reads files and gathers information.

One answer is to break the intelligence issue into a series of general questions. To do this, the new analyst should be encouraged to step into the policymaker's shoes and ask himself: what do I want/need to know about this issue? The questions should flow from the intelligence issue; if they do not, the purpose of the paper is probably not clear. (b)(1)

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(b)(1)

The first cut at this should be a spontaneous, stream of consciousness exercise. The analyst can then weed and consolidate the list.

The list of questions serves to sharpen the focus of the paper. The new analyst now knows "what's in" and "what's out," for instance, whether he needs to be concerned about Soviet–North Korean economic relations. The list also tells him what he should be looking for as he reads files, and once that is done, it helps him identify intelligence gaps and write requirements. Because the analyst now knows what information is relevant, it should also speed up the research and prevent the indiscriminate collection of data.[4] The questions may change as the analyst does the actual research, but this only serves to define the paper more precisely.

As with identifying the intelligence issue, the manager will have a major input in identifying the questions, and the new analyst should be encouraged to touch base with his counterparts at State, Defense, and elsewhere. But, it is important that the analyst take the first cut and actually put the questions down on paper. The exercise furthers three goals: it gets the analyst thinking in terms of an audience; it heightens sensitivity to policy relevance; and it gets the analyst thinking in terms of something besides what happened.

With the questions at hand, the analyst can do the research.

Step three: after completing the research, identify the two or three key points the policymaker is to take away. This is the most important step in the process. At this point, the task for the new analyst is to: (1) digest his research, (2) decide what he knows, and (3) put down in a short paragraph or as bullets the two or three key ideas to impress on the reader. Point three is the analytical bottom line, the essence of the paper and probably the heart of the prospects or outlook section. If an analyst cannot summarize concisely his bottom line, he has not done the analysis. If he starts to write before determining his bottom line—the hope that the conclusions will fall out of the facts—he almost certainly will never have one.

It is, of course, a very big step from what you know (2) to what it means (3). How do we get the analyst there? The analyst cannot get there unless he first decides what it is he knows. The manager's function, then, is to get the novice to answer explicitly—if only in his mind—the questions outlined in step two.

That done, the analyst is in a position to go beyond the evidence—to think about what the answers mean. The preferred methodology is to use questions to think the issue through, questions designed to bring out the implications of

[4] I have few illusions about this point. At a minimum, it reduces the excuse for prolonged and indiscriminate research.

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the facts. I just happen to have a set of generic questions with me. Having digested the research, the analyst reflects on:

- What is new or what is being done differently?
- Why is it occurring?
- What are the goals and/or broader concerns of the principal actors?
- What factors influence success or failure? Are the actors aware of these factors? Do they have a strategy/program to deal with the factors?
- What are the prospects for success, and more important, what are the implications for the actors, their broader concerns, the United States, and other countries?
- Where do the principal actors go from here?

By preaching these questions the manager gets the analyst to focus on the "big picture." The questions cannot—must not—be answered by restating the facts. The questions get at the processes and call out for generalizations, the essence of good finished intelligence. The key points the analyst wants to impress on the reader—the "3" —is a distillation of this thought process.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Step four: draft using questions to organize the paper. The final step should be the easiest. Once the analyst knows the two or three key ideas he wants to make, the task is to organize the material in a way that makes the points most effectively. The best papers are those that are organized into sections that address what policymakers want to know and need to know. The questions used in step three often can be used to organize the draft.

(b)(3)(c)

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Does It Work?

Yes and no.[6] The four-step process will not make bad analysts adequate. But it does help the learning process:

- It provides a common framework and language for managers and new hires.
- By helping new people think about the process of writing finished intelligence, it improves their ability to master what is an art rather than a science.
- It can be used to explain to analysts why a particular draft is deficient and offers guidance on how to fix a sick draft.
- It gets the new analyst focused on the consumer and US policy questions.
- It stresses that intelligence is interpretation of fact, not the recitation of fact.

The merits of the system outlined here aside, the manager, and especially the new manager, needs to develop his/her own plan for training analysts.[7] The art of analysis is, or should be, second nature by the time individuals are tapped for managerial positions. It may be particularly difficult to communicate to someone just how you do it, unless you take the time to reflect on what works for you and how best to get those ideas across. A system makes the manager's job easier, it standardizes training across the unit, and it allows the manager to test different approaches in a systematic way.

Whatever he develops, the manager must do a number of other things to make the tool useful. It is especially important to discuss the differences between academic writing and intelligence with the new analyst, and lay out for the new hire what the manager looks for in a good piece. This personal philosophy of intelligence plants a suspicion that there is indeed a method in your madness and that not all you do is managerial capriciousness. The discussion also serves to establish the standards you will hold the new analyst to. Mentors are fine, but the new hire needs to know what the manager thinks.

There is no substitute for practice. The more a new hire writes, the sooner he will master intelligence writing. This has to be coupled with a careful reading of the finished product, but for style and organization rather than substance. The new analyst should be given examples of particularly good papers, and the manager should discuss with the novice what makes the paper exceptional.

Correctly handling the first paper is also critical. The manager should go over each of his editorial changes with the new hire, explaining clearly why each was made. This may be more guidance than the analyst wants at times, but it is an essential part of the teaching process.

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[6] Come on. You know that is as good as it ever gets.

[7] The system outlined in this article works for me because it is my style. Perhaps the quickest way to go wrong is to try to apply it without adapting it to your personality.

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Finally, the manager has to dredge up from his own pysche the long suppressed feelings of frustration and anger that accompanied his own learning process. Uniformly, our new hires were very successful in college, doing something that looks very much like what we do. In many cases, you will be the first person ever to tell them their work does not measure up. It is a truly traumatic experience for many when that first draft comes back. Some will not even hear you at first—a good reason for also putting your comments on paper—when you start explaining the changes; they are too busy wondering if they are a failure or are about to be fired. In this situation, there is no substitute for positive reinforcement, patience, and a little judicious handholding. Stress what is right and find a way to say that their experience is typical and not all that different from yours. It is at this point that the framework for analysis can be helpful in pointing out what works, what does not, and why.

A little luck helps, too.

This article is classified ~~SECRET~~.

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SANDOR RADO: THE JOVIAL AND WORLDLY SPY

(b)(3)(c)

In mid-August 1981, in my office at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, I spotted in the *International Herald Tribune* an obituary taken from a brief Hungarian MTI release announcing the death of Sandor (Alexander) Rado in Budapest. Other newspapers in Europe and North America also carried a brief mention of the passing of Professor Doctor Sandor Rado, doctor of science, doctor of economics, fellow of the Royal Geographical Society of Great Britain, and co-president of the Hungarian Society of Geodesy and Cartography; but few obituaries alluded to Professor Rado's unusual role as a principal in a major intelligence drama during the Second World War.

I first learned about Rado in 1952 as a newly commissioned second lieutenant taking the Army's Counterintelligence Officer course. On the required reading list was a book, *Handbook for Spies*, by Alexander Foote, a Briton who had worked in the Soviet espionage network established by Rado in Switzerland.

Other post-war publications about Rado's activities provided some historical data about the network, but very little about the man.

Years later, while assigned in Budapest (1977-1980) as US Defense and Army Attache, I was introduced to Rado at a diplomatic reception, and thereafter had an opportunity to converse with him on a number of occasions. The last time I saw Rado was in 1980, a year before he died, at the residence of the French Ambassador during the 14 July Bastille Day reception. He was elegantly attired as usual, lapel covered with decorations, radiating good humor.

I told Rado that I was being reassigned from Budapest, bade him farewell, and thanked him for sharing some of his reminiscences and vast knowledge of maps with me.[1] I questioned Rado again (he had always changed the subject in past conversations) concerning his post-war adventures. "Professor Rado, will we ever know the complete story of the Dora network? What happened to you in the Soviet Union after 1945? What about your ten years in the Lubjanka prison? Was that not a strange reward for someone who did so much for the Soviet war effort?" Rado pursed his lips, folded his hands across his generous paunch, and replied, "I wrote a book; you have seen it—*Dora Jelenti* (Codename Dora). Others have also written books all of which tell of many things. It is enough for everyone to know that I worked in a common cause with all those who were fighting against Hitler—all of the accounts agree on this, if nothing else. I hope I will be remembered mostly for my contributions to geographical science."

[1] After our first meeting, I once complained to Rado about the inadequacy of the Hungarian *Autoatlasza* (book of road maps). Rado suggested that I acquire some newly published maps from a special map store in the city and gave me directions to find the store. For a brief time, until the map store manager informed me that foreigners were not allowed to make purchases, I was able to obtain new and detailed maps, charts, city plans, and similar useful and interesting documents.

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Rado undoubtedly made some significant contributions to the study of geography and cartography. Nevertheless, it is most likely that his activities as *Dora*, the spy, are what will secure his name in history.

The Twig Is Bent

Sandor Rado was born in Budapest in 1899 into a middle-class family and pursued a traditional, classical education which was interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War. Rado was mobilized into the Austro-Hungarian Army at the age of 17 as a junior staff officer in the artillery. Stationed in Budapest, he was able to continue his university education. During the turmoil following the end of World War I, Rado became a political activist and joined the communists. Under the leadership of Bela Kun, the communists overthrew the Social Democratic Republic established in 1918 under Count Karolyi and in power for less than a year. The Kun revolt then survived for only 133 days during which Rado served in the Red Army as a political officer. When the Kun government collapsed, according to Rado's account in his book, he fled for his life to Austria, not to return to his native Hungary for almost 37 years.[2]

In the fall of 1919, Rado entered the University of Vienna to begin the study of geography and cartography. At the end of the year he traveled to Moscow for work with the Comintern Secretariat and also to pursue his courtship of a young German communist, Helene Jansen, whom he had first met in Vienna. Helene Jansen was employed as a secretary to Lenin and Rado claimed to have had at least one conversation with Lenin. The young Rado directed Soviet intelligence and propaganda offices in the Swedish town of Haparanda on the Finnish border as well as in Vienna.

In late 1923, Sandor Rado and Helene Jansen were married in Moscow and then returned to Germany so that Rado could complete his studies.

The next year, he returned to the Soviet Union for training with Soviet military intelligence and was thereafter assigned to Berlin, under cover as an employee of the German company that published *Meyer's Lexicon*, and later as a cartographer with *Lufthansa*. During the 1930s Rado also did cartographic work in Stockholm for *Aerotransport*, the predecessor of *SAS–Scandanavian Airlines*. This assignment gave him access to defense information of Sweden and possibly some other countries.

Rado's publication of the first geographic atlas of the USSR in 1932 established him as a cartographic authority and on the strength of this he returned to Germany to work as a geographer for the *Almanach de Gotha*.

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[2] One of Rado's contemporaries had a different account which suggests that Rado's departure was more romantic than political. When the Kun government collapsed, Rado and some Hungarian army friends were in the town of Györ and received orders to report back to Budapest to give their parole to support the newly established government and be demobilized from active military service. During an extended celebration that evening, Rado became acquainted with a young lady and left his pals to spend the night with her. Consequently, he overslept and failed to report to the formation for transport to Budapest. Hung over and frightened at the prospect of disciplinary action for being AWOL, Rado fled to Vienna and refused to return to Hungary. He also changed his name from the original Radolffy to Rado "to protect the family."

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In 1933, after Hitler came into power, the Rado family moved to Paris where Rado established a new venture, a press agency called *Inpress* which specialized in maps and geographic data pertaining to current events. This venture, founded with Soviet financial backing, employed more than a dozen people, including several Soviet agents who were able to use *Inpress* as a cover. The venture continued until 1935 when the Soviets decided that the operation could not become self-supporting and should be discontinued.

According to several accounts, Rado was directed by S. P. Ourisky, then director of Soviet Military Intelligence, to establish himself in Brussels. His attempts were thwarted by Belgian authorities and he moved to Geneva where he established a new firm, *Geopress*, patterned after *Inpress* but more successful commercially.

The Dora Network

In April 1938, Rado's Soviet controller in Paris informed him that the Paris *residency* was to be closed and that Rado would become the *resident director* in Switzerland for Soviet Intelligence and would report directly to Moscow Central. The controller turned over his entire Swiss network to Rado. (Code-named *Dora*—an anagram of Rado).

Until the summer of 1939, Rado, with the secret Red Army rank of major general, was occupied with development and expansion of his agent net. He provided the Soviets with information concerning German preparations for the occupation of Danzig and other political and military activities. Once the Second World War broke out, Rado had to acquire radio communications. His search for communications and sources soon led him to Alexander Allan Foote who had been living in Switzerland as an expatriate Briton of independent means. Foote, who became Rado's assistant, had been involved with British Intelligence, mainly under direction of Lieutenant Colonel Sir Claude Dansey.[3] Rado acquired, through Foote's efforts, a radio transmitter and operators. Regular and considerable intelligence then began to flow to Moscow. There was some antagonism and competition between Rado and Foote for control of Soviet intelligence activity in Switzerland. This later would cause problems for both of them as Foote related in his book.

Rado provided high-quality intelligence to Moscow. For example, this transmission on 17 June 1941:

> . . . For Director. About 100 infantry divisions are now positioned on the German-Soviet border. One-third are motorized. At least ten of the remaining divisions are armored. Divisions are concentrated in Romania at Galatz, and elite special mission divisions stationed in German occupied Poland are taking part. Dora.

[3] Lieutenant Colonel Claude Edward Marjoribanks Dansey was born in 1876. He served in Africa as an officer in the Matabele and Zulu wars and as a reserve military intelligence officer in France during World War I. After the war he lived for a brief period in the United States where he failed in a business venture. Dansey returned to Britain and into the Intelligence Service. In the 1930s he established an intelligence operation known as the "Z" Organization, based in Switzerland. "Z" Organization (outside of, but paralelling SIS) was a peculiar establishment headed by a strange chief. Dansey, controversial, anti-intellectual, unpopular, and controversial, was believed by a few to be brilliant, but one of his erstwhile colleagues described him as "totally incompetent." For a review of a book about Dansey, see page 78 in this issue of *Studies*.

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At Moscow Center, the information from *Dora* was assessed as accurate along with similar information received from other sources. Unfortunately for the Soviets, Josef Stalin and his entourage did not believe any of it; they felt they had a clear and positive insight into Hitler's plans, and so the initial objectives for Hitler's *Operation Barbarossa* for the invasion of the Soviet Union were achieved. Those who had correctly reported the intelligence did not fare so well—several lost their lives, many lost their freedom. Rado, however, continued to operate from Switzerland and achieved new credibility with his professional masters for the accuracy of information provided by his network.

During World War II, Swiss counterintelligence and security authorities were occupied primarily with protecting Switzerland against hostile activities and violations of Swiss neutrality. Intelligence gathering which did not violate Swiss laws, provoke violence, or otherwise give cause for apprehension was noted by the authorities, but little interference resulted. German counterintelligence, on the other hand, largely as a result of investigative successes in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, was able to unravel a considerable part of the Moscow-run networks and, after 1942, knew a good deal about Rado and his communications system.

Through early 1943, the *Dora* network continued to function with mixed results. Rado was under continuous pressure from Moscow to equal or exceed his past successes. Finally, in April 1943, *Dora* was able to provide the Moscow Center with vital intelligence concerning the German salient at Kursk. Today, historians are in general agreement that the battle for Kursk was the decisive turning point in the war in the East. German victory, although unlikely, was still possible before Kursk. After Kursk, German defeat was certain.

When the Germans attacked Kursk on 5 July in *Operation Citadelle,* General Rokossovsky and his forces, relying on intelligence from *Dora,* were able to anticipate German operations. By the beginning of August, the Kursk battle was concluded, and the Soviets could take to the offensive. After Kursk, Rado was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1943 (later revoked), but *Dora* never again achieved either the volume or quality of production that had characterized its performance since 1939. The overall situation for Rado and his net seemed to deteriorate as individual agents were picked up, codes were compromised, and sources appeared to become less productive. In October, it became obvious to Rado that he was in personal danger as the Swiss authorities had become more interested in his work. Shortly thereafter, Foote was arrested and jailed briefly by the Swiss.

Ordered to Moscow

In 1944, the Rados made their way to southern France and worked about six months with the French Resistance, work for which Rado was awarded the Legion of Honor. With help from the *Nicole* communist network, Rado went to Paris where he informed the Soviet Military Attache that the *Dora* network was finished in Switzerland. A short time later, Foote also arrived in Paris and reported to the Soviet Mission, but his account differed from Rado's in a number of details. Faced with the inconsistent reports, early in 1945 both Foote and Rado together with another Soviet agent, the redoubtable Leopold Trepper, were

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ordered to report to Moscow. Their Soviet aircraft was routed through Marseilles and Cairo. During the stopover in Cairo, Rado disappeared. During the summer of 1945 Rado, then hiding in Cairo, was turned over to the Soviets because he was traveling on a Soviet passport.[4]

He was flown immediately to Moscow and consigned to the Lubjanka prison. Rado remained in the Lubjanka for about 18 months and then, charged with espionage for the West, diversion of confidential funds, and compromise of secret communications, he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and stripped of all rank and honors.

His wife Helene had resisted Soviet pressures to come to the USSR, obtained a French divorce of convenience to forestall further pressures, and remained in Paris with their two sons.

As a prisoner, Rado was shifted to various sites, first in Siberia and later to Kuchino, near Moscow. He soon qualified as a "privileged prisoner" and reportedly worked in the geophysical observatory and on mapping and charting projects. Rado had some influential friends (among them Ferenc Munnich, one-time Hungarian Foreign Minister and an army comrade from the Bela Kun revolt) and their assistance undoubtedly played a part in his more lenient treatment as well as contributing to his release in a 1954-55 post-Stalin amnesty.

In 1955, Rado returned to Hungary after a long absence and soon after was engaged as deputy chief of the State Survey and Cartographic Office, specifically as head of the Cartographic Department. Arrangements were made for Helene to rejoin him and she moved to Budapest in 1956. Helene died in 1958 and lies beneath an imposing monument attesting to her lifelong dedication and service to communism.

According to all reports, Rado took no part in the 1956 Hungarian revolt, although this appears to have been by chance rather than design. Rado was a friend of Imre Nagy and many other major figures on both sides of the struggle. It is said he tried at the beginning of the uprising to get the opposing parties together but when his efforts failed, wisely, he let the matter drop. After the revolt, Rado apparently regained some favor with the Soviets and his career took an upturn. One report suggests that he was appointed chairman of the Warsaw Pact Committee on Mapping and Geodesy in 1957. Although this was never confirmed, it is clear that his power and prestige continued to increase and that the Hungarian mapping effort improved.

As the head of Hungarian geographic and cartographic activities, Rado continued to display the imagination and energy that had characterized his wartime work. The Hungarian geodesic journal, *Földmêrestâni Köslemenyêk* (Periodical of Geodesy) underwent a name-change in 1955 to *Geodêzia es Kartográfia* (Geodesy and Cartography) and incorporated a number of new features, such as a section on map changes, i.e., current data on countries, East

[4] Rado was originally apprehended by the Egyptian police operating under British direction. During his interrogation, Rado attempted to negotiate a defection to the British. His case was routinely reviewed by counterintelligence and apparently on the recommendation of CI (including one H.A.R. Philby) the defection was rejected as was Rado's effort to escape Soviet extradition on legal grounds.

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and West, listing civil divisions, place names, and other items of interest to cartographers. In 1962, Rado expanded the quarterly publication schedule to six issues per year and, in 1965, commenced publication in English, French, and German of a new quarterly, named *Cartactual.* (This presented no difficulty for Rado, who was fluent in at least six languages.)

Cartactual was a very clever collection device. For a $10 subscription, (payable in hard currency) readers obtained maps designed for ease in reproduction, illustrations of significant map changes, and related data, all obtained from open sources by Rado's organization which contributed the search, selection, organization, illustration, and publication. A normal issue contained perhaps two or three maps of communist countries and about two dozen from the West. Rado, on the other hand, obtained an extensive and systematically organized file of Western data (which the East could use to keep its maps accurate and up-to-date), a plausible basis for close contact with Western sources (and a potential for their recruitment), and considerable prestige as a world clearing house for geographic information.

Rado also developed numerous other collection schemes such as exchange agreements with official agencies and private organizations and geographic societies throughout the world. He established several joint ventures for map publication. A review of his activities made during the 1960s indicated that Rado's schemes were quite good for the Hungarians but a poor bargain for their partners.[5]

The sociable Sandor Rado never passed up the opportunity to attend international conferences. He attended conferences in Bloc countries, in Mexico City, Havana, Western Europe, and in Asia. In 1967, Rado almost became vice president of the International Cartographic Association (ICA), a position which normally leads to the incumbent becoming president. With his reputation as a spy by that time well-known, his candidacy failed.

Theories

A complete and accurate account of Rado's operations in war-time Switzerland is not to be found either in the hostile, selective, and self-aggrandizing memoirs of Foote or in Rado's own book. Records of the two prosecutions of Rudolf Roessler, (Codenamed *Lucy*) a German refugee living in Switzerland and one of *Dora's* main sources, provide some helpful insights but are not credible as a basis for historical judgments. Rado's post-war adventures in the Soviet Union can be explained in the light of personalities and related events, but even the most thoroughgoing analysis of the confirmed and reliable factual evidence leaves us with three (possibly four) scenarios on *Dora* and *Lucy.*

Theory 1 postulates that *Lucy,* probably *Dora's* most important source, received his significant intelligence from four sub-sources in Germany, mainly from individuals in the anti-Nazi movement in the German General Staff.

Theory 2 holds that *Lucy* was really not much more than a "front" for Swiss Intelligence, operating through "Bureau Ha" (Colonel Haussaman) as a cutout

[5] It has been suggested that this scheme was more a characteristic of traditional Hungarian bargaining than clandestine collection. There is an old Central European saying that a Hungarian is someone who follows you into a revolving door and comes out in front. Maybe Rado's operations were a bit of both.

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in order to pass intelligence gained through their collection inside Germany to the Allies without compromising Swiss neutrality.

Theory 3, of more recent vintage, claims that the British, through Colonel Dansey's network, used Foote (the assistant and principal radio operator for *Dora*) to pass sanitized and disguised ULTRA-derived intelligence to the Soviets in a manner which would be credible and conceal the source.

The possible *fourth theory* holds that the *Lucy* traffic dispatched to the Western allies went from Swiss Intelligence through a Czechoslovak colonel, Karel Sedlacek (codenamed *Uncle Tom*). In support of this theory, it is argued that Sedlacek obtained his information from Colonel Haussaman, who had obtained it from *Lucy*, who then determined which intelligence was to go to the the diverse recipients, i.e., East or West. Alternatively, it has been claimed that Sedlacek obtained the intelligence from Haussaman for dispatch direct to London.

Some insight into Rado's 1945 attempt to escape returning to Moscow was provided in 1975 by the publication in France of the memoirs of Leopold Trepper, leader of *The Red Orchestra*, the Soviet intelligence network which operated during World War II in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. Trepper, recalling his flight from Paris to Moscow, wrote:

> While we were flying toward Moscow, Rado's disappearance (in Cairo) obsessed me. I knew he had performed his mission beyond all expectation, that he had nothing to reproach himself for . . . In Switzerland, he had contributed substantially to the victory, but because of his profound understanding of the facts, his realism as a man of learning, he felt in spite of victory, nothing had changed in the kingdom of the OGPU (KGB). He foresaw the fate that awaited him in Moscow. He did not care for the prospect of ending his life in one of Stalin's jails; hence he disappeared in Cairo after making sure his wife and children were safe in Paris.

Trepper himself was not so fortunate. As he related, "The truth Rado perceived did not strike me with its blinding light until later. I was too naive." [6]

A contributing factor to Rado's treatment in the Soviet Union could be the personal hostility of Lavrenti Beria, KGB Chief. It is reported that during the Second World War, Beria's son, a playboy type, was stationed in Switzerland to work in Rado's net and avoid combat service. The son reportedly squandered operational funds, compromised security, and accomplished nothing useful. Rado had him recalled to the Soviet Union where he was eventually killed in action with the Red Army. Another possible factor was that Rado, together with many others, had been directed by Soviet Intelligence General Berzin. When Berzin was purged by Stalin, anyone who had been associated with him came under suspicion.

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[6] Trepper paid for his naivete with more than ten years in prison in the Lubjanka and Lefortovo. He was released after Stalin's death and permitted to live under house arrest in Poland. After intense Western pressure, he was allowed to emigrate first to England and later to France.

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Rado's status as a "privileged prisoner" was alleged to have resulted from an administrative error, although there are indications that the "error" occurred as a result of efforts made by influential friends. It is known that Rado was released from prisoner status in 1954 but remained in the Soviet Union for about a year trying to negotiate his citizenship status. His negotiations were difficult and protracted and his refusal to accept a choice of professorships in the Soviet Union did not help. Apparently the intercession of his old friend Munnich and the overthrow of Beria combined to hasten the departure of Rado for Budapest with Khrushchev's blessing.

The various theories postulated as to *Dora's* sources are more difficult to reconcile. The Soviets initially took the position that *Dora's* sources inside Germany (which, primarily, were those of *Lucy*) were all communists. When they were unable to sustain this position in the light of hard evidence adduced, particularly during Roessler's first apprehension and trial, they shifted their argument to hold that the *Lucy* sources were not individuals, but were institutional sources and, above all, that they were completely unrelated to members of the anti-Nazi Twentieth of July Group, the dominant branch of which was unquestionably pro-Western, not pro-Soviet. Detailed analysis of traffic between *Dora* and Moscow and with *Lucy*, when considered against the background of other information, strongly suggests that German military sources fed *Lucy* through Swiss Intelligence, *in Switzerland*. This is to say that the intelligence was communicated through German military *(Abwehr*–counterintelligence) channels. The *Abwehr* channels were relatively secure until the failure of the 20 July plot and Swiss communications were demonstrably less so. (If the *Abwehr* communications were not secure, the plotters probably would have been rolled up prior to 20 July.) The "Bureau Ha" appears to have been established by Swiss authorities to provide key intelligence from Germany to the British through Sedlacek *(Uncle Tom)* and to the Soviets through *Dora*, while maintaining Swiss neutrality. Roessler *(Lucy)*, even in his published memoirs, revealed very little which could delineate the operation with precision.

The argument that the British employed the *Dora* network (through Foote) with intelligence derived from ULTRA intercepts in order to ensure that the material reached the Soviets without compromising the real source is difficult to sustain. Some of the intelligence could have originated from ULTRA and certainly much of the Kursk-related data transmitted by Rado are difficult to relate to another source. This argument is supported by the strange career of Foote, his lengthy relationship with Colonel Dansey, and the support and government employment afforded Foote when he returned to Britain. The British established a UK-Soviet liaison mission in Moscow after the Kursk battle and if *Dora* had been utilized as a conduit earlier, certainly with the liaison mission functioning, it was no longer necessary to use Rado/Foote as a channel. There is really no hard evidence to support the ULTRA theory, plausible though it may be.

The Swiss are unlikely to reveal their role in the operations discussed above; they have a great interest in preserving their position as neutrals, and there is no discernible advantage to them to lay open the record. German records

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captured by the Soviets, together with detailed interrogations of some of the principals, would very likely reveal a considerable amount of information about the *Lucy* sources, but the possibility of revelations from the USSR are remote.

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The objective of Rado's war-time mission—defeat of Hitler—was achieved and the little pear-shaped professor has secured a place for himself in history. His status is not as he would have preferred, as a cartographer and geographer, dedicated to the advancement of geodesic science, but rather as an individual caught up in the history of his time, involved in an epic struggle between great powers—as a spy.

From my own observations of Rado, I conclude that he had what it takes to be a great collector of intelligence. He had an ingratiating personality, a brilliant mind with a well-developed imagination, and a capacity for hard work. Because he was an internationally recognized expert in his chosen specialty, many doors were open to him and he never passed up an opportunity to walk right in.

In Western traditions, there are Valhallas for the fallen warrior; cavalrymen have their Fiddler's Green and sailors, Davy Jones's locker. I suspect Professor Sandor Rado might yet be charming his listeners and telling jokes in six languages in some special place for old spies, a place whose name and location, of course, cannot be revealed.

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TITLE: The International Luncheon

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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Recipe for esprit de corps

THE INTERNATIONAL LUNCHEON

(b)(3)(c)

It is one of CIA's best-kept secrets and one of the best luncheons in Washington. It comes along only once a year but has such a devoted clientele that it has been operating under the same management for more than a quarter of a century. One of its chief attractions is the extraordinary range of the kitchen staff. The last luncheon, for example, offered more than five dozen dishes drawn from the culinary repertoire of over 30 nations.

Getting a chance to savor this lucullan fare is tougher than getting a table at Le Pavillon or Lion d'Or on a Saturday night. For this event you need a security clearance as well as a personal invitation to get past the *maitre de'hotel.* Finally, if eavesdropping on one's fellow diners is one of your delights in eating out, don't plan on that in this place unless you're fluent in Turkish, Danish, Laotian, or a host of other foreign tongues.

As the last clue may have made clear, this "restaurant review" is about the International Luncheon thrown by the Agency's Language School each December. This gala affair is not to be compared with the normal run of Christmas parties. Certainly, nothing this reporter has witnessed in Langley's corridors and offices has attempted so much in the scope and sophistication of its cuisine.

The sponsors do not see the International Luncheon as a Christmas party because the multiplicity of religious faiths and ethnic traditions represented in the Language School's faculty makes such a focus inappropriate. It is, instead, a sort of celebration of the winter solstice and of the unique *esprit de corps* that characterizes this special part of CIA, the Language Training Division, Office of Training and Education.

History

The history of this event goes back to the early 1960s when the then Language and Area Studies Division was ensconced in the Arlington Towers complex. Working conditions there were less than ideal and the luncheon was conceived both as a morale booster and a means of building some bonding among the hard-pressed students and instructors. It was a small affair, no admission fee was charged, and the participants took "pot luck" on what their more culinarily talented colleagues could provide. But the key idea of featuring the foods of many lands was operative from the outset.

With the Language School's transfer to the Chamber of Commerce Building (now the (b)(3)(c)), significant growth occurred in the faculty, curriculum, and student body. And with these changes the International Luncheon grew both in its importance to the school and in what it attempted to achieve. Today the faculty includes over [redacted] instructors representing more than 40 nationalities. The luncheon has become a primary means for building familiarity and cooperation among teachers separated not only by background, but by an increasing workload dealt with in separate departments.

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Doubtless there are many valid explanations for what makes this party tick, but the common denominator for everyone seems to be the quality of the food. At the 1985 party, there was the usual bewildering array of dishes and, try as he might, this reporter * did not sample everything in sight. Still, a goodly portion of this groaning board was tested and what follow are some highlights from one man's point of view. This list of ten dishes will at least provide a flavor, no pun intended, of the variety and excellence available at this unique occasion:

- Herring (Sweden)–made unique by presentation in a curry sauce.
- Rice Noodles (Philippines)–a pasta to rival the best of Italy,
- Fresenjan (Iran)–chicken with rice and a particularly piquant sauce.
- Frijoles (Guatamala)–not your usual Tex-Mex beans.
- Paella (Spain)–made spectacular by service with a whole lobster.
- Janson's Temptation (Sweden)–sliced potatoes and onions baked with anchovies; super!
- Lengua (Bolivia)–beef tongue, but certainly not in the bland English style.
- Babarrois (Chile)–creamy, soft dessert combining mocha and melon flavors.
- Sweetheart Pudding (Portugal)–another delicious, soft-textured dessert.
- Pudim Romy (Brazil)–fruits, nuts and cream in a cheerful, crunchy blend.

This expansion also has forced the exclusion of the student body from the luncheon and the guest list typically is limited to a handful of the most senior Agency officials such as the DCI and the Deputy Director for Administration. Even these worthies were not included at the most recent luncheon, however, in part because experience has shown that the heavy responsibilities they bear often necessitate a late arrival. Keeping 50 dishes warm and 100 diners patient while waiting for "les elephants" is a formidable task even for this resourceful group.

Anecdotes

Some of the Agency's foremost leaders have participated in this affair, however, and endeared themselves to the faculty. The recently retired Deputy Director for Administration, Harry Fitzwater, is fondly remembered not only

(b)(3)(c) served for five years as the principal restaurant critic for *Washingtonian* magazine.

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for his appreciation of the fare but for his virtuosity on the ukulele and an annual rendering of a song called "Kangaroo Stew." The current DCI was the first to attend the luncheon with his spouse. Mrs. Casey shared the Director's admiration for the food and was so enamored of a Nicaraguan shrimp salad that she asked for the recipe.

NICARAGUAN SHRIMP SALAD

10 oz.	**package frozen peas defrosted**
8 oz.	**small shrimp pre-cooked**
2	**strips of bacon cooked to a crisp**
1 cup	**sliced ripe olives**
1/4 cup	**chopped green onion**
1 cup	**diced celery**
1/4 cup	**minced fresh parsley**
1 tsp.	**(or less) curry**
1 cup	**(or less) mayonnaise**
2 tbs.	**soy sauce**
1 tbs.	**lemon juice**
1/2 cup	**toasted slivered almonds**

Combine first six ingredients. Blend the next four ingredients and add to the first mixture. Just before serving, toss in the toasted slivered almonds.

Perhaps the best leadership anecdote concerns former DDCI Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, now serving as the US Ambassador to the United Nations. Walters was a great favorite not only for the spirited manner in which he entered into these occasions, but for his mastery of so many languages. At one luncheon he found the food so spectacular that before leaving he asked for a plate to be made up for his driver. On returning to the car, General Walters handed the plate to the chauffeur, saying: "Here, you eat; I'll drive."

Ultimately, the luncheon matters most to the faculty of the Language School and it is their recollections of this evolving celebration that are the most revealing. Old timers note that, although the quality and variety of the cooking improves steadily each year, other aspects of the event have fluctuated significantly over time. In the 1970s, for example, there was a strong emphasis on faculty members bringing seasonal decorations and wearing costumes from their native lands. Last year only a few donned traditional foreign garb. Even so, memories still linger of former School Chief (b)(3)(c) dressed as a Polish peasant, of festive holiday dresses from Holland borrowed from the Dutch embassy here, and of the Greek annuitant who came in costume and danced like Zorba.

Planned entertainment is another facet of the luncheon which has waxed and waned over the years. The menu/program for the 1980 celebration, for example, begins with a costume parade representing the garb of a dozen nations and continues with songs and dances from France, Sweden, Germany, Greece, Thailand, Chile, Paraguay, and Mexico. At a more recent luncheon—and despite the assertion that this event is not a Christmas party—a faculty group sang "Silent Night" in a presentation made more moving because it was rendered in multiple languages. Skits also have figured prominently at past luncheons including one at which a mock language test was administered to the audience.

The recent trend is toward a less structured party, fewer guests, and more spontaneous entertainment. Toward the close of the 1985 luncheon, French, Russian, and Norwegian songs were offered and, as has long been the custom,

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there was recorded music for social dancing. The latter activity is clearly a highlight for many though, as several instructors complained, it is limited by the fact that there are "too few men on this faculty."

These changes in the non-culinary dimensions of the International Luncheon are a subject for mild controversy within the school. Some instructors are quite satisfied with the "new look" while others long for a return to the more ambitious parties of the "old days." Faculty members do agree, however, that there is an underlying set of reasons for the success of this party that makes such differences inconsequential. Moreover, they think this rationale is so compelling that the luncheon is likely to be a highpoint of life at the Language School for at least another 25 years. Among the reasons most often cited is the idea that the diversity inherent in the Language School demands a unifying event of this sort. In essence, these folks believe that if the luncheon didn't already exist, the dynamics of the institution would demand that it be invented.

Another theme frequently encountered when asking about the rationale for the luncheon's longstanding success is that it constitutes a unique opportunity to express pride in—and receptivity to—the broad variety of foreign cultures represented in the school. A variant on this thought was expressed by several others who noted how important it was—especially at the holiday season—to be able to touch base with one's traditions in the company of good friends and colleagues.

Yet another rationale was espoused by some instructors, especially those who valued the participation of senior Agency officials in the luncheon. They see this event as a rare opportunity to call attention to the contributions foreign language training makes to the success of the Agency's mission. It is a way of showing pride in a professional career. Such an annual affirmation is especially important to those who feel that Language School instructors will always remain something of an anomaly among CIA personnel because they are foreign born. They have set themselves apart from their former countrymen not only by taking American citizenship, but by making the US intelligence service their employer. For those who hold this view, the International Luncheon is not only an important affirmation of heritage, but of a belief that they have done the right thing by becoming a part of an elite language faculty in the service of their adopted country.

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Big pictures and a low profile

SENATE EXECUTIVE SESSION BRIEFING

Donald E. Welzenbach

In early September 1973, Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson (D-Washington), chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, and committee members Senators Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) and John Tower (R-Texas) approached DDS&T Carl E. Duckett to ask his help in preparing a briefing of the full Senate on the nation's capability to monitor the SALT-II agreement. This pact had been signed by President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev at the White House on Thursday, 21 June 1973. Carl Duckett had been present to witness the event. Before the Senate began debating the ratification of the SALT agreement, the three senators wanted to use classified overhead photography to demonstrate to their colleagues, some of whom had expressed strong doubts on the subject, just how effectively the United States could monitor the pact with the Soviets.

Duckett, who was effective in conducting congressional relations, was anxious to demonstrate the practicality of satellite reconnaissance and photo intelligence. He suggested to Senator Jackson that CIA provide view-graphs and a large, rear-projection screen so as to make the illustrations clearly visible throughout the chamber. Jackson demurred, saying the Senate would not tolerate such gadgetry. He wanted only enlargements of the photography that could be displayed on an easel.

Realizing that this meant very big enlargements, Duckett went to NPIC Director John J. Hicks to ask for special assistance. Hicks told Duckett that NPIC could produce quality photo enlargements of up to 30 by 60 inches. Duckett and Senator Jackson chose the photos they wanted and NPIC set about producing the briefing boards.

To dramatize the size of an SS-9 missile site, Duckett had NPIC superimpose a photograph of an SS-9 site over an outline of the Pentagon drawn to the same scale. Another briefing board superimposed a photograph of a Soviet launch control center on a same-scale drawing of the Capitol. Duckett wanted to make certain that the senators grasped the size of these missile-launch facilities. "I wanted them to understand that we were talking about a great big thing, not about a little hole in the ground," Duckett recalled.

On Saturday, 22 September, Duckett and R. Evans Hineman, who was then Deputy Director of Weapons Intelligence and had earlier served as Agency representative in support of the SALT negotiations, rehearsed the presentation in Duckett's Langley office. The next day, Sunday, the two men took the 26 briefing boards, measuring six feet long by three feet high, to Senator Jackson's house where they coached him on how to make the presentation. Again on Monday, this time in Senator Jackson's Capitol Hill office, Duckett and Hineman rehearsed the presentation. With all three senators watching, Duckett, playing

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the role that Senator Jackson would perform the next day, read the script explaining the graphics, while Hineman, playing the part of Senator Nunn, used a pointer to illustrate the points being made orally.

The DDS&T's two major concerns about the briefing were, first, to keep it secret and, second, to make certain that the senators understood it was the CIA that provided the information. Senator Jackson assured Duckett that if the briefing were given to an executive session of the Senate the existing rules would provide ample protection. Jackson had a copy of the rules for executive session placed on each senator's desk prior to the opening of the briefing. These rules, in paraphrase, threaten any senator who reveals what happens in executive session with expulsion from the Senate. Because the briefing would be part of an executive session, only senators could be in the Senate chamber; no pages, ushers, or, for that matter, not even Duckett.

The briefing was given on the afternoon of Tuesday, 25 September 1973. Senators Nunn and Jackson stood in the well in front of the vacant desk of the President of the Senate with the 26 large briefing boards. As Senator Jackson described the various photographs, Senator Nunn pointed out the details. Senator Jackson wanted to make sure that, if any senators had questions he could not answer, Duckett would be close at hand to provide the data. Thus, he arranged for the DDS&T to stay in the office of the President of the Senate, which opens directly off the Senate chamber. Senator Tower stayed at the front of the chamber to act as a runner, ready to take written questions from Senator Jackson to Duckett and return with the written answers.

The President of the Senate is the Vice President of the United States, and in September 1973 the office was held by Spiro T. Agnew. Present with Duckett in Agnew's office were Richard Perle, then an adviser to the Armed Forces Committee, and Dickie Fosdick, Senator Jackson's chief staff assistant. About midway through the briefing, Duckett, Perle, and Fosdick heard a great commotion in the outer hallway in front of the main entrance to the Vice President's office suite. Newsmen were rapping on the Vice President's door and Duckett feared they had learned about the super-secret briefing given at the executive session.

Dickie Fosdick learned from one of the newsmen that Vice President Agnew had just been indicted in Baltimore for income tax evasion and the newsmen were trying to find him. Duckett, Perle, and Fosdick left the office through interconnecting doors which led to another, inner hallway. Thus they were able to avoid the newsmen. (Vice President Agnew was not so fortunate. The newsmen eventually found him, as did the US marshals.)

Senators Jackson, Nunn, and Tower completed the briefing without interruption. No questions were asked that Jackson or Nunn could not answer. Thus, Duckett's assistance was not needed nor were the senators aware of his absence until much later. More importantly, not one senator ever revealed what was discussed at the executive session.

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HOW WE ARE PERCEIVED

(b)(3)(c)

As the Central Intelligence Agency approaches its 40th birthday, those of us in the clandestine service tend to view ourselves as performing important functions which are extraordinarily helpful to senior levels of the US government. We know that we go to great lengths to abide by the intent as well as letter of US law. We also know that we are one of the most carefully audited institutions of the government—fiscally as well as behaviorally. We draw considerable satisfaction from the knowledge that a long sequence of presidents, national security advisers, ranking ambassadors, and informed senior military officers have held us in the highest regard, placed great value on our product, and relied on us to acquire foreign intelligence and carry out covert action directives. Indeed, we function in the certain knowledge that the Directorate of Operations is cost-effective (we save the government more than it costs to sustain us) and is at the forefront of virtually all activities involving international matters of real concern to our government.

As one of the relatively few clandestine service officers who have the opportunity to talk to and be questioned by new junior officers from the Department of State and the US Information Service, I have been exposed to questions about the Agency (particularly the clandestine service) that bespeak a perception of us and our role within the US government which is dramatically different from the one that we have of ourselves. It came as a shock to learn that there seem still to be large numbers of well read and presumably intelligent US citizens who perceive that we are assassins, blackmailers, exploiters of sex and illicit drugs as well as the creators of our own foreign policy separate and distinct from that of the Department of State. Apparently, many see little difference between the Directorate of Operations and the KGB, believing that at the core we, like they, are basically secret police. Others of our soon-to-be colleagues abroad believe that we will monitor their activities and maintain files on each of them. Some articulate the fear that a refusal to cooperate with us will have an adverse impact on their careers. They believe that our case officers must surely be psychologically scarred from career-long tussles with morality. They presume they will disagree with various CIA activities in their countries of assignment and want to know what their "dissident channel" will be for those inevitable disagreements. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

Some of the more outrageous questions we have been asked are:

Secret Police: "Does the CIA often try to pressure State or USIS officers into performing secret duties?" "Does CIA look into our personal lives as a matter of routine?" "To what extent should I expect

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my personal life to be scrutinized by CIA?" "Should we expect to be tested by CIA during our overseas assignment?" "Is the major function of the CIA to report on foreign nations and their policies or to observe and detect leaks by US government employees?" "What does INTERPOL do and what is the relationship between CIA and INTERPOL?" "How could CIA overlook someone like Ron Pelton and allow him to sell information to the Soviets?" "What is the CIA role in disciplinary action taken against Foreign Service officers?"

Assassins: "How does CIA justify using assassination?" "Approximately how many assassinations has CIA attempted and how many US citizens have been killed or 'disappeared' by CIA?" "Does CIA officially admit its complicity in the assassination of Salvadore Allende?" "Has the Agency ever killed one of its own when it appeared that he might defect?" "Are there limits to the activities the CIA will undertake in the pursuit of 'the national interest' and, if so, who determines those limits?" "Does the Agency always believe the end justifies the means in achieving its objectives?" "What percentage of CIA operatives leave the organization for admitted moral or ethical reasons?" "Can you name any 'bad things' that Soviet espionage agents do that we do not?" "Has there been an increase in CIA-sponsored terrorism in the past five years?"

Self-Image: "What does your wife think of your job?" "What made you decide to be a CIA agent?" "Do you have a college degree?" "Did you join the CIA because you did not pass the Foreign Service exam?" "Don't you feel any reservations about serving in an organization that will instruct you to sleep with people?"

Other, less outrageous questions betray these young officers' sense of personal or professional concern at our presence amongst them. For example:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Professional Rivalry: "Aren't we competing for the same information with all the rules of the game weighted in your favor?" "We share our information with you, but do you share your information with us?" "Since we identify our sources to you, why don't you identify your sources to us?" "How can we keep from losing our sources of information to you when you can pay them and we can't?" "Do you use our sources without our knowing it?"

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

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Fortunately, the picture is not as bleak as those questions,which come up again and again in one form or another, would indicate. Other questions make

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

The Impact of Exposures: "How effective is Soviet propaganda?" "How can you function with all of the media attention that has been focused on you?" "Have congressional investigations and media coverage damaged the ability of the CIA to gather information from indivdual as well as from foreign intelligence services?"

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

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It is disappointing that, even among our supporters, there seems to be little appreciation for the critical need and role of integrity, discipline, and creativity in the work of the clandestine service. Many seem to believe that we have a bottomless well of resources (money as well as people) and engage in the recruitment process without regard to cost or even value. These new officers are frequently astounded to discover that we are driven by objectives, that we have limits on funding, and that we are tightly accountable for our resources and the quality of our product. Many have to be explicity told that we cannot and do not pick up the phone and talk to our agents. Few have any sense of the discipline implicit in the exercise of tradecraft.

These questions and the attitudes that underlie them are reflections of what can be read in great volume these days about the Agency as a whole, and the clandestine service in particular. And these young people are, in the main, bright, motivated, and well read. They tend to be 30 years old with one or more advanced degrees. But understandably, given the entry requirements they had

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to meet, they are relatively long on education and short on life experience. Also, they are apt to place more reliance on the printed word than on interpersonal communications—at least according to the Meyers-Briggs tests they all take. There is no gainsaying their deep interest in foreign affairs and profound concern about the image of their government. The questions these young men and women raise are most probably echoed elsewhere both within and outside the government.

How can it be that perceptions about us differ so radically from reality in the minds of many of these well educated, presumably objective young individuals? It is, I believe, pertinent that one of the Soviet propaganda objectives for the past two decades has been to turn "CIA" into a dirty word. The Soviets have had considerable help from persistently prurient (and sometimes misinformed) US media. The leaks, accurate or inaccurate, together with some of our acknowledged missteps, have made the job of the KBG propagandist easier. Even so, it is safe to say that the Soviet propaganda machine has been tireless in carrying out its self-appointed role as our principal public relations outlet.

What can or should be done about these distorted views of our nation's clandestine intelligence service? Clearly, we cannot go out on the lecture circuit and attempt to convince the public at large that there really are tight ethical standards in the spy business and that the fact that we were given the charter to break the laws of foreign countries places more demand on us—not less—for integrity, morality, and ethical standards.

There is, however, a whale of a lot we can do within the cleared foreign affairs community. The "no comment" and stiff upper lip are normally appropriate for dealing with the public; but this approach is not useful or adequate in-house. By "in-house" I mean across the entire gamut of cleared foreign affairs specialists that populate the US Foreign Service, the military intelligence community, and our own analytical corps. Misperceptions within these entities can and should be corrected. Specifically:

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We must share professional attitudes with our analytical brethren in the Washington arena, and create opportunities to reach out to them.

We have the options of keeping mum and allowing the misperceptions to grow, or of tackling them head-on. I am hopeful that the current candid approach by DO senior management will continue and will spread to the rest of the clandestine service. We have only ourselves to blame if we do nothing to set the record straight.

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TITLE: Forecasting the Sino-Vietnamese Split

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Out of the closet

FORECASTING THE SINO-VIETNAMESE SPLIT

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Following the fall of South Vietnam in April 1975, the intelligence community drastically reduced its resources and analytical efforts on Indochina, as succeeding administrations sought to distance themselves from that episode in American history. As the Ford and Carter administrations moved to capitalize on the China initiative begun under Nixon, the US retreated from a clear-cut policy in Southeast Asia; little attention was paid to the storm brewing inside Pol Pot's Cambodia, to the gulf that was developing between Vietnam and China as a result of it, or to the Soviet drive to exploit the rift at the expense of the Chinese in hopes of gaining a much stronger foothold in the newly reunified Socialist Republic of Vietnam. This article examines the efforts of the intelligence community to warn policymakers of the growing tensions between China and Vietnam, and notes how these intelligence assessments lacked sufficient impact, due to the political environment of the time.

• • •

From 1975 through 1977, the volume of finished intelligence reports on Indochina fell dramatically. This drop in assessments reflected both a sharp reduction in analytical resources on the region as well as a waning interest by intelligence consumers in a part of the world where the United States was perceived to have suffered a humiliating military defeat. After the end of US involvement in Vietnam in 1975, the Ford and Carter administrations sought to purge Vietnam from our memory—it was acknowledged as a dark episode which succeeding administrations hoped to distance themselves from. When, in 1976, our Thai allies asked us to close our air bases there and depart, the US complied, but failed to develop an alternative policy in Southeast Asia, preferring instead to view developments there in terms of an acceptable equilibrium between the Chinese and Vietnamese communist regimes on the one hand, and the free governments of ASEAN on the other hand. The reports filtering out of Cambodia (then Kampuchea) about the brutality and genocide of the Pol Pot regime were indeed disturbing, but there was little official recognition at the time that developments there would lead ultimately to a major new realignment of alliances in the region. Cambodia, after all, had been, and remained—in the words of William Shawcross—"a sideshow." The Ford administration focused its attention on Cambodia only long enough to recapture the hijacked US containership SS Mayaguez from the Khmer Rouge government in June 1975. During the succeeding Carter administration, the pursuit of better relations with China became the principal policy goal in Washington.

This political environment had, in my view, a direct bearing on intelligence analysis. The number of US intelligence analysts working on Indochina dropped dramatically after 1975. In the words of a former colleague—an army captain

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with a professional military intelligence background assigned to work on Indochina at DIA in the early 1980s—to have been an army officer assigned to work the Vietnam account in 1976, 1977, or 1978 would have been the career "kiss of death." The stigma associated with Indochina following the disaster of April 1975 prompted some professional analysts to consider switching from Vietnam to more interesting accounts, and reportedly, more than a few bailed out to work on China, Thailand, and even Brunei. In such an atmosphere, it is certain that a few military professionals pined for an end to their intelligence assignments; after all, the inherent danger associated with driving tanks was far less risky than the career danger associated with being the army captain assigned to produce the Vietnamese ground order of battle in 1977.

This combination of political environment and a sudden drop in analytical resources had a corresponding impact on intelligence production. The number of finished long- and short-term intelligence assessments produced on Indochina by the US intelligence community—principally CIA, DIA, and State—fell from 58 in 1975, the final year of the Vietnam War, to 17 in 1976. In 1977 the number fell to 7. In 1978 the number of finished assessments rose slightly, to 10.

While the quantity of reports on Indochina fell off sharply, the quality of assessments produced remained high. The professionalism and dedication of those few analysts who stuck with the Indochina problem was reflected in the accuracy of their work. Their reporting on political and military developments in the region in the mid-1970s, and ultimately their prediction of the Sino-Vietnamese split and resulting Soviet-Vietnamese alliance stands as an intelligence success. That their assessments lacked the impact that they should have had was due more to the political environment than anything else. An examination of the critical events in the region from 1975 through early 1979, and the judgments which analysts forwarded to policymakers as tensions escalated in 1978, shows intelligence on the target.

Events

Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978. In February 1979, China launched an attack into Vietnam's six northern border provinces. Relations between Vietnam and China had been steadily declining since 1975:

- In September 1975, China refused to grant Vietnam the amount of aid it had requested.
- In October 1975, Vietnam's Party Secretary Le Duan traveled to Moscow where he obtained considerable Soviet aid and where he endorsed Soviet foreign policy positions.
- By December 1975, the Soviets were involved in assisting Vietnam with some 40 economic projects.
- Throughout 1977 and much of 1978, border clashes took place between Vietnamese troops and the troops of the Beijing-backed Khmer Rouge government of Democratic Kampuchea—the Pol Pot government.
- In March 1978, the Vietnamese government decided to "nationalize" private trade throughout the country. This action most affected the

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Chinese merchant class, resulting in a mass exodus from the country of overseas Chinese.

- In June 1978, Vietnam joined CEMA, the Soviet-bloc economic and trade association.
- In November 1978, Vietnam and the USSR signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation.
- In December 1978, Hanoi announced the formation of a "National Front" in Cambodia, signalling an intention to invade that country.

What took place between 1975 and 1978 was a steady withdrawal of Vietnam from China's sphere of influence. To the Chinese, who had firmly supported North Vietnam during its war with the US, this behavior was an insult, resulting in loss of face and loss of prestige in the region. Also influencing this tense situation was the thawing of relations between the United States and China during the Carter administration. Beijing's new posture was that the Soviet Union—and not the US—was the principal threat to world security. As relations between Hanoi and Beijing worsened, the Chinese could not prevent the Vietnamese from moving into the Soviet sphere, and this was a direct affront to China's foreign policy objectives.

There is reason to believe that both parties would have preferred a resolution of differences to an outright break in relations. This view is supported by Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiao Peng's statements to the press in June 1978, when he portrayed Vietnam's actions as a series of "10 steps" against China. According to Deng, only when Hanoi took the "11th step"—the expulsion of overseas Chinese—had the situation reached a turning point. It was at this time that the Chinese leaders began to warn that Hanoi must be, in their words, "punished." Deng further stated that unless Hanoi moderated its policy on ethnic Chinese, Beijing would retaliate. China subsequently ordered three Vietnamese consulates located in South China closed, and began small-scale military maneuvers near the Vietnamese border.

Analysis

CIA's Office of Regional and Political Analysis produced an Intelligence Assessment in June 1978. Among the key judgments were two perceptive ones which, while not directly forecasting a Chinese military response to Vietnam, did note that relations between Hanoi and Beijing were likely to deteriorate further, and that outright military confrontation was highly possible:

> Although both sides realize that neither is likely to benefit from an all-out confrontation, bitterness is so deep that the situation could deteriorate further, especially if the Vietnam-Cambodian fighting intensifies.
>
> The relationship between Peking and Hanoi already has moved into a new and probably protracted stage of open political warfare and heightened military tensions that could threaten the new equilibrium that has developed in Southeast Asia since the end of the Indochina war . . .

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Additionally, the assessment predicted that "Peking can and probably will resort to a number of other measures to remind Hanoi of China's influence and capabilities in the region. They are likely to include further reductions in economic assistance and trade, military posturing along the border, increasing diplomatic attempts to convince other countries—especially in Southeast Asia—to reduce dealings with Vietnam, and perhaps a more aggressive assertion of its claims to islands in the South China Sea, which are disputed by Vietnam as well as other countries."

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Tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese border increased throughout the fall of 1978. In September and October revealed that the Vietnamese were increasing their physical defenses along the border with the addition of antiaircraft artillery batteries and SA-3 surface-to-air missile batteries. A report received in early October stated that there had been intensified Vietnamese military movements along the border, including troop reinforcements and SAM deployments.

By mid-October, the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and Pacific released an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM) on Sino-Soviet competition in Indochina. The IIM pointed clearly to the possibility of a Chinese military action against Vietnam. The memorandum stated that should the Vietnam-Cambodian situation worsen to a point which seemed to threaten the independence and stability of the Phnom Penh government, China would be left with three options:

> China could greatly increase aid to Phnom Penh . . . This . . . poses the risk . . . of emboldening the Cambodian leadership to provoke Hanoi even further. It could also lead to greater Vietnamese dependence on the USSR for political and military support and therefore to greater Soviet involvement in Vietnam.
>
> China could try to distract Vietnamese attention from Cambodia by a show of force along the border with Vietnam. While this would certainly affect the pace of fighting along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border, it would also pose the kind of security threat to Vietnam that could lead Hanoi to permit a marked increase of the Soviet military presence in Vietnam and might also lead to a Soviet show of force along the Sino-Soviet border. China nonetheless might consider such a move if it was assumed that Vietnam was already past the point of no return in forging a close military relationship with the USSR.
>
> China's third option would be to do nothing more for Phnom Penh, letting the chips fall where they might and hoping to capitalize politically and diplomatically in the long run . . .

As we now know, the second of the three options put forth in this estimate accurately predicted the future course of events in the region. What remained for analysts was to monitor the Cambodian situation, measure the Chinese response, and affix a timetable for any possible Chinese military reaction. As noted, Vietnam proceeded with its full-scale invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. The fact that the Vietnamese employed several infantry divisions—including some belonging to three strategic army corps—and that some were

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airlifted into combat from northern Vietnam, showed that this was no short-term punitive military operation. Although it was not until early January that analysts finally reported the Vietnamese SAM emplacements along the Chinese border and Hanoi's increased readiness posture, they had reported six months earlier that the potential for open hostilities between the two countries was very high. (b)(1)

By mid-January 1979, [redacted] had provided strong evidence of (b)(3)(n) a large Chinese military buildup along the Vietnamese border. [redacted]

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[redacted] On 17 February [redacted] the Chinese Army attacked across the Vietnamese frontier at 25 locations. In the ensuing 30-day incursion, the Chinese managed to capture at least five Vietnamese provincial capitals and inflict some punishing blows on their former allies. Subsequent analysis, however, and statements by the Chinese themselves, indicated that the Vietnamese more than held their own and probably inflicted serious casualties on the People's Liberation Army, thus causing more perceptive analysts to question whether China really taught Vietnam a lesson after all.

Despite the timely assessments and warning of war provided to policymakers by the intelligence community months before the fact, some US officials reacted with incredulity when Deng Xiao Peng—on a visit here—informed them of China's intentions in January 1979. Although analysts clearly recognized that confrontation between China and Vietnam was imminent, some officials could not—or would not—believe that Beijing would make a total break with Hanoi. Their refusal to accept this possibility was probably due to several factors, though two seem clear. First, the deterioration of relations between the two countries took place over such a long period that policymakers may have been lulled into a belief that China was bluffing; this was compounded by a general lack of interest in Indochinese affairs by Washington during the preceding three years. Second, Deng's visit here in early 1979 made it difficult, if not impossible, for policymakers to believe that China would act against Vietnam anytime soon.

The intelligence community's forecast of a break in relations between China and Vietnam and the subsequent tactical warning of war were accurate and timely. But the effect was dampened significantly by Washington's lack of interest in Indochina, and by a zealous pursuit of better political and economic relations with Beijing, at the expense of a new and decisive foreign policy toward Southeast Asia.

Postscript

The Sino-Vietnamese split and accompanying border war which had been so accurately predicted by US intelligence analysts throughout 1978 resulted in

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renewed interest in Southeast Asian affairs after February 1979. The intelligence community launched a major new effort to study Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and work on the Chinese Army was intensified. New analysts were hired, and the old interagency Vietnam Ground Forces Working Group—dormant since the end of US involvement in Vietnam in 1975—was reconstituted. Analysts were assigned to assess the outcome of the China-Vietnam border war, and predict whether or not China would follow through with threats to teach Vietnam a "second lesson." Others were assigned the task of analyzing the order of battle and capabilities of the Vietnamese Army; they soon found that most of the files had been packed away in boxes, and that they had to start from scratch. For the next three and one-half years, a team of analysts from CIA, DIA, NSA, State, and Intelligence Center, Pacific (IPAC) met regularly to hammer out a variety of NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs, and order of battle documents. By late 1982, most of the Vietnamese order of battle disagreements had been ironed out,* allowing analysts to tackle questions relating to ground forces capabilities, command and control, and the future of Cambodia. Throughout this period analysts also kept a close watch on Soviet involvement in Indochina, and in doing so, they witnessed the prophecy of October 1978 come to pass. During 1979 the US intelligence community produced a total of 35 finished assessments on Indochina, 30 of them in the last ten months of the year—after the February 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Just as the low production figures of 1976, 1977, and 1978 reflected a decrease in analytical resources and consumer interest, so the much higher figures of 1979 were indicative of greater analytical resources and a renewed interest in the region. Although some of us who were involved in this later effort on Indochina believed that the US was still a long way from developing a clear-cut policy for Southeast Asia, we at least were comforted by the knowledge that we had an interested audience which read our assessments carefully—a far cry from those analysts who kept watch over Indochina during the unrewarding period of the mid- and late-1970s.

This article is classified ~~SECRET~~.

* "Solving the Vietnam Order Of Battle Puzzle," *Studies In Intelligence*, Fall 1984 (b)(3)(c)

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TITLE: Surveying Intelligence Consumers

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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SURVEYING INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS

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The recently published *Intelligence Consumer Survey, 1988* provides important, new information on the views of senior consumers toward intelligence. The 234 officials of the Reagan administration who responded to the survey were broadly representative of consumers at the deputy assistant secretary and above levels at the National Security Council, State, Defense, and at other departments chiefly concerned with international economic issues. Respondents included Vernon Walters and Elliott Abrams at State, Donald Gregg and Robert Oakley at the White House, Caspar Weinberger and Fred Ikle at Defense, and Alan Greenspan at the Federal Reserve. The attitudes of such officials toward intelligence can be compared with those expressed by 133 former Carter administration officials of equivalent rank in a 1980 survey also undertaken by the Intelligence Producers' Council.[1]

There are at least four reasons to pay attention to the survey data.

- The responses of the officials surveyed, both as a group and along agency lines, are credible because they are consistent with much of our anecdotal or case-specific knowledge of senior consumer attitudes towards intelligence. As a result, the survey provides a much broader, yet still believable baseline of knowledge about what senior consumers think of intelligence than do the random set of anecdotes on which most of us normally rely.
- Analysis of the data indicates that officials from all agencies provide very similar responses on most questions. Where differences do appear, the 1988 data can be broken out into the agency groupings indicated in Table 1 for closer analysis.
- The 1980 and 1988 results are very consistent with each other. This indicates that the surveys have tapped policymaker concerns and satisfactions about intelligence that persist over time and political admininistrations.
- The 1988 survey indicates areas where intelligence producers need to improve the services provided to their principal consumers. If consumers were giving intelligence producers a letter grade, a "gentleman's B" would come to mind after perusing the survey data. This suggests room for improvement, and in some areas more serious deficiencies appear to exist.

Table 1
The 1980 and 1988 Survey Populations

	1980 Survey		1988 Survey	
Agency Grouping	Number of Respondents	Percent of Sample	Number of Respondents	Percent of Sample
Dept. of Defense	42	32%	113	48%
Dept. of State	35	26%	58	25%
White House	19	14%	19	8%
Economic Agencies	37	28%	35	15%
Other Agencies	0	—	9	4%
Totals	**133**	**100%**	**234**	**100%**

[1] See *Intelligence Consumer Survey* (IPC 82-10002, September 1982, Confidential).

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This article focuses on what I believe are the four key findings of the 1988 survey and, where possible, compares them with data from the 1980 survey to indicate any trends over time. The implications of all of these findings indicate that intelligence producers should make changes in the way they do business, if they are to serve policymakers effectively in the 1990s.

Key Finding #1: All Forms of Intelligence Are Equally Useful

Both surveys asked consumers to indicate the usefulness of five basic kinds of information: nonintelligence materials, such as newspapers or academic research; basic intelligence, such as biographic, order of battle or other factual data; current intelligence, such as the National Intelligence Daily (NID) or the State Department's Morning Summary; in-depth analytic studies, such as CIA Intelligence Assessments or National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs); and raw or uninterpreted reporting, such as State cables or attache reports. Unfortunately, the two surveys gave respondents a different range of possible answers, with the 1980 survey offering more negative choices and the 1988 survey offering more positive choices on the issue of utility. This has naturally skewed each survey's results in the indicated direction. To minimize this bias, the responses from each survey have been reorganized into three basic categories: "useful," "not very useful," and "not used." [2] Table 2 summarizes consumer responses along these lines.

Table 2
Percent of Policymakers Indicating Usefulness of Different Types of Information

Type of Information	1981 Survey			1988 Survey			% Spending at Least An Hourly/Wkly
	Useful	Not Very Useful	Not Used	Useful	Not Very Useful	Not Used	
Current Intel	84%	8%	8%	78%	12%	10%	67%
In-depth Intel	72%	20%	8%	74%	16%	10%	39%
Non-intel Info	71%	15%	14%	73%	18%	9%	63%
Basic Intel	75%	11%	14%	70%	21%	9%	38%
Raw Reports	66%	22%	12%	66%	20%	14%	50%

The responses are notable both for the high proportion of senior officials who cite each type of information as useful and for the consistency of the figures across the two surveys. Two-thirds or more of our consumers find each type of information useful. The small sample size in both surveys makes differences of less than 10 percent of negligible significance. This means, for example, that nonintelligence information was about as useful as any form of intelligence for Reagan administration officials. It also means that the comparative utility

[2] The following chart indicates how the responses available on the two surveys were reorganized into the categories used in this study.

New Category	1981 Responses		1988 Responses
Useful	Very + Fairly Useful	=	Essential + Very Useful + Somewhat Useful/2
Not Very Useful	Not Particularly Useful + Not Useful	=	Somewhat Useful/2 + Of No Use
Not Used	Did Not Receive + No Answer	+	Have No Experience + No Answer

Analysis of each survey using its original range of responses produces the same findings, but it does not allow comparisons over time.

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advantage held by current intelligence over all other information sources in 1980 virtually disappears in 1988; only raw reporting remains less useful than current intelligence for senior officials.

These aggregate survey results hold up across three of the four agency groupings in the 1988 survey. Consumers at Defense, State and the other, mostly economic agencies display no strong preference for one form of information over another. However, nearly 90 percent of the officials from the Reagan White House cited current and in-depth intelligence as useful, a higher proportion than at the other agencies. NSC officials, with their broadranging and rapidly changing focus of responsibilities, probably have a greater need for these finished forms of intelligence. Departmental officials are somewhat more specialized and experienced in their respective areas.

As the last column in Table 2 reveals, there are sharp differences in the amount of time senior officials spend on various types of information. The survey results, however, allow us to estimate that senior officials spend between two and eight hours a week reviewing intelligence of any form.

There are apparent inconsistencies between how much time consumers say they spend on various types of information and how useful they say each type is. Fewer consumers spend at least an hour a week on in-depth intelligence (39 percent) than on raw reports (50 percent) and nonintelligence sources (63 percent), even though in-depth studies are rated useful by at least as many consumers. Current intelligence and nonintelligence sources receive significantly more time than the other sources, but do not get significantly higher marks for their utility.

This time-utility contradiction can be explained by two conditions confronting most policymakers. First, incentives are high for senior officials to focus on immediate problems. They fear the consequences of not spending as much time as other players in the policy game searching for currently relevant material. The substantial amount of rapidly and widely disseminated raw reporting that flows to senior officials puts an additional time burden on the consumer's daily encounters with intelligence. Ironically, the surveys suggest that when consumers take the time to read more in-depth analyses, they find them equally useful. But this does not reduce the policymaker's near obsession with keeping current.

The second reason consumers spend as much time on nonintelligence sources as on intelligence material is, in my view, the crucial importance of the domestic and bureaucratic political context of American foreign policy. Awareness of what issues and events are receiving public or Congressional attention and of what one's competitors in the policy game are doing is at least as important to senior officials as knowledge of foreign developments.

The initial message for the Intelligence Community is gratifying: a large majority of senior consumers find all forms of intelligence useful in one way or another. A future survey would help producers even more if it asked for consumer feedback on what is more or less useful in different types of intelligence, when each type of intelligence is most useful, and what sort of packaging or presentation makes written intelligence more or less useful.

The implication for producers of current and in-depth finished intelligence is less encouraging. Such material is cited as no more useful than are newspapers and raw reporting. The basic message here should not be missed: the information marketplace is highly competitive, with consumers picking out whatever is most relevant and available at the time needed. The surveys indicate that finished intelligence does not have a built-in comparative advantage in these terms.

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There are three lessons for finished intelligence producers to draw from this finding. First, producers must place a premium on conciseness and on a format that highlights what is important. The current policy peg also should be identified and emphasized at the outset.

Additionally, intelligence producers need to consider more frequently what the comparative advantage of finished intelligence is in any given situation. Many times we cannot "beat" our competitors to the consumer, even if we want to. Do policymakers benefit and does the credibility of intelligence increase if a story containing no unique intelligence is published just to get it on the record? Alternatively, if producers decide they have something of value to offer the consumer that is not already available from other sources, the survey indicates that simply dropping the product in the consumer's mailbox is not a strategy for success in a competitive marketplace. Time and energy have to be devoted to marketing finished intelligence.

Finally, newspapers and raw reporting may be as useful as finished intelligence because their style and approach to interpreting events are often more in line with the way policy officials think about or approach events. These sources tend to be conversational in style, anecdotal in their treatment of events, and often focused on personalities. Finished intelligence tends toward a denser style, seeks to highlight generalizations about events, and focuses on abstract forces, thereby reducing its potential utility.

Key Finding #2: Personal Staffs Play a Pivotal Role

Both surveys confirmed that most senior officials rely on their personal staffs to screen or summarize the intelligence they receive. Over 80 percent of the Carter consumers said that their staffs screened some or all of their intelligence; nearly 65 percent of the Reagan consumers said their staffs summarized or otherwise edited some or all of the intelligence they saw. The drop in the proportion of officials acknowledging such staff interventions presumably reflects the narrower question wording in the 1988 survey and not a drop in policymaker reliance on gatekeepers. Such a drop would run contrary to much of our anecdotal evidence.

Evidence of the increasing role of the personal staffs is found in the answers provided to survey questions on the channels used to request intelligence. Table 3 indicates the percentage of consumers who indicated they requested intelligence either "daily or weekly" or "not at all" via five possible tasking channels: personal staff, intelligence liaison officers, directly to other intelligence officers, via formal requirements, or via the directors or deputy directors of an intelligence agency.

Table 3
Percent of Senior Officials Indicating
Use of Various Channels to Request Intelligence

	1981 Survey		1988 Survey					
					Daily/Weekly Use at			
Channel	Daily or Weekly	Not At All	Daily or Weekly	Not At All	DoD	State	WHse	Other
Personal Staff	55%	18%	65%	14%	66%	65%	83%	59%
Via Intel Liaison Off.	65%	15%	40%	25%	41%	24%	44%	55%
Directly to an Intel Off.	44%	15%	21%	28%	21%	12%	56%	18%
Via Formal Requirements	NA	NA	19%	44%	23%	7%	22%	20%
Via Agency Director/DD	16%	31%	3%	61%	3%	2%	22%	0%
% Citing Any Intel Channel	75%	15%	55%	25%	55%	45%	70%	55%

Note: Table excludes consumers who indicated they used a tasking channel less than weekly.

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The change between the two surveys in the proportion of policymakers requesting intelligence via each channel is striking. The proportion of consumers who used *any* of the direct channels to the Intelligence Community on a daily or weekly basis declined by about 30 percent. The proportion who indicated that they did not use a direct channel rose in every instance. In contrast, the percentage of consumers asking their personal staffs to obtain needed information rose between the two surveys. The bright spot in the data is the equal significance of the intelligence liaison officer and personal staff channels at the other, mostly economic agencies. The minimal use made of intelligence agency directors, except by the White House, is not surprising; most consumers in the survey would not have frequent access to this high-level channel. The limited use made of formal requirements systems confirms longstanding concerns that consumers are largely ignorant of how to use such systems and, when knowledgeable, find them confusing, rigid, and often too slow to meet their needs.

The evidence of a decline in the frequency of direct tasking of the Intelligence Community is troubling. Personal staffs may usually come to Community components to fulfill the needs of their principals, but they may also be filling those needs themselves by tasking components in the policy agency itself. Interviews with policy officials or other research are needed to confirm exactly what has happened and why.

Whatever the case, the prominent role of senior staffs has two significant implications for intelligence producers. First, intelligence production managers should be in frequent personal contact with the personal staffs of the senior consumers that they are trying to serve. In many cases, such staffers should be seen as the firstline, or even primary, consumers. Infrequent contact with senior staffs increases the risk of not being in on the action when intelligence is needed or of providing intelligence that is not focused on the actual needs of the policymaker. The challenge is often seen by producers as one of trying to get past these gatekeepers. The real challenge is providing gatekeepers with the appropriate assistance at the appropriate time in serving their principals.

Second, the continuing importance of intelligence liaison officer channels at the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and Energy appears to provide a model worth building on elsewhere. Every military commander of a unit of battalion or squadron size or larger benefits from a full-time intelligence officer looking out for his needs. It would seem useful to extend the same service to every assistant secretary or higher-level official in our key foreign policymaking agencies. Such liaison officers would help particular producers to stay close to consumer needs and to protect consumers from being swamped with calls by many producing units trying to market their services or be of help. Rotational service as a liaison officer would also increase any intelligence officer's awareness of how his or her self-initiated intelligence can better serve consumers upon return to a production component.

Key Finding #3: Oral Briefings Preferred

The 1988 survey asked consumers about their preferences for various mediums for receiving intelligence. Between 50 and 60 percent said that they liked getting intelligence via every medium—written, oral, or electronic. This is consistent with the Carter-era survey, which found that 60 percent of consumers liked to get intelligence in a combination of written and oral forms. As Table 4 indicates, however, the 1988 survey revealed some differences in the proportion of senior officials who had stronger likes or dislikes for the various forms of delivery.

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Table 4
Percent of Policymakers Indicating Strong
Likes or Dislikes for Different Intelligence Mediums

Medium	% Who Haven't Used	% Who Have Used Medium & Like Very Much	% Who Have Used Medium & Dislike Very Much/Dislike	% Who Like Very Much at DoD	State	White H.	Others
Oral Intel Briefings	8%	37%	5%	37%	30%	41%	43%
Formal Intel Pubs	4%	28%	6%	24%	35%	47%	23%
Written Intel Done for You	11%	27%	7%	23%	24%	41%	34%
				% Who Have Not Used at DoD	State	White H.	Others
Videotape Intel	65%	17%	20%	63%	82%	56%	55%
Intel on Computer Terminal	81%	16%	26%	80%	89%	72%	82%

The strong preference for oral briefings is not surprising. Oral presentations, when done well, are more focused on a particular policymaker's concerns, and there is a chance for followup discussion. In some ways, it is surprising that the number of consumers preferring oral briefings is not higher and that only consumers at Defense and the economic agencies displayed such a relative preference in the survey. This probably reflects the situational element that is missing from the survey question: sometimes oral briefings are preferred; sometimes written intelligence is wanted.

In contrast to these marginal differences, the response to intelligence via videotape or computer terminal is much less positive. Our conclusions have to be tempered by the fact that two-thirds or more of our senior consumers have yet to sample these mediums. Of those who have, however, fewer like them very much, and more disliked the electronic mediums than for either written or oral intelligence.

The heavy investment of time by at least some producers of finished intelligence in the preparation of formal current and in-depth intelligence publications appears to be out of line with the marginal preferences of consumers. For example, Table 5 provides evidence on how production branches in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) allocate their production effort and on the frequency with which various product types have been requested.

The pattern is clear. Over 60 percent of the DI's effort is put into preparing the NID and the President's Daily Brief (PDB), hardcover publications, and its periodicals. These products are the least requested by consumers. In contrast, oral briefings and shorter written products are frequently requested, but they receive the least amount of the DI's effort. While a continuing investment in basic research by intelligence producers is necessary to make subsequent oral briefings or talking points both credible and useful, the evidence indicates that we could provide better service to key consumers by making changes in two areas. At the margins, more effort in preparing, marketing, and presenting intelligence orally and less effort in preparing and reviewing NID items and hardcovers would respond to consumer preferences on how to deliver intelligence. Also, better mechanisms are needed to determine whether a policymaker wants a written report of some kind of whether he or she really wants to pose a few questions to an intelligence expert. More personal contact with policymaker staffs and more extensive use of intelligence liaison officers would improve the ability of producers to provide the right type of product at the right time.

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Table 5
How Do Production Branches in the CIA'S Directorate of Intelligence Allocate Their Production Effort?

Type of Production	Branch Average in Five Regional Offices	Branch Average in Four Functional Offices	Branch Average For Directorate	Estimated % of Product Type Done at Request Of a Consumer
Oral Briefings	10%	10%	10%	80%+
Typescripts, Talking Points, Short Memos	18%	12%	15%	60%+
Periodical Publications	15%	15%	15%	3%
NID/PDB	25%	10%	18%	10%
Hardcovers	25%	35%	30%	20%
Bios, Maps, Databases, Other	7%	18%	12%	35%
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	—

Note: Based on data collected from 95 DI branch chiefs and experienced analysts who took the Supervision of Analysis, Workshop on Reviewing Analytical Papers, or Reaching Policymakers courses in 1988-89. Excludes time spent on travel, training, administrative, or housekeeping matters.

Producers need to find out more about the reasons for consumer resistance to the electronic delivery of intelligence. Is it mostly reflective of a generational gap between those who gained their professional success before the information revolution and those who began their professional lives in a multimedia world? Or do the new mediums fail to provide something that is valued in the traditional formats: a computer screen cannot be taken to a meeting or highlighted by magic marker; a videotape lacks the authoritative credibility of an expert briefing, and it cannot answer your followup questions on the spot. The expense of new electronic delivery systems will be justified only if they are used.

Key Finding #4: A Need for Better Policy-Support Intelligence

The 1988 survey also recognized the importance of discovering consumer perceptions of the quality of intelligence. Even unsatisfactory or low-quality support may be useful, or at least better than no support at all. Table 6 provides the responses of consumers to the question, "How satisfied have you been with the performance of the Intelligence Community in providing you with information that keeps you generally informed about world affairs, that keeps you informed about your specific areas of responsibility, or that addresses policy objectives of the current administration?" While the meaning of the last category could have been made clearer, other evidence in the survey indicates that it at least partially taps consumer perceptions of how well the Community does in preparing intelligence that directly supports decisionmaking, as opposed to intelligence that provides background facts or analysis. The first two information categories in this question clearly fall into this latter area.

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Table 6
Policymaker Satisfaction
With Different Types of Intelligence

	Type of Intelligence		
Satisfaction Rating	Intelligence on World Affairs	Intelligence on Official's Areas of Responsibility	Intelligence To Support Decision making
Very Satisfied	24%	28%	9%
Satisfied	69%	61%	64%
Dissatisfied	6%	10%	21%
Very Dissatisfied	1%	1%	6%
% Indicating Such Intelligence Is:			
Essential	8%	71%	15%
Very Useful	52%	24%	37%

Over 90 percent of senior officials indicated satisfaction with intelligence that essentially provided background on world affairs, although only 8 percent said that such intelligence was essential. Small pockets of dissatisfaction existed only among officials at State and Defense. These responses validate the high proportion of consumers citing current intelligence publications as useful: 65 percent of all consumers said so about the widely disseminated NID; 75 percent of DoD consumers said DIA's Defense Intelligence Summary was useful, and 71 percent of State consumers said the same about the State Morning Summary.

Eigthy-nine percent of the policymakers expressed satisfaction with intelligence received on their areas of concern. This is gratifying, in light of the 71 percent of consumers who indicated that such intelligence was essential to their jobs. At the margins, dissatisfaction is slightly higher with this type of intelligence in comparison with background on world affairs. Twenty-three officials, including some at the White House and the economic agencies, were dissatisfied with intelligence on their areas of concern. This is 11 percent of the total.

These responses are consistent with the significant proportion of consumers who cite various in-depth intelligence publications as useful. For example, 58 percent of all consumers said they found CIA Intelligence Assessments and Research Papers useful; 67 percent at State said INR's Intelligence Reports were useful; and 46 percent of DoD consumers cited DIA Appraisals as useful.

Consumer satisfaction drops significantly concerning intelligence meant to support decisionmaking and policy implementation. While about one-fourth of all consumers were very satisfied with the first two categories of intelligence, less than 10 percent said the same here. The rise of dissatisfaction to 27 percent of the total is of greater concern. Results vary somewhat when they are broken down along agency lines. Only 7 percent of officials at the mostly economic agencies were dissatisfied with such policy-support intelligence, but 17 percent of the officials surveyed at the White House, 30 percent at Defense, and 38 percent at State were dissatisfied.

These responses on the 1988 survey are consistent with comments by senior Carter administration officials in the earlier survey. Over 40 percent of the Carter officials said that they received an insufficient quantity of "intelligence analyses specifically prepared to support the development of policy options or operational planning." Over half of the Carter survey

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respondents said that the quality of the policy-support intelligence actually received was only "fair" or "poor." The consistency of the data across the two surveys indicates a deep-rooted and continuing area of deficiency in such Intelligence Community work.

Neither survey asked directly for the reasons why consumers were dissatisfied with policy-support intelligence. Some consumer dissatisfaction probably reflects unhappiness with the judgments provided by intelligence. Answers to three questions on the 1988 survey provide some clues about other sources of dissatisfaction. They also suggest that while 73 percent of consumers said that they were satisfied with intelligence to support decisionmaking, many of these respondents almost certainly were providing at best a soft endorsement of such intelligence work.

Policymaker staffs frequently are forced to modify or repackage intelligence to make it focus on their principals' concerns. Listed below are the percentage of policymakers in the 1988 survey giving various reasons for the editing done by their staff before they receive intelligence material. Many cited more than one reason. The responses indicate that producers of finished intelligence are too often unaware of what policy officials need.

Reason For Staff Editing	Percent Citing Reason
To reduce the length	66%
To remove irrelevant material	62%
To integrate other intelligence information	50%
To identify or emphasize support for current policy concerns	50%
To improve the clarity of presentation	47%

Another question on the 1988 survey indicates that senior officials sometimes either do not request intelligence support before acting or request it and fail to receive it. Less than half of our senior consumers said that they always sought intelligence before acting, even though nearly all of them said that they believed intelligence might have helped. About 40 percent said that they failed to do so because time pressures precluded making a request. This also means, however, that intelligence producers have not been close enough to senior officials on some occasions to know that intelligence would have been helpful. The same is true for the 20 percent who said that they did not request intelligence because they thought it was either unobtainable or would not be useful. Roughly 30 percent of all consumers said that they sometimes requested intelligence support and either never got it or got it too late to be used. This answer was given most frequently by White House officials; over half of them said so, twice the proportion at other agencies.

An open-ended question at the end of the 1988 survey provides strong evidence that many senior officials want more intelligence that is tailored to their particular needs. When asked to write in "ways that intelligence producers can improve the usefulness and quality of their support," nearly half of the Reagan officials wrote "be more responsive to specific needs," "respond more quickly," "make tasking easier," "establish more personal contact," or "develop a rifle rather than a shotgun approach to providing intelligence." This collection of responses far overshadowed the roughly 15 percent who said that they thought the substantive content or quality of intelligence needed improvement or the 5 percent who wrote in "I'm satisfied."

The strength and breadth across agency lines of the evidence that better intelligence to support policymaking is needed indicates the one aspect of our work that is deficient in more than a marginal way. This judgment based on the survey data is supported by a growing body

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of case-study material and by recent public criticisms of the performance of the Intelligence Community by members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and a number of former Reagan administration officials.[3]

The judgment that producers are deficient in providing policy-support intelligence must be tempered by the evidence in the surveys and in our personal experiences that wide variations exist across cases. Some consumers have gotten just what they needed to make decisionmaking easier or more informed. The senior officials in the economic agencies appear to stand out in the survey data in this regard. Within every producing agency, some production units are more or less dedicated to the publication of basic intelligence. They should not be held to an unfair performance standard that may indicate a need for substantially improved policy-support work by others. Nonetheless, the basic judgment still stands: the policy-support work of intelligence producers is more problematic than their other types of production.

How can the problem be fixed? Part of it is caused by policymakers themselves. Sherman Kent was among the first intelligence producers to complain publicly about the failure of policy officials to give intelligence analysts questions to address and about the tendency of policy officials to ask questions only at the last minute, thereby guaranteeing a hasty intelligence response to often tough questions. Kent also complained about the failure of the policy agencies to keep intelligence producers informed about their changing agendas and policies. Unfortunately, policymaker culpability for a lot of what is irrelevant or unfocused in intelligence was diagnosed in 1948, and it has since received serious comment a number of times. This suggests that policymakers are not about to make great strides in helping us better serve their needs in the 1990s. The ball is in the intelligence producers' court.

My own experience, reinforced by the pattern discerned in much of the survey data, indicates that shifts are necessary in how intelligence producers make three tradeoffs that have always confronted them. First, intelligence analysts have to work harder to increase their expertise and knowledge about the US policy process and agenda and less on developing it on foreign lands. This means spending more time studying the US foreign policy process, the shifting legislative and budgetary agendas that set the tempo for much decisionmaking, and the interests and personalities of consumers. Analysts should try to obtain such knowledge firsthand by talking with officials in policy agencies, by attending significant Congressional hearings as observers, and by participating in public conferences on foreign affairs issues. Infrequent "parish calls" or feverish running about are not the cure. Time spent out of the office has to be guided by specific purposes and be subjected to some division of labor. Although we will still need to devote the bulk of our time to building and maintaining the intellectual capital that makes our work credible, we should be spending close to one-third of our time on staying attuned to the policy process.

Second, the consumer surveys show that our self-initiated work is useful and appreciated, but the deficiencies in the area of policy-support work boil down to what intelligence producers are not doing. To do more of such work and to get better at the support we provide, some of the effort now devoted to getting out scheduled research has to be shifted to the area where senior officials are telling us they need more help.

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[3] Nearly all the case studies developed by the Program in Intelligence Assessment and Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government illustrate variations of the problem of intelligence - policy disconnect, for example. Recent public criticisms of the deficiencies of intelligence producers in providing policy-support intelligence can be found in Roy Godson, ed. *Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s* (Lexington Books, 1989) and in articles by Robert Gates and Anne Armstrong in *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter, 1989).

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Third, intelligence production managers need to spend more time and effort out of the office staying in touch with consumers at their appropriate level and less time and effort in the office reviewing paper products and attending to internal bureaucratic concerns. Adjustments in the first two tradeoff areas will not occur, unless managers display their own commitment to meeting more of the particular needs of consumers. Equally important, as managers or their liaison officers learn what is needed, the message has to be relayed quickly and clearly to the production units for action so that relevant products are available when needed.

Some Final Thoughts

If senior officials from at least the last two administrations have been asking for more and better intelligence tailored to their decisionmaking and policy implementation needs, why has the Intelligence Community been slow to respond? Reforms in these directions will not be easy to make because they run counter to how the intelligence culture operates and because such changes entail real risks.

- It would be harder for intelligence producers to avoid being co-opted into the policymaking process itself.
- All intelligence producers would be likely to have less freedom of activity, as the customer's agenda controlled increasing amounts of our time.
- All DI managers would be less aware of intelligence production activity, and thus less able to control it.
- Consumers' judgments of the quality of our work would become more important and would loom much larger in career development.

Nonetheless, the risks seem to be worth taking. The margin for policymaking error for the US Government is declining as the *relative* power and influence of the US over international affairs declines. When high-quality policy-support intelligence is unavailable, the result will be more damaging in the future than it has been in the past. The US will increasingly lack the luxury of being able to make repeated or serious mistakes and still protect its interests.

Moreover, only the Intelligence Community has the capability and mission to serve all the policymaker's information needs, including professionally tailored support of the decisionmaking and policy implementation process. Providing useful but often not essential background analysis and facts is not where the challenge lies for intelligence producers in the next decade. At the level of policy implementation, actionable intelligence and other kinds of support for operational activity are the growth industry. At the level of policy formulation, "opportunities and vulnerabilities" analysis and evaluation of the likely foreign impact of, or responses to, US policy options are the areas for major improvements in intelligence. This is the essence of what consumers tried to tell us in the survey.

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Souers speaks out

NOTES ON THE EARLY DCIs

William Henhoeffer
James Hanrahan

In 1969, Ludwell Montague, a member of the CIA's Board of National Estimates, interviewed Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, the first Director of Central Intelligence (January—June 1946). Montague was gathering material for an official history of General Walter Bedell Smith, the fourth DCI. Montague had come to know Souers well from 1944 to 1950, when Souers successively served as Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence, DCI, and Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC). As excerpts from the interview reveal, Souers pulled few punches in talking about his predecessor, General William Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and about his own successors as DCI: Lt. General Hoyt Vandenberg (June 1946—May 1947), Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter (May 1947—October 1950), Smith (October 1950—February 1953), and Allen Dulles (February 1953—November 1961).

Montague's Background

As a colonel in Army Intelligence during World War II, Montague served as Executive Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The committee was subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and it was composed of representatives of the intelligence components of the armed services, the Department of State, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the OSS. Montague opposed Donovan's 1944 proposal for a postwar Central Intelligence Agency; he claimed that a plan that he himself worked on in his JIC capacity—JIC 239/5, mentioned in the interview—was the basis for the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) established in 1946 and, by extension, for the CIA itself. Others have judged that the CIA embodies the fulfillment of Donovan's proposal and the discarding of JIC 239/5.

After a brief postwar tour at the Department of State, Montague headed the CIG's Central Reports Staff, which produced a Daily Summary of Intelligence and a weekly wrapup for President Truman. When the CIA replaced the CIG, Montague helped set up the Office of National Estimates. He served as a member of the Board of National Estimates until his retirement in 1971.

Setting the Stage

Before responding to Montague's specific questions, Souers reminisced about his career and about the bureaucratic politics surrounding the creation of the CIA. Montague's reconstruction of Souer's wide-ranging remarks, which follows, paints an interesting picture of postwar power politics in Washington. For the sake of coherence, we have inserted explanatory information at appropriate points in the account.

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Before the war, Souers was a Naval Intelligence reserve officer. Naval Intelligence as he then knew it was chiefly concerned with plant security in the US and with target data on foreign industrial plants. Souers was assigned the task of obtaining target data on certain

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REAR ADMIRAL SIDNEY W. SOUERS, USNR
23 JANUARY 1946–10 JUNE 1946



LIEUTENANT GENERAL
HOYT S. VANDENBERG, USA
10 JUNE 1946–1 MAY 1947



REAR ADMIRAL
ROSCOE H. HILLENKOETTER, USN
1 MAY 1947–7 OCTOBER 1950



GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH, USA
7 OCTOBER 1950–9 FEBRUARY 1953



THE HONORABLE ALLEN W. DULLES
26 FEBRUARY 1953–29 NOVEMBER 1961

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chemical plants in Japan from the American industrial engineer who had designed and built them. The man was repelled by the idea. He felt an obligation of honor to his Japanese employers, and he was not disposed to facilitate the destruction of his own creations. Souers got him to talk by putting forward some ignorant suppositions regarding those plants, which moved the engineer to correct Souers' mistakes.

Souers was *not* a Truman crony when he was made DCI. He had been a pillar of the Democratic Party in St. Louis, so that Truman knew who he was, but they had never met. Souers recalls having been appalled when Truman was first nominated for the Senate. His thought was, "I would not hire that man in my business for more than $250 a month." Souers later became a warm admirer of and confidential adviser to the President.

James Forrestal was Souers' particular friend in official Washington. They became acquainted when Forrestal helped to finance Souers' reorganization of the General American Life Insurance Company. When Forrestal became Secretary of the Navy, he asked Souers to accept a position in the financial administration of the Navy Department, but Souers declined. If there was going to be a war, Souers wanted active service overseas.

Souers became the Director of Intelligence at the headquarters of the Caribbean Sea Frontier in Puerto Rico, where his chief concern was the protection of naval installations from sabotage. His wife was not allowed to go to Puerto Rico. Lonely and bored, Souers finally invoked Forrestal's friendship in order to escape from Puerto Rico. Thus, he became Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence in Washington, under Commodore Thomas B. Inglis.

Inglis opposed the 1944 Donovan plan providing for an independent and autocratic DCI, but he favored JIC 239/5, which provided for a CIA under the control of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. In September 1945, President Truman instructed Secretary of State James Byrnes to develop a plan for organizing national intelligence. The final version of this plan, which was submitted in December 1945, called for the Secretary of State to occupy the most powerful position.

During the controversy over this plan, Souers prepared for Inglis a paper designed to get the JCS to revive JIC 239/5. Inglis was for the paper, but he hesitated to sign it. Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations, was thought to be violently opposed to any sort of CIA. Souers, however, persuaded Inglis that it was his duty to recommend the best solution. To their relief, King passed the proposal on to the JCS without comment. The JCS subsequently recommended the JIC 239/5 solution to the Secretaries of War and Navy, which enabled Forrestal to urge it upon Byrnes and Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson. It was the basis of the President's letter of 22 January 1946 that established a central intelligence service.

Montague mentioned having seen a note from Souers to Commander Clark Clifford, then a White House naval aide, urging that the President be persuaded to adopt the JCS plan in preference to the State Department one and remarking that this advice was disinterested, since Souers would not accept appointment as DCI, even if it were offered him. Souers was eager to get back to his business in St. Louis, but was stuck in Washington because he had promised to stay until the issue was resolved. Forrestal wanted Hillenkoetter to be the first DCI, but Admirals Leahy and Denfeld vetoed Hillenkoetter and insisted on the appointment of Souers. This was not a matter of personal favor, since Leahy subsequently obtained the appointment of Hillenkoetter, who had been his aide at Vichy. It was just that both knew that Souers was familiar with the JIC 239/5 background and that Hillenkoetter was not. In the end, Souers reluctantly accepted the appointment, just to get the CIG started, with the understanding that he would stay for only six months. Souers met Truman for the first time when he went to the White House to help draft the President's letter.

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On being selected to be DCI, Souers was transferred from the Office of Naval Intelligence to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. He and Inglis were made rear admirals on the same day.

Truman regarded the CIG (and the CIA) as his personal intelligence service. Its job was to keep him personally well informed of all that was going on in the outside world. That is why there was so much pressure to have US operational information, as well as foreign intelligence, in the CIG Daily Summary.

From the first, Souers was looking for a long-term successor. The Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB), which advised the CIG, contained some candidates. Its regular members were the heads of the intelligence services of State, War, Navy, and the Air Force. Initially, these were Colonel Alfred McCormack of State, Lt. General Vandenberg of Army (G-2), Rear Admiral Inglis of Navy (ONI), and Brig. General George C. McDonald of Air Force (A-2). Occasionally, when invited by the DCI, the Director of the FBI or his representative attended IAB meetings.

Vandenberg seemed a better candidate than Inglis because he was the nephew of Arthur Vandenberg, a prominent Republican Senator. The Senator's support for legislation to establish the CIA was especially desired, in order to keep it from becoming a party issue. But Gen. Vandenberg's ambition was to become Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Souers asked him if he thought that he would be made Chief of Staff just because he was handsome. Obviously, the best way to make himself personally known to the President and the prospective Secretary of Defense would be to serve in their presence as DCI. That persuaded Vandenberg to accept the Directorship. He had no long-term interest in the CIA, but Souers was himself past caring about that in his impatience to get back to St. Louis.

Inglis was opposed to Vandenberg and Hillenkoetter. He evidently did indeed want a CIA but only as a common service agency under IAB's control.

Souers was never a member of the White House Staff. As DCI, he was a naval reserve officer on active duty in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. On being relieved as DCI, he was relieved from active duty and was enrolled as a White House consultant, but he never functioned in that capacity. He had no further contact with the White House, until he was called back to be Executive Secretary of the NSC in September 1947.

The National Security Act of 1947 described the Secretary of Defense as "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security." That sentence was intended to give the Secretary of Defense a status superior to that of the members of the JCS, who had been insisting that they were the President's principal advisers in relation to such matters, as they indeed had been from 1942 to 1947. Forrestal interpreted this sentence to mean that he was, in effect, Deputy President for National Security. He regarded the NSC as a coordinating mechanism subordinate to his prerogative as "Deputy President" and the Executive Secretary and the DCI as his personal agents. He demanded that Souers and Hillenkoetter establish their offices in the Pentagon next to his. They demurred, but Forrestal insisted. Thereupon, they practiced a small deception on him. They had a one room in the Pentagon, not too near to Forrestal's office, in which they kept one girl with two telephones and two squawk boxes. If Forrestal called one of them, the girl said that he was out at the moment. She then called him at his real office, and he returned Forrestal's call. Souers kept a car and driver constantly ready. If summoned to Forrestal's office, he could get there almost as quickly as, say, the Secretary of the Air Force could from within the Pentagon. Presumably, Hillenkoetter did the same thing.

Eight months after Hillenkoetter took office as DCI and only five months after the passage of the National Security Act, the NSC set up a Survey Group to examine the CIA and "national

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organization for intelligence." The Survey Group, which was composed of Chairman Allen Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Matthias F. Correa, submitted its findings to the NSC on 1 January 1949. It proposed a substantial reorganization of the CIA and greater leadership for the CIA over the rest of the intelligence community.

Specific Questions Answered By Souers

Why was the Survey Group set up? Was the NSC aware of some problem with regard to the CIA?

The NSC as a whole was unaware of any problem with the CIA. Forrestal certainly was aware of tension between Hillenkoetter and Inglis, but he thought that he had resolved that by directing Inglis to support Hillenkoetter. He did not realize that there was any particular problem requiring investigation. The origin of the Survey Group was actually quite casual. Souers reminded Forrestal that the NSC was supposed to supervise the CIA. Forrestal said that the NSC had no time for that and that Souers should do it as Executive Secretary. Souers replied that he had no such authority. Moreover, if he had wanted to supervise the CIA, he would still be DCI. They agreed to set up an independent, outside group to keep check on the CIA from time to time for the NSC. They did not anticipate such a devastating report as that which the Survey Group eventually rendered.

Who chose Allen Dulles to head the Survey Group?

Forrestal did. He chose all three members of the Group. Souers would not have chosen Dulles, whom he identified with the OSS, a bad model for the CIA. Donovan had been arrogant and arbitrary; he had misled the President by sending him unevaluated information. Dulles was a member of Governor Thomas Dewey's entourage, and he had been coaching Dewey to attack the CIA. That was mainly about Hillenkoetter's performance in relation to the riots in Bogota, Colombia, in April 1948 that disrupted the conference preparing the charter for the OAS. The CIA was blamed for failing to predict the riots, but Hillenkoetter maintained that State had ignored the CIA's warning. Dulles had also been receiving complaints against Hillenkoetter and the men surrounding him from former colleagues in the clandestine services. Thus, there may have been some thought of neutralizing these attacks by putting Dulles in charge of an official investigation of the CIA. But the main consideration was that Dulles was personally known to Forrestal, who was impressed by his reputation as a clandestine operator in Switzerland during the war.

What about W. H. Jackson? Was the NSC aware that he was the originator of the "board of directors" concept that Inglis advocated in his war on Hillenkoetter?

Forrestal also picked Jackson. The choice had no doctrinal significance. It was just that Forrestal knew Jackson personally, and deemed him to be knowledgeable about intelligence, particularly about the British system.

Why Correa? He seems to have done nothing much, concerning himself only with counterintelligence and relations with the FBI.

Correa had had some counterintelligence experience, but, as in the cases of Dulles and Jackson, the main reason for this appointment was that Forrestal knew him personally and deemed him knowledgeable. He had been Forrestal's favorite aide, and he had been designated to work with Souers to defeat the State Department plan and to promote the "Navy plan," which was actually JIC 239/5.

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Hillenkoetter's response to the Survey Group report implied that Dulles was seeking to destroy Hillenkoetter in order to get his job. Was Dulles ever considered to succeed Hillenkoetter?

Dulles and Jackson were certainly not the disinterested and impartial investigators that they were supposed to be. They were both prejudiced against Hillenkoetter before they began their survey. But the fact remains that Hillenkoetter was a disaster as DCI. He was not qualified to be DCI and should never have been appointed. From the date of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, 1 January 1949, it was generally understood and agreed that Hillenkoetter must go. Many men were considered for appointment to succeed him, but Dulles was never considered, insofar as Souers was aware. Certainly, Souers would never have recommended Dulles to be DCI. Dulles' interest was too narrowly concentrated on clandestine operations. Moreover, he was of the "dictatorial" OSS school.

If it was agreed that Hillenkoetter must go, why did it take 18 months to find a replacement?

Because Truman hated Louis Johnson. In 1948, the Truman campaign was very short of money. Someone persuaded Johnson to help raise contributions by promising him his choice of a cabinet position. Truman knew nothing of that at the time and was outraged when he heard of it, but felt bound by the commitment. Johnson insisted on being made Secretary of Defense. Truman kept Forrestal in office long after everyone knew that he should have been relieved, just to avoid having to appoint Johnson. When Forrestal killed himself, further evasion was impossible.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson refused to suggest a replacement for Hillenkoetter because he considered it inappropriate for him to do so. Johnson proposed Maj. General Joseph T. McNarney, which made good sense. As Deputy to Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall in World War II, McNarney had drafted a directive strengthening the role of the OSS. But Truman would not have McNarney, just because Johnson had proposed him. Johnson proposed a succession of other names, but Truman turned them all down, for the same reason.

Who proposed Bedell Smith, and when?

In early July, Souers told Truman that the outbreak of the Korean War made it imperative to replace Hillenkoetter without further delay. Truman responded by asking how Bedell Smith would do as DCI. Souers does not know who suggested Smith to Truman. Marshall might have, or Averell Harriman. Harriman had a high regard for Smith, because Smith had made possible Harriman's escape from Moscow, by accepting that ambassadorship when no one else would. But Souers thinks that Truman may have thought of Smith himself. Truman had a high regard for Smith as Ambassador to Moscow and considered that he really understood the Russians. Truman would also have considered that Smith, a general who had been an ambassador, would be acceptable to both State and Defense. It is highly unlikely that his consideration would have gone any deeper than that. Smith was nominated on 18 August 1950.

How was Jackson chosen to be Smith's deputy?

Smith came to Souers and said, "I know nothing whatever about this business and need a deputy who does. Whom would you suggest?" Souers suggested Jackson,

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as the member of the Survey Group who had represented the cooperative approach—as distinguished from Dulles, who was of the "dictatorial" school.

How did Dulles come to be chosen as DDP?

Smith, prompted by Jackson, wanted Dulles to take charge of clandestine operations, for which he was well suited by experience, but feared that Truman would veto the appointment of a Dewey partisan. Souers arranged for Truman to receive Dulles at the White House, after which Truman consented to his appointment as DDP.

What is the story behind Smith's promotion?

When Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, he asked for Smith to be his Chief of Staff. Truman said no. Smith was indispensable as DCI; besides, the DCI was a more important position than Chief of Staff. So Maj. General Alfred Gruenther was sent to be Eisenhower's Chief of Staff. Later, Eisenhower asked to have Gruenther made a four-star general. Truman was willing, but Souers reminded him of what he had said about the relative importance of being DCI and suggested that Smith also be given four stars. Truman directed the Army to promote Smith as well as Gruenther, but, when the promotion list came out, Smith's name was not on it. Souers brought this to Truman's attention, and Truman refused to promote anybody until Smith was promoted. Souers attributed the omission of Smith's name to the animosity of Omar Bradley, Lucius Clay, and the West Point clique in general toward Smith.

Smith's appointment as Under Secretary of State cleared the way for Dulles to become DCI. Had it been intended from the first that Dulles should succeed Smith?

Smith certainly never had any such intention. He disliked Dulles. He wanted to remain as DCI and hated the idea of going to State, but he was forced to go by President Eisenhower, whose wishes he could not refuse. Smith told Souers that Lucius Clay had persuaded Eisenhower that it would be improper for both the President and the DCI to be military men, which seems a far-fetched idea and a flimsy pretext. There was a great deal more impropriety in appointing a brother of the Secretary of State to be DCI.

Was Smith's appointment as Under Secretary, then, a devious device to make Dulles DCI?

Draw your own conclusions.

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TITLE: How the Iran-Contra Story Leaked

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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HOW THE IRAN-CONTRA STORY LEAKED

(b)(3)(c)

With all the publicity surrounding the Iran-Contra affair, there was little focus on who leaked the initial story to the Lebanese newspaper *Al-Shiraa* on 1-2 November 1986, or why. It was not until June 1987 that reporting was received on the origin of the mysterious press piece. According to (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) Damascus leaked the US-Iranian arms-for-hostages deal for its own purposes, thus setting in motion events that would temporarily undermine US prestige in the Middle East, expose the diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan Contras, and create a major controversy in US politics.

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n) the Syrian Government first learned of the arms-for-hostages deal from its chargé in Tehran, Iyad Mahmud, who probably got the information through his contacts in the Iranian Government. For Mahmud, who was in fact a Syrian military intelligence officer, this knowledge quickly became a dangerous thing.

In early October 1986, a group of Iranian officials kidnaped Mahmud and beat him badly before letting him go. Iranian press reports at the time claimed that Mahmud had been arrested by the Iranian antivice squad for drunkenness in the company of women and then released 24 hours later. This story covered up the real reason for the arrest—to intimidate Mahmud from passsing on his knowledge of the deal.

Immediately after Mahmud's release, Damascus withdrew him, and he apparently then told his colleagues what he knew. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) claims that Syria, now angry at both the US and Iran, chose the Syrian-financed *Al-Shiraa* to print the story. Although Syrian intelligence officials tried to take credit for disrupting US relations throughout the region, they evidently never anticipated how far-reaching the political reaction would be in the US.

Why Syria Did It

Syria was the only Arab state to consistently back Iran in the Persian Gulf War from 1980 to 1988, and, in return, Iran provided Syria with low-priced oil. In this context, Damascus had no reason to stop the US sale of weapons to Tehran. While Damascus may have feared further US-Iranian cooperation on the Lebanese civil war and other issues, such cooperation is difficul(b)(1) to imagine. Yet claims that Syria exposed the deal out of its anger at both(b)(3)(n) the US and Iran. One possible explanation is that Mahmud found out about the role Israel played in facilitating the deal and that Damascus feared Israeli-Iranian ties would return to the relationship of the 1970s, when Israel provide a steady flow of weapons to the Shah of Iran. But Syrian knowledge of the Israeli angle was unlikely, considering that the *Al-Shiraa* piece made no mention of it. A less unlikely explanation is that Syria had the story printed to punish Iran for its treatment of Mahmud.

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n) however, may have been misled by his Syrian sources on Syrian motivations for releasing the story. He did not account for the four-week lapse between early

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October, when Syria apparently learned of the story, and 1-2 november, when the story appeared in the press. This lapse suggests that Syrian leaders had more in mind then retaliation against Iran.

The Terrorist Trials

The fall of 1986 was a troubled time for the Syrian Government. On 24 October, eight days before the publication of the *Al-Shiraa* story, a jury in London convicted Nizar Hindawi, a Palestinian terrorist who, under orders from high-level Syrian intelligence officials, had tried to blow up an *El Al* airliner in April 1986 by using his unwitting pregnant Irish girlfriend to smuggle a bomb on board. Hindawi was sentenced to 45 years in prison, the longest sentence in modern British history. What followed that afternoon caught the Syrians, and most of the international community, completely by surprise. Within three hours of the court decision, British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe appeared as expected before the House of Commons to denounce the "monstrous and inhumane" terrorist operation. He then did the unexpected by announcing that the UK had decided to break diplomatic relations with Syria. That same afternoon, both the US and Canada announced that they too were withdrawing their ambassadors from Damascus

To make matters worst for the Syrians, a second terrorist trial, this one in West Berlin, was about to begin. It was clear that Syrian intelligence would be implicated in the March 1986 bombing of a German-Arab cultural center. Syrian President Assad probably worried that the economic sanctions imposed by the UK and the US following the Hindawi trail would be taken up by the rest of Europe, following the West Berlin trial. This would put an added strain on the shaky Syrian economy.

Assad also was concerned from a public-relations standpoint. Unlike Iran and Libya, the other large-scale sponsors of terrorism, Syria has sought to protect its international image, particularly in the West. Syrian intelligence officials carefully hid their involvement in terrorism, often by using surrogate groups. Circumstantial evidence linked Damascus to dozens of attacks, including the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 and the Rome and Vienna airport attacks on 27 December 1985, but none produced the "smoking gun." The trials in London and West Berlin were changing all this. For the first time, the West had clear-cut evidence of Syrian involvement in terrorism, and Assad was embarrassed by the highly publicized trials.

Exploiting a Mouthpiece

It was at this moment that Syria, hoping to deflect Western attention, decided to leak the arms-for-hostages story to *Al-Shiraa*. For years, the Syrian Ministry of Information had maintained close ties to the publishers of the weekly tabloid newspaper, providing them with a steady flow of stories, some true and some false, that served Syrian interests. In return, *Al-Shiraa* became increasingly pro-Syrian, reaching the point where it frequently ran editorials supporting the presence of Syrian occupation troops in Lebanon and predicting that only Syria could end the fighting. As a result, the magazine had become known as a one-sided, unreliable source of news.

The *Al-Shiraa* arms-for-hostages article on the weekend of 1-2 November claimed that the US secretly had sent Iran spare parts and ammunition for American-built fighter planes and tanks that the latter had purchased from the US before the Shah's fall in 1979. Furthermore, it described a secret trip made by former US National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane to Tehran in early September 1986. On 4 November, *The New York Times* picked up the

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Al-Shiraa story and put it on the front page. That same day, Iranian Speaker of the Parliament Rafsanjani, in a speech marking the seventh anniversary of US Embassy takeover in Tehran, described in some detail a secret mission made by McFarlane and four other US officials to Tehran. Rafsanjani boasted that Iran had held them hostage for five days, before expelling them.

The fact that Rafsanjani immediately confirmed at least part of the *Al-Shiraa* story rather than ignoring it or even denying it suggests that Iran may have been ready to end the arms-for-hostages arrangement. If so, the situation in Tehran had changed since the kidnaping and beating of Mahmud. By November 1986, Rafsanjani and other more pragmatic Iranian leaders probably were under a lot of pressure from radicals in the regime to terminate contacts with US officials. When the story broke in Lebanon, Rafsanjani moved quickly to make it appear as though Iran had duped "the Great Satan."

A Rich Harvest

For Syria, the *Al-Shiraa* story was a sizable success. By the time the West Berlin terrorist trial ended in mid-November with another guilty verdict and more economic sanctions against Syria, the arms-for-hostages controversy was dominating the headlines, and the issue of Syrian-supported terrorism had moved to the back pages. Syrian leaders almost certainly watched with amazement as the controversy unfolded, revealing the diversion of funds to the Contras and creating a major political scandal in the US. By damaging the credibility of the US counterterrorist effort, Damascus made it unlikely that Western diplomatic and economic sanctions against Syria would last for long. Within a year, the US Ambassador was back in Damascus and the European economic sanctions were nearly rescinded. Only Britain had decided not to resume normal relations with Syria.

Other Results

The impact of the *Al-Shiraa* story also was felt in Iran. On 28 September 1987, Tehran announced the execution of extremist leader Mehdi Hashemi after his conviction on several charges, including murder, kidnaping, and attemping to overthrow the Iranian Government. Hashemi had been identified as one of the more radical Iranian leaders, and there is speculation that he helped leak the secret US-Iranian arrangement to discredit the more moderate Rafsanjani. If so, Hashemi or one of his associates probably was responsible for giving the information to the Syrian diplomat in Tehran. The fact that the arrest of Hashemi, along with 60 of his comrades, took place in November 1986 is hardly a coincidence.

For *Al-Shiraa*, the story caused a tremendous boost in the newspaper's popularity in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East. It also earned *Al-Shiraa* some credibility for its revelation of the dealings between the US and Iran.

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TITLE: Tribute to Women Who Have Died

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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TRIBUTE TO WOMEN WHO HAVE DIED*

(b)(3)(c)

We gather here today in recognition of Women's History Month—a time we set aside to remember the remarkable women in our country who have left their mark in many different fields of endeavor. And surely one whose contributions will be noted in future observances of Women's History Month will be Senator Kassebaum.

At this time, it seems only fitting that we remember our own. Their names will never be in a history book, but they will not be—and should not be—forgotten in these halls. Many words have been written and spoken about the intelligence profession and the special demands it makes of those who choose to follow it. We know when we come here that the work will be tough; that a high measure of dedication will be required; that we will not be able to say much about what we do; that our successes will often be hidden but any failures highlighted on the front pages of the newspaper; that conditions in the countries in which we serve may not be ideal for ourselves or our families. And we know, too, that in a profession where danger is real and for some ever present, we may be asked to give that last full measure of devotion.

We honor today four of our women who made that supreme sacrifice: Barbara A. Robbins, Phyllis Nancy Faraci, Monique N. Lewis, and Deborah Marie Hixon. There are no words that can begin to express our gratitude to them, no way that we can lessen the pain for the families they left behind, no promise that we can make that such outrages will not happen again. But we can remember them, honor them, and, in so doing, perhaps rededicate ourselves to the enormous tasks at hand.

Barbara Robbins was 20 twenty years old when she came to the Agency as a secretary. Born in South Dakota and trained at Colorado State University in its secretarial program, Barbara was eagerly awaiting that all-important 21st birthday *and* her first overseas tour. Aft(b)(3)(c) serving an interim assignment in the then-Far East Division s(b)(3)(n) left for Saigon less than one month after turning 21. Once there, she quickly established herself as a person with sound technical skills and as one who approached her job with enthusiasm and dedication. She still found time for hobbies, one of which was flying as an amateur pilot.

The secretary to (b)(3)(c) in FE Division recalls to this day Barbara's departure for Saigon—how happy and excited she was to be going overseas. And she recalls the day when the cable came from Saigon with these words: "Our secretary is dead."

Barbara Robbins was killed on 30 March 1965 by a Viet Cong explosion in front of the US Embassy in Saigon. Posthumously, she was awarded the Medal of Honor for Vietnam Merit, First Class.

* These remarks were made on 20 March 1989 in the CIA Auditorium.

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Phyllis Nancy Faraci, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) Yet another appraisal referred to her "exemplary performance" and described her as a "doer" who does not wait to be asked. For her performance over the years, she received a Certificate of Exceptional Service, a Certificate for Special Achievement, and a Certificate of Distinction. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) Phyllis Faraci died in the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut on 18 April 1983, at the age of 44. Posthumously, Ms. Faraci was awarded a Career Intelligence Medal and Certificate of Distinction for Courageous Performance.

Monique N. Lewis (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) Monique married an Agency employee and both were sent to Beirut.

Monique told Agency friends how delighted she was at the prospect of working with her husband. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) the Embassy was bombed. Tragically, Monique *and* her husband were killed—the first time that both a husband and wife employed by the Agency have died while in the service of the CIA. At the time of her death, Mrs. Lewis was only 36 years old.

Deborah Marie Hixon, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) In an appraisal of her performance, her supervisor noted that "she is one of the finest young officers I have had the privilege of working with." (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) Her supervisors, noting her "intelligence, drive, and perseverance," commented that she was performing at a level one would expect of someone several grades her senior.

(b)(1) (b)(3)(c) in Beirut in April 1983, Deborah Hixon—only 30 years old—was killed in the bombing of the US Embassy there. She was posthumously awarded an Intelligence Commendation Medal and the Certificate of Distinction for Courageous Performance.

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Dwight David Eisenhower, our 34th president, once said, "Of all the nations of today, the future will say that there were two kinds: those that were intelligent, courageous, decisive and tireless in their support of high principle—and those that disappeared from the earth. The true patriots of today are those who are giving their best to assure that our own country will always be found in the first of these two categories."

Barbara Robbins, Phyllis Faraci, Monique Lewis, and Deborah Hixon were indeed among the true patriots.

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TITLE: Organizational Change in a DO Division

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN A DO DIVISION

(b)(3)(c)

Before you read any further, stop for a moment. Think about your work. Why do you do what you do? Does what you do make any difference? Does what you do eventually show up in the bottom line? What is the bottom line? Do your customers care what your bottom line is? Are you producing for the sake of producing? What happens to your product? Are you clear about what your goals are, or are you throwing blunt darts in the dark? Do you work in a supportive environment? Do you feel sufficiently empowered to question instructions that are not clear or could take you and your office in the wrong direction? When was the last time you or your organization asked these questions? If you have not asked them for a while, why not? You spend more waking hours in the office than you do with your spouse, children, or significant others, and if you are part of the American cultural mainstream, you probably define yourself in terms of your job.

In the Near East and South Asia Division (NE) of CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO), a process called Skunkworks is used to involve *all* division personnel in finding answers to such questions. By working in partnership with the division leadership and employees, Skunkworks strives to increase the division's effectiveness.

The name Skunkworks originated with Kelly Johnson of Lockheed, whose Skunkworks designed the U-2 and SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft.

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Launching the Process

Skunkworks began with a formal contracting session with the then Chief of NE Division. We talked specifically about what Skunkworks had to offer, what support we needed from the division's management, and what products we would deliver. It was agreed that without a commitment to stay the course, efforts to bring about change could do more harm than good.

We started with a bite-size piece of the division, and talked to everyone in Headquarters. With help from a colleague in the DI who is engaged in similar work, we gave them a written survey that asked two basic questions: What makes it hard to work here, and what makes it easy to work here? Because organization change efforts typically take years, we were careful to temper expectations. We also were emphatic about getting people to think about how *they* were part of the problem and the solution. We fed all the data back to the survey participants and, after distilling the major issues, we published it throughout the office.

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We went into this data-gathering and feedback process not knowing what to expect. The worst case scenario would have been rampant negativism and cynicism. Not one of the interviews devolved into unconstructive nit-picking. People participated with enthusiasm, and they left us with the general impression of a group persuaded of the importance of its mission with clear ideas of how to improve effectiveness.

The tough part was that many of the suggested improvements were "process" (how we do our job) versus "content" (what we do) suggestions. The DO is good at getting things done, but it is much less adept at tackling the messy, human questions of how to change the way we do things. After the data gathering, diagnosis, and feedback, the next step is usually action planning. The most effective way to plan action is to get supervisors to take their immediate subordinates off site to discuss the issues and ways to solve problems within the context of the work unit.

At this point, we ran into a brick wall. We simply could not get unit supervisors to confront issues head-on. This raised questions about managerial skills, the nature of supervisory jobs in the division, and the overall quality of communication within work units. In essence, the obstacle provided us with additional data, and the response to date is an in-house management training program tailored to our specific perceived needs. Our response to the managerial roadblock was to slice the data up into issues, instead of by work unit, and to engage everyone in the system in seeking solutions to the problems.

Midway through our process, the leadership of the division changed. We recontracted with the new division chief and his deputy, who had a clear sense of the division's mission and how to accomplish it. (b)(3)(n) . In the year since the new chief's arrival, we have worked to harness resources both inside and outside the division in pursuit of the mission.

Some Results

Because we are still in the initial phases of a multiyear program, results are still cast in terms of means, not ends. It will be some time before we expect to see measurable progress toward fulfilling NE's mission. With the encouragement and support of the division's leadership, however, Skunkworks has worked with a wide range of NE personnel to achieve the following initial results:

— The division leadership established a systematic program for focusing division resources on relevant collection challenges, and it has begun a multiyear project designed to sharpen dialogue between field stations and Headquarters and to breathe life into DO planning tools. (b)(3)(n)

— Incorporating suggestions from key players in the division, including chiefs of station, the division chief began an experiment that will try to focus collectors on strategic multiyear intelligence problems, (b)(3)(n)

— The deputy division chief is developing a division management and personnel strategy to cope with the new and changing intelligence challenges of the next 10

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years, allowing us to do more with less. This strategy will be designed to support the overall division mission, and it will address personnel, training, financial resources, computers, and leadership.

— Problems with substantive and managerial skills have led to a series of in-house courses, some produced with the active and invaluable assistance of the (b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

— Borrowing an idea from another division, a senior division desk officer is working full time on a program to increase the overall skills of Intelligence Analysts and Research Officers. (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

— The division chief has started his own "brown bag" lunches that anyone is welcome to attend. A group chief is having regular lunches to discuss survey issues raised in our data-gathering exercise.

— To help address the problem of communication (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) an advisory board was created with direct ac[illegible]vision leadership. Also, all division personnel at Headquarters met together for the first time in 40 years for a state of the division address shortly after the arrival of a new division chief.

— The division has surveyed computer use, including artificial intelligence and neural networks, in other agencies. Some of these uses proved to have direct applicability, with minor adjustments, to NE problems; efforts are under way to acquire and use proven programs.

— A division working team clarified the division's computer needs with the (b)(3)(c)

— One desk officer organized four joint sessions with the Office of Technical Services (OTS) to orient NE desk officers. (b)(3)(c)

Other Benefits

The Skunkworks experiment also has yielded other, perhaps more important results. One is the gradual establishment of a climate where people are comfortable with change and where everyone feels they have something to contribute. To that end, half of Skunkwork's effectiveness lies in the signals division management is sending downward—that it is open to questions, that constructive change is encouraged, and that ideas are welcome.

Another key, unforeseen benefit of Skunkworks is its ability to look out into the community for ideas that are adaptable to the division. It is, in essence, a clearing house for ideas. The training idea for Intelligence Analysts and Research Officers was not original; it was prompted by a similar arrangement in Latin American Division. Efforts under way to improve the career management system were derived in part from successful aspects of the system used in East Asia Division. A further implication of this ability to scan beyond NE's boundaries is the importance of bringing diverse resources to bear on NE's intelligence targets. It is safe to say

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that the number and complexity of NE's targets are simply too much for the division alone. To succeed in the future, it is imperative that we foster and encourage relationships with others in the community.

Taking Stock

What are the general lessons learned thus far from Skunkworks?

— You have to have the strong support of your office leadership. Without it, you are wasting your time.

— Organizational change takes time; five years is a good rule of thumb. If you are not willing to persist, you risk doing more harm than good.

— Change is not neat; it often is a process of "muddling through."

— Expect resistance. No resistance is a form of resistance, and it could mean you are not working in the right area. And if you are worried about your popularity, you are miscast.

— Keep everyone informed about what is going on. Change causes anxiety, especially in a compartmented environment. Clear communication is essential to countering such anxiety.

— Use existing resources for change and flexibility within the Agency. There are trained professionals in the organization with experience in managing change.

— After you do your data gathering and diagnosis, pick a simple problem that is within the office management's power to solve, and solve it quickly. This demonstrates that you mean business, and it builds credibility.

— Make sure your managers fully understand their role in the process before proceeding. If necessary, give them active assistance by facilitating their work-group meetings.

Obstacles Ahead

Based on our 18 months of existence, we can identify some of the DO's major challenges. Like many commercial corporations, we are faced with the problem of doing more with less. The numbers of our targets and their complexity are increasing, while our resources will remain fixed for the foreseeable future. The way out of this jam is what Rosabeth Moss Kanter describes in her book *When Giants Learn to Dance* as "organizational synergy." Almost everything in our compartmented organizational fiber mitigates against synergy—we are not skilled team players, and we are xenophobic and competitive by nature. One sign of the times is a course taught by Leonard Greenhalgh at Dartmouth's Amos Tuck School of Business entitled "Executive Power and Negotiation." It is the most popular course in the school's history, and it emphasizes teamwork and negotiation instead of the "do it or else" management style we know so well. The challenge is to protect that which truly merits tight compartmentation while opening up to the wide range of resources around us.

Another of our problems is our historic disdain for any form of training. Given the changing nature of our world and our work in it, it is questionable whether we can continue to be effective when many of our officers and support personnel receive little or no training after their initial "basic training." This is a deep-seated cultural issue that will take time to change. Fortunately, there are clear signs from directorate and division leadership that changes are under way.

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We do not do enough to prepare our "corporate" leaders. Many of our senior officers have "stovepipe" careers without sabbaticals or rotationals to give them wider vision or a sense of being part of the Agency as a whole. This hurts when the Executive Committee looks for Agency leaders from among the DO population. By contrast, people in other directorates are forced to interact vigorously with offices inside and outside the Agency throughout their careers. Again, there are signs that this is being examined closely and that steps are being taken to give some of our strong performers in the DO a corporate sense.

If you are asking yourself if all this is necessary, stop again and look around you. Are your intelligence problems changing? Is your place in your wider Agency environment changing? Are the young people working with and for you any different than your own peers? And what about the diversity of your work group? Change is going to occur, whether you manage it or not. Skunkworks is part of NE's decision to be a driver instead of a passenger.

The end game is a state of organizational being that might best be illustrated by an experience we have all had, the family dinner as described by Linda Schmitt, a quality consultant with the Telenet Communications Corporation in Reston:

> "Picture yourself as you were when you were eleven years old, and it is almost dinner time. Mom tells you to set the table. Well, this is not such a bad chore, and besides, you're hungry, so maybe you'll get fed faster if you get cracking with setting the table. So you go get the plates, napkins, and silverware and set the table. Everybody gets called to dinner, all the people in your family and maybe a neighbor kid or two. Everybody sits down. Maybe in your family a blessing is said. Then the food is passed and everyone helps themselves. But there is a problem. Mom forgot to tell you that you're having corn on the cob tonight. You forgot the butter. So you go to the fridge and get the butter. Then you have to get the salt and pepper. But the corn is too hot to handle, so then you have to get up again and find those little things you hold the corn with. By now your brother is saying how dumb you are that you forgot. You say, "Well, Mom didn't tell me we were having corn." Mom's saying, "Now, now, it's not your fault, I didn't tell you . . . " Eventually, you sit back down to eat, but all the enjoyment has gone out of the meal. You're bugged, and in addition you have one more reason never to speak to your brother again!"
>
> Three key elements were missing in the situation described by Ms. Schmitt:
>
> *Leadership*. That is Mom. She was busy, but she might have taken one more minute to go over with you what she was planning to serve and talk with you about what would be needed to set the table.
>
> *An empowered employee*. That is the son or daughter, who is accustomed to having the authority and responsibility to stop before he or she starts, to find out what the desired results are, and to think through what to do. An empowered employee who is not afraid or intimidated to slow Mom down for a minute and get a good clear idea of what is expected.
>
> *A supportive environment*. That is your brother, who, instead of picking on you, volunteers to go get the butter or offers to give you a hand.

That is the end game. A work environment with leadership, empowerment, and support. It takes everyone being consciously, deliberately, responsibly involved in the process of producing appropriate results. There are no bit players in this scenario; everyone is on the team. Now, go back to the opening paragraph, answer the questions for yourself, ask where you and your office are relative to the end game, and, if you need one, develop your own mechanism for change.

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Keeping up with crises

COVERING COUPS IN SAIGON

George W. Allen

The early 1960s were a tumultuous period for the CIA Station in Saigon. At a time when US policymakers yearned for a modicum of internal stability in South Vietnam, they were faced instead with a deteriorating politcal environment punctuated by successive changes in government. Beginning with the aborted coup by paratroop elements in November 1960, there were no less than a dozen different coups, minicoups, leadership shuffles, and rebellions in a five-year period. Through it all, the Saigon Station evolved rather effective means for covering these crises, rapidly and systematically getting on top of the often hectic developments and relaying timely and informative accounts to Washington.

Covering the rapidly shifting dynamic of a politically unstable situation can challenge even the largest and most sophisticated "news" organizations. CIA field stations are not in business, of course, to compete with or duplicate the flow of reports by the media. They are tasked rather to pull together an accurate and comprehensive picture of ongoing developments from knowledgeable, "inside" sources whose insights might help US policymakers understand the forces at play and to anticipate, if not influence, the outcome.

To do this, field stations have to be in a position to tap a wide variety of agents, informants, and other potential sources having access to leadership elements in all key political groups. They have to be able to track accurately the movements and actions of government security forces and potential rebel forces. They need to be able to organize and manage their collection activities in order to be able to follow up rapidly on leads that can—or should—be cross-checked with other sources. And they need the means to assemble this information rapidly at a central point, evaluate and collate it, and prepare it for transmittal to Washington in the form of spot reports or periodic situation summaries.

From the vantage point of one who was "in the loop" on most of these crises, either contributing to the Station's efforts in Saigon or conveying its products to policymakers and operating officials in the US, I believe the Saigon Station merits high marks for its coverage of these events during those years.

Abundant Assets

The breadth of the Station's contacts with key elements on the Saigon political scene was at the core of its success. In the Nho Dinh Diem era, it had close relationships with just about everyone of importance in the presidential palace and in the military and security services. Despite the rapid "platooning" of generals into the palace with successive coups after Diem's demise, the Station developed useful new assets with alacrity. When Buddhist dissidence became an issue in the spring of 1963, it acquired valuable assets in the rebellious temples. Flexibility, along with the dedication and hard work of a number of experienced and savvy case officers, paid off at crucial times.

Station contacts were sometimes embarrassingly extensive. In 1960, when paratroop battalions were laying siege to Diem's presidential palace in an attempted coup, a young and

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enthusiastic Agency officer who had worked with some of them in covert operations was sent to establish contact and report to the Station on their activities. Using the two-way radio in his jeep, which he parked at the paratroops' command post near the palace, he became a conspicuous go-between in Embassy efforts to restrain the paratroopers, whose delay in pressing their initial advantage allowed Diem to rally loyal divisions from neighboring provinces to put down the coup. Some observers believed that the young officer had been "directing" the coup forces, and he and his family had to depart quickly from Vietnam when the Diem government officials suggested they could "no longer guarantee his safety." Nonetheless, his efforts had enabled the Station to know in detail what the paratroopers were up to.

Flexible Communications

Radio-equipped jeeps were an invaluable supplement to the two-way radios permanently located by the Station at key sites in the Saigon area. It was this combination of fixed and mobile radio facilities that made possible both the rapid transmission of information to the Station and the management of many collection assets. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) When a crisis occurred, the "net control" radio in the Station activated the net, and the outstations functioned as observation posts, reporting what they could see and being tasked accordingly. A number of Station jeeps and cars had two-way radios, and officers assigned these vehicles, alerted via phone, were dispatched to contact their assets or to proceed to critical locations and report what was happening.

With these collection assets, those on duty at the "command post" in the Station were able to follow quite readily the movements of government and rebel forces in the city. If a fixed observer reported a convoy of rebel forces moving down a particular boulevard, another observer might pick it up as it approached a key intersection. A mobile observer could be dispatched to check on its further movement and perhaps determine whether it had taken up positions outside the Post and Telegraph Building. An attempt might then be made to identify these forces, to fill in the picture of the size and composition of the rebel elements. Meanwhile, (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) might be queried—discreetly—to determine their intended reaction.

An Efficient System

The Station's command post was not rigidly structured. Operating under the general supervision of the Chief of Station and/or his deputy, it was manned principally by the Reports Section and augmented his assistant and by whatever assortment of case officers might be available. Maps of the Saigon-Cholon area and its environs were used to plot the locations and movements of opposing military and security forces, and order of battle lists were compiled to keep track of which side the various units were supporting. Information obtained by various sources and observers was funneled to the officers detailed to track the situation and to draft spot reports and situation summaries. Collection tasking was developed through an unstructured but generally smooth-flowing synergistic feedback process. New requirements were levied by radio or telephone to our collectors or led to visual reconnaissance missions by officers dispatched from the command post. There were always enough "veterans" of previous coup attempts on hand to provide stability and a leavening influence in the often exciting and stimulating atmosphere of a crisis. Through repeated practice, the process evolved into an efficient system for organizing the collection, collation, evaluation, and reporting of ongoing developments in what was often a rapidly moving situation. (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

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I had earned my first Vietnam coup "shoulder patch" as an analyst with Army Intelligence in the Pentagon during the infighting in 1955 that the US-backed Prime Minister Diem used to defeat a united front of French-supported sectarian paramilitary forces who were trying to unseat him. The Saigon Station, which under Colonel Ed Lansdale was deeply involved in the crisis, covered the action well. I remember moving through the corridors of the Pentagon with my well-marked briefing map to fill in the Army's top brass on the status of the machinegun at the "Y" bridge that was holding up Diem's forces at one crucial juncture.

On the morning in February 1962 when dissident Vietnamese Air Force officers decided to assassinate Diem, I was in Saigon on an extended TDY from DIA. I was eating breakfast on the roof of the Brink BOQ, only a half-mile or so from the presidential palace. After watching the planes drop their napalm and 500-pound bombs on the palace, and then rocket and strafe it in repeated passes, I sped to the Embassy in a taxi to draft an eyewitness account and send it via the Army Special Security Officer to Washington. Fortunately, before sending the cable, I phoned the intelligence staff at the US Military Assistance Command to compare notes, and discovered—to my chagrin—that the "four" planes I had observed in the attack were, in fact, only "two." Thus I reaffirmed that double-checking with others can usefully counteract the impact of adrenalin on the sensory systems of even experienced observers.

The Station's crisis reporting system performed splendidly in covering the momentous generals' coup that overthrew Diem in 1963. The generals had invited their designated Station liaison officer to join them at their command post at the outbreak of the coup. Information acquired because of his presence there, combined with that gleaned from the network of fixed and mobile observation posts and from Station contacts with other sources, enabled Saigon to keep Washington fully apprised of developments. We at Headquarters—which I had just moved to from DIA—were summoned in the early morning hours to follow the situation and prepare a briefing for DCI McCone to present at the White House at 0800. The ample flow of reporting from Saigon and the Station's responsiveness to our queries made our work a "piece of cake."

The minicoup the following January, which saw General Nguyen Khanh displace the older generals who had ousted Diem, was not as easy to fathom. Unlike the Diem coup, it came as a surprise. There was no serious fighting, however, and after a day or two of tension the new regime was in control. This coup featured the playing of martial music on the local radio stations and announcements on the US Armed Forces Radio urging all Americans to stay off the streets. In Saigon on TDY, I went to the Station, where I was drafted into the reporting team, contributing my own accounts of coup activities seen while en route and helping to prepare the situation reports.

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The next major government shuffle occurred in midsummer, shortly after I arrived on a two-year PCS tour as [redacted] As I emerged from Sunday church services in the USIS auditorium shortly before noon, I was trying to decide whether it was too hot to walk to the Embassy, where I was expected to check through the overnight traffic. Spying a large convoy of trucks coming up the boulevard carrying troops in field equipment, fixed bayonets, and wearing red bandannas—the "trademark" of Saigon coup forces, I immediately decided it was indeed "too hot" to walk. I took a cab and arrived at the Embassy in time to find I had brought in one of the initial reports that another coup attempt was under way. Having learned the Station's system and procedures, I was able to play a more useful role both in "anchoring" the reporting process and in guiding collection for this and subsequent coups during the remainder of my tour.

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Averting Other Coups

There could easily have been more coups than actually show in the historical record if dissaffected Vietnamese military commanders had not sometimes been restrained by their American contacts. One coup was headed off when the disgruntled commander of the corps in the Delta south of Saigon was talked out of marching on the capital when he phoned his Station contact to determine whether the US would approve his taking over the government. A US military adviser performed a similar service on another occasion.

One "coup that wasn't" led the Ambassador in August 1964 to order the departure of the legendary Lou Conein, the OSS veteran whose intimate relationships with most of the Vietnamese military hierarchy made him an invaluable resource during this period. Conein's downfall in 1964 was precipitated by the unscheduled midnight move of a couple of US Army armored personnel carriers through the streets of Saigon, without the Vietnamese MP escort called for by standard practice. The APCs were unable to find their way to the pier where they were to be outloaded for movement north, and they pulled up outside the entrance of the Headquarter's compound of the Vietnamese Navy, where Premier Khanh had secretly decided to spend the night. Khanh judged these vehicles to be precursors of a coup attempt; he alerted the US Ambassador, and he then fled by boat. The Ambassador alerted the Station Chief, who directed Conein to canvass his contacts to determine who might be "making the coup." Conein called each of his friends, which included most of the members of the top military leadership council, inquiring whether they were mounting a coup. When the generals met the next morning and compared notes, they wrongly concluded that the CIA had been trying to stir up a change of government, leading the Ambassador to decide that Conein had outlived his usefulness to the Station.

Chasing the Ky-Thieu Coup

I received word of the June 1965 coup, which solidified Generals Ky and Thieu at the top of the government and thus halted the coup carousel, while on a visit to Pleiku. The Station Chief, reaching me by phone in the office of the II Corps G-2 Adviser, told me of the coup and asked that I get back to Saigon as soon as possible to help with the Station's coverage of events. I was unable to reacquire my aircraft until mid-afternoon; by then, no aircraft were being cleared to land at Tan Son Nhut, the Saigon airport. We touched down briefly at Bien Hoa air base, but soon left when coup forces were reported preparing to attack that facility. We were finally able to land on the coast at Vung Tau, where I phoned the Station Chief to tell him (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) had offered to take me by boat to Saigon. The Chief of Station told me to stay away from him and all other senior Vietnamese military officers, because the US did not want to be perceived as playing favorites in this coup. On arrival at the local hotel, however, my colleagues and I found ourselves in the command post of the countercoup forces, which had commandeered the main lounge.

After spending the night at Vung Tau and finding that Tan Son Nhut was still closed, we flew back to Bien Hoa, where we hired a taxi to drive a group of us, all Station officers, to Saigon. As we approached the main bridge connecting Saigon with areas to the north, we overtook and passed a halted column of trucks and armored vehicles whose troops were wearing the red bandannas. At the crest of the bridge, we discovered why Vietnamese fighter bombers were "buzzing" the site; at the center of the bridge, there was the head of a similar column with troops wearing blue, or "loyalist" bandannas, in a direct faceoff with the head of the "red" column. Working our way gingerly past this confrontation, we finally arrived at the house of one of our officers in a suburb of Saigon, where I phoned to advise the Station Chief

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of my imminent arrival and described what we had seen at the bridge. He wearily replied that it was all over; an accommodation had just been reached between the opposing factions. He said that we should have lunch before checking in at the Embassy to assist with the wrap-up reporting on the coup.

Peace and Quiet

Aside from renewed Buddhist unrest and demonstrations, which led to little more than occasional whiffs of tear gas, there were no further coup attempts in Saigon for almost 10 years. The only major crisis of political instability took place in the northern provinces in early 1966, when the Saigon government had to suppress a rebellious corps commander who was involved in the Buddhist dissidence.

The Station's machinery for covering coups was finely tuned by the mid-1960s. Covering coups had become routine, and the Station took them in stride. By late 1964, Saigon veterans had devised a "coup-qualified" shoulder patch, and one wag wrote lyrics to a song titled "I Feel a Coup Comin' On." These efforts at black humor reflected a certain degree of frustration and exasperation at the fragility of the political foundation underlying the American effort in Vietnam. But these frustrations did not deter the Station from fulfilling its responsibility for collecting and reporting on the situation, with aplomb.

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TITLE: Political Instability: A Psychological Perspective

AUTHOR: Helene L. Boatner

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POLITICAL INSTABILITY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Helene L. Boatner

As I was reading (b)(3)(c) preceding article,* two light bulbs popped. The first, which lit up when I read his comments on "implicit promises and bargains," said: "This is a genuinely original thought." And those of us who pursue truth and wisdom daily in the Intelligence Directorate know that even there—in an environment where ideas are important and intellectual endeavor is prized and praised—a genuinely original thought is rare and deserves to be treasured.

Even as I was savoring the idea, the second light came on. This one said: "I've heard something like that before, in the Levinson Seminar. Only he called it the psychological contract." Perhaps I can make a small contribution of my own to our work on political instability by explaining what a psychology-based course for CIA Senior Intelligence Service (SIS) officers has to do with indicators of political instability in the Third World.

The Levinson Leadership Seminar is a one week course that was first offered to senior CIA executives about ten years ago; it has since been incorporated into the training program for new SIS officers. Harry Levinson, the Ph.D. psychologist who created it, runs the Levinson Institute and specializes in applying psychological concepts to management situations. When I took the course in December 1978, it made an immense impression on me—and on most other Agency officers who took it—because the concept of an invisible contract between the Agency and its employees, and the consequences of an apparent breach of that contract by either party, seemed so timely.

For those who cannot quite place December 1978 on the historical continuum, it was a time when the Agency was reeling from several traumas. We had survived the separate investigations by the Church and Pike Committees of allegations that the Agency was guilty of a variety of abuses. Eventually, of course, even Senator Church conceded that CIA was not a "rogue elephant." But a lot of us were uncomfortable with revelations of plans made or actions taken by individual Agency officers that we felt were wrong—assassination plots, drug experiments, and the like. So we were a little bit disillusioned about the Agency—or, more accurately, a few of its former officers.

That was, however, only one of our problems. The investigations themselves had been immensely painful. The Agency had been subjected to public attacks on virtually a daily basis by members of Congress, by staffers, and by the press. Many officers—especially those with teen-aged children—faced

* "Some Thoughts on Political Instability," by (b)(3)(c) *Studies in Intelligence*, Volume 32 number 1.

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suspicion and accusation from within their own families. Professionally, we were inundated with questions from both investigating committees that involved endless hours and major issues of "sources and methods." The time it took us to resolve such questions made our answers slow to arrive, stirred suspicions on the Hill, and brought on more trouble. In short, we had not been having fun. There was, nonetheless, a sense that we were all in "it" together—an unspoken, but shared understanding that we as individuals and the Agency as an institution stood together in the face of the attack from outsiders who were not "witting" and therefore somehow not fully responsible.

Then (in March 1977) Stansfield Turner arrived on the scene. He was Director, and therefore fully informed, and therefore someone whose respect and regard we wanted. He was also well qualified for the job. We expected him to become one of us and to join "us" against "them." He didn't. During his confirmation hearings, he went on record with his suspicions of the Agency and particularly of some of its covert activities. Once on board, he or his staff took a number of small but symbolic steps that were seen by many in the Agency as evidence of his distrust—for example, making it difficult to obtain an appointment with him. He seriously considered dividing up the Agency—removing the analysis function and incorporating it into a new organization—before backing off on what was widely seen as a threat to "dismember the Agency." In August 1977, he decided to move forward on a reduction in the size of the Directorate of Operations (DO) proposed by others. He eliminated [redacted] slots, out of a total authorized 1977 strength for the DO of [redacted] although many of the slots were empty and the number of personnel directly affected was much smaller. More important in terms of impact, I believe, was the fact that he decided to make the reduction a matter of public record. He held a session in the auditorium to announce his plans; he announced the decision to the press as well. Subsequently, he moved to make changes in the personnel system that were seen as a thinly veiled attempt to impose a Navy personnel structure on the Agency, including an "up or out" philosophy.

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Turner, for his part, had encountered a number of situations during his early months that no doubt led him to conclude that Agency officers were not as uniformly loyal and trustworthy as we had come to believe. Shortly before his arrival, Edwin G. Moore, who had worked both in the DI and in Logistics, made an inept attempt to offer his services to the USSR—throwing an envelope containing several documents, including a copy of an old Agency telephone book, across the wall of the Soviet Embassy on 16th Street as evidence of his *bona fides*. In April 1977 John Stockwell, a former DO officer who had served in Africa, wrote an "open letter" to the DCI for publication in the Washington Post accusing DO officers of poor management and corruption. A former DO contract agent, Edmund P. Wilson, was found to be working for the Libyans and getting some assistance from two active Agency employees. A DI analyst who claimed that Agency analysis on arms control issues was being politicized had taken his case—out of channels—to a Capitol Hill staffer, among others. Frank Snepp, an ex-employee writing a book on his Agency experiences, promised Turner he would submit it for prepublication review and then failed to do so. He accused senior Agency people of badly mishandling the evacuation of Saigon. Another ex-employee—William P. Kampiles, who served briefly in

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the DI's Operations Center—was arrested in August 1978 for selling a reconnaissance satellite manual to the Soviets. And personnel still working in the Agency obviously were reacting to Turner's internal personnel and organizational moves by leaking their own version of various events to the press.

What we all realized so vividly when we began listening to Levinson and his associates talk about the invisible contract was that we were now understanding for the first time why the emotional reaction within the Agency to the events of the last several years was so intense. The strongest feature of the invisible contract in CIA—a contract to which we had all subscribed without realizing it—was mutual loyalty, among employees, between employee and Director, and between the organization and the individuals. One aspect of loyalty was that "the Agency took care of its own"—not by retaining personnel who were no longer needed or no longer up to the job, but by going to great lengths to protect their dignity and sense of self-worth. Agency people, by the same token, stood up for the Agency and its leaders in public, even when they harbored some doubts. The promise of mutual loyalty included the understanding that a competent and reliable employee could look forward to a career in the Agency, not just a job for a while. It included the obligation to keep silent in public about the Agency's business, no matter how unfair the attacks or inaccurate the stories. It included a commitment to truthfulness among ourselves and trust in the integrity of all parties.

That contract had been shattered. And Agency employees were thrown off balance—not just because the organization had failed to honor fully its obligation of loyalty to some employees, but because all of us were in some measure now withholding from the Director and the organization a portion of the loyalty we felt that they were due. We had "lost" the Agency of our expectations and had nothing with which to replace it.*

What makes all of this potentially applicable to the issue of political instability is that we were, in the psychological model put forth by Levinson, reacting very typically to grief—to the loss of something dear and familiar. According to Levinson and his associate, Dr. Ralph Hirschowitz of the Harvard Medical School, there is a fairly standard pattern of reactions to grief—to loss—through which individuals AND GROUPS tend to pass.

> "After the onset of the crisis [breach of contract], there is a period of life disorganization. Then, depending on individual coping strategies combined with outside interventions, comes a period of life reorganization: dependence will shift to independence, denial to realization, and identity disruption will come to a halt, and identity consolidation, in a new form, will occur.
>
> "This 'grief sequence' can apply to the loss of a job, the loss of a marriage, or some other important change. There is always the

* It may be that the public controversies stirred up—in particular the publicity given to the reduction in force in the DO and the retaliatory leaks of anti-Turner rumors by Agency employees—also undermined the invisible contract between retirees and the organization. This could, I believe, account in large measure for what appears to be the increased propensity of some Agency annuitants to "go public" about the Agency; it dates from the same period.

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possibility that people will conclude mourning and move to a new consolidation. There is also the possibility that the downward spiral will continue, uninterrupted and without a resolution; the end will be serious, long-term disorientation or death."

Application

Each of us, listening to this sequence and to illustrations of the various behaviors in real-life crises, could recognize the applicability of the pattern to our own personal experiences and to the reaction of the Agency as an entity. There really was a distinct living organism, complete with personality and behavior and emotions, that could be referred to as "Agency society" just as one might refer to "Egyptian society." And that organism really was going through all the predictable stages of an emotional loss—disorientation, denial, acceptance, and a new beginning.

My hope is that political analysts will be intrigued enough by (b)(3)(c) proposal to try hard to define the psychological contracts or implicit promises in the countries they study and to test the applicability of the "grief cycle" to past and present cases of abrupt political change to see if this insight from organizational psychology is applicable.

If so, the psychological theory offers us not only a way to ask questions about the consequences of instability (is the government of X on the verge of breaking an important implicit promise?) but a way to analyze the results: Is the period of disorganization over? Has the situation moved from denial to realization? Is identity consolidation taking place? If not, what events might trigger the end of a destructive period and the beginning of reconstruction?

Certainly the general pattern of loss and recovery appears to have been followed in at least two recent cases—Iran and the Philippines. Both seem to have moved through disorganization to the early stages of identity consolidation fairly quickly, although the process is not complete in either case. In Hirschowitz' terms, a return to the downward spiral remains possible. The case of Lebanon may offer an example of the alternative outcome—a case in which the collapse of a network of implicit promises has effectively shattered the underlying institution, so that no new beginning is possible.

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An art, not a science

SOME THOUGHTS ON POLITICAL INSTABILITY

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c) excellent article, "The Two Faces of Political Instability," which appeared in the Spring 1987 issue of *Studies in Intelligence*, has led me to rethink my own ideas on the subject. I agree that, while the intelligence community has been engaged in political instability analysis for many years, only recently has it begun to approach the problem in a systematic way. (b)(3)(c) article advances the cause, and I hope that my remarks will do the same.

Definitions

(b)(3)(c) described the two faces of political instability as *potential* and *commotion*. The former is the probability of a sudden, major change in a country's politics, while the latter consists of events such as demonstrations, strikes, riots, issuances of manifestoes, military states of alert, the emergence of hitherto underground opposition groups, and increasingly vocal demands for a government to quit.

I define political instability as *observable evidence of non-self-correcting pressure that, if not counteracted by other forces, would lead to a major change in policy, regime, or system.* The rationale for this definition is as follows:

- *Observable evidence* is my redundant way of getting around (b)(3)(c) problem of "instablity as potential" and "instability as commotion." For me, instability as commotion is a subset of instability as potential. Observable evidence of pressure may take the form of a food riot or of a blip in the inflation rate, of an assassination or of an increasingly unequal Gini coefficient. In all of these cases, we are mainly interested in the potential they show for major change. If the food riot or assassination develops into a revolt, we are no longer talking about instability but rather the results of instability.

- By using the term *non-self-correcting pressure*, I want to emphasize that most political systems—even in the Third World—are in stable equilibrium. That is to say, any major deviation from normal political practice carries within itself the seeds of its own correction. Thus, if in a certain state the military is accustomed to getting X percent of the budget and this percentage is reduced, the military will exert such pressure as may be required to restore its "rightful" share. Even though tanks may roll up to the national palace, this will be part of the "normal" process of restoring stability. If an unstable equilibrium exists, however, then the same cut in the military budget could lead either to a military government or to complete civilian domination—in either case a "major change" according to my definition.

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- By specifying *if not counteracted by outside forces*, I want to underline the fairly obvious point that destabilizing pressures can be offset by stabilizing pressures. For example, a destabilizing economic policy may not lead to a "major change," if a loyal and well-trained police force stands in the way.
- My definition makes clear that political instability (all other things being equal) *would lead to a major change in policy, regime, or system*. I use "would" rather than "could" or "might" or "would tend to" in order to avoid the "pressures are building" syndrome that affects so much writing about political instability. This disgraceful cop-out allows the analyst to come down firmly on both sides. If there is a revolution, the analyst can say that he or she predicted it; if nothing happens, the analyst can say that pressures are still building. Any statement that cannot be proved wrong by future events is worthless.

Ethnocentrism

Many political writers both within and outside the community seem to operate under the unstated assumption that political instability is a Third World phenomenon (or rather that Third World political systems are in unstable equilibrium while developed world systems are in stable equilibrium). We do not seem to regard repeated political assassinations in this country as instabilty indicators; how would we feel if the equivalents of Kennedy and King had been killed in South Africa or South Korea? Blocks of downtown Washington went up in flames in 1968 and no one (in this country, at least) thought the government was about to fall; if the flames had been in Buenos Aires or Cairo, would we have been as sanguine? Is massive corruption in Mexico City an indicator of instability while massive corruption in New York City is irrelevant? This is not to argue that the same events have the same meaning in different countries—they don't—but rather to suggest that judgments should be conscious and rational rather than unconscious and ethnocentric.

In this regard, let me make a couple of "outlandish" statements for the reader's consideration:

- In terms of "a major change in policy, regime, or system," the coming of de Gaulle in 1958 is right up there with the coming of the Brazilian generals in 1964 and the coming of Khomeini in 1979. It should have been—and perhaps was—predicted by the instability indicators of the period.
- Mexico is the most politically stable country in the Western Hemisphere. Could Canada, Venezuela, or the United States have withstood an across-the-board fall in living standards which some authorities estimate to be as much as 50 percent in four years without a "major change in policy, regime, or system"?

The Marxists have a faith that the world *must* keep changing until communism is reached; we have a similar faith that political systems *must* come to resemble our own (or that of the United Kingdom) if they are to

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achieve long-term stability. We (and the Marxists) would be on firmer ground if we were to admit that these predictions are more a reflection of our desires than of our understanding of history and political dynamics.

Are Universal Indicators Possible?

I have struggled with this question for several years, first with the old Social Science Research Division and more recently in my connection with the Office of Global Issues' *Political Instability Quarterly*. I am tempted to say no. It seems obvious that, under some circumstances, poverty can be a catalyst for revolt and, under others, it can sap the will to rebellion. In one country heavy-handed repression sparks unrest, while in another it keeps unrest under control. In some cases riots lead to further change, in others they act as escape valves to reduce political pressure. The same can be said for most other proposed unversal indicators.

Recently, however, I have become somewhat more optimistic. Although many of the most important political instability indicators will remain country specific—and even universal indicators will have to be applied with a country-specific twist—I do spy some universals on the horizon. (b)(6) work on the youth bulge, while not totally convincing in all of its details, appears to contain a nugget of universal applicability; that is, young people are more volatile than older people and if, in the relevant population (nation, city, or ethnic group), the youth bulge hits a certain (undetermined) high percentage, "a major change" becomes very likely.

My own search for universal indicators—which is still in its preliminary stage and may not pan out in the long run—is along very different lines. Going back to some insights from a previous incarnation as an anthropologist and to a more recent examination of Indian revolts in colonial Mexico, I have come to the conclusion that a good part of political stability rests on what I call "implicit promises and bargains." When a government or its perceived agent breaks such an implicit promise, a condition of political instability has been created. This appears to hold true across cultures.*

The Implicit Promise

Implicit promises and bargains come in many forms. All university graduates get white-collar jobs. One-third of your crop goes to the landlord, another third to Church and State, and you keep the remaining third. If you keep your nose clean, you won't get hurt. The president has no right to involve himself in purely military affairs. The police can't enter a university building without the rector's permission. The common land belongs to the village and cannot be taken by the hacendado. The president cannot serve more than one term. The "political class" cannot be denied an opportunity to take part in government. We have the right to be ruled by a pious king. Bus fares cannot be raised. If you march with the party and vote right, the party will get your kid out of jail or your wife into a hospital. The government cannot seize your farm without due process of the law.

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* For further discussion of this concept, see the next article, "Political Instability: A Psychological Perspective," by Helene L. Boatner, and the Richard M. Helms book review, *For Lust of Knowing*.

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What all of these implicit promises have in common is that they remove uncertainty. They set the ground rules. They let a person (or a group) know what he or she can reasonably hope for (a white-collar job, for example) and what he or she has no cause to fear (getting hurt if his or her nose is clean). It is ironic that people—even in the developed countries—take such implicit promises of the political culture much more seriously than the explicit promises of politicians and rulers. We are not shocked if a president fails to balance the budget despite promises to do so; we would be shocked if a president were to send troops to close Congress.

History appears to show that people will accept high degrees of poverty, inequality, hardship, and repression as long as implicit promises and bargains are not broken. A major cause of the Mexican revolution of 1910 was the failure of the dictator Porfirio Diaz to keep a rashly made promise to step down. This explicit promise entailed the implicit promise of a new political era. During the three decades of Diaz's rule before he made that promise, he had little effective opposition; thus it seems clear that the initial cause of the revolution was not years of tyranny but the breaking of a promise only a few months old. In a similar fashion, the Chamorro assassination in Nicaragua—the event that, in my opinion, determined the success of the Nicaraguan revolution—was seen as breaking an implicit bargain between Somoza and his nonviolent opposition. Even the Iranian revolution may be basically the result of a broken inplicit promise that "Iran should remain Iran," rather than the result of corruption, unemployment, SAVAK brutality, or any of the other causes often proposed.

The broken-implicit-promise indicator, like all political instability indicators, is difficult to use. Although it is (I believe) universal in the sense that it operates in all societies, it can only be used successfully by someone with country-specific knowledge. It will take a Russian expert, for example, to say whether Gorbachev's use of increased income differentiation to spur production breaks an implicit promise of relative income equality. And it will take a South African expert to tell us whether Botha's slow movement on reform is intended to avoid the politically destabilizing effects of breaking an implicit promise to his Afrikaner constituency.

I want to reemphasize that I do not claim that all political instability can be reduced to broken implicit promises or bargains. In some cases, this factor may be of great importance, while in others it may have little relevance. Whatever the relevance of implicit promises for instability from the South African extreme right, I doubt that they have much bearing on instability stemming from the dissatisfaction of the black majority. I suspect that instability arising from the Sikh community in India is about equally the result of broken implicit promises and other factors. At the other extreme, I believe that, if the Chilean military decides to remove Pinochet from the presidency, it will be almost entirely because of broken inplicit promises.

The Future

Political instability analysis will remain an art, not a science. And, as (b)(3)(c) article implied, the best artists will be those—regretably few either inside or outside the community—who combine deep country-specific

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knowledge with a profound understanding of instability patterns through history and across cultures. No computer program will do our job for us.

That said, I do believe that indicators can be devised that will make the country-knowledgeable analyst's job easier. One set of these indicators must be highly country specific. Another set may depend heavily on demography or even geography; for example, it may turn out that a revolt is unlikely during the rainy season in any tropical nation. A third set of indicators could be based on the broken-implicit-promise factor—perhaps combined with elements of Gurr's relative deprivation theory. I believe that, in the future, these three sets of indicators will allow a skilled and knowledgeable country analyst to make reasonably accurate projections of major change—or, equally important, the absence of major change—even in counterintuitive cases where expert opinion is divided. In this best of all possible worlds, we should never again have to read, "Pressures are building, but the staying power of the government should not be underestimated."

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TITLE: John Honeyman: The Silent Patriot

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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"Are spies nice people, dad?"

JOHN HONEYMAN: THE SILENT PATRIOT

(b)(3)(c)

My youngest son is normally excited and talkative during the long drive to his little league basketball game. This time, however, he was unusually quiet and pensive. It was an important championship match and I assumed he was nervous. All kids are nervous before the big game, right? As we drove along Route 123, I searched my mind for a calming and inspirational phrase. I wondered what John Thompson would say to his Hoyas at a time like this.

"Dad?"

Here it is, I thought. This is what dads are for. He needs my vote of confidence. I worked the answer over in my mind. "Its only important that you give it your best shot. I'll always be proud of you even if you don't score any points." It sounded good.

"Are spies nice people, dad?"

It took a moment to sink in. Had I somehow blown my cover to an 11-year-old kid? Had he remembered the time years ago when my car was down and my wife had to pick me up at the front entrance? I wasn't ready to give him a full briefing on what I really did. I had pictured another time and place, a long walk in the autumn woods with him as a teenager while I, throwing pine cones at chipmunks, explained that I was [redacted] a CIA officer. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

"Well, it depends. American spies are good guys and Russian spies are bad guys," was my less than creative response. "Why do you ask?"

"I don't know. I kind of feel sorry for John Honeyman."

John Honeyman? John Honeyman? I racked my brain trying to remember the name. Was he associated with Pollard?

Accepting my ignorance, I asked him who John Honeyman was.

"He was a spy for George Washington. I read about him in Social Studies. You don't know about John Honeyman?"

One more disillusionment. Last month my son discovered I had a lousy outside jump shot. Now he was faced with the realization that I was not all knowing. I promised myself that I would secretly practice my jump shot and read more American history. His details on Honeyman were sketchy at best. He recalled that Honeyman was a farmer who posed as a British sympathizer but actually passed secrets to General George Washington. Though scorned by his neighbors and threatened with prison, he never told anyone about his true role.

My son wasn't nervous about the game. He's never nervous. We (I like to think I'm part of the team) won the game by 15 points. I'm the one who is

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always nervous. My son fouled out in the last quarter so I had time to think about spies. I would look up Honeyman the following Monday in the Agency library.

In addition to the Agency library, I checked the Fairfax public library. I found very little on the man, perhaps because no one had ever bothered to write a novel or make a mini series on him. What I did learn, however, I found interesting, and I thought it should be shared with other intel officers. Honeyman was obviously very courageous. I was even more impressed with the fact that he operated effectively for seven years under deep cover, used excellent tradecraft, provided timely and important intelligence, and never admitted he was an intelligence operative even after the Revolutionary War was over. Nathan Hale failed in his first mission, yet his name is nearly a household word and we even have a statue of him near the CIA front entrance. Honeyman is merely a footnote in the history books, yet his reporting may have been responsible for America's first major victory of the war.

The Immigrant

Remember the painting of George Washington crossing the Delaware River in the dead of winter? There he stands resolutely in the prow of his boat, surrounded by chunks of floating ice. Pretty inspiring, isn't it? The crossing of the Delaware and the Continental Army's brilliant surprise attack on Trenton changed the course of the war. It was an extremely courageous maneuver which, had it failed, could have doomed Washington's fledging army. It was a calculated risk and a successful one. A good commander, however, usually bases calculated risks on good intelligence, and this is where John Honeyman enters the picture.

Honeyman, a brawny Scotch-Irish immigrant, had come to this country as a British conscript during the French and Indian War. Discharged in 1763, he decided to stay, became an apprentice weaver, and married an Irish-born Philadelphia girl. Life was good to Honeyman. He prospered and by 1775 was living comfortably in Philadelphia with his wife Mary and his four children, including a crippled daughter named Jane. As the winds of war began to blow, the Irish side of Honeyman rose to the surface. Hatred of the British, and affection for his adopted country, drove him toward a fateful decision. At 46 years of age, perhaps too old to bear a musket for his country, he thought he could make an even more valuable contribution, in another way.

In 1775, the Continental Congress named George Washington to lead the colonial forces. Honeyman gained an audience with the General. Turning on a remembered Scottish burr, he explained to Washington that he could easily pass as a fervent and loyal Scottish Tory. He could gain the confidence of the British and act as a spy for them, but in reality spy for Washington as a double agent. Washington thought Honeyman's proposal had merit but as a weaver Honeyman would have limited mobility and very little access. He would need a more effective cover. It was decided Honeyman should become a cattle dealer and butcher, of which he had a great deal of experience back in Ireland. In supplying provisions to the enemy, Honeyman would have constant access to the British and Hessian lines. A scenario was worked out for a cover for

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action. Washington said he could easily get word to Honeyman when he needed to meet with him. Whenever Honeyman had any important information, he should allow himself to be captured by Continental sentries. To insure that the capture appeared realistic, Honeyman said he would put up a struggle. When Honeyman was subsequently brought in for interrogation, he was usually the worse for wear.

Shortly before the Revolution began, Honeyman moved his family to the village of Griggstown, New Jersey, a few miles north of Princeton and a center for Loyalist activity. He began his new occupation and soon was providing some of Lord Cornwallis' British and Hessian troops with beef. His 1763 honorable discharge papers from the British army lent some bona fides to his Tory cover.

By November 1776, four months after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the Continental army was in disarray. It had been chased across the states of New York and New Jersey and had lost nearly 3,000 men at Fort Washington. The army was in full retreat and down to a few thousand starving, demoralized, and ragged soldiers. Washington, attempting to save what was left of his army, sought safety across the Delaware River in Pennsylvania. Washington sent word to Honeyman and a hurried clandestine meeting was set up outside of Hackensack, New Jersey. Washington told Honeyman to mingle with the British army, gather information, and contact him when he had something of significance.

The afternoon of 22 December, a dejected General George Washington sat in Keith's Pennsylvania farmhouse, a few miles south of the Delaware. His army was slowly dissolving from the daily desertions. Washington was certain that across the river, Lord Cornwallis' warm and well fed soldiers were probably building boats and would soon come across in force to finish off his remaining troops. One of Washington's letters to his brother, John Augustine, reveals some of the depression he was experiencing as he viewed the end of the short-lived Revolution: "I think the game is pretty near up. No man, I believe, ever had a greater choice of difficulties and less means to extricate himself from them."

The Intelligence

Suddenly, there was a knock on the door. Two of his sentries dragged in a beaten and disheveled "spy" who had been caught near the army's perimeter. Washington gave a curt order for them to wait outside the door until he completed a personal interrogation of the spy. As the door closed, the spy straightened up, dusted off his jacket and offered his hand to the General in greeting. General Washington grasped the hand of his best of all possible Christmas presents, his spy John Honeyman.

Honeyman offered a detailed description of the British troops in New Jersey. Posing as a friendly Tory, Honeyman had gained full access to their lines and, during conversations around campfires, learned a great deal about the disposition of the British army. Certain that Washington's army had been effectively destroyed, the British had not yet bothered to build boats to ferry their troops across the Delaware. They would enjoy the Christmas holidays in bivouac and then mop up the remnants of the ragtag army in due course.

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Colonel Johann Gottlieb Rall, the commander of the mercenary Hessian troops, had secured Trenton for the British. Rall had such contempt for Washington's rebel troops that he had not even bothered to erect breastworks around the village. In addition, Honeyman had learned that the homesick Germans were planning a gala Christmas feast and few, if any, sentries would be posted. The normally grave General Washington allowed himself a smile and patted Honeyman on the shoulder. The single moment all great commanders dream about had arrived. He would crush the Hessians at Trenton and, along with captured supplies, give his army a needed boost to their morale.

At the end of Honeyman's report, the General again assumed the pose of the stern interrogator. He called for a sentry and instructed him to lock Honeyman in the guardhouse for a court martial the next morning. Later that evening, a haystack outside the farmhouse caught fire. As the guardhouse sentry ran to help put out the fire, Honeyman's locked door was mysteriously unlocked and Honeyman ran unseen for the woods. He was able to cross part of the Delaware River on the ice but had to wade and swim through most of the frigid water. He then ran on to the Hessian lines where he fell shivering and exhausted. Taken to Colonel Rall's quarters, he described his captured by Continental troops and his subsequent escape. He told Rall that Washington's army was disorganized and totally incapacitated. He added they were on the verge of mutiny and would not last the winter. Though Rall needed little encouragement, he decided to proceed with his Christmas party and pulled his sentries in for the celebration.

Across the river, Washington made his preparations. He sent a message to his commanders: "Christmas day at night, one hour before day, is the time fixed for our attempt on Trenton." All troops were instructed to prepare and keep on hand three days' rations of whatever cooked food they could find. Scribbling on a scrap of paper, Washington devised his famous watchword for the march on Trenton, "Victory or Death."

As Rall and his Hessians ate and drank far into the night, Washington and his troops, many barefoot and dressed in rags, silently ferried themselves across the ice-choked Delaware River. (Remember the painting?) Shortly before dawn on Christmas day, as the Hessians slept off their 'Frohliche Weinachten' hangovers, two columns of Continental troops marched through the sleet and stormed into the pages of history. The village of Trenton was taken in less than an hour. One hundred and six Hessian mercenaries were killed or wounded, including Rall who was shot while attempting to rally his groggy troops. Of the patriots, only four men were wounded. More than 900 Hessians were captured and ferried across the river. They later were paraded through the streets of Philadelphia, proof that the Revolution was still very much alive.

The Cost of Cover

It was America's first major victory of the war. A startled Cornwallis attempted to rush troops to block Washington, but the wily General slipped around his flank and, in the dark, destroyed Cornwallis' rear guard in the Battle of Princeton. The attack on Trenton would change the complexion of the war. As Washington's now spirited troops hurried back to safety in the New Jersey

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hills, Honeyman slipped back home. There was no hero's welcome. His house was surrounded by a crowd of patriots who threatened to burn the Tory's place down. As the crowd shouted abuse and threats, Mary Honeyman, with her children fearfully huddled behind her, denied he was there or that she knew where he was. Cooler heads prevailed that evening and the crowd left, muttering dire warnings about what would happen to Tory sympathizers. Mary Honeyman was the only person, outside of Washington and a few of the General's trusted advisers, who knew of her husband's double agent role. She watched the crowd disperse before unlatching the cellar door to allow John to disapppear into the winter night.

Honeyman, unable to return home after Trenton, lived a lonely existence for the rest of the war. In 1778, he was captured and indicted by the colonial government of New Jersey for high treason, punishable with death, and locked in the Trenton jail. Fifteen days after his arrest, a leading patriot, Jacob Hyer, a colonel in the New Jersey militia, quietly paid his bail. When Honeyman came up for trial he was just as quietly released. Later that year, he was again indicted for aiding and comforting the enemy and again, charges were quietly but quickly dropped. The commander of the Continental Army had made sure that his favorite secret agent would be protected.

A letter written by Washington that year to the Governor of New Jersey, William Livingston, described the esteem the General held for the dangerous and thankless job of a secret agent.

> "You must be well convinced that it is indispensibly necessary to make use of these means to procure intelligence. The persons employed must bear the suspicion of being thought inimical: and it is not in their power to assert their innocence, because that would get abroad and destroy the confidence which the enemy puts in them."

Peace came to the colonies in 1783 and Honeyman returned home to stay. The family continued to be scorned by friends and neighbors alike. Life in the new United States had become extremely difficult for Tory sympathizers and most had emigrated to England or Canada. One day as his daughter Jane, a quiet and sensitive teenager, sat on the front porch she saw a crowd of neighbors and soldiers come down the road. She was certain the time had finally come when her father would be imprisoned and the family driven off into exile. The mounted party of Continental officers appreared especially dashing in their blue uniforms with their clanking swords. They were led by a tall, white-haired man riding a spirited white stallion. The crowd of neighbors, rather than displaying the raucous behavior of an angry mob, seemed subdued, almost respectful. As they turned into the yard, the man in the lead dismounted and Jane gasped in surprise. General George Washington gravely walked up the porch stairs and, upon seeing John Honeyman, reached out and grasped both of Honeyman's hands. As Honeyman's neighbors looked on, Washington thanked him for the service he had provided his country. As Washington rode off into the distance, the neighbors crowded around Honeyman. The distrust and hate disappeared and for the first time in years, Jane and her family could hold their heads high.

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John Honeyman lived to the age of 93 and became a prosperous farmer in the neighboring village of Lamington. He had a total of five sons and two daughters. Honeyman continued to keep silent about his war service and never discussed it with either his children or neighbors. Perhaps Honeyman's exploits would have been lost to posterity except for his grandson, Justice John Van Dyke of the New Jersey Supreme Court, and a noted New Jersey historian, William S. Stryker. Van Dyke had spent a great deal of his youth with his grandfather, working the farm and sharing winter nights around the fireplace. He never dreamed the gentle, dignified old man had at one time been a secret agent during the Revolutionary War. He learned the full story from his Aunt Jane who came to live with the Van Dyke family after Honeyman died.

In 1873, after compiling as many facts as he could about Honeyman, he wrote a short historical piece for a New Jersey periodical. Stryker, who was president of the New Jersey Historical Society, became interested and conducted his own investigation. Both of these men, digging through the records of a colonial village family and interviewing area survivors, were able to document a more complete and fascinating exploit of early American espionage. A young patriot who was privy to Honeyman's services told Van Dyke during an early interview that Honeyman had "done more for the cause than many who are shining heroes today."

Outside of New Jersey, little is known of Honeyman. He is buried in the old village cemetery at Lamington and next to his eroded headstone a Revolutionary War veteran marker has been placed. On the New Jersey side of the Delaware river at Washington Crossing State Park, where Washington landed for his march on Trenton, a stone memorial fountain with a bronze plaque on it has been erected by the Patriotic Order of the Sons of America. It reads:

Dedicated in Memory of
John Honeyman
Who Served Washington and
the Continental Army
as a Spy

Drink of the Fount of Liberty
Let Posterity Inherit Freedom

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TITLE: The Decline and Fall of the Shah

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SHAH

(b)(3)(c)

In *The Eagle and the Lion*, published by the Yale University Press in 1988, author James A. Bill offers a version of events in Iran which skirts many major issues in favor of a view implicitly accepting the current government as an inevitable representation of the desires of the majority of Iranians. For example, the author reacts negatively to a major historical issue facing Western governments: is it ever appropriate to intervene in a Middle Eastern country in favor of American and Western interests? For many, the answer until well into the 20th century was an easily accepted "yes." The supposed superiority of Western culture and the primacy of our interests were readily accepted by foreigners and nationals of most Middle Eastern countries as suitable justifications for intervention. With the end of World War II, this facile judgment fell into question, leading in time to the freeing of many countries from European dominance and eventually to a renaissance of a variety of ancient cultures, and, of more relevance to Bill's book, a return to the fundamentals of Islam.

While Iran never was colonized by the West, it experienced the impact of European culture. Under Reza Shah, it opted for a Western rather than an Islamic orientation. In 1953, Western countries had no qualms about intervening to protect what they saw as their fundamental interests. In the process, Western nations incurred a debt to the man they returned to the Pahlavi throne, thus reducing future Western policy alternatives when that leader's rule began to disintegrate. Bill, writing at the end of a dynasty, takes it as a given that intervention has been bad for Iran, in that it somehow prevented the emergance of true Iranian rulers. This implicit assumption underlies Bill's debunking of alternative views, while avoiding responsibility for the excesses and anachronisms of the rulers who succeeded those linked to the West. To accept Bill's approach and his underlying bias in favor of nonintervention is to do a disservice to those Iranians who have made a commitment to Western culture as offering alternatives and balance to traditional systems. By re-examining arguments dismissed by Bill, it may be possible to do some small justice to those in Iran who have lost the most to Islamic fundamentalism or who remain committed to the Western principle of representative government. For an intelligence officer, covering this ground may assist in formulating predictions and judgments on the future directions of Iranian developments.

Opposing Theories

Both intelligence analysts and operations officers are warned early in their careers to beware of conventional wisdom. *The Eagle and the Lion* is an example of such "wisdom." The author subscribes to the popular "volcano" theory, which holds, as Bill puts it, "that the Shah's regime, backed by one of the most powerful military machines in the Third World, collapsed in the face

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of a massive popular uprising in which millions of citizens marched in the streets during a year of generally peaceful demonstrations." This is a faulty thesis, and Bill skims over some basic questions while contructing it. Because he accepts this explanation as obvious, he also sees no need to defend it with detailed arguments and documentation.

Bill accuses the US Intelligence Community of failing to build the understanding of Iran which might have led to a more enlightened and successful US policy. His charges that US intelligence was severely debilitated by bureaucratic infighting and limitations artifically imposed by Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi are particulary disturbing. From my personal perspective (b)(1) I (b)(3)(c) believe such charges do not hold up. Bill's focus is on the forces which emerged to replace the Shah and the ignorance within the US Government of who they were and what they represented. Bill argues that, if US policymakers had known the answers to these questions, there might have been an earlier and more complete US break with the Shah in favor of these new forces. Bill's sympathies are clearly with the Iranian masses, whom he accuses the official American community of scorning in favor of a seemingly invincible Shah and those who slavishly supported him.

Readers of the book will be surprised and disappointed by how lightly Bill sketches the events surrounding the Shah's ouster. He treats the outcome as inevitable, as another case in which a tyrant is sent packing by oppressed masses finally fed up with corruption and the loss of moral values. Although Bill hints that there were those who knew the Shah would go, he does not cite any solid predictions being put on paper beforehand.

Bill's book is a polemic against insensitive and ignorant bureaucrats, backed with a plea to listen instead to academics whose understanding is deeper and unwarped by worldly consideration. More important, Bill is biased in favor of a historical perspective which assigns greater weight to the role played by "masses" and "classes" than to the role played by leaders. In my view, he makes a basic mistake when he fails to appreciate the role of the "great leader" in the Middle East.

My view, which was formed in the last half of 1978, is that the Shah abdicated in place and that he alone was responsible for his ouster. In contrast with the volcano theory, I favor the "genie in the bottle" theory of events in Iran—the Shah removed the cork and unleashed the genie, who in turn frightened the Shah into abdicating.

Liberalization Disaster

Anyone who tries to understand why the Shah was ousted must satisfactorily explain why this happened in 1979 and not earlier or later. Bill skims over the reasons with a retrospective emphasis on economic and religious factors which drove the masses to action. He mentions the Shah's liberalization program as a factor, but he does not give it the weight that I believe it deserves as the answer to the question of why events unfolded when they did. Bill cites the "Pahlavi invincibility thesis," or the "Pahlavi premise," as a phenomenon of "shared image" among American officials which distorted their view of the

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political realities, especially the mood of the masses. In hindsight, there is an easy appeal in Bill's theory that, if the US had looked behind the scenes, the forces forming to act against the Shah could easily have been identified.

Bill ignores another possibility, however, that does not fit his theory. According to this second theory, the Shah was indeed invincible in the mid-1970s. In true Middle Eastern fashion (Saddam Hussein in Iraq comes to mind), the Shah had built a repressive mechanism that was impervious to pressure from below, because the Shah, using Savak, had fragmented and cowed the opposition. As Bill acknowledges, the Shah had the money and political skills to coopt large sections of the opposition. Only the terrorist Mujahedin-e Khalq and the Charik-e-Fedayeen-i Khalq registered serious dissent through their armed struggle. The Shah easily dominated the Shia clergy, many of whom were in the pay of Savak, after a hard-won victory in 1963 and the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini. Why, then, did the Shah decide to liberalize? Among other reasons, Bill cites the one to which I always subscribed—the Shah wanted above all else to ensure the survival of his dynasty. To do so, he undertook, as supreme manipulator of Persians, to make political changes to broaden support from a perpetually disgruntled population which he knew his young son could not control and rule under the Shah's system of a one-man monarchy. The Shah also launched this program because he believed that events from 1963 to 1977 had erased the shame of his cowardly flight from Iran in 1953 and demonstrated his courage and his dominant political skills to both the Iranian people and himself. In the confident ruler's view, liberalization would allow for greater popular participation but still under a continuing Pahlavi dynasty.

The period from the summer of 1977 to the summer of 1978 was marked first by concession and then by repression, as the Shah floundered through a disastrous liberalization program. In his paternalistic approach, he denied Iranians a view of his objectives, leaving the fragmented opposition to shape a one-plank platform for liberalization—get rid of the Shah. The Shah's handling of the program gave all Iranians the first glimpse of his vulnerability. It became obvious that his vacillation between concession and repression was a sign that he did not know what he was doing. The Middle Eastern ruler's iron fist had begun to shake, and the opposition became increasingly confident that the Shah could be overthrown.

In this context, I recall a discussion in October 1978 (b)(3)(n) which centered on the fate of Middle Eastern rulers, once the opposition sensed their vulnerability. Ayub Khan's downfall in Pakistan, begun by his illness, was a case in point. The fall of another Pakistani leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was an even better example—one that was not lost on the Shah. During Bhutto's last weeks in power, the Shah told a visitor that Bhutto "must brazen it out" and dispel any sense of vulnerability.

By mid-October 1978, (b)(3)(c) only a miracle would save the Shah. This judgment was based on the sense that the Shah was not of the stuff needed to avert disaster. Once the Shah had freed the genie, he dissolved into an indecisive and frightened monarch who could not

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save himself or his supporters. The Shah was not overwhelmed by a mass uprising. Rather, he was not up to the task of handling the dissenting forces he had released.

Other Negative Factors

Students of the Shah's downfall have to answer the question of why he failed so badly. At the time, we saw some contributing factors, but we did not have a complete picture. Although we were unaware of his cancer, we believed that health might have been a factor. As early as May 1978, there were rumors that the Shah had a serious illness. In retrospect, the Shah concealed his ailment, probably limiting knowledge of it to his French doctors and to a few in his inner circle. (A recent book, *The Shah's Last Ride*, by William Shawcross, suggests that the Shah and the Empress did not even acknowledge to one another that he had cancer.) During the summer of 1978, there also were widespread rumors that the Shah had been wounded in an assassination attempt. The Shah inadvertently encouraged such speculation by withdrawing to the Caspian for most of the summer. When he returned to Tehran in August, he began another round of concessions and repressions which underscored his vulnerability.

A more fundamental mistake in our appreciation of the situation was made when we lost sight of [redacted] the Shah's cowardly performance in 1953. I also believe that the death in 1977 of former Court Minister Asadollah Alam robbed the Shah of his most astute political adviser. Without Alam, the Shah was unable to cope with the fast-breaking situation or to make quickly the sound political decisions necessary for survival. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

To achieve a genuine understanding of events in Iran, other questions, either lightly touched upon or ignored by Bill, must be considered. Among these are:

- Why did the mullahs and not pro-Western moderates inherit power from the monarchy?
- Why did the Iranian military collapse?
- Could the US have saved Iran from the clerics?

Turkish Influence

Bill makes no mention in his book of Turkey's great leader, Kemal Ataturk, and the influence he had upon affairs in Iran. In his book on Reza Shah, Donald Wilber offers a key insight into how Reza Shah was influenced by Ataturk's reshaping of the Turkish people and Ataturk's successful attempt to relegate Islam to a secondary position in favor of westernization. Reza Shah adopted Ataturk's westernization objectives as his own, and he, and later his son, successfully pursued that policy until 1978. In 1963, the Shah crushed the mullahs, and they did not reemerge as a contender until the Shah lost his grip. Why had Turkey succeeded and Iran failed in continuing westernization? In my view, Reza Shah and his son ignored the differences between Turkish and Iranian nationalism. Reza Shah returned from visiting Turkey to impose a Persian nationalism which was built upon sand, trying to copy in a land of great

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diversity the example of a homogeneous Turkish people (Kurds excluded) whose language and history allowed them to build a durable nation committed to westernization.

Islamic Revival

With Turkey's continuing adherence to Ataturk's secular principles in mind, Bill's theory of the inevitable reemergence of Islam is not as obvious as he would argue. Rather, other causes must be sought to explain why Islam replaced the monarchy. The primary cause, I believe, was the nature of the Shah's rule. Reza Shah, and, especially his son in the later years of his rule, destroyed the institutions whose support was crucial for the Shah's liberalization program. Chief among these would have to be individuals grouped together in associations dedicated to maintaining programs favoring westernization. In 1977, the Shah set out to enlist such support. The chaotic advances and retreats of 1977-1978 clearly suggest, however, that he had never grasped that his earlier repressive policies had weakened his natural allies to the point where they lacked the will and courage to defend their national interests in the face of an Islamic resurgence.

In this situation, the mullahs had a natural advantage which was never to be overcome. Of all of the opposition forces, only the mullahs had an existing organization capable of asserting itself. Each mosque was a political unit that could field a street force. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(c) Other potential political forces, including the National Front, were organizationally incapable of matching the already immense human resources of the clergy. By October 1978, the more Western potential actors had resigned themselves to Khomeini's leadership filling the vacuum created by the Shah. One by one, potential leaders paid their respects and offered subjugation in Paris to the exiled Ayatollah.

Military and Political Collapse

With the monarchy dissolving and pro-westernization forces capitulating to the Ayatollah, the military was the only institution capable of limiting the extent of the clergy's power. I seriously overestimated the potential of the military to shape events after the Shah's departure, partly because it was hard to believe that a 400,000-man force would ever abdicate its responsibility to itself and its families. As I watched the military disintegrate, the idea was ever present that other military institutions with which I was familiar would never accept such an end. Can one imagine the Indian Army abandoning the field and retreating to the barracks in the face of threats to its power and existence? Later, I was to watch the Turkish Army resume power in September 1980 to end in a day an anarchic threat to Ataturk's revolution.

Looking back, the explanation seems to lie in the unique relationship between the Shah and his military. We had one clear warning beforehand that the military would collapse, but I tended to discount it because it seemed

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inconceivable. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(c) that the military itself, like Persian nationalism, was founded on the sand of the Shah's person.

The Shah himself nurtured an every-man-for-himself ethic when he threw his loyal supporters to the political wolves in the fall of 1978. The fate of Savak head General Nimatullah Nassiri is an excellent example. Nassiri had many faults, but his courage and loyalty to the Shah were not among them. In 1953, Nassiri had obeyed the Shah's foolhardy and powerless order to arrest well-entrenched Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddiq. In 1978, while Nassiri was serving as Ambassador in Islamabad, the Shah bent to pressure to recall and investigate Nassiri for his years as Savak chief. When the Shah issued a formal order that Nassiri return to Tehran, he sent a second and personal message through a Savak telephone call to Nassiri that he should disregard the Shah's formal summons and slip off to South Africa. Nassiri ignored the Shah's personal message and returned to Iran, because the Shah would not rescind the formal order. Former Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda and others were sacrificed in similar fashion by the Shah. Each example undermined loyalty to the crumbling monarchy, but the Shah lacked the courage to resist.

During the fall of 1978, the Shah made similar missteps which had the effect of undermining his own rule while reintroducing the sense that the unarmed opposition was irresistible. A good example was the Shah's decision on 5 November to allow mobs to run riot throughout Tehran. Military and police forces were withdrawn into the background by the Shah in order to allow the mob to have its day. Instead of facing up to the forces he had unleashed, the Shah chose to withdraw.

US Reactions

The cumulative effect of the Shah's collapse ultimately determined what US policy was to be in the late days of the Shah's reign. Bill concentrates on the inability of the Shah's "Rockefeller" supporters to face the reality of his condition. There was no such ambivalence among US officials on the scene. As early as mid-October 1978, they had correctly determined that a fatalistic and broken Shah would not survive. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(c)

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(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)
(b)(3)(c)

Looking Ahead

The factors contributing to the Shah's ouster are important, because they relate to predictions over the fate of Iran's current government. Bill's volcano theory obscures the serious differences within the clergy over the question of its right to temporal rule, and, ultimately, whether the clergy wants to maintain responsibility after Khomeini is gone for the blood debts incurred by his government. It also obscures the centuries of monarchical rule in Iran and the past attractions of that system for Persians. In fairness, it should be noted that Bill correctly senses these underlying problems in his refusal to condemn the search during the Iran-contra affair for elements within the clergy who may be amenable to the earliest stages of a rapproachment with the US.

Bill exaggerates the political distance between Iran and the US. He chooses to scorn the ordinary Americans who manned the many public and private programs in Iran for their lack of academic understanding of Iranian culture. Bill's scorn leads him to discern a palpable anti-Americanism he describes as having been created by this lack of cultural awareness.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)
(b)(3)(c)

I acknowledge that there are still those in Iran who want to poison relations through bloodshed to preserve their positions, and we should be most wary of playing into their hands. More important, however, we should not be too quick to accept conventional but flawed theories about the past, such as those contained in Bill's book. To do so would risk blinding ourselves to further opportunities to resume more normal relations with a country where many will continue to view the US as leader of an attractive Western alternative to harsh Islamic rule, not to mention US potential as an antidote to Soviet imperialism.

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TITLE: The Sverdlovsk Deception

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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A biological warfare capability

THE SVERDLOVSK DECEPTION

(b)(3)(c)

In late 1979 and early 1980, the US and other Western countries began to hear rumors from Soviet emigrees that an outbreak of some kind of unusually virulent infectious disease had occurred in the spring of 1979 in the closed city of Sverdlovsk in the north-central Urals. The US Intelligence Community viewed these reports as especially significant because a suspect biological warfare (BW) research, production, and storage facility was located in Sverdlovsk. The identification of this facility was based on information (b)(3)(n) as of 1972, the US considered the facility fully operational.

Arms control compliance was a key issue in 1972, when the USSR and many other nations signed a global treaty prohibiting the use, stockpiling, and transfer of biological and toxin weapons. This treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), went into force in 1975. Although the BWC lacked provisions for verification, there were provisions for consultation among signatories in case of compliance questions. There was also a provision for review of the effectiveness of the BWC every five years, with the first review conference scheduled for mid-March 1980.

Based on intelligence information, the US Government officially requested information from the Soviets on the outbreak in Sverdlovsk in a demarche which cited the BWC as justification. A Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative responded verbally, and angrily, that the outbreak was due to meat infected with anthrax and that there was no relation to the BWC. He stated that the dates of the outbreak were March-April 1979 and that no quarantine of any kind was established. The US responded by suggesting that qualified experts from each country hold confidential discussions. The Soviets, however, continued to maintain that no BWC issue was involved.

Intelligence Assessment

ublished an assessment of the epidemic (b)(3)(n) The assessment judged that the most likely cause of the anthrax outbreak was the accidental release of airborne anthrax spores from Cantonment 19, the long-suspect BW facility in southern Sverdlovsk. According to some reports, there was an explosion which disseminated the anthrax spores into the air. Credible reporting of autopsy findings indicated there were many cases of inhalation (pulmonary) anthrax. Despite treatment, death resulted within a few hours.

Gastrointestinal anthrax would have resulted from eating infected meat, provided the meat was undercooked. The distinction between these two routes

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(b)(3)(n)

of anthrax infection by autopsy findings is usually possible, if death occurs early. Because fatal anthrax eventually becomes a blood stream invasion with seeding of infection into multiple vital organs, a case which has survived long enough for wide organ involvement may be less clear. In the reports on Sverdlovsk, however, the medical professionals were convinced that inhalation anthrax was the correct diagnosis.

(b)(3)(n) the earliest cases of anthrax occurred in members of the military staff and in dependents from Cantonment 19, adjacent Cantonment 32, and a nearby ceramics factory. All cases were treated after all non-anthrax cases had been transferred and the civilian physician staff had been replaced by military physicians. (b)(1)

There were rumors that the Defense Minister and the Health Minister visited Sverdlovsk two weeks after the epidemic began, while it was continuing.

(b)(3)(n) the implementation of unusual medical control measures at Sverdlovsk, including a quarantine and extensive environmental cleanup. In addition, the population was provided with vaccine, prophylactic drugs, and anti-serum. These measures would have been appropriate for an airborne dissemination of spores whose extent was not

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well defined, but they seemed inappropriate for control of a meat-borne outbreak. A public health problem caused by infected meat would not have prompted military involvement. More important, such a problem would have no implications for compliance with the BWC.

The US believed that the weight of the intelligence evidence indicated that the Soviets had experienced a considerable number of human cases of inhalation anthrax, following an accidential release of virulent anthrax spores. Because virulent anthrax spores are not used for producing either human or animal vaccines (which are allowable peaceful activities under the BWC) and because a fairly large quantity must have been spilled to cause cases over a large area, the worst-case implication was that the USSR had maintained a BW program in violation of the BWC. In addition to the Sverdlovsk episode, considerable evidence had been obtained over many years that pointed to the existence of such a program.

During 1980, several unofficial Soviet statements dealing with the outbreak in 1979 seemed to be aimed at supporting the infected meat explanation. All of the statements, however, were intended to play down the importance of the anthrax outbreak. The sketchy details provided were so inconsistent with the information available (b)(3)(n) that the US remained skeptical of Soviet explanations and continued to request full information under the provisions of the BWC. This skepticism was not confined to the Intelligence Community; the view was widespread in the US press and the Congress that the USSR was not complying with the BWC.

Soviet Accounts in 1986

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Quite similar verbal accounts were presented on 16 and 25 September 1986, during the Second BWC Review Conference. These accounts were startling, because of their level of detail, their differences from previous versions, and the degree with which they were consistent with some facets of the Western perception of the outbreak. It seemed that the Soviets might have

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tailored a story which was as consistent as possible with the unclassified information published widely in the US and European press.

The story, however, was still not consistent (b)(3)(n) Release of the story obviously was timed to influence global public opinion and to offset the damage of Soviet trustworthiness in arms control treaty compliance issues.

During the BWC Review of 1986, the US continued to request an official Soviet response and made it clear that the verbal briefings on 16 and 25 September 1986 did not constitute an adequate reply. The Soviets were accused of maintaining an offensive BW program in violation of the BWC.

New Information

In April 1988, the Soviets unexpectedly dispatched to the US a briefing team of three scientists whom they said were personally involved with the analysis and control of an anthrax epidemic in 1979 in the city of Sverdlovsk. The Soviets were picking up the pace on chemical warfare treaty negotiations, and the briefing team probably was sent to try to help resolve the Sverdlovsk issue. The team, (b)(3)(n) gave talks to academic audiences in Washington, Baltimore, and Boston, and it presented a somewhat embellished version of the contaminated meat story first advanced in 1980 and then extensively detailed in 1986. The four pieces of new information presented by the team, however, did not significantly strengthen the contaminated meat scenario.

First, the Soviets reported that Major General V.I. Agafonov had visited Sverdlovsk, presumably during the epidemic. Later, they admitted that he was a member of the Ministry of Health team from Moscow investigating the epidemic. (b)(1) Agafonov is a senior military and Ministry of Defe (b)(3)(n) Agafonov's presence at Sverdlovsk is consistent with intelligence reporting that military personnel were involved in managing the outbreak. (Expertise on anthrax rests with military medical officers in both the Soviet Union and the US.) The Soviets' primary purpose, however, probably was to protect military BW activity.

Second, the Soviets claimed that the carcass of a cow which died of anthrax was found in an abandoned mineshaft near Sverdlovsk. This bit of information was not included in the Soviets' presentations in 1986, but the mineshaft disposal had been mentioned in August 1980 in an article in a Soviet legal review that discussed actions relating to the epidemic. The Soviets evidently took pains to ensure that their account in 1988 was in line as much as possible with all previous accounts, in order to strengthen plausibility.

Third, the Soviets argued that, if the anthrax spores had been spread by airborne dissemination, many children would have been infected. In 1988, they reported that only one child was infected. They explained that, because children ate their meals in schools or nurseries, where only inspected meat was served, they were not exposed to any of the contaminated black-market meat.

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The Soviet description in 1986 of the outbreak listed one infected six-year-old child, but the rationalization for cases being seen mainly in adults was not advanced at that time. This explanation is weak, because one would expect the children to eat at home in the evenings and on weekends. Therefore, cases of infected children should have occurred in homes with both children and infected meat. (b)(3)(n)

Fourth, the Soviets presented more clinical and autopsy slides in 1988 than they did previously. The slides showed characteristic lesions of only cutaneous and gastrointestinal anthrax. On a few slides, however, it would not even be possible to determine if they were of human or animal origin. In fact, from the information presented in the slides, almost nothing could be independently traced to its origin.

The paucity of systematic descriptions and full identification of the tissue slides reduced the credibility of the presentation for the audience of medical and academic professionals. It was also surprising that no cultures of the germs from this recordbreaking outbreak were preserved for additional study by interested scientists.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Familiar Fabrication

(b)(3)(n)

Reporting of gastrointestinal cases only also provides plausible explanations of some previously unexplained quirks of the Soviet story. For instance, when questioned about the predominance of single male victims, one to a household, the Soviets provided the following explanation at the National Academy of Sciences:

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"Families sometime purchase black-market meat. In this instance, the meat was contaminated with anthrax. The male head-of-household always receives the largest portion of meat served at a meal."

(b)(3)(n)

This plausibility is offset if the 1988 explanation is compared with the 1986 version, as presented by Dr. Meselson during a briefing at the Department of State. In that version, there was an elaborate discussion of the Russian custom of cooking meat slowly by simmering, which would only partially sterilize the anthrax spores. The claim was made, without citing supporting evidence, that men were more vulnerable to anthrax, because of ulcers or gastritis resulting from alcohol intake.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

A Poor Performance

The Soviets have badly botched their handling of this story. If, in 1979 or 1980, they had conformed to the generally accepted practice of voluntarily reporting unusual infectious disease outbreaks to the World Health Organization, their credibility would have been much better. By releasing their story in incremental fragments over a nine-year period, while simultaneously refusing official confidential expert review or visits of Sverdlovsk, they have intensified Western suspicions. The obvious selfserving timing of their efforts, first in conjunction with the 1986 BWC Review Conference, and then again just before critical treaty negotiations in 1988, has been quite damaging. The Soviets apparently fear the questions which might result from any visit to Sverdlovsk by international investigators.

Outlook

Barring any new radical disclosures by the Soviets, it is increasingly unlikely that any persuasive new evidence will emerge to resolve the conflict over what actually happened at Sverdlovsk. The US cannot reveal its sensitive intelligence information. If it did, the Soviets would promptly revise their explanation and concoct a plausible story to explain away the damaging details. By not providing an official response to the US, they have kept open their ability to revise their explanation when required for propaganda purposes. The

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Soviets probably remain confident that, in terms of influencing worldwide public opinion, they can plausibly deny what really happened at Sverdlovsk. Whatever the case, this experience underscores the shortcomings of arms limitations agreements which do not include effective provisions for verification.

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TITLE: Conditions of Risk

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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CONDITIONS OF RISK

Carl P. Fedkiw

The statue of Nathan Hale that stands outside the main entrance of the Headquarters building of the Central Intelligence Agency is a constant reminder that intelligence work has historically carried with it a considerable element of risk. In the lobby of the building, 52 stars are carved into the marble wall in memory of those CIA employees who have given their lives in the service of their country. Fifteen of them have been awarded the Agency's Intelligence Star. This medal recognizes voluntary displays of courage performed under hazardous conditions or outstanding acheivements or services rendered with distinction under conditions of grave personal risk.

On 15 March 1954, Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles approved the establishment of a series of internally controlled CIA honor awards. In its original submission, the CIA Honor Awards Board recommended that one of these awards be called the CIA Meritorious Service Medal (with Device for Valor). DDCI Lieutenant General C. P. Cabel, however, recommended that the Awards Board "make a strenuous effort to dream up names for final approval which will not include 'CIA' but might have some legendary relation to intelligence, such as, for example, 'The Cross of the Scarlet Cord.'" * The Awards Board subsequently changed the name of the Meritorious Service Medal to the Intelligence Star.

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(b)(3)(n)


As of 1 December 1988, 190 Agency employees have received this award. The first recipients, Earl M. Harter and [redacted] were approved for the award on 11 November 1954. Both were in the Directorate of Operations, and they received the award for acts of courage while involved in covert operations.

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

* The "scarlet cord" refers to the biblical story of Rahab, a prostitute in Jericho who hid in her house two spies sent by Joshua to gather information on the city before its invasion. After helping the spies to escape, Rahab marked her house by tying a scarlet cord in its window. Only she and her family survived the subsequent conquest of Jericho.

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(b)(3)(c)
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TITLE: Myths and Truths of Training

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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Educational experiences

Myths and Truths Of Training

(b)(3)(c)

My time in training . . . Setting aside experiences before the Agency, it started with occasional lecturing at the Office of Training and Education (OTE) and the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), mostly on economic development and South Vietnam. Then a tour as the faculty economist at the National War College, with related work in the economics department of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Four years, on and off, of back and forth to teach at West Point. More OTE lecturing. Seven months in OTE as a course director. A year in FSI's Senior Seminar, in which, though a student, I helped with various course designs. A little over two years as OTE's Deputy Director for Curriculum.

Having had more than the average amount of exposure to training in my 28 years with the Agency, I feel free to put down a word or two on the principal fictions and non-fictions that surround it, especially in our culture. But I hasten to note that I make no claim to being a professional trainer. Rather, I can relate to trainers as a baseball commentator relates to players: I recognize a good stance and swing, but I make no claim that I can hit the ball.

Some Myths

The most remarkable thing about training myths is their resistance to contravening fact. They are a bit like the concept of the miasma in premodern medicine. Even if they have little or no explanatory power, people will die to defend them.

Myth 1: *Training can cure almost all organizational problems.*

Who would say such a thing? Just about anyone who has ever conducted a study on what is wrong with our components, facilities, people, or product. Inevitably, studies by the Inspector General or the Product Evaluation Staff contain at least some reference to training, primarily because most people do not understand what can and cannot be taught. And because training is an easy answer in a nation that expects a lot from formal education. As one veteran OTE trainer puts it:

> Training becomes a solution when taking on the hard issues is too difficult. For example, send supervisors to management training when the real problem is the lack of a clearly articulated system for management of people and programs. Or, if we train managers on alcoholism, we will fix the problem when, in fact, the problem is good management (know your people).

But there is a second, and substantial, reason why we look to training to do so much: people neither understand how resistant entrenched behavior is to change nor how adults absorb new information. Specialists on adult eduction recognize, for example, that most of what a worker needs to know about his or her job is learned at the worksite, not in the classroom. The layman has an entirely different outlook on this issue. He looks back on years of formal education before he took a job, and he is not about to view those years as wasted.

But there are key times when the adult needs to take on new blocks of information, and these are periods in which the putative student is receptive to information and the development of skills. Even then, however, the going can be rough. There probably is no area in which training is more difficult than in the teaching of management skills. A new manager presumably would be eager to

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acquire skills and avoid pitfalls. The fact is that most new managers have accumulated strong opinions on what was wrong with the managers for whom they worked. Consequently, they are prepared to manage with a "style" that is reactive to their past rather than constructive toward their current environment and the future.

As a result of this complex of interacting factors, the trainers often have to begin with the formidable task of clearing away some of the clutter from the minds of new managers. It is such a consistent pattern that trainers have labeled this the "unfreezing" stage of training. Although it is particularly characteristic of managerial training, it is certainly not unique to this discipline. It parallels the same problems that sports professionals have in training the neophyte who has learned a set of skills "on his own." The pro first has to help the student "unlearn" bad habits. Managers who try through their best feedback methods to improve the performance of subordinates and are consistently unsuccessful will also recognize this phenomenon.

I am not saying that training cannot have a substantial positive impact on people or organizations. We just need to understand that training is most effective with adults when they want it and then learn what is most appropriate to their needs.

OTE's experience with management training over the past few years provides a classic example. When I was a course director in the Intelligence Training Division in 1986, the OTE Management School was undergoing some serious problems of adaptation. It was clear to OTE's director that, with some exceptions, the students were not enthusiastic about the courses being offered. After some soul-searching, OTE decided to stop teaching most management courses until it could do a zero-based assessment of the real needs of Agency managers.

This process produced course designs that were submitted to the Agency's Training Steering Group (the Associate Deputy Directors and a representative of the DCI area) and, in two instances, approved as mandatory for Agency managers. The Management Training Division of OTE has since gone through repeated re-evaluations of the core courses, now contained in one course, "Managing and Leading in CIA," to assure that the students' needs are met . This course has been supplemented with "Managers in Residence" (people on rotation from their organization) and "Managers in the Classroom" (on loan for a particular course running) to assure the job-relevance of the training material. In April 1990, OTE management trainers again refocused their efforts by reaching agreement with the Directorate of Intelligence to conduct the "modern" equivalent of the earlier-required two mandatory courses plus "Supervision of Analysis" and "Counseling Skills for Managers," supplemented by its "Multicultural Management."

Myth 2: *Any intelligent person can train others, if he or she understands the relevant substantive issues or skills.*

This is first cousin to that old saw, "Those who can, do; those who can't, teach." The underlying concept is that a good education and the accumulation of knowledge are necessary and sufficient conditions to produce a competent trainer. Necessary, yes. Sufficient, no. But we are led to believe this by the fact that our universities hire people with PhDs to teach who have never been trained to train, and they do just fine. Or do they? Who has never had a teacher who made an hour seem like an eternity, without adding anything to what was contained in the textbook?

We forget that higher education in most of America is based on the concept that the students are children. And once the child-student is liberated from the high school or university, he or she is not about to go back to being treated as a captive. At this stage, you have to be able to show students that their efforts in the classroom will enhance their lives.

People who teach adults regularly have to be trained how to do it. In serious recognition of this, OTE conducts "Train the Trainers" courses. Some parts of the Agency that have long presented lectures and workshops on component-specific issues have discovered that they can benefit from

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OTE training in this area, and it has become a growth industry. In my recollection, the highest-ranked student we ever had in this course was an office director bound for a rotational assignment outside the Agency. To his everlasting credit, he had the good sense to come to OTE to find out how he could do his best in the classroom. He was the star pupil of his particular running of "Train the Trainers."

Effective trainers in the private sector learn about their audiences before they settle on how they are going to present their material, even if they have already run a course many times. They tailor what they say to the audience's goals and interests. Every word is intended to hold the attention of their audience. They emphasize a limited number of key points because they understand that you can only communicate about three substantial issues to an adult in an hour. They pepper their presentations with specifics on how the student will be able to use the material back on the job. And they stick to the day's schedule because they recognize the importance of the audience's time.

I once asked a truly superb commercial trainer why his industry's best trainers did so well. His explanation was simple: "There are a lot of us who want to do this work. You screw up once, they fire you." As Samuel Johnson said, "Nothing so clarifies the mind as the imminent prospect of hanging in the morning."

Myth 3: *The most important part of teaching adults is knowing the key facts they have to learn.*

I cannot recall a supervisor I have ever been fonder of than a former commandant of the National War College. A bomber jockey by training, he was completely out of his element at the college. His great contributions to his staff and faculty were his unswerving support, his humility, and his willingness to stay out of our way so that we could do the job. On the few occasions that he intruded, he would end up saying, "Know your stuff, and that is everything." He was dead wrong. Having command of a set of facts is not the same as being able to convey them—or skills and techniques—to an audience.

More than a few recommendations from senior managers for training are built around the idea that a set of facts has to be passed on to the students. There are many instances in which students need to absorb certain facts, but an audience will tune you out fast if you firehose it with facts. Good students come to the classroom to discuss concepts and to challenge the ideas of others.

One of my most dismal moments in OTE came when I reviewed a videotape that was to be used in training in another part of the Agency. The other component had taken the lead in drafting the script, even though it had no experience in scriptwriting. The initial product was a 10-minute video rich in facts that could charitably be described as a talking Agency regulation. The two representatives from the component, who had a vital interest in its success, fell asleep almost immediately at the first running of the video. Fortunately, they agreed to turn the project over to OTE media folks who knew how to write scripts and make video lively.

Myth 4: *The teacher is the focal point of learning in the classroom.*

This classic misconception can as easily be attributed to some trainers as to students. I have asked trainers many time how their students reacted to a course and been told that it went over like gangbusters. But the student evaluations were the equivalent of burlesque's "Give 'em the hook."

What is happening here? The trainer becomes enamored of his own voice and forgets the students, who conclude that they are not going to be able to intrude on this bout of theatrical narcissism and thus tune out the trainer. They emerge from their comatose state only when it is time to fill out the evaluation.

In fairness, I suspect that this bacterium infects all trainers at one time or another. I remember addressing a class in an overheated room late in a long day. I decided to do the students a favor by speeding up my lecture to get them out early. When I finished, I got two polite questions, both of which were crafted to ensure that my answers

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could only be monosyllabic. The best evaluation I got for that unit read: "Nice suit."

The best trainers understand that a successful course is often one in which the students talk as much or more to the teacher and to each other as the trainer talks to them. This concept is at least as old as Socrates.

Myth 5: *The best way to assess a course is to ask your employees about it as soon as they are back on the job.*

Trainers in OTE and elsewhere have suffered more needless grief on this avenue of sorrows than any other. I am constantly amazed at what usually discerning managers or colleagues will take as useful input from the recently returned trainee on the value of training. Training has to meet the needs of the employee, and one of the few ways to measure this is to ask the students how a course helped. It is beyond me, however, why supervisors, after telling trainers that they know Charlie or Sue is unreliable, not very bright or skilled, and may not be at the Agency much longer, will not question their negative evaluations. For some critics, "didn't like the course" is a complete answer.

For a variety of reasons, the National Security Agency has to depend on extensive and continuous training over the course of its officers' careers. Unlike in our Agency, NSA trainers have a good deal of power over the students and their managers. Certain courses have to be completed for promotion and advancement. Both the student and his or her manager have to complete evaluations of the course; the manager's is based on whether the student has demonstrated the requisite skills on the job. Until the two forms are submitted, the student cannot be certified to promotion panels as having met the requirements.

In this system, evaluation techniques have to be above reproach. NSA has the largest course evaluation staff in the Intelligence Community. The evaluators agree that time has to pass before the supervisor can evaluate what impact training has had.

Myth 6: *A tour in training constitutes a simple flow of service and knowledge from the person on rotation to the training component.*

Almost uniformly, people who do tours in training say several things when they are over.

— They understand their own field better than they did before, (Try, as I did, teaching beginning economics to 35- to 45-year-old field grade officers, mostly trained in engineering, and see if you can fake your way around the parts of your own discipline on which you were a bit fuzzy. It does not work.)

— They have a better grasp of where training can and cannot be helpful to their own employees. (Trainers are mostly extroverted or have learned to behave as extroverts. You learn a lot about other trainers' programs when you are among them.)

— They have a better appreciation of the Agency's mission and what other parts of the organization do than they did going in. (No matter what you teach, if it entails contacts with new employees, they are going to force you to learn enough about the Agency to help them understand better. And, as is often the case, classes that mix people from several Agency components provide ample opportunity for lateral transmission of data.)

In recognition of these and other facts, the Federal Bureau of Investigation regards assignment to training as a sign that the employee is a comer. In fact, the Bureau uses training assignments at various career stages as a way to size people up for increased responsibility. (It is no coincidence that James Greenleaf, who was briefly head of the Agency's Office of Public Affairs, passed through CIA from a position as the FBI's director of training to one as the FBI equivalent of our own Deputy Director for Administration.)

I have been equally bemused by what I see as a remarkable lack of understanding Agency-wide about what goes on in training in our organization.

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Truth 1: *CIA invests a lot of time in training.*

Most Agency employees know that OTE has a host of courses on a variety of topics. In fact, it conducts about 250 separate courses, many of them multiple times a year. It and the various other Agency components also support a prodigious amount of external training. Most funding of external training now comes from the sponsoring Agency components, while most of the logistics of processing the requests and entering course completion data in the records falls to OTE.

In FY1990 there were som(b)(3)(c)student-instances of external training ranging from one-day workshops to full ye[illegible]demic institutions. This compares with(b)(3)(c)uch instances in FY 1985. Full-time academic training is growing rapidly, too. In FY1990 there were roughl(b)(3)(c). ple taking such training; there w(b)(3)(c)FY1985.

A lot of other Agency components also conduct training. Several different parts of the Directorate of Operations (DO), for example, conduct surveillance training. The Office of Communications has its own substantial training program, both internal and external. The Directorate of Science & Technology conducts some directorate-wide training and supports training efforts in its own components and in OTE. The National Photographic Interpretation Center trains its people in a variety of component-specific skills. The Office of Security and the Counterintelligence Center have training components, as does the Office of Information Technology. The Office of Technical Services has a wide range of specialized skills in which it has to instruct its employees. At one time or another, almost all of us have been exposed to presentations by the Office of Medical Services on health issues.

To keep track of this array of programs, the Agency has so(b)(3)(c)ning officers dotted among its ranks. Add to this the dozen or so people in OTE who register folks for their internal programs and a plethora of external programs.

Truth 2: *OTE spends a lot of time and trouble trying to design courses that are relevant and useful for the Agency population.*

"If OTE would only listen to our needs" is one of the oft-heard canards in this area. Having seen this one from the inside, I would be royally upset as a taxpayer if OTE paid more attention to course design and tailoring its product to fit needs than it now does. Unfortunately, most of the Agency does not know the process that OTE goes through in putting new courses together.

Before a new OTE course design leaves the drawing board the first time, it typically has been vetted with those parts of the Agency most likely to be interested in it. Then it has to be defended before the Curriculum Committee, a body made up of all of OTE's division chiefs and chaired by the Deputy Director for Curriculum. If it survives this process reasonably intact, it is presented to the Senior Training Officers, a group made up of single representatives from each directorate and the DCI's Executive Staff. If the program is substantial in scope, it will probably go before the Training Steering Group. Once it clears this hurdle, it can be run in the classroom. Each running of the course includes completion of standardized evaluation sheets, which become the basis of further redesign and retunings.

Truth 3: *There are some kinds of training that the Agency does that have no real parallels in other organizations, and this training is admired by other US Government trainers.*

When I first joined OTE, I expected that I would learn that the really exotic stuff was what we did in training in tradecraft, science and technology, and advanced analytic methods. Some remarkable things have been produced in these areas, such as advanced tradecraft training for officers going to dangerous areas, work to familiarize our staff with new directions (b)(3)(n) and a course that is highly regarded by other components of the Intelligence Community.

But there are rough analogs for all these things in at least some other organizations. Some of the glitter of uniqueness of the first-rate Career Training Program, for example, was diminished for me when I looked at aspects of the FBI training for Special Agents or visited West Point to see how its staff developed a sense of belonging and mission.

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One type of training that we do particularly well—and extensively—is secretarial training. Other courses that have no clear analogs in the rest of the government are the ones in our "Working with People" program, which focuses on interpersonal skills. Moreover, few if any other US Government agencies would be willing to tackle a training challenge like our "Counterintelligence Awareness Program" that every employee will take.

Truth 4: *Since the mid-1980s, OTE has made and continues to make every effort to deliver training in a way that reduces the employee's loss of time on the job in taking it.*

To get training to the customer, OTE—among other things—uses: classrooms in both headquarters buildings; the courses presented over Headquarter's television grid; learning centers, including one in (b)(3)(n) a flood of self-study materials: and training teams that go overseas (b)(3)(n)

One of the really touching experiences in my tour as Deputy Director for Curriculum was looking at course evaluations from such places as (b)(3)(n) that said that the secretaries who had been trained in the field were delighted that someone in Washington thought enough of them to recognize they were a part of the Agency team. Some claimed that, from their perspective, this was the first real recognition from Headquarters in what had been long careers with us.

In addition to facilitating access to courses as a way to save the employee's time, OTE has since the mid-1980s worked hard to shorten course designs. In part, the position of Deputy Director for Curriculum became a "supergrade" slot in recognition of the need to put as much muscle as possible behind the review of course designs. The net effect has been to reduce consistently course lengths to less than a week wherever possible. I suspect no single question has passed the lips of the four successive Deputy Directors for Curriculum more often than, "Can't we shorten this?"

Truth 5: *Each employee can have an impact on how training is conducted in the Agency.*

The network of training officers works up as well as down in seeking ideas for new training. If you believe you have a good idea for useful training, it is a part of their job to help get your message across. Tell them what is on your mind.

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On buildings and grounds

The E Street Complex

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This article is based mainly on an address of 21 June 1990 at a Directorate of Science and Technology staff meeting.

My purpose is to describe briefly the origins of the CIA in terms of the property it has occupied, particularly the E Street complex, and some of the people who occupied it. There is somewhat more attention paid to the beginnings of scientific and technical intelligence than to other parts of our profession because, in my view, S&T enjoys pride of place at E Street.

The plot of land on which the E Street complex is located was originally a steep bluff on the Potomac River, deeded in 1664 by English royal authority to John Longsworth. Over the next century, some 19 acres of this property passed into the hands of two families. Sam Davidson owned the smaller portion to the north, and David Burnes owned everything to the south, plus considerably more adjacent land extending across what is now Constitution Avenue but was then known as Goose Creek or Tyber Creek. In 1790, the Federal Government acquired the 19 acres plus adjacent land, which became known as Federal Appropriation 4 or Federal Reservation 4.

Disputed Territory

It is a matter of some dispute as to just how the federal government acquired this land—whether by purchase, seizure (as in "appropriation") or donation. To check on this, I visited the Columbia Historical Society in 1986 and through their files established that the dividing line betwen the Davidson and Burnes portions of the 19-acre plot runs roughly parallel to and just north of what is now South Building and south of what is now East Building. Officials of the Society informed me that in recent years some of Burnes' descendants have brought suit to recover their property or at least to receive financial compensation. That means that the title to South Building is theoretically in dispute.

The chances that land owned for 200 years by the federal government would revert to private ownership seem remote (Federal Reservations 1, 2, and 3 are now occupied by the White House, the Capitol, and the Mall). Still, the possible legal complications became a significant factor in the decision made by the Agency's Office of Technical Services to relocate from South Building to the New Headquarters Building.

A National Observatory

For more than a half century nothing much was done with Federal Reservation 4. The 19-acre parcel was considered and rejected as the site for a fortification, for a national university, and even for the Capitol building. In 1842, a Congressional bill authorized the construction of a national observatory, under control of the Navy. In that sense at least, it can be said that the first activities authorized for the E Street property were scientific and technical and related to national defense.

From 1844 until about 1894, the Washington Observatory witnessed numerous scientific achievements. Matthew Maury, for example, studied the influence of tides and winds on sea navigation before going off to join the Confederate side in the Civil War. A dome was constructed, on which a black ball was suspended from a pole. "At

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precisely noon every day, celestial time, it slid down the pole," a reporter of the time observed. "Fascinated Washingtonians set their watches and marveled at the wonders of science." [1]

By 1894, the observatory had been abandoned by the scientists largely because the Tyber Creek had become a stinking marsh. The Navy kept control of the property, however, and after the Tyber Creek was paved into Constitution Avenue, the Navy constructed additional buildings over the next half century. The buildings we are most concerned about include North, Central, East, and South.

North and Central Buildings

North Building, built in 1903, lay parallel to Central Building. It was used by the Public Health Service for research on smallpox, typhus, rabies and diphtheria; for improving vaccines; for setting standards for antitoxin manufacture; and for serving as an educational facility for the service's health offices. When William J. Donovan took over the E Street facility during World War II, North Building housed such diverse units as Procurement, Medical Services, Schools and Training, and Motor Transport. When I arrived in CIA in November 1960 and was assigned to North Building, I found it housed mostly the Directorate of Intelligence's (DI) Office of Central Reference, but it also included Mac's Snack Bar, where the main entrees nearly every day seemed to be American cheese on white and peanut butter and jelly on raisin bread. North Building was demolished for highway expansion in the early 1960s, thereby reducing the 19-acre parcel to 15 acres.

Central Building was completed in 1904, and it served largely as a Marine hospital until World War II. During General Donovan's tenure, Central Building housed the Deputy Director for Intelligence, General John Magruder. Magruder's component performed many of the functions of the current DI plus counterintelligence, clandestine collection, and various types of domestic contacts. Most of these offices were located outside Central Building.

Central Building also contained the Planning Group. This group had general responsibility for seeing that OSS operations were coordinated with military operations, and particular duties in approving psychological warfare. In addition, it was responsible for the Special Relations Office, which handled the many problems in coordinating OSS activities with the State Department, other branches of the US Government, and foreign diplomatic missions in the US.

In a sense, the presence today of portions of the Intelligence Community Staff in Central Building continues the interagency direction exercised from the same building in World War II.

The "Kremlin"

The cornerstone of what is now East Building was laid in 1932, and the building served as the administrative headquarters of the medical and public health facilities at E Street until World War II. Then Donovan established his office in Room 122 in the southwest corner of the first floor. The building was formally known as the Administration Building, but in the OSS days it was commonly known as the "Kremlin." (The informal OSS name for the headquarters complex was "St. Elizabeths.") When CIA was set up in 1947, Admiral Hillenkoetter, the first Director of CIA, occupied Donovan's old office. So did the next Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), General Walter Bedell Smith, of whom more than one colleague remarked, with more admiration than criticism, that he was the most even-tempered man they had ever met—he was "always angry."

Allen Dulles began his almost nine-year tenure as DCI in the same office but soon moved over to what is now South Building. Thus, in the mid- and later 1950s, while construction was under way at Langley, South Building temporarily became the Administration Building and the former

[1] *Mr. Lincoln's City.* By Richard M. Lee. Epm Publications; McLean, Virginia; 1981.

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Admin Building was renamed, permanently, East Building.

South Building

South Building is the largest in the E Street complex. It was constructed at about the same time as East Building or somewhat earlier—the GSA records are murky. South, like Central, was a hospital before World War II. Under Donovan, several components operated from South: Communications, Special Funds, the Naval Command, Security, and the most interesting of all, the Research and Development Branch, presided over by Doctor Stanley Lovell, who occupied Room 113 and answered Donovan's many phone calls on extension 2104. The R&D Branch was the daddy of the old Technical Services Division in the Directorate of Plans and therefore the granddaddy of the Office of Technical Services in the Directorate of Science and Technology. But it is worth emphasizing that in the OSS days "branches" contained "divisions" rather than the reverse and both were larger than "offices," except for the designation of the organization itself, OSS. Moreover, the official *OSS War Report* indicates that R&D Branch had responsibilities in addition to technical services. Lovell reported directly to Donovan and the First Assistant Director, Colonel Ned Buxton, and he also represented OSS on all matters scientific and technical to other parts the US Government and foreign governments; this suggests that he was in fact though not in name the first Deputy Director for Science and Technology.

Lovell was the chief scientific and technical expert under Donovan, but another of that ilk was the Chief of the Field Photographic Branch, headquartered in the South Agricultural Building. The National Photographic Interpretation Center is the direct descendant of this component. Its chief was the famous Hollywood film director John Ford, who much preferred taking live-action footage of battle scenes at Midway and D-Day to attending staff meetings more than a mile away.

Ford was not the only OSS official in the Washington area who had to travel to attend staff meetings. A short walking distance to the southeast of the E Street complex were two large "temporary" wooden structures, M and Que Buildings, where Edward Bigelow, Deputy Director for Strategic Services Operations, and many of his colleagues in paramilitary action held sway. James Murphy, chief of counterintelligence, was also located there, and CIA's DI inherited those two buildlings.

More Real Estate

Other significant OSS facilities in the Washington area, which were identified through the listing of guard posts in the February 1944 OSS telephone directory, included:

— Annex #1, 401 23rd Street, N.W., where William Langer ran the Research and Analysis Branch.

— The Auditorium, 1901 New York Avenue (19th and E Streets, N.W.), where H. C. Barton was Chief of Presentation.

— The Coliseum, 510 26th Street, N.W., where the Second Assistant Director of OSS, Charles Cheston, was located, as were components dealing with budget, finance, and civilian personnel. In CIA days, the building was referred to as Riverside Stadium, or just the Stadium, and it housed similar support functions. (In the spring some of us at the E Street complex were told to be ready to lay sandbags at the Stadium if the Potomac flooded.) As is the case with North, M, and Que Buildings, it no longer exists.

— The Courts Building, 310 6th Street, N.W., where DeWitt Poole presided over the DI's Foreign Nationalities Branch.

— Auth's Warehouse at 6th and D Streets, S.W., used for just that purpose.


— Office space for miscellaneous purposes in the War and Interior Departments.

This list does not include the more than 20 OSS training and special purpose areas outside Washington listed in the *OSS War Report*. OSS had a

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Original OSS/CIA Building and Grounds



[a] Used by both OSS and CIA; others only by CIA.

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"farm" too, RTU-II, located in Maryland. One of the OSS training areas is better known these days as Camp David. All of these US facilities were used to support a fairly large enterprise; by my count of the official personnel roster, more than 21,000 worked for Donovan at some point during

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World War II. A precise listing of CIA buildings in the Washington area and their functions would be beyond the classification level of this article.

Fond Memories

The late Archie Roosevelt fondly recalled [2] what life was like in the Clandestine Service in the temporary buildings, I, J, K, and L, which were on the south side of the reflecting pool below the Lincoln Memorial. As Archie remembered it, working conditions were austere but the view was pleasant; the conditions ensured that virtuous conduct usually prevailed one way or another. And the move to more comfortable surroundings was not an unmixed blessing. I will give Archie the final words:

> "They were dilapidated, impractical, hard to heat or cool, yet we developed a certain affection for them. We were all within reach of each other in well-defined territories along the corridor connecting all the buidlings. We walked together at noon by the pool in warm weather, and those sufficiently high in the hierarchy to enjoy offices with windows facing the pool and the Lincoln Memorial could gaze out at the skaters in winter. Others in the back wings could at least contemplate their colleagues at work in the buildings next door, giving us a comfortable sense of camaraderie and intimacy.
>
> Sometimes this propinquity led to security problems, and windows had to be screened off to prevent other elements of the Agency from seeing papers or maps they had no need to know about. At least in one case I know of, it led also to personal embarrassment. One of my friends, working in his second-floor office on a weekend, happened to look down and see a colleague in an office below in the process of undressing a pretty secretary, with the obvious intention of committing a bit of unauthorized covert action.
>
> Surrendering to an irresistible impulse, my friend picked up the phone, dialed his colleague, and watched him draw away from the lady to answer it.
>
> > 'This is God speaking,' said a deep, commanding voice. 'I see what you are doing. It is a grievous sin.'
>
> He hung up and saw the parties separating . . . .
>
> Now we faced the prospect of leaving these familiar ramshackle offices for a huge cement structure in the country, far away in Langley, Virginia, eight miles from the White House and the State Department. We did not like the idea at all and criticized our misguided Uncle Allen for moving us to a sort of academic campus far from the corridors of power."

This article is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

[2] *For Lust of Knowing.* Archibald Roosevelt. Little Brown; Boston, Mass.; 1988.

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AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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A personal view

The Toshiba Case

(b)(3)(c)

As the Harvard case study suggests, the CIA has faced few analytic issues that have put as much public and political pressure on it as its discovery, analysis, and reporting of the diversions of militarily critical technology to the Warsaw Pact by the Japanese firm, Toshiba. The study, however, ends in what hindsight shows was the middle of the case. What follows is an attempt to finish the narrative and to highlight some of the key lessons I learned.

Further Background

Had the case finished where Harvard ended the story, it would have been interesting, but not a firefight. In early 1987, Norway had admitted violations of COCOM. By July 1987, Japan—after several months of foot-dragging—had also acknowledged violations. The US House of Representatives and the US Senate voted to impose trade sanctions against the companies involved. The House and Senate versions were different and would require negotiations in the Conference Committee. The administration argued that trade sanctions against the companies were counterproductive, would be perceived in Tokyo as "Jap-bashing," and a better policy would be to work with our allies to improve COCOM. Administration spokesmen and lobbyists hired by Toshiba Corporation had made progress arguing against the sanctions, and the issue appeared to calm down.

As the party was winding down, however, CIA briefed National Security Council (NSC) and Department of State officials in August 1987 about new, strong—but not conclusive—evidence linking Toshiba Corporation, independent of the activities of its subsidiary, Toshiba Machine, with transfers of significant microelectronic technology to Eastern Europe since at least 1979. Independently reviewing the same evidence, DIA had also reached this conclusion. This discovery would be particularly vexing to the Japanese because the key to Tokyo's argument against sanctions was that the Toshiba Corporation had no knowledge of the illegal sales to the Warsaw Pact and should not be punished for the action of a subsidiary. We prepared a paper used by the Deputy Secretary of State and the US Ambassador to brief Japanese officials on the problem.

Tokyo denied any wrongdoing by Toshiba Corporation, and many in the administration wanted to believe the company, hoping that the issue would fade. Many in Congress, however, saw this as a weapon against Japan. The debate with the administration, Tokyo, Toshiba, and its lobbyists on one side and the Congress on the other continued for almost a year after the Harvard study ends. For most of that year, CIA was in the middle. In the end, the Congress approved and the President signed the Trade Bill with sanctions against the firms. The process taught me some lessons.

Different Agendas

Most consumers want intelligence that supports their agenda, and we were not always aware of who had what agenda and why. In the machine tool case—detailed in the Harvard study—many in the Defense Department used and leaked our information to argue for sharp increases in funding for submarine development and construction, as well as antisubmarine technology. Early in the

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case, State and Defense officials used our analysis as a weapon to persuade Japan and Norway to improve their export-control systems. As the case developed, some on the Hill and elsewhere used the information to stoke the anti-Japanese fire already being fueled by the trade deficit.

To support their different agendas, policymakers often will try to accelerate dissemination of information or restrict it. Early in the case, for example, high-level State Department officials wanted to keep pressure on Japan to implement a strong export-control system. The officials requested that we bypass the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the Japan Desk at State in preparing a *demarche* based on the intelligence to speed the process of briefing Japanese officials in Washington and Tokyo. When State first briefed Japanese officials in Washington on both the machine tool case and on the microelectronics case, the Japan Desk and INR were excluded. On the other hand, once State decided CIA information was no longer helping and was hurting its case, these same officials began to insist that all analysis reflect an Intelligence Community judgment, knowing that this would slow the process.

Our customers also misanalyzed the agenda of some actors. When we briefed the NSC and State on the microelectronics case, we noted that Congress might use this evidence against the administration. Nonetheless, I said that we felt obligated to inform at least our oversight committees. The senior NSC person on this issue, however, told me that Congress was already getting bored with this problem. As a result, the administration played down the importance of requests we were getting for Congressional briefings. Because we gave the same briefing to all requesters, Congress knew as much on this issue as the White House and was using the information to counter administration arguments.

The Mystery of Intelligence

The wide range in quality and quantity of intelligence evidence remains a mystery to many consumers. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) This quality and quantity overcame the preconceived bias of many policymakers. A senior Defense Department official, for example, when first approached by us about Kongsberg's involvement, argued that he knew the company and that it was clean. Our evidence changed his mind. (b)(1)

Consumers also often do not understand the difference between a legal case and an intelligence case. Even if they understand, they will be likely to complain when the evidence is clear but its legal application is not. For example, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense told a senior CIA official that CIA should only publish and brief what we can prove in court.

Withstanding Political Pressure

The public and political pressure on us was intense. (b)(3)(n)

High-level officials in Washington and Tokyo complained about our analysis, our briefings to Congress, and the leaks in the press. In a letter to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), an Assistant Secretary of Defense accused us of convicting Toshiba in the pages of the *Washington Times*. (b)(1) a senior US diplomat accused me of attempting to undermine the US-Japan relationship. Speaking to high-level US officials, a Japanese trade official labeled me the principal "Jap-basher" in Washington.

To try to clear the air, key policymakers and the DDCI agreed that I would brief an NSC-chaired

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interagency group on all of our evidence and analysis. The impact of the actual briefing is debatable. One official told me it helped clarify key points, but another told me General Colin Powell left the room unconvinced and concerned about the thinness of our case. According to another high-level official, US troops had been sent into countries based on less evidence. In my judgment, however, the meeting primarily showed that I had support at the highest levels at CIA—both the DDCI and the Deputy Director for Intelligence attended the briefing—and that further public pressure on CIA was not going to change our analysis.

The impact was clear. At the interagency meetings I attended in the weeks following the briefing, the debate shifted from putting pressure on the CIA into changing our analysis to how to develop a strategy to deal with Congress. In addition, leaks in the press on CIA evidence and analysis dried up and the policymakers stopped writing to the DCI on the subject.

Conclusion

Many of these lessons will be important in the future. Policymakers and the Congress face increasingly complex problems; they want clear answers that help solve problems, not complicate the issue. But intelligence is almost never that clear. Increasingly, intelligence is being used to support negotiations, monitor international agreements and treaties, and aid enforcement arms of government. Often we will know or have strong evidence about violators but will not be able to "prove" our case in court. When that happens, many of the experiences of the Toshiba episode and the kind of publicity it inspired are likely to be repeated.

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Toshiba–A Chronology

Early - Mid-1986	Initial intelligence that Soviets had acquired large number of significant machine tools; *demarche*, using intelligence, issued to Japan; allegations denied.
December 1986	Using more complete intelligence reporting, Defense Under Secretary Ikle approaches Japanese Government again; using information supplied by Toshiba, Tokyo rejects *demarche.*
January 1987	At COCOM high-level meeting in Paris, US announced evidence that Toshiba and Norwegian firm Kongsberg had supplied the USSR with machine tools, computer control systems, and technology.
February - March 1987	Norway begins serious investigation of charges; Japan again denies involvement.
April 1987	After reports begin to appear in US press, interest in Congress accelerates and Tokyo initiates investigation.
May - July 1987	Japan admits violating COCOM; House and Senate approve differing amendments to Trade Bill calling for sanctions against Toshiba and Kongsberg; Japan revises its export-control procedures.
August 1987 - September 1987	CIA and DIA uncover strong but not conclusive evidence of further diversions by Toshiba, involving microelectronics; Tokyo promises a complete investigation.
September - October 1987	Japan replies on microelectronics cases, denying any wrongdoing.
November 1987	In response to Congressional request, CIA briefs Trade Bill Conference Committee.
November 1987 - February 1988	Administration opposes sanctions in Trade Bill; members of administration and Congress begin leaking information from CIA and DIA briefings that bolster their case.
March 1988	Administration pressure on CIA to revise assessment or revamp briefing peaks.
August 1988	Congress passes Trade Bill with sanctions.

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How to succeed and survive

The DI's Organizational Culture

(b)(3)(c)

Organizations, like societies, have cultures. These cultures reflect the organization's mission and how its employees carry it out. The culture of an organization also exerts a powerful influence on the job satisfaction of its employees. When we feel in harmony with the values and workstyle of our organization, we are likely to be productive and satisfied. When our work preferences, personal values and attitudes conflict with those of our organization, our lives in the workplace can be miserable and extremely stressful.

An organization's culture often manifests itself in a distinct professional personality—a set of common work norms, attitudes and behaviors—found in a majority of its professionals. These personalities have their roots in early training and job experiences, and they are reinforced through countless repetitions of routine activities. They are what distinguish us from our colleagues even in closely related sister organizations. Journalist Arthur Hadley describes a woman who operates her own computer research firm who says she can tell within minutes whether an interviewee was trained at IBM, Apple, Hewlett-Packard, or some other major computer firm. Hadley also describes the differences in outlook, behavior, and values that clearly distinguish Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force officers from each other.[1] Our own experience within the CIA's four directorates makes the same point. Ask a member of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), the Directorate of Operations (DO), the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T), or the Directorate of Administration (DA) what are the three most important elements of their mission. You will be lucky if there is any convergence.

As an outsider, my sense of the culture in the DO, the DA, or the DS&T is highly impressionistic. But I have experienced the DI's culture firsthand, and I believe that the directorate and the personality it spawns have been shaped by a number of features of our work.

The Analysis Business

Analysis is what the DI does for a living. We research, analyze and write about some of the most complex issues one can imagine, including wars; the intentions and capabilities of foreign adversaries; political succession, turmoil, and change; the world economy; technology transfer; and the international narcotics network. This work invariably is done with incomplete information and a substantial degree of uncertainty. It is often like trying to put together a jigsaw puzzle without the box-top picture as a guide, without all the straight-edge pieces to provide the picture's exact width and depth, and without all the internal pieces. There are always parts of the picture that are unknown, and we can only speculate about them.

We also are paid to make judgments about the future and to predict what is likely to happen, not simply to describe what has occurred. We are expected to know our history and to be familiar with the current facts about our accounts; our analysis must address the meaning of those facts for the future and for the US.

This business of analysis dictates the combination of education and intellectual skills we look

[1] Arthur T. Hadley, "The Split Military Psyche," *The New York Times Magazine*, 13 July 1986, pp. 26-32.

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for in the people we hire. It also shapes our daily routine—read, think, communicate verbally, and write a lot. More important, it shapes the way we look at ourselves and the mental habits that mark us as analysts.

In the DI, we take great pride in our ability to think critically about issues, to ask the right questions, to be objective, to see issues from a number of perspectives, and to marshal evidence in support of our conclusions. We also pride ourselves on being intellectually honest. We call the shots as we see them, regardless of any partisan political considerations or pressures. As a group, we are a tough-minded and critical lot, always ready to do battle with words and ideas. We are as quick to challenge anyone else's conclusions and arguments as we are to defend our own. While we see ourselves as being open-minded empiricists, at times we can also be defensive, intellectually arrogant, and overly cynical. We often find it easier to be neutral or negative than to be upbeat and optimistic. To survive in this culture, intellectual robustness, self-confidence, resiliency, and assertiveness are essential.

The Communications Business

The communications business, which also preoccupies most DIers, forms the other important component of our mission. In a sense, we are only paid half our salaries for doing our analysis. We earn the other half by communicating the policy-relevant portions of that analysis to those who need to know it.

Our communications requirements are just as demanding and difficult as our analytic mission. But the talents they require are quite different from those that define a good analyst. The professional education of a communications specialist stresses knowledge of the various media, audience analysis, and the art of packaging and delivering a message. Effective communicators are often extraverted and similar in personality type to their colleagues in the business world. On the other hand, the college course work of the typical political or economic analyst emphasizes concepts, theories, models and comparative analysis—magnets for the introverted. Their natural colleagues are academics, not entrepreneurs. The successful DI officer has to find a way to merge both the analytic and communications professions.

In the communications business, we compete with other intelligence agencies for the policymaker's attention and time, and we are often competing with the policymaker's own views. Success requires constant attention to our consumer: What is it he or she wants and needs to know? We also have to know something about how our consumer thinks and takes in information, if we are to succeed in getting our message across. While we are not in the business of telling the policymaker what he or she wants to hear, we want to be sure that the consumer hears what we have to say—like it or not.

The "DI style" is the most conspicuous element of our culture that derives from the communications dimension of our work. It includes presenting conclusions first; using tight, logical organization; emphasizing brevity and clarity of expression; describing the evidence; and providing a precise analytic bottom line. These elements are all designed to ensure the most effective and persuasive communication of our message. The singularity of the DI product reflects the powerful influence of this dimension of our culture.

Few, however, come to the DI as polished communicators. Our people are hired primarily for their area expertise and analytic skills, not for their ability to identify and assess an audience or to package and market an analytic product. Most of us have to learn these skills on the job. Over time, we master the formats—intelligence assessments, typescripts, current features and items, briefings—and the presentational tricks of the trade. We also should grow more adept at anticipating and responding to our consumers' needs. While the learning process can be painful, we have discovered the same verity as our colleagues

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in the newspaper, radio, and television worlds: he who ignores what the customer wants and how he wants it will lose that customer.

A Corporate Product

Some years ago, a colleague and I produced a paper that was handed directly to the President by his National Security Adviser with the following advice: "Mr. President, you really must read this nice piece that Bill's folk"—here he reportedly pointed to then Director William Casey—"out at the Agency prepared." From an analyst's point of view, that is high praise for the relevancy of a paper. It certainly represents getting to our most senior customer. But I have always been more intrigued by the phrase "Bill's folk." It conjures up images of a band of Keebler elves running around Langley producing cute little papers that our avuncular director takes to the President. Over the years, I have come to appreciate how that simple phrase effectively captures how we are viewed downtown. To most of our customers, we are "Bill's folk" or the "Judge's people," with our product representing the Agency and the directorate as a whole. Good papers reflect favorably on all of us, and the bad ones make us all look just a little suspect. We are, in effect, a corporate enterprise.

Think about how we do our work. Others collect and often control most of the data we use. There are always multiple sources of in-house expertise on any subject with whom we should collaborate, and most of them will officially get involved in coordinating any finished piece of intelligence concerning their substantive area. Then there is the review process at the branch, division, office and directorate levels. At the lower levels, the product is primarily scrutinized for substantive accuracy and presentational clarity. At the upper levels, the focus shifts slightly to policy relevancy, comprehensiveness, and message clarity. Once a paper leaves our building, it in theory represents the best thinking the DI collectively can muster on that subject.

And how does the individual analyst fare in this process? A few get lost, most find a reasonably comfortable niche, and many thrive. Much hinges on each analyst's ability to comprehend the corporate nature of our production process and to make it work for him or her. Pride of individual authorship and expertise, while important, is never an appropriate end in itself. The name of the game is steering one's product through the process while ensuring that the basic thrust of one's analytic message remains intact. It is a lot like a Congressman's challenge in steering a bill through the legislative process; the effort is complex, lengthy, multilayered, and filled with pitfalls. Nevertheless, the effort is essential if we are to communicate analysis to our customers.

To succeed in the DI environment, an analyst has to have or develop strong interpersonal skills. He or she also has to understand that the requirements for working within a hierarchical power structure—the ability to give and take orders—are quite different from those needed to survive in situations where power and authority are structured horizontally. We cannot order a coequal colleague to agree with us, we have to convince him or her. This often requires a willingness to bargain, persuade, and compromise.

It takes time, hard work, and determination to develop the skills needed to master the ins and outs of a corporate production process. Although it is often stressful and frustrating, most survive and learn. A great many regularly gripe and complain, a defining characteristic of the DI personality. To one such litany of complaints, a former Deputy Director for Intelligence once provided the following corporate response: "I'm not sure 'we' should trust the analysis of a complex international problem to someone who can't even master his own production process."

Publish or Perish

During my years in the academic world, my colleagues and I spent many hours discussing the "publish or perish" phenomena. We had all been conditioned in graduate school to accept it as essential for survival. In truth, as most of us

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came to realize, the phenomena was more fiction than fact at most American institutions of higher learning. Effective classroom performance and service to the university community were equally, if not more, important.

When I joined the DI, however, I quickly learned that I had entered a world where publication really was essential to survival. No analyst makes it in the DI without successfully putting pen to paper from time to time. In fact, analysts establish their bona fides both with their managers and their colleagues primarily through the written word; to be taken seriously, you have to show you can do what everybody else has to do.

The production files maintained for each DI analyst symbolize the importance of establishing a "paper trail" of one's analytic performance. Much like baseball players, we are judged in part by our statistics—not exact numbers but the ranges. Over time, we all know our publication numbers have to be respectable across the various types of written production.

Unfortunately, writing publishable analytic prose—like hitting or pitching a baseball—is not easy. No matter how much some analysts want to or how hard they try, they never master the art. Moreover, there is something so final and intellectually threatening about putting your thoughts on paper and handing them to someone else for evaluation—if you avoid the batter's box you cannot strike out. But all DI analysts have to write, and that is pressure. And the better you hit, the more times you will be sent to the plate. Although you may get used to the pressure, it never goes away.

Get It Right

"Sadat will not recognize Israel."
"The Shah will not fall."
"The Soviets will not pull out of Afghanistan."
"Nothing ever happens in Eastern Europe."

Each of these statements is a judgment no DI analyst ever wanted associated with his or her name. Still, making judgments is what we are paid for, and the law of averages mandates that some will be wrong. In theory, of course, we can be wrong for the right reasons or wrong because we lacked the right information. But wrong is wrong, and we all know about long memories and the visual acuity of hindsight.

Every DI analyst regularly experiences the pressure of not wanting to be wrong. Consequently, the good ones develop techniques for reducing the risks through research habits, collaborative analysis, alternative hypothesis exploration, retesting assumptions, and challenging the conventional wisdom. They also master the watchwords of caution—might, could, possibly, however, on the other hand. Yet, in the end, there are no guarantees. Thus, is it any wonder that the DI analytic cadre is a conservative lot? Who among us would agree with the notion that a .500 analytic batting average qualifies us for the analyst's hall of fame?

Importance of Timing

If we only wrote for ourselves, or if our analysis was mainly for posterity, the issue of timeliness would be irrelevant. But we write for busy policymakers who "need it when they need it." This is especially true of current intelligence, which is needed at the opening of the day's business. Analysis that arrives too early—or worse, too late—will usually have minimal impact. Consequently, the timeliness of our analytic efforts can mean everything.

Most of us who have been around for a while can relate a war story or two about a colleague whose analysis hit at just the right time and made a significant difference in the policy process. We remember these times because praise and promotions often follow. Unfortunately, we probably can also recall a few topnotch analytic efforts that disappeared into some black hole once they left the building. In many cases, the timing was not right.

It often helps that our consumers' lives are heavily driven by their calendars. Heads of state

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meetings, summits, ministerials, policy review gatherings, foreign travel, international conferences, and negotiating rounds are usually scheduled well in advance. When we are lucky, a customer will actually tell us what is on his or her mind so we can be both timely and relevant.

Nevertheless, timeliness is not an exact science, and we often find ourselves rushing to meet a deadline imposed by unforeseen events. If we miss the deadline, it almost certainly will mean missing the intelligence boat and a chewing out. We also frequently find ourselves squeezed between two deadlines, neither of which has much give. Where are those 36-hour days? Such time pressures shape our professional lives and working style.

Surviving in the DI

There are many strategies and techniques for advancing and coping with the daily pressures of professional life in the DI. Each of us has to find and use those that are most "us." Some do's and don'ts are conveyed via orientations, mentoring and training. Other things we have to experience and figure out for ourselves—after all, we are analysts. I have, however, also observed some special characteristics common to most people who "make it" in any organization, the DI being no exception. These simple rules are often easier to admire than to emulate.

Learning From Mistakes

My father often delighted in noting that experience was one of life's cruelest teachers. "What other pedagogue", he would say, "gives you the exam before teaching you the lesson?" I have often reflected on those words after botching something. The exam becomes a powerful lesson. Intelligence analysis demands a certain amount of initiative and risk taking. As a result, mistakes are inevitable. Those who succeed often seem especially adept at identifying the reasons for a foul-up, including their own, and at avoiding a repetition. While to err may be human, consistently making the same mistake smacks of stupidity.

Imitate What Works

The ability to observe what works and to imitate it is closely related to learning from mistakes. Examples of success are constantly around us and free for the taking. Most successful analysts, for example, learn to master the DI presentational style through imitation. Practicing this rule, however, requires that we not get hung up on the notion of having to do it our way. A mentor of mine once pointed out that "a good idea is a good idea, whether you had it or not." Successful people intuitively seem to understand this wisdom, and they constantly apply it to their own work.

It would be ideal if our careers would move ever upward, with brief and predictable plateaus. But for most of us a career more closely resembles a series of peaks and valleys; there are times when we feel on top of things and times when we feel we have fallen behind. Most of us are good at handling the peaks, but those valleys can be hell.

"Murphy" lives, and he regularly stalks the halls at Langley. There are many Catch-22s in this or any business, and today's success is often followed by tomorrow's failure. Those who make it ride out the tough times by keeping them in perspective and by finding some humor in the ridiculousness of it all. Remember, we are expected to take our work—not ourselves—seriously. Behavioral scientists call this maturity. It can also be thought of as basic survival when all the intelligence, determination, and force of will we can muster is to no avail.

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AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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The future is now

The DI Mission in the 21st Century

(b)(3)(c)

Before dawn on 23 October 1983, I was awakened by a call from the CIA Operations Center. The US Marine barracks in Beirut apparently had been attacked with some type of explosive. As the political analyst on Lebanon, I came in to cover the story. During that day, I found out that a car bomb had killed over 200 US marines. By 10:00 a.m., analysts from the Directorate of Intelligence's (DI) Near East and South Asia (NESA) Division were briefing CIA officials, other agencies, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) Although information on the tragedy was trickling in, we believed we were better informed than almost anyone in Washington about what had happened.

If a similar tragedy occurred today, the media coverage of it would be different. The entire country would be tuned to the Cable News Network (CNN), which, more quickly than the other networks, would devote its air time to showing reports from its correspondents on the scene. We would have little reason to doubt the enormity of the attack because we would be seeing live coverage of the devastation. (In 1983, it was not until later in the morning that we had a firm handle on how many had died.) The Commonwealth representatives would not have to come to Langley, knowing that the CNN coverage was timely and generally accurate. CNN also would be interviewing "experts" who would speculate on the perpetrators of the attack and its ramifications. The widespread TV coverage would largely preempt what an analyst would say in print the next morning, unless there was overnight intelligence identifying the actual instigators. In fact, the first thing the analyst would do when he or she got to work would be to turn on CNN so a timely situation report could be written.

The pace of change in the world during the 1980s means that "future shock" is now. As the example on Lebanon illustrates, the impact on the DI has already been substantial. Critics are questioning the CIA's value, and the alleged failure to predict major world events has left the DI uniquely vulnerable to cheap shots. Whatever the case, the DI faces revolutionary challenges during the next 10 years. These challenges will be particularly formidable because of the rapid changes in the area in which the DI makes its living—information.

Anyone who has worked in the DI during the last 10 years has his own idea of the nature of these challenges. Based on my 11 years of experience in regional offices, I believe the DI will have to deal with three major challenges: the information age, the devaluation of intelligence, and a crisis of self-doubt.

The Age of Cable News

CNN recently ran an advertisement claiming that people in Washington who need to be in the know watch CNN. The wording of the commercial made one wonder whether or not CNN in fact was aware that the major intelligence centers in Washington depend upon CNN for timely information. Analysts who have worked on several recent crises readily admit that they acquired information fastest through cable news.

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It is one thing to say that analysts use CNN. It is another to claim that the revolution in information has forced changes in the DI's analytical effort. But I would argue that the almost instantaneous coverage of world events by the media, the visual impact of wall-to-wall CNN news feed, and even the more comprehensive articles by the daily newspapers have made it much more difficult for DI analysts to provide the policymaker with unique and timely current intelligence. We no longer have a monopoly on information or analysis. CNN competes with us on the former, and National Public Radio, Nightline, and in-house experts vie with us on the latter.

In some cases, DI analysts have been put on the defensive because their articles in the *National Intelligence Daily* (NID) did not jibe with the way the story played in the press. A case in point is the rebel offensive in 1989 in El Salvador. Unlike the press, the DI believed that the offensive had failed militarily from the start. What we failed to anticipate was that press coverage of rebel efforts would keep the offensive alive for weeks and that, in fact, the rebels would start conducting operations with an eye toward media coverage. This coverage and its different slant forced an adjustment in the tone of current intelligence. We became reluctant to write unequivocably that the military had the situation in San Salvador under control, when, for all intents and purposes, it did. It was also difficult to maintain that rebel forces were reeling from the failure of the offensive when CNN reporters, standing in front of a smoking building, claimed that this or that attack indicated the offensive was far from over. From the military perspective, they were wrong, but from the journalist's point of view, they were right.

The vast information revolution that CNN only symbolizes could spell real trouble for the CIA in general, and for the DI in particular. Unlike the situation 10 or 15 years ago, we cannot take it for granted that our coverage of political change in Country X will be more timely and comprehensive than that of the media. It becomes more difficult to present analytical judgments that run counter to pictures from the scene or the lengthy analysis of a foreign correspondent who can now communicate instantaneously with his network or newspaper via fax and satellite. Critics of the press have long complained that the media—particularly TV news—sensationalizes domestic events; now we are watching journalists apply more of their talents to international stories.

Solving the Mystery

There is the argument that the DI product is superior and more important than the story in the *New York Times* because of our access to classified information. One wishes it were so, but a look at a month's-worth of NIDs indicates that the overwhelming majority of the articles is not based on classified information. Evidently, they are classified primarily because of their analytical content.

The following numbers reflect NIDS published from 30 April to 25 May 1990. Items were categorized based on their regional subject matter, so the figures do not necessarily indicate which regional or functional office drafted the piece. Some of the highlights:

— The NID carried 125 items on the USSR. Only five were classified Top Secret, and only 26 were Secret Orcon or Top Secret. Almost all of the stories on Lithuania, arguably the most important international issue at that time, were Confidential Noforn.

— One-hundred sixteen European stories were run, of which four were Top Secret. That number expands to 26 when stories at the Secret Orcon level are included.

— Stories dealing with Middle Eastern and South Asian issues generally had the highest classification. Out of 108 pieces, 26 were Top Secret and 63 were at least Secret Orcon. This was the only regional area where items classified Secret Orcon and above were in the majority. The India-Pakistan problem and its nuclear implications contributed greatly to higher classifications, although the principal feature article that appeared on the issue was Secret Noforn.

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These numbers overemphasize the importance of "secrets" to our analysis. The pieces were categorized based on the highest classification of any paragraph, although many longer items had only one or two sentences at the Orcon or Top Secret level. Two items in particular stick out because of their unusual classifications. One had a lead that was Secret Noforn; all the other paragraphs were Confidential Noforn. The lead of the other was classified Orcon, but nothing else in it carried that classification.

Secrets admittedly were important in the coverage of some issues. In addition to India-Pakistan, these included nuclear proliferation, chemical and biological warfare matters, and the Soviet military. More often than not, however, the NID earned its stripes because of only one or two items that appeared in the book.

It is unclear whether these figures represent a change from five or 10 years ago, but at least some recipients of the NID have to wonder about all the mystery. If the DI product does not provide unique information, if it appears after several news programs and papers, and if it can only be four paragraphs or 36 words long, we may not be fulfilling the needs of our consumers or our mission.

Blowing Calls, Blowing Smoke

DI analysts are the international affairs experts. Almost every policymaker, and particularly members of Congress, will tell you that CIA briefings are the best and most objective. So our expertise should help us compensate for whatever comparative disadvantages we may or may not have. The DI, however, appears to be undergoing a crisis of self-doubt about its discipline, an uncertainty that serves as a drag on our expertise. Moreover, the formats and products that we use in some cases actually work against our greatest strength, diluting our expertise to the point of generality.

Two articles in the media illustrate some of the issues that fuel the DI's concern. On 14 May 1990, *Newsweek* wrote that "one of Bush's chief foreign-policy advisers ranks the agency's recent track record as only fair . . . good at analyzing trends . . . but poor at predicting the timing of events in the collapse of Eastern Europe." *Newsweek* quotes former Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle as saying that CIA analysts "collect a lot of facts and organize them very nicely. But their predictions are wrong." The next month Roger Morris, in a *New York Times* article that belabored the Agency, wrote that "political intelligence could be vested in a revitalized foreign ministry and diplomatic service, where it belongs."

Many DI analysts knowingly react to such criticism by joking that if they could predict the precise timing of events, they would work on Wall Street. But the cynical shrug masks our own disappointment over our inability to call every election or forecast the fall of each dictator, let alone predict the triumph of democracy. We conduct post mortems on our analyses and invite second and third opinions, but we remain confused as to why the DI technique of employing good minds to know everything about a subject and write forward-looking analyses based on intelligence does not hit the mark more often.

This confusion and uncertainty in some cas(b)(1) affects our analyses. For example, even thou(b)(3)(n) Cuban leader Castro appears secure, we are reluctant to make that call unequivocably. Many of our caveats are honest— (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) Some caveats, however, are the result of confusion about our discipline. We realize that other political an(b)(1) working on other countries (b)(3)(n) predicted a continuation of the *status quo*, and reversed themselves in the NID one week later. We are spooked. We are dismayed that on almost any issue we can point to an individual who was more correct than the organization. What makes it worse is that his or her call was sometimes based entirely on instinct.

Much of this criticism is healthy. We need to analyze our own effort, but we are sometimes

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second-guessing ourselves before the fact. One of the most important lessons to be learned is that no matter how professional we are, we will be wrong on occasion. We predict based on our rigorous approach or we rely on instinct. My prediction would be that instinct overall would have a much worse track record.

Communication of our expertise is complicated by our format and processes. Particularly in current intelligence, the physical limitations of the product lead to analytical limitations. In the survey of NID pieces, almost every office produced more "in briefs"—three- to five-line nuggets of information—than any other category. Anyone who has ever written an "in brief" knows that it is impossible to impart much expertise or any degree of subtlety in the item. In addition, the NID only has room for a small number of pieces. Every office has horror stories concerning an item that waited in the NID queue just long enough to be scooped by the newspapers. Our advantage in expertise is just not relevant if it has trouble leaving the building or is oversimplified.

Answering the Challenge

The DI has for years recognized the need to look hard at the way it does its business. The explosion in the production of less formal typescripts, for example, has been one successful way of providing our expertise to consumers more promptly, comprehensively, and informally. Proposals for an electronic or computer-delivered NID have also been made. The design of the electronic NID, which would allow readers to search computer files for more in-depth information on a subject of particular interest, anticipated the need to provide more analysis more quickly. Budget constraints, however, have delayed many reform proposals.

Given the current fiscal and Congressional climate, the CIA and the DI will probably have to look for less expensive ways to respond to our challenges, at least in the short term. A case can be made, as Roger Morris did in his article, that the CIA no longer needs to be in the business of political—and current—intelligence. The DI, however, is too good an organization and its people are too talented to abandon this mission. But the time has come to retool.

Decentralize Current Intelligence

There is no easy way to reform the current intelligence process, but perhaps the pain of transition could be eased by patterning the process after what is arguably the DI's most successful product, the typescript memorandum, which is produced at the office level. This would decentralize current intelligence. Each distinct regional and functional area—in most cases, each office—would produce a daily review. The publication would be standardized to the extent that each office product would carry identical cover sheets. It could be called the *DI Daily Review*, with each office using a subtitle to distinguish its product. Other features could include:

— A distribution list, similar to the office's typescript distribution list, aimed at the Assistant Secretary level and below.

— Washington-only distribution at opening of business, using, at least initially, secure fax transmission.

— A Monday edition that, recognizing the generally slow information flow on weekends, would feature more op-ed, speculative pieces. Analysts would have the opportunity to use more of their expertise by writing about ideas rather than facts. Many newspaper articles do not advocate policy but provide a different way of looking at a problem. We should do the same.

— Use of an early-morning team of analysts and managers who would use new information or what appeared in the press to update existing articles. A lot of frustration could be avoided if analysts could use such phrases as "Despite press acounts this morning, we still believe that . . ." Every office may not always need

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such a team, but today in crisis situations analysts already come in early to update the briefers who deliver copies of the *President's Daily Brief* (PDB).

The creation of daily typescripts need not endanger the NID, which has a vast clientele overseas that could not be serviced by the office dailies. And many of its several hundred Washington readers probably would always want a general world overview. Their assistants, however, might pass on to them articles in the *DI Daily Review* that supplemented NID pieces. The DI dailies, in fact, would be more likely to pick up where the NID left off by providing dailies to the Assistant Secretary level and below, whose current intelligence needs are not currently met, at least not by the DI.

The NID production process need not change much, and it might improve. Offices would propose items for the NID, and they would also give the NID Staff their menus for their own daily publications. The preliminary version of the publications would be sent to the staffs late in the day, offering the NID and PDB a chance to pick up stories that turned out to be more interesting than their titles suggested. Similarly, offices would share stories among each other to supplement their dailies and to ensure that CIA published only one version of a story.

Decentralized current intelligence also would pose some problems. They might include:

— *Classification.* As the survey of NIDs indicated, the DI uses little Orcon and Top Secret material. Presumably, the Directorate of Operations (DO) would allow use of most its reports in a document that was Washington-only and had a distribution list similar to typescripts. It would be more difficult to use Top Secret material. Nevertheless, it does not make sense to limit the distribution of our analysis and inconvenience our readers by publishing only in the NID.

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— *Delivery.* This is likely to be a bigger problem and to require funds and bureacratic finesse to solve. Secure fax centers are springing up everywhere, but more will have to be created to handle the transmission of as many as a dozen different dailies. The real obstacle, however, probably would be delivery within a building. One answer might be to create more positions for DI representatives in Washington. (b)(3)(c) Each regional and functional office needs to have its own representative in the appropriate bureau at State. Eventually, the DI might begin to use computer linkups for its daily publications. The material could be transmitted from one word-processing station to another, allowing for the production of a letter-quality product right in the Department of Defense or State. The delivery problem in an electronic age is an overarching one that the DI will have to solve, whether or not we change the way we do current intelligence.

— *Quality Control.* There is a tradeoff between quality control and decentralization. An argument could be made, however, that more timely and in-depth analysis would help redress the balance. DI management also would still be able to review the subject, if not the substance, of daily office publications.

What is Gained

Some of the benefits, such as a more timely product and greater coverage of issues, are readily apparent. But many other benefits are possible.

Better Relations with Policymakers. Daily publications that covered smaller parts of the world or narrower issues should improve DI access to policymakers. The development of a distribution system that allowed the DI product to be delivered personally in and of itself should facilitate feedback and subsequent improvement of our effort. The Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, for example, would receive a document—perhaps four or five pages in length—that contained more of the

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information she really needed. If our product was not satisfactory, if our readers were not reading it, adjustments could be made almost immediately to reflect real demand. If, on the other hand, our analysis proved useful, we probably would increase our access to policymakers.

Better Relations with Congress. Decentralized current intelligence probably would allow us to provide more information to the Congress. Congressmen appreciate CIA briefings, but they are unhappy when we are reluctant to provide things in writing. Reading the NID is even more difficult on the Hill. Daily reviews, however, presumably could be shared more easily with some Congressmen and their staffers—at least on an *ad hoc* basis—because of their lower classification. In any case, it is in the CIA's interest to be of greater service to the individuals who will control increasingly tighter purse strings. DIA officials recently remarked that in a time of budget constraint their analytical arm was emphasizing *ad hoc* products, including answering Congressional requests, and data bases. We should look for ways to expand Congressional access to current intelligence.

Our inability to get our message across to Congress as a whole may have already hurt us in the budget crunch. Many members of Congress seem to have accepted media depictions of the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as triumphs of democracy. What we may have witnessed instead, however, is the triumph of ethnicity and geography over hollow ideology. DI analysts in fact have made that point, which indicates that country analysis remains important. Despite what some may think, change in Eastern Europe required us to pour more resources into studying the area.

Some Relief from Criticism. The provision of more current analysis in less classified formats—the "demystifying" of intelligence—could help defend against unjust criticism. Certainly, the way the DI does its business today probably invites some of that criticism. We shroud our analysis in deep layers of classification. The reader, much like Geraldo Rivera opening Al Capone's safe, expects to find something wonderful and magical inside—or at least some good secrets. Instead, he finds, for the most part, facts that he could have read about in the *New York Times* and analysis that only leaves you wanting more. Making our intelligence more accessible and providing more subtlety on a daily basis would probaby boost our ratings or provide for a better understanding of our limitations. Having more space to write about problems would almost certainly aid in explaining complicated issues and avoid overly simplistic judgments.

The DI, in fact, should consider whether or not its analysts could generally be more accessible to the public. We have already increased briefings of the press in the last year or two. We could "go public" in a much bigger way: office directors or national intelligence officers could appear in public forums, perhaps on TV, to provide commentary on a particular topic. Such exposure, particularly on TV, would have to be on a selective basis. It could do us a lot of good. Our top officials ought to be just as adept as any other bureaucrat in distinguishing between classified and unclassified information in making his comments.

The Role of Research

The changes suggested in the way we do current intelligence would require a shift in resources. A much more active current intelligence process would be likely to cut down the amount of time analysts could devote to longer papers. One suggestion would be for us to write more typescripts and real research papers and to phase out intelligence assessments. Typescripts usually answer a real question; research papers are necessary to develop analyst skills and a foundation of knowledge. Intelligence assessments, however, tend to be neither fish nor fowl. They are schizophrenic creatures that seek to satisfy both the policymaker, who does not have time to read anything too long, and the expert, who wants to learn something he or she does not already know.

There is some concern in the DI that analysts will fail to become sophisticated thinkers if they are diverted from research and spend too much time writing current intelligence. But that concern can

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be turned around. Is our current intelligence so shallow that analysts can be proficient without really knowing their subject matter? The answer is "maybe"—many offices let their new analysts write short items for the NID early on because the products are fairly straightforward. Daily reviews, on the other hand, would make more demands on analytical expertise.

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Foreign Correspondents

Reforming our Washington work habits would go a long way toward ensuring that the DI remains the most important analysis resource for policymakers. We would, however, still be the only international information service without its own dedicated foreign correspondents. This problem is likely to become worse for the DI in the 1990s. Secure phone lines between embassies and the State Department have already reduced cable traffic in crisis situations. In addition, the revolution in open-source information and the changing world environment is leading the DO to reassess its own collection priorities. Internal political developments may become less important because the State Department and the *New York Times* already report on them. But where does that leave the DI? Where do our secrets come from?

The DI could look at several options to expand its international coverage.

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The Bottom Line

Some change is necessary and some is inevitable. And the DI should be in charge of both kinds. Even if Brezhnev rose from the dead tomorrow, the revolution in information technology alone would force us to alter our work habits. One could even envisage a day when the NID evolves into a video newscast on secure TV nets that are being installed all over Washington.

The DI and current intelligence may be creatures of the Cold War, but both can prosper from its end. US policymakers need even more information on world events. More important, they need an organization that will sift through all of that information, analyze its importance, and place it in the appropriate context. The DI's mission today is to make sure we do that better than anyone else.

This article is classified ~~SECRET~~ (b)(3)(n)

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Never-Never Land and Wonderland?

British and American Policy on Intelligence Archives

Richard J. Aldrich

Wesley K. Wark, a noted intelligence historian, once defined the status of British secret service archives as a "Never-Never Land." In an elegant essay on British archival policy in the 1980s he explained how, before 1981, departments of state were told that secret intelligence materials were "never released to the Public Record Office (PRO)." Subsequent to the Wilson Committee White Paper of 1981, this guidance was changed, and departments were thereafter instructed that "the word 'never' should never be used." The Wilson Committee considered that in the fullness of time all such records would eventually find their way into the public domain. But for those outside Whitehall, this intriguing double negative seemed to signal little material change, and secret service archives remained "a far-off place" that no independent historian was ever likely to visit.

In the United States, the experience of historians working on secret service records is continually identified by writers as being very different. The US National Archives are often represented as nothing short of a "wonderland" where all sorts of treasures are on public view and where specialist archivists, not least the legendary John E. Taylor who presides over records that originate with CIA, conjure up the most remarkable things. Sensitive British records that are not open to public inspection in the PRO at Kew reportedly are there in profusion. Moreover, it is widely held that items that are not immediately available in the National Archives can be summoned magically through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

The 1990s have seen a number of important changes in policy and practice relating to the management of secret service archives on both sides of the Atlantic. In Britain, the Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government has resulted in the participation of independent historians in the review process and in rapid decisions to release substantial amounts of intelligence material for the 1940s. There have also been positive responses to the specific requests of historians for closed material, and, as a result, significant parts of "Never-Never Land" are now open to visitors.

Meanwhile, in the United States there have been notable changes in practice. Surprising materials continue to be released into the National Archives, but problems caused by the FOIA have rendered this archival "Wonderland" perhaps a little less productive than it once was.

The Waldegrave Initiative has been operating for a year, and it is perhaps an opportune moment to review the new archival elements of this policy in a comparative Anglo-American frame. Accordingly, the first objective of this essay is to assess the importance of the recently released papers, focusing on the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and new evidence on Pearl Harbor as a case study. The second is to use this as a reference point for a wide-ranging comparison of British and American policy on intelligence archives, particularly regarding wartime and postwar materials.

The JIC and Pearl Harbor

It is now widely appreciated by historians that the story of the higher management and control of British intelligence during World War II was unique. Between 1936 and 1941, there evolved, albeit a little uncertainly, an efficient and centralized mechanism for coordinating the numerous British clandestine organizations and for ensuring the careful assessment and distribution of the

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intelligence they collected. This was the JIC, consisting of intelligence chiefs and chaired by a senior official of the Foreign Office, normally the head of the Service Liaison Department. The JIC was served by a Joint Intelligence Staff which helped to draft its papers and was organized in a way not dissimilar to its opposite number, the Joint Planning Staff.

Together, these committees constituted the engine room of wartime strategic thinking. This system for the coherent and rational management of a rapidly expanding intelligence community was essential if material derived from codebreaking was to be disseminated in time to have an influence on operational planning. It was also essential for complex deception operations that required sophisticated cooperation among deception planners—MI5 (the Security Service); MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS); and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), then based at Bletchley Park.

The success of the British system has been contrasted with the equivalent German story, in which Hitler deliberately pitted different organizations against each other. Equally, the American wartime experience was characterized by the lack of a centralized authority. In the postwar period, the contrasting success of the JIC system was underlined by the way in which London imposed it upon regional commands, creating additional JICs in Germany, the Middle East, and the Far East. It is also illustrated by the way in which the JIC system was admired or emulated by Australia, Canada, and the United States.

Given the central importance of the JIC, the release of most (but not all) of its papers and minutes to 1941 has understandably been widely welcomed. At the same time, some have paused to question the value of this particular release, noting that its contents have been largely prefigured in the magisterial five-volume official history of British intelligence during World War II with its extensive treatment of the development of the JIC. Moreover, for many years historians have been aware that perhaps half of the pre-1945 JIC papers (but not the minutes), and at least 30 postwar JIC papers and minutes are available elsewhere, scattered through other categories of files in the PRO. The same question will doubtless be asked of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) archives, because much SOE material has long abounded in the PRO and in Washington. In reality, how valuable has been the release of JIC papers from 1936 to 1941?

The newly available JIC files have undoubtedly contained surprises, even for diligent readers of the official history. This can best be illustrated by focusing briefly upon the vigorous debate initiated by revisionist historians writing on Churchill's and Britain's possible foreknowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The JIC minutes for 1941 cast real doubt upon their suggestion that Churchill received such intelligence and blocked its transfer to the Americans.

Above all, the revisionist case is undermined because of the multiplicity of conduits through which this sort of information was being passed to the Americans as early as July 1941. Churchill was simply not in a position to exercise detailed control over what was passed to the Americans.

The recently released JIC minutes for 6 June 1941 reveal the precise structure of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation in the Far East. They show that American intelligence personnel had already been attached to the Far Eastern Combined Bureau, which presided over the "collection, collation, and dissemination" of all Britain's intelligence in that region, including signals intelligence.

Before June 1941 much of this Anglo-American exchange had concerned intelligence of interest to the army planners. Now, on 6 June 1941, Britain and America resolved to extend this exchange to intelligence on naval matters and ship movements in the Far East. The British Admiralty reportedly was "very anxious to cooperate." London instructed the Far Eastern Combined Bureau that "there should be a full exchange of intelligence between British and American officials in the Far East," including signals intelligence. The exchange of information from such secret sources required the routine approval of the local SIS chief in Singapore, but the only information that London required Singapore to withhold related, not to codebreaking, but to the fledgling SOE station there. This was because the SOE was

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beginning to conduct sensitive operations into neutral Thailand, exploring the possibility of a coup d'état against the government in Bangkok which some considered to be increasingly pro-Japanese. Instructions to exchange intelligence material on the basis of "the fullest cooperation" were also issued to British personnel in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Chungking, Bangkok, Manila, and Peking. Accordingly, the multiplicity of links between British and American intelligence developing throughout the Far East from the summer of 1941 renders it improbable that Churchill exercised detailed control over the exchange of individual documents.

One particular revisionist account of Pearl Harbor has gone so far as to suggest that on 5 December 1941 Britain's JIC met and discussed at length the impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This author, Constantine Fitzgibbon, writing in 1976, claimed to base these assertions on a letter received from none other than Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, wartime chairman of the JIC. How do these claims compare with the JIC minutes from the fateful week before Pearl Harbor? The minutes, which are entirely extant for this period, reveal that the JIC did not even meet on 5 December. It met on 3 and 9 December, and Pearl Harbor was not mentioned at either meeting.

The minutes of the JIC will be valuable to many historians for many different reasons. But their release also serves to underline a number of wider points about the nature of secret service archives. It is increasingly clear that sensationalist accounts of important historical events, or malignant interpretations of the actions of politicians and officials, do not result from the early release of intelligence records but from their prolonged closure.

Files that are closed for an absurd length of time are an invitation to entrepreneurial writers to speculate in an over-imaginative way on the nature of the "dirty secrets" that such archives supposedly contain (why else, these authors ask, would they be closed?). Academics may eventually establish the truth of the matter and expound it in tomes that will find their way onto the shelves of university libraries. But the public mind is increasingly informed by the conspiratorial versions of contemporary history, often piled 50 deep in the High Street bookstores. The damage done to the wider public understanding of history by such books is unlikely ever to be undone.

Above all, the lesson to be learned from the eventual release of JIC records is that serious researchers and governments share a clear vested interest in the prompt release of such materials. The fact that these and many other intelligence documents released under the Waldegrave Initiative are remarkable only for their dullness is, paradoxically, very important. After all, one of the elementary rules of textual analysis for all historians when considering a document is to reflect not only on what is there, but also on what is not there.

British and American Archives Compared

What are the essential differences in the way in which the British and the Americans have managed the release of secret service archives? Most obviously, while Britain is releasing the archives of the JIC, of the SOE, and of Churchill's signals intelligence summaries (Dir/C) at approximately the 50-year point, the Americans released most of their equivalent materials at the 40-year point. Much of the British signals intelligence archive, notably for the Far East, (but also some material relating to wartime Europe), remains to be released, and as yet there has been no discussion of the release of wartime SIS materials. Meanwhile, the Americans have released almost all their wartime signals intelligence and their Office of Strategic Services (OSS) records to 1947. OSS fulfilled the functions of both Britain's SOE and SIS during World War II.

The result of this early American release has been the appearance of high-quality academic histories of these subjects. In the 1980s, as a direct result of this de facto 40-year rule, American historians were able to locate retired OSS veterans and conduct interviews that could be compared with the written record. Almost all the participants had safely reached retirement; enough survived from the policymaking level to ensure that conducting interviews was a rewarding activity for historians. A rich and sophisticated literature on the history of OSS is now emerging from the synthesis of oral testimony and written records.

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By comparison, as SOE records become available in 1994, there will be few survivors available to talk about the policy level. When wartime SIS archives are released, the written record will doubtless stand alone, devoid of accompanying oral testimony. This is worrying when one reflects on the arcane and technical nature of some secret service activities. The full meaning of some of these documents will not necessarily be self-evident to future historians.

American authorities do not make a squeamish distinction between secret service activities conducted during war and peacetime. CIA is now depositing hundreds of files relating to its changing internal organization for the period up to 1953, including a great deal of correspondence by such luminaries as Walter Bedell Smith and Allen Dulles. Moreover, many American National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs)—the equivalent of British JIC papers—are available for the mid-1950s. This has ensured that diplomatic and military historians working on postwar American subjects have been able to integrate the intelligence dimension into their wider work. The slower release process in Britain tends to encourage the writing of a separate "intelligence history" that is sometimes devoid of context.

Yet the exciting CIA releases of the early 1990s pale beside the extraordinary post–Cold War initiative begun by CIA Director Woolsey in 1993. CIA's Historical Review Group has essentially completed the declassification of political and economic NIEs on the Soviet Union through 1984. Articles from CIA's quarterly journal, *Studies in Intelligence,* also are being declassified.

Declassification of the first 11 Cold War covert actions was begun in 1994. The operations for which records will be released include France and Italy in the 1940s and 1950s, North Korea in the 1950s, Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Indonesia in 1958, Tibet in the 1950s and 1960s, Cuba in the 1961 Bay of Pigs, the Congo and the Dominican Republic in the 1960s, and Laos in the 1960s. In March 1994 the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, together with the Truman Library, hosted a conference for historians on CIA during the Truman period, and it used the opportunity to explain this magnificent program in detail.

The American interpretation of the subject of intelligence is also commendably broad. In Britain, the debate has focused narrowly upon the release of secret service records held by SIS, MI5, and GCHQ. In the United States, proper recognition has been given to the importance of somewhat less secret Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence activities. Before 1953, in both Britain and the United States, armed service intelligence personnel outnumbered those in the secret services such as SIS and CIA. Typically, in occupation areas like Austria, the local CIA station was marginalised by a much grander program of military intelligence operations. This is not just a question of numbers, but of relevance.

For a British historian writing on the subject of British defense policy or strategic planning in the immediate postwar period, the most valuable intelligence materials might be those relating to RAF intelligence rather than those of the secret services. Yet the vast blocks of military service intelligence records withheld in Britain for the period after 1945 pass almost without comment.

But most US military intelligence records have now been released for the period up to 1955. These records contain important material concerning how United States Air Force intelligence analyzed the Soviet Union and formed its impressions of Soviet strategic airpower. Historians have been delighted by what they have found in such records. Meanwhile, government officials have been pleased by the way in which this development has relieved pressure for the release of much more sensitive records, typically postwar National Security Agency (NSA) (signals intelligence) material.

A further respect in which the United States advances a broad definition of intelligence records relates to its commendable emphasis upon regional or "theatre command" intelligence records. Britain and the United States administered large areas of the world during the 1940s and 1950s, and this generated vast regional archives, typically relating to Germany and Austria. These files are important to British and American historians and to academics from the many countries under Allied control.

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While many of the British intelligence papers relating to the occupation of Germany and Austria are yet to be released, all of the voluminous files of the United States European Command (EUCOM) and Far Eastern Command (FECOM) are available, including the registry files of their regional intelligence headquarters. Some of the finest studies of US policy in Germany and the Far East have drawn extensively on these types of files.

A final area in which there is something to be learned from good American archival practice is captured records. During the 1980s, historians of Asia were surprised to find that CIA released into the US National Archives the files of the Shanghai Municipal Police, an extensive British-run security agency. These materials, which included files on Sun Yat-sen and Ho Chi Minh, had enjoyed a checkered history. Captured by the Japanese at the outbreak of World War II, they had fallen into the hands of the Nationalist Chinese in 1945. In 1949, with the Communist victory in China, these records were again in peril, and they were eventually offered to CIA and transferred to Washington.

Although relating to the prewar period, these records were examined with interest by security authorities on account of the information they contained on previous associations between serving Western officials and Asian Communists. Academic historians of Asia in the 1980s, perhaps the last of many groups to make use of these records, pronounced them invaluable.

Britain also presides over captured archives. A good example is the German Security Service records relating to Soviet espionage in Europe during the 1930s and 1940s, the so-called Red Orchestra. German wartime security operations had been highly effective and had damaged Soviet espionage in occupied Europe by 1944. German records, therefore, offered a full picture of the nature and techniques of Soviet espionage and were acquired by British Special Counter Intelligence Units as they entered Germany in 1945. Thereafter, CIA was allowed to inspect them to compile a classified internal history of Soviet military intelligence operations in Europe. Yet while this American history, based on materials held in Britain, has long since been declassified and published, the fate of the files themselves remains something of a mystery.

British Documents in the US Archives

British intelligence reports in the files of the Shanghai Municipal Police in Washington are just one example of the profusion of British secret service materials that have reportedly long been available in the US archives. Tales of the existence of such materials in Washington assumed legendary proportions during the 1970s and 1980s. How accurate were these reports and how has the American system of managing sensitive British records changed?

Two important distinctions can be drawn. The first is simply chronological: for the period up to 1945 a vast quantity of British intelligence records of many different types abounds, much of it not yet available in the PRO. Its extent defies comprehensive description here, but some indication can be given by referring briefly to historians who have already exploited these materials. John Costello, in a recent study, *Mask of Treachery*, has demonstrated that both Special Branch and MI5 materials appear regularly in low-level State Department files. Bradley F. Smith, in a path-breaking study of Anglo-American cooperation in the field of signals intelligence to 1947, has illustrated how much GCHQ-related material is available in Washington.

Perhaps the most concentrated source of British intelligence is contained in the archive of the OSS, now running to many tens of thousands of files. Approximately 3 to 5 percent of this material is of SOE, SIS, or MI5 origin or discusses British intelligence in detail. A historian at Harvard University has recently completed a detailed study of cooperation between OSS and wartime MI5/SIS, using unprecedented amounts of British secret service documentation from OSS files. These are not just isolated documents; there are often entire files of British material.

For the period after 1945 the story is rather different. Archivists in the United States often refer to some sort of agreement between the State Department and the British Government detailing the categories of material that London requested be withdrawn from American files. These guidelines have been enforced with much more rigor in relation to postwar materials. Accordingly, there are few MI5 or SIS records for the postwar

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period, the primary exceptions being occasional reports relating to Soviet agents that have found their way into declassified FBI files. Perhaps only 200 or 300 pages of material relating to GCHQ are scattered through many different collections of papers, most of which deals with electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications security (COMSEC) rather than communications intelligence (COMINT). Perhaps fewer than 10 percent of postwar JIC papers are extant in Washington, again in a scattered way, in different types of military and diplomatic files.

The case of postwar JIC papers seems to offer some indication of how industrious American archivists have been in seeking to remove British material. Various cover notes in American files often refer to two or three "attached" British JIC reports at a time, but the papers have usually been removed. We know that after 1945 the British continued to send large numbers of their JIC reports to the Americans via Britain's JIC/Washington located at the British Embassy, hinting meanwhile at hopes of reciprocation. The flow of American JIC reports to Britain had ceased on V-J Day, initially thwarting London's hopes for a continuing postwar intelligence exchange. The British tactic of bombarding Washington with unreciprocated JIC reports eventually paid dividends. On 25 September 1946 the American JIC concluded:

> If it is desired to continue to receive the British JIC intelligence estimates, it is submitted that it must be done on an exchange basis, otherwise the source will dry up. Since there are many areas, particularly in parts of Europe, the Near East and the Middle East, where the British sources of information are superior to those of the United States, it is believed desirable that the United States JIC continue to receive such estimates. This view is reinforced when the world situation is considered.

The Americans recommended that exchange now proceed on a quid pro quo basis. Thereafter, intelligence estimates were routinely exchanged and delegates to major postwar Anglo-American conferences departed London for Washington armed with new JIC material. Only a minority of these exchanged papers have survived and, for those seeking JIC papers after 1945, the US archives are not a wonderland.

This assertion about the paucity of postwar material must be qualified by drawing a second distinction. It has already been remarked that the United States defines its intelligence archives broadly. The vast collections of American service intelligence and regional intelligence contain a great deal of British service intelligence material. Typically, in the papers of US organizations like EUCOM and OMGUS, a substantial proportion of the papers of the British Intelligence Division, Control Commission Germany, are to be found for the 1940s and 1950s. It is disturbing that a reasonable history of this important British organization could be written in Washington but not in London, where the main records have been incinerated.

The Government-Historian Interface

The United States has generally handled the release of its intelligence records in a wise and often generous way. The American system for response to the specific requests of historians for declassification of closed materials is less impressive. The presidency of Jimmy Carter during the 1970s saw the United States introduce FOIA legislation. In principle, its objectives were commendable, enshrining the idea that government information belonged to the people whose taxes paid for it to be generated. Henceforth, the inherent presumption was that documents should be released on request and the burden of proof lay with the government departments to demonstrate any need for them to remain closed. By the 1980s, however, an increasing gulf was opening between principle and practice. Perversely, FOIA, at one time a centerpiece of the American archival system, was actually beginning to restrict access to documents.

Two things had gone wrong. In 1982 the US Government chose to modify FOIA guidelines, allowing government departments wide areas of exemption. This could often be challenged only by resorting to time-consuming and expensive legal action. More important, the FOIA system was being abused by the American public's submission of an avalanche of frivolous requests that absorbed considerable amounts of government time and resources. In the early 1990s many government personnel who had previously been assigned to the routine

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and rapid declassification of large blocks of records had to be redeployed to search, often unsuccessfully, for individual documents requested under FOIA. The result has been that some US diplomatic and military records for the late 1950s are still not available due to personnel shortages caused directly by FOIA. Some British Foreign Office records are now being declassified several years ahead of equivalent American series.

Moreover, the material secured through FOIA has not been of sufficient value to offset this problem. American historians have noted with dismay that the printout of FOIA requests for 1991 reveals that well over half were for material on sightings of Unidentified Flying Objects.

The revised British system, backed by a recently announced Advisory Council, offers at least the potential for a more effective and rational system of response to requests. In addition, the presence of independent historians is a particularly welcome development likely to inspire confidence within the academic community. This system appears to be well placed to make judgments about priority among what will be an increasing flow of British requests. It is also less likely to be hijacked by frivolous requests or by demands for unrealistically large quantities of material by one particular lobby group. While the absence of an American-style legal right of access enshrined in law appears disadvantageous, in reality the extensive litigation that the American FOIA system sometimes inspires is one of its least attractive aspects.

Are there any positive lessons to be learned from the American experience of responding to specific requests? The US State Department certainly has some important advice to offer. Faced with increasing backlogs of unprocessed material, it has made available a handlist of categories of documents that it still holds for the period before 1970, with their approximate quantities in shelf-feet. The thinking behind this is commendably logical. How can historians make informed requests without knowing what types of records government still holds?

These lists, often provided in a preliminary form, have nevertheless allowed records officers to gain a more informed view of the priorities expressed by historians. This is supplemented by more informal contact between those who manage the records and those who use them.

Published Documents and Classified Histories

The last two years have seen promising developments in terms of the published information on intelligence in both Britain and the United States. The prospect of more British published intelligence documents has improved because British officials are taking greater interest in the use of sanitization to release documents. This is not a wholly new development; sanitized files have been making their way to the PRO for many years. Nevertheless, this technique apparently will now be exploited more frequently, bringing with it both new problems and new possibilities.

The problems relate largely to the efficient use of time by hard-pressed Departmental Record Officers, because the physical process of blanking out specific sensitive passages on a page is extremely time consuming. An hour spent sanitizing a specific document is an hour not spent declassifying another file. This problem also is recognized in the United States, where sanitization is primarily employed for documents requested through FOIA, and is only rarely used voluntarily by those reviewing records for routine release.

The advantages of sanitization are also considerable. In the field of intelligence, the presence of a single name or a brief reference to a type of source can close a lengthy and valuable document. In the United States, the most impressive use of sanitization has been made by CIA to facilitate a published volume of CIA documents on the Cuban missile crisis. This 370-page book includes raw agent reports, estimates, material on how intelligence was disseminated to policymakers, and retrospective studies conducted immediately after the crisis reviewing the CIA's performance. Some of these documents are sanitized, a few rather heavily, but this volume stands as a powerful testament to the potential value of this technique. The trend toward published intelligence documents is gathering pace in the United States with

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the prospect of two volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) devoted to the American Intelligence Community (1946-50) scheduled for publication in 1994-95.

The expressed intention of British Departmental Record Officers to make greater use of sanitization makes it more likely that we will see published intelligence material in series such as *Documents on British Policy Overseas* (DBPO). To the surprise of many, a recent volume of DBPO contained the fabled "Global Strategy Paper" for 1950, albeit with three lines dealing with Asia deleted.

This approach could certainly be extended to JIC papers for the same period in the way that many equivalent NIE papers are routinely included in the FRUS series. A volume of DBPO focused upon the work of the postwar JIC would be an ideal reflection of the new Open Government policy and of forthcoming JIC releases into the PRO. Equally, it might be possible to choose a particular event, perhaps the crises in Czechoslovakia and Berlin in 1948, and produce a volume of related British intelligence material that would stand alone, in much the same way as the Americans have done for the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

The field of official history is a separate area that offers promising developments. The official history of intelligence and special operations is something that Britain seems to do particularly well. One virtue of this sort of history is that it allows the many historians working on wider subjects, typically international history, to take some account of the intelligence dimension even though the primary papers are, in many cases, not available. After all, international historians far outnumber specialist intelligence historians and, moreover, intelligence is often best understood when set in the context of wider developments.

Official histories have done much to encourage this contextual approach. While the SOE papers for France are due to be opened in 1994 or 1995, historians have long been able to turn to M.R.D. Foot's acclaimed official study. Equally, while SIS papers for World War II are unlikely to be available for some time, many important questions that have confronted historians of this conflict are resolved by the magisterial official series on British intelligence.

Perhaps what is needed is an official history of British intelligence during the early Cold War (1945-54). The majority of British historians working on the wider international history of the postwar period do not want to spend hundreds of hours rummaging through the low-level files of Britain's Intelligence Division, Germany. But there are certain basic questions concerning the nature of Britain's picture of Soviet capabilities and intentions that most Cold War historians would like to have answered by an official history.

There are already promising developments in this direction. In 1993 a "semiofficial" history of the Intelligence Corps from its origins in the mid-19th century through to the 1990s was published. Four chapters, accounting for a quarter of the text, cover the postwar period. The discussion of the postwar period is deliberately selective, and it is overtly stated that Northern Ireland is omitted (readers will also note that Army signals intelligence operations are conspicuous by their absence). Nevertheless, this book is an auspicious development.

It is worth dwelling briefly on the parallel American experience. There is no official US intelligence series that can compare with the impressive British official volumes on intelligence or SOE activities in France. The Americans, however, have been quick to release many of the internal classified historical studies that the intelligence services produced years ago for their own reference purposes. For the wartime period, the obvious example is the Signal Research Histories, summarizing much of the "take" from signals intelligence operations against the Axis and describing the development of American signals intelligence organizations.

More recently, CIA has declassified sanitized versions of its internal official histories of the development of CIA from 1945 to 1950 and from 1950 to 1953. But the quality of these volumes is, at best, uneven. Moreover, NSA has decided not to release any chapters of an internal history covering the period from 1940 to 1952.

Nevertheless, for the many American international historians working on the early Cold War period, CIA internal histories are sufficient to answer important

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questions. Similar British internal studies exist and consideration might be given to their release, albeit in a sanitized form.

Finally, there is the field of memoirs. The 1980s were a period when the literary efforts of retired British secret service officers were greeted with official hostility. This approach might be contrasted with the American system in which retired intelligence officers are required to submit their memoirs for clearance, a process which usually results in sections of the memoir being sanitized. Historians are not alone in benefiting from memoirs that have appeared under this regime. Arguably, the widely quoted memoirs of William Colby have done much to encourage a sympathetic view of CIA's place in US postwar history. Some have even interpreted this post-1975 wave of approved memoirs as an attempt to offset some of the damage done to CIA's reputation during the various Congressional enquiries of the early 1970s, notably the Church Committee. Whatever their motivation, they have contributed to a more balanced picture of American postwar intelligence.

There is now a strong case for Britain to look again at a similar system of official clearance for memoirs. The most forceful argument for this is derived from recent developments in the former Soviet Union. In the early 1990s numerous retired KGB officers, some quite senior, began to write their memoirs. Their numbers are increasing, and, as a result, we will soon have a growing picture of British intelligence in the postwar period, albeit from a dubious source.

It will be dubious because some of these officers are bitter, unreconstructed Communists with an axe to grind, and because retired KGB officers naturally want to present the achievements of their own service in the best possible light. There is a growing danger that the history of British intelligence will be written by its enemies. One has only to recall the damage done by Kim Philby's propagandistic memoir, *My Silent War,* which remains one of the most widely read accounts of SIS.

In 1993 there were unconfirmed reports that the British Government had made representations to the Russians, asking them to keep certain aspects of their archives relating to Britain closed. However successful this approach was, it will not address the problem of KGB memoirs. At the same time, there have been welcome signs of a more balanced British approach to secret service memoirs, most obviously provided by the unopposed publication of the memoirs of Desmond Bristow, *A Game of Moles.* But if full advantage is to be taken of this slightly bashful shift of policy, some formal mechanism for the clearing of secret service memoirs needs to be instituted.

What, in conclusion, are the important lessons to be learned from recent developments in the British and American archives? The sternest lesson to be derived from the Americans' management of their intelligence materials during the last 10 years is that their sheer volume presents significant problems. From 1945 to 1989, the Western intelligence community enjoyed steady growth. Consequently, the quantities of old intelligence records awaiting declassification will increase for the foreseeable future. At the same time, these types of records are awkward and time-consuming for officials to process for release.

To deal with these sorts of problems, a government requires a carefully considered open-government policy and the commitment of adequate resources and the effective management of those resources through a clear dialogue with historians. Given a picture of what governments hold in their archives, historians will readily articulate their priorities. After all, resources for serious historical research are increasingly limited, and thus the appetite for records is finite. Yet, at present, demand and supply are not sufficiently coordinated. Everything that is routinely declassified is not immediately required by researchers, nor is everything required by researchers given priority by departments. There also will be a growing need to screen out excessive or frivolous requests. There are encouraging signs that a sensible system that fulfills some of these requirements is now emerging.

There also is a need for a climate of greater trust between historians and British departments of state. This will develop only slowly, for intelligence historians who took an adversarial view of official policy in the 1980s have largely concluded that they have been proved right by the nature of some of the documents released in 1993. One can only wonder at those who

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have hitherto maintained that terrible things would happen if the public were allowed to gaze upon, for example, records relating to secret postal interception from 1742 to 1792. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that intelligence historians initially greeted the announcement of the Waldegrave Initiative in 1992 with profound skepticism.

This attitude is now changing with the release of several thousand files relating to wartime SOE, to JIC, and to Churchill's personal summary of signals intelligence materials (Dir/C). This event understandably caught the imagination of the press, but perhaps the most impressive development was the rapid response to detailed requests by researchers for particular files.

There is still some way to go before a balanced policy on all aspects of British intelligence archives emerges, but historians were pleasantly surprised by the reality of the Waldegrave Initiative as it unfolded in its first year. The experience of "Never-Never Land" will not be forgotten quickly, but, at the same time, there are indications that something wonderful has begun to happen.

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TITLE: More PAR Bloopers

AUTHOR: Carol Willett (b)(3)(c)

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Language abuse

More PAR Bloopers

Carol Willett (b)(3)(c)

From time to time the challenge of crafting timely, accurate, and persuasive performance appraisal reports (PAR) strains the skills of the most dedicated and thoughtful manager. The malaproprisms, creative misspellings, and mixed metaphors that occasionally result cause both confusion and amusement in centralized Directorate of Operations (DO) evaluation and promotion panels. The following excerpts, selected by 1993 panels, illustrate why English is often cited as a difficult language. Excerpts are grouped according to the panel response they elicited. Our observations are in parentheses.

I Beg Your Pardon?

"X accompanies a majority of meetings the rater attends...." (Does X play banjo or piano when accompanying?)

"We cannot miss a beat in this office." (It throws off the aforementioned banjo player.)

"Complimentary to his employee grooming...." (Nothing like making sure that your employees are well coifed, and well complemented.)

"She immediately tightened her belt and effectively performed her duties and those of her subordinates." (A Special Achievement Award for a two-for-one-blooper sentence.)

"X is competent in the completion of memoranda responsive to requests when the results are negative and those which are so vague that it is impossible to conduct a reasonable search." (Translation: "Sorry, we have no idea what you want.")

"...tomorrow is often a luxury." (Don't tell the IRS. They'll try to tax it.)

"...during the terrible rotational cycle of 1992...." (Right up there with the blizzard of '88, the flood of '93, and the Mets of '62.)

"The fire in the gut has not always been obvious." (Another satisfied Maalox customer.)

I Don't Think That Word Means What You Think It Means

"His erstwhile contribution and participation is expected to continue." (Le mot juste.)

"She possesses good intrapersonal skills." (Talks to herself; gets polite answers.)

"X tackles new assignments willingly." (OK, X, you rush the quarterback; I'll cover the receivers.)

"One of subject's most attributable assets...." (The employee's other assets are not his own.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

"X has demonstrated the capability to perform complex tasks in a qualitative manner." (Written by an economist!)

"Can be called upon on a real-time basis." (Comes when called.)

"X worked concomitantly with OGC...." (The only way to work with OGC.)

The initial article on this subject, "Writing Below PAR," appeared in the fall 1991 edition of *Studies in Intelligence*.

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"Subject prepared poignant talking points." (Tell your asset her eyes are like limpid pools.)

"...has an uncanny precognitive response." (Like a preventive reaction strike?)

Is This a Biological Thing?

"Due to his height, this man should probably be directed along liaison lines or staffwork." (Over 6 feet or under 4 feet?)

"He involves himself athletically in Base and local activities." (Physical conditioning is a must.)

"All said and done, Subject is human." (What a relief! We thought he might be an alien.)

"He needs to get the operational chrysallis out of the political cocoon it is in." (A tricky metamorphosis.)

"He is endowed with a certain lethal gentleness." (And she has a certain gentle lethality?)

"He supervises one part-time wife." (If the service had wanted you to have a wife, they would have issued you one.)

"He has a numbleness of mind and spirit." (He can imagine jumping over a candle?)

"He needs to develop a sense of looking more at the horizon at the front than checking back to see how well he is covered to the rear." (Sounds like this one has executive potential.)

Yes, But What Did They Actually Do?

"X demonstrated an extraordinarily high learning curve." (Did he go ballistic?)

"Subject encouraged and enjoyed a steady stream of visitors to her office, including political officers, DEA officers, military attachés, visiting analysts, and lesser mortals." (Such as? Oh, well, at least she enjoyed them.)

"She has served in a position of furnishing continuous continuity to this base." (Without a break?)

"Subject projects the image of a highly intelligent and professional officer." (Isn't, but projects a great image.)

"Policymakers were indeed literally hanging on her very words, creating constant, extreme pressures." (Hanging is, after all, a capital punishment.)

"One of X's main attributes is that she has the self-confidence to question herself." (Self-debriefing, a great party trick.)

"The highest compliment that can be paid to X...was that after her departure...the desk was ably handled by a CT." (OK, what's the second highest?)

"He must keep his eye on the importance of constantly turning over rocks, examining what might be worthwhile underneath and, if there's not much, replacing the rock and moving to the next one. He must learn to be an efficient hunter." (And the rater an efficient writer.)

More Food Metaphors?

"Eager to gain additional knowledge and experience, X consumed every piece of information shared by Y." (Thereby providing food for thought?)

"Managers and employees were starving for her expertise." (Let's get her together with the previous employee and start a food fight.)

"Subject suffers from intellectual malnutrition." (A loser in the last food fight.)

"Can cut through garbage, get to the meat." (Never accept a dinner invitation from this officer.)

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Headquarters Versus the Field

"X, who characterizes himself as 'not having a natural warmth for people' and as 'having difficulty communicating,' has a realistic and effective way of conveying his concepts." (In other words, X knows he's a jerk, you know he's a jerk, and he tells you anyway.)

"One recent returnee, a senior officer fresh from several days of Headquarters briefings, commented that Subject's briefing was the only substantive conversation he'd had since returning to Headquarters." (Don't complain, buddy. Imagine what it's like to work with these people every day!)

"The Headquarters-Field relationship is the lifeblood of the DO and Subject's role in the program was the oxygen that provided the fuel and energy." (Calling Dr. Kildare.)

"...not just another Headquarters Department of Obfuscation...." (But THE Headquarters Department of Obfuscation.)

Cliche Count!

"...no noticeable weaknesses." (Or has kept them hidden so far.)

"...tenacity of a bulldog." (Doesn't know when it's time to let go.)

"...fulfills every manager's dream." (Mine is a Ferrari. Can this employee get me one?)

"...without belaboring a cliche...." (Don't worry, it's already been done.)

"Proverbial quick study." (Call Aesop! I can't remember that proverb!)

English is a Difficult Language!

"X is able to identify problems and successfully complete them in its entirety." (Did the writer lose interest in the sentence?)

"...imminently capable of providing this important function." (Eminently, too.)

"X has done an excellent good job." (Not just fair to middling, mind you.)

"...exceptionally unique." (Writer is taking PAR-writing lessons from the previous rater.)

"...a very important necessity." (Glad to see we have another student in that class.)

"It was immediately clear when foreign hands were found in the World Trade Center bombing...." (Must have been messy.)

"...demonstrated unmitigated excellence...." (The rest have been mitigating their excellence, and I want it stopped, pronto!)

"...showed excellent understanding of the English-language." (Glad somebody here does. But what's that hyphen for?)

"X found his self alone." (Without no help?)

"Seldom has such a large accomplishment fit into a single PAR paragraph." (For my next writing trick....)

"I'll-do-as-I'm-told-so-I-can-get-back-overseas trap." (Winner of the adjective of the year award, but don't let this rater near any more hyphens.)

Metaphorically Speaking

"...provided oral briefs...." (I prefer Haynes.)

"...quintessential diamond in the rough...." (Translation: hard to work with.)

"...making sure that the release of DO information does not result in an unmanageable mosaic." (Annals of Flowerey Prose, Round I.)

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"He takes more time than most of his peers to travel from Key Building to Headquarters to community facilities...." (Get this guy a horse! A map! Something!)

"...standing astride the divide between ops and analysis and pitching and catching with both hands...." (Quick, call the Orioles!)

"X could squeeze traces out of a rock!" (Concealment devices get more and more clever.)

"X is the spark plug which fires the DCO engine." (On all six cylinders?)

"This PAR is an effort to take the bushel basket away from X's 'light.'" (Words fail us. And failed the rater, too.)

Spell Check!

"...heroine trafficking...." (Low bidder on the spell checker.)

"...cudo...." (...I'll hit him with my thesauru. Kudos is not plural.)

"X has undergone a complete metamorphous...." (Back to caterpillers again.)

"...completed her 3 year trail period...." (Presumably somewhere out in the field.)

"...speedy editorial finallzing...." (Glad she wasn't in a hurry to get it done.)

"...subject's communications abilities...and...technical fine points...." (The gift that keeps on giving.)

"...more felictious in style." (Never met a style problem she couldn't lick.)

"Never requires editing for...grammer/spelling." (Maybe we can still get our money back on the spell checker.)

"Beyond the cope of her assigned duties...." (Such as proofreading?)

"...expresses herself verbally with equal flare and ease." (Quite a flashy speaker.)

Anchors Aweigh!

"X enthusiastically immersed himself...." (Splash! Cat S overboard!)

"...pulling her oar...." (A failed attempt to rescue the person above.)

"She has sailed uncharted waters in a nontraditional boat without hitting any rocks." (Woman on board!)

"...was thrown in at the deep end and performed swimmingly." ("There's a whale in the bathtub," said Tom superficially.)

"X dived in with both feet." (Straight 6s work on PARs here, but not at the Olympics.)

"...showed persistence and tack." (By fishing in troubled waters.)

What Is Going On Here?

"You are welcome to rotate with us any time." (We go around in bureaucratic circles.)

"X is the third or fourth largest DO station in the world." (Depending upon whether everyone shows up for work on the day we count noses.)

"X had the misfortune of arriving at perhaps the worst period in station's history: its physical destruction." (Of course, there was that one really bad hair day last week.)

"I was impressed, several months ago, with how quickly X understood what I was saying at a briefing." (I mumble a lot.)

"She followed the instructions perfectly, as I knew she would—except for the yelling." (She's still learning to yell.)

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"...she has spread her mantle of efficiency over him as well." (Leaving us all gasping for air.)

"This individual was assassinated before Subject's ops initiatives could be implemented." (If only Subject had met her deadline with that target study!")

"Subject is also very thorough in the execution." (Just tell that to the officer above!)

"...extensive network of contacts within the outside of the Directorate...." (Is this person going up the down staircase?)

"...with...development...of a unilateral surveillance team running close behind." (The team is training for the Olympics.)

"Laziness and greed began to pose handling problems." (Another great vaudeville team.)

"She takes the time to proofread her work and the results show." (Whiteout all over the page.)

"A CT...who sincerely thought a sanitized memo has to be first boiled to remove fingerprints." (We do that only to get the whiteout off.)

Math Check!

"X ran 264 traces, three times more than the 145 she ran last year." (OK, if I have three apples and give you one...)

"The newly formed 9-person X branch...tripled in size...at one point numbering 23 people" (Must be new math.)

"...0n 38 occasions, X displayed a high degree of tact and diplomacy." (As for the other 98,239 occasions...)

"Although X is only 11 days past the 120 day rule for writing a PAR, it is my pleasure to report that her performance has continued in the same manner as reported in her previous PAR." (Sets a standard by which all nonsequiturs will be evaluated.)

"...numberous experts in the cue...." (Sounds like a job for a mathematician.)

Call the IG.

"...exercising an increasingly firm grip on her IS-3 reports secretary." (You're choking me!)

"...(our office) recognized his talents and capabilities by awarding him several EPAs. While these are awarded on a fairly regular basis throughout the DO...." (Hey, it keeps him happy...)

"Ms. Subject's...." (well, it may be politically correct.)

"Mr. Subject." (Apparently the spouse/brother of Ms. Subject.)

Please, Don't Say It Again!

"Which brings me to a point that I simply cannot overemphasize." (But watch me. These are not idle words.)

"As I have stated over and over, but feel it is worth repeating...." (Would you mind saying that again?)

"...leaving me with little to add." (The reviewer then went on for 1 1/2 pages.)

"She exhibits no weaknesses which require improvement." (They're strong weaknesses in their own right.)

Pointing Out the Obvious

"...her job changed and evolved during her tour." (Evolution without change. What a concept!)

"For the record, in this Rater's 31 years with the Agency as a Category B officer, he has written only three overall 7 PARs." (This was not one of them, but thanks for setting the record straight.)

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"Tedious it is, but it is the only way." (The Tao of Tedium.)

"She has the potential to be rated higher, depending upon her future performance." (How do YOU spell "tautology"?)

"...on arrival here, X's duties were new to him." (A surprise party? You shouldn't have!)

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Contentious confirmation

The Gates Hearings: Politicization and Soviet Analysis at CIA

(b)(3)(c)

Editor's Note: This article uses the testimony of witnesses at the DCI confirmation hearings of Robert Gates in September and October 1991 to present the controversy over alleged politicization of Soviet analysis by the CIA in the 1980s. Though its original purpose was to provide a framework for public discussion of the issue, it is offered here as a stimulus to internal debate among intelligence analysts.

On 16 September 1991, Senator David Boren gaveled to order the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). In the witness chair for confirmation hearings was Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates, recently nominated by President Bush to replace William Webster as Director of Central Intelligence. This was Gates's second chance to head the agency in which he had spent most of his career. President Reagan had nominated him in 1987, following the death of William Casey, but Gates—then Casey's deputy—decided to withdraw when questions were raised about how much he knew of the Iran-contra affair, which was just beginning to break.

In some ways, the timing of the second nomination was no better than the first. Gates would still have to resolve the Senate's lingering doubts about his Iran-contra role, but he would also need to confront new charges that CIA had failed to anticipate the collapse of the foreign country he knew better than any other—the Soviet Union.

At the heart of both issues was Gates's relationship with Casey. Gates, a CIA analyst with a Ph.D. in Soviet studies, had caught Casey's eye as a bright and ambitious staff assistant early in the DCI's tenure. He quickly became Casey's protégé, installed as head of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) in 1982 before reaching his 40th birthday, and elevated to the number-two position in the Agency in 1986. Casey was an unrelenting cold warrior, and his outspoken anti-Soviet beliefs and rhetoric were seen by many CIA officers as inappropriate in an agency that prided itself on rigorous objectivity. Gates would find himself accused of imposing his and Casey's hardline view of the Soviet Union on a more skeptical CIA analytic bureaucracy.

Gates's views on the USSR were relevant to the confirmation process in two ways. First, as the highest ranking analytic manager under Casey between 1982 and 1986, Gates was the final reviewing authority on all CIA estimates and assessments of Soviet policies. Second, as a substantive specialist on the Soviet Union, he had often held forth publicly and testified before Congress on his view of the Soviet threat. In the first role, his integrity was the issue; in the second, his substantive judgment.

Gates's performance of the first role was more important in determining whether he would be confirmed. The Senators were probably willing to tolerate tardiness in recognizing the end of Communism in the Soviet Union—Gates and the CIA had not been alone on that score. But integrity was essential to a DCI. If an intelligence agency could not be trusted to be objective, it would surely be resisted or ignored by the rest of the government. The SSCI would thus subject Gates's stewardship of CIA analysis in the early- and mid-1980s to close scrutiny.

Intelligence and the USSR

A primary role of intelligence is to help American foreign policymakers make informed decisions. To this end, the intelligence agencies daily inundate the policy departments with what Gates has called a river of information and analysis. This flow includes materials as

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diverse as biographic profiles of foreign leaders, international trade statistics, locations and physical characteristics of ballistic missiles, descriptions of narcotics trafficking networks, and estimates of future conditions in various countries.

The potential value to the policy community of these products turns on their accuracy, balance, and presumed impartiality. CIA's status as an independent agency, free of the bias that can taint intelligence produced by policymaking departments, is supposed to guarantee that its only obligation is to the truth—and that it will, in Gates's words, "tell it like it is, with the bark off."

The trauma of being taken by surprise at Pearl Harbor brought CIA into being, but it was the persistence of the Soviet threat that sustained it until the 1990s. During most of the 1980s, as throughout the Cold War, the Agency's most policy-relevant analytic work was on Soviet intentions and capabilities. For more than 40 years, half of the Agency's resources were devoted to collecting and analyzing intelligence on the USSR.

At the beginning of the Casey-Gates years, the idea that the Soviet Union might soon be free of Communist rule—or collapse altogether—would have seemed like a fantasy, both to the American public and to the Intelligence Community. The unraveling of detente in the 1970s had culminated in the USSR's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, and a national consensus had begun to form on the need for stepped-up defense spending. This issue was one of several that Ronald Reagan rode into the White House in 1980.

During the first years of the Reagan administration, including most of the years Robert Gates served as Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI), US-Soviet relations were extremely tense. Reagan's "evil empire" rhetoric and the installation of short-range nuclear missiles in Europe led, as we later learned, to genuine Soviet fear of an American nuclear strike. On the Soviet side, old, ailing, and conservative leaders held sway from 1980 until 1985, reducing the likelihood of any new thinking in Moscow on how to reduce tensions with the West.

In the face of this mutual hostility, President Reagan charged William Casey with revitalizing American intelligence and combating Soviet expansionism. Casey's passionate pursuit of this second goal made many insiders wonder if he could provide policymakers with objective intelligence on the Soviet Union. Harold Ford, a veteran intelligence officer, testified at the Gates hearings that "the seventh floor [the Agency's executive suite] had this great vision of 'the Russians are coming' everywhere in the world." Reports began to circulate around CIA that Casey was "appalled" by the product of CIA analysts and that he was rejecting what he felt were overly "soft" national estimates of Soviet activities and intentions. Commenting on a draft assessment that minimized the Soviet role in international terrorism, according to journalist Bob Woodward, Casey said, "read Claire Sterling's book [*The Terror Network*] and forget this mush."

Casey seemed especially convinced of Soviet aggressive intentions in the Third World. As Ford put it, "The Director had a thing about that, and he would often come to Congress with all kinds of big charts with red splotches" scattered throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In 1985, the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America resigned, claiming that Casey had pressed for an estimate exaggerating the implications of Mexico's normally turbulent politics and portraying that country as ripe for instability and spreading Soviet influence.

Casey's defenders conceded that he had strong opinions but denied that he imposed them on CIA analysts. "Mr. Casey was indeed impatient with analysts who cleaved to a narrow interpretation of events, and he could be intimidating," admitted Graham Fuller, a former NIO for the Middle East. "But he was willing to take as well as to give, if he had any respect for the interlocutor.... Casey respected the judgment of those who seriously defended their views." In one episode carefully noted in intelligence circles, Casey sent back an estimate reporting that the Nicaraguan contras—whom he supported wholeheartedly—had no domestic political base, only to release it when analysts reaffirmed their arguments.

It was Robert Gates, however, who was directly responsible for overseeing CIA's analytic output. Gates shared Casey's basic predisposition towards the USSR.

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The similarity of their views, presumably, was one reason Casey had been drawn to Gates in the first place. At the hearings, Graham Fuller, who worked closely with Gates, offered this judgment: "Gates did share a hard-line view, but a very well-informed view of the Soviet Union, independent of Casey." He added, "The international situation at that time, I would argue, justified a fairly hard-line view in any case." CIA's top Soviet analytic manager, Douglas MacEachin, agreed, adding that Gates "had a strong personality, he held positions very strongly, he challenged positions very heavily, and his views of the Soviet threat roughly coincided with the views of most of the people senior [to him]."

"Reading" the Gorbachev Revolution

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became head of the Soviet Communist Party, but several more years went by before the US analytic community became persuaded of the seriousness of his efforts to restructure the Soviet system. In 1986, Senator Bill Bradley asked Gates, then Casey's deputy, whether there might come a time when the Soviet Union might be open to "fundamental change." The idea seemed so far-fetched to Gates that he told Bradley, "Quite frankly, and without any hint that such fundamental change is going on, my resources do not permit me the luxury of sort of just idly speculating on what a different kind of Soviet Union might look like."

In 1991, intelligence critics in Congress, including Bradley, judged that a little "idle speculation" five years before might have helped policymakers to understand better what had happened later. The surprising political and economic collapse of the "main enemy" had left many policymakers wondering why they could not remember any advance warning of the collapse in Agency publications. Charging that it had botched its central mission, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan declared that "the CIA's useful life is at an end."

Agency insiders knew that this criticism was overdrawn and that it misrepresented the value of a great deal of sound intelligence analysis. Even some Senators sprang to the CIA's defense. During the Gates hearings, for example, Senator John Glenn said the Agency has been "faulted perhaps too much in past years for not foreseeing some things that would have required an infallible crystal ball."

Though criticism of the Agency for perceived analytic misjudgments was common, until the Gates hearings the Senate had not heard plausible allegations of systematic distortion of analysis by Agency managers. Public discussion of this issue had been limited to dissidents like the NIO for Latin America, in connection with the Mexican estimate, and journalists like Bob Woodward. In his book on Casey, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, Woodward left the firm (but undocumented) impression that the DCI's anti-Soviet views had a strong impact on the analytic process, and sometimes on the analytic product.

Now, in September 1991, several former Agency analysts were coming forward to allege that the CIA's Soviet analysis had indeed been "politicized"or slanted to match the views of Casey and the President. If these allegations were true, a proper analysis of the Soviet Union's mounting difficulties might not have been possible in the Agency's bureaucratic climate before Casey's death in 1987. Was the CIA guilty of suppressing intelligence on the Soviet Union?

Analysis Under Fire

The DI, one of four major subdivisions of the CIA, is charged with analyzing raw intelligence information and passing its conclusions to foreign policymakers in the form of written reports and oral briefings. The Directorate's product—intelligence analysis—is shaped by hundreds of mostly young foreign area specialists recruited from the best American universities. DI analysts are selected primarily for their ability to think logically and to express themselves clearly and concisely. A premium is also placed on collegiality, for all differences among analysts have to be negotiated and resolved in order to arrive at findings that the entire Agency can stand behind. The result is occasional friction and considerable intellectual give and take.

The DI was preoccupied by the aftereffects of a major reorganization when Gates took over in late 1981. Offices that had previously been devoted to single-discipline political, economic, and military research had recently been rearranged into several geographic offices, mixing skills in order to encourage multidisciplinary analysis. Thus, political analysts sometimes

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found themselves working for economists or military specialists, and vice versa. As Gates later noted, "There was predictable great disruption and a lot of unhappiness on the part of a lot of analysts who found their familiar worlds and surroundings turned upside down."

The new Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA) got off to a particularly difficult beginning. A large number of Soviet political, economic, and military analysts were merged into what Douglas MacEachin called a "forced culture." He recalled at the Gates confirmation hearings that "it was the only office in the DI which took whole pieces—the main core—out of the three [previous] principal offices, and put them all together." By the time MacEachin was appointed director of SOVA in 1984, the office was still in turmoil. "I knew I had a lot of hard work," he said. In a shortsighted attempt to free up more space at the Headquarters building, SOVA was physically moved to a distant building, with further negative consequences for management and morale.

A Tough Speech

"Four months after all this happened," Gates told the SSCI in September 1991, "I came along." The sudden ascendancy of Gates, who had barely a year of experience in line management at CIA, surprised and to some extent upset the conservative DI bureaucracy. He immediately heightened concerns with a speech to the entire Directorate, assembled in the Headquarters auditorium, that senior DI analysts still talk about. In it, he sent out a clear signal that the status quo would no longer do:

> I have seen analysis that was irrelevant or untimely or unfocused, or all three; failure by analysts to foresee important developments or events; closed-minded, smug, arrogant responses to legitimate questions and constructive criticism; flabby, complacent thinking and questionable assumptions combined with an intolerance of others' views, both in and out of CIA...; poor, verbose writing; a pronounced tendency to confuse objectivity and independence with avoidance of issues germane to the United States and policymakers...; and analysis that too often proved inaccurate or too fuzzy to judge whether it was even right or wrong.

Gates intended to strengthen a product that he thought had been defective for years. Long before he became DDI, Gates had had problems with CIA's approach to the Soviet Union. As early as 1973, when he was still a junior analyst, he had written an article in *Studies in Intelligence* criticizing Soviet political analysis.

Returning to the Agency after spending much of the 1970s on the National Security Council staff, Gates called CIA's work in this area "flabby." He asserted at the hearings that Soviet analysts had taken an overly charitable view of Soviet foreign policy goals, thus missing the likelihood and significance of several previous Soviet inroads into the Third World—in Angola in 1975, Ethiopia in 1977, Afghanistan in 1979, and in Central America throughout the 1970s. "The need for more rigorous work was evident," he asserted. "Surveys of users of intelligence suggested it was our weakest area."

Gates told the Directorate that Casey, too, was "deeply concerned about the quality of the Directorate's work," and that he, Gates, had a mandate to bring accountability to analysis and "to implement far-reaching changes in the way we went about our business." He conceded later that some analysts and managers had been offended by the speech, arguing that they resented the "obvious intent to diminish their autonomy" and "greatly disliked the idea of accountability."

Rigorous Review

The means by which Gates intended to increase accountability was the so-called analytic review process. All major research papers written by DI analysts had to be reviewed in draft by the branch chief, division chief, and office director. Papers tended to get the closest scrutiny at the branch level, but more senior managers could and did have an impact on them ranging from simple style editing to major revisions to "killing" them outright. Though analysts chafed under this frequently long and arduous procedure, DI management had no trouble justifying it; after all, the written intelligence assessment was the DI's reason for being.

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Gates underlined the purpose and importance of this rigorous approach at the hearings:

> The much-maligned review process takes the analysis of a single individual, challenges assumptions, asks questions and hopefully scrubs out the biases of the analyst, as well as others at all levels, thus turning the draft of an individual into the official view of CIA or the Intelligence Community. The process can be rough and tumble.

Now Gates proposed to add another level to involve himself directly in the review process. His predecessors had not personally approved papers unless they were going to senior policymakers. Gates intended to read and approve every DI assessment in draft, and he promised in his introductory speech to do so within 48 hours. This was designed to reassure analysts who might be appalled by the prospect of additional delay and to set an example for his managers, who had been known to allow papers to languish unread for weeks.

It quickly became clear, moreover, that the DDI's review would not be pro forma. Papers began coming back from Gates's office with numerous handwritten notes and questions in the margin. Sometimes, they were accompanied by long memorandums setting forth his detailed reactions and objections or questioning certain lines of argument. Occasionally, he recommended that papers be completely reworked or dropped.

After listening to the testimony of several former analysts during the Gates confirmation hearings, Senator Warren Rudman concluded that some of them felt "intellectually assaulted" by the DDI's blunt missives. Gates noted that he had been "very careful, and I won't say I was 100-percent successful, but I tried to be very careful never to personalize my criticisms." He also claimed that some analysts had seemed challenged by his close attention to the product.

Intellectual Warfare

Gates believed that he was bringing to the review process a much-needed "iterative dialogue" between him and the analyst. Many times, however, the hoped-for dialogue did not take place, because analysts and managers seemed reluctant to press their case. At the hearings, Gates admitted that this had been so, and he conceded that his own style might have been partly to blame. "I am probably not the easiest person in the world to work for," he said. "I am fairly demanding, and I'm probably, at times, more direct than I might be in terms of people's egos."

Hurt feelings and damaged egos, in any case, seemed to be occupational hazards in the highly charged and demanding environment in which CIA analysts worked. Graham Fuller told the Senators that analysis was "not a game for kids." He described an atmosphere that was "full of fireworks," in which "real hardball was played." Gates himself put it best in trying to explain the turmoil: "These issues are important. And people are going to argue, and they're going to fight, and they're going to debate. This is a turbulent business. This ain't beanbag." He added, "most analysts do well in the give-and-take. But some do not."

For the analysts, even more was at stake than damage to their egos. To get promoted, they had to produce successful written assessments. "We live in a publish or perish world, Mr. Chairman," MacEachin told the SSCI. "And when an analyst gets a paper rejected, that's a serious blow. They start to think about [their] careers."

Listening to the testimony, Senator Slade Gorton proclaimed this institutionalized intellectual warfare a healthy thing. "Imagine!" he remarked, "Analysts at CIA differ from one another on the way in which they approach particular issues." He went on:

> They start from different philosophical bases, they read facts differently, they weigh them differently, some are more willing than others to take leaps of faith, they argue with one another bitterly and deeply on a number of issues, they are annoyed when their views on one level are not instantly and completely heeded by others on some higher level. It sounds exactly like almost every other organization in America. And it sounds to me like a damn good idea.

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Bitter Debate

Casey's reputed heavyhandedness and Gates's close scrutiny of the analysis aggravated a longstanding debate within the DI about the nature and severity of the Soviet threat. In his testimony, MacEachin described a deep and bitter division in Soviet analytic ranks between what were derogatorily termed "knuckledraggers" and "Commie symps." The former saw Soviet foreign policies as relentlessly aggressive and thought of themselves as "hardnosed realists"; the latter believed the evidence pointed to Soviet "retrenchment and retreat" rather than expansion and portrayed themselves as "rational thinkers."

The two groups, said MacEachin, were particularly divided "on the question of how much they saw Soviet foreign policy actions being driven by sort of old-line ideological concerns versus some sort of modern, practical politics." Oversimplified, the "knuckledraggers" argued that the Soviet leadership was committed to a policy of expansion and permanent hostility to the West, while the "Commie symps" believed that the USSR was motivated by "objective" national interests, and therefore behaved much like any other country.

These terms of opprobrium reflected some mutual disdain, born of prolonged intellectual combat. Each faction "tended to suspect the other's motives," MacEachin recalled, "or to suspect the other's objectivity." For 26 years, he testified with apparent exasperation, he had had to listen to these "same approaches and contests and clashes of egos." At one point, DDI Gates recalled telling MacEachin that he thought the atmosphere in SOVA was "poisonous."

Within the DI, the main exemplars of the two competing schools of thought, many believed, were DDI Gates and Melvin Goodman, who had been chief of SOVA's Third World Division until 1985. The conflict between the two, once friends and colleagues as junior Soviet analysts in the 1960s, spilled out into the Gates confirmation hearings as a blend of substantive disagreement and—on Goodman's part, at least—personal rivalry.

Gates's Chief Critic

An articulate and outspoken Soviet foreign policy specialist, Goodman had found himself increasingly at odds with Gates after the latter's promotion to DDI in 1982. In 1985, Goodman was removed from his job as head of Soviet Third World analysis—an action taken by SOVA Director MacEachin but one that Goodman believes was ordered by Gates. A year later, he was removed from SOVA and assigned to the National War College. He returned to the Agency briefly in 1989, but he resigned the following year.

Two of his colleagues testified at the hearings that Goodman's uncompromising views and energetic intellectual leadership exerted a polarizing influence on analytic debate in SOVA. Goodman's Third World Division, MacEachin recalled, seemed to regard any effort by management to defend its own views as politically motivated and "tended to see itself in a holy war with the administration." Another Soviet senior analyst testified that the otherwise "very engaging" Goodman showed "a different side in dealing with substantive conflict on the job." In explaining his reasons for sending Goodman to the National War College, MacEachin told the Senate that "Don Quixote had gone after one too many windmills."

At the hearings, however, Goodman electrified the SSCI by charging Gates with using the review process to impose his own conclusions about Soviet intentions, regardless of their evidentiary base, against the better judgment of working-level analysts and managers. He accused Gates, in so doing, of "corrupting the process and ethics of intelligence" and defending Casey's world view of the Soviet Union as "the source of all US problems in the international arena." The result, he believed, was that "data...was suppressed, particularly with regard to Soviet retrenchment and retreat." At the Gates confirmation hearings, Goodman reviewed at length several specific cases in which he felt intelligence had thus been politicized, including the DI's assessments of Soviet inroads in Iran, of possible Soviet involvement in the attempted assassination of the Pope, and of Soviet support to Nicaragua.

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Arguing Soviet Strategy

The dispute that especially rankled Goodman involved his own 1982 draft estimate on Soviet activities in the Third World, which found "unmistakable signs" that such activities were leveling off or declining in number. Gates found the draft unpersuasive. Upon reading it, he sent Goodman a memo arguing that the estimate overlooked the "creativity of the Soviet approach" and the "ideological and political motives that have impelled the Soviet Union to an activist role in the Third World now for more than 60 years." He also said that Goodman's work had "missed a major historical and political development in failing to point out...just how surrogates are used in the Third World. This is a fundamental flaw in the draft, in my judgment."

Angry but undeterred, Goodman continued to build his case. In 1985, he enlisted the aid of a noted scholar, who had developed a methodology for assessing Soviet influence-building efforts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. "I think methodology is very important in this process," Goodman reflected during the Gates hearings.

> We looked at indicators of military aid, economic aid, Soviet advisers, ship days in out-of-area waters. And all of these indicators were either stagnant, some were even dropping. We thought we had an important message ...We thought we had good evidence.

But Goodman's evidence had little apparent impact on Gates or upon the view of Soviet foreign policy Gates presented in public. In 1986, Gates made a speech calling on Americans to realize "the strategic significance of the Soviet offensive, that it is in reality a war...against Western influence." He listed three "ultimate targets" of Soviet strategy in the Third World: "Oil fields in the Middle East, which are the lifeline of the West, the Isthmus and Canal of Panama between North and South America, and the mineral wealth of Southern Africa." Though Gates labeled these views his own, Goodman was appalled. "There was no evidence, no good evidence, that you could cite to support these charges," he exclaimed at the Gates confirmation hearings.

Goodman also argued that Gates's reaction was typical in its excessive emphasis on Soviet ideology and that it fit a larger pattern. It was easy, he claimed, for Soviet analysts at CIA to "give our best guess when the Soviets were involved in one nefarious activity after another, but we couldn't even guess at all when it meant that there were signs that the Soviets maybe were being conciliatory or moderate in some fashion." Goodman lamented the resultant loss of "all the analysis we were never permitted to say...the intelligence that policymakers never got, trends that were never reported, [and] data that was suppressed."

Perceived Pressure

Some witnesses at the Gates confirmation hearings attested to the high level of frustration in SOVA and the inclination of some analysts to distrust management's motives. MacEachin recalled a "very strong feeling that somehow we had to compensate for Casey's views." In testimony otherwise sympathetic to Gates and Casey, Graham Fuller conceded that SOVA analysts had become "shellshocked by Casey's interest in pursuing things that he thought were strategically important.... They were maybe tired of running after some of his particular private, or not so private, concerns."

Even more disturbing was the possibility that perceived pressure from the seventh floor might have caused some SOVA officers to anticipate criticism and to adjust their behavior accordingly. MacEachin recalled that a division chief once asked him, in a discussion of the analytic "line" to be taken on an assessment, "How do you want me to go on this?" MacEachin added. "I was fairly shocked about that." A SOVA branch chief testified that his people "eventually understood what would and would not get through the front office, and there developed...a self-censoring atmosphere." In his testimony, Goodman asked that the Senators try to develop "an appreciation of the feeling of intimidation that existed in that building."

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Other Critics

Two other former CIA analysts, Jennifer Glaudemans and Harold Ford, came forward to add weight to Goodman's charges. These officers differed widely in experience. Glaudemans, a young Soviet specialist, became an analyst in SOVA in 1985—her first permanent Agency position. At the hearings, she acknowledged her junior standing and sometimes professed to be speaking for "people down at my level, which was the bottom." Ford was a respected veteran of 40 years in the intelligence business, much of it with the Agency's highly regarded estimates staff.

Neither Glaudemans nor Ford could offer direct evidence of improper behavior by Gates, and neither had personally experienced politicization at the hands of the DDI. Ford even noted that Gates's working relations with him had always been above reproach. Glaudemans stated that she and her colleagues could "feel Mr. Gates's contempt" and "sense his party line." She produced a memo from her division chief which suggested ways of "improving" the division's analysis, but the memo was neither particularly remarkable nor could it be linked to Gates. She also noted that politicization was elusive, describing it as "like fog." Senator John Danforth appeared uncomfortable with her lack of specifics, reminding the committee that she was relying primarily on her "general perception of what was going on in the office, sort of the feel of the place."

Ford seemed to argue that where there was smoke, there had to have been fire. Too many people he respected, he said, had complained to him about the DDI's behavior over the years for something not to be wrong. He noted that roughly 16 to 18 Agency officers had offered him encouragement and support when they heard he was going to testify against the Gates nomination. As if anticipating the charge of basing his testimony on hearsay, Ford added:

> This is not a court of law. And the questions of hearsay and the evidence are a little different.... When ...people are moved from position to position...and they have told me so, and I have learned of it, because their views did not accord, to me that is evidence. When people have come to me and told me and shown me papers that they have written within the DDI that were killed, that to me is evidence.

Alleged Politicization

Among the most debated cases of alleged politicization at the Gates hearings centered on a 1985 CIA assessment of the likelihood of Soviet complicity in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in 1981. At the hearings, the Senators grappled with charges and countercharges about the so-called Papal paper that helped illuminate the arcane procedures and production processes of intelligence analysis but left many of them as confused and divided about the presence of politicization at the end of the sessions as they were at the beginning.

There could be no confusion, however, about the view of Casey and the Reagan administration on the attempted assassination. "Now everybody in Washington, including Bill Casey, wanted to hang this on the Soviets," testified John McMahon, Casey's deputy from 1982 until 1986. "There was a book written on the Soviet involvement and Casey was very persuaded. And so he kept beating back on the DDI saying, you know, there has to be something to it."

In 1983, the CIA had produced a report on the incident that seemed to rule out a Soviet role, but the lack of evidence available at the time made it unpersuasive even to intelligence managers, let alone the DCI. In response to Casey's prodding, and with the receipt of some new evidence, Gates commissioned another assessment in 1985.

The growing frustration and "shellshock" in SOVA over Casey's perceived interference with analysis guaranteed a cynical reaction to the assignment. At the Gates confirmation hearings, Goodman led the attack on this second Papal paper, *Agca's Attempt To Kill the Pope: The Case for Soviet Involvement.* The essence of his charges was that Gates had orchestrated the writing of an assessment that knowingly misrepresented the evidence and thus confirmed Casey's suspicions.

To support his case, Goodman pointed to several supposed irregularities in the writing of the report—that it was prepared virtually in secret; that it was rushed through to publication before it could be properly coor-

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dinated with other experts at the Agency; that Gates had deleted a prefatory "scope note" pointing out to the reader that counterarguments to Soviet complicity had not been included; that its contents were misrepresented to consumers in a covering memo from Gates as "the most balanced and comprehensive work on the subject"; and that Gates had tampered with the paper's executive summary to leave a stronger impression of Soviet involvement than the body of the paper could support.

Process aside, the thrust of the paper struck Goodman as analytically illegitimate. He charged that Casey had directed Gates to "write the case for Soviet involvement." Thus, the paper, by focusing only on how the Soviets could have been behind the attempted assassination, failed to consider the case that they were not. How, Goodman argued, could such a paper be considered "balanced and comprehensive?" The final product, he claimed, put excessive credence in a "flimsy" (b)(3)(n) source pointing to Soviet complicity. As a result, "the assessment was terrible. The scenario was farfetched. The analysis was tendentious."

A Postmortem

Goodman placed particular emphasis on the findings of an internal CIA postmortem, prepared by senior analytic managers several months after publication of the Papal paper. Relying primarily on interviews with analysts and managers, it had noted a widespread perception that the paper had an "unusual thrust for an intelligence assessment" and that it had "stacked the deck" by considering only the Soviet role. The report also pointed to an "inconsistency between the key judgments and the text" and observed that, in the haste to publish the paper, "the coordination process was essentially circumvented."

But was the paper politicized, or was it merely flawed? According to the author and managers of the paper, it was neither. They came forward at the Gates hearings to say that the circumstances of its publication, while unusual, were perfectly proper. Gates had apparently taken pains to disassociate himself from Casey's views. "All of us knew that Mr. Casey was strongly inclined to believe that the Soviets had played a role," testified Lance Haus, the project manager for the Papal paper. "Mr. Gates repeated that he was agnostic about the issue.... At no point did [he] specify or suggest what our findings should be.... None of us felt any pressure to have the report say one thing or another."

The postmortem agreed. It noted that "there appears to have been a conscious effort on the part of upper management—the DDI, at least—to keep hands off the DI product in order to avoid the appearance of manipulating the analytic process."

Haus also defended the way the paper had been managed and reviewed. Though it was prepared on what everyone acknowledged to be a "close-hold" basis, it had been "fully coordinated" and "cleared by virtually everyone who knew anything about the case." Conceding that a (b)(3)(n) source had been a "key element in our conclusions," Haus nevertheless insisted that "if [the DO] had serious doubts about the source, they never voiced them to us." He proclaimed the paper "balanced and sound" and "true to the information and convincing in its argument." On the key question of the DDI's review of the draft, he declared Gates blameless.

> Mr. Gates did not drop any scope note.... I eliminated it after consultation with [the coauthor]. I thought it was wishy-washy and redundant. Though he reviewed them, Mr. Gates did not draft or redraft the key judgments—I did, with help from [the coauthor]. Finally, Mr. Gates did not draft the transmittal notes, although he certainly reviewed them. Again, I did. This was standard procedure.

Several senior intelligence managers defended the Papal paper's exclusive emphasis on the Soviet role and failure to include alternate possibilities. Acting DCI Richard Kerr, a close associate of Gates for many years, called it a process of "hypothesis testing." "We do this on a regular basis," he told the Senate. "We set up a scenario and pursue that, to see if, in fact, the evidence would support it." Adding weight to Kerr's explanation was the fact that Soviet complicity was the only

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issue surrounding the assassination attempt that interested US policymakers. Kay Oliver, a SOVA analyst who drafted a contribution to the Papal paper, reasoned: "If the Soviets were not involved, it did not matter a great deal to US policy whether the Gray Wolves, Mafia elements, or Agca alone was responsible for the crime."

With all the key participants in the drafting of the Papal paper in essential agreement about the facts of the case, Goodman's argument stood undermined by his own noninvolvement with the paper and reliance on hearsay in his testimony. MacEachin also criticized his former colleague for his tendency to make sweeping charges—to say, for example, "Bob Gates rewrote the key judgments," rather than "I've heard reports" that this happened.

When some of the verifiable charges made by Goodman turned out not to be exactly true—for example, the covering memo to readers did not call the paper the "most balanced and comprehensive work on the subject," but merely a "comprehensive examination"—the tide began to turn against this challenge to the Gates nomination. Senator Rudman, outraged by what he considered Goodman's inability to substantiate many of his charges, called his testimony "an attempted assassination of [Gates's] character" and "McCarthyism, pure and simple."

Some Irregularities

Yet the postmortem did seem to have revealed irregularities in the preparation of the Papal paper. A panel of senior managers had been able to find "no one at the working level in either the DI or the DO—other than the primary authors of the paper—who agreed with the thrust of the assessment." The same group "could find no compelling reasons to rush this paper to completion without benefit of all expert views."

And Gates himself implicitly agreed that the paper was unbalanced. "In retrospect," he conceded, "the cover note probably should have indicated what in fact was the primary deficiency of the paper, and that was that it did not thoroughly examine all of the alternatives that were available....And as DDI...I would have to take responsibility for that."

But irregularities did not necessarily add up to politicization. And the complicated discussion revealed that politicization was indeed, as Glaudemans had admitted, an elusive concept. The Papal postmortem admitted that "despite the DDI's best efforts," there was a widespread perception that the paper had "upper-level direction." But it concluded that the behavior of managers below the top level had to be looked at as well. It suggested that there may have been "not so much DCI or DDI direction as...an effort on the part of some managers at the next one or two levels down to be responsive to perceived DCI and DDI desires."

Counterattack

On 3 October 1991, Gates returned to the SSCI to try to rescue his nomination. Earlier regarded as a shoo-in for confirmation following what *The Washington Post* described as a "bloodless" first week, Gates was now being encouraged publicly by Chairman McCurdy of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to resign if he could not "with absolute certainty disprove the charges," a task McCurdy judged was "almost impossible, because it now gets down to his word against that of the analysts...." First-week praise for Gates from such high-ranking former intelligence officials as Admiral Inman and John McMahon, both deputy DCIs under Casey, and his own deft handling of questions on Iran-contra were not by themselves going to put him over the top.

Gates began by noting that it was "discouraging to see that the old battles, the old problems, the strong feelings about management's role in the analytic process...have not diminished in intensity even in the years since I left the Agency." He denied that he or the DI had ever provided "intelligence to please" and defended the integrity of the analytic process. To allege that politicization had polluted analysis over so many years, as Goodman and others had, implied that "hundreds of analysts and managers in CIA either acquiesced in it, ignored it, somehow missed it, or joined it. And that's ridiculous." The "much-maligned" review process, he added, "wasn't easy, but it was far from closed. It was rigorous, but it was fair. People who wanted to be heard were heard. I was demanding and

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blunt, probably sometimes too much so, [but] I never distorted intelligence to support policy or to please a policymaker."

Gates was at pains to leave some daylight between his views and Casey's. There were a number of occasions," he reminded his questioners, "when we would pull Mr. Casey back some." The bottom line, he asserted in an exchange with Senator Hollings, is that "we were not doing Bill Casey's bidding, and we were not doing the Reagan administration's bidding....We were nobody's toady and nobody's patsy in the 1980s, and the analysts put out a heck of a lot of good analysis."

Gates marshalled several examples of analytic messages he had sent to senior policymakers that had undoubtedly been unpopular. "We published papers saying that...the rate of growth in Soviet defense spending was going down," he noted. "If you think it was fun to publish that when [Secretary of Defense] Cap Weinberger was sitting over in the Pentagon, I think you'll appreciate the situation." And he recalled that the Administration "was absolutely dead certain that they could stop the Soviets from building [a] gas pipeline" in Europe, but we said "that they were going to build the pipeline. And there was nothing they could do about it." Gates concluded that "there [were] a number of occasions where we did work on the Soviet Union that I think made a lot of problems for the Administration."

A Persistent Perception

Gates did agree that the perception of politicization had nagged the CIA's Soviet analysis for years and—more broadly—had "dogged American intelligence for decades." Though Agency Inspector General reports and other studies had "searched in vain for evidence of slanting in our products," the issue, he said, "came up repeatedly in my meetings with analysts and in training courses":

> I'd ask analysts, when I would go down into their work spaces to talk with them, if their work had been distorted. Ironically, many felt this happened more often at the branch- and division-chief level, where their drafts were first reviewed, than higher up. But the answer was virtually always no. But they had heard that had happened for sure in the next branch over. And so I'd go over there, and I'd get the same answer.

To Gates, the real problem was that some analysts confused losing an honest substantive debate with politicization:

> When major changes in draft analysis come out of the review process, it is understandable that analysts would be more inclined to blame them on an external source, such as political pressure, than on weaknesses in their own analysis and exposition. No analyst who considers himself or herself to be the best informed person on a subject likes to be challenged. Analysts like to write on subjects they like in the ways they like. And to be told that your specific subject, or the way you present it, is irrelevant to policymakers, or is not persuasive, is hard to swallow.

MacEachin agreed with Gates, pointing out that analysts have to expect challenge as a normal part of the job and be prepared for it. In his testimony, he did not "find it remarkable that when you go to your boss with a judgment that contradicts the boss's view or which gets your boss crossways with his boss, that you really have to have your act together. You have to have your evidence lined up and you have to have your analysis in sharp order." Another senior Agency official, the NIO for Strategic Programs, Lawrence Gershwin, also agreed: "Analysts all grouse about having to respond to the comments of reviewers...including those up the chain," Gershwin said. "But we must all recognize the need to provide a convincing argument to justify our judgments. These judgments are important."

While Soviet intelligence managers lamented the tension that attended internal debate over the Soviet Union, many of them drew the line at what Kay Oliver, echoing Senator Rudman, called "character assassination" of Gates. Oliver noted:

> Nothing is more poisonous to the atmosphere at CIA, more destructive to the process of debating issues on the merits, than accusing colleagues of conspiring in or being duped into "politicizing" intelli-

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> gence. It is imperative that substantive discussions can take place with an understanding that honest people can disagree, and a realization that few of us this side of heaven have a monopoly on truth.

MacEachin agreed. "Far more often than we'd like," he reminded the Senators, "the evidence is quite legitimately subject to different interpretations." In a veiled reference to Goodman's testimony, he said: "I don't believe it is professional to try to hide behind some kind of attribution of base motives."

Avoiding the Seamy Side

Instead of politicization, Gates's defenders saw at work the old fundamental dispute between schools of thought on Soviet analysis. According to Kay Oliver, the approach followed by Goodman and his supporters had been fundamentally flawed and unbalanced. She testified that while Soviet foreign policy objectives were being pursued on two levels, many analysts in SOVA had paid attention to only one of them:

> For many years, analysis of the Soviet foreign policy shop at CIA...focused almost exclusively on Soviet relations with other countries at the level of diplomatic and military support, and treated dismissively...behavior orchestrated by the Central Committee...and the KGB. These institutions... attempted to influence foreign developments through espionage, propaganda...active measures [and] clandestine support for political violence.

Oliver concluded that she had detected little enthusiasm in some quarters of SOVA for analysis of the "seamy side" of Soviet foreign behavior. Instead, "a certain intellectual fastidiousness was at work."

The result, agreed Graham Fuller, was a "highly benign" and mistaken view in SOVA of Soviet goals in the Third World. Behind this view, he believed, was a lack of appreciation for "ground truth" in areas where the Soviets were active. "I personally felt that many [SOVA] analysts may perhaps have been experts on Soviet writings on Third World issues, but few of them had gotten their feet dirty, so to speak, in the dust of the Third World." These analysts, he asserted, failed to notice that the Soviets "played hardball."

Part of the problem, according to MacEachin, was the intellectual baggage Soviet analysts brought with them from graduate school. "We came off campus in the 1960s, and the faculties were teaching [that] the world was a rational place and the Soviet Union was a rational actor and would do things in accordance with...political science paradigms."

Empiricism Versus Experience

In short, Gates's defenders argued that his critics were turning an honest difference of interpretation over Soviet behavior and intentions into out-and-out distortion and intellectual dishonesty. The critics professed not to mind different interpretations as long as they were supported by the available facts. As Jennifer Glaudemans noted, "I was taught that there is a tremendous responsibility in weighing evidence" and that "I had a duty to state when I didn't know certain things in my research."

On the other hand, many experienced managers believed that a narrowly empirical approach often led to mistakes. Graham Fuller called it one of the dilemmas of intelligence work:

> Does absence of evidence mean that something is not there or it has not happened? How much should we rely on intuition, judgment, and experience in appraising the likelihood of events or motives or the issue of who benefits from an event? This dilemma can never be solved. SOVA seems to have clung to the idea that the sweeping force of "no evidence" means that we don't think it happened, which is the safe and perhaps appropriate position for a junior analyst. But is a more experienced analyst or manager wrong to examine other considerations even in the absence of evidence that we may never collect?

Analysts, Fuller added, sometimes hid behind a lack of evidence to avoid coming to a conclusion. The problem with this, he said, is that policymakers cannot wait:

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> Analysts love to say it is "too early" to make a judgment. But the policymaker has to make a judgment, and right now, dammit! What are we analysts paid for anyway? they will say. If the evidence was that clear, of course, we wouldn't need an estimate....But when we have only a tiny sliver of evidence, is that all that we go on, or do we use our intellects to try to glean the remaining 95 percent of an unknown construct of which we have only one tiny part?

Fuller's observations brought the discussion back to the function of the review process. The inexperience of most analysts, he seemed to be saying, needed to be compensated for by management. When analysts become overly empirical, Fuller argued, more seasoned officers must weigh in:

> Is wisdom couched exclusively at the lower levels of analysis, with the "hard facts," or does it reside perhaps nearer the top with senior, experienced officials who have seen much of the world and a lot of politics...? In principle, good people are supposed to be at the top where they can exercise their own judgments about the true import of events. These senior people may appreciate the analyst telling them about what happened, but they will not relinquish the right to interpret events for themselves if they wish.

Everyone agreed that managers had the right to question and even to overrule the conclusions of their analysts. To some analysts, however, such "meddling" by management seemed indistinguishable from politicization, and Fuller conceded this. He added, "That's the way the system is built. And it's very difficult to decide whether the top, senior people are being political or simply being wiser and more thoughtful about certain problems that they deal with."

Kay Oliver made the same point in a different way:

> Supervisors of analysis are not simply bureaucratic processors but substantive people, essentially senior analysts themselves directing the work of other analysts, many of them younger and less experienced. To ask these managers to stop using their thought processes, and to put in abeyance perspectives they have developed through long study...would be to rob our assessments of valuable input.... There is inherent tension between the intellectual autonomy of the analyst and the institutional responsibility for the product.

Repairing the Damage

The Gates confirmation hearings concluded on 4 October, but a vote was not taken until two weeks later. When the votes were finally tallied, it became clear that Gates's testimony had been more persuasive than that of his critics, and his nomination was reported favorably to the Senate by an 11 to 4 margin. The full Senate later confirmed his nomination.

But the open wounds revealed during the hearings lingered in the memories of many intelligence insiders. Of those who had testified during the two weeks, MacEachin seemed the most deeply concerned about the propensity of analysts and managers to go at each other's throats. "This has been a very sad experience for me, Mr. Chairman, just going through this," he said. "Now I have to ask myself, what have we done to ourselves? What have we allowed to happen to ourselves?" He continued:

> Have we created a situation in which each time a supervisor challenges someone's analysis, his conclusions, or his treatment of evidence, or his lack of treatment of competing judgments that he or she has to wonder whether a dossier is being started that will someday be pulled out of a drawer? Have we created a readily available devil theory that can be applied at will?

MacEachin exclaimed that it was time to end the recriminations:

> We have to say however it got there, let's stop now trying to blame who put it there. Let's have the managers stop talking about the whiny analysts and the analysts stop talking about the bully managers. Let's get a standard of conduct in...the way we go about our business, and let's have that professional

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> ethic explicitly eschew the concept of wrongheaded-ness. Incompetence, stupidity, sloth, all those are legitimate sins that you can complain about, but wrong-headedness…is just not to be there.

"As I said," he concluded, "this is the most troubling, the most disturbing, most serious issue for me."

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Looking back

Overhead Imagery in the Directorate of Intelligence

(b)(3)(c)

On 1 October 1993 the Office of Imagery Analysis (OIA) was formally transferred from the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) to the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T). Rae Huffstutler, former CIA Executive Director, earlier said that the merger is intended "to keep us from having two organizations both labeled as imagery organizations; to put all of our imagery analysis assets under one roof...; and to consolidate some support, training, and career service management assets in the face of (the) downsizing of the imagery populations."[1]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

Although OIA will still be providing current and in-depth imagery analysis support to the DI [redacted] for the first time in 41 years the DI will not have an internal imagery analysis component. This is the end of an era, for it was in the DI Office of Research and Reports (ORR) in 1952 that the use of overhead imagery as an intelligence source began in CIA.

Need for New Methods

As the Cold War began to take shape in the late 1940s, traditional methods of intelligence collection against the Soviet Union were not sufficient. Interest in overhead photography as an additional source grew out of the World War II experience of a group of analysts and managers in CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates, who recalled the role that overhead photography had played as an intelligence source. Among this group, Frederick A. Voigt, a COMINT specialis(b)(6)mbered that a fellow officer in Army G-2, [redacted] had been in charge of a small unit late in the war engaged in the joint exploitation of reconnaissance photography and communications intercepts. Voigt recommended asking (b)(6) to study the joint exploitation of COMINT and photography as part of the all-source effort in CIA.

(b)(6)
In his report, [redacted] stressed the need for constant and free interchange of information between imagery specialists and their analytical counterparts. [redacted] recognized clearly the value added from photointerpretation closely integrated with the production of strategic intelligence for use by policymakers and planners at the highest levels of government. His proposal for an all-source photographic exploitation capability was submitted to the recently formed ORR, which had assumed responsibility for production of economic and geographic intelligence in the DI. Robert Amory, who later became Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI), and Chief of Geographic Division Otto Guthe supported the proposal.[2] (b)(6)

Getting Started

The Photographic Intelligence Division (PID) was formally established on 2 November 1952 within the Geographic Area of ORR. PID would have a T/O of 13 and be housed [redacted] CIA's headquarters at 2430 E Street, NW. [redacted] ORR's Geography and Cartography Divisions. PID would only slowly fill out its ranks over many months as tight budgets constrained growth and recruitment suffered from a low GS grade structure. Most recruits had had photointerpretation experience from World War II or Korea or were working as civilians for the military. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

Overhead photography available at this time and the equipment to exploit it were limited by today's standards, but it was still useful for certain kinds of requirements. Captured German and Japanese World War II

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archives provided a major source of photography. More recent, limited coverage was available from shallow penetration missions along the periphery of the Soviet Bloc. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

These early photointerpreters (PIs) worked from individual paper prints using folding pocket stereoscopes with 4x magnification. They had access to all other sources of reporting on their study areas for insight into what the photography might reveal. Working closely with geographic analysts in ORR, a majority of PID resources were devoted to studies (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

Information from overhead photography was also used to judge the credibility of reporting from other sources. For economic analysts in ORR, overhead photography, even if dated, yielded useful information on the existence of Soviet industrial plants and their physical characteristics. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

Art Lundahl arrived as Chief of the PID in May 1953. Lundahl served as a photointerpretation officer with the US Navy during World War II, and he was the second-ranking civilian at the US Navy Photographic Interpretation Center when hired by CIA. Under his tutelage, overhead photography and its use as an intelligence source in CIA came into its own in the 1950s and 1960s.

PID moved to more spacious quarters in M Building soon after Lundahl's arrival. Relocation also had the advantage of collocating PID with ORR's economic analysts but at the expense of separation from ORR's geographic component. The benefit of having an imagery intelligence component physically located and closely integrated with all of its intelligence production constituents was not achieved until years later. Collocation had the dual advantage of keeping the PIs in touch with the latest reporting and judgments on issues, and all-source analysts closely apprised of new intelligence from imagery. Collocation also facilitated the frequent free exchange of ideas in an informal setting.

Important Contributions


Almost two years after its founding, PID played a major role in a project assessing supply routes in southeastern China that evolved into current intelligence and crisis support. The Office of Current Intelligence, as a contingency measure in October 1954, requested photographic support to provide information on the major roads and rail lines leading to the area of mainland China opposite the Nationalist-held offshore islands, the Tachens, Quemoy, and Matsu. By January 1955, as work on the project continued, the Chinese Communists increased the pressure on the offshore islands. Communist troops seized one island, heavily bombed another, and shelled still others with artillery. The mainland government restated its intention to conquer Taiwan.

As the crisis built, President Eisenhower requested emergency authorization from Congress to use US forces to protect Formosa and other islands. PID increased its effort on the logistics project as ORR levied a further requirement for support to its contribution to a National Intelligence Estimate. This work and other reporting on Communist Chinese activities in the Formosa Straits area were supported by current photography from the US military.[5]

This was the first of many foreign crises over the years where OIA and its predecessors were to provide direct imagery support as part of an intensive DI effort to produce key intelligence for decisionmakers. PID had come of age and proved itself worthy in crisis support, and the value of recent photography to reporting on current issues had been demonstrated. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

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The U-2 Program

Development of overhead reconnaissance technology, driven by the Cold War, was soon to have a major and sustained impact on PID's fortunes. First would come overflights of the Soviet Union by the U-2 aircraft, to be followed in a few years by the advent of reconnaissance satellites.

In November 1954 an intelligence advisory committee chaired by Edwin H. Land, inventor of the Polaroid camera, and consisting of five members from the academic and scientific communities, recommended to President Eisenhower that the US develop a peacetime overhead reconnaissance program. The committee believed that CIA should manage this peacetime program because military overflights in armed aircraft could provoke a war. Eisenhower approved the development of the system, but wanted it handled in an unconventional way so that it would not become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department or troubled by rivalries among the services.[7]

The assignment of the U-2 project to CIA was to have dramatic consequences for PID because when the aircraft became operational, CIA, as manager of the program, would be in the driver's seat for exploitation of the resulting photography.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Significantly, PID would continue to be responsible for imagery support to intelligence production in CIA [redacted] but it would also be expected to report U-2 photographic exploitation results to the Intelligence Community. The US military services were invited to participate in the exploitation effort; the Army, and, to a lesser degree, the Navy participated. The Air Force did not participate. Art Lundahl had long advocated centralization of photointerpretation in support of national intelligence objectives.[8 9]

PID became the exploitation element in HTAUTOMAT, the project name devised for the task force assembled from PID and parts of the Office of Central Reference for support. This large, [redacted] (b)(1) exploitation effort took root in July 1956 in the Steuart Motors building at 5th St. and New York Ave., NW—just three blocks from the Gospel Mission. The neighbors must have wondered about people coming and going at all hours of the day and occasionally during the night, with mysterious vans delivering unmarked heavy boxes.

The first eight U-2 missions over Soviet Bloc territory were flown between 20 June and 10 July 1956. Ten Russian penetration missions were flown between early August and mid-September 1957. Gary Powers's ill-fated flight on 1 May 1960 was the 24th and final deep-penetration overflight of the USSR.[10]

Dual Results

CIA's exploitation of the U-2 missions produced both current and long-term results. In the current timeframe, doubt was cast on both the "bomber-gap" and the "missile-gap," regarding the proposition that the US was lagging behind the USSR in either category of weapon. This was a matter of contention between the CIA and Defense Department and of major concern in Congress and the White House.

The BISON and BEAR long-range bomber production numbers were revised downward to the lower CIA numbers as a result of the U-2 evidence. U-2 missions flown along major Soviet rail lines in search of deployed SS-6 ICBM sites revealed none. The conclusion was that the SS-6 was still under development; there was no credible evidence that the Soviets had deployed as many as 100 missiles, a position held by the Air Force.[11]

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Longer term, with U-2 photography of the Soviet Bloc, CIA PIs began establishing the substantive base of Soviet strategic R&D, military, and industrial analysis that has continued into the 1990s. This was not an easy beginning because in the U-2 era there were just too many unknowns about the Soviet Union. For example, in 1956 there was no institutional knowledge of what Soviet strategic R&D and nuclear and guided-missile facilities would look like on the U-2 photography. As a start, domestic U-2 missions were flown over similar US facilities to give CIA PIs an idea of what to look for in the USSR. Once the U-2 coverage of the USSR was available in the Steuart Building and the initial exploitation of a mission completed, plans were set in motion to convene a meeting of experts, including CIA PIs, all-source intelligence analysts, engineers, scientists, and academics. People such as (b)(6) were invited. In these working sessions each could bring his or her particular expertise to bear on the solution of important unknowns. In this fashion, the most likely function of complex, strategically important facilities was systematically derived.[12]

These assessments were preliminary, however, and additional information from later photography and other sources over time led to more complete understanding of Soviet strategic, conventional military, industrial, and economic programs. This process illustrated the beginnings of in-depth substantive expertise and analysis in the exploitation of imagery in CIA.

U-2 missions were also flown in the mid- to late-1950s and exploited by PID PIs in support of intelligence needs (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

With the success of the U-2 program securing the role of overhead photography as an important intelligence source in the DI, and follow-on overhead collection programs in development, the DDI approved reorganization and expansion of HTAUTOMAT. The project was resubordinated from ORR to office-level status under the DDI and renamed the Photographic Intelligence Center (PIC).[13]

With the PIC's establishment, Art Lundahl was moving closer to his goal of consolidating imagery exploitation into a national center that would provide imagery intelligence and support services to all national-level consumers, civilian and military. Projects that were deemed "national" in scope by the PIC requirements staff were assigned to joint teams for completion by Army, Navy, and CIA PIs working individually but combining their results into a single Center product. These projects sometimes involved important complexes such as the Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam Missile Test Centers or atomic weapons facilities. Photographic exploitation for the CIA alone was done within the PIC by the Photographic Analysis Division (PAD).

Satellite Reconnaissance

The shootdown of Gary Powers's U-2 flight on 1 May 1960 ended this remarkable intelligence collection effort against the Soviet Union, but other programs were soon to fill the collection gap. The first successful satellite mission—a film-based, wide-area search system—was successfully launched in August 1960, the same month that the Soviets convened their show trial of Gary Powers in Moscow. This was to be the first generation of a succession of satellite reconnaissance systems that would become a mainstay of worldwide US intelligence collection. PAD and its successors would continue to prosper, along with this new source of material.

Art Lundahl achieved his goal of a national photographic intelligence center in January 1961 with the issuance of NSCID 8. PIC became NPIC, and the newly established DIA would become a participant in NPIC.

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Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban missile crisis demonstrated the efficacy of Lundahl's national center concept. Although Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles were not identified on U-2 coverage until mid-October 1962, monthly U-2 missions had been flown over Cuba since the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961. These missions were exploited by teams of CIA/PAD and DoD civilian and military officers who conducted a preliminary scan of each mission to report new intelligence developments.

As the Soviet involvement in Cuba grew, so did the frequency of the U-2 missions. By May 1962, U-2s were flying two missions a month over Cuba, and PIs began seeing increasing amounts of Soviet military equipment arriving in-country. On 15 October 1962 a combined exploitation team exploiting a U-2 mission flown the day before reported a concentration of tents and military vehicles in the San Cristobal area, about 50 miles west-southwest of Havana. After much study, six long, canvas-covered objects were identified as missile transporters. The only known Soviet missile of that size was the SS-4, a single-stage, nuclear-capable missile with a maximum range of 700 to 1,000 nautical miles. Three sites with missile equipment were found; none were judged to be operational. The National Security Council and the White House were briefed, and U-2 flights were flown every day. The Intelligence Community, including the NPIC exploitation teams, went on 24-hour duty. President Kennedy went on television the evening of 22 October 1962 to disclose the developments and to announce a quarantine of Cuba.

The Soviets backed down, and over the next few weeks withdrew the missiles as U-2 overflights continued and the NPIC exploitation teams monitored developments.[14] NPIC received plaudits from the White House and the national security community for its role in the crisis. PAD, CIA's portion of the combined exploitation teams, had acquitted itself well.

By the conclusion of the crisis and with national reconnaissance programs now in full swing, it was time for larger quarters to accommodate NPIC's continuing expansion. The move from the Steuart Building to Building 213 in the Washington Navy Yard took place in January 1963. PAD and its successors would remain at the north end of the third floor of Building 213 for the next 27 years.

NPIC's starring role in the Cuban missile crisis, DIA's participation in national imagery exploitation activities, and the increasing amount of satellite imagery requiring an initial scan for new intelligence developments put increased pressure on PAD to support these activities. Inevitably, one could expect PAD's support to CIA requestors to suffer, even though there was no intent for that to happen.[15] The result was a more formal separation of PAD's efforts against national and CIA departmental requirements.

Another Exploitation Element

To manage these competing demands, in June 1963 plans were implemented to establish a second imagery exploitation element in NPIC. This component would be staffed equally by CIA and DIA/DoD photointerpreters and managers, and support national-level requirements. What had begun as ad hoc joint project teams between CIA and DoD with HTAUTOMAT was now being carried a step further.

The new component was called the Photographic Analysis Group (PAG), and PAD would revert to an earlier name, the Photographic Intelligence Division. Staffing of CIA PIs in PAG would be managed by PID. PIs and managers from PID would serve 18-month rotational assignments in PAG. PID would be responsible for the career management of CIA officers in PAG. It would be four years before the close ties between PAG and PID were severed and each would go its separate way. PAG would become the NPIC Imagery Exploitation Group and eventually part of the DS&T; PID would eventually become OIA, remaining in the DI.

PID had now come full circle from its origins in November 1952, returning to its original name and basically its original mission, CIA departmental photographic support. In June 1965, with imagery (b)(1)
analysts assigned, PID was renamed the Imagery An(b)(3)(c)
sis Division (IAD), NPIC.

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Bureaucratic Conflict

During the mid-1960s, senior CIA managers determined that Agency interests would be best served by further separating CIA departmental imagery support from national-level exploitation. There were two important study groups in 1965 that put the spotlight on the conflict stemming from attempts by the Director of NPIC to manage both national imagery exploitation and departmental imagery support. The first was a CIA Inspector General (IG) inspection. Although laudatory about NPIC's work overall, the IG report expressed concern about a growing imbalance between collection and exploitation capabilities, suggesting that NPIC consider new approaches for greater efficiency. The report suggested that a building backlog of customer requirements was related, at least in part, to a high priority for exploitation of new imagery at the expense of detailed analysis. It also called attention to a lack of discrimination and rigor in accepting and prioritizing exploitation requirements.

Another report suggesting changes at NPIC was done by the Joint Imagery Interpretation Review Group (JIIRG). It was established in late 1965 under US Intelligence Board auspices at the request of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Imagery collection and exploitation costs associated with the escalation of the Vietnam war had risen significantly, and the budget director proposed that the Defense and Intelligence Communities undertake a joint evaluation of the various requirements for departmental and national-level imagery exploitation with a view to reducing their costs. .

The JIIRG report recommended, among other things, increasing the role of departmental imagery organizations and the decentralization of some national-level work from NPIC to departmental imagery organizations, under the National Tasking Plan. NPIC would be tasked to establish and maintain a national data base of important targets worldwide for use by the Intelligence Community and military commands. The JIIRG report specifically recommended the separation administratively of CIA national and departmental imagery exploitation. [16] [17]

By late 1966 the DDI was compelled to take action. The person assigned at the DDI level to look into CIA imagery management issues was Enno H. Knoche.[18]

[redacted] a number of reasons why it was advisable to remove IAD from the direct supervision of D/NPIC and to resubordinate it to the DDI: (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

- IAD should undertake imagery analysis on all intelligence subjects in order to respond to the unique CIA and DCI responsibilities and to ensure that the Agency's needs for imagery intelligence are met. Most of IAD's imagery work is departmental, therefore its supervision should be departmental, rather than national as personified by D/NPIC.

- Under direct DDI management, tasking of IAD by CIA elements would be improved, especially in prioritizing requirements. This is more a departmental than a national matter and the DDI should end D/NPIC responsibility for IAD tasking.

- Removal of IAD from D/NPIC supervision would relieve Director NPIC of a sizable management burden and allow IAD to compete more successfully for NPIC support services.

- Under the JIIRG-proposed tasking plan, military PI units would become responsible for some national-level intelligence reporting. The Agency would want to use IAD to keep the military PI units as objective as possible, and this can be accomplished better under DDI direction.

- DIA would continue to maintain separate command of its departmental PI resources and would prefer that D/NPIC not concern himself with CIA's departmental imagery management.

- A solution must be found for the question of how to regulate and prioritize Agency-wide imagery support requirements.

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he Executive Director–Comptroller was management and supervision of NPIC. It dealt mainly with concerns over rising costs, the need to institute controls over rising requirements, and the need for greater DoD support to NPIC, which Knoche felt required new approaches regarding administration and management of NPIC. JIIRG report and recommendations in several places. most important to IAD:

> The second point concerns the subordination of CIA/IAD. It will be removed from direct supervision by the Director of NPIC and will be subordinated directly to the DDI. Under terms of the JIIRG recommendations, IAD is authorized to do departmental imagery interpretation in all categories of intelligence in meeting unique DCI and/or CIA responsibilities. This capacity will be carefully nurtured, and we must ensure that IAD is as responsive as possible to all appropriate and validated Agency requirements.

The IAS

The DCI approved the recommendations of the review group, and the IAD was resubordinated administratively from NPIC to the DDI in February 1967.[19] The name of the office was soon changed again, to the Imagery Analysis Service (IAS), in concert with its new status in the DI.

The first director of IAS, Howard Stoertz, Jr., who came from a DI analytical background, worked to put the office more directly in the mainstream of DI intelligence production. He established several goals for the office, which included using imagery as the primary source but incorporating other sources to expand the scope of analysis; going beyond mere factual reporting to assess the implications of the evidence; expecting analysts and managers to work closely with DI research offices to develop collaborative research efforts; and encouraging the development of imagery-based analytical methodologies to increase the value of imagery as a source.[20]

Stoertz served as director from February 1967 to July 1972.

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Over the ensuing years and functioning as a DI office, OIA made significant progress in meeting Stoertz's and subsequent Directors' goals, contributing to the DI's mission of providing intelligence support to policymakers.

Vietnam War Support

In the mid-1960s to early 1970s, IAS worked closely with the DI's ORR and Office of Economic Research (OER) on North Vietnam's ability to sustain th effort in South Vietnam

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When the US air offensive began over North Vietnam in August 1964, IAS did bomb damage assessments (BDA) on industrial and transportation targets. In addition, Secretary of Defense McNamara, who was becoming skeptical of destroyed bridge claims made by DIA that were based on pilot reports, asked CIA in 1965 to provide its estimate of bridge destruction. By the time of the bombing halt of North Vietnam on 31 October 1968, IAS had documented the destruction of 541 bridges and also reported on the construction of countless bypasses. This work proved to ORR/OER that US bombing of North Vietnam and its logistic infrastructure had not seriously hampered the North's ability to sustain its war effort. Moreover, the US was paying an increasingly high price for its attacks in the form of aircraft losses.[21]

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Military Unit Analysis

In the late 1960s, IAS worked closely with the DI's Office of Strategic Research on the buildup of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border. This work and other studies of Soviet ground forces culminated in the early 1970s in publication of breakthrough methodological studies

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Collocation and Integration

In the mid-1980s planning began in earnest to move OIA into the Headquarters compound. DDI Robert Gates and ADDI Richard Kerr believed it important for OIA to be colocated with the other DI offices in order to create the opportunity for imagery analysis to be most effectively and completely integrated into DI substantive output. In May 1984 they announced their goal to move OIA

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OIA moved into spaces at Headquarters in late 1989–early 1990. Despite the many changes that have occurred in the Agency since the collapse of the Soviet Union, results from OIA's move have been uniformly positive. In fact, OIA's adaptation to the post–Cold War world of intelligence has been helped by being in the same neighborhood as the DI and DO offices, task forces, and centers. OIA analysts are now close to the action and have opportunity to participate and integrate their analysis with the rest of the DI as never before.

Arms Control Role

Building on in-depth analytical studies accomplished over the years on Soviet strategic and conventional forces, OIA became increasingly involved in providing support on arms control issues. Working closely with the Arms Control Intelligence Staff and the rest of the Community, OIA has responded to questions about Soviet forces and programs

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Persian Gulf War

Perhaps nothing has demonstrated the value of OIA's move to Headquarters better than the Office's participation in the Persian Gulf war effort in 1990-91. OIA was a major contributor of intelligence to the DI's Persian Gulf Task Force, in addition to providing analytical support

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Outlook

After 41 years of departmental imagery support to CIA, OIA's role remains the same—maximizing imagery input to DI intelligence analysis The Office will continue to maintain its close interaction will the DI, DO, and various centers and task forces. With the OIA and NPIC merger, addi-

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tional resources will be available to complement and reinforce OIA's departmental support to CIA. As a result of the economies resulting from the merger, greater efficiencies in the use of increasingly scarce imagery resources should result than would otherwise have been the case.

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TITLE: Historical Intelligence Documents

AUTHOR: The Editors

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CIA's early days

Historical Intelligence Documents

Editor's Note: The following reprints are part of a series designed to illustrate important events in the history of CIA.

Document 1

The first page of the minutes of the DCI's staff meeting on 23 September 1947, in which he announces the establishment of CIA.

Document 2

The final issue of the *Daily Summary*, dated 20 February 1951. It was the the intelligence digest prepared by CIA for President Truman. The *Current Intelligence Bulletin* (CIB) replaced it.

Document 3

A note from President Truman to DCI Smith giving his reaction to the CIB.

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Document 1

MINUTES OF STAFF MEETING

23 September 1947

9:00 AM

PRESENT:

Director	- Rear Admiral Hillenkoetter
Executive Director	- Captain W. C. Ford
ICAPS	- Captain H. C. Doan
OCD	- Captain C. E. Olsen
OO	- Brig.General E. Sibert Mr. George Carey
ORE	- Mr. Theodore Babbitt Captain A.H. McCollum
OSO	- Colonel Donald Galloway
Inspection & Security	- Colonel S. Edwards
Administration & Management	- Colonel L.T. Shannon
General Counsel	- Mr. L. R. Houston
Advisory Council	- Captain J. Finnegan
Secretary, NIA	- Mr. John S. Earman
Personal Ass't to the Director	- Mr. R.A. Richard

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☒ Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS (S) C
Next Review Date:
Auth: AR 380-5
Date: 22 may 90 By

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DIRECTOR:

We are now known as the Central Intelligence Agency. According to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, CIG became CIA the day following the date Mr. Forrestal was sworn in. Mr. Hill, Admiral Souers and the Director have not yet been sworn in -- this may take place today. Until such time as the Director is sworn in, certain provisions of the Act will not be put into effect, for instance, the section authorizing CIA to terminate employment of individuals found undesirable.

The Director wishes that we continue using our present letterhead stationery until supply is exhausted, as an economy measure.

Mr. Forrestal is moving to his new offices in the newly-designated National Defense Building (formerly the Pentagon). No decision has as yet been made with regard to other agencies who might be moved to the National Defense Building.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:

Captain Ford stated that the Monthly Progress Reports of the Branches are being circulated to the other Branch chiefs -- their circulation, however, should be limited to the Branch chiefs only and should not go to the lower levels.

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Document 2

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GENERAL

1. Embassy Moscow's analysis of Stalin interview--US Embassy Moscow, in commenting on the 16 February Stalin interview in Pravda, expresses the view that the most significant aspect of the interview is the discussion of the inevitability of war. Pointing out that Stalin declared war can become inevitable if "the deception practiced by warmongers" is successful, the Embassy remarks that this constitutes a notice to the Soviet people and others that war is a possibility.

The Embassy considers that the interview as a whole may have been calculated to: (a) establish a favorable popular attitude toward the Soviet position prior to the prospective CFM exploratory talks; (b) give new momentum to the "peace drive" on the eve of the World Peace Council meeting; (c) demonstrate the "reasonableness and righteousness" of Soviet policy for the benefit of peoples in the Soviet orbit and wavering Communists abroad; (d) nourish popular dissatisfaction in the West over the economic burdens of rearmament; and (e) widen the split now evident in the UN between Asiatic and NATO countries.

The Embassy comments that in this interview Stalin has permitted his reputation for superior wisdom to become involved in much more sophistry than previously. This may reflect a greater degree of Soviet vulnerability on the issues involved; it may reveal a feeling on the part of Soviet leaders that Stalin's authority is the margin needed to assure popular support abroad for Soviet foreign policy; or it may reflect a Soviet belief that Stalin's intervention will cause sufficient confusion to pave the way for success in any adventure to be undertaken in the near future.

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THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
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Document 2 (continued)

Looking at the question of what strategy is desirable for the US and the "free world," in the light of Stalin's pronouncements, the Embassy observes that Stalin has attempted to regain a measure of the diplomatic initiative wrested from him through effective inauguration of a Western defense program and that it is consequently important that the program be continued vigorously.

EUROPE

2. YUGOSLAVIA: Tito warns Communists to accept policy--US Embassy Belgrade, in commenting on a speech by Tito before a Communist Party group, notes that Tito warned Yugoslav Communists to accept Yugoslav foreign policy and declared that dissension on this point "would not be tolerated." The Embassy observes that there is probably a minority among Yugoslav Communists who find it difficult to accept a Yugoslav-Western rapprochement and that this speech was aimed at such elements. The Embassy has long felt some danger that Tito, in reorienting the Yugoslav Government toward the West, might get too far ahead of the Communist Party. It is now apparent that the Party leadership is aware of the problem and has taken steps to meet it.

FAR EAST

3. CHINA: Reported Russian military control in Peiping--The US Air Attache in Taipei transmits a report from a source in Peiping that Russian officials there called a meeting on 6 February of the Chinese responsible for

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Document 2 (continued)

garrison control of the Peiping area and told the Chinese that the military control in the Peiping area was too weak. The Chinese Commander reportedly stood up to defend his position and was told to sit down and shut up. According to this report, the Chinese were then told that a Russian Commander would give orders in the Peiping area in the future. The Chinese made no open protest but deeply resent such control by the Russians.

Source also reported that several Chinese representatives who returned to Peiping from the recent Moscow Conference said that the Korean cease-fire discussions have closed, with the conclusion that no further cease-fire proposal will be presented to the UN.

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Document 3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

U. S. Naval Station,
Key West, Florida,
March 6, 1951.

Dear Bedel:

I have been reading the Intelligence Bulletin and I am highly impressed with it.

I believe you have hit the jackpot with this one.

Sincerely,

Harry Truman

General Walter B. Smith,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington 25, D. C.

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TITLE: Japanese Army Intelligence Activities Against the United States, 1921-45

AUTHOR: Stephen C. Mercado

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A dismal record

Japanese Army Intelligence Activities Against The United States, 1921-45

Stephen C. Mercado

The record of Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) intelligence operations against the United States from about the opening of the Washington Conference in 1921 until Japan's surrender in 1945 is largely one of failure. Before Pearl Harbor, the Army generally neglected a hypothetical enemy, concentrating instead on the Soviet Union and China as its primary threats and Germany as its model. Military education before the war produced few officers knowledgeable about the United States. Moreover, Army officers tended to discount intelligence on US capabilities gained before the war.

The IJA thus entered the war against the United States ill prepared both at the level of the Army General Staff (AGS) and in the field. AGS 2nd Bureau (Intelligence) lacked a substantial analytic capability against the United States until late 1943. In its collection efforts, the IJA suffered from the loss of its spy network in the United States and its meager success in breaking encrypted US military communications. Contempt for the United States and a general "operations first" mentality that slighted intelligence combined with a readiness to believe unsubstantiated battlefield reporting and poor coordination with the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) to produce disasters, perhaps most spectacularly in the Philippines, where the AGS directed a ruinous defense of Leyte that hastened the loss of Luzon and the subsequent invasion of Okinawa.[1]

Neglecting a Potential Adversary

The opening in November 1921 of the Washington Conference for disarmament marked a turning point for the IJA.[2] The high command before then had regarded only the Soviet Union as its hypothetical enemy. Following the Washington Conference, however, Japan added the United States to its list of potential adversaries. The IJA duly responded by designating three divisions for an invasion of the Philippines in the event of hostilities.[3] But Army officers continued to focus their attention on the Soviet Union, concentrating in particular on turning Manchuria into a first line of defense.[4]

Army training reflected its intelligence priorities. Most cadets entered the IJA's Military Academy from military preparatory schools, where Russian, German, and French were the only foreign languages taught. Only a few cadets among the minority that entered the academy from high schools, where English was taught, pursued the language as a special subject. Moreover, many IJA officers then gained further experience in the Soviet Union and Germany by serving as military attachés or taking study tours.[5] Many Japanese officers who came in contact with Germany became convinced of German military prowess.

Following Japan's entry into an undeclared war against China in 1937, the IJA took concrete action that appeared to recognize the United States as a potential problem, offering English as one of the languages for students at the Nakano School for intelligence officers established in 1938. Even so, few of the school's graduates before Pearl Harbor studied English or received subsequent overseas assignments targeting the United States.

Contempt for the United States contrasted sharply with the IJA's fascination with Germany. One of the key Army officers responsible for creating the puppet state of Manchukuo once rejected an American officer's suggestion that he visit the United States on his way home from two years' study in Germany by saying that he

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would go there only as part of an occupation force. In such an atmosphere, what few Army experts there were on the United States were kept from rising to the IJA's key positions.

The preponderant influence of pro-German officers versus the presence of only four or five experts on the United States or Great Britain holding positions higher than section chief in the War Ministry and AGS reportedly increased the high command's "disdain" for the United States. The expectation that Washington would forsake London in the face of Hitler's juggernaut in 1940 then contributed to Tokyo's decision to join Berlin and Rome in the Tripartite Pact that year and declare war against Washington the next.[6]

Prewar Intelligence Activities

The IJA, despite its contempt for the United States as a potential foe, did conduct intelligence-gathering operations on American soil. Successive Army officers in the United States spent years and a considerable sum of money diligently building up a network of spies largely from among the Japanese population. The IJA also monitored US diplomatic and military communications. Within the IJA, the Central Special Intelligence Department (CSID) conducted SIGINT activities under the direct command of the Army chief of staff. The CSID originated in the code research group that the IJA, IJN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Communications Ministry established in 1921 in an annex of the MFA's telegram division. From 1936 through December 1941, the CSID was able to decode or surreptitiously read part of US State Department diplomatic traffic.[7]

None of this intelligence activity apparently yielded any information that caused IJA to rethink its views toward the United States. Indeed, Japanese military officers tended to reject as astronomical even the US Government's official industrial production figures. In any case, proud IJA officers tended to denigrate America's spiritual fiber.[8]

One key instance where good intelligence failed to sway the IJA was the reporting of Col. Shinjo Kenkichi. Leaving Yokohama for New York City in March 1940, Shinjo settled in the New York branch of the Japanese trading company Mitsui & Co. to begin research on the war potential of US industry. With the "valuable" cooperation of more than 50 Japanese companies in New York, he produced by August an outline of his first report.

Shinjo found that the capacity of America's defense industrial base was in the aggregate between 10 to 20 times that of Japan. His findings were disseminated in Tokyo by Maj. Gen. Iwakuro Hideo, who spent the latter half of August briefing senior IJA officers. The information, however, failed to change the course of IJA thinking.[9]

Wartime Army Intelligence

When some 43,000 troops under Lt. Gen. Homma Masaharu launched the first large-scale Army assault on an American position by landing on 22 December 1941 north of Manila at Lingayen Gulf,[10] AGS 2nd Bureau lacked an intelligence staff equal to the task of analyzing reporting on the US military. Its lackluster 6th Section, responsible for analyzing the United States and Great Britain, had emerged by default rather than intention when 2nd Bureau created sections to cover other countries.[11] Hori Eizo, who joined 2nd Bureau in November 1943 after graduating from the Imperial War College in December 1942, found himself assigned to the 6th Section's America Group. Col. Sugita Ichiji, promoted after Pearl Harbor from head of the section's America Group to chief of 6th Section, belatedly began building up its analytic capability. From the end of 1942 to the end of 1943, the unit grew from 18 to 65 personnel, including nine staff officers and several Nakano School graduates recalled on account of the war from their overseas insertions in the Americas and India.[12]

Sugita's efforts to develop an analytic capability for the fight against the United States came too late. Hori notes his surprise that a 2nd Bureau section devoted solely to the United States and Great Britain was not established until April 1942, some four months after Pearl Harbor. He describes the emergence under Sugita at the end of 1943 of a substantial 6th Section as "too little, too late." Pointing to Sugita's order that he research US

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military tactics, Hori reflects that the Army should have conducted such a survey and incorporated the results into its planning in the 1920s.

Hori also quotes approvingly a postwar reflection by his immediate superior as chief of the 6th Section's America Group that the Army High Command did not refocus its education, training, intelligence gathering, and research from the Soviet Union to the United States until late 1943, when the US counteroffensive had already gained momentum. Second Bureau's focus on the Soviet Union to the neglect of the Pacific resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, according to Hori.[13]

Far into the conflict, many AGS officers continued to reflect the Army High Command's longstanding failure to take the United States seriously. Hori heard fellow staff officers as late as November 1943 dismissing successful US invasions of smaller islands by predicting that the US military's lack of peacetime training above the regimental level and the Japanese Army's "incomparable" fighting spirit would result in disaster for US forces coming ashore against large-scale IJA forces. Hori also recounts the visit to the War College of a 2nd Bureau intelligence officer who spoke contemptuously of how, during Homma's invasion of the Philippines, a unit of 15 M-2 tanks retreated from a village near Lingayen Gulf toward Manila after offering only token resistance to a smaller Japanese force of nine tanks. At the War College, Hori learned only of easy victories at Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and elsewhere; there was no mention of the Japanese reverses at Midway or Guadalcanal.[14]

Other Problems

The IJA's intelligence effort also suffered from insufficient reporting from the field. The IJA's loss of its spy network in the continental United States was devastating, according to Hori. Washington's internment of individuals of Japanese descent on the West Coast deprived the IJA of valuable intelligence on ship movements, US industrial trends, aircraft production, and other information. Hori calls the internment a "strategic intelligence victory" for the United States far surpassing Japan's "tactical victory" at Pearl Harbor.[15]

In addition, the IJA also suffered from its failure, despite great efforts, to break the higher US military codes after the United States changed the military codes in January 1942. This failure was in sharp contrast to its successes against the Soviet Union and China.

Only late in the war did the codebreakers in CSID have any success. In July 1944, Col. Onodera Makoto, Japan's military attaché in Stockholm and reputed chief of Japanese military intelligence in Europe, obtained an M-209 mechanical encryption device. The CSID began at once to analyze the device, succeeding in August to decode some frontline US military codes.

Col. Nakano Takeshi, who had lead the study of the device, then went to Manila to assist Col. Kudo Katsuhiko, chief of the Southern Army's special intelligence division, in preparing for the anticipated US return. Both men died outside Canton harbor when, accompanying the transfer of Southern Army headquarters from Manila to Saigon during the fighting for Leyte, their ship hit a mine.

Nakano's loss left the CSID's US-British Decryption Research Group rudderless. It was not until May 1945, when two of the group's officers mobilized students of mathematics and foreign languages, that the CSID regained its momentum. Only at the end of the war did the CSID manage to decrypt approximately 80 percent of the US military traffic.[16]

The CSID's failure until the final weeks of the war to crack US military codes forced it to rely on traffic analysis. Creating a nationwide SIGINT network and coordinating its activities with its Navy counterparts, the CSID conducted systematic collection and analysis of B-29 bomber communications frequencies and call signs. It then combined the information obtained with direction-finding equipment to track approaching B-29 formations and alert local air defense units. But preparations by the United States to use its newly developed atomic bomb illustrates the limitations of the Army's SIGINT effort. The CSID, through traffic analysis, detected in May 1945 an unconventional B-29 formation and—with increasing anxiety—tracked it through

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August without divining its mission. Using its M-209 device, the CSID managed to decode a message referring to America's atomic bomb only on 11 August, two days after the second atomic bomb had fallen on Nagasaki.

Acting on Bad Intelligence

The IJA also blindly accepted wildly inaccurate reporting of Japanese military engagements with the enemy. Hori notes that reports from the Navy General Staff (NGS) of the number of US aircraft carriers reported sunk or severely damaged in a series of engagements during November 1943 off Bougainville and the Gilbert Islands suggested that the US Navy had lost every one of its carriers. Based on the NGS's account, Eighth Area Army Commander Gen. Imamura Hitoshi ordered his 6th Division to counterattack the 1 November US landing at Bougainville; the operation ended in a costly failure. The Japanese military's negligence in devising a system to verify the reports of Japanese pilots returning from battle forced Hori and other 6th Section officers to rely on CSID monitoring of foreign broadcasts from San Francisco and Sidney for more accurate information.[17]

Second Bureau also suffered throughout the war from insufficient coordination with its IJN counterpart at IGHQ. Hori indicates that the Army and Navy general staffs, while unified on paper within IGHQ, had in reality been operating independently of each other since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Neither general staff would inform the other of its reverses. Immediately after joining AGS, for example, Hori first learned of the Japanese disaster at Midway not from the NGS but from the German military attaché in Tokyo.[18]

IJA commanders, possessing an "operations first" mentality, often conducted their operations with little or no regard for the intelligence at hand. Colonel Sugita, chief of 2nd Bureau's 6th Section, viewed AGS's neglect to build up his section until late 1943 as evidence of IGHQ's tendency to slight and ignore intelligence in planning operations. Hori reveals that the AGS ordered the Nanto Detachment at Buna, on Papua New Guinea's north coast, to proceed over the nearly trackless jungle of the forbidding Owen Stanley Range to attack Port Moresby. According to Hori, the real enemy was the nearly impassable terrain and lack of provisions. Only one in 10 soldiers from the detachment returned to Buna after failing to reach Port Moresby.[19]

Nor did operations officers in 1st Bureau show much regard for the intelligence officers in 2nd Bureau. In October 1944, for example, Hori was ordered to fly to Manila to brief his analysis of US military tactics to the 14th Area Army commanders. While operations staff officers had the use of reserved planes at nearby Tachikawa Airfield, Hori had to take a long train ride south to Miyazaki Prefecture's Nyutabaru Airfield.

In another case, when 6th Section's America Group put together its estimate in early 1945 that the United States would initiate the anticipated invasion of the Japanese main islands by landing its main force in Kyushu's Kagoshima Prefecture in the October-November period, only the chiefs of 2nd Bureau and its 6th Section briefed the estimate to 1st Bureau. The members of Hori's America Group did not feel at liberty to enter the operations room.[20]

Debacle in the Philippines

The IJA's contempt for the United States, an "operations first" mentality that precluded planning in advance, a readiness to accept unsubstantiated reporting of enemy losses, and poor coordination with the IJN led to disaster in the Philippines. IJA commanders neglected to establish an effective intelligence network well in advance of General MacArthur's return. The overseas distribution of intelligence officers from the Nakano School is indicative. Only two Nakano intelligence officers were serving in the Philippines as late as November 1942. Responding late to an accelerating US counteroffensive approaching the Philippines, the IJA attached a total of 98 Nakano graduates to the 14th Area Army only by December 1944, when Japan was losing the battle for Leyte.[21]

The IJA's disdain for the United States and general neglect of intelligence had also left the Army unable to break US military codes until late in the war. In the

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three months that Colonel Nakano's group worked with Southern Army cryptologists in Manila, they "completely succeeded" in breaking the "strip coordinate code" of the guerrillas. On the whole, however, it proved only a partial success that came too late. Had IJA obtained the M-209 earlier, Hori reflects, the 14th Army would have had a far better picture of US intentions regarding the Philippines.[22]

The odd complacency of AGS staff officers regarding the US counteroffensive also apparently slowed their planning for the defense of the Philippines until it was too late. IGHQ only began in March 1944 drafting plans for a decisive battle in the Philippines into which the IJA would throw nearly all of its resources on the islands against the invaders on the main island of Luzon.

The Army High Command moved to execute its plan by upgrading in August the 14th Army in Manila to the 14th Area Army and placing the 35th Army, which was responsible for Leyte, under its command. IGHQ then transferred Lt. Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki, called the Tiger of Malaya for his rapid capture of Singapore in 1942, from his command of the 1st Area Army in Manchuria to Manila to take over command of the 14th Area Army.[23]

But AGS staff officers, ever ready to underestimate the United States, threw away any chance for sustaining a conventional defense in strength in the Philippines by blindly accepting in mid-October an announcement of a resounding defeat of a US fleet off Taiwan. The NGS later revised its tally downward but neglected to give the new results to the IJA.[24] The AGS readily accepted the results. "Drunk" on the reporting, IGHQ hurriedly ordered the decisive battleground shifted from Luzon to Leyte, where the Japanese now planned to contain US forces at the anticipated site of their first landing in the Philippines. The result, in Hori's words, was a "historic blunder of a handful of strategists" in IGHQ that pushed Japan down a steep slope to defeat.[25]

Hori himself witnessed the disaster unfold. Arriving at Nyutabaru Airfield on 12 October on his way to Manila to brief commanders there on US military tactics, he watched in shock as officers simply tallied on a large board the unsubstantiated claims of pilots returning from the battle. He cabled the chief of AGS 2nd Bureau that the reporting was unreliable, but his warning went unheeded.[26]

Arriving in Manila on 15 October, Hori learned that the various staff officers had entirely accepted IGHQ's report of a resounding victory. Hori briefed Lieutenant General Yamashita on 18 October, explaining how erroneous IJN reporting in 1943 had led to the failure to repel an American landing at Bougainville. Yamashita's staff officers, however, continued to believed the false report.

When a scout plane from the 16th Division on Leyte reported on 19 October seeing some 10 US destroyers screening a few battleships, most of them jumped to the conclusion that the force was the survivors from the engagement off Taiwan taking shelter in Leyte Gulf from a storm. Hori countered that frequent US landings in bad weather in the past and the occupation two days earlier of a small island off Leyte were indicators of an imminent US invasion. His arguments fell on deaf ears until the military police called to report that a downed American pilot had revealed under interrogation that 12 US carriers were preparing to invade Leyte.[27]

The intelligence was accepted too late. Yamashita had already bowed to IGHQ orders by sending the cream of his units to Leyte. IJA commanders in Tokyo completely misread the situation by blindly accepting the IJN report of victory off Taiwan. Thinking that General MacArthur was trapped at Leyte, IGHQ even prepared a victory announcement for release on 3 November.[28] Yamashita, stripped of his core units, could no longer hope to fight a decisive battle near Manila. He then deployed his remaining forces for a holding action in the mountains of northern Luzon to tie down MacArthur as long as possible, thereby giving his superiors in Tokyo at least some time to prepare for the defense of the Japanese home Islands.[29]

If IJA leaders had permitted Yamashita to conserve his limited forces on Luzon rather than throwing them at the last minute into Leyte on the basis of their own prejudices and faulty intelligence, the Tiger of Malaya

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would almost certainly have exacted far higher US casualties and pushed back considerably the timetable for the invasion of Okinawa. A prolonged defense could even had led to the atomic bombs, Soviet entry into the war, and Tokyo's surrender without the deaths of some 12,000 US combatants and over 150,000 Japanese military and civilian casualties in the battle for Okinawa.

Notes

1. This article is based on a number of Japanese and American sources. The accounts of two IJA intelligence officers who served in 2nd Bureau are especially useful. Hori Eizo, who worked in AGS 2nd Bureau's America Group and in the Philippines as chief intelligence officer to Lt. Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki, has written *Daihonei Sanbo No Joho Senki (An IGHQ Staff Officer's Record of Intelligence Warfare)* (Tokyo, Bungei Shunju; 1989). Hayashi Saburo, who headed 2nd Bureau's Soviet section, is the author of *Unofficial History of Army Battles in the Pacific War.* Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten; 1951. In this article, I have drawn on the annotated English version that he and historian Alvin Coox published as *Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association Press, 1959). I have put Japanese personal names in the Japanese order, surname followed by given name.

2. Meirion and Susie Harries, *Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army.* (New York, Random House; 1991) p. 133. The Conference resulted in the IJA's giving up its gains in Siberia, Tsingtao, and on the Shantung Peninsula, the IJN bowing to a 6:10:10 ratio regarding the United States and Great Britain in capital ships, and the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

3. Iwakuro, Hideo. *Junbi Sareteita Himitsu Sen (Covert Warfare Prepared)*, Shukan Yomiuri, 8 December 1956, p. 21.

4. Hayashi and Coox, p. 7.

5. Spector, Ronald. *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War Against Japan.* (New York, Free Press, 1985) p. 38.

6. Hayashi and Coox, p. 7.

7. Hori, pp. 82-84, 171, 210, 233-34.

8. Hayashi and Coox, p. 23.

9. Iwakuro, pp. 22-23.

10. Karnow, Stanley. *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines.* (New York, Random House; 1989); p. 291.

11. Richelson, Jeffrey. *Foreign Intelligence Organizations.* (Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988) p. 250, and Hori, pp. 39-43.

12. Hori, pp. 13-14, 49-54, 77.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-54, 78,. 134.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-32, 54.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 171-72, 210-19, 234.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-93, 101, 145.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-32, 87.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 98.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 135, 223.

21. Nakano Koyukai. *(Society of Friends of the Nakano School) Rikugun Nakano Gakko (The Army Nakano School)* , pp. 522-23.

22. Hori, pp. 171-72.

23. Drea, Edward. *MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan*, 1942-1945. (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1992) pp. 159-60. Hayashi and Coox, pp. 121-22, 126-27.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 166.

25. Hori pp. 156-57.

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26. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-39.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 141-44, 152-55.

28. Drea, pp. 167-68.

29. Hori, pp. 132, 174, 221.

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Evaluating prediction

Soviet Military Power in the 1980s

James A. Barry

In 1987, John Lewis Gaddis, the eminent diplomatic historian, published an article entitled "How the Cold War Might End."[1] Four years later, he republished it, with comments and the subtitle, "An Exercise in Faulty Prediction." In this evaluation, Gaddis concludes that his predictions were at best mixed, and makes several recommendations to his fellow historians on how to improve their understanding of events and processes.

In 1981, the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC—subsequently renamed the Directorate of Intelligence) published a study entitled *The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends Since 1965 and Prospects for the 1980s.* It was the culmination of a two-year, multidisciplinary research effort aimed at describing and evaluating the strategic, technological, political, and economic factors that would influence Soviet military forces and policies in the coming decade.[3] The NFAC effort was intended to provide an intellectual foundation for intelligence support for the national security policies of a new administration.

Like Gaddis's article on the Cold War, the NFAC study had a mixed record. And no one who participated in the research effort would have predicted that, barely 10 years after the study's publication, Soviet military power as such would cease to exist. Thus, it seems worthwhile that we, like Gaddis, reexamine our assessment. What did we get right? What did we get wrong? What did we miss? And it seems appropriate as well to ask: what could we have done to improve our record and what difference would it have made?

This article tries to probe these questions by adopting Gaddis's method. In the sections that follow, excerpts from the 1981 paper are reprinted in italics, followed by comments made with the benefit of hindsight.[4] In the conclusion, an attempt is made to draw some lessons about the capabilities and limitations of intelligence analysis and its influence on policy decisions.

The CIA's Projections

As the Soviet leaders formulate their defense plans for the future, they face major external and domestic uncertainties:

- *The fluid international situation dictates a prudent defense posture and the Soviets' perceptions of emerging military threats argue especially for continued qualitative improvement in forces.*

- *On the other hand, to maintain even a modest rate of economic growth, those leaders must allocate more resources to capital investment and must improve labor productivity, in part by providing a rising standard of living.*

This dilemma could cause political tension, particularly at a time of leadership transition.

This was an accurate statement of the problem. The Soviets and Western analysts were facing what Gaddis calls paradigm fratricide. They were subject to countervailing pressures and could not predict which would win out. The dilemma certainly did cause political tension!

In the international arena, the Soviets are concerned by the prospect that the US will augment its defense effort, by China's opening to the West, and by the possibility that US opposition to Soviet global aspirations will increase. They are troubled by instability on their borders—an insurgency in Afghanistan that they have been unable to suppress, an unpredictable regime in Iran whose fundamentalist Islamic ideology could spread to Muslim minorities in the USSR, and a major threat to Communist Party control in Poland. They probably view the 1980s as a decade of heightened competition, in which they will run a greater risk of military confrontation with the US and of actual combat with major powers.

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All of the Soviets' worst fears (except the last) came true!

As they attempt to react to the wide array of situations they perceive as either promising or threatening, Soviet policymakers will face a far more constrained resource picture than in the 1960s and 1970s.

- *Soviet economic growth, which has been declining since the 1950s, has slowed to a crawl in the past several years. The real average annual growth in GNP in 1979 and 1980 was a little over 1 percent—the worst in any two-year period since World War II.*
- *In the 1980s, developing energy and demographic problems probably will hold GNP growth to an average of 2 percent or less—only half the rate at which defense expenditures have been growing.*
- *If military spending is allowed to follow its past trend, its share of economic output could increase from about one-eighth now to over one-sixth in 1990.*
- *More importantly, this increased military burden would reduce significantly the share of the annual increment to GNP that can be distributed among civilian claimants to ease the political tensions that arise from competition for resources. Military programs—especially those for nonstrategic forces—divert key resources from the production of critically needed equipment for agriculture, industry, and transportation.*

This forecast was essentially accurate, perhaps even a bit optimistic. According to later CIA estimates, economic growth did hover around 2 percent for most of the 1980s. (Some Soviet economists, as well as Western critics of CIA analysis, had even lower figures.) Military spending continued to rise through 1988, when Gorbachev announced unilateral military reductions and a reduction in the defense budget by some 14 percent over a two-year period. His unilateral reductions concentrated first on conventional forces, to release manpower and production resources for the civilian economy.

The problems of Soviet leaders in allocating resources could be further complicated by a political succession. Soviet President Brezhnev is 74 and in poor health, and most of his colleagues are also in their seventies, many of them also ailing. The departure of these men could affect military policy but probably not immediately. The process of Soviet national security planning and decisionmaking is highly centralized, secretive, and resistant to fundamental change. It is strongly influenced by military and defense-industrial organizations, represented by men who have held their positions for many years, providing a continuity of plans and programs. Because of this momentum, and the political clout of the men and institutions that support defense programs, we doubt that Soviet emphasis on military power would decrease in the early stages of leadership succession.

Not a bad call. The momentum continued for several years after Brezhnev's death, through the tenures of Andropov and Chernenko. It was the third political succession, from Chernenko to Gorbachev, that made the big difference. Gradually, the defense policy process began to open up and the previously sacrosanct defense-industrial sector of the economy had to shoulder part of the burden of diminished economic performance.

In contrast to the imponderables of the economic and political environments, we have a good capability to identify most future Soviet weapon systems. The forces of the 1980s will be equipped primarily with systems already in the field and secondarily with those now entering production or in late stages of development. (Because it takes a decade or more to develop and test modern weapon systems, few of those now in early stages of development could be introduced in significant numbers in the 1980s.) We believe that we have identified about 85 percent of the new systems likely to be introduced in this decade. Knowing Soviet military requirements and the amount of available development and production resources, we can postulate others. These identified and postulated systems, plus existing systems, will make up well over 90 percent of the weapons in the field in 1990.

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We did get most of the weapon systems right. We sometimes were overly optimistic, however, about when they would become operational and about their rates of deployment. Of the systems that we projected, more than 90 percent were deployed, and most within a year or two of the estimated date. Those that we missed fell into three categories: systems in early stages of technology demonstration that we misinterpreted as prototype weapons; high-technology weapons that the Soviets found unusually challenging to develop and produce; or systems not scheduled for production until the late 1980s, when economic and political turmoil had begun to disrupt military programs.

Because changes in political and economic conditions could lead to discontinuities in policy, we present three alternative projections: two that require an acceleration in the growth of military spending and one that requires an absolute reduction. We consider all these to be less likely than the baseline projection but present a discussion of them intended to suggest reasonable limits to the options open to Soviet policymakers.

This was a good idea. It is beneficial to acknowledge our uncertainty and explore scenarios that could make a difference to US policy. Most National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), and many DI papers, now give "alternative futures." The problem is, as discussed below, that we were not quite adventuresome enough in our alternative projections and failed to follow up with a systematic effort to see if our baseline projection was consistent with evolving Soviet reality. The fact that we included two scenarios involving an increased military program and only one that postulated a reduction seems in retrospect to have been misleading.

Baseline Projection. *For our baseline projection we estimate—on the basis of the weapon production and development programs we have identified—that the Soviets will continue their policy of balanced force development. Within the outlines of this continuity, however, we expect them to increase their emphasis on strategic forces that can survive a US attack, on strategic defense, and—to a lesser extent—on forces for the projection of Soviet power to distant areas. Manpower constraints will limit increases in the size of forces, but improvements will continue rapidly as new weapons become available. Improvements in Soviet military forces will lead to growing capabilities in many areas, including some areas of traditional Western strength.*

Yes on balanced force development and survivable strategic forces, yes and no on strategic defense, and WRONG on power projection forces, which were built up to a lesser extent than we anticipated. We underestimated the influence that the Afghan imbroglio would have on Soviet ambitions in the Third World, and misread some of the military programs as suggesting greater interest in projecting power overseas.

We expect the Soviets to carry out programs aimed at maintaining or increasing their lead over the US in most measures of intercontinental nuclear attack capability and at upgrading their nuclear war-fighting capabilities. They will continue to improve the accuracy of their ICBMs and will develop a variety of payload options for responding to US deployment of new ICBMs. As a result, the Soviet ICBM force—with or without the SALT II Treaty—will have the theoretical potential to destroy most of the warheads on US land-based missiles throughout the decade. This potential will be greatest in the early 1980s, before the US can deploy a new ICBM. But even in that early period, US forces could conduct a massive retaliatory strike.

Pretty good. By 1989, according to NIEs, the USSR had the capability to launch preemptive strikes or to "launch on warning" against a comprehensive set of targets in North America and Eurasia, including attacking US missile silos with two warheads each. (NIEs of the early 1980s had enormous detail about this potential vulnerability of US retaliatory forces—an obsession of US military planners of that period.) But the Soviets still could not destroy US ballistic missile submarines, bombers on alert or in flight, or dispersed mobile ICBMs.

To maintain survivable strategic forces in the face of a potential threat to their own fixed, land-based missiles, we expect the Soviets to increase the capability of their submarine-launched ballistic missiles

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Selected Soviet Weapon Systems:
Projected and Actual Initial Operational Capability (IOC)

Weapon System	Projected IOC	Actual IOC	Comments
Medium solid ICBM	Early 1980s	1987	Designated SS-24
Small solid ICBM	Early 1980s	1985	Designated SS-25
SS-N-20 SLBM	Mid-1980s	1983	
New long-range bomber	Late 1980s	1988	Nicknamed "Blackjack"
Wide-body cruise missile aircraft	Late 1980s		Not deployed
SA-10 SAM	Early 1980s	1980	
New airborne warning and control aircraft	Early 1980s	1984	Nicknamed "Mainstay"
Two new interceptors	Mid-1980s	1984 and 1986	Nicknamed "Flanker" and "Fulcrum"
Two new ABM missiles	Mid-1980s	1989	Nicknamed "Gorgon" and "Gazelle"
Possible ground-based laser air defense system	Late 1980s		Not deployed
SA-11 SAM	Early 1980s	1980	
T-80 tank	Early 1980s	1981	
T-80 follow-on tank	Mid-1980s	1984	Upgraded version rather than new design
New ground support aircraft	Early 1980s	1984	Nicknamed aircraft "Frogfoot"
New attack helicopter	Late 1980s	1991	Nicknamed "Havoc"
SS-23 SRBM	Early 1980s	1985	
New SRBM	Late 1980s		Not deployed; SRBMs limited by INF Treaty
New cruise missile submarine	Early 1980s	1982	Oscar-class
Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier	Late 1980s	1991	Admiral Kuznetsov–class; not nuclear powered
New heavy transport aircraft	Mid-1980s	1986	Nicknamed "Condor"

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and possibly (especially in the absence of SALT constraints) to deploy land-mobile ICBMs. They may introduce a new strategic bomber or an aircraft to carry long-range cruise missiles, and they may already be testing a sea-launched strategic cruise missile.

All of the above. Clearly, the Soviets perceived an emerging threat to their own forces—a threat that was embodied in collection tasking to their own intelligence services. For their strategic forces, the Soviets deployed the rail-mobile SS-24 ICBM and the road-mobile SS-25. By 1989, there were six Typhoon-class ballistic missile submarines, each carrying 20 ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. Other modernized submarines were equipped with new missiles, some of which had a limited capability to attack hard targets such as US missile silos. A new long-range, supersonic bomber was introduced in 1988 (although the Soviets apparently scaled back the number produced) and the Soviets developed air-launched and submarine-launched long-range cruise missiles.

Should strategic arms control negotiations be resumed, these weapon developments could complicate monitoring an already difficult US intelligence task. Land-mobile strategic weapons and cruise missiles cannot be counted with high confidence. As a result, monitoring strategic arms control agreements will be much more difficult in the 1980s than it was in the 1970s.

Yes. We did not envision, however, that the USSR would tolerate intrusive on-site inspection that has made monitoring the INF and START treaties more feasible.

The Soviets continue their antiballistic missile (ABM) programs, but the technical difficulties of detecting, identifying, and intercepting ballistic missiles have kept progress slow. Moreover, the deployment constraints of the 1972 ABM Treaty severely limit the effectiveness of defenses against missiles. (Should the Soviets abrogate the treaty, they could deploy ABM defenses widely in the latter half of the decade.) We expect continuing Soviet interest in antisatellite defenses and in high-technology systems for strategic defense. Possible developments in the late 1980s could include a space-based antisatellite laser system and a few laser air defense weapons. Continuing civil defense efforts will improve protection for the leaders and essential work force, but not for the general population or for military or economic facilities. Soviet capabilities against ballistic-missile-launching submarines will remain poor.

This projection was accurate, except in the case of the laser programs. The Soviets continued through the 1980s to devote about as much investment to strategic defenses as they did to strategic offensive programs. They modernized the ABM system around Moscow. They did not abrogate the treaty and incur the expense of a nationwide ABM system. The small number of ABM launchers and associated radars made the system highly vulnerable and ineffective against large-scale attacks, and in retrospect we probably overestimated the possibility of an "ABM breakout." They continued to work on laser systems for defense, but they did not deploy operational weapons. Although a major effort to provide protection for the leadership continued, civil defense programs for the general population and the economy remained selective and ineffective. An extensive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) effort continued, but by 1989 the Soviets remained incapable of threatening US ballistic missile submarines in the open ocean.

We project that, despite the widespread Western deployment of counterforce weapons in the 1980s, the Soviets will maintain the capability to destroy most of the US population and industry in a retaliatory strike. Conversely, despite their own growing counterforce and defensive capabilities, they will not in the 1980s be able to prevent a devastating retaliatory strike by remaining Western ICBMs and air- and submarine-launched weapons.

A net assessment. This is not our job, strictly speaking, but it is generally accurate. The "balance of terror" remained a central feature of the US-Soviet

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relationship throughout the decade, although by the end of the 1980s the Soviets had scaled back some of their strategic nuclear programs. As recently as 1990, analysts were debating whether this presaged a new doctrine of "minimum deterrence." Debates on the role of nuclear forces continue in Moscow.

Programs for theater nuclear weaponry will further erode NATO's nuclear advantage in Europe unless NATO takes action to offset them. The Soviets have programs under way to improve the accuracy and flexibility of nuclear delivery systems at all ranges. These include the introduction of new tactical aircraft and short-range ballistic missiles, the continuing deployment of nuclear-capable artillery, and further improvements in the number and quality of weapons long-range theater nuclear delivery vehicles (missile launchers and aircraft) based in the USSR.

At the time of writing, NATO had already taken action—notably the 1979 "Dual-Track" decision to deploy the US Pershing II and Ground-launched Cruise Missile while simultaneously negotiating to constrain Soviet forces. In the event, the INF Treaty, and later the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, led to a fundamental change in the European nuclear balance. Neither was obvious to the authors of the 1981 study, though we did recognize the increasing pressures on the Soviets to pursue negotiations, as well as the strains in the Pact.

Our baseline projection includes improvements in Soviet Ground Forces. They will continue to emphasize the central role of armor; by the end of the decade most major Soviet units (and some units of their allies) will have tanks with advanced armor that provides good protection against current NATO weapons. The introduction of new artillery and air defense systems, as well as organizational changes that involve the addition of combat units and weapons, will increase the capabilities of Soviet divisions to respond to rapidly changing battlefield conditions. New fixed-wing ground attack aircraft and helicopters, with increased ranges and payloads and improved munitions, will increase the vulnerability of NATO's installations and forces and improve Soviet capabilities for close support of ground operations.

These judgments were generally accurate, but suggested a greater Soviet confidence in their forces than they actually had at the end of the 1980s. An NIE written in 1989 stated that "the Soviets have been able to match or exceed NATO's capabilities in nearly every ground forces' weapon category." But it also noted that "The Soviets assess NATO to be a tougher military opponent on the conventional battlefield today than in past decades." This was because of improvements in NATO doctrine and its ability to integrate land and air forces, as demonstrated so vividly in the Persian Gulf war.

With these new systems, we expect Soviet theater forces to keep pace with NATO's modernization programs. The East European forces of the Warsaw Pact will improve less rapidly, however, because economic constraints will limit the amount of modern Soviet equipment they can afford to acquire and maintain.

They did not keep pace, as production rates dropped. Moreover, the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states experienced not only economic strains but also political upheaval. While we knew that the Eastern European forces would diminish in terms of comparative effectiveness, we did not expect that the Pact would evaporate.

Soviet naval programs will continue to emphasize open-ocean forces and the deployment of air power to sea. These programs will improve the Navy's capabilities to contest areas of the open ocean with the West. Ships and submarines with a new, long-range cruise missile are being introduced to offset Western gains in shipborne defenses. The Soviets are producing nuclear-powered attack submarines at an increasing rate, and the submarines introduced in this decade probably will be quieter (and harder to detect and track) than current models.

Something of an overstatement! (Could it have been due to the fact that the principal author of the 1981 study was a former naval analyst?) By the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Navy had been modernized, but

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lacked adequate ASW, air defense, sea-based tactical air support, and naval amphibious lift to sustain long-range operations. The long-range cruise missiles were slower in coming than we anticipated, and submarine production rates were falling at the end of the decade.

Another naval development has important implications for Soviet military power—we have evidence of activities that probably are related to a program for a new aircraft carrier. It could be introduced in the late 1980s and probably would carry standard fighter or attack aircraft and be nuclear powered. (The Soviets have helicopter carriers and ships that carry short-range, vertical and short takeoff and landing aircraft, but this could be their first attack aircraft carrier.) It would improve the Navy's air defenses and—more important—it could inaugurate a capability for projection of air power in distant area. The USSR could not achieve a large-scale capability in the 1980s—only one or two carriers could be available—but this could emerge as a major theme in the 1990s and later.

An exaggeration! We correctly identified the construction program for aircraft carriers, but greatly underestimated the construction time. The first carrier was still not finished at the end of the decade, and it now appears that projection of power to distant areas was not the objective of the limited aircraft carrier program.

With these new forces and capabilities, we expect the Soviets to maintain a high level of activity in the Third World to achieve both military and political goals. They may be willing to use their own forces more actively in the Third World, even if the activity brings a greater risk of confrontation with Western powers.

WRONG! The Soviets came to the end of their rope in Afghanistan, withdrew from Cam Ranh Bay, and generally hunkered down. A case of trying, unsuccessfully, to infer political intentions from military programs.

***Alternative Projections.** More radical changes in Soviet military policy are possible. Currently available evidence provides no clear indications that they are in the offing, but the interaction of political, economic, and technological forces in the 1980s could conceivably lead to major discontinuities.*

Acknowledging that we could have been wrong was a positive step. But we felt compelled to excuse ourselves on the basis that there was no current evidence.

One possibility is that the Soviets will reduce the level of military expenditures absolutely (rather than merely reducing the rate of increase). We believe this is to be unlikely in the near term. Their dim view of the international environment would argue against such cuts, and the guidelines they have published for their next Five-Year Plan imply continued growth in defense spending. We have not detected any evidence that the Soviets are considering reductions.

We correctly acknowledged that what really happened was possible.

Nevertheless, reductions cannot be excluded as a long-run possibility; and, as one alternative projection, we have examined the consequences of a cut in defense expenditures. We believe that to reduce expenditure levels in real terms the Soviets would have to alter the roles and missions of some of their armed forces. They probably would spread the cuts amongst all the military services—making them somewhat deeper in general purpose forces, especially ground forces. General purpose forces are larger than strategic forces, and they take up more of the defense budget and use more of the energy, manpower, and key material resources needed by the civilian economy. Production of general purpose weapon systems competes directly with production of equipment for transportation, agriculture, and manufacturing. (The resources devoted to production

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of strategic weapons, on the other hand, are more specialized and less readily transferable to important civilian uses.)

This proved to be accurate. In 1988, when Gorbachev announced a unilateral reduction in defense spending and forces, he articulated a new doctrinal concept of "reasonable sufficiency" that involved changes in the roles and missions of the services. His cuts affected all the forces, but impacted more heavily on general purpose forces, especially the ground forces in Central Europe and the portions of the USSR west of the Ural Mountains.

Another alternative projection considers the possibility that the Soviets will increase defense spending more rapidly than in the past to support a stepped-up military competition. This effort (focused on either strategic or conventional forces) could expand the forces and improve capabilities more rapidly than is forecast in our baseline projection. The range of program options is broad enough to permit a major increase in defense spending, and Soviet military-industrial capacity is large enough to sustain it. Such an increase would affect the distribution of economic resources significantly, however (especially if it were in conventional forces), and its political consequences could be extremely serious:

- *The Soviets' ability to increase investment resources critical to long-term economic growth would be reduced substantially.*
- *Per capita consumption might decline in real terms late in the decade.*
- *Key sectors of the economy would be disrupted.*

In retrospect, we should have realized that these consequences were so serious that an increased military effort was a real nonstarter.

We do not know at what point the Soviets would find an increased defense burden to be unacceptable. This would depend on the international environment and the outlook of the leaders in power. Judging by their past behavior, we believe that they would prefer, if possible, to keep defense expenditures within their current growth rate, while still pursuing their military goals:

- *The Soviets probably will seek to constrain US programs and to reduce their uncertainty about future US capabilities by urging further arms control negotiations.*
- *They will also attempt, through propaganda and diplomacy, to undermine Western cohesiveness on security issues and to slow the pace of West European defense programs.*

They certainly did both of these. But eventually the pain became so great that they took dramatic, unilateral actions.

The Soviets' incentives for such actions will increase as their economic growth slows in the 1980s. But Soviet leaders place a high premium on military power and will not, for economic reasons alone, accept constraints on defense programs that they consider vital to their interest.

A truism! And a lousy way to end an analysis that was, all things considered, pretty good. Of course, the Soviets would not forego programs they considered vital. But what Gorbachev and his colleagues considered vital was somewhat different from what we projected. In sum, we were generally accurate in our projection of Soviet military capabilities in the late 1980s, but underemphasized the possibility of a "paradigm shift"—a dramatic change in the underlying factors that shaped Soviet policy.

Indicators of Change

In its concluding sections, the report explicitly acknowledged the possibility that its assessments were increasingly subject to uncertainty. It described both the conditions that could lead to an accelerated or reduced Soviet military effort and the specific evidence or indicators that might accompany a policy change.

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This notion of "indicators" is one that analysts had considered for some time, partly at the urging of the DCI's Military-Economic Advisory Panel, which was charged with overseeing CIA estimates of Soviet military spending and economic performance. A few months after publication of the study, the Office of Soviet Analysis was formed as part of a large-scale reorganization of CIA analysis. The office established an "Indicators Project" to monitor evidence that might lead to a new assessment of Soviet military intentions. A senior analyst was placed in charge, and an annual assessment was planned. Regrettably, because of personnel changes, a systematic effort at monitoring indications of change was never institutionalized.

In retrospect, the indicators described in the 1981 study as signaling a reduced military program were quite accurate. The relevant portions of the report are reproduced below in italics, together with comments on actual developments:

We consider an absolute reduction in military spending unlikely . . . Under some circumstances, however, the Soviets might feel impelled in that direction. These include:

- *Economic conditions poorer than those we currently project—for example, a series of disastrous harvests causing an actual reduction in economic output.*

Poor harvests occurred, further depressing economic growth. Some Soviet economists calculated an absolute decline in the economy during this period.

- *The spread of popular unrest from Eastern Europe to the USSR, coupled with the rise to power of political figures sympathetic to the consumers' plight.*

Both happened.

- *A Sino-Soviet rapprochement, a general lessening of tensions with the West, and a move by West European countries closer to the Soviet orbit and away from US influence.*

Tensions lessened, largely because Gorbachev took steps to moderate them. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

- *. . . We would expect to receive evidence* [redacted] *that would alert us to the change . . . But no single clue would be adequate to identify a policy shift. We would have to detect at least several indicators, and evaluate them over a year or more, before we could be confident of identifying an actual change . . .*

It took us several years to recognize that major changes were under way. This was because the "soft" evidence—political and economic indicators—preceded the "hard" evidence of actual changes in military programs and forces.

Political. *Political evidence of a reduced military effort could include:*

- *Reports of greater optimism in the Kremlin on the prospects for detente.*

Gorbachev proved much more willing than his predecessors to engage with the West on arms control and foreign policy issues, but it took analysts some time to understand this. (A 1989 NIE contained a section entitled "Is Gorbachev's 'Detente' Different?") After meeting initial US skepticism, by the late 1980s Gorbachev found a willing partner for detente in Ronald Reagan.

- *The accession to leadership of political figures inclined to support civilian economic activity—perhaps even at the expense of the military.*

  In the mid- and late-1980s, Soviet leaders evinced growing concern about the costs of their military effort and the need to divert resources to rebuild the civilian economy. In 1988 and 1989, Gorbachev announced the first unilateral reductions in military forces and budgets since the 1950s.

- *The admission of additional civilian participants to the defense decisionmaking process.*

  By 1989, the USSR had established a defense oversight committee in the Supreme Soviet, and civilian academics increasingly challenged the military and served as alternative sources of analysis for political leaders.

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- *A more flexible Soviet stance on arms control; in particular, movement on MBFR could signal a desire to improve economic performance by reducing expenditures on theater forces.*

  In the mid-1980s, the Soviets became more flexible across the board on arms control, while analysts debated whether their new stance was cosmetic or serious. By the end of the decade, new agreements were in place covering the full range of conventional and nuclear forces.

- *Signs of greater tolerance for experimentation in economic management and more sympathy for consumer complaints.*

  In the mid-1980s, Gorbachev introduced the new concepts of glasnost, broadening the limits of political and economic debate, and perestroyka, major restructuring of the economic system, in an effort to stave off economic decline. A principal objective was to improve living conditions and arrest social decline.

  Economic. *Economic information that might reflect a reduced defense program could include:*

- *Pessimistic Soviet forecasts of economic growth.*

  In the late 1980s, Soviet economic performance continued to slide, with agricultural output declining in several years. As early as 1986, Gorbachev expressed the fear that the USSR could become a third-rate power.

- *Energy shortages developing early in the 1980s.*

  Many of our critics charged that we were unnecessarily pessimistic on Soviet energy resources.[5] However, significant energy problems did develop in the late 1980s: oil production fell by 2 percent in 1989 and 6 percent in 1990, and net exports of oil fell by 2 percent in 1989 and some 15 percent in 1990.

- *Major shifts in plan targets toward increased investment or consumption at the expense of defense programs.*

  Against the backdrop of worsening economic performance, the Soviets announced in the late 1980s a 20-percent cut in spending for weapons procurement.

- *Reduction or halting of construction activity at defense plants.*

  In 1989, the Soviet leaders endorsed conversion of some military production capability to civilian purposes, causing dislocation in military programs.

- *Sharp increases, actual or planned, in the output of civilian transportation or agricultural equipment.*

  This equipment was produced at plants that also manufactured tanks and armored vehicles. Gorbachev's 1988 decision to cut back general purpose military forces was an admission that military production was curtailing needed civilian programs.

  Military. *If the military effort were being cut back, we might also see:*

- *Cuts in weapon testing levels and production rates.*

  By 1989, the number of strategic delivery systems was decreasing and the number of strategic missile test launches had decreased by 50 percent.

- *Dissolution of military units and reorganization or consolidation of forces.*

  This began to occur in the late 1980s in conventional forces and in the early 1990s in strategic forces.

- *Releases of men from active duty and reduced draft calls.*

  In December 1988, Gorbachev announced a unilateral personnel reduction of 500,000 in the Soviet armed forces, and by the 1990s the conscription system had begun to collapse.

- *Evidence of debates on the roles and missions of the military services and on the nature of a future war and the goals of military strategy.*

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These debates were in full swing by the mid- to late-1980s, and led to a major redefinition of Soviet military doctrine under the concept of "reasonable sufficiency."

Grading Our Performance

Gaddis gives himself a grade of C+ for his predictions regarding the Cold War. The NFAC analysts had a somewhat less daunting, but still challenging task: to make predictions about the future of Soviet military power. To do so, they had to consider both "soft" issues like leadership views and intentions and "hard" issues like weapon system developments. Not surprisingly, the analysts did better at the latter.

The NFAC analysts seem to merit a grade similar to the one Gaddis gives himself for their forecasts of Soviet political developments; we did not do any better or any worse than historians and political scientists outside the Intelligence Community in predicting the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism. But we merit a much better grade (say an A-) for having an excellent understanding of weapon systems and programs and for accurately describing most of the capabilities of Soviet military forces nearly a decade in advance. Moreover, we had a good list of "leading indicators," although we certainly could have monitored them more systematically. Overall, a high B!

At the conclusion of his essay, Gaddis asks why historians and social scientists do not do a better job at prediction.[6] Was the NFAC analysis of Soviet military power guilty of the same errors of judgment as Gaddis and his colleagues? The five weaknesses that Gaddis noted were:

1. The assumption that the future will resemble the past.

Guilty! Although we realize that changes in policy were possible, we characterized them as "unlikely." And even when we explored alternative scenarios, we modeled them on historical events—the reduction in military spending under Khrushchev in the late 1950s and the rapid buildup of strategic military forces in the early 1960s.

2. The temptation to return nations into abstractions.

Not guilty! One of the strengths of the NFAC study was that it dissected in minute detail the inner workings of Soviet defense, as we understood them at the time. Even more than a decade later, this is an impressive accomplishment, and the study was genuinely multidisciplinary in bringing together the perspectives of political, military, technical and economic analysts.

3. Neglecting points of intersection between short-term and long-term phenomena.

Guilty of a lesser included offense! We clearly knew what the short- and long-term phenomena were. (They included growing societal ills, a faltering economy, and an uncertain political succession on the one hand; and the momentum of military programs, Soviet desire for international power, and the threat from a rearming West on the other.) And we knew that they were intersecting. We did not, however, know how to weight the various phenomena, which were pushing Soviet decisionmaking in different directions. In the end, we opted for the conservative assumption that the forces for continuity would outweigh those for change.

> *. . . We believe that we have identified most of the weapons . . . that will shape the evolution of Soviet military power over the next decade. That knowledge, plus our understanding of Soviet decisionmaking and of the military, political and economic environment in which it takes place, leads us to believe that Soviet forces and doctrine will develop much as outlined below.*

There followed a series of projections that gave the greatest emphasis to continuation of current forces and policies. This proved to be accurate for most of the decade, with the major changes not beginning in earnest until 1988.

4. Ignoring the role of personalities.

Guilty, but with mitigating circumstance (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

We also covered the implications of both the Soviet political succession and possible changes in the military leadership. On page 57 of the study there are photographs of six potential successors to Brezhnev, including one labeled "M S. Gorbachev, Party Secretary." The text reads:

> *Gorbachev, 50, is the youngest of the top leaders and is responsible for agricultural policy; his views on defense and national security issues are unknown. He reportedly has opposed liberalization in Eastern Europe.*

On the other hand, there is no photo of Yuriy Andropov. During the coordination process, one of the analytical offices insisted that he be deleted from the list, because the Soviets would never appoint a KGB Chairman as General Secretary. In short, we knew that personalities mattered, but knew too little about both the individuals and the selection process.

> 5. Chance. Unpredictable events, by definition, defy prediction!

Nolo contendere. We did not predict the unpredictable, but we did say:

> *We cannot rule out the possibility that Soviet military programs in the 1980s will differ from our baseline projection because our evidence, though fairly definitive on future weapon systems, is less conclusive in such areas as the political succession and is too general to pinpoint the foreign policy environment and economic performance in any given year. But it is precisely these less predictable factors that could make the greatest difference in Soviet policies.*

In retrospect, we might have noted more forcefully that the increasingly complex environment for Soviet decisionmaking on military programs heightened the possibility that chance events could result in sharp discontinuities. "We cannot rule out the possibility" is a real cop-out! Certainly, however, the role of unpredictable events in the actual development of Soviet military power should make us more humble about our powers of prognostication.

So What?

In another essay, Gaddis asks whether good intelligence in fact makes any difference in policy.[7] He quotes Yale historian Robin Winks as asking "So, what difference does it make that . . . Hitler had one testicle, that Sicilians still use sixteenth-century vulgarisms, that narrow-gauge track is not the same in New South Wales as in the Sudan."[8] The same question has been raised in a series of case studies conducted by the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, under the CIA-sponsored Intelligence and Policy Program.[9] The answer seems to be that the influence of intelligence on policy depends more on the policy process itself than on the quality of intelligence.

In the case of analysis of Soviet military programs in the early 1980s, it is difficult to imagine that better analysis would have made much difference to policy. To assess this we have to indulge in what historians call "counterfactual" analysis. Hold everything else constant and alter the variable of interest, then try to imagine what might have happened. For example, if Cleopatra's nose had been two inches longer . . .

Let us imagine that CIA discerned as early as 1983 that a significant unilateral reduction in the Soviet military effort at the end of the decade was increasingly likely.[10] Would this have altered key elements of the Reagan Administration's defense strategy such as the buildup of American strategic forces, the 600-ship Navy, the "Zero-Option" proposal for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force negotiations, or the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)?

Frankly, it seems highly unlikely. The buildup was managed by officials whose views of the USSR were shaped by the Committee on the Present Danger and the so-called B-Team—defense analysts who regarded the

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Intelligence Community's views with skepticism, if not contempt.[11] The 600-ship Navy was the brainchild of a forceful Secretary of the Navy with strong support from the President. The Zero-Option was the outcome of political bargaining among presidential advisers, and intelligence played essentially no role in the policy decision (although it was useful in policy implementation).[12] And SDI resulted from the coincidence of President Reagan's vision of a nuclear-free world with the technological hopes of a few key scientists, especially Edward Teller. The president's principal national security advisers (let alone intelligence analysts!) knew next to nothing about it until the last minute.[13]

Perhaps over time, as the indicators became stronger, intelligence on changes in Soviet military programs might have made a greater difference at the margin. But, again, the influence of political processes and personalities seems to be greater. Would President Reagan have been even more adventuresome at Reykjavik if he had been armed with intelligence showing that Gorbachev's reforms would lead to loss of Communist Party control? It is hard to imagine that he would.[14] Moreover, since Reagan became an ardent arms controller, Gorbachev fell for domestic political reasons and the West eventually won the Cold War, it is tempting to task again, "So what?"

Explanation Versus Prediction

Perhaps the most important "so what" is that the Intelligence Community was essentially correct in its understanding of the factors that influenced and explained Soviet military policy, and in its assessment of Soviet military capabilities nearly 10 years in advance. This is an achievement of great importance, unprecedented in the history of intelligence. It resulted from a confluence of sophisticated technical collection capabilities, old-fashioned espionage, creative analytical methodologies and sound scholarship. That we did not do a better job of predicting the fall of Communism is regrettable but not surprising. After all, as Gaddis has noted more recently, social science failed in predicting the end of the Cold War, and intelligence is in the final analysis dependent on the methods of the social and physical sciences.[15]

What is of more concern is how well the Intelligence Community—and specifically NFAC and its successor organization—capitalized on its understanding to help policymakers understand the dynamics of Soviet military policy and the influence their own actions might have on it. Again the record is mixed. Many of the participants in the 1981 study went on to positions that gave them direct contact with policymakers and the ability to provide intelligence support to negotiations and policy decisions. But others took assignments that were at best peripherally related to the expertise they gained and—as we have seen—the "indicators" effort foundered because of personnel reassignments. All of this suggests that the influence of the analysts' understanding on the policy process was less purposeful than might be hoped for.

The key lessons in this experience seem to be:

- Intelligence has a comparative advantage when intelligence sources or methodologies make a major contribution to analysis, and does better than academia in integrating the expertise from different disciplines. This permitted us to forecast Soviet military capabilities with good accuracy.

- Ultimately, intelligence insights on the softer areas of political trends depend on the methods of the social sciences, which have proved to be ineffective in predicting major changes in the international system. Hence, our performance was poorer in forecasting Soviet political choices than in projecting military forces.

- Intelligence, like the social sciences, is likely to be better at explaining than predicting, because of the expertise of its people and the high quality of its written products and briefings.

- Intelligence analysis should discuss alternative futures, together with the conditions that could lead to discontinuities abroad and indicators of impending change. Equally important, the systematic monitoring of key indicators should be institutionalized, and bureaucratic procedures or personnel systems that interfere with this task should be reexamined.

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- Expertise is difficult to build and should not be dissipated for reasons of personnel management or organizational convenience. Intelligence organizations should foster and protect expertise, and ensure effective interaction between intelligence and policy officials.

- No matter how accurate the explanations or predictions of intelligence analysts, in the final analysis policy depends more on political factors and the values and mind-sets of leaders than on intelligence.

NOTES

1. The article appeared in *The Atlantic,* CCLX (November 1987), pp. 88-100.

2. John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War.* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 133-154.

3. The research process was described in "A Procedure for Managing Interdisciplinary Intelligence Production," *Studies in Intelligence,* fall 1981, p. 37.

4. The comments are based either on well-known historical facts or on the descriptions of Soviet military forces in NIEs from the late 1980s and early 1990s.

5. See, for example, US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Gorbachev's Economic Plan* (Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1987) p. 494.

6. Gaddis (1992) pp. 153-4.

7. "Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War History," in Gaddis (1992), p. 94.

8. Robin W. Winks, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War,* 1939-1961 (New York, Morrow, 1987), p. 63.

9. *Case Book: Intelligence and Policy Project* (Cambridge, Harvard University, 1991).

10. This would have been difficult to predict, as there was at that time no clear evidence of significant changes in Soviet military programs, although we did see a slowdown in Soviet military procurement. More definitive evidence did not become available until after Gorbachev took office.

11. See Anne Hessing Kahn and John Prados, "Team B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* April 1993, pp. 22-31.

12. L. Keith Gardiner, *INF Deployment: The Role of Intelligence Analysts in a Policy Success* (Washington, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1993)

13. George P. Shultz, excerpts from *Turmoil and Triumph, Time,* 10 May 1993, pp. 50-51.

14. "The Unexpected Ronald Reagan" in Gaddis (1992), pp. 119-132.

15. "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War" *International Security.* winter 1992/93, pp. 5-58.

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Rewarding rotations

Reflections on Cross-Agency Assignments

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The assignment of intelligence officers from their parent agency to other parts of the Intelligence Community on a rotational basis is a career development option that has been discussed repeatedly over the years. Administrative problems, including the use of the polygraph examination, have limited the implementation of rotation schemes. To an even greater degree, senior management within the Community has not emphasized cross-agency experience as highly valuable to either agency performance or individual career development.

Budget cuts, a renewed emphasis on "corporate" behavior within the Community, and plans to "reinvent government" have created a new interest in cross-agency rotational assignments, making such duty a potentially more commonplace experience for the next generation of intelligence officers. In the following article, two intelligence officers from NSA and one from CIA reflect on their cross-agency tours.

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(6) **NSA**

In July 1990, after three years as SIGINT National Intelligence Officer (SINIO) for the Near East and South Asia, I became an Assistant National Intelligence Officer for the same region. An intended one-year excursion into the National Estimates process was about to extend into a five-year tour of duty.

My involvement with Estimates and the National Intelligence Council (NIC) had grown broader as well as longer. As originally defined, my SINIO role was for South Asia only, with another officer handling the Middle East. South Asia had the wonderful advantage of being an area of great interest to me but of relatively little interest to the US Government. I had hopes of something approaching a sabbatical.

When Gen. William Odom, then NSA's Director, decided that I should take on the entire NESA account, I tried to decline; the ratio of my interest (rather low) to that of the US Government (very high) in the Middle East seemed inconvenient.

"Convinced" by the General to rethink my decision, I resigned myself to the new job by noting that the timing was right. "At least," I assured him, "the Israelis and Palestinians are behaving themselves." This was in November 1987, two weeks before the outbreak of the *intifadah*.

Three years later, my timing had not improved. As I prepared to assume the Assistant NIO/NESA position, splitting my time between NSA and CIA, Iraq invaded Kuwait. At the beginning of a historic American involvement in the Middle East, the Assistant NIO for the region did not have a CIA badge, was not allowed into the SAFE system, could not figure out the phones, and occasionally got lost in the building.

Somehow, it all worked out. I never worked harder, challenged by the roughest (but best) intellectual peer competition I ever hope to encounter. I was putting in workdays that produced minimal consolation in allowing me to use the Cabin John Bridge at off-peak hours. And, over time, miracle of miracles, the number of outright gaffes tended to decline. (The first time I was to accompany the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) to the Hill for testimony I literally missed the bus. I was so new I did not know there was a bus. I thought everyone—Legislative Affairs personnel, analysts, and the DDCI—left together. So I simply appeared in the DDCI's outer office and waited for the crowd that

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never gathered. Predictably, the always gracious Dick Kerr took me in his car, and he did not even make me ride in the trunk.)

The job set new standards in forcing me to think faster and react more precisely. It required me to undertake a major cultural change—making the transition from SIGINT analysis to national intelligence assessments and estimates. It brought me into even closer contact with my colleagues in the Community.

As a SINIO, I had grumbled about the occasionally thin line between the NIC being at CIA but not, technically, being part of CIA. For a non-CIA outfit, for example, the NIC made a big deal about the writing style in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). And when controversies arose on an estimate, only one agency's representatives were in position to walk down the hall and come back with a small army of reinforcements.

Despite these occasional concerns about the level of the coordinating field, I developed a great respect for my colleagues in the DI. This respect extended to other analysts in other agencies and survived even the occasional outbreaks of interagency rivalry. Perhaps because I came from beyond the finished intelligence community, I sometimes thought that I was especially sensitive to (and sometimes privy to) comments about relations within that community.

Sandra Mackey suggested in her book on the Saudis that being a woman actually helped her acquire information when she was in Saudi Arabia. "The Saudis regard women as such mindless creatures that I was able to ask questions without raising suspicions," she later noted. As a representative of a "collection agency," I may have gotten a similar treatment.

For whatever reason, I had an excellent opportunity to observe the Intelligence Community. It was always great fun to watch the exchanges between DI analysts ("After all, why do you think they call us the Central Intelligence Agency?") and their counterparts from the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) ("We may be outnumbered, but we're never outthought!"). Would the Defense Department come to meetings represented by DIA and the services? Or would the mere act of announcing a meeting reveal the presence of yet another staff or element, hitherto unknown but armed with a charter of some sort and an acronym that would defy the best efforts of NSA cryptanalysts? The experience even affected the way I looked at NSA and its work, especially the occasional tendency to report, without comment, as intelligence that which was no longer even news.

The NIC's location at CIA gave me a more intense look at CIA. The DI's analysts were the ones I saw day after day and were the ones with whom I had the most frequent opportunities to talk with informally, outside the often intense circumstances of estimate coordination.

I remain deeply impressed with the intelligence and curiosity of the DI's analytic force and the very real sense that the DI encouraged strongly held, well-reasoned dissent from even junior analysts. Many in the DI would be quick to point out the limits on this practice—even its absence in the presence of certain managers—but I would encourage them to believe that from the outsider's perspective it is the general practice, not its breaches, that gets noticed.

Ultimately, it was the outsider's perspective that I was allowed to contribute: the transitory ability to say, without appearing critical or cynical, "Why do you do it that way?" This, I suspect, is where cross-agency rotation has the capacity to help us all, by allowing a larger percentage of officers from across the Community to see things from an outsider's view.

Even more, rotation allows officers to return to their own agencies with the capacity to note, however carefully, "You know we do not have to do it that way. CIA (or DIA or INR, as the case may be) does it this way." (In my early months back at Fort Meade, I developed the unfortunate tendency to get my pronouns confused, contrasting the way "we" did things at Langley compared to the way "they" did it at NSA. After a few weeks at a reeducation camp, however, I was recertified as fit for duty.)

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The Community needs more cross-agency assignments, in liaison positions and in places like the NIC and the Community Management Staff, but also integrated into line organizations. Each agency will, of course, determine that some positions require specialized experience that do not lend themselves to performance by an outsider. An NSA cryptanalyst, for example, is probably not going to be a good candidate to run covert action operations.

But strong functional analogs associated with the collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence exist across the Community and should offer opportunities for fruitful exchanges of personnel. Every agency fights the tension between timeliness and completeness in reporting. Each has procedures for testing and evaluating the quality of its sources. All of us, one hopes, are constantly engaged in the search for better sources and methods. We need to work more closely in reviewing the results of these processes and the processes themselves.

We need to institutionalize the cross-agency experience by developing training programs that put greater focus on the interworkings of the Community. At the pinnacle of professional intelligence education and training, we should consider the creation of a National Senior Foreign Intelligence Course concentrated on the successes and failures of Community interaction. And we need, at the agency level, to reinforce the value of cross-agency experience by making it a significantly weighted ticket to be punched in career development.

At some point, we may even need to consider the creation of a National Foreign Intelligence Service, or at least a single senior intelligence service. This may seem a bit radical, but the precedent of the creation of the Foreign Service from the consular and diplomatic services is at least instructive—in its limits as well as its lessons.

An internal NSA study of a few years ago concluded that the agency had performed its mission "effectively but not efficiently," a reflection of the generous appropriations provided to the agency during the Cold War. In much the same way, the Community has probably functioned at less than maximum efficiency, a reasonable shortfall in virtual wartime conditions in which efficiency *should* take a back seat to effectiveness.

Nonetheless, we should not expect such generosity in our immediate future. As we are called on to do more with less, one of the force multipliers of a more efficient Community should be a larger cadre of professional officers with intimate understanding of agencies other than their own.

Early in my tour at the NIC, I was complimented, along with the NIO for whom I worked (also an "outsider"), for our work during Desert Storm. "You performed like real troupers," it was said. "But then we have always known that CIA people were real troupers." At the moment, I took the latter comment about as well as the average southerner would appreciate being called a carpetbagger. Over time, however, I came to treasure the reference for what it was: possibly the highest praise I am ever going to get from a CIA professional rightly proud of his agency.

I would encourage every intelligence officer to take a cross-agency tour at some point in his or her career. It will add to one's understanding of other agencies, and change perceptions of one's own. Beyond that, the experience can encourage intelligence officers to see the Community as a truly national service.

My tour has left me with a sense of participation in that service that I could not have achieved otherwise. It is a participation I feel each time I walk through the lobby at CIA Headquarters, with its juxtaposition of the mission of American intelligence ("And ye shall know the truth . . . ") and the cost of that mission (the memorial book to officers killed in the line of duty). As the Community restructures for a different set of challenges, we need to ensure that cross-agency experience becomes central to the development of future generations of intelligence professionals.

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(6) **CIA**

In August 1991, after almost a decade in South Asia and North Africa as a CIA case officer, I was looking forward to my next assignmer(b)(3)(c) At the last minute, however, I had to give up the assignment because of a medical problem. For many

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reasons, professional as well as personal, I was terribly disappointed. More than a modicum of disquiet was added to my disappointment when the Directorate of Operations (DO) responded by advising me that my new assignment would be on rotation to NSA.

Some of the negative side effects of the DO's high esprit de corps and camaraderie are incredible insularity and self-absorption. Except at the highest levels, DO employees tend to think of other governmental agencies in terms heavily tinged with pity. The mention of NSA immediately evoked in my mind some less than glowing images: huge, amorphous, military, inscrutable, and largely irrelevant to the real business of intelligence, which, everybody knows, is HUMINT. I asked for a few days to think about the job, and I contacted the incumbent. To my surprise, he appeared to be an upwardly mobile officer who was not serving out any particular penance for some misdeed. He described his time at Fort Meade in positive terms. I decided it was worth a try.

The job turned out to be one of the most rewarding and enlightening I will ever have. A few years before, the leadership of NSA and CIA had decided, as a confidence-building measure, to exchange officers who could facilitate cooperation at the corporate level. My predecessor had been the first to come from the CIA. He had done an outstanding job in starting to develop a real role for the position by expanding on the rather meaningless title of DCI Representative to NSA to take on an actual NSA job as one of the executive assistants to the Deputy Director. As I came into the job, the Deputy Director offered to make me his only assistant, a development which further enhanced my access and made it even easier for me to find issues in which I could play a constructive role.

Confidence-building between organizations has to begin at a personal level. The Deputy Director for Operations, on giving me the job, advised me that above all I was to exercise discretion and good judgment in representing one agency to the other. He accurately predicted that, if I did my job right, I would be privy at both NSA and CIA to highly confidential deliberations which would be very interesting if leaked "across the river." He warned me, however, that this time the DO was not sending me out to spy; any tactical advantages I might be tempted to give one side through such a "spy in the enemy's camp" approach would not be worth the damage it could cause to the more important goal of improving cooperation.

Though my discretion was sorely tried on many occasions, by keeping confidences and trying to play a constructive role, I was given unlimited access to the innermost deliberations and candid discussions of NSA's leadership. NSA's trust in me allowed me to be of significantly greater value to both agencies.

I had a good vantage point from which to observe, and occasionally influence, the development of interagency policies. In its more dramatic moments, I felt, figuratively, like an observer on a mountaintop watching two trains hurtling blindly and headlong toward each other. Sometimes a gentle word of caution could sensitize one side to danger around the bend.

On other occasions, it was useful to conspire with my NSA counterparts at CIA to decide how best to defuse or limit a problem in the making. I had discovered, after a few months in the job, that the successful NSAers at CIA had also hit upon the obvious formula that discretion and nonparochialism usually inspire the host's confidence. Thus, those caught up in bilateral rotations, in addition to being hostage and counterhostage, are natural allies in trying to reduce friction between organizations.

Not all rotational assignments are alike, and some would have been a waste of my time. My assignment at NSA will, however, definitely be numbered among my most rewarding personally and professionally. In addition to correcting my preconceptions about NSA, my knowledge of the Intelligence Community and its place in the government expanded by an exponent which NSA's Cray supercomputers could never factor. My clearances multiplied twentyfold or more. I was able to observe the management of a large intelligence agency at close quarters. I learned of the

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intricate interrelations—complementary, competing, and sometimes conflicting—among the elements of the Intelligence Community.

I was also fortunate in being exposed to the complex process whereby NSA and the Community develop, present, and justify budgetary packages to Congress. These, and many other experiences, forced me up and out of the trenches of clandestine HUMINT operations into the open, where I was able to look toward the horizon.

In a parochial sense, perhaps such broadening experiences may not be totally for the good of the parent organization: I will never again assume that I am working on the sole island of dedication and expertise in the government, and my organizational loyalties are no longer quite so narrow. Troubling as this may be for some, for those who have a rotational experience and go on to positions of leadership, such ecumenism may become more valuable as circumstances inexorably lead the elements of the Intelligence Community to cooperate more closely.

Learning the ways of others and making friends have been central to the DO's business overseas. It is slowly becoming more apparent to those at the working levels of the DO and other intelligence elements that the same tenets also apply in our need to work within our own government. Rotational assignments are essential to this process.

(b)(3)(c) (b)(6) **NSA**

In October 1990, for a one-year period, I was detailed from NSA to CIA to work as a special assistant to former DDCI Dick Kerr. I had applied for the position with no real idea of what it entailed, but I was eager to find out more about the workings of the CIA and the Intelligence Community. My year provided me with insights on those two entities, but it also provided information of far greater importance. Moreover, the personal challenges and rewards offered by the job were tremendous.

I was the second DDCI Special Assistant from NSA, a position established in 1990. The objective was to provide NSAers with an education on the Intelligence Community and the role of the DDCI, while providing the DDCI with someone knowledgeable about the SIGINT system. The basic assignment given me by the DDCI was to handle his Intelligence Community work. The DCI and DDCI are the final decisionmakers on Community activities. At that time, the Intelligence Community Staff was responsible for working cross-community issues for DCI/DDCI decision. All that staff work flowed through me.

I also worked other issues as assigned, some involving the SIGINT system, and some with wider applications, like the strategy for presentation of the Community program to Congress, and the development of the DCI Nonproliferation Center. In addition, I attended virtually all of the DDCI's meetings, from his discussions with CIA analysts on intelligence issues to discussions with Community figures like the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. The work was challenging and fascinating.

Because of its scope, the job provided me with insights into areas I could not have received from any other assignment.

First, I observed the interaction between the Intelligence Community and the policymaker. The job of the DCI and DDCI is largely to work with and understand the intelligence needs of the highest level policymakers, including the President. One of the DDCI's primary functions was to attend meetings of the National Security Council Deputies' Committee. During the Bush Administration, "the Deputies" functioned as a primary interagency forum on national security policy. For example, the Deputies met continuously to discuss and develop policy options during Desert Shield/Storm.

The chance to watch how intelligence contributes to policy decisions and how the highest level of policymaker drives the intelligence system during crises is invaluable to an intelligence officer. I gained some unique insights into the limitations of intelligence and the very real influence policymakers have on intelligence collection.

I also observed some senior executives at work. The pressures imposed on the DCI and DDCI, of a type undreamed of by most of us, and the ways in which they responded, provided important lessons on the management of large organizations. The spotlight is often on the DCI and DDCI, and public reviews of their actions were not always favorable. There is also a constant tension between a Community dealing in secrets and a legislature and press whose basic job is to serve the public.

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The policymaker is not an easy master. He is a skeptic with firm ideas often rooted in his own past experience. The challenge of providing intelligence during Desert Shield/Storm and responding to criticism of the Intelligence Community in the aftermath was difficult duty for the DCI and DDCI. I observed that nothing substitutes for a basic understanding of your organization's responsibilities, a sincere desire to solve problems, grace under pressure, and a well-developed sense of humor.

I saw at close range the achievements, structure, strengths, and weaknesses of the agencies that constitute the Intelligence Community. Each week, I attended the National Foreign Intelligence Board with the DDCI, and, when it met, the National Foreign Intelligence Council (NFIC). The NFIC was charged with determining the final disposition of the National Foreign Intelligence Program—the Intelligence Community budget. Assisting the DDCI in preparing for those sessions, and observing the sessions themselves, was a lesson in organizational decisionmaking in the resource arena. And performing the daily task of coordinating Community documents before DDCI signature was enlightening. I was surprised at the coordination and structure in evidence in the Community.

Finally, I did observe CIA at close range, again through seeing documents, listening to briefings, and working with CIA personnel. I developed great respect for the ability of CIA personnel to function under great pressure and intense scrutiny. Like every other agency in the Community, however, CIA is undergoing a great deal of change, particularly in the military support arena. Given the shift in the focus of military support from the old Cold War model to smaller operations in diverse corners of the world, I believe a greater CIA role in military support is desirable.

I would strongly encourage intelligence officers from any agency in the Community to consider a tour of duty in another agency. Whether you intend to follow the technical track or become a manager, you gain from the experience of working in an institution with different missions, goals, and methods.

There are also valuable insights to be gained in viewing one's own agency from the outside. One leaves an outside assignment with a far greater appreciation of where the parent organization fits and what ought to be done to improve the services it provides.

I believe an outside tour will provide anyone with a unique sense of his or her own capabilities and limits. It increases self-confidence immeasurably. In an era of personnel reductions throughout the US Government, I hope that more cross-agency tours will be encouraged. The benefits far outweigh the losses.

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Toward standards

On Analytic Success and Failure

Martin Petersen

"Intelligence failure" are two words that analysts never want associated with their name. But what is an intelligence failure? According to popular culture, at least as reflected by the press, our job is to know everything and to predict the future—and with a high degree of specificity.[1] Intelligence, of course, will never be all-knowing and all-seeing, and finished intelligence often boils down to informed opinion about the implications of precious few facts. This begs the real question: what are reasonable standards?

Setting reasonable standards begins with an appreciation of the nature of our work and the field we play on. There are three givens in our world, and our success will always be hostage to them. First and foremost, the information available to us is generally limited, conflicting, and open to a variety of interpretations. Time pressures are great, and the issues we are asked to address are almost always multifaceted and evolving. The yes or no question is rare; we deal in trends and outlooks. The smoking gun of an intelligence failure—that piece of reporting that points clearly to the truth—is generally visible only in hindsight, and sometimes it is not so clear to us as it is to our critics.[2]

The policy environment is frequently charged, and at times it can be hostile. Not all agendas are aboveboard, and not everyone is interested in an objective assessment. For some policymakers, the truth—to the degree it can be established—is as likely to make them angry as it is to make them free. Thus, intelligence and the intelligence analyst may be seen as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution.

Finally, a key piece of the puzzle often is what the US Government is saying and doing in private, and that can be the hardest piece to obtain. The task is even more difficult when multiple policy agencies—each with its own agenda—are involved.

Setting a Standard

But what standard should we apply to ourselves? If we cannot predict the future, is it enough just to present the possibilities? Does a policymaker have to act on a piece of intelligence in order for us to be successful? Does the action itself have to be successful? Can there be an intelligence success and a policy failure?

I believe that in asking the question in this way we imply that intelligence, like a game, has a clear outcome and that we can keep score of wins and losses. The nature of our work indicates otherwise. Rather, we should define our standards in terms of the organizational purpose of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI)—support to the policymaker. *I believe therefore the difference between success and failure is whether or not we put the policymaker in a position to make the best-informed decision possible under the circumstances: we have to ensure that policymakers are given the dynamics of a situation or issue, the risks to US interests, the options they and their adversaries have, and the consequences of various choices.*

To those who might say that this standard is too limited and too subjective, I can only answer that, however subjective it may be, meeting it is not easy.[3] Moreover, it does have three concrete elements. We have done our job well if, and only if:

- *We have answered the yes or no questions correctly and have gotten the trend lines right.* Yes or no questions are comparatively rare: Will X invade Y? Who will win the election? More frequently, we are asked to assess the outlook for, or implications of, some development. In such cases, we have to be able to say that we foresaw the trend, even if we were unable to measure it precisely: growth in country X's exports over the decade; a decline in country B's military capabilities.

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- *We have illuminated for the policymaker the forces at work and correctly estimated their importance, strength, and trends.* It is not enough to just report or even add context. We have to strive to put events in broader perspective and to provide a framework that allows the policymaker to incorporate new information. We also have to be able to say that we correctly saw the threats to US interests and laid out clearly options and consequences. We have to state the degree of confidence we have in our judgments and what factors can change them.

- *We have marketed our product in a way that allows it to play a role in the policy process.* This requires us to study our customers, to tailor our product so that they can use it easily, and to make them aware of the full range of our capabilities.[4]

An intelligence success cannot be declared on the basis of a single piece of finished intelligence. Rather, success on an issue or set of issues is determined over time: did we adjust our analysis as circumstances changed; did we effectively target and tailor our product to the shifting needs of our consumers; and were we timely?[5] If success is always somehow conditional, failure can be immediate and absolute. It may be a single piece that is poorly crafted or the absence of a piece that should have been written. In either case, the stain is indelible, and no amount of good work before or after completely removes it.

Knowing What You Believe

Setting a standard is one thing, but meeting it is another. I believe the key to getting it right is *knowing what you believe and questioning what you believe.* Knowing what you believe involves identifying, and separating in your mind, the facts, what is not known, your assumptions about how things work, and where the wheels can come off.

As a rule, the facts are not that hard to identify, if only because there are generally so few of them. And most analysts are good at identifying what it is they do not know that is critical to the issue at hand. We are also adept at dissecting the facts for clues to the unknown. These things are not at the root of most flawed analysis.

The problem frequently is our assumptions about how things work. Any analyst who has spent time on an issue quickly begins to form assumptions about its dynamics. Each of us builds out of assumptions and opinions a subliminal model about some of the hardest things to know: motive, character, culture, who has influence, how decisions get made, and the interrelationship of events. This barely conscious set of beliefs is the product of everything from earlier, accurate analysis to impressions gleaned from snippets we have read. These assumptions and opinions can be, and often are, contradictory.


Knowing what you believe also involves knowing where things can go wrong. Avoiding surprise is often a function of knowing what is out there that can radically change our assessment. This is more than an appreciation for the things we do not know; it is an awareness of the potential for the sudden so-called low-probability, high-impact event. We also need to be attuned to how much our bottom-line judgment hinges on a particular variable or assumption.

Three Examples

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Living With Assumptions

Because we cannot do analysis without making some assumptions, we have to reduce our vulnerability by increasing our awareness of our assumptions. Analysts have to ask themselves what they believe about the priorities, motives, and interrelations involved in the issue at hand. The goal is to expose contradictory notions and to identify the most questionable assumptions and the most volatile factors in the analytic equation. This process sharpens our thinking, thereby making our analysis more persuasive. And, most important, it reduces the impact of unspoken, half-realized assumptions about new evidence.

Thinking through one's assumptions is a tall order under the best of circumstances. First, you have to set aside the time to do so. Time is the analyst's most precious commodity, but minutes invested in thinking about your account on the commute to and from the office or while taking a shower are minutes well spent.

Second, you have to limit your thinking to discrete problems or issues. You are not going to be able to think through all that you believe about China. You can, however, think through what you believe about China's relations with Taiwan or the Khmer Rouge's military capabilities or Japan's approach to GATT negotiations.

Four Traps

By itself, thinking through assumptions will not ensure accurate analysis. There are many causes of flawed analysis, but the four most common are easy to avoid.

Straight Line Projections. One of the easiest things to do as analyst is to take the present situation or trend and project it. The press and TV commentators do this frequently.[6] Straight line projections occur when analysts fail to identify and think through all the factors driving a problem. The analyst may be in over his or her head—or he or she may be guilty of sloppy thinking. In either case, the result is an implicit conclusion that what is true today will be true tomorrow.

This trap has two variants. One is to focus on a single variable and neglect others: polls, numerical strength, and rates of growth. The other is to seek a precedent in the past and transfer it to the future: the government will survive this crisis because it has survived similar crises in the past.

Sometimes the present situation does extend into the future, trends continue (that is why they are called trends), and historical precedents are valid clues to the future. The point is not that such things are always wrong. Rather, such things should ring a bell that causes us to examine them closely before putting them in print.

Seduced by Logic. Much has been written about the mirror phenomenon in analysis, the assumption that others will behave as we would. We need to remind ourselves that risk, goals, honorable outcome, and cost/benefit trade-offs are all culture-bound concepts that make actions that seem illogical or counterproductive to us acceptable to others. But I believe this is part of a larger analytic trap—being seduced by logic, our principal tool. We forget sometimes the importance of emotion and the fact that all leaders make bad, even stupid, decisions.

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Sometimes our analytic ability works against us in another way. Analysts by disposition as well as by trade, we divine hidden meaning and uncover patterns in events, even when they are not there. Given enough time, a good analyst can fit any two pieces of information together. It is important to remember that many things are just what they appear to be, and that there is such a thing as coincidence. See Occam's razor.

Leap to Judgment. Because we see making judgments as one of the things that distinguishes us from the press and academics, we sometimes rush into them, even when it would be wiser and more helpful to the policymaker to reserve our opinion on how things will turn out. Coups attempts, elections, and negotiations are classic cases for caution, especially at the onset. The key variable in any fast-moving, evolving situation is that it is fast moving and evolving, and we generally are trying to play catch-up.

We are not forsaking our responsibilities if we withhold a judgment on the outcome when things are too uncertain and our sources too limited to support an informed opinion. Indeed, we may mislead our consumers if we try to do so in such circumstances. We best serve the policymakers if we inform them about the factors at work, the signposts to watch for, and the implications of potential outcomes.

The US Factor. What Washington does or does not do is often a key variable. It is essential to cultivate policymakers, not only to serve them better but also to avoid being surprised by our own government. Our analysis is much more likely to be flawed if we do not know everything that is causing the other side to react. We also have to remember that what the others think Washington will do may be more important than what Washington actually does. Perceptions, after all, drive one's behavior.

The coordination and review process is our best defense against these traps, as well as the other things we need to keep in mind. When they work as intended, these two processes sharpen judgments and help us articulate underlying assumptions. They force us to test our views and incorporate the expertise of others. Managers and analysts alike have a large stake in making review and coordination as intellectually rigorous (as opposed to mind-numbing contentious) as possible.

Some Reminders

There is more to successful analysis than avoiding analytical traps. We would do well to keep in mind:

- *How we say things can be as important as what we say.* No one likes to be told, "I told you so," so be mindful of tone. Our access to the policymakers is at their sufferance, and we will not be invited back if we insist on putting our thumb in their eye at every opportunity.
- *Cynicism is the DI disease.* Some policies that DIers believe will not work ultimately do. We need to remember that the half-empty glass is also half full and to look at what is going right, as well as what is going wrong.
- *The danger of casual causal judgment.* Clauses that start with "if" or "given" are dangerous when carried over from one piece to the next. They postulate a causal relationship that may no longer be that case, and they can easily become unexamined assumptions. Every "if" and "given" should make us pause.
- *Numbers are meaningless, unless the reader knows how they were derived.* Moreover, no matter how sound our methodology, there is a good chance they are off by some factor. Numbers suggest a precision that intelligence rarely possesses.
- *Criticism is a given in our business.* Indeed, it is necessary for success. We can only hope that it is honest and informed, which it may be more times than we are willing to admit.
- *Our own emotions and biases.* Some consumers will see our work as a report card on their performance. We want to make sure that that is not our intent. We also have to take care that pressure "to get on the team" does not lead us to an analytic version of Newton's third law, an equal and opposite reaction.

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A Final Word

We are not primarily economists, historians, or political scientists. We are intelligence analysts. It is important that each of us makes the time to think about our profession—what it is and how to do it better. If we do not, we will never be as good at it as we could be and as the nation needs us to be.

NOTES

1. During the Gulf war, some critics took us to task because we could not state exactly how many Scuds Iraq had and where each was. Others have declared our work on the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and any number of other places a failure because we did not predict a specific event sufficiently in advance or because we hedged our warning. Many of these criticisms start with a policy preference and an assumption that the Agency has one, too.

2. In *Romeo and Juliet,* Shakespeare captured the analyst's point of view best: "Seal up the mouth of outrage for a while, til we can clear these ambiguities."

3. As a quick review of the DI's Product Evaluation Staff's (PES) studies will reveal, a vigorous PES is essential to maintaining standards, however they are defined. It is in the best position to bring the dispassionate, policy-neutral analysis essential to the evaluation of our work. Unlike the press, PES also brings an understanding of the directorate and its mission on the task.

4. I sometimes think that the role of the analyst is akin to getting policymakers to eat their vegetables. We select only the finest vegetables, prepare them carefully, and serve them attractively. The problem is that policymakers also have a lot of meat on their plates, and they do not always eat their vegetables. Intelligence is good for you, but it is not always appetizing. Thus it is that you can have an intelligence success and a policy failure.

5. Personal success is something different. To my mind, it is more than getting it consistently right. As individuals, and as an institution, we ought to strive to so establish our reputation for objective, insightful analysis that our consumers acknowledge—implicitly if not explicitly—that they cannot have an informed opinion unless they know what we think. They may ultimately reject our views, but they nonetheless feel obligated to check with us, even when they know they are not going to like what they will hear.

6. Meg Greenfield in the 9 November 1992 issue of *Newsweek* mused on why the press was so often surprised and wrong about developments in the elections. She argued that the press was swamped with data but failed to look beyond them. I would add that the press also fell victim to straight line projections. The coverage of the primaries, in particular, is instructive in this regard.

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Power struggles in Saigon

The CIA and the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem

Thomas L. Ahern, Jr.

When the First Indochina War ended with the Geneva Accords of 20 July 1954, the Eisenhower Administration decided to assume the French burden of preventing the advance of Communism in Southeast Asia. In practice, this meant trying to build a nation-state south of the 17th parallel that could defend itself against Ho Chi Minh and the North. The question of Vietnamese leadership had already been decided: at US instigation and with French concurrence, Ngo Dinh Diem had become Prime Minister in early July, and the American task was to help him consolidate his control in a situation that appeared to favor an eventual victory by Hanoi.

As the Geneva Accords came into effect, CIA had already established itself with the new government. Two independent stations represented the Agency in Saigon: the Saigon Military Station headed by Col. Edward Lansdale, and the regular Station [redacted] *Lansdale had introduced himself to Diem, and Paul Harwood, chief of covert action in the regular Station, had already known Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem's brother, for several months. The Embassy, essentially French-oriented, was treating the Ngo brothers with some reserve, and Lansdale and Harwood quickly became the principal channels of political information and influence between the two governments.*

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Diem's early opponents were not the quiescent Communists but a variety of religious and bandit groups, abetted by the Francophile command of Diem's own Army. Paris was quickly alienated by Diem's stubborn independence; on the American side, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Eisenhower's personal representative, soon despaired of Diem's ability to govern. In these unpropitious circumstances, the two Stations did their best to fulfill their mandate from Headquarters by helping Diem fend off his opponents. These efforts had a significant, perhaps decisive effect, during Diem's early months in office, but by March 1955 armed rebellion looked imminent, and Ambassador Collins was advocating that the US look for someone to replace Diem. The following excerpt from The CIA and the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem, *a forthcoming CIA History Staff volume, describes what happened from then until early May 1955.*

Lansdale had become involved with several religious sect leaders in September 1954. Undertaken at Diem's request, these contacts included the autonomous Cao Dai leader, Trinh Minh The; Gen. Nguyen Thanh Phuong, commander of the regular Cao Dai forces; and two Hoa Hao generals. Except for the early payment to The, Diem asked Lansdale for no material support, saying in one case that he merely wanted Lansdale "to teach (Hoa Hao General) Ngo how to earn the love and affection of his people."[1] Whatever Diem's concern for the general's popularity, he must also have intended his choice of Lansdale as middleman to demonstrate to the sects his command of American support.

Maneuvering and Mediating

The sect leaders were fully aware of the weakness of Diem's position and, with the exception of The, withheld any commitment to the new government. But as 1954 drew to a close, they grew anxious about the impending termination of French subsidies to their armed forces. If these units were neither integrated into the Vietnamese Army nor paid off upon demobilization, their leaders' authority would suffer. The French still controlled the Army payroll

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and the national treasury. When their sect payments ended in February 1955, Diem had no funds with which to continue them. One regiment of The's forces was integrated on 13 February, but the future of all the other sect forces and their leaders' political loyalties remained unresolved.[2]

As Lansdale mediated between Diem and The in the weeks before 13 February he was apparently unaware of simultaneous direct negotiations between Nhu and the Cao Dai, although Nhu kept Harwood continuously informed. Harwood was ignorant of Lansdale's role, and neither saw any need to keep the other apprised.[3] As a result, Lansdale viewed his role as more operative than was actually the case. Nevertheless, he served with The, as he did with the Hoa Hao's General Ngo, to provide an American guarantee of Diem's good intentions. At the same time, Lansdale continued to mediate with the other sect leaders, all of them less receptive to government authority than The, Nhu's longtime associate.

With French support of the sect armies coming to an end, Gen. John C. (Iron Mike) O'Daniel, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and French High Commissioner Paul Ely named Lansdale to head a joint Franco-American military team to work out arrangements for their demobilization or integration into the regular Army. Consistently more fearful of a sect rebellion than other Americans on the scene, Lansdale persuaded O'Daniel and Ely to reassure the sect leaders with a mid-March series of briefings on Franco-American plans.[4] Still unpersuaded that their interests would be protected, the sect leaders, including The, formed a United Sects National Front, and issued a manifesto on 21 March giving Diem five days in which, as Lansdale put it, to "clean out his entire government." Otherwise, they "would go to the people."[5]

As the crisis intensified on the evening of 20 March, Lansdale found himself beginning a four-hour session with the Prime Minister. Diem complained about the sects and about his defense minister's presumption in wanting authority to dismiss "undesirable" Army officers. During the next two days, Lansdale shuttled frantically between Diem and the Cao Dai, assuring Diem that The, at least, was still loyal to the government, despite having signed the manifesto.

Ambassador Collins, whom Lansdale had kept informed, wanted to be helpful and thought he might be able to reassure Cao Dai Generals Phuong and The. But at the ensuing meeting, on 22 March, Collins criticized the manifesto and questioned its authors' patriotism. It went so badly that Lansdale felt constrained to ask Collins, at the end of the session, to explain to his visitors that three note-taking American participants were Embassy officials, not journalists.[6]

Lansdale saw Diem the evening of 22 March. Diem was still worried about control of the military and about Collins having told him that Defense Minister Minh was responsible for the Army. Lansdale explained that Collins was actually defining the chain-of-command, and that this had been prompted by Diem ordering troop movements without notifying Minh. Diem asked for an American "job description" of his responsibilities as Prime Minister and Lansdale outlined those of the US President.[7]

As the crisis mounted, Lansdale noticed a strange passivity in Diem's reaction:

> Diem does very little constructive planning in such times of stress; or, at least he has not told me his plans. He pays scant attention to such planning, seems eager to continue reporting the events of the day, what Ambassador Collins has termed "crying on my shoulder."[8]

Lansdale tried to fill the gap, suggesting various political and public relations maneuvers that Diem might use to regain the political initiative against the sects. He also tried to mediate the enduring dispute between Diem and General Phuong over pay and subsistence to Cao Dai troops. Of his method in resolving a disagreement over the amount already paid, Lansdale later said that, "As usual, I had checked (the matter) out with both parties, telling them that I preferred taking such matters up openly rather than going behind their backs."[9]

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Resort to Force

On 29 March, after a week of inconclusive maneuvering, Phuong and The came to Lansdale, claiming that a Hoa Hao–Binh Xuyen *coup de force* was imminent. They sounded out Lansdale about getting Phuong's troops integrated into the national Army to prevent their being suborned by the anti-Diem Cao Dai pope, Pham Ngoc Tac; Lansdale undertook to discuss it with Collins.

At the same time, Diem was telling the French that he was about to use the Army to take over the National Police headquarters. General Ely pressured him into postponing an attack, but the Binh Xuyen preempted the issue that night, opening fire on Army posts in Saigon. Mortar rounds landed on the Palace grounds, and Lansdale wanted to go to Diem for first-hand reporting of developments. General O'Daniel, apparently concerned for Lansdale's safety, refused to let him go.[10]

As usual, there had been no coordination between Stations, and Lansdale did not know that Harwood was at the Palace when the mortar rounds fell, watching as Diem's artillery leveled a house across from the Palace grounds from which some sniper fire had come. Harwood had been at the Palace almost daily during the crisis, debriefing Nhu and on Collins's behalf urging Diem to refrain from deploying the Army against the Binh Xuyen. On 29 March, he was there to check out a French report of an Army advance toward Binh Xuyen territory in Cholon. Diem gave assurances that he had made no such move and did not intend to do so.[11]

Lansdale was horrified to find, the next morning, that Ely had used the threat of French armed intervention to impose a cease-fire, and that Collins supported him. Lansdale protested that "the French Army in effect was assuming a role which made Saigon a protectorate." Collins disagreed, insisting that the French role was only that of mediator. Diem saw it as Lansdale did, and he complained that Ely had proclaimed himself "commander in chief." But Ely and Collins prevailed, at least for the moment. In one development that gratified Lansdale, Diem and General Phuong agreed that day, 30 March, to integrate 8,000 more Cao Dai troops into the national Army, thus denying them to the sects' dissident United Front.[12]

Nhu's Negotiations

Meanwhile, Nhu kept Harwood informed of his own efforts to defuse the crisis. While Diem was again using Lansdale as his emissary to Trinh Minh The, Nhu continued his personal negotiations with The and Phuong. A Station report of 29 March, apparently from Nhu, described a meeting at which The agreed to withdraw from the sects' United Front and Phuong undertook to leave the cabinet. The two Cao Dai generals performed as promised, and Nhu's authority as both negotiator and reporting source was accordingly enhanced.[13] While the Embassy was reporting that the rest of the cabinet was about to quit, Harwood told Washington that it wouldn't: Nhu had said that none of its members had the fortitude to confront Diem with a resignation. None did, and they all stayed, at least for the time being.[14]

Showdown Averted

On 31 March, probably at French instigation, Bao Dai sent Diem a reproachful telegram from his retreat in Cannes. It deplored the bloodshed—there had been a hundred or so casualties—and obliquely suggested that Diem resign. (The Emperor sent it twice, once in the clear to ensure that Diem's enemies were kept informed.)

Ely and Collins maintained their pressure on Diem not to act against the Binh Xuyen, and the Prime Minister was reduced to asking Lansdale whether this meant that the French and the Americans were planning to depose him. Lansdale assured him to the contrary, but could offer no help when Diem complained of the corrosive effect on his authority of the enforced standoff. But Lansdale could at least ensure that the Vietnamese perception of events was conveyed to Washington. The day after the French prevented a showdown with the Binh Xuyen, he spent three and half hours in the prime-ministerial bedroom, debriefing people sent in to him by Diem.[15]

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Defense Minister Quits

During this phase of the crisis, Defense Minister Ho Thong Minh resigned over Diem's refusal to guarantee prior consultation with the cabinet before moving against the Binh Xuyen. Collins thought this an example of Diem's inability to manage people of independent views, and he reacted by threatening Diem with the withdrawal of US support if Minh were not retained. Minh left the cabinet anyway, and on 31 March Collins intimated to Washington that he had given up. Diem, he said, had had a "fair chance" to set up a working government, but had "produced little if anything of a constructive nature."[16] Lansdale, meanwhile, complained to Headquarters that he thought Collins destructively inconsistent in criticizing Diem for passivity while preventing him from curbing the Binh Xuyen, the single most immediate threat to the government's authority.[17]

Lansdale Versus Collins

Lansdale's major points of disagreement with Collins were the morale of the Army and the sincerity of Cao Dai Generals Phuong and The, who simultaneously professed loyalty to Diem and trafficked with the anti-Diem leadership of the sects' United Front. Lansdale and the regular Station, supported by the MAAG and the military attaché, thought the Army could whip the Binh Xuyen, and Lansdale was certain of the good faith of his Cao Dai interlocutors. Collins was doubtful on both counts. Despite being discouraged by the State Department from exploring alternatives to Diem, he wrote John Foster Dulles on 7 April that "my judgment is that Diem does not have the capacity . . . to prevent this country from falling under Communist control."[18]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Fearing that Collins would object to the proposal, Lansdale asked Headquarters to approve it without ambassadorial coordination. Washington sympathized with his dilemma, but insisted that Collins be consulted. As it turned out, Collins readily approved the idea. At that point, however, John Foster Dulles had already endorsed a suggestion from the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, Frank Wisner, to postpone final word to the Station until Washington could discuss the plan directly with the Ambassador, who was to be recalled for consultations on Diem's political future. Lansdale, meanwhile, was to temporize if Diem pressed him on the matter.[20]

Apprehensive about the line that Collins would take in Washington, Lansdale cabled the DCI asking for permission to accompany the Ambassador to Washington. The reply, from Wisner, turned him down, but urged him to try to prevent a damaging rejection by Diem of Collins's latest recommendations for government appointments. Lansdale spent the two days before Collins's 20 April departure shuttling between the Palace and the Embassy, but he was unable to prevent what he saw as a fundamental misunderstanding between Diem and Collins.

The result was that Collins left for Washington persuaded that Diem would take only sycophantic yes-men into the cabinet, whereas Lansdale thought Diem was insisting merely that they be "anticolonialist honest courageous men."[21] Lansdale seems to have been taking Diem at his word, while Collins, who never questioned Diem's sincerity, had the better appreciation for what this formula would mean in practice.

Difficulties with Nhu

Harwood was experiencing the same problem with Nhu that Lansdale confronted with Diem. On 21 April 1955, just after Collins's departure, Harwood predicted to Headquarters that, at an impending discussion of the police problem, Nhu would ask why Diem was being prevented from asserting control of his own government. Harwood had already received Nhu's letter protesting Collins's latest effort at cabinet broadening. Noting that Collins had acknowledged consulting other Vietnamese on a reorganized government, Nhu insisted that compliance by Diem meant "the negation of the whole revolutionary ideal . . . and the realization of a regime like that of Chiang Kai-shek, ending in a Viet Minh victory, they alone being capable of sweeping away all this rot."[22]

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Adversarial Relations

This apocalyptic vision of the results of a non-Communist coalition illustrates the perceptual gap, in the matter of defining a legitimate authority for South Vietnam, that already separated the Ngo brothers from their American sponsors. Diem had once written that "a sacred respect is due to the person of the sovereign. . . . He is the mediator between the people and the Heaven as he celebrates the national cult."[23] In the midst of the struggle with the sects, Diem and Nhu seem to have seen their mission in terms both mystical and proprietary. The Americans, on the other hand, might be divided as to tactics, but all saw the task as one of trying to reconcile the various anti-Communist interests while holding off the Viet Minh and beginning the construction of a popularly based government.

The divergence of American opinion at the tactical level, which persisted until the eve of the coup in 1963, resulted in a relationship with Diem that was adversarial at two levels. First was the opposition of the US officials who thought Diem incapable of succeeding and wanted him replaced. The second level arose from the tension between Diem and those Americans who saw him as the only candidate for leadership of an anti-Communist South Vietnam, but wanted him to accept their views of the institutional form it should take.

Both CIA Stations saw the weaknesses in Diem's leadership, and Harwood in particular had already experienced one confrontation. But neither he nor Lansdale saw any alternative. As Ambassador Collins left for Washington, both remained committed to helping Diem survive.

Publicity Flap

Collins's departure for Washington on 20 April launched the most fateful episode in CIA's relationship with the Diem government. It also illustrated both Collins's tangled relations with CIA and the Agency's capacity at that time to exploit the US media for support of political action. In Hong Kong, while en route, the Ambassador picked up a copy of *Life* magazine with a cover photo of a triumphal Diem reception in Central Vietnam. The photograph and accompanying story had resulted from a Lansdale initiative that Wisner took to *Time/Life* in January. He gave the editors a background paper, and they undertook to publish a feature on Diem's growing political stature in Free Vietnam.[24]

Collins arrived in Washington outraged by this publicity for what he regarded as a lost cause. He told an interdepartmental meeting that Diem had no popular following. The photo was faked, he insisted, probably by Harwood, and CIA was "slanting its reports." Wisner responded that he understood Diem to have scored a genuine public relations triumph, and Collins "practically called (him) a liar."[25]

Wisner promptly asked the Station for its side of the story. The thrust of its reply was that money could not buy the popular feeling so evident in the photograph (the Station had, in fact, given Nhu $1,700 to help prepare Diem's reception). Wisner later told Harwood that he had read the cable to a subsequent session of the same interdepartmental committee, with some consequent damage to Collins's credibility in Washington. Collins apparently had forgotten his own approval of the *Time/Life* project, given to Wisner in Washington in early February and confirmed in Honolulu on his way back to Saigon.[26] Harwood thought Collins's apparent forgetfulness may have represented a fundamental lack of interest in the covert action program. The Ambassador, throughout his tenure in Saigon, never asked for a briefing on it.[27]

Ambassador's Concerns

With or without a formal briefing, Collins had already decided that CIA officers in Saigon enjoyed too much freedom of action. State Department records hold a memorandum by Deputy Chief of Mission Randolph Kidder noting that the Ambassador had "directed that (CIA) will not undertake . . . new programs in Vietnam without previous consultation" with him, and with Kidder and the political counselor. "Furthermore, (CIA) will periodically review" current activity with these officials. According to Kidder, Allen Dulles sent George

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Aurell to Saigon in February 1955 to "discuss the above decision with Ambassador Collins. No change in the Ambassador's directive was made."[28]

Collins had not shared with CIA in Saigon his 7 April 1955 recommendation to State that Diem be replaced. CIA Headquarters, presumably aware of it at least after the mid-April meeting that discussed Collins's recall, was also silent. As Collins prepared to leave, Lansdale wanted to know how he should respond to the anticipated probing by Diem as to American intentions. Collins told him to assure the Prime Minister of continued US support. The Ambassador's well-known differences with Diem rendered this guarantee somewhat suspect, and Lansdale was uneasy. But for the first week of Collins's absence he had no choice but to feign optimism in his dealings with Diem.[29]

Renewed Tension

In the last week of April, tension with the Binh Xuyen mounted once more. In an almost exact reprise of the events of late March, Diem told Lansdale of his intention to remove Lai Van Sang, the chief of the National Police; the same information came from Nhu via Harwood. This time, Collins was not around to object, and Diem acted, on 26 April, without informing the French. He appointed a new security chief and set up a headquarters for him outside the sector controlled by the French Army. The rumor mill continued to predict French and American defection from the Diemist cause, and Lansdale begged Headquarters for authority to assure Diem and other Vietnamese officials of Washington's continuing commitment.

This elicited a reply from DCI Allen Dulles urging restraint on Diem and pointing out that any assurances of the kind Lansdale wanted would be sent through the chargé d'affaires, Randolph Kidder. In any case, Dulles said, no assurances of any sort could be given until the conclusion of deliberations then being conducted "at the highest level," and "you should be prepared for (the) possibility that this might involve some changes in relations to Diem."[30]

This cautionary word reflected General Collins's formidable presence in Washington. The contretemps over the *Life* cover story may have tarnished Collins's credibility, but the Ambassador had two advantages in the debate over what to do about Diem. One was the strength of his conviction of Diem's incapacity. The other was his status as personal representative of the President. The title was designed to meet the peculiarity of his accreditation to both the Diem government and the French, but it accurately reflected his relationship with President Eisenhower.

Within a few days of his arrival in Washington, Collins had prevailed on the President and a reluctant Secretary of State to start working with the French and Bao Dai to find a replacement for Diem. On 27 April, at the close of the working day, three cables went to the Embassy in Paris with instructions on the way to broach the subject with the French.[31]

Backing for Diem

As State was telling Paris how to begin preparing Diem's removal, an uninformed but suspicious Lansdale was looking for a way to forestall just such a move. By 27 April, he had sounded out the members of the country team and confirmed that all, including chargé d'affaires Kidder, thought Diem could beat the Binh Xuyen.[32] Early on the 28th (at the close of business on the 27th in Washington), he asked Kidder to authorize the country team members to let their respective headquarters have their views, but Kidder declined, saying that Collins already knew them.

Lansdale then turned to the regular Station, and by 0900 they had a joint cable on its way, telling Headquarters that it was the "considered opinion" of CIA in Saigon that Diem had a better chance to succeed than any prospective replacement; failure to support him would doom any successor government and benefit only the Viet Minh. The message added that information just received and being passed to Kidder warranted a country-team estimate and suggested that the DCI ask the Department of State to request one from Saigon.[33]

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Part of what the State Department later called "a flood of reports and recommendations" from Lansdale, this cable arrived at Headquarters on the evening of 27 April, local time. Along with the other reports, it provoked:

> a series of telephone calls from. . . (George) Aurell to (Archibald) Roosevelt (acting for Wisner), to Allen Dulles, to (Undersecretary) Hoover, to the Secretary, to (Director of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs) Ken Young. The result was a stay order on Paris not "to embark on the course of action agreed to late yesterday afternoon."[34]

Another Attack

While the State Department was putting a hold on preparations to replace Diem, Headquarters asked Saigon for more details on events there. By the time the request arrived, the replay of the late March crisis was resuming. Shortly after noon on the 28th, mortar rounds again exploded on the Palace grounds.

Diem called General Ely to protest—the fire seemed to be coming from the Binh Xuyen in an area protected by the French—while his secretary was on another line, giving Lansdale a running account of the firing and of the argument with Ely. As another round landed nearby, Diem told Ely he was ordering the Army to return fire, and hung up. His secretary relayed this to Lansdale, and then also hung up.[35]

Some students of early US involvement in Vietnam have believed that Lansdale, anxious to block any move in Washington to abandon Diem, encouraged the Prime Minister to challenge the Binh Xuyen, and that it was the Army that fired first. Lansdale probably did not try to persuade Diem to avoid a showdown, but as far as his interpreter, Joe Redick, could later recall, he said nothing to incite one, either.[36] The provenance of the first rounds thus remains uncertain.

Lansdale's team and the regular Station spent the next two days keeping Washington abreast of Diem's progress against the insurrection. Lansdale concentrated on Diem, other contacts at the Palace, and Trinh Minh The. Harwood, meanwhile, debriefed Nhu, getting from him copies of reports prepared for Diem by the chief of the Army's intelligence service. Since the fighting in late March, the regular Station had been in almost nig[illegible]ntact with an agent in the Binh Xuyen; (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) he was in a position to provide [illegible]ative tactical information. Harwood passed much of this to Nhu for use by the Army.[37]

On 29 April, the State Department asked for the country team estimate suggested by CIA in Saigon, and Kidder's reply confirmed the optimistic assessment of Diem's chances sent the day before by the two CIA Stations.[38] Meanwhile, the Vietnamese Army, supported by The's Cao Dai troops, seized the initiative. The Hoa Hao hung back, watching as their Binh Xuyen allies went on the defensive.[39] The confidence in Diem and the Army voiced by Lansdale and the country team seemed about to be vindicated.

Order from Bao Dai

At this point, Diem showed Lansdale a second telegram from Bao Dai. No longer content with the veiled threat of late March, Bao Dai now ordered Diem and his Army chief of staff to Paris. Diem was to turn over the Army to Gen. Nguyen Van Vy, a French citizen and supporter of the former Chief of Staff and would-be mutineer, General Hinh. Diem told Lansdale that the Army and the loyal Cao Dai refused to accept Vy's authority and that they wanted Diem to endorse their intended repudiation of the emperor.[40] Diem wanted to know if the US would accept this.

Lansdale's description of the incident does not refer to any consultation with Headquarters or the chargé d'affaires. It says he responded that Washington "would accept a legal action, but that dethronement by voice vote . . . such as that described by Diem was hardly a legal proceeding."[41] At the same time, as recounted later in his book, Lansdale encouraged Diem to defy the emperor's order to report to him in France. He pictures Diem in an agony of indecision over the conflict between imperial authority and the national interest, a conflict that Lansdale implies he helped him resolve. "Slowly, painfully," they came

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to the conclusion that if Diem left, "there would be no moral basis upon which the government could govern . . . freedom would founder."

In fact, Nhu had already told Harwood that Diem would ignore the order, and Diem did so, though he also resisted sect pressure formally to repudiate the emperor. Chargé d'affaires Kidder, to whom Diem also described his dilemma, adopted a more neutral stance, saying that the Prime Minister would have to bear full responsibility for any defiance of imperial command.[42]

Victory for Diem

Diem's decision to stand fast deprived General Vy of any resources except that portion of the Imperial Guard still loyal to Bao Dai. These modest forces were enough to provoke near-chaos, even as the Army battled with the Binh Xuyen for control of the city. While the pro-Diem Cao Dai were trying to arrest General Vy, Vy's Imperial Guard arrested, then released, Diem loyalists, including the Army Chief of Staff. According to Lansdale's account, Col. Tran Van Don then somehow persuaded Vy to trick the French into delivering armored vehicles they had been withholding from the Vietnamese. Vy turned them over to the Army, which promptly deployed them against the Binh Xuyen.[43]

Whatever the contribution of Vy's armored vehicles, Diem's Army made short work of the Binh Xuyen. By noon on 30 April, the rebels had been driven from Saigon and all but a few isolated strongpoints in Cholon.[44] The Binh Xuyen and the Hoa Hao retained some nuisance value for another year, but without serious French support they no longer presented a real threat.

Washington Reacts

An Agency officer then in Washington later recalled that on a weekend afternoon, presumably either Saturday, 30 April, or Sunday, 1 May, Allen Dulles and Frank Wisner took the latest reporting on the battle for Saigon to John Foster Dulles's house. Diem was holding his own against the Binh Xuyen, it said, and people were rallying to him.

The DCI and Wisner argued that this was the wrong moment to fulfill President Eisenhower's commitment to Collins to look for a Diem replacement. The Secretary of State agreed and, with his visitors still present, telephoned the President. He summarized the Agency reporting, and recommended postponing the intended withdrawal of US support. In Collins's absence—he was already on the way back to Saigon—Eisenhower concurred.

As the meeting ended, an aide announced the arrival of French Ambassador Couve de Murville, and the Secretary of State assured his departing visitors that "he would take care of the French." On the afternoon of 1 May, with Collins still en route to Saigon, a State Department telegram to the Embassy reaffirmed the US commitment to Ngo Dinh Diem.[45]

Questions of Influence

Information from Lansdale's sources was a small, though certainly significant, part of the reporting that persuaded President Eisenhower to reverse his decision to abandon Ngo Dinh Diem. Most of this product was acquired by the officers of the regular Station. Allen Dulles, however, treated it all as emanating from Lansdale, whom he had personally selected for the Saigon assignment, and whom he regarded as the Agency's preeminent authority on Vietnam. Wittingly or otherwise, Lansdale lent that authority to the reporting of the regular Station and, in so doing, became the largest single influence on deliberations in Washington at the most critical point of Diem's tenure before 1963.[46]

More generally, the episode illustrates one of the salient features of the Agency's relationship with Ngo Dinh Diem, namely, that CIA exercised its influence much more effectively on Diem's behalf than on Diem himself. He seems never to have acted in the spirit of quid pro quo, but rather as one entitled to the satisfaction of his demands by the justice of his cause and by the US interest in seeing him succeed.

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Diem undoubtedly never learned the details of the Agency's operative role in arranging the suspension of State's instructions to Paris, and then persuading the Secretary of State and the President to rescind their commitment to Collins to abandon him. But he would certainly have regarded this service as no more than his due.

Decisive Support

It is not certain that without CIA support Diem would have been forced from office. He still had committed backers on Capitol Hill. Senator Mike Mansfield had threatened to cut aid to Vietnam if Diem were replaced, and Congresswoman Edna Kelly of New York spoke for many on the House Foreign Affairs Committee in opposing withdrawal of US support for him. And two influential State Department officials—Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, and Kenneth Young, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs—were unpersuaded by Collins's arguments; they saw no viable alternative to Diem. John Foster Dulles, less committed to Diem than any of these, had always questioned whether anyone better was to be found. And Diem's success against the Binh Xuyen would have strengthened his supporters' hand even without help from CIA.[47]

But negotiations with Paris, once under way, might have acquired momentum of their own. With a foot in the door, the French would have fought hard to bring Diem down, and Ambassador Collins would probably have supported them, even after the defeat of the Binh Xuyen. The certainty is that CIA, by virtue of Lansdale's advocacy in Saigon and through the exploitation of DCI Allen Dulles's ready access to the Secretary of State, ensured that the issue would not be joined. Doubts about Diem persisted, but the die was cast.

The same combination of goal-oriented action and intellectual objectivity that CIA officers brought to bear on their dealings with Diem and Nhu also produced pioneering work on the operational concepts and the techniques of interagency coordination that later defined the American counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. All of this taken into account, the Agency's role in consolidating Diem's hold on the government of South Vietnam remains its most consequential achievement of the Second Indochina War.

NOTES

1. (b)(3)(c) Clandestine Service Historical Program (CSHP) 113, October 1970, *The Saigon Military Mission: June 1954-December 1956,* Vol. II, p. 11 (Secret).

2. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 73. Lansdale reported the troops of this regiment as "pledged . . . to SMM who in turn had insisted that they be loyal to Vietnam" (CSHP 113,Vol. II, p. 26).

3. Harwood interview, 21 June 1990; memorandum from the Special Assistant (Anderson) to the Ambassador (Collins), "Confidential Funds Project," 25 March 1955, AN 68A 5159, Box 124, Records Group 84, National Archives and Records Administration, Suitland, MD (hereafter cited as NARA).

4. CSHP 113, Vol. I, pp. 66-68, 73-79.

5. Col. Edward G. Lansdale, CHSP 62, *The Defeat of the Binh Xuyen Sect by the Diem Government,* 10 March–3 April 1955, 15 April 1955, p.6 (Secret).

6. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 9.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-15.

11. Harwood interview, 21 June 1990.

12. CSHP 62, pp. 14-15, 17.

13. Intelligence Report CS PD454, 29 March 1955, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

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14. Harwood interview, 17 October 1989.

15. CSHP 62, pp. 18, 22-27.

16. J. Lawton Collins, telegrams to Department of State, 29 and 31 March 1955, FRUS, 1955-57, I, Vietnam, pp. 158, 169.

17. SAIG 6517, 20 April 1955, cited in CSHP 113, Vol. I, p. 101.

18. J. Lawton Collins, telegram to Department of State, 7 April 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-57, Vietnam, 1, p. 219.

19. One subsequent cable from Lansdale gives the amount as (b)(1) piasters (SAIG 6925, 16 May 1955, (b)(3)(c) (b)(1) Later, the Station advanced (b)(3)(c) piasters, which was ultimately returned (SAIG 8226, 29 August 1955, (b)(3)(c) Redick interview, 28 September 1989).

20. CSHP 113, Vol. I, pp. 95-97. The whole thing came to naught when Diem concluded that the authors of the idea could not produce. He returned the money in late August, but used Lansdale as intermediary in unproductive negotiations until shortly before Ba Cut was captured in April 1956 (b)(3)(c)

21. CSHP 113, Vol. I, pp. 97-98; SAIG 6517, 20 April 1955, quoted in CHSP 113, Vol. I, p. 100.

22. SAIG 6523, 21 April 1955, (b)(3)(c)

23. Nguyen Thai, "The Government of Men in the Republic of Vietnam" (thesis, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, 1962), quoted in Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake*, p. 109.

24. Deputy Director for Plans, memorandum for (b)(3)(c) Support Assistant to the DDP, "Proposed *Time* Magazine Cover Story on Diem," 2 February 1955, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

25. Harwood interview, 17 October 1989; John Caswell, interview, 13 December 1963 (b)(3)(c)

2(b)(1) 22 April 1955; (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) Harwood interview, 17 October 1989; unsigned memorandum, "Significant Travel by Premier Diem Outside Saigon Area," 24 April 19(b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

27. Harwood interview, 16 May 1990.

28. Randolph Kidder, memorandum for the record, untitled, 11 March 1955, AN 68A 5159, Box 124, RG 84, NARA.

29. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, pp. 276-277.

30. Special Assistant (Anderson), Memorandum for the Ambassador (Collins), untitled, 25 March 1955, AN 68A 5159, Box 124, RG 84, NARA; CHSP 113, Vol. I, pp. 101-102. The quotation is from (b)(3)(c) 26 April 1955, p. 104.

31. FRUS, 1955-57, I, Vietnam, pp. 294-299.

32. CSHP 113, Vol. I, p. 38; Randolph Kidder, interview by Thomas Ahern, Washington, DC, 22 January 1990 (hereafter cited as Kidder interview, 22 January 1990).

33. CSHP 113, Vol. I, p. 40; SAIG 6635, 28 April 1955, of which a retyped copy is filed in (b)(3)(c)

34. Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, untitled memorandum, 28 April 1955, FRUS, 1955-57, *Vietnam*, Vol. I, pp. 305-306. The "stay" order is reprinted on p. 301.

35. CSHP 113, Vol. I, pp. 105-106.

36. Joseph Redick, interview by Thomas Ahern, Staunton, VA, 22 January 1991 (hereafter cited as Redick interview, 22 January 1991).

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37. CSHP 113, Vol. II, p. 41; (b)(3)(c) Magill interview, 24 October 1989.

38. CSHP 113, Vol. I, pp. 106-107.

39. CSHP 113, Vol. II, p. 4.

40. CSHP 113, Vol. I, p. 108. As was often the case, Nhu was simultaneously giving Harwood what Diem was telling Lansdale. The same information, attributed to a source described in terms that fit Nhu, is contained in SAIG 6659, 29 April 1955, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

41. CHSP 113, Vol. II, pp. 44-45.

42. SAIG 6678, 29 April 1955, (b)(3)(c) Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars,* p. 299; FRUS, 1955-57, Vietnam, Vol. I, p. 318.

43. CHSP 113, Vol. II, pp. 42-43; Memorandum, S/S [Fisher Howe] to The Secretary [John Foster Dulles], "French Aid to Anti-Government Elements in South Vietnam," 6 May 1955, citing ARMA [Army Attache] Report 982, 2 May 1955, Decimal File 751 Goo/5-255, RG 59, NARA.

44. CHSP 113, Vol. II, p. 43.

45. John Foster Dulles, telegram to Embassy Saigon, 1 May 1955, US Department of State, FRUS, 2955-57, Vietnam, Vol. I, p. 344; Caswell interview, 27 February 1990. Caswell described his presence at the meeting as that of "someone who can pronounce the names."

46. Caswell interview, 27 February 1990.

47. Kenneth Young, Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 30 April 1955, FRUS, 1955-57, *Vietnam*, Vol. I, pp. 337-339.

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Relations with the White House

Richard Helms as DCI

Robert M. Hathaway

Editor's Note: The following article is an excerpt from the first chapter of Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence, 1966-1973, *which was published in 1993 by CIA's History Staff under its DCI Historical Series.*

In practical terms a Director of Central Intelligence has one and only one boss: the President of the United States. Certainly a DCI has to respond to the concerns of other Washington players as well: the Secretaries of State and Defense, the President's National Security Adviser, the members of the US Intelligence Community, and strategically placed legislators in the Congress. But compared to his relations with the occupant of the Oval Office, his ties to all others pale into insignificance. A DCI in frequent contact with and fully supported by his President will have few equals in Washington in his influence on the policymaking process. Conversely, a Director lacking entry into the innermost circles of the White House quickly finds himself—no matter how well informed his sources or accurate his intelligence—isolated from the administration's central decisions. His warnings and advice will fall unnoticed into the vast wastebin of rejected and ignored memorandums Washington daily spews out.

As Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms served under two of the most complex and controversial Presidents in the nation's history—Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon.

In the case of Johnson, Helms was dealing with a longtime member of the Washington political establishment who was also monumentally insecure within that establishment. One of the most effective majority leaders ever to boss the United States Senate, Johnson entered the White House after John Kennedy's assassination, determined to legislate a program of reform that would rival in scope Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. Yet, much against his will, he found himself swept up in a conflagration far from American shores, a war that would eventually doom his Great Society and drive him out of the White House.

His successor was a man even more beset by inner demons. Historians will long puzzle over Richard Nixon's psychological makeup, but it is arguable that no more tortured individual had entered the White House in the 200 years of the nation's existence. Meanspirited and withdrawn, an unlovable man who desperately craved acceptance, Nixon—even more than Lyndon Johnson—suspected those around him of secretly laughing at him. Neither man proved an easy boss to work for. Both men came to build around themselves a protective shield of advisers to filter out unwelcome or unwanted views. And yet in many respects Richard Helms's experiences with each were stark opposites. The first of these Presidents bestowed on Helms a position of trust and influence, while the second usually regarded Helms with the distrust the besieged accords someone on the other side of the ramparts.

Richard Helms and Lyndon Johnson

According to Richard Helms, his success with President Johnson largely arose out of one dramatic coup. For the first three and a half years of his presidency Johnson had never found much use for intelligence. His relations with DCI John McCone, whom he had inherited from Kennedy, gradually soured to the point where McCone found resignation preferable to being ignored. McCone's successor, retired V. Adm. William Raborn, never came close to reestablishing a strong voice for the DCI in the White House. Within months of his appointment, the White House and others recognized that selecting Raborn as DCI had been a mistake, and in June 1966 he was replaced by Helms. In his first year, Helms

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also failed to make much of an impression on President Johnson, who was increasingly overburdened by domestic controversy and overseas crisis.

All this changed in late May and early June 1967, just as Helms was completing his first year as Director. CIA successes just before and during Israel's Six-Day War dramatically enhanced the prestige of the Agency—and of its Director—in the eyes of President Johnson. Some wonderfully accurate CIA prognostications concerning the timing, duration, and outcome of the 1967 war swept Helms into Lyndon Johnson's inner circle of advisers, where he remained for the rest of Johnson's term of office.

In Lyndon Johnson's White House, membership in the Presidential inner circle meant joining in the Tuesday luncheons, and, for the balance of the Johnson presidency, Helms attended these functions regularly. As Helms describes it, his role at these luncheons—Johnson's personal device for gathering about him the people in whom he had confidence—was to provide corrective intelligence and judgments whenever one of the other participants appeared to get off track:

> He never said this to me, but I got the distinct impression that the reason he valued my presence was that I kept the game honest. When Rusk would go way out on some policy, or McNamara would advocate X, or Earle Wheeler, the Chairman of the JCS, would be too upfield, then I would come in and say, 'This is the way we understand it, and the facts are as follows. . .' And I did this constantly. So it was a useful role for him. There was no doubt about it. I went to Guam (with President Johnson); I went to God-knows-where on these various conferences on Vietnam. And when I'd get there, there wasn't a hell of a lot of work to do, but he just liked having me around, sitting there.[1]

Sitting there, keeping the game honest: this was an ideal situation for an intelligence officer, to sit beside the President of the United States with an open invitation to speak up whenever facts or judgments contrary to the best available intelligence made their appearance.

Richard Helms was extremely careful not to abuse this position of trust, not to overstep his bounds as an intelligence officer. He went to considerable lengths to avoid being involved in the policy debate, and, regardless of his personal opinions, he refrained from advocating one policy over another unless directly asked by the President (as sometimes occurred). He did this not out of mere caution or self-protection, but rather out of his own deep convictions about the proper role of intelligence. "I am a believer that the Director of Central Intelligence, as the principal intelligence officer to the President, should not be involved in foreign policy recommendation," he has explained. "I don't think it's helpful to a President to have all the people surrounding him involved in policy issues."[2]

Helms had arrived at this conviction in part by observing the less restrained performance of John McCone. "McCone believed that he could wear two hats. One hat was as Director of the Agency and the presenter of intelligence information that the Agency produced. The other, that he could sit at meetings and help to formulate the policy that the administration ought to follow," Helms recalls. "I did not agree with that," he laconically adds. Instead, he remained silent except when one of the policy officers strayed beyond the limits of reality as indicated by Agency information and judgment. He felt that he could perform a more useful role:

> by seeing to it that the Secretary of State or Defense, or whoever was advocating whatever they were advocating, stayed with the acceptable limits of the facts as we knew them, the parameters of events that had transpired. This was a useful function to perform for the President. Because every Cabinet officer, in advocating policies, whether the President's policy or not, is constantly tempted to overdrive and to oversell, to overpersuade. Often the degree to which this is being done gets lost sight of. I figure that the intelligence chief has a role to play in keeping these things in perspective, keeping the perceptions as accurate and as objective as possible.[3]

His membership in the White House inner coterie did not necessarily shield Richard Helms from presidential disapproval on occasion. These were

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difficult, contentious times. The war in Vietnam produced sharp divisions of opinion and raised sensitivities to adverse public opinion to very high levels. For instance, Lyndon Johnson found it painful to have figures of the civilian casualties caused by US bombing publicly aired. Once, a senior Agency Officer, while briefing the Senate Armed Services Committee, was asked a question out of the blue about casualties inflicted on North Vietnam's civilian population during USAF bombing attacks. The CIA officer provided such figures as he could. Several days later Helms happened to be walking through the White House arcade between the Mansion and the President's Oval Office. Lyndon Johnson, walking alongside, took Helms by the arm and said in a fatherly tone, "Now, if you feel any urge to go up and testify in Congress on this whole question of civilian casualties in Vietnam, I just hope you'll pass by and have a drink with me the afternoon before." Helms, of course, promised he would. He later said of the incident, "This was his way of conveying a message to me that he wanted to have something to say about this. It was done pointedly but not vociferously."[4] At his morning meeting the next day, Helms told the DDI of the President's sensitivity to North Vietnamese civilian casualty figures and instructed all elements in the Agency to avoid the subject.[5] Although one can understand the DCI's wish to accommodate the President, in retrospect one must wonder whether the Agency could legitimately avoid or ignore evidence of civilian casualties in reporting on the war in Vietnam.

Lyndon Johnson was not always so gentle, and on two occasions in the first month that Helms was DCI the President had expressed his disapproval of certain CIA actions in loud, wrathful tones. "He was very vociferous with me and I was very vociferous right back," Helms later recalled, and continued:

> After that, I never had a vociferous conversation with President Johnson again. I think he figured that taking me on that way was not very useful, and that if he wanted to talk to me he did it differently. From then on, we never had any noisy words with each other . . . no shouting back and forth.[6]

While it is easy to picture a vociferous President Johnson, it is difficult to imagine the austere and controlled Richard Helms shouting back. Nevertheless, these exchanges in the summer of 1966, combined with Helms's performance during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, evidently established the President's confidence and respect in him as DCI. Helms emphasizes that after the initial altercations his relationship with Johnson was excellent: "He didn't badger me; I was well treated by him."[7]

Given Johnson's penchant for informal policy discussions such as the Tuesday luncheons, and his tendency to buttonhole opponents and urge them to "sit down and reason together awhile," one might assume that he preferred to receive his intelligence information through oral briefings. Richard Helms quickly discovered, in part by observing John McCone as DCI, that this was not true. When Johnson first became President, McCone had started a program of daily briefings. As Helms remembers it, Johnson "finally got bored, closed the door, and that was the end. He just didn't want to do it any more. You couldn't make him do it any more." For Helms the implications were obvious. "This one-on-one, that people who live in academia hold to be so important, does not necessarily achieve your objective. You either adjust your production to the man you have in office or you're going to miss the train."[8]

Thus, while President Johnson found informal discussion within small groups highly useful, he shied away from formal presentations and prolonged briefings. It was clear to Helms that "Johnson was much better at reading documents. The way to get his attention was to present a well-reasoned, well-written piece of paper."[9] Helms enjoyed his first real success with Johnson largely through the Board of National Estimates' short analysis controverting an alarmist Israeli intelligence estimate in May 1967. This success encouraged Helms to send—as often as several times a week—brief memorandums containing information pertinent to the President's current concerns. Lyndon Johnson was a voracious reader who kept several news tickers operating just outside

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his office door, regularly tearing off long swatches to scan, and he found himself well served by the DCI's steady flow of brief, sharply pointed pieces. They provided a backdrop and written basis for the comments Helms made "to keep the game honest" during informal policy meetings.

These same presidential preferences dictated Helm's modus operandi at National Security Council meetings. During the Eisenhower administration, when many NSC customs and practices were institutionalized, the Director of Central intelligence, though not a statutory member of the body, became a regular participant in its deliberations. Allen Dulles would always present an intelligence briefing and relished these opportunities to intermingle juicy tidbits of intelligence with more solid substantive material. Under John F. Kennedy, National Security Council meetings were mostly formal events, held only sporadically. When they were held, John McCone usually gave a sober account of the world's problems as seen through the eyes of CIA and its Director.

Richard Helms attempted to carry on this tradition once he became DCI by presenting a survey of the world in a 10- to 15-minute briefing. He found that with Lyndon Johnson this was a mistake:

> With President Johnson . . . I finally came to the conclusion that what I had to say I should get into the first 60, or at least 120 seconds, that I had on my feet. Because after that he was pushing buttons for coffee or Fresca, or talking to Rusk, or talking to McNamara, or whispering here or whispering there. I had lost my principal audience.[10]

The adjustment made for Johnson consisted of a steady stream of short, crisp papers combined with attendance at the Tuesday luncheons.

One must be careful not to place too rosy a glow on the relationship between Helms and Johnson. Many commentators have noted the inherent conflict between sophisticated intelligence, which is apt to see many sides of a question, and the needs of decisionmakers, who must often ignore shadings and ambiguities in deciding upon a single course of action. The last thing a policymaker wishes to hear is why his preferred course of action may not work, but that is precisely the service timely intelligence often provides. Lyndon Johnson has left us with a memorable quotation with respect to this spoiling role intelligence often plays. "Policymaking is like milking a fat cow," the President remarked on one occasion. "You see the milk coming out, you press more and the milk bubbles and flows, and just as the bucket is full, the cow with its tail whips the bucket and all is spilled. That's what CIA does to policymaking."[11]

During the Johnson years, CIA played the cow's tail repeatedly on matters pertaining to the war in Southeast Asia. Helms's Agency again and again produced intelligence analyses that conflicted with the optimistic line the White House took on the progress of the war. Johnson's response was not to change course, but to ignore what his intelligence experts were telling him. As administration policy became more and more beleaguered, the White House decisionmaking process became an exceptionally closed one—with discouraging intelligence reports and analyses excluded from any role in policymaking. So while it is undoubtedly true that Johnson found it useful to have Helms close at hand, this does not mean that the White House always accorded the products of Helms's Agency the respect or voice this might imply. In certain important respects, most notably on matters pertaining to the war in Indochina, Johnson seems to have divorced Helms from the CIA, valuing the former even as he chose to ignore the latter.

Richard Helms and Richard Nixon

Compared to what followed, however, the Johnson years seem almost a golden era of President-DCI, White House-CIA relations. A warning that this favorable situation would soon end was sounded on 31 March 1968, when President Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection. Helms sent a personal note to LBJ expressing his keen regret over this decision.

Immediately after Richard Nixon's electoral triumph in November 1968, Johnson called Helms to the White House to meet the President-elect. At this

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meeting LBJ informed his DCI that starting immediately Helms was to make CIA's entire output of reporting and analysis—"everything that I get"—available to Nixon. Since the Nixon staff had decided to remain at its campaign headquarters at the Pierre Hotel in New York until Inauguration Day, CIA had to set up a secure Agency outpost where the ultrasensitive daily and weekly periodicals as well as numerous codeword studies could be transmitted electronically. Helms dispatched a team to New York, and over the weekend these officers established a vaulted, secure area in the basement of the American Bible Society Building a short distance from the Pierre Hotel. On the following Monday CIA materials began to flow to New York for the use of President-elect Nixon and National Security Assistant-designate Henry Kissinger.[12]

Even before Nixon's inauguration, Helms received disturbing indications that his would be a far less favored position under the new President than it had been under Johnson. Early presidential ideas on organizing the national security function envisioned excluding the DCI from National Security Council meetings. Nixon backed away from this extreme position before it was implemented, when the new Secretary of Defense, Mel Laird, interceded on Helms's behalf. Nevertheless, in the early days of his administration Nixon allowed Helms to attend NSC meetings only to offer factual briefings, after which he excused the DCI from the room. The awkwardness of this situation was immediately obvious in the NSC, and after six weeks or so the DCI was permitted to remain throughout the meeting.

Henry Kissinger's memoirs suggest one reason behind the President's frontal assault upon Helms's position within the decisionmaking apparatus. Nixon brought to the presidency, Kissinger has written, a belief that the CIA was "a refuge of Ivy League intellectuals opposed to him." A man prone to see enemies everywhere, Nixon blamed his 1960 defeat for the presidency on allegedly inaccurate and politically motivated CIA estimates that the Soviets had achieved strategic superiority over the United States during the Eisenhower years when Nixon served as Vice President; this was, of course, the so-called missile gap. Nixon was convinced that Agency liberals, behind a facade of analytical objectivity, were usually pushing their own agenda—a far Left, essentially defeatist set of views incompatible with those held by the silent majority of Middle America, which he had adopted (or created) as his constituency. As for Helms, Kissinger reports, the new President felt ill at ease with the DCI, "since he suspected that Helms was well liked by the liberal Georgetown social set," the very "establishment" Nixon professed to scorn.[13]

Why did Nixon, given these prejudices, decide to keep Helms as DCI? The former President has never explained his reasoning, but the answer may partly lie with the extremely narrow margin of his 1968 presidential victory. Given the absence of any real mandate, he almost certainly felt a need to move cautiously. With Helms commanding widespread and bipartisan respect in Washington, there were no compelling reasons, nor any importunate alternative candidates, to justify or require a change. In addition, the practice of each new President appointing his own Director of Central Intelligence had not yet been established in 1969; both Kennedy and Johnson had retained DCIs selected by their predecessors. Finally, Nixon's bias was not so much against Helms as against the Agency he ran.

Although he kept his job, Helms realized immediately that his Agency was in for some rough sledding. "It was bound to be a rocky period with Richard Nixon as President, given the fact that he held the Agency responsible for his defeat in 1960," the former DCI would later say. "And he never forgot that. He had a barb out for the Agency all the time." Nixon initially concentrated his fire on the National Intelligence Estimates, evidently regarding them as the chief vehicle for CIA animosity. And his memory was long. From the early days of his administration, Helms recalls, the President singled out for criticism Estimates from the 1950s, when he was Eisenhower's Vice President. "He would constantly, in National Security Council meetings, pick on the Agency for not having properly judged what the Soviets were going to do with various kinds of weaponry . . . he would make nasty remarks about this and say this had to be sharpened up. The Agency had to understand it had to do a better job and so on." Helms's concluding remarks are arresting: "Dealing with him was tough, and it seems to

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me that the fact I ended up with my head on my shoulders after four years of working with him is not the least achievement of my life."[14]

Nor were the temperament and personal style of Richard Nixon the only obstacles Helms faced under the new regime. The new President surrounded himself with a staff that combined an intensely personal loyalty to its boss with a vindictive capacity for seeing presidential adversaries in every quarter. Helms thinks it likely that personalities played a role in the uncomfortable situation in which he found himself:

> To this day, I obviously don't have any way of judging what my being Director had to do with this one way or the other. Because, after all, Nixon reappointed me. But I was no man for (presidential assistants) Ehrlichman or Haldeman. I mean, they didn't like the appointment in the first place. So there was an element that was anti-Helms. I mean, it didn't manifest itself with knives in my back, particularly, but, you know, "this guy's not for it."[15]

CIA was not the only agency to notice a marked change once the Nixon team replaced Johnson's. The revelations in the Watergate hearings have made it abundantly clear that President Nixon viewed most of the governmental institutions he inherited from his predecessor with keen distrust. The new administration brought to the daily operation of the government an us-against-them approach. The White House seemed to regard the entire governmental bureaucracy as just another locus of political partisanship, necessitating tighter control and greater centralization within the small group of officials close to the President.

This was particularly true in the realm of national security policy, where Kissinger moved quickly to establish a strong National Security Council staff under his leadership. Moreover, he brought a new dimension to the job of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Both his immediate predecessors, McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow—presidential assistants to Kennedy and Johnson—were men of broad understanding and high intelligence. Bundy and Rostow, however, had confined themselves to subordinate roles in national security affairs, primarily making certain that the President was kept thoroughly informed on key issues by channeling the requisite information to him. Kissinger, a man of powerful intellect with an ego to match, injected himself far more directly into the actual policymaking process. The former professor turned National Security Assistant imposed a strict methodology upon the formulation of policy and the intelligence to support it. For the Intelligence Community this entailed a rigidly formalistic system designed to generate multiple policy options for White House use. In Kissinger's scheme of things, CIA was demoted from its traditional position as the primary governmental source for objective reporting and analysis on international affairs and relegated to being merely another contender for White House attention.

Even though Kissinger himself was very critical of national estimates, in Helms's view Nixon's "carping" heightened this disdain. "So estimating was hardly something that he wanted to be a champion for," Helms later observed of Kissinger. "These two men tended to work on each other with respect to the estimating process of the Agency. And Kissinger, feeling that Nixon didn't regard the estimates as being very good, didn't pay very much attention to them himself." Moreover, he had a tendency to be selective in the way he read intelligence. All this, Helms came to feel, was:

> part of Kissinger's tactics. The more you keep people off balance, the more you keep the pressure on, the more he felt they'd work harder or be more careful or do a better job or something. So that getting any praise out of Kissinger for any particular thing was—well, it virtually never happened. He didn't have any commendations to hand around to anybody.[16]

The result, Helms has noted, was a period when Agency analysis and estimating rather consistently encountered heavy weather in the White House.

In other respects as well, Nixon was quite unlike the gregarious Johnson. Opportunities for informal meetings with the President were few, and direct substantive exchange between Nixon and Helms quite

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meager. Most presidential foreign policy discussions took place in closed Oval Office sessions with Henry Kissinger and Nixon the only participants. In contrast to LBJ, Nixon chose not to rely on his Director of Central Intelligence to keep the facts straight and the judgments sound. Except for Kissinger, who quickly established a secure relationship with the President in the realm of national security affairs, the Nixon White House inner circle consisted exclusively of presidential campaign lieutenants and political partisans.

Like LBJ, however, Nixon preferred to receive his intelligence information through the printed word. Nixon "took it in better through the eye," Helms recalls. In NSC meetings, he "would sit there for longer briefings—but after the first five minutes his mind would start to wander, too, unless something came up that he was particularly interested in. So one has to adjust to these things."[17] Thus the question became how to get the important documents to Nixon's desk. The problem was made considerably more difficult by the system Kissinger established with his NSC staff—with President Nixon's approval—for filtering the flow of information to the Oval Office. At the outset of the Nixon administration, Helms attempted to send to Nixon, as he had to Johnson, a steady flow of short pieces containing intelligence pertinent to ongoing events. But since Nixon felt no particular need for the type of in-depth CIA reports and studies the Agency had provided for Johnson, Helms was soon reduced to sending Kissinger those items he felt contained especially pertinent information, with a note politely suggesting that the information be passed to the President. In short, direct access to the President for timely and sensitive information from his principal intelligence officer was closed off during the Nixon administration.

The record of CIA intelligence support during the Johnson and Nixon administrations amply illustrates that it is the President himself who determines how effective that support can be. His attitudes, his work habits, his receptivity to objective judgment whether favorable or unfavorable to his hopes and plans—these are the essential elements in determining how much and how well his intelligence organizations can help him. Richard Helms well understood this point:

> Each President has to be dealt with by a Director according to his personality and according to his way of doing business. To have (someone) say that the Director's relationship with the President should be X, Y, or Z is absolutely worthless. . . . There is no way that these things can be legislated or controlled. Every President is going to do his business the way he wants to do it. You say, "Well, he should discipline himself," but they never do. They do it exactly the way they want to do it.[18]

The single most important thing a DCI must have to ensure maximum impact and effectiveness is access to the President. But here again, such access depends entirely on the principal occupant of the White House. "Most people miss the point about the United States Government," Helms has remarked:

> The Cabinet and all the principal (posts) are appointive jobs; they are all appointive. . . . (And) every single one of those fellows has got to be someone the President can get along with. If the President doesn't get along with him, then he'll fade away.[19]

Richard Helms did not fade away, but neither was he able to use CIA intelligence to serve President Nixon as well as he might have.

The contrast between the relationship Helms and CIA enjoyed with Lyndon Johnson and their relationship with Richard Nixon underscores this point. The policy problems the two Presidents faced, and the intelligence CIA could provide to help them deal with those problems, were not significantly different in kind or quality. Yet, measured by the effective assistance CIA was permitted to offer, the contrast is stark. In the atmosphere of the Johnson administration, CIA under Richard Helms was a trusted, competent ally that was accorded the large scope to do

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its job. The Nixon administration, on the other hand, tended to see the Helms CIA as a suspect, erratic entity that required constant scrutiny to ensure that it acted in the interests of the White House rather than its own. The record makes it clear: CIA intelligence was only as useful as the President permitted it to be.

NOTES

1. Richard M. Helms, interview by R. J. Smith, tape recording, Washington, DC, 21 April 1982 (hereafter cited as Helms interview, 21 April 1982) (SECRET). Recordings, transcripts, and notes for the interviews conducted for this study are on file in the CIA History Staff office.

2. Richard M. Helms, interview by R. J. Smith, tape recording, Washington, DC, 3 June 1982 (hereafter cited as Helms interview, 3 June 1982) (SECRET).

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. Morning Meeting Minutes, 31 January 1967.

6. Helms interview, 3 June 1982.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

11. Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power* (New York: Doubleday, 1973), p. 103.

12. Kissinger's full title was Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

13. Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 11, 36.

14. Helms interview, 21 April 1982.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

17. Helms interview, 3 June 1982.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*

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AUTHOR: Burton L. Gerber

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A farewell address

Reflections of a DO Division Chief

Burton L. Gerber

The author made the following remarks to employees of the Directorate of Operation's European Division in CIA Headquarter's auditorium on 30 March 1992.

In 1958 I courted and then married one of the employees of the (b)(3)(c) European (EUR) Division. So, there is something special about (b)(3)(c) And it always will be special for both Rosalie and me. She was an Agency officer before me. And her intelligence, grit, and determination always motivated me.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

On our way to the auditorium we passed the statue of Nathan Hale, a brave young schoolteacher who died pursuing information for General Washington. I sometimes think that, however worthy Nathan Hale is of a statue, we ought to have a statue to another young man who was also a spy for the Continental Army, a young Quaker boy from Oyster Bay on Long Island. Unlike Hale, he succeeded in his mission and survived the Revolution. His code name was Samuel Culper, Jr. His true name was Robert Townsend. He is not well known in American history, except by a few Revolutionary War spy buffs. He received his assignments from General Washington. He got his secret-writing ink from the brother of our first Chief Justice, John Jay. His messages were developed by Alexander Hamilton. I believe that is a pretty fine tribute to the beginnings of American espionage, and something we should be proud of.

This week concludes for me almost eight years as a division chief, a job which I believe must be the best in CIA Headquarters. No one comes here reasonably aspiring to being a division chief. When I was a young officer, division chiefs were people who were born in those chairs and certainly not persons whom I addressed. I hardly even saw them.

In the intervening years, division chiefs have become approachable, and they should be. Their role is to know their employees, their reports, their resources, and their operations. I have tried to do this in these eight years. I believe that I have failed in some respects, but, on the whole, I can reflect on some successful and important achievements.

Among the failures, the Howard case is the biggest tragedy of my operational life—and of the Agency's, I believe. And the fact that terrorism still threatens Americans overseas, including our own officers, is another failure. We have to defeat it.

This has been a time of tremendous change in the world, change that no one could anticipate in its depth and scope. But fortunately intelligence did give indicators which helped explain the change as it happened, and we are helping policymakers in dealing with it. Frankly, we won the Cold War. The American people made tremendous economic sacrifices maintaining a defense structure unparalleled in the history of our republic. And many brave American men and women gave the ultimate sacrifice in Korea and Vietnam in fighting what was the great evil of the second half of the 20th century, world communism. We, as intelligence professionals, for 45 years have helped our diplomats and our military confront the problems caused by communism. This is something that speaks of great dedication and personal involvement for all those who have worn the CIA badge.

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The world is now much safer from the threat of nuclear holocaust, but it faces other dangers. And CIA personnel will again be in the forefront in the defense of our country

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(b)(3)(n)

As this decade develops, European interests will be less congruent with our own. You already see that significant differences have developed between the US and Europe, led by Germany, on Yugoslavia. Economic rivalry grows. US claims to world leadership will be resented and later challenged in Europe.

We need to develop better expertise on Europe. Thirteen languages, plus English, are spoken in our division area. An understanding of European history and regional relationships is vital. Our targets and our liaison partners are sophisticated. They do not think in two- or three-year timetables.

I am not sure the Directorate of Operations (DO) has tried hard enough to understand Europe for itself.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Developing exp(b)(1)n Europe in areas as diverse as (b)(3)(n) requires senior-level commitments to this division. Your job is to outline those needs and push for them.

Our country's foreign policies and some of its defense policies are changing. Intelligence needs to be in the forefront of change. We should welcome it, and we must help shape it.

This change will affect people, positions, and requirements because it is already affecting national objectives. How we organize and how we go about our business need to be reviewed. We no longer have the Soviet Union as a central objective of this Agency, just as it no longer is the central focus of American foreign and defense policy. If we created CIA today, we would not build it the way it is now. Now is the time to think of where we in the DO sit in the totality of the US intelligence world. We are part of a community. We need still closer ties to our Directorate of Intelligence (DI) colleagues, to our colleagues downtown, and to others who are most interested in our product.

Our product is important only if it is relevant. Our goal is not reports. Our goal is information which policymakers can use. Consequently, to keep our product relevant we have to satisfy requirements set by others. We do not set them ourselves. We reach out for guidance, and we welcome it.

To satisfy requirements in almost all cases we need to recruit sources. New agents, or new technical operations, are the lifeblood of our work. We cannot survive without this. I want to make two points about this. First, our recruitment of new sources must always be relevant to the requirements process. Recruitment must never become an end to itself. The second point is one of the absolutes of our intelligence business: we must protect our sources. Men and women put their trust in us. As individuals and as a service, we cannot afford to compromise that principle.

In speaking to career trainees and other prospective DO employees, I have emphasized that the single most important quality necessary for success in our service is honesty. Any other attributes are secondary. You must be an example yourself; you must foster honesty in others; you must move against deviation from our high standards. We represent the US Government, often in singular ways—a case officer out on the street, late at night, alone with an agent; a technical officer working on his own to install an operation; an analyst pulling together material that no one else commands. If this work is not done honestly and if faults are not reported fully, then we fail. And our failure can be dramatic. We enjoy extraordinary trust within this government and in this country. This trust must not be tarnished. Honesty in reporting and in financial dealings are not to be compromised.

You have to have standards. You have to think about professional and personal goals, and you have to be comfortable with the means you use to achieve those

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goals. Whatever you do, you have to face your leaders, your colleagues and your subordinates. You must have no fear and give no favor.

After honesty, probably the next most important quality is courage. Sometimes, in this dangerous world, that courage will be of a physical sort, facing down an enemy. The stars on our lobby wall reflect the fact that 54 of our employees, in showing great courage, "gave that last full measure of devotion."

Courage often means being tough in the intellectual process, developing beliefs and standing up for them. You have to stick to what you determine is the truth. You have to pursue unpopular ideas if you believe they are right. You can bring to your leaders questions and comments. I truly welcome it. I learn that way. Take the time to develop the kind of relationship with your leaders that allows you to be comfortable in raising fresh ideas with them. And if you are a leader, foster office relations which assure openness.

We are proud professionals. We represent abroad what I believe is the world's greatest democracy, in many places where democracy has been on trial or suppressed. By the nature of our business we often deal with issues and people who may offend our own principles. We must never let this compromise us. Democracy has to remain our guiding principle. Throughout the world it is not just a goal for some future day. The thirst for it is so evident in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Our nation has to help satisfy that thirst. It is too easy to say that a certain country or a certain people are not ready for democracy. Perhaps no people is ever ready for it. There are many problems and inefficiencies associated with democracy; but it is better than anything else.

Our founding fathers, in setting up our democracy, were suspicious of placing too much power in any one hand. Therefore, they created two levels of sovereignty, the national government and the state governments. Then, to spread power even further, at the national level the Constitution created the three independent branches of government. It is inconvenient and certainly inefficient, but it has created a system of government responsive in most cases to the needs of the American people. We work for the Executive Branch. We are subordinate to it, and we report to it. Our first responsibility is to keep the Executive Branch informed and to respond to its needs.

For many years, our reporting responsibilities to the Congress were limited. Now, to many, they seem excessive. It is easy to complain about Congressional interest in our work, but we have to remember that the Congress was created by our founding fathers to be a check on the executive. Its power is so defined. We owe to the Congress candor in our reporting to it and cooperation in its activities as they apply to the intelligence field. We should not resent this. In fact, I believe we are strengthened by it. I remember that Judge Webster talked about his wanting to have risk-takers, not risk-seekers. We always speak about risk in our business, often referring to risk versus gain, or speculating about operational risks. Risk is the lack of an *a priori* assurance of success. It is clear we take risks every day in our operations and even in our assignments. The way I measure an officer and a manager is in his or her willingness to take risks.

As Browning wrote, "A man's reach should exceed his grasp or what's a Heaven for?" As you reach, you will have doubts. You will need information. You will need advice. Once you make the decision or choose a course of action, you have to put doubts behind you. You have to get on with the other aspects of your job. I do not have second thoughts about my decisions. I have made some wrong ones, but I have felt comfortable about the way I reached decisions. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) I had done my job—ops planning and case officer selection. Now it was their job.

And most important, you have to take responsibility for what you decided and what you did. You will earn praise or take blame. You cannot shift responsibility. Never try to. I first learned this as a 12-year-old boy, when I damaged a friend's father's car while we played at driving. I miscalculated when I started the car and released the clutch, springing the door on the side of the garage. My friend took the blame. I decided then I would never dodge responsibility again.

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Some of you have heard my phrase, borrowed from Churchill, "luck is the residue of design." Some of you have even said it sounds silly. But I have been quite comfortable with it, using it as a major aid to me in my job. What do I mean by it? Few of us have the kind of luck which means winning the $1-million lottery or Ed McMahon's sweepstakes. What I mean is that we can create opportunities for ourselves and our service so that we are ready to grasp the chance to succeed. In my own career, I have had many such opportunities. I tried to become the best officer I could be. I learned languages well. I studied countries. I proved myself. And opportunities came to me. And they will to you.

Starting something new is difficult. Some tasks may seem too formidable for the individual or the unit. You might consider the Cartesian way of breaking a problem into its smallest parts, solving them, and then putting them together in the form of a solution. This formula has applicability in much of our daily work. Take, for example, operational tradecraft. I believe it lends itself very well to the Cartesian solution. Similarly, restructuring resources to face the tasks of the 1990s and of the 21st century lends itself to this technique.

We are first a field organization. Our role in Headquarters is to support field operations by giving them resources and assistance. It also means giving the field guidance and sometimes course correction. This must always be done in a manner which inspires trust and confidence. As a field officer, I sometimes wondered if anybody understood what I was going through. I am sure some of our field colleagues wonder that today.

Keep the thought of support to the field consciously in your mind at all times. One of a field officer's biggest frustrations, forcefully expressed to me when I travel, is the absence of Headquarters' responses. Young officers in particular are dismayed by this. We can do better. Do not dawdle over correspondence. Write.

When I came here to EUR three years ago, I had a definite goal of giving EUR officers opportunities to succeed. If you look around, you will see that many of the senior assignments in this division have gone to EUR home-based officers. I wanted EUR officers to have the chance to prove what they can do. And they have.

But I want to emphasize that all of you are first DO officers. Home-basing is a convenience, not a law. Seek opportunities throughout the directorate. Expand your interests. You and the service will prosper.

In my final cable in SE Division a few years ago, I wrote "Think aggressively, act prudently." I believe that thought applies today, both in the changing circumstances of the world and in the operational environment we face in Europe. We need clear, aggressive, fresh ideas for attacking targets. Once we get down to work, we need to be doing it in the most secure manner with the highest level of operational tradecraft.

I know that I have been hard on issues of tradecraft and on some technical matters. I am the guy who (b)(1) quired officers (b)(3)(c) And I believe I have been (b)(3)(n) proven right as to the need for that at that time. I have aimed for high security standards in our operations and in our technology. I stand ready to reassess security requirements, change some and push hard to maintain those which should not be altered.

The recent publication of the book, *Molehunt*, which, is about a tragic and unproductive time in our history, primarily in the 1960s, reminds us that in our work we have to stay vigilant and prudent but that we must not allow internal suspicion to poison the atmosphere of this great service. At that time, individuals were able, without sufficient control from the leadership of this Agency, to damage careers, operations and ultimately themselves. Now most everyone familiar with the situation condemns it. But you have to do more than that. You have to ensure that such an atmosphere does not dominate this service again.

Counterintelligence will remain fundamental to our work, but it may be different in the 1990s than that which we have known in earlier years. And I believe some of what we are calling counterintelligence today is really tradecraft and ops security. We have to give credit to other nations' abilities to protect themselves. That is what internal security services do.

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And many internal security services are good. Our job is to succeed despite their efforts. Every one of our employees must know there is no benign operational environment.

From both a counterintelligence and operational standpoint, I urge you to think about the operations which dominate the moment, about the pressure to address something quickly before we have sufficiently figured out what we need to do. I remember some years ago when officers came to me with what I thought were bad operational plans. When I objected to them, they said that DCI Casey wanted it done, and fast. I replied maybe he does, but he does not want it done dumb.

Our leaders may order us to undertake operations and send us forth to run them. We are professionals, the permanent intelligence officers. Our leaders deserve and expect that we tell them what we can do intelligently and securely and what we cannot. We have to have the professional courage to resist bad instructions. "Can do" does not always make the best sense for our Agency or for our country.

When I was a high school sophomore, I was told to write a term paper. The concept frightened me because I had never done one. I even had trouble figuring out a topic so I could get started. My father suggested I choose something of interest to me, so I wrote a paper on the origin of baseball. There is a myth in this country that Abner Doubleday invented it on a spring day in 1839 in Cooperstown, New York. The reality is that Doubleday was not even in Cooperstown that spring. Baseball is, of course, descended from the English game "rounders" but, oh, how American it is.

Baseball has some applicability to our own business. It is played by normal-sized people. Anyone, if he or she is good enough, can be a baseball player. And it is both an individual sport and a team sport. Just as in our business, you face the pitcher—the opposition—alone. Although the odds of getting a hit might seem overwhelming, practice increases the chances of success. Once you get on base, your teammates can help bring you home. Our team is made up of support officers, technical officers, communicators, secretaries, intelligence assistants, reports/requirements officers, and case officers. All are part of the team who help you score.

The environment is an intelligence issue. War and destruction can affect us; the possibly unstable nuclear reactors in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can affect us; the struggle to develop agriculture in much of the Third World can affect us. We will have environmental subjects on our operational requirements list.

The environment is also a personal issue. It will affect your way of life and your quality of life, as well as that of your children and your children's children. You can color me green, just as Dick Stolz said several years ago. I hope that we also can color many of you green.

America is a society built upon immigrants from many countries. Our culture for many years has been predominantly influenced from Europe, but the growth of America's personal and business relationships with Asia and Latin America suggests that more and more we will look in those directions. If we were ever monocultural, that time is past. Americans are strengthened by this cultural richness, and CIA is, too.

You will hear increasingly more about diversity and multiculturalism and the important programs designed to promote them and opportunities for all employees in exploiting the talents of everyone. This is necessary and it is good. Most important, it is right.

The role of women employees in our Agency (b)(3)(c) deserves some mention. In 1957, there were [redacted] my class [redacted] Only (b)(1) was a woman, and she quit within a year or tw (b)(3)(c) the course's completion. Now our CT classes c (b)(3)(n) anywhere from 20 to 40 percent women. We are developing a cadre of outstanding female case officers. Females lead Stations, are deputy division chiefs, are (b)(3)(c) [redacted] and receive medals and other awards. They serve as examples for us all. I still believe that there is no restriction as to what a woman can do in our organization other than what she herself, or we as a service, impose.

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I continue to question why a woman can be a mother and a Supreme Court Justice, a mother and a university president, a mother and a Nobel Prize winner, and not be able here to be a mother and a senior CIA DO leader. We have to look at the opportunities we give to women and the opportunities we give women to have families as well as careers.

The Black experience in America is distinctly different from that of Whites, Asian Americans or any other Americans. Because of that special difference, Blacks have not had the opportunity that many of us have had. While we have had Black employees for many years, we have often not recognized that we can stretch them in their assignments nor have we done so sufficiently. I am confident that Black employees will move up through the system and that we will recognize their contributions.

CIA is only part of your world. There should be other things in your life, things which also are important. One of these is your family. Whatever its size, whatever your family status, relations with your loved ones have to be important to you. No one on his or her deathbed ever said, "I wish I had worked more." Take time to value your family and your friends. Nurture those relationships.

This is a hard business, mentally demanding and often physically difficult. That is why I have asked our employees to stay healthy, exercise and have fun. Keep your mind clear. I found that building models kept my mind off anything but the intricacies of that. Skiing down a mountain which is much too hard for me concentrates my attention and clears my mind of all worries and concerns.

Take time. Relax.

Think of your community; think of our cities and our schools; think of our homeless; think of your place in this country and this world. It is larger than this building.

Dream. Find some poetry in your life. You will be larger for it.

Our national anthem has always meant much to me. It stirs me. To the best of my knowledge, ours is the only anthem that ends with a question:

> O say does that star-spangled banner still wave,
> O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave?

Make sure that you can always answer yes to that question, that our banner will wave over a free land of brave people.

Sophocles wrote, "One must wait until the evening to see how splendid the day has been." Thanks to you and your colleagues, it has been for me a truly splendid day.

This article is classified SECRET.

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A foreign intelligence threat

Analyzing Economic Espionage

(b)(3)(c)

This article was the basis for testimony given on 29 April 1992 by the Director of Central Intelligence before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. An earlier version of the article appeared in the November 1991 issue of Counterintelligence Trends.

Analyzing the foreign intelligence threat to US economic interests—not to mention countering it—is difficult. The threat is diffuse, and it comes primarily from countries whose intelligence activities we have not tracked closely. It is complex, and it is characterized by a wide variety of operational practises not easily classified in accordance with conventional categories of espionage activity.

The Changing Threat

With the end of the Cold War, the foreign intelligence threat has become less concentrated. The winding down of international military competition, the declining perception that the Free World faces a common threat, and the growing tendency to measure national power and national security in economic as well as military terms are causing countries everywhere to reassess their intelligence priorities.

Foreign targeting of American technology continues; technology is important for economic as well as military reasons. Because the US continues to be on the cutting edge of technological innovation—leading even the Japanese in this respect—technology theft will remain a major concern for the US. Requirements of individual intelligence services are of course influenced by the particular economic needs of each country. But, in general, those areas of technology critical to any country's ability to compete effectively internationally, especially those areas where the US maintains a lead, are most vulnerable. These areas include aircraft and space technology, biotechnology, data processing, and advanced manufacturing. Companies leading in research development and product commercialization in these technologies are prime targets for foreign intelligence operations.

Foreign intelligence operations against our economic interests, however, encompass more than technology diversion. Some foreign governments target a range of economic and business data. They want access to US Government policy deliberations concerning foreign trade, investments, and loans, and positions on bilateral economic negotiations. Several governments also seek information about company bids for contracts and takeovers, information that affects prices of commodities, financial data, and banking information affecting stock market trends and interest rates.

In addition to collecting economic information, a few foreign intelligence services have tried to exert clandestine influence on US business and government decisions that affect their economic interests. They have attempted to recruit agents of influence in US Government, banking, and business circles. Besides those who have pushed such "active measures" in the economic area, several governments engage in aggressive lobbying on behalf of their national firms, to the point of exerting political and economic leverage in a heavy-handed manner.

Another reason the threat has become more extensive in recent years is that the number of foreign intelligence services capable of conducting sophisticated operations has increased. There has been a proliferation of commercially available intelligence technologies. In addition to technologies for intelligence operations becoming cheaper, dozens of Third World intelligence services have profited from training they

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received in the past from either Western or East Bloc services, and they are now more able to act unilaterally.

At the same time, with large numbers of intelligence operatives thrown out of their jobs in some former communist countries, the reservoir of professionally trained intelligence mercenaries is growing. Some former *Stasi* officers have even taken out classified ads in German newspapers.

Categories of Countries

In an environment of heightened global economic and technological competition, and one in which intelligence capabilities have proliferated, the danger exists of intelligence operations being conducted against our economic interests from a variety of sources. First of all, those traditional adversaries that remain in business against us are giving a high priority to both technology theft and economic intelligence collection. This is true of intelligence services both in unreformed communist countries and in some reforming former communist countries. The economic distress that former communists countries are experiencing in some cases gives impetus to intelligence efforts to acquire information and advanced technology of commercial value to them. The communist governments that remain, feeling increasingly isolated and threatened by "democratic encirclement," continue to view technology theft as one means of propping up their repressive regimes, military arsenals, and sagging economies.

For many countries, collection of weapons technology serves both economic and military ends. The technology may enhance the country's military capabilities, while also making its armaments industries better able to compete with US suppliers in international arms markets. The extremely sensitive nature of the information pertaining to weapons proliferation—chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missiles—has led most governments interested in procuring weapons technology to lean heavily on their intelligence services.

We also have to be alert to the activities of countries whose national intrests have been compatible with ours. In the post-Cold War world, more of our friends may adopt a parallel approach of cooperating with us in the realm of diplomacy and military liaison while engaging in intelligence practices that put them in an adversarial relationship with us. We now lack the evidentiary basis to establish any overall trend toward increased economic espionage among advanced industrial countries. Nevertheless, economic intelligence collection by such countries is potentially more damaging to our economy than intelligence operations by traditionally hostile countries, because some traditionally friendly countries are strong economic competitors, which the communist and former communist states clearly are not.

Finally, there is a category of countries that are not major economic competitors of the US across the board but are competitors in particular sectors. Collection of economic intelligence by such countries could damage those particular sectors of the US economy.

The emergence of regional trading blocs or economic associations, (b)(1) could also portend an increase in economic espionage against US interests. We have yet to see the emergence of regional intelligence services, and it is doubtful that any such supranational services will emerge in the near future. There is reason to believe, however, that in striving to develop common foreign, economic, and trade policies, members of regional groups may direct their national intelligence services to cooperate more fully—even to pool intelligence resources—in support of common goals.

Approaching the Problem

There are many gradations in the threat. Some foreign efforts to gain economic advantage through collection programs pose serious problems for the US; others do little damage. In assessing what sort of threat various activities constitute, we look at several basic questions.

First, *who* is conducting the activity? Often the primary actor from a given country is not an intelligence organization but a business or another component of the government performing *de facto* intelligence functions, such as a trade organization or economics ministry. When private firms are involved, an intelligence agency or government is sometimes sponsoring, orchestrating, or coordinating the activity. This is more likely to be the case in countries with

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centralized economies or corporative structures in which there is no clear separation between public and private sectors, between business companies and government agencies.

Take, for example, the case of a scientist from a foreign private research institution who attends a professional conference in the US and picks up information from colleagues in open discussion. We consider whether the scientist is a cooptee of an intelligence service, whether he was given collection requirements, whether he had an obligation to report back to his government, and whether his trip was part of a systematic collection program. One or more of these circumstances may obtain. (Similarly, foreign governments sometimes play a role behind the scenes in facilitating visits of researchers working for foreign corporations to our federal laboratories or encouraging foreign businesses to sponsor R&D programs at American universities that provide them some degree of proprietary control over the technology through patents or licenses.)

Second, we look at *what* is being collected—the "shopping list." This may be embargoed technology or classified research. But it is important to keep in mind that much valuable information is available from open sources. Even most intelligence services, including those in former communist countries, have begun to place a higher premium on open-source collection. This is partly because advances in data processing have made it much easier to aggregate, manipulate, and exploit large volumes of data. And it is partly because open-source collection is less politically risky for services that do not want to get caught in classic espionage operations.

Third, we look at *where* the information is obtained. Foreign intelligence services are more inclined to operate against American targets outside the US. They know there is a greater chance American officials will detect an operation taking place on our own territory, and a greater likelihood of serious repercussions once the operation is detected. Most services are consequently more aggressive inside their own countries, where they can control the operating environment better and the legal environment is naturally benign. Operations against US targets in third countries constitute another approach in use.

Fourth, we consider *how* the information is acquired. In human operations, some intelligence services that stop short of recruiting US citizens use intelligence operatives to elicit information from them; the targeted American is unwitting of his interlocutor's intelligence connection.

(b)(1)

In addition to human operations, a number of services conduct technical operations against US businesses. On the low-tech end, such things as bugging hotel rooms of traveling American executives occur. Beyond such practices, we operate on the assumption that any technically sophisticated intelligence service could mount a technical attack against US businesses or businessmen in their countries. Attractive targets would be a company's communications and computer systems.

Finally, we look at *why* the information is collected and what is done with it. A number of countries, for example, disseminate economic information and some economic intelligence to individual national firms. This process is sometimes regularized, but it is also facilitated by the existence of informal channels between government and industry.

Patterns of Activity

Distinguishing between these various types of activity, we can discern several distinct collection patterns, each more or less characteristic of one or more countries today.

The first pattern— (b)(1) is classic espionage, in which a foreign intelligence organization operates clandestinely on a global basis to recruit and run paid agents in US companies and governmental institutions. This is often done by using academic, business or international organization cover, which often succeed where a straightforward pitch to work for a foreign intelligence service would fail.

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In the second pattern, (b)(1) intelligence operatives rely largely on elicitation rather than outright recruitment, and often try to exploit ethnicity as a means of developing targets.

In the third pattern, (b)(1) the intelligence service conducts "bag operations" within its own border, surreptitiously entering hotel rooms of visiting American officials or executives to search for documents containing sensitive economic or business data, taking advantage of other security lapses as well, and passing the information gathered to national firms.

In the fourth pattern, (b)(1) the government operates not through intelligence services *per se* but through other components to conduct an extensive, systematic program of collecting information of economic value—largely but not entirely from open sources—and disseminating it to business leaders.

The fifth pattern (b)(1) In this case, a government covertly targets sensitive weapons technology by working through front organizations, military attaches, and special intelligence units that operate outside of regular intelligence organizations and may be directly subordinated to top national leaders. A high premium is placed on secrecy in the process of diverting the technology and on deception in preventing its acquisition from becoming known later.

An emerging sixth pattern is that of intelligence *entrepreneurs* prepared to sell their services either to foreign governments or to private organizations.

It is important for us to make these distinctions about different patterns of activities. Doing so helps in analyzing and understanding the problem. It also helps in deciding what sort of response is appropriate in particular cases. We do not have the same level of counterintelligence interest in all types of foreign collection activity. (b)(1) At the same time, it is essential that we monitor and defend ourselves against more sinister activity. Deciding what activities cross the threshold to require a vigorous response is essentially a policy decision.

Sizing the Problem

In assessing the seriousness of the threat of foreign economic espionage, it is necessary to consider whether the US has peculiar vulnerabilities to foreign intelligence operations. To gain perspective on the problem, it also is helpful to place the economic espionage threat in the larger context of foreign aggressive activities to gain economic advantage over the US through a variety of methods that seem unfair by American standards.

A strong argument can be made that the US is more susceptible than many countries to foreign intelligence machinations. It is a truism that we have an open society in which most of our business, government and commercial, is conducted in public view. We also have a fairly clear demarcation between business and government. Whether or not there is a Japan Inc. may be debated, but there is not an America Inc. These circumstances make it harder for us to defend against foreign intelligence efforts that coordinate activities of business and government. Increased foreign ownership of US companies further complicates an already difficult situation.

Moreover, it is possible that many Americans possess certain personality attributes that increase our vulnerability. (b)(1)

- (b)(1) Americans like to talk. We tend to be sociable and gregarious, even with casual contacts. We want to be liked, especially by foreigners, because many of us are still trying to overcome an "ugly American" complex. We place a higher premium on candor than on guile, on trust than on discretion.

- Many Americans do not know foreign languages, which in some respects puts them at a disadvantage when living in foreign countries. This does not mean we are "innocents abroad," but it may make us less likely to pick up clues of suspicious behavior. Americans who do not know the language of a given country may forget that nationals of that country in a position to overhear their conversations often do know English.

- Many Americans are ambitious, oriented toward job advancement and professional recognition. Inevitably, some morally weak individuals are willing to sacrifice personal integrity in pursuit of these career goals.

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Our vulnerability may increase as a result of reduced US military spending, the scaling down of US national security institutions, and corresponding cuts for Department of Defense contractors. Layoffs in the American defense industry and reduced opportunities for upward mobility in government service may produce morale problems, thereby creating a "happy hunting ground" for foreign intelligence services seeking to recruit Americans in possession of sensitive information.

Espionage is only one of the destructive activities that some foreign governments resort to in order to gain advantage over US industry. Tailoring government procurement policies to favor domestic firms, manipulating standards and testing regulations to the detriment of foreign firms, under-the-table subsidies, schemes to promote or illegally dump exports or to choke imports, barter and other countertrade activities are all examples of such market-distorting practices.

The full array of such destructive activities probably damages our economy to a significant degree. Foreign economic espionage by itself is a significant factor only in particular cases. Overall, it probably matters at the margin. Thus, economic counterintelligence is not likely to prove a panacea for US economic problems. Nevertheless, considering that economic success or failure is often determined at the margin, (b)(1) a vigorous economic CI program could yield valuable positive results.

Looking Ahead

In the future, monitoring and assessing the foreign intelligence threat to US economic interests are likely to assume greater importance for the US Intelligence Community. Fulfilling our responsibility in this area will be a challenge. Conceptualizing the issues will continue to be complex, as we try to define what activities constitute espionage, and seek policy guidance about what interests are "American"—considering the multinational ownership of many corporations, for example. We will need to surmount any conscious or subconscious tendency to apply a double standard, which could lead us to play down hostile activities if conducted by traditional allies. At the same time, we will need to avoid the pitfall of hyping the threat as a means of justifying bureaucratic budgets, satisfying a longing for new "enemies" to replace the old, or rationalizing our national economic problems.

Definitions and Counterintelligence Functions in the Economic Area

Economic counterintelligence is the monitoring, through human or technical means, of foreign targeting of classified information, or clandestine collection of proprietary information, that enhances a foreign country's economic competitiveness *vis-a-vis* the US. This term also encompasses attempts to counter such espionage activity. We have traditionally emphasized tracking the theft of classified material, but we also monitor acquisition of business information. In the past our CI monitoring has focused largely on activities conducted or coordinated by foreign intelligence organizations. But our coverage now includes collection involving other components of foreign governments, as well as operations conducted by foreign companies.

Economic espionage is government-sponsored intelligence collection conducted for the purpose of enhancing a country's economic competitiveness.

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Industrial or *commercial espionage* is the theft, either by a government or by a company, of business information that is proprietary in nature but not classified, for the purpose of giving particular firms an edge in international competition. We do not engage in commercial espionage ourselves.

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Recollections and reflections

The Berlin Wall: Intelligence and Policy

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The call came shortly after 2:00 a.m. on 13 August 1961, which was also the 13th day since I had arrived in Berlin and taken over as Chief of Base. "It's happening. Better come in," was all Deputy Base Chief (b)(3)(c) needed to say. "It" could only mean what Berlin Operations Base had long thought could be the outcome of the current Berlin crisis initiated by Krushchev in November 1958: the Soviets were closing the Sector Border dividing East Berlin from West Berlin. In fact, the Base had cabled Headquarters a few days earlier that tension had greatly increased over the past week as the flow of refugees to West Berlin reached flood proportions; the Soviets and East Germans would very soon have to do something to stop it.

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Closing the Border

But now, less than two hours later, that question had been answered. East German troops of the "National People's Army" had been brought by trucks from their home stations, carrying with them rolls of barbed wire and concrete fence posts. In a well-coordinated action they had arrived simultaneously at their assigned points along the entire Sector Border, where they at once began erecting barbed-wire barriers and establishing guard posts to prevent East Germans from crossing into West Berlin.

In a remarkably brief time East German police and military had taken control of the border. The S-Bahn, the elevated railroad serving all Berlin but operated by East German railroad authorities, ceased service to West Berlin. Strict document controls were instituted at all subway stations in East Berlin to identify, and remove from the train, any East Germans travelling on the subway, which was operated by West Berlin rail authorities and continued to provide service between East and West Berlin. Before daybreak on 13 August travel by East Germans across the 27-mile-long Sector Border had been almost completely halted. Krushchev had taken action, as he had so long threatened, and he had now directly challenged the wartime-agreed Allied rights in Berlin, which were the basis for the American, British and French presence in the city, geographically 100 miles from West Germany and surrounded by the Soviet Zone.

Wartime Agreements on Allied Rights in Berlin

The rights of the Western Allies in Berlin were created by Allied agreements on the terms for the postwar occupation of Germany. Negotiation of the key issue—the location of the border between the Soviet and the Western Allied Zones and the boundaries of Greater Berlin—had already been completed in 1943 by the European Advisory Commission, which met in London to plan the Occupation, comprising the Soviet and American ambassadors to Great Britain and a representative of the British Foreign Office.

The Soviet and British Governments gave their approval to the proposed boundaries in February 1944, and President Roosevelt approved them in April 1944. The Soviet-Western Allied border on the Elbe created by that agreement remained unchanged from beginning to end of the occupation period.

Soviet Pressures

The dates of those agreements are significant; they bear a direct relationship to the status of the war. By the end of January 1943, the Soviets had overwhelmed the Germans at Stalingrad, forced the surrender of the entire German Sixth Army commanded by Field Marshal Paulus, and launched a major offensive on the Eastern Front which made steady progress from then on. The tide of World War II had turned in favor of the Allies. But the landing of the Western Allied Forces in Normandy was not to occur for another 18 months, in June 1944. During those 18 months, while the Allies negotiated the postwar settlement, the Soviets capitalized on their strong position, pressed for the opening of the Western Front (dismissing the Allied campaign in Italy as contributing little to reducing the forces available to the Germans to oppose the Soviets in the east) and kept pressure on British and American negotiators to adopt insofar as possible Soviet proposals for the postwar settlement as part of supporting the Soviet war effort.


Preparing for Occupation

By November 1944, while major battles were underway on both the Eastern and Western Fronts, the European Advisory Commission had reached agreement on organizational and policy aspects of the occupation. Each of the Commanders in Chief was to have supreme authority over his Zone, subject to veto only by unanimous agreement of the three (amended in May 1945 to four, to include the French) Commanders acting as the Allied Control Council for all Germany, which was to be located in Berlin, in theory to control a Germany-wide government. A separate Quadripartite Kommandatura, comprising the four Berlin Commandants, was to control the administration of a government of Greater Berlin, with each Berlin Commandant vested with supreme authority over his Sector, again subject only to unanimous veto by all four Commandants. Chairmanship of the Quadripartite Kommandatura was to be rotated among the four Commandants, just as the Chairmanship of the Allied Control Council was to be rotated among the Commanders in Chief.

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Berlin and Its Environs Before German Reunification



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These agreements were the basis of the right of the Western Allies to be in Berlin. Their intent was to make the entire territory of Greater Berlin officially subject to the control of all four Allies through the Quadripartite Kommandatura.

A Significant Omission

One decision was made whose consequences would long be felt by the Western Allies: no agreement pertaining to the right of free Allied ground access between West Germany and Berlin was ever put in writing or even negotiated with the Soviets. At that time, the view of the Western Allies was that their right of access to Berlin was so clearly implied as to make specific agreement unnecessary. Only the air corridors were defined in writing at the outset of the occupation, a step necessary for safety reasons.

Soviet Obstructionism

It is worth noting that, with the exception of the geographic locations of the borders between East and West Germany, between East Germany and Greater Berlin, and between East and West Berlin, all of the agreements on Allied rights in Germany and in Berlin were challenged or abrogated by the Soviets early in the occupation period. Soviet cooperation in the Allied Council diminished as Western Allied troop strength declined (while the Soviets continued to maintain substantial forces in East Germany), and in March 1948 Marshal Sokolovsky, the Soviet Commandant, walked out of the Allied Council never to return when the Western Allies authorized currency reform in West Germany after the Soviets refused to extend the measure to their Zone.

The Soviet Berlin Commandant walked out of the Allied Kommandatura Berlin in June 1948, and thereafter the Soviets administered East Berlin separately. (The Soviets also soon ignored the provision of the agreements that no restrictions were to be imposed upon the free circulation of the local populace within Greater Berlin). The most dramatic challenge to Allied rights was the Soviet blockade of ground and water access between West Germany and Berlin from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949, during which time West Berlin was sustained by the Allied airlift. And from 1949 on, although the blockade was not reimposed, the Soviets frequently interfered with access between West Germany and Berlin. This kept alive a crisis atmosphere which on several occasions moved senior officials of Western Allied governments to make public statements reaffirming Allied rights in Berlin and Allied determination to preserve the freedom of West Berlin.

The Khrushchev Ultimatum

No challenge since the Berlin Blockade had posed such a threat to Allied rights in Berlin as did Khrushchev's note, sent separately to the US, Great Britain, and France on 27 November 1958. It declared that the Soviet Union regarded ". . . as null and void the Protocol of the Agreement . . . on the zones of occupation in Germany and on the administration of Greater Berlin." The Soviet Union proposed that West Berlin be converted into an independent political unit—a free city—and be demilitarized. The Soviet Union also intended ". . . to turn over to the Government of the German Democratic Republic . . . the functions temporarily performed by the Soviet Union . . . but would make no changes in the present procedure for military traffic of the USA, Great Britain, and France from West Berlin to the Federal Republic of Germany for half a year . . . to allow them time to agree on proclaiming West Berlin a Free City." If agreement was not reached within that time, the Soviet Union intended to carry out its plan to allow the GDR to ". . . exercize its sovereignty on land, on water, and in the air . . ." and the Soviets would terminate all contact with representatives of the armed forces of the US, Great Britain, and France in questions pertaining to Berlin.

Going to Geneva

The immediate reaction of the Western Allies was to seek a dialogue with the Soviet Union about Berlin, and, shortly before the 6-month "deadline" expired, the Soviets agreed to a conference of the four Foreign Ministers, to be held in Geneva commencing 11 May 1959. A significant concession had been required of the Western Allies to get the Soviet Union to the conference table: representatives of the "GDR" would be allowed to attend. Although the GDR representatives were not official participants and were seated at a table separate from that of the "Big Four" Foreign Ministers, they were present. And from time to time during the conference they were even consulted as though they represented a sovereign state.

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The conference caused great concern in the Federal Republic as well as in Berlin. Fortunately, the Foreign Ministers could not reach any agreement and the conference adjourned without setting a date for a further meeting. From time to time thereafter, Krushchev kept tension high by repeating his objective of concluding a separate peace treaty with the GDR, but he took no further action during President Eisenhower's term of office. In retrospect, it was perhaps just as well from the Berlin standpoint that the summit meeting scheduled for May 1960 in Paris was canceled because of the U-2 shootdown. Several Allied concessions had been discussed, although not agreed, at the Geneva Conference, including a substantial reduction of the Allied military garrisons in Berlin, and Krushchev might have pressed his demands vigorously, using such items as his point of departure. In any event, the Berlin issue remained dormant until Krushchev's meeting in Vienna in June 1961 with the new US President, John F. Kennedy. At that meeting, Krushchev revived in bellicose tones his threat to conclude a separate peace treaty which would cancel the wartime agreements pertaining to Berlin and openly threatened to resort to war if the Allies tried to interfere. The President held firm. Clearly, the Berlin crisis was still on.

Contingency Planning

The Krushchev ultimatum had rung alarm bells in CIA's Berlin Base from the day it was received in 1958. Unlike policy levels of Allied governments, which generally viewed the ultimatum as a threat to the access routes between Berlin and West Germany, the intelligence operatives in Berlin saw the proclaimed Soviet intention of granting sovereign rights to East Germany as a direct threat to the largely uncontrolled access between East and West Berlin. This free access was the key element in practically all Berlin operations. It meant that East Germans and persons from any country who could manage to get to East Berlin would then be able to come to West Berlin and return to the East without a visa and without the visits being recorded by Communist authorities. The Soviet threat to grant the GDR sovereignty, if implemented, would inevitably transform the open Sector Border into an international border with some form of document and customs controls.

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Alerting Headquarters

Well prepared though Berlin Base was for the closing of the Sector Border, none of its sources had been able to report what the Soviets were going to do. But the reasons refugees gave for leaving (often, they simply said that "everyone else at the factory is gone"), and the statistics we could compile in West Berlin showing the mounting daily total of refugee arrivals, convinced us by 8 August that some action was imminent. We sent Headquarters a cable on that date reporting our belief that the situation in East Germany was deteriorating rapidly. Over 2,000 refugees were being registered each day in West Berlin, and an atmosphere of fear that "the gates were about to close" appeared to pervade all East Germany. The Soviets, we wrote, must soon take action to stop the flight to West Berlin, in particular of skilled and semi-skilled workers whose loss was seriously disrupting the East German economy.

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An Ominous Sign

Our prediction appeared to be confirmed three days later, when the Chief of the US Potsdam Military Mission reported that he and his British and French counterparts had been summoned to Soviet Military Headquarters in Zossen/Wuensdorf late the day before, Thursday, 10 August. There they were received, quite unexpectedly and without any prior notice, by Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan S. Konev, a leading Soviet hero of World War II. He had been Commander of the Soviet Forces which invaded Poland and Czechoslovakia, and which had joined Marshal Zhukov in the assault on Berlin. In the immediate postwar era, Konev was Commander of Soviet Occupation Forces in Austria, where, in sharp contrast to the Soviets in Germany, he participated actively with the other Allied Commandants in Allied Control Council oversight of the Austria-wide National Government. For a short time, he was a deputy in the Supreme Soviet, then he was recalled to active military assignment as the first Supreme Commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces, a post he held from the Pact's inception in May 1955 until he retired in July 1960.

Konev was trusted by Krushchev, and his sudden appointment as Commander of Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), displacing Colonel General Ivan Yakubovsky, was a clear indication that a Soviet action of high political significance was imminent. But despite all the signs that something would happen, and soon, there was no agreement among the intelligence community representatives, or among State or US military officials in Berlin, what that something would be or when it would occur.

A State of Shock

Neither we nor the Berlin populace had long to wait. When daylight came on 13 August, it was evident that the entire Sector Border had been cordoned off by East German forces. A state of shock pervaded East and West Berlin alike. Everyone awaited some sign from the Western Allies, some move that would restore the open border. But they waited in vain, and saw only that stronger barriers were being erected. One after another of the former 60-some crossing points was closed, until only 12 remained passable, and those to authorized traffic only. The number would continue to be reduced.

No representatives of the Western Allies were in evidence at the Sector Border. A handful of West Berlin Police kept watch along the Western side. A few American officials, principally State Department officers from the US Mission, made discreet visits to the border, and some crossed into East Berlin to reconnoiter the crossing points which had been left open.

A number of Berlin Base officers also walked about in East Berlin, getting some sense of the mood of the populace.

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From his Headquarters in Heidelberg, General Bruce Clarke, Commander, US Army Europe, ordered that no US soldier was to come "closer than a baseball throw" to the Sector Border, and this was interpreted for the Berlin Garrison to mean the prowess of a big-league outfielder. Thus no uniformed personnel were to be seen at the Sector Border.[2]

The Emergency Operations Center at US Headquarters, Berlin, was frantically busy, but this was invisible to the Berlin populace. Continuous consultation was underway with the US Embassy in Bonn and the US Military Commands in West Germany, and with Washington. The same applied to the Berlin Headquarters of the British and French Commandants and their respective superiors; the three Allied Commandants and the heads of their diplomatic missions also exchanged views frequently. They all hoped somehow to find a feasible response to this final abrogation by the Soviets of the postwar agreement that Greater Berlin would be the joint responsibility of the four Allied Commanders.

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Disillusionment

But the people of West Berlin were only aware that Sunday passed without word from the Western Allies. Monday came and went, and the West Berliners' state of shock began to turn to disillusion, then anger. The East Germans imposed further controls on Monday night, requiring special permits for cars with West Berlin registration to enter East Berlin. More East German armed guards were in evidence, some blocking the escape for East Berliners via the waterways which form the Sector Border at several points. And still only the West Berlin Police confronted the East German security forces at the Sector Border.

The only public statement from the Western Allies was a call for negotiations with the Soviets. Worse, the West German ambassador in Washington notified Bonn on Monday evening that the Ambassadorial Group, the high-level coordinating group consisting of French, British and US diplomatic representatives which was set up after the Krushchev ultimatum of 1958, would not endorse even mild measures in retaliation for fear of making the situation worse.

Press reaction to the Allies' silence soon became strident. "The West Does Nothing" filled the entire front page of a Berlin tabloid. And the paper with the largest circulation in West Germany, the *Bildzeitung,* headlined "We Are Dissillusioned"—"*Wir Sind Entaeuscht*"—conveying, as clearly intended, the implication that the Allies had not kept faith with West Berlin and West Germany. The Berlin Sector Border was becoming a national issue in the Federal Republic, and it was even raising questions about the ability and willingness of the Allies to defend West Berlin's freedom.

A Mild Rebuke

Tuesday afternoon the Allied Commandants finally were authorized by their governments to protest to the Soviet Commandant the closing of the border. But here, too, the low-profile policy prevailed: the protest was not delivered to Soviet Headquarters in Karlhorst in the customary manner. Instead of being delivered personally by one of the Commandants, it was sent by messenger from the Allied Staff. News of the mildly worded protest only increased the apprehensions and anger of the West Berliners.

By Tuesday evening, it was evident that the West Berlin populace was rapidly losing confidence in the Western Allies. That same evening Berlin Base sent a long cable to Headquarters describing this mood. Suddenly, the cable reported, West Berlin had become the problem. It pointed out that the local populace would look in particular to the US to take the lead and to act as decisively as it did in 1948, when it sustained West Berlin during the blockade. How the US reacted would have decisive effect upon the morale and confidence of the West Berliners.

A Personal Protest

At 2:00 a.m. on 16 August, following a not very encouraging da(b)(1)
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(b)(3)(n) I delivered an extemporaneous harangue on the necessity that US troops at once begin patrolling the US Sector Border on a 24-hour-a-day basis. I argued that we were conceding that the East Berlin Sector Border was the border of East Germany. I also argued that until we confronted the Soviets at the Sector Border—until we compelled the Soviets to appear there—they would not engage in a dialogue with the West about Berlin.

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
Brandt Speaks

On Wednesday, 16 August, nearly 500,000 angry West Berliners gathered at the Town Hall. Brandt's political sensitivity and his oratorical powers managed to calm their fears somewhat; he urged them to have confidence and patience. He revealed that he had written President Kennedy, asking, among other things, that the Allied garrisons be reinforced; that Allied troop convoys be sent on the Autobahn between Berlin and West Germany to emphasize the continuing right of Allied access; that "token" Allied forces take up stations along the Sector Border; and that other measures be taken symbolizing the freedom of West Berlin and its ties to West Germany.

LBJ's Visit

On Thursday, 17 August, the formal Allied protest was delivered in Moscow, the text of which stated that, "the East German sealing of the frontier . . . had the effect of limiting, to a degree approaching complete prohibition, passage from the Soviet Sector to the Western Sectors of the city," which Jean Smith termed "one of the great understatements of diplomatic communications."[3] It did nothing to encourage the West Berliners. But Friday finally brought promising news: President Kennedy announced that he would strengthen the Berlin garrison and that he was sending Vice President Johnson to make a firsthand appraisal of the Berlin situation. The Berliners were even more encouraged by the fact that General Lucius Clay, who in their eyes was the hero of the airlift, would accompany Johnson.

The Vice President's visit that weekend did much to reassure the populace. Enormous crowds lined the route of the motorcade. The high point of the day from the Berliners' standpoint was the arrival of the lead element of a US Battle Group from West Germany in mid-afternoon. The announcement that it would be replaced by another battle group from West Germany every three months, and that this rotation of battle groups would continue as long as necessary, was welcomed with cheers; it meant that the Berlin Garrison was to remain at a reinforced level and that the right to use the ground-access route to Berlin would be regularly asserted.



An emotional Clay addresses Berliners at the Berlin Wall in August 1961. LBJ and Brandt look on.

But these measures would not change anything at the Sector Border, where indeed the situation became more ominous as the East Germans began replacing the barbed wire fences with a masonry wall, increasing fears that control of the Sector Border was to be permanent. Nonetheless, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Charles "Chip" Bohlen, who accompanied Johnson to Berlin, privately instructed Lightner to "cool it" because Berlin was not a popular issue back in Washington.

While Johnson's visit had not changed the Berlin situation, it had important results in Washington. He returned home with a vivid impression of the effect of the closure of the Sector Border. He saw that the people of West Berlin were in a state of shock and that Washington had badly misjudged the effect of the situation upon West Berlin. His report made a strong impression on the President; so did the continued tightening of controls at the Sector Border by the East Germans.

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Turning the Screws

On Wednesday, 23 August, the total number of crossing points had been reduced to seven, of which Allied Forces were permitted to use only one, at Friedrichstrasse, which became known worldwide as "Checkpoint Charlie." Shots were fired by border guards to warn off people who approached too close to the barriers on the East side, and residents of buildings located directly on the border were being evacuated and the buildings' doors and windows bricked up. Increasing demands were made of members of Allied Missions in West Berlin to show identity documents when crossing into East Berlin, contrary to Four-Power Agreements. And a US Army bus, carrying uniformed US soldiers on a regularly scheduled US Army sightseeing tour of East Berlin, was delayed over an hour by East German border guards demanding identity documents. The incident received wide publicity in East and West Germany.

Alarmed by declining morale in West Germany and West Berlin, and with it confidence in the US and the other Western Allies to defend West Germany against Soviet aggression, Chancellor Adenauer wrote President Kennedy to this effect on 29 August. He emphasized that Allied inaction was encouraging neutralist sentiment in West Germany. All these factors, and more, had their effect: Kennedy announced on 30 August that General Clay was returning to Berlin as his personal representative, and would take up this post immediately after the 17 September West German election.

Clay Returns

Clay arrived in Berlin on 19 September, and lost little time in carrying out an action designed to assert the US—and by extension, the Western Allied—right of unimpeded access to Greater Berlin. On 21 September he tried to go by car to the tiny exclave of Steinstuecken, officially part of the American Sector, but physically separated from the American Sector and accessible only via a road several hundred yards long, running through the Soviet Zone. He was prevented from doing so by the East German guard, so the next day he flew to the settlement in a helicopter. The political war over Allied rights in Berlin had at last begun.

Working with Clay

The US Mission provided Clay a rather modest staff. This proved to be a real advantage to Berlin Base, because Clay and the new DCI, John McCone, were close friends, and the DCI directed us to provide him all possible support. Thus we got to see him frequently. I brought him a specially prepared *Current Intelligence Bulletin* every day, and we often discussed actions which it might be possible to undertake in East Germany to discredit the Wall.


In our conversations, Clay invariably emphasized that anything he undertook would conform with Four-Power Agreements. He considered for a time breaking through the Wall by ramming it with a tank, stipulating in discussing the possibility that the tank driver would withdraw to the western side of the Sector Border immediately thereafter, to show that the US was making no claim that armed US military were authorized to be in East Berlin. Clay also was interested in various "wonder potions" which were supposed to dissolve concrete blocks of the sort used to construct the Wall, and he shared our disappointment that none lived up to their claims. It was particularly encouraging to me to realize that he was alert for any opportunity which would unmistakably demonstrate that the Soviets were responsible for the Wall.

A Fortuitous Incident

Such an opportunity came on the evening of 22 October, when Minister Lightner, accompanied by his wife and driving his personal car, was denied access to East Berlin, where the Lightners had intended to go to the opera. Lightner knew everything about the US rules for access to East Berlin, which prohibited officials from showing identity documents, and he also carried in the car a checklist of the procedures to be followed in the event entry of a member of the American Mission was impeded. He identified himself orally, refused to show any documentation, and following the guidelines tried to move his car slowly forward in a show of righteous determination. But the East German guard did not step aside; instead, several more guards jumped in

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Clay chins himself up the Berlin Wall for a glimpse of East Berlin.

front of his car and blocked the way. In accordance with the SOP, Lightner demanded to see a Soviet officer, but he was ignored. After about an hour of trying to assert their right of entry, the Lightners returned to the western side of the checkpoint.

Meanwhile, General Clay had been notified, and he came at once to the checkpoint, ordered two jeeps with armed soldiers as passengers, set up a convoy of one jeep ahead and one behind Lightner's car, and sent it off through the East Berlin control point without stopping. After the convoy had driven 100 yards or so into East Berlin, it turned around and returned per the General's instructions. The right of Allied access to East Berlin, in political terms, had been asserted.

Reaction was swift. A dozen unmarked Soviet tanks moved into East Berlin—the first, incidentally, which we had seen in East Berlin—and bivouacked in a vacant lot a few blocks from the Friedrichstrasse crossing point. Clay at once ordered US tanks to be

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stationed daily along Friedrichstrasse near Checkpoint Charlie. Two or three times, between 23 and 27 October, Clay dispatched US Mission officers into East Berlin. They had strict orders not to show any identity documents, and, when they were blocked by the East Berlin guards, proceeded through the checkpoint in convoy with jeeps manned by armed soldiers, then immediately returned to West Berlin.

Late in the afternoon of 27 October, just after the US tanks had withdrawn to their nighttime bivouac area at nearby Templehof Airfield, the unmarked tanks appeared in Friedrichstrasse and deployed in a blocking pattern near the East Berlin checkpoint. The US tanks were quickly ordered back to their station at Checkpoint Charlie, and a nightlong confrontation ensued.

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By the next morning, the Soviets were finding the standoff embarrassing. Around 10:30 a.m. young German girls appeared, presented bouquets of flowers to the Soviet tank crews "to thank them for defending the Republic," and the tanks withdrew, as did the US tanks shortly thereafter. The first direct US-Soviet confrontation was over, with Clay the clear victor.

Soviet responsibility had been demonstrated to the world, but the Wall remained. Almost all East Germans were forbidden to travel to the West, the ground-access routes between West Germany and Berlin remained vulnerable to East German/Soviet interdiction, and the Soviet threat to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany had not been withdrawn. The division of Germany appeared more permanent than ever before.

Intelligence Performance

Almost immediately after the Sector Border was closed, senior policymakers in Washington began asking why this "intelligence failure" had occurred. "The Wall" seemed to many by its very existence to be proof of failure, and perhaps that judgment still prevails. It would be rash to assert the contrary, but, more than 30 years after the event and despite all that has appeared in print about the Wall, misconceptions persist. And there are even some pertinent facts that may not be generally known.

Some commentators on this subject seem to concentrate their charge of failure upon the fact that intelligence did not provide in advance the precise date and time the border would be cordoned off. If one accepts that narrow definition, intelligence did fail.

But from the time of Krushchev's "ultimatum" in November 1958 to August 1961, there had been a steady flow of analytical reporting from Berlin Base addressed to senior Agency levels, including the DCI, pointing out that the political objective of the USSR was to transform East Germany into a sovereign state, which would logically require imposition of strict controls at what it would proclaim to be an "international" border—the Berlin Sector Border.

Letters to the DCI

A number of insightful analyses of the Berlin situation were sent to Headquarters by the Berlin Base Chief, Dave Murphy, using the "Monthly Letter to the DCI" as a means of bringing his observations and conclusions to the attention of senior levels of the Agency. At that time, every Chief of Station or Base wrote a letter each month addressed to the DCI, which was always seen by the Area Division Chief, the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations, and the staff of the DCI. That staff often sent the letter, or extracts, to the DCI himself.

In his May 1960 letter to the DCI, more than a year before the "Wall," Murphy made a prescient analysis of Khrushchev's objectives and his likely actions to achieve them, predicting that those actions would include creating an "international" frontier between East and West Berlin.[4] He wrote:

> "A separate treaty between the Soviet Union and the 'GDR' opens a Pandora's box of possibilities insofar as access to West Berlin from West Germany is concerned. We are inclined to

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doubt, however, that the Soviets will permit their East German 'gauleiters' to interfere with access to a degree that could risk hostilities. A more likely result of a separate peace treaty will be the creation of an 'international' frontier between East and West Berlin. This would provide the SED regime for the first time with a 'legal' basis for eliminating the present uncontrolled movement across the sector borders. In so doing they would not only reduce the refugee flow to insignificant proportions but would also prevent the exposure of thousands of East Berliners and Zone residents to the 'demoralizing' influences of West Berlin. This is without doubt the East German regime's most important single objective and one which is shared by the Soviets. Unless the constant drain of refugees can be stopped and until 'GDR' citizens are no longer able to draw moral and spiritual sustenance from visits to West Berlin however brief, it will be impossible to achieve the total communization of East Germany."

A few months later, in late October 1960, Murphy's letter to the DCI, in addition to describing further instances of "salami" tactics in Berlin, highlighted problems facing the Western Allies in trying to devise effective countermeasures to dissuade the Soviets and East Germans from imposing travel controls on West Berlin residents, controls which reflected unfavorably upon the ability of the Allies to protect them. Murphy also stressed the importance of holding the Soviets responsible for the measures allegedly being taken by the East Germans, and of insisting that the Soviets deal directly with the Allies on Berlin issues:

"The East Germans have made permanent their 30 August controls on West Germans wishing to enter East Berlin. They have also declared that West Germans and West Berliners wishing to visit the West Berlin exclave of Steinstuecken must submit to similar controls. Finally, the East Germans, backed up by the Soviets, Poles and Czechs, no longer recognize as valid West German passports in the possession of West Berliners wishing to transit the GDR to the Soviet Bloc . . . The net effect of these actions has been to lend considerable weight to Walter Ulbricht's claim that Berlin is their capital and that they have the right to control traffic to and within their capital as they see fit. Allied protests both on the Berlin and Moscow levels have been rebuffed by the Soviets, who fully support the East German position."

Finding protests of no value, and considering that a serious situation had arisen, the American Embassy in Bonn urged reprisals. First, an attempt was made to withhold travel documents from East Germans desiring to travel to West European nations not recognizing the GDR. However, there are loopholes in this and NATO nations have not agreed to plug them with respect to commercial travellers if this means a loss in trade. Next, West Germany responded to additional American urging by several measures aimed at interzonal trade, including cancellation of the current agreement. However, West German business circles have made it clear that they expect NATO to follow suit. So far NATO nations and Great Britain in particular have been reluctant to push economic sanctions as reprisals because they do not feel that East German actions to date warrant such severe measures.

While we are in full agreement with the Embassy on the gravity of the present situation, we do not believe reprisals will dissuade the East Germans from their present course. In our view they will continue harassment tactics against Berlin, and will concentrate on disrupting the commercial and industrial life of the city.

The only thing that can stop this gradual deterioration of the situation is determined Allied action of a type which forces the Soviets to resume the 'dialogue' on the Berlin question directly with the Allies and does not permit them to disclaim any responsibility for Berlin. To do this we must appear ready to take direct action on an issue which touches a Soviet nerve and would require Soviet intervention if

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such action were taken. We think the one thing which concerns the Soviets and certainly the East Germans the most is our continued insistence on the Four-Power status for all of Berlin. Consequently, if the East Germans extend their sector controls to include West Berliners and forbid them to enter East Berlin, the Allies should consider direct action to insure freedom of circulation throughout a city for which they continue to bear responsibility even though the Soviets disclaim any such responsibility."

Murphy recognized that the "Right of Free Circulation" had pretty much been allowed to lapse since the Soviets withdrew from the Quadripartite Kommandatura in 1948. But his intention was to sound once again a warning to Headquarters that permitting the East Germans to institute controls on the Sector Border would raise doubts in the minds of the West Berliners about Allied ability to ward off East German harassment, not only of access routes but also in other matters affecting the prosperity and stability of West Berlin. He concluded:

" . . . the West Berliners will become more and more convinced that the Allies are unwilling to take any action at any time . . . *We seem to forget that we can only remain in Berlin if we enjoy the full confidence of the West Berliners.* That confidence is still there but it has slipped during the last month of 'salami' tactics. We cannot long delay taking definitive action, and it might be best if we looked ahead on this one and chose the issue which we feel most confident would bring the Soviets back into the act."

And in April 1961, Murphy's letter pointed out the growing problems in East Germany created by the mounting numbers of persons fleeing to West Berlin:

"Events of the past month indicate that both the Soviets and East Germans are still anxious to resolve what from their point of view is an increasingly onerous Berlin problem. The most exasperating manifestation of this problem, the refugee flow, continues at a level higher than last year. On Good Friday and Holy Saturday alone over 2,500 refugees registered at Marienfelde, and a total of 5,000 is expected by Easter Monday evening. The impact of this flow was noted in speeches during the 12th Plenum of the SED. Bruno Leuschner, the head of the State Planning Commission, in a very frank review of economic shortcomings cited the declining labor force as a major problem inhibiting the growth of the East German economy. Walter Ulbricht also referred to the refugee problem and called upon the party to investigate all cases of 'flight from the republic' to determine the causes. Ulbricht then went on to urge action on the Berlin question, and in terms reminiscent of the 1959 and 1960 propaganda campaigns, attacked West Berlin 'espionage and subversive organizations.' References of this type and attacks on the presence and activities of the Federal Republic in West Berlin were more vehement than anything we have heard since the summer of 1960."

Misjudging Moscow

Khrushchev may have been keeping his options open in April 1961 with respect to what move he would make, but the steadily increasing flow of refugees to West Berlin was making it inevitable that effective controls would be imposed on the Sector Border. In the first quarter of 1961, 34,000 refugees registered in West Berlin, and the total was rising every day; in July 1961 alone, as panic spread throughout East Germany, a total of 30,000 were registered.

In retrospect, it is rather curious that in springtime 1961, US policy planners in Washington, Bonn and Berlin were attracted to the idea that the East German Government would not be permitted by the Soviets to close the Sector Border, and came up with the idea that, instead, the border between the "Soviet Zone," i.e., between East Germany and East Berlin, would be closed. This "solution" perhaps was found appealing because it would not violate the rights of the Western Allies. But it ignored the central point of Khruschev's political objective, which was to establish a sovereign "GDR" with East Berlin as its capital. It also ignored the fact that, as a Communist state, East Germany had a centrally directed, planned

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economy, whose government offices were located in East Berlin, which would mean that there would be constant traffic from East Germany to East Berlin, whence they could flee to West Berlin, unless the Sector Border was controlled. Nor did the idea address the already critical need felt by the East Germans to reduce the refugee flow, which could only be achieved by effective controls of the Sector Border.

Nonetheless, to a surprising degree, the idea that the East Berlin Zone Border would be closed tended to cloud discussion among US officials about likely Soviet moves. There seemed to be a great reluctance to accept control of the Sector Border as a real possibility.

An Intelligence Gap

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But the Berlin Base analysis quoted above clearly stating that the Sector Border might be closed had not had any visible effect in Washington, either; National Intelligence Estimates concerning the Berlin crisis published between January and July 1961 did not address this possibility.

Whatever the case, messages based on field opinion which served mainly to alert Headquarters to a possible event would not have the status of firm intelligence on Soviet intentions. The question persisted: why "all those US, British, French and German agencies" which had been running spies in East Germany for so many years failed to notice preparations for building the Wall? At least they might have noticed the massive amount of building materials needed to construct the Wall. And what about all those troops which were moved into Berlin to block the border?

Those questions arose from a misconception of what actually happened. No agency saw those vast quantities of building materials before 13 August, and for quite a while after that date, because no unusual quantities of concrete block—for a city in which many buildings were under construction—were lying about in East Berlin. They were not seen because they were not there.

Difficult to Detect

The "Wall" that went up on 13 August was a few strands of barbed wire strung from concrete posts. All the material necessary to cordon off the Sector Border—the 27-mile length of which was also guarded by hundreds of East German Army troops during the initial stages—all the barbed wire and all the concrete posts needed for the first, temporary fencing, could be and were brought in the same trucks which transported the troops to the scene. Those troops came from garrisons in East Germany, far from Berlin. It was Saturday night, so the likelihood that a patrol of one of the Allied Military Missions in East Germany might come across the convoys was remote, as the Military Missions generally stayed in their homes in West Berlin on weekends.

Moreover, at any time, day or night, on any day of the week, Soviet and East German military convoys were underway somewhere in East Germany, engaged in training exercises. In the small geographic area of East Germany there were 20 Soviet divisions, more than 300,000 troops. There were 75,000 East German troops in six divisions. And there were also the "Ready Police," which looked very much like military units and indeed included many former soldiers in its ranks who had already completed the maximum permissible term of 6-years' active duty in the East German Army. Thus it was possible to carry out a large-scale movement of East German troops at night, especially on a Saturday evening, without much likelihood that it would be seen as out of the ordinary.

On 13 August a number of Berlin Base officers talked to a few of these soldiers along the Sector Border, and found some in the more remote and rural areas of the border who did not even know they were in Berlin. And as for building a wall, in many of the rural areas the guards did not even put up fence posts during the first days, relying instead on

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concertina-style coils of razor-sharp barbed wire laid out along the border. Construction of the Wall did not commence for several days, and work on the original 6-foot-high wall went on for many months.

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Penkovskiy's Knowledge

Publication of *The Penkovskiy Papers* in 1965 gave rise to another misconception. Oleg Penkovskiy was the GRU colonel who was the most valuable penetration of the Soviet Union in the post-World War II era. He was arrested late in 1962, tried and executed in mid-1963. *The Penkovskiy Papers* includes the statement that he had "learned about the Berlin closing four days before the Soviet Government actually closed it off."[6] Penkovskiy, however, had just returned to Moscow the same day he learned of the Soviet plan—10 August—after having been in London since 18 July. Communication with Penkovskiy in Moscow was very risky, and in this instance he did not initiate the means he had for calling an emergency meeting. As a result, his knowledge that the Soviets intended to close the Sector Border on 13 August was not received until well after the fact.

The authors of *The Spy Who Saved the World*, a more detailed account of the Penkovskiy case published in 1992, state that he did not report that information until 23 August, when he met Greville Wynne in Paris. They add their opinion (in 1992!) that: "had President Kennedy known of Krushchev's intentions, he could have undermined the Soviet action, possibly forcing them to abort it by exposing the plan to build the wall and, at least, alerting the Germans."[7]

That hypothesis is at least open to doubt, in view of Krushchev's political objectives and the need to stop the flight of East Germans to the West. The President had made a thorough study of the Berlin situation following his confrontation with Krushchev in Vienna in June. He also had the benefit of Penkovskiy's reporting, which had contributed significantly to reducing the estimate of the Soviet long-range missile capabilities and therefore of the threat of nuclear attack on the US. The President took steps to increase the strength of conventional forces in all four services, and he put in motion preparations to increase the US military contingent in Europe.

On 25 July 1961, in a speech to alert the US public to the seriousness of the Berlin crisis, Kennedy at the same time threw down the gauntlet to Krushchev, declaring that the US was in West Berlin by right, and would remain so long as the freedom of West Berlin was threatened. The speech—with such statements as " . . . the solemn vow each of us gave to West Berlin in time of peace will not be broken in time of danger . . . Today, the endangered frontier of freedom runs through divided Berlin . . . " alarmed many in West Berlin and the Federal

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Republic of Germany because of the absence of mention of East Berlin. But it was by far the strongest commitment to the protection of West Berlin that any Ally had made since the airlift.

The President saw that the claim to free access and to presence in West Berlin were fundamental Allied rights on which no concessions had been made throughout the occupation; likewise, he understood the potential for adverse impact upon the credibility of US commitments if concessions were made. The claim of Western Allied rights in East Berlin, on the other hand, had been de facto abandoned since Soviet withdrawal from the Quadripartite Kommandatura more than a dozen years earlier. Weighing all factors, the President made his decision: he committed the US to uphold the freedom of West Berlin, setting the policy which preserved that freedom another 30 years, until Germany was finally reunified.

Reviewing Western Policy

Charges persist that the West's policy on Berlin was wrong. Perhaps no firm conclusion can ever be drawn, but any assessment of that policy should include recognition of the temper of the times. This was the first confrontation in which both sides were nuclear powers. The members of the Western Alliance were persuaded of Moscow's power and of their own military weakness, and NATO defense plans called for almost immediate resort to nuclear war. The Western Allies—all three—did not see closing of the Sector Border as an issue over which they would go to war. In their perception the freedom of West Berlin would only be threatened if the ground-access routes were cut off. On that issue there could be no compromise, as Dean Acheson had emphatically advised President Kennedy.

In fact, as events demonstrated, no plans had been made to deal with the contingency that the Sector Border might be closed, beyond deciding that the Western Allies would not intervene. On 13 August 1961, East Berlin and East Germany were physically cut off from the West. The dividing line between Eastern and Western Europe, which the Soviets began drawing shortly after World War II with the takeover by the communist party first of Hungary, then of Czechoslovakia, had now been formally extended to include East Germany, a division which would last some 30 years. But throughout that time the Western Allies succeeded in defending the freedom of West Berlin by maintaining the Allied rights established in World War II. A Soviet takeover of West Berlin was averted. If the West had known, authoritatively, precisely, and well in advance of the action the Soviets would take, could the Berlin Wall have been prevented without war? I leave it to the historians—past, present, and future—to debate that question.

NOTES

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2. This order was consistent with the prevailing assessment of the US Joint Chiefs that direct confrontation of the US and Soviet military risked triggering nuclear war. The JCS held to the belief that conventional forces available to NATO would not be able to halt a Soviet attack on Western Europe, and defense plans accordingly called for virtually immediate recourse to nuclear weapons. Generals Maxwell Taylor and Matthew Ridgeway had each resigned his post as JCS Chairman when they were unable to gain adoption of the doctrine of "flexible response" and the buildup of conventional forces which that policy would require. President Kennedy inclined to their view, because immediate recourse to nuclear arms would not offer much opportunity for negotiations to try to avoid military hostilities, and he decided to start building up US conventional forces. In his first State of the Union address, he called for an increase in airlift capabilities essential to projecting the power of conventional forces. At the end of March 1961, he

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asked Congress for an additional appropriation to add to conventional capabilities. And, after the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, he appointed General Taylor to his personal staff as adviser on NATO and Germany, and through him thereafter took a direct hand in events in Berlin. The day the Soviets closed the Sector Border, however, US defense plans still called for rapid resort to nuclear weapons, and there was great apprehension among many policy-level officials in Washington that the Soviets might block the West Germany-Berlin access route and precipitate nuclear war. In his book, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, Paul Nitze wrote (page 197) that "Our NATO contingency plans called for sending a small military force down the Autoban to Berlin and, if resisted, moving to the nuclear response envisioned in MC 14/2." Nitze further states (page 205) "To my mind, the Berlin crisis of 1961 was a time of greater danger of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union than the Cuban missile crisis of 1962."

3. Jean Smith: *The Defense of Berlin*, p. 286

4. [redacted]

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5. [redacted]

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6. *The Penkovskiy Papers*. Doubleday; Garden City, New York; 1965; 411 pp.

7. Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter Deriaban. *The Spy Who Saved the World*. Charles Scribner's Sons; New York; 1992; p. 226.

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How to improve it

The DI's Product Review Process

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". . .it is worth remembering that the basic purpose of the review process is to take the individual ideas or judgments of a single analyst or a few analysts, and turn those ideas or judgments into the institutional position of the Central Intelligence Agency."

DDI Newsletter
12 January 1984

From the standpoint of intelligence analysis *per se*, the product review process is one of the central fixtures of professional life in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). It is also an aspect of intelligence work that deserves more attention and study than it has traditionally received. While attitudes toward review vary tremendously across the directorate, most observers agree that the process could be improved. The last DI-wide survey on the subject, conducted in late 1988 by the DI Management Advisory Group (MAG), found that the biggest single complaint from analysts was not with the process itself but with management's failure to follow the prescribed process. I would argue that as a directorate we do not have any "prescribed" process, and that many of the problems with review can be traced to this basic lack of a conceptual framework.

For new analysts, review can be an unexpected, humbling experience that seems to contradict many of the norms of their academic experience. In the case of complex or contentious pieces review can be a grueling exercise, even for experienced analysts. In some cases, the outcome of the process may be a decision not to publish, with months of research and writing seemingly wasted. One of the most common grievances expressed by analysts is that there are too many layers of review, leading to contradictory requirements and redundant or "circular" revisions.

Managers have to deal with similar problems, though from a different perspective. Their greatest challenge is often to mediate conflicting positions and produce compromise language without gutting the analysis. And, finally, for all involved the process can sometimes be protracted and exhausting. Many of us have heard stories about items for the *National Intelligence Daily* (NID) that took a week to coordinate or "hardcover" papers that took a year from first draft to final publication.

In my view, the existing review process is necessary and it is not fundamentally flawed. Many of its problems can be ameliorated, if not solved, by building a clearer shared understanding of its goals and purposes.

First Things First

The directorate has no succinct, common definition of review. Some DI offices have statements about how review is supposed to function. But these are usually mechanistic descriptions or production timetables detailing, for example, how much turnaround time each management echelon has for a paper. Because of differences in culture and subject matter, and the latitude given office directors by the Deputy Director For Intelligence, at this level the process can differ substantially from office to office.

In general terms, review is the contribution of the organization to the production of a particular intelligence product, as opposed to the contribution of the individual analyst. (This discussion deals primarily with the production of longer-term written intelligence products, though some if it applies to current pieces and high-level briefings.) This may seem obvious, but it is an important characterization because it reminds us that intelligence in whatever form it

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may take is essentially an amalgam of individual and organizational efforts, both of which have to be given their due. To depreciate the individual's contribution is to forget that all analysis has to begin with some person's intellectual effort; ignoring the organization's rightful role risks straying into the morass of analytical pride.

At a more specific level, review can be seen as having four basic elements: coordination, validation, editing, and production. These are not, however, sequential stages; they are logically, but not necessarily temporally, distinct. *Coordination*, which some mistakenly assume to be synonymous with review, is the quality-control part of the process. It consists of the examination of a particular piece of intelligence by others in the organization to eliminate errors of fact, to identify additional perspectives that might not have occurred to the author, and to ensure that the judgments drawn are congruent with those taken by other DI components.

Validation is the adoption by the organization of the analysis contained in the product as its corporate position. It is the heart of the process. Validation formally occurs when the product receives final approval from the appropriate management level, but it actually takes place throughout the process, beginning with management's decision to undertake the project. Through the sometimes innumerable coordination meetings and draft rewrites, the organization gradually takes "ownership" of the product from the analyst. This is often difficult for both parties: the analyst has to learn to give up total control of substance, while the organization has to take care not to muddle or compromise the analytical message. Even after final approval, some may remain skeptical of a piece's analytical line. There is nothing wrong in this. When the Agency puts its seal on a product, it signifies only an organizational consensus, not a unanimity of opinion. In cases where opposing views are held by a significant minority, differences can and should be reflected in the draft itself.

Broadly speaking, the goals of the *editorial* stage of review are to improve the readability and organization of the text and bring it into conformance with the DI writing style. Good editors are able to improve the clarity of a piece while leaving substance unaffected. Because editing plays a role in refining the presentation of analysis, a critical aspect of intelligence production, it is properly considered part of review. Unfortunately, a basic problem with editing is that too many in the process view it as their responsibility, a fact that often leads to an unnecessary duplication of effort. For example, how many of us can recall expending considerable effort on the precise wording of a piece of current intelligence at the office level and below, only to have the NID Staff substantially reword it?

The final phase of the review process is usually dominated by *production*, during which the piece is prepared for publication by the Office of Current Production and Analytic Support production staff, the author, and his or her home office editorial staff. Although some might consider it inappropriate to include production as part of review, important decisions regarding the overall layout, the presentation of maps, figures and other visual aids, and the finalization of the piece's dissemination list are made only at this stage.

Perspectives on the Process

A majority in the DI regardless of position, seniority, or substantive speciality believe the review process is imperfect. In my experience, observers of it usually fall into one of three general categories. The first could be labeled the "pessimist" school. Its proponents argue that the existing process is systemically corrupt and that no amount of tinkering will cure its ills. For example, they cite the fact that those closest to "substance," the line analysts, have a weaker voice in deciding disputed intelligence judgments than their non-expert superiors. This, they sometimes hold, opens the doors to the politicization of intelligence. Others claim that minority positions are often submerged by the dominant corporate view, and that fresh, groundbreaking analysis cannot occur because of the demands of building consensus. In view of the seriousness of these shortcomings, they argue, the existing edifice of review should be razed and rebuilt.

A second, more mainstream group might be dubbed the "cynics." While disagreeing with the pessimists' contention that the process in inherently flawed, this

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group agrees that it is a waste of time to try to improve it. Cynics have witnessed many attempts to "fix" the review process, most of which they judge to have had little practical effect. They are, therefore, content to live with the prevailing process. It is difficult to generalize about the predominant attitudes of this group because they cover such a wide spectrum. Most seem to believe, however, that the shortcomings of review are a natural consequence of the conflict between the individual's desire for substantive creativity and judgmental freedom and the organization's demand for conformity and compromise. If the cynics had a motto, it probably would be: "When you can fix human nature, then you'll fix the review process." In an extreme form, some cynics have almost a "sink or swim" mentality: having put up with and succeeded in spite of the challenges posed by the review process, they see no reason why others, particularly new analysts, cannot do so as well.

I call the last group the "optimist" school. It believes that the process is not fundamentally defective and that its deficiencies can be remedied to some significant degree. The mark of an optimist is the willingness to entertain and at times to implement significant changes or experiments in the review process. Most are cautious, however, because they recognize that tinkering with a basically sound process has its risks. In a perverse way, the optimists in the DI probably are responsible for most of the shortcomings of the process because they have been in the vanguard over the years in refining the system. But this should not deter us from suggesting or attempting solutions.

Tackling the Problem

To my mind, all of the problems with the review process in the DI boil down to two: one substantive and one perceptual. The substantive problem is that the functions of the individuals involved in the process are not drawn clearly enough. This leads to a duplication of effort and unnecessary delays. What, for example, is the difference between the functions of the branch chief and the division chief? Should there be any difference? Among peers, where does the burden of persuasion lie with regard to disputed judgments, with those requesting change or with those resisting change? What is the threshold for including dissenting opinions in publications? In the case of editing, where does the branch chief's role end and the office editorial staff's begin? All of us have different answers to these questions but no common set of guidelines.

This problem could be substantially reduced if each of the participants in the process concentrated on that function that they perform best. For example, analysts are best suited to perform research and draft basic analysis. Branch chiefs have greater experience, and they are still in touch with the subject matter on a routine basis; they are best equipped to perform a thorough substantive check. Higher-level managers have greater experience, and they are more in touch with consumers; they are best able to examine the product for focus and policy relevance. And so it goes with all the other participants. Instead of having the perspective of producers who "assemble" a product, with each contributing his or her share to the as yet imperfect whole, we often seem more like artists who feel that the work of art can only go forward in "perfect" form (hence the stylistic editing at every level of review). We need more producers and fewer artists.

The perceptual problem with the review process is that each one of us defines it in a different way. Sometimes these differences are significant. The particulars of the process vary widely across the DI, and that is as it should be. But there exists no authoritative framework within which to structure the details. In the MAG survey, analysts felt most frustrated that management did not follow the prescribed process. This is a direct reflection of the varying expectations between analysts and managers about what review is and how it should function. This has sometimes contributed to a perception among analysts that, while they are held accountable for following the prescribed process, management has no such strictures.

When analysts join the DI, they are expected to be able to do research, analyze, and write. Such expectations are reasonable because these skills are tested on the PATB and because they are required to make it through the university system. It is curious, however, that we also seem to expect them to understand the review process without ever having been exposed to it. In the Office of Training and Education's (OTE) Analyst Training Course, a great deal of effort is rightly devoted to teaching new analysts how to write in the DI style. But the review

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process receives little attention, even though an understanding of it will be as important to an analyst's success as mastering the DI writing style. Similarly, in the Supervision of Analysis Course, new managers are taught how to review papers but not about the review *process* itself. OTE is not responsible, however, for this state of affairs; the DI has no formal review concept that could serve as a basis for such instruction.

Recommendations for Change

As a first step, the DI should develop and promulgate a directorate-level product review process concept, with which all individual office review procedures must be in accordance. The broad outlines of such a concept have already been defined, most recently in the DI Notice *Guidelines for Product Review, Coordination, and Incorporation of Alternative Views* (DI N 20-205, 2 June 1992). They now need to be developed further and formally published in a manual or similar document. This effort should involve both managers and analysts, and it should focus on elaborating an overarching concept of review that can be applied across all of the DI line offices, rather than establishing particular review procedures, which should be left up to the individual offices.

Once developed, this concept should be integrated into OTE training for analysts and managers in the DI. For analysts, this could be accomplished primarily through a block of instruction in the Analyst Training Course, which is required for all new analysts. It could also be presented in the Workshop for DI Midlevel Analysts and the DI Writing Workshop. Managers could receive instruction during the Supervision of Analysis Course, which is mandatory for all new branch chiefs. The DI review process concept could also be included in an analysis tradecraft manual, development of which was called for in another recent DI Notice. Over time, the concept would permeate the directorate and become its institutional philosophy. And, unlike the current situation, it would be explicit and commonly held. If experience so warrants, the concept could and should be modified as conditions change.

Toward a DI Review Philosophy

The DCI's task force on Politicization and Intelligence Production has already taken steps to address many of the concerns raised here. Their efforts are a good start toward developing a more clear-cut philosophy of review in the DI. Some of my thoughts on the possible substance of such a philosophy follow:

— The central purpose of review is to produce a product that represents the institutional position of the CIA.

— All other things being equal, fewer levels of review are better than more. There should exist a presumptive requirement to demonstrate that a new level of review will *significantly* improve the product before it is created.

— Review begins at the conceptual stage of a paper, not when analysis and drafting are completed, and it carries through to the final physical production stage.

— For the analyst, review is as much about giving up his or her sole control of the product as it is about getting others to take ownership of it.

— Even though the analyst plays the primary role in carrying out the day-to-day procedures of review, management should bear the ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of the process.

— All parties should be held accountable to the established review process, except in the most unusual circumstances.

— There is no room for ego or literary hubris in the review process. Intelligence production in the DI is a team effort in which compromise, next to the pursuit of truth, is the most highly valued commodity.

— Review is logically distinct from research but not from analysis. The intellectual scrutiny to which products are exposed during the process is an integral part of the final published analysis.

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— Greater emphasis should be put on timeliness. According to the recent DCI task force report on production, consumers believe that timeliness is sometimes a problem with DI products, and they generally value it more highly than quality of content.

— To reduce duplication of effort and enhance timeliness, participants in the process should concentrate on the task or function that they alone among the participants are best able to perform.

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AUTHOR: David Peterson

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High-tech hotline

Teleconferencing and Crisis Management

David Peterson

At about 1900 hours on 1 August 1990, Washington received the first sketchy reports that Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait early on 2 August (Persian Gulf time). When confirmation was obtained, a meeting of the Deputies' Committee, comprised of representatives of national security departments and agencies, was called. By 2230, when the group convened via a closed-circuit television network, Iraqi troops had entered Kuwait City.

A second meeting of the committee was held at 0645 on 2 August, and another—the third within nine hours—convened later that morning. Each session was chaired by Richard Haass, Senior Director for the Near East on the National Security Council staff. (The designated chairman, Robert Gates, then the President's Deputy National Security Adviser, was not in Washington at the time.) Other attendees included Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Richard Kerr, who was then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

The members of the committee were accompanied and supported by regional experts from their respective organizational staffs. Kerr, for example, was assisted by the Chief of the Near East Division in CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO); the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia; and the Chief of the Persian Gulf Division in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) and his senior analyst.

The committee considered several operational proposals and possible countermeasures. A key recommendation that was discussed and implemented within hours was the freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in US banks. After consulting Treasury Department officials and the Federal Reserve Bank, an Executive Order was written and taken before dawn to President Bush for his signature.

Not putting too fine a point on it, CIA's Senior Duty Officer wrote in his log, "It was a busy night." It also was a textbook example of how technology has transformed the business of crisis management, bringing "teleconferencing" to its lexicon.

SVTS

The medium for the Deputies' Committee's deliberations during those hectic hours was the Secure Video Teleconferencing System (SVTS). The system was developed to enable the President and his senior national security advisers to confer without leaving their own buildings, and it proved its worth throughout the Persian Gulf crisis. Committee members sat in or near their respective communications centers so that any new information could be shared immediately. (In CIA's Operations Center that night, the Chief of the Near East Division had direct telephone contact [redacted] (b)(1) files, maps, photography and other background (b)(3)(n) material were readily accessible.

For several weeks thereafter, the Deputies' Committee used the SVTS to meet daily, including on weekends. The meetings tapered off to an average of three times per week during the succeeding months before the allied offensive to liberate Kuwait. Throughout this period, the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) and numerous other interagency groups also used the network to confer on Gulf-related matters. Activity on the system increased again in the weeks leading up to, and following, the allied attack on 16 January 1991.

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The Oil Spill

Interactive SVTS media were especially valuable when the Intelligence Community was tracking the Iraqi oil spill. Shortly before the allied offensive, suspicion mounted that tankers the Iraqis were loading in Kuwait might be used as "floating bombs" to oppose the expected seaborne assault by US Marines. Then an oil slick was sighted at one of Kuwait's offshore loading terminals.

The Department of State promptly called for a teleconference. In addition to the usual national security agencies, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the US Coast Guard, and the Department of Energy were represented. A US official in Saudi Arabia participated by telephone.

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Panamanian Precedent

Before teleconferencing could become commonplace for national security deliberations, the deficiencies inherent in operating without its technological advantages had to be exposed. In such instances, participants in high-level interagency meetings would consume precious time before assembling at the White House Situation Room. During these sessions, they had only remote telephonic and electronic contacts with the operations centers, supporting personnel, and other organizational assets at their home bases.

The cumbersome and inefficient nature of this arrangement was painfully obvious during the unsuccessful coup attempt in Panama on 3 October 1989. Senior US policymakers, who did not use SVTS on that occasion, did not receive timely information, and, as a result, the departments and agencies concerned each had known only part of what was happening in Panama at critical stages of the uprising.

Gates, after the Deputies' Committee he chaired had reviewed the lessons learned from the Panama experience, distributed a memorandum in late October directing that certain steps be taken to improve crisis-management operations. One was to incorporate use of the SVTS in order "to improve lateral and vertical dissemination of information and guidance." A Supplement to the National Security Directive on Crisis Management was issued on 25 October stating that "the NSC Deputies' Committee shall be responsible for day-to-day crisis management, reporting to the National Security Council."

These new arrangements thus were in effect on 19 December 1989, when the Deputies' Committee assembled via SVTS to monitor Panamanian and foreign reaction to US intervention in Panama, "Operation Just Cause." The group remained in virtually continuous session from 2330 that night until about 0700 the next morning. On succeeding days, it met once in the morning and again near the end of the day to review events. There was marked improvement in the coordination and flow of information to senior officials and in the associated decisionmaking process.

Other Situations of Note

During the interim before Operation Just Cause started, the new emphasis on teleconferencing in fact had already improved DI support for crisis management.

- When Salvadoran rebels mounted their "November" offensive in 1989, the network was used extensively for meetings of the Deputies' and Policy Coordinating Committees. During the height of the fighting, Intelligence Community analysts participated in as many as four teleconferencing meetings per day.

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By the spring of 1990, when the USSR began to disintegrate, the national security community had become comfortable with teleconferencing. March and April were especially busy months for Soviet watchers. Five meetings of the Deputies' Committee and eight of the PCC, each concentrating on Lithuania, were held on SVTS during that period. The Baltics also were the focus of attention in January 1991, when the Deputies met on the network three times and the PCC used it on six occasions.

Pluses and Minuses

The sources for this article were unanimous in acknowledging the psychological advantages of conferring by teleconference. They agreed with the observation that it provides a unique bonding experience. Assembling frequently in this format, they concur, promotes informality and greater participation. Principals have more eye contact while facing each other through the video cameras, there is less side chatter, and the meetings as a consequence are shorter and better focused. This makes it possible to pull together interagency views in a matter of hours, expediting the preparation of a coordinated Intelligence Community product.

The benefits also extend to members of the supporting cast. One of them pointed out that use of the SVTS permitted his attendance and that of other backup personnel, all of whom otherwise would not have been present if the principals had assembled at the White House. In addition to enabling them to contribute their expertise directly, these subordinates got to know each other better, and professional relationships were established that flourished even outside the formal meetings.

There is a negative side to repeated teleconferencing. The frequency during a crisis can fuel the policymakers' insatiable demand for the latest news, according to one veteran of such conferences. The pressure to provide a fresh assessment of the situation at each meeting virtually compels intelligence officers to offer the latest tidbit from the field, raising the risk that misleading and possibly erroneous information will be passed. As a consequence, both DO and DI officers ought to be cognizant of this danger and provide cautionary notice.

The pluses, however, clearly overbalance the minuses by a wide margin, and the efficacy of using SVTS is well established. The USSR is gone, but important US interests will be at risk as post-Cold War reordering progresses around the world. Whenever major international crises arise involving those interests, Washington's response almost certainly will follow the now-familiar pattern: intelligence coordination and policy formulation will begin at a teleconference.

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Uses and attitudes

TV IN THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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Recent research indicates that the impact of TV news on American public opinion may be more pervasive than a casual consideration would suggest. Much of this research has been done by Professor Shanto Iyengar of UCLA. His findings imply that the manner in which US TV news is presented to the public not only influences what people think *about* but also what to *think*. The way in which a news story is "framed" can influence the public's focus when assigning blame for social problems that are discussed on the broadcasts or when asked to suggest remedies for these ills. A news story on unemployment that focuses on the plight of a recently laid-off worker has an "episodic" frame; the broadcasting network has taken one episode of a larger problem and reports it. Conversely, should unemployment be presented in terms of the "big picture, " with facts and figures, and economic correspondents providing their views on the latest figures, the frame is labeled "thematic."

The research indicates that when viewers are exposed to episodic framing of an issue such as unemployment, they tend to "personalize" the news and to focus on unemployed *people* as both the cause and remedy of unemployment. On the other hand, viewers exposed to the predominantly thematic coverage of unemployment overwhelmingly tend to hold the government responsible for the problem and to cite increased government attention as the remedy. Hence, how the news is presented can affect to whom the public will assign responsibility and the nature of additional policy demands. The consequences of this power are significant.

Experiments and Research

Laboratory experiments provide much of the evidence on the impact of TV news on public attitudes. Typically, subjects in these experiments view network TV news broadcasts that have been altered to include stories designed for the experiment. By subjecting subsets of the viewers to different altered broadcasts, the researchers have been able to study the ability of TV news to inflate the importance of specific issues as well as influence how the viewers assign causality for social problems. But just how strong is the impact of TV news on public opinion outside of the laboratory? Do the research findings hold true when the sample of subjects is drawn from the national population, who watch the evening news each day over an extended time?

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In preparing this project, the question arose of whether analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) use foreign TV in analysis as both as a source of information and as a tool for prediction? To try to answer the question, I interviewed three to six analysts from various offices who were known to watch the TV news from their areas of responsibility. The analysts at times also watched documentaries, interviews, and other programs of possible interest. The number of interviewees usually reflected TV

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news availability in the office and the ease with which it was obtained. Generally, if the news can be obtained with a short turnaround time, then the analyst will use it.

Factors Affecting TV Viewing

The widely varying ways in which analysts use foreign TV and their reasons for using it depend in part on the nature of the individual analyst's duties. Analysts in the Office of Leadership Analysis (LDA), the Office of Scientific Weapons and Research (OSWR) and the Office of Imagery Analysis (OIA) are primarily interested in the video content of foreign TV. In the area offices, some analysts use foreign TV primarily as a source of information and others use it to gain a sense of government or public attitudes. Most of the analysts interviewed fell somewhere in between; they realized that TV is more than a quick source of information, but they did not fully understand its potential uses.

In addition to availability and ease of viewing, the degree of TV watching in the DI depends on language skills, office culture, other sources of information, and amount of time available. All of these factors are directly influenced by the analysts' opinion of the usefulness of TV news.

Because of the ready *availability* of broadcasts from their countries, the Office of European Analysis (EURA) and the Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis (OSE) seem to watch TV news more than other offices. Some EURA analysts watch the news from its countries on a daily basis. OSE has a roster of analysts who take turns watching the news and writing summaries for distribution throughout the office. These two offices also have many analysts with the necessary foreign language abilities. In contrast, the Office of Near East and South Asia Analysis (NESA) has fewer newscasts from its countries on the grid, and analysts do not watch them on a daily basis. This is probably due in part to the number of NESA's Arabic and Hebrew speakers, but, if an analyst has to order a tape of the news because it was not broadcast on the grid, he or she tends to make less use of TV.

Office culture is another factor. This partly refers to the importance that management places on watching the news. Managers in OSE, for example, watch Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) news themselves, and they also ask analysts about what they have seen. One analyst said that she began taking a serious interest in TV viewing when the office director started to ask analysts about what they had seen; several other analysts also mentioned the director's viewing habits.

Office culture also refers to the mindset of the individual analysts within the office. Several analysts from the same office indicated that they have little use for the news. The most prevalent attitude seemed to be "we already know the story through other sources" or "the government controls the media, and we already have a good idea of the government line through other sources." If this thinking is prevalent, obstacles to using the news, such as a language barrier, will not be overcome.

The *availability of other sources* of information and the *time available* to watch TV also affected viewing. A busy analyst who believes he or she can get information quicker elsewhere may not take the time to watch the news. If an analyst regards TV as just another source, he or she would tend to ignore TV, especially if it required more effort to watch the news than it does to read traffic. Conversely, if an analyst regards TV as a unique source of information that can be used as an analytical tool, then obstacles are more likely to be overcome.

Two examples that illustrate this point involve language ability. An Asian analyst who cannot speak the local language watches the TV coverage of the parliament to get a sense of the severity of the debate. She usually obtains a transcript in advance from Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translations (b)(3)(n) She believes TV news adds a unique dimension to her analysis. Her inability to understand the language makes her more selective about what she watches, however, and her viewing is often event driven. On the other hand, one analyst working on a Middle Eastern country rarely watches TV because he does not speak the language; he believes he receives all the information he needs through FBIS media translations. He ob-

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tains 80 percent of his information about the country from the print media.

In OIA, OSWR, and LDA, TV news may not be watched daily, but it is still recognized at times as a unique source of visual information. Analysts in these offices depend on FBIS to filter their viewing. Much of their analysis is not time sensitive, and they have the luxury of scanning the summaries and ordering tapes of what they want to see. Also, FBIS provides compilation tapes based on their requirements, and many analysts believe this is adequate. When the analysis is time sensitive and the analysts need the footage immediately, they tend to rely more upon getting the tape from FBIS than from watching the grid. If they cannot get a timely tape, however, they will reassess their need for the footage, often deciding that it does not warrant the effort of obtaining the video.

Use of Foreign TV

Analysts use foreign TV for everything from practicing their language skills to analyzing government propaganda. Many also believe that analysis requires "seeing" the atmospherics of a situation. Analysts who watch TV regularly often cite its timeliness as the primary reason for viewing. The ability to watch fast-breaking developments allows the analyst to be at the forefront in reporting and analyzing events. Analysts believe that they would be at a real disadvantage if they waited for information from other sources. This attitude was especially prevalent in EURA and OSE, where the daily news is often checked for potential articles for the *President's Daily Brief* and *National Intelligence Daily.*

Timeliness

The more event driven the office, the more likely its analysts would be to watch TV. If a story was not time sensitive or dealt with a longer-term issue, analysts would wait for FBIS to provide the summaries and translations of newscasts

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Real-time reporting seemed to be the primary reason to watch TV among the TV users, suggesting that if TV did not cover fast-breaking news, it would not maintain its priority. TV was preferred over print media because the local papers often would not arrive until two or three days later.

Background Knowledge

Even if TV news coverage provides no new information on the facts of the story, it often enhances an analyst's overall understanding of a country or situation. One analyst said she even paid attention to the commercials, just for general knowledge of the people and the culture. Another analyst said that watching TV was a good way for analysts who have not yet visited the country to get a general idea of what the streets look like, how the people dress, and other general information; TV was the next best thing to being there.

Uniqueness

The video portion of TV news is the most common source of truly unique information, and it ranked second as the reason for watching the news. Text could be read (b)(3)(n) or the facts could be gained elsewhere, but the footage would provide an "atmospheric" dimension that could not be gained from print. Analysts could see the context in which statements were made or events occurred.

One analyst working on a South American country was surprised by the permissive public attitude regarding a native politician who had violated the law. The politician was acquitted, and it was widely accepted that he bribed his way out of trouble. Although the analyst was aware that the politics of the country are highly personalized, she still was surprised that this individual was acquitted. Once she saw him on TV, however, his popular appeal was evident. She said his charisma would influence even a non-Spanish-speaking viewer.

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LDA, OSWR, and OIA often are required to determine the status of objects and people, and video allows them to do analysis from a primary source. The footage allows them to check facts.

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Assisting Analysis

Analysts who work on countries where TV is government-controlled tend either to discount TV completely because it is a mouthpiece of the government or to do more analysis. Analysts who discount TV believe that they have other sources that can tell them what is happening in the government. Those who do more analysis are interested in seeing what the government is trying to say to the people or to get the people to believe.

One analyst working on another South American country recalls the time when an opposition party had taken over several town halls in remote regions in that country. The government-controlled news featured man-on-the-street interviews asking citizens' opinions about this. Everyone condemned it, leading the analyst to wonder whether the interviews were staged. Several days later the government forcibly removed the opposition party. The analyst believes that the interviews were trying to prepare public opinion for this action.

Some analysts are interested in finding out what a government wants its citizens to believe

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When the media was not government controlled, a few analysts studied it to help obtain a general understanding of the culture. One analyst, for example, recalled the coverage in a European country during the Persian Gulf War. After the US bombed the civilian/military bunker in Baghdad, the news in this country juxtaposed pictures of dying babies next to pictures of American soldiers. She thought that this type of coverage may have increased local antiwar sentiment.

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Use of Domestic TV

Most analysts regard US TV news as a source of background information in the form of new facts, interviews, or local footage. One analyst watched Barbara Walters's interview of Libyan leader Qadhafi because he was interested in what Qadhafi wore and in his general demeanor.

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Some analysts were also interested because they might be asked to comment on something raised in a US broadcast. For example, OSE analysts were interested in a CNN story that implied that Ukraine threatened to sell conventional and nuclear arms to the Arab world. CNN had interviewed the Ukrainian Minister for Defense Conversion, and OSE analysts looked at the complete interview to discover just what he said. They concluded that his remarks were taken out of context and were made to sound unduly controversial. The analysts knew that the "spin" put on the story by CNN would cause alarm, and they wanted to be ready to defuse the story.

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As he put it, "A good analyst is a good investigative reporter, so why not let the news and their investigative reporters do work for you?"

Prospects

While TV was used in some way by most analysts in the DI, few consciously thought about using it on a systematic basis to assist their analysis. Most realized that they were getting more than facts, but they did not fully realize what analytical viewing may reveal. As the factors that affect TV viewing become more favorable, more analysts will probably begin to use TV. Still, until TV is viewed as an analytical tool that gives another dimension to DI analysis, TV will not be used as anything more than a unique and timely source of information. If ORD's research does indicate that foreign TV does affect its audience, then this change should begin to take place, and TV will move from being a source of information to a tool of analysis.

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An extraordinary exchange

Telemetry on a Platter

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It is Thanksgiving Day 1991 and, instead of feasting on turkey, US interagency specialists are looking at Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) telemetry. Nothing extraordinary about that, as anyone who has worked (b)(1) can attest. But on this day the discussions are occuring at the Soviet processing facility. Soviet specialists are describing the structure of the telemetry signal and the equipment required to extract the data. For those of us who have spent much of our careers collecting, processing, and analyzing Soviet telemetry, such an event was truly the dawning of a new era in the arms control arena.

The Telemetry Protocol

On 31 July 1991, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed in Moscow by President Bush and President Gorbachev. Many sections in the treaty dealt with telemetry carried on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In particular, Article X and the Telemetry Protocol are the major items which address telemetry.

The Telemetry Protocol contains some revolutionary features which will take effect after both sides ratify the treaty. Included among these is the requirement that, following every flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, tapes containing all telemetry data generated on board the missile be provided by the testing party to the observing party. As a prelude to this regular transfer of data, both the US and the USSR are required to conduct a demonstration of the telemetry tapes which they will be providing and of the equipment needed to play back the tapes. The treaty stipulated that these demonstrations occur within 120 days of the treaty signature, which just happened to coincide with Thanksgiving Day, 28 November.

Meeting in Moscow

Early in August 1991, the US and the USSR had agreed to meet in Geneva around 16 September to discuss the details of conducting these demonstrations. These discussions were to be held under the auspices of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), which was set up to discuss START topics. Unfortunately, the Soviet coup attempt just before this meeting threw schedules and organizations into chaos. When the Soviets finally focused on organizing the initial meeting of the JCIC, it was late October and little time remained to iron out all the demonstration details. Following a flurry of cables between the US and USSR and a number of "go, no-go" situations, a US team comprised of 12 interagency experts departed for Moscow on 13 November.

Due to the short time remaining before the 28 November deadline, as well as the Soviets' lack of funding authority to purchase *Aeroflot* tickets from Moscow to Geneva, the US had offered to meet in Moscow. This proved to be fortuitous, as a significant number of Soviet telemetry experts were available for direct questioning while the demonstration details were being negotiated. In the past, the Soviets had resisted bringing to Geneva experts knowledgeable in telemetry who could have facilitated discussions. Without the presence of such experts, a meeting in Geneva would have required a substantial amount of time to come to agreement on the very detailed and technical issues being discussed.

Included in the 12-person US team from the Intelligence Community (IC) were (b)(3)(c) Arms Control Intelligence Staff (ACIS); (b)(3)(c) Office of Scientific and

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Scientific Weapons Research (OSWR); (b)(3)(c) Office of SIGINT Operations (OSO). The team was led by T. R. Koncher from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with other representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Department of Energy, the State Department, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

A Good Beginning

The first meeting was held on 14 November. For the next 10 days, the two sides held intense discussions regarding what each side planned to demonstrate. In order for US policymakers to determine what type of data the US would provide in the future and thus what would be demonstrated, the US team had to assess exactly what the Soviets were planning to demonstrate. This task fell primarily to the IC experts, as only they were knowledgeable of Soviet telemetry and able to understand the information being provided.

Throughout the negotiations the Soviets were cooperative and forthcoming with the level of detail needed. At times, it seemed their experts were flooding us with information, often to the chagrin of the leader of the Soviet delegation.

Finally, an agreement was reached on the details. The US would provide predetection tapes recorded during the missile's flight test and the Soviets would provide a unique postdetection tape. In both cases, these recordings represented the initial level of recording. Because of the delay in initiating the negotiations, it was determined that the US demonstration could occur in late December or early January. (It took place from 13 to 15 January 1992.)

The stage was now set to bring in the rest of the US team to observe the Soviet demonstration. These team members were the "A-team" of recorder, signal-processing hardware, and Soviet telemetry knowledgeable experts: (b)(3)(c) of OSO, and of NSA.

Throughout the planning phase following the July signing and during the negotiations in Moscow, there had always been a level of disagreement and tension on the US side between the IC and JCS representatives. This was a natural outcome of the conflicting interests of both parties. The IC wanted to obtain the maximum amount of information from the Soviets, which in turn required the JCS to reciprocate with similar information. At times, discussions were heated and contentious within our delegation, but in the end a common path was established.

The A-team

When the A-team arrived in Moscow, the JCS representatives must have thought the shock troops had just hit the shore. These four individuals came with a mission to obtain maximum information and reach a full understanding of the Soviet recording process.

Shivers seemed to emanate from the JCS people as a full realization of the level of detail they would be expected to provide at the US demonstration became apparent. From a counterintelligence perspective, it may all sound as if the IC were ready to give away national secrets. In actuality, all data the US side would provide at its own demonstration were unclassified, and JCS fears were groundless.

Soviet Show and Tell

The demonstration began on 27 November with the US team being escorted to a facility in the town of Kaliningrad, just north of Moscow. This facility is the central location where all ICBM and SLBM telemetry is processed following a flight test.

The demonstration was conducted in the processing laboratory by the people who process the Soviet data. With the lab director, Mr. Kommisarov, setting a tone of complete open-mindedness and cooperation, the demonstrations continued over the course of three days. Though a few problems were encountered, they were all rectified before the demonstrations' completion.

The Soviets provided information on the telemetry hardware used on board their test vehicles. They proudly stated that all their hardware subsystems use

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fourth-generation solid-state electronics having as many as 2,000 discrete elements per solid-state chip.

Three actual components of the onboard telemetry system were handed out for examination. These were the frequency-modulated (FM) transmitter, a dual-ported local code commutator, and a 4-million bit digital storage device used to store and dump test-flight data.


The Soviets demonstrated their proposed methods of disclosing signal decommutation structures, which is called interpretive data in the Telemetry Protocol. This information provides the explicit guide to isolate every unique sensor and/or data word within each complex telemetry signal. The combination of IC intercepted data, the knowledge of Soviet telemetering practices, and the supplementary information derived from the interpretive data should adequately facilitate determining the authenticity of the Soviet-provided data tapes.

The demonstrated Soviet recording equipment was a dual-transport system widely used throughout Soviet missile test ranges for the last 10 years. This analog magnetic storage system can record and play back 24 tracks of digitized data, and it uses tapes which physically conform to US instrumentation standards. Because of the limited sub-megahertz frequency-handling capabilities of the recording equipment, the Soviets record only demodulated signals.

To demonstrate the playback capability of their equipment, the Soviets had generated and recorded a complex simulated telemetry signal. This simulated signal was a generic replica of the signals seen over the years on their ICBMs and SLBMs.

The tape was played back and various displays shown to the US delegation in order to familiarize the US experts with the Soviet recording procedures. The Soviets provided a sample magnetic tape log/summary, which indicated the actual tape format selected, the relative quality of the recording, and other ancillary comments. Such a log will accompany every tape provided in the future.

By the end of the demonstration, the Soviets had satisfactorily shown that their "first recording" is an accurate representation of the transmitted signal.



Visiting the museum.

After completion of the demonstration, this tape was handed over to the US delegation and hand-carried back to the US for analysis.

For those of us in the IC who had devoted much of our careers to Soviet telemetry collection and analysis, this truly was a culmination of years of effort. As is the case these days with many aspects regarding the former Soviet Union, it was difficult to imagine a year ago discussing decommutation structures with the people who designed the system.

Two Side Trips

Besides attending the demonstration, the delegation was treated to side trips to the MIR space-station mission-control center and to the Korolov Design Bureau Museum. At the museum, many space vehi-

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cles are on display, including Gagarin's space capsule. We learned that Gargarin did not actually return to the Earth's surface inside his capsule. He was ejected from the capsule at an altitude of several thousand feet and parachuted to Earth. Following his landing, he was transported to the capsule landing site and photographed inside as if he had been there for the duration of the flight. This was one more bit of new information collected during this most historic venture.

At the close of the demonstration, Mr. Komissarov stated that he was surprised by its rapid progress. He had anticipated that it could take as many as 10 days to adequately familiarize the US delegation with the Soviet practices. A humorous invitation was extended to a number of the US experts to come to work for him, as his employees had learned a few new things during the demonstration about their own telemetry.

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Impressions of my DO

The Blind Men and the Elephant

(b)(3)(c)

Recently, two of my colleagues tried to describe "their" Directorate of Operations (DO).* Like the blind men in the fable, they accurately described only parts of the elephant. The complete beast that emerged from their description only imperfectly resembles the animal I knew and (usually) loved for 35 years.

Our emphasis and appreciation differ, but the reader will soon realize that we all are describing an extinct mastodon. The symptoms had not yet become apparent, but the DO in which we served fell into a terminal illness about 20 years ago. For roughly the first 20 years after its creation, the DO was largely a WASP preserve, dominated for much of that period by OSS veterans. The latter, mostly from the Ivy League, Easterners and Europe-oriented, monopolized all of the senior positions and played organizational musical chairs with each other. In the 1960s, the DO was led by East Asia specialists as the Agency concentrated on Vietnam. They in turn were replaced by NE specialists when the DO's focus shifted to the Arab-Israeli confrontation, terrorism, Lebanon, and Afghanistan.

Whatever the geographic affiliation of the DO leadership, the "barons" ran their divisions and Stations like feudal fiefs, and the serf who tried to move from one division to another, much less to another directorate, was labelled as "disloyal." For example, when a colleague I respected and admired decided to move temporarily from the DO to the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), a DO deputy division chief told him that his return would be highly unlikely. Moreover, if by some chance the DO was forgiving and gracious enough to welcome him back, he would be so far behind his peers that he would never make up for the time "lost" in the DI. It was only some years later that what "lost" meant became apparent.

By then, he was chief of the largest branch in one of the largest and most important DO Stations. His branch was the most productive in the Station, in part because of the knowledge of the target he had acquired in the DI. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) Nevertheless, he repeatedly was passed over for promotion. His COS, a senior baron not known for sensitivity to his subordinates, nonetheless became annoyed because his judgment was being challenged.

On a TDY to Headquarters, the COS asked the promotion panel to explain why his key branch chief was not being promoted. What they told him says a lot about the DO 20 years ago. First, the officer did not have his own "command." That is, he was not a COS like, for example, the Station chiefs in Africa, most of whom "commanded" miniscule Stations far smaller than his branch. And the incontestable fact that my colleague's branch produced intelligence of far greater interest and value to the US was, apparently, irrelevant. Second, he had spent a tour in the DI. As a result, the DO promotion panel "did not know where his loyalties lay...." This statement stunned even his baron, but by that time barons could no longer dictate promotions.

Social Change

It was about this time, too, that the social composition of the DO slowly began to change. For most of the DO's history and until relatively recently, there

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*"The In-Culture of the DO," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 23-28

(b)(3)(c) "The DO Culture: An Oxymoron?" *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 35, No 4. Winter 1991, pp. 81-82.

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were few blacks, few "Hispanics" (as yet innocently unaware that they merited a separate designation) and almost no women among the case officer cadre. The one-legged lady who had parachuted over France during World War II was one of the few women "professionals" in the DO. We properly regarded her with reverential awe.

There were plenty of women in the dank, sloping halls of the temporary buildings below the Lincoln Memorial and later in Langley, but almost all were in the clerical category. In addition to "little old ladies in tennis shoes," the DO had some of the best-educated women in the country doing its filing and typing. Later, many women entered the professional door as reports officers, a function disdained by male case officers, who regarded "reports"—intelligence—as inferior and subordinate to action—operations. The inability of many case officers and their superiors to link operations to the production of intelligence remains to this day a consistent and puzzling manifestation of the DO "culture."

A Military Flavor

One reason for the absence of female case officers was the semi-military nature of the DO, which is derived from its origins (OSS and the National Security Act of 1947) and reflected in its vocabulary: "officers," "line division," "command." There was a clear and simple chain of command from the DO to the division chiefs (b)(3)(c) Part of the basic training was in fact paramilitary, including jump school (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) sabotage; weapons familiarization; and exercises with explosives. No women took this training, just as there were no women in the combat arms of the military or cadets in the service academies. The lack of this training served to exclude women from "command" functions.

The geographic "line" divisions were the heart and soul of the DO. Several small staffs had always existed, but, as in the military, they were not in the chain of command, and ambitious case officers avoided assignments to them. They also avoided being assigned (b)(3)(c) as instructors and for the same reason: it too was out of the chain of command and not involved in operations. It was understood that a tour on a staff or the "farm" was not "career enhancing." In fact, another consistent hallmark of DO "culture" has been the antipathy of most case officers to training, which they have seen as a waste of time or a pointless diversion.

Vocational training is still only reluctantly tolerated, but assignment to one of the large "centers" now is acceptable. These "centers"—contemporary, bloated versions of staffs, albeit with some operational responsibilities—drain case officer personnel, thereby contributing to their absence in the divisions and the concomitant decline in the status and role of the (b)(3)(c) no longer the repository of profound area knowledge. Now they are largely staffed by women, most of whom are not case officers.

Specialization and Cross-Fertilization

The extensive exchange of personnel among divisions is another recent phenomenon. Most case officers normally spent most if not all of their careers in the same division, thereby becoming Latin America "types," or European "types," or Near East "types." When one "type" referred derogatorily to another "type," he assumed, correctly, that his interlocutor would understand what was implied when someone was dismissed as "an NE type." As a result of this geographic compartmentation, the case officers in one division would know each other, at least by name, but it would not be unusual for European "types" to know few LA "types."

Besides breeding stagnation and insularity, this specialization also produced solid cultural, geographic and area knowledge. Once the barriers among divisions began to break down, however, this knowledge began to erode. "Cross-cultural fertilization"—an "in" phrase borrowed from cultural anthropology—made, it was thought, case officers "broad-gauged," a description dear to "hard-chargers" in the business world.

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Unfortunately, many of the broad-gauged-hard-chargers had only a thin veneer of area knowledge and often limited language ability. Case officers (and their managers) with real knowledge of their targets began to be in short supply. It remains to be demonstrated whether wider ignorance is more valuable to the DO than narrow expertise.

Misplaced Mobility

The application of the mobility theory of management produced some bizarre assignments in the 1980s.

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In any case, geographical mobility, whatever its organizational and managerial virtues, diluted the sense of camaraderie in the DO. When most case officers served in the same division for most of their careers, they (and their spouses) knew each other, shared the same experiences, and developed a common view of the world and the DO mission.

DO Elitism

For many years there was a familial feeling of membership in an elite unit. Underpaid, overworked, grumbling, cynical, and harassed, but nonetheless an elite: the intelligence praetorian guard. When case officers referred to "the Agency," they meant the DO, not any of the other directorates. They knew that the other directorates, theoretically at least, could just as easily be housed in some other government department. But not the DO, which was the essence of the Agency, its Clandestine Service, what made it different and special. And the case officers were its elite corps.

A Darker Side

This elitism and pride were distinguished by an admirable spirit of discipline, sacrifice, and commitment. At the same time, however, there was a disdain for the other directorates and for intelligence as opposed to operations. Particular scorn was reserved for the Department of State, regarded as pusillanimous and an obstacle to "operations." This attitude was transferred to Congress when it began to inquire into the operations of "the Agency," meaning, again, the DO.

Congressional interest in the inner workings of the Agency was a new and to some a disturbing development. As a Deputy Director for Administration said many years after he retired, "I had no budget problems, no personnel problems, no Congressional problems. Things are different now." Indeed. To some old DO barons, unused to being challenged by anyone and often possessed of egos the size of Mt. Rushmore, this new situation was intolerable, and they did their best to evade it. Their younger successors are more malleable. They have accepted both Congressional oversight, and Congressional micromanagement.

Bad Decisions

"Upper management" in the DO could not resist Congress, and it had no influence over the changed social composition or educational attainments of its employees. It did, however, make on its own two decisions which impaired DO expertise and morale. The first was the cluster of concepts that held that rapid turnover and exchange of personnel were for personal development and for the DO as an institution. These propositions are not necessarily identical. Allied to the dubious benefits of rapid turnover and short assignments was the related idea that a manager needed only to know how to manage; knowledge of the subject of his management was not required.

In the 1980s, these theories were routinely applied in the DO. As a result, the DI placed a number of its personnel in the DO, some in key positions formerly reserved for case officers. Other DI officers spent

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rotational tours in the DO, assignments which benefited their careers and probably the DI as well. In contrast, few DO officers sought or received assignments in the other directorates. Those who went or were sent were not regarded as "fast-trackers," and their tours in the DI were not "career enhancing".

The second decision, that DO personnel overseas should be paid overtime, was more insidious and in the long run perhaps more corrosive. This doubtless was a commendable attempt to find some legal way to compensate DO personnel, especially case officers, for long hours, slow promotions and inadequate pay. Whatever the reasoning, the psychological effect on the discipline and integrity of the case officer corps has been disastrous.

At one stroke, this decision removed the sense of dedication and sacrifice which distinguished an elite corps. Case officers became merely another category of *employees,* not intrinsically different from other categories. Moreover, the provision of pay for overtime produced dependence on a supplementary income, which in turn stimulated petty chiseling with accountings and a clock-punching mentality. Rescinding this decision would be difficult, perhaps impossible.

The DO is which my colleagues and I spent our adult lives is dead, killed by a variety of causes, some inevitalbe, others natural, still others self-inflicted. The institution which survives with the same name confronts new and in many ways more difficult challenges under largely unfavorable circumstances.

Some Recommendations

So, as Vlaydimir Ilyich once wrote, "What is to be done?" Plenty. Hire only against high standards and real needs, not quotas. Instill in new personnel a sense of ethics, duty, and discipline, not just rights and rewards. Cease mechanically transferring people in response to some abstract theory of personnel development. Develop and reward solid area expertise. Establish a sabbatical program for outstanding operational personnel at a mid-career level. Assign DO case officers to rotational tours in the DI to improve their substantive knowledge and to give them a better appreciation of the intelligence process.

More. Discipline senior officers for operational blunders and mismanagement of resources and personnel. Control the cost of perks (cars, redecorating, servants) allowed senior Station managers. Consider eliminating bonuses to SIS personnel and distributing the monies instead to outstanding middle- and lower-grade personnel. Oblige SIS officers parked in lower-ranking positions to retire or be reduced in grade and pay. (b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

Some of these suggestions are obviously more important that others. Few, like a Brezhnev speech, will inspire "loud, prolonged applause, all rise." And none, simply or in combination, will resurrect the DO in the absence of inspired, inspirational and respected leadership. If the DO is to recapture a sense of mission and dedication, however, some of these steps have to be taken.

Without the Evil Empire, the threat to the US is no longer direct and the need for clandestine operations in the classical sense less demonstrable. DO leadership in the 1990s thus has a difficult task in the context of a completely new domestic and foreign environment. Although many of the new barons running the DO are far superior in experience and talent to their predecessors, success under these conditions will not come easily.

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Overcoming obstacles

Analytical Pitfalls and Stumbling Blocks

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Soothsayers used to examine the entrails of animals to predict the future. Today, we intelligence anaylsts rely on far more sophisticated sources to underpin our appraisals of what lies ahead. Nevertheless, we often do not appear to obtain much better results that our more primitive predecessors.

On some occasions our seeming inability to figure out what comes next is caused by the way we approach our work, rather than a failure of intellect or imagination. Moreover, there are times when we actually get it right but somehow are unable to persuade our superiors or the policymakers of the accuracy of our judgments.

The following is a list and disucssion of what I contend are several barriers to good intelligence analysis. Most examples relate to life in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI). I believe that they also are generally applicable to intelligence producers in the community. I present this to alert junior people to potential problems and to remind seniors that there are traps for even the most experienced.

Defensive Analysis

Those analysts who are brave enough to make judgments usually make far more good ones than bad. The best and brightest analysts that I have known have never shirked from making a judgment, and promotions go more often to analytic risk-takers. If one wants to join their ranks, the following pitfalls should be avoided:

- Echoing the opinions of collectors in the field, who usually are not privy to all-source intelligence.
- Being comfortable as part of a consensus. You can have a lot of company in making a wrong judgment.
- Defining prediction so narrowly that you really do not do it at all.
- Setting up a series of distant hypotheses to avoid a short-term prediction. For example, an assessment of how a united Korea would likely deal with the US probably would not be helpful if it did not offer insight on when and how unification would be likely to occur.
- Establishing a straight-line projection in lieu of real analysis.

The Use of History

A look at a nation's or region's history is often the logical starting point for an intelligence officer. For too many, however, it also seems to be the stopping point, particularly in terms of analytical history. The fact that something occurred a certain way 10 or 20 years ago can easily become the basis for a judgment that the same thing is happening today. While such an approach often provides the correct answer, it almost guarantees failure in predicting new developments. In using history, always look for what is new. Are there real parallels, or are today's events being forced into yesterday's mold?

Applying Labels

To simplify presentation, we type individuals and issues. Everyone is put into his or her group—conservatives and liberals, reactionaries and radicals, hardliners and softliners. Too often the reader is expected to understand precisely what the terms mean. If there is a chance that your reader might be mislead, add a short definition.

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Underestimating Situations

For many years we put considerable stock in the permanence of repression. The cant was that "the regime's pervasive and efficient secret police will be able to handle dissent." We also invented the "long-suffering peasant" who would put up forever with a situation that would send Americans to the barricades. Finally, we seemingly closed the loop with the judgment that, in the absence of evidence of large-scale opposition to a system, the people had to have bought what their governments were selling. But from time to time, and especially during the past few years, intelligence analysts have been brought up short when highly controlled regimes rapidly fell apart. What did we miss?

I would argue that the myth we created of the degree of political control and the impact of societal inertia has been a major barrier to our understanding of change and our ability to recognize early the signs of an impending national or regional explosion. Once we conclude that a government is essentially unchallenged, virtually all resources and analytic effort can be focused on military and technological developments, leadership shifts, foreign policy adventures, and economic problems.

If we want to be relevant, bread-and-butter issues have to be at the top of our list. I do believe, however, that we have to pay more attention to understanding societal change.

This process often proceeds at a slow pace. To measure it, we identify and weigh the importance of small breaks with the past and evaluate how such change will affect a government's ability to survive.

Examples abound. The children of the revolution begin to replace their parents. Ideology is ridiculed. People begin to focus on the disparity between the haves and the have nots. Corruption erodes the leader's authority. Economic ineptness and bureaucratic bungling foster anger, resentment and frustration. Foreign wars fuel national rage as casualties mount. Young people reject the values of their own society for those of another. Although we have not ignored such changes, we have not concentrated on developing the analytic tools to the extent that they can help us do a better job in anticipating landmark events.

In looking at societal change, an analyst probably should not dwell too long on the differences between "them and us," to put much stock in "national character." People are likely to have the same needs, goals and desires wherever they live. Even though people adapt to the mores of their particular societies in order to survive, it does not mean that they have to like them. If logic suggests that people should be unhappy, they probably are. And at some point they will be likely to try to change their situation.

Publish or Perish

Intelligence officers use many different vehicles to transmit their messages. Many often appear to consider that the daily current intelligence publications have the most impact because the President, cabinet members, and other senior policymakers read them. Nevertheless, I see two serious problems stemming from the way we produce current intelligence—publishing too fast and too often.

In my view, many analysts and managers believe that the primary goal is to scoop the commercial competition. This approach sometimes means that ideas are vetted prematurely, before full analytical resources can be applied. As electronic dissemination is increasingly used, analysts will almost certainly come under even greater pressure to get a story out.

Some analysts have said that they also have been pushed to publish because they are the recipients of expensive-to-obtain technical intelligence. Using the material in a product supposedly justifies the cost of collecting it, even though it adds little to the body of knowledge.

Getting Locked In

On really "hot" topics, the policymakers invariably will want a continuing flow of information. The lack of new information or insights, however, can lead to the repetition of analysis, with the consequence that a judgment too often stated becomes difficult to change.

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This problem is compounded by a demand for continuity and consistency. Most analysts have been advised from time to time that it is bad form to keep taking their consumers up one hill and then down the next. There is, at least, an implicit command to stick to initial judgments until they are contradicted by strong evidence. From a public relations standpoint, this probably is the right thing to do. But this position would seem to impede the prompt transmittal of reports or messages to policymakers, thereby limiting their available options in dealing with the problems at hand.

At a minimum, analysts should do a periodic zero-based review of their key judgments to ensure that pressures to write are not interfering with their ability to determine the facts of a given situation.

Policy Relevance

In the Agency's early years, managers and analysts seemingly adopted the view that knowledge was sought for knowledge's sake. This led to a debate between those who believed that remaining aloof from policymakers was the only way to keep their analytical purity and those who believed that purity without relevance made no sense. The latter group won the argument.

Analysts and managers are now expected to establish effective contact with policymakers, and we have largely succeeded in plugging into the policy process. As a result of our efforts to march in step with policymakers, however, we appear less inclined to produce premonitory intelligence. This perception is based on a sampling of intelligence publications over time. I have gained the clear impression that most papers that I read now seem to emphasize what is happening and why, or what happened and why. In the interest of policy relevance we appear to be training a generation of intelligence newspersons and historians.

Overcoming Bias

A fair amount of time, energy, and emotion recently has been devoted to the debate on "politicization." There are a few points around the periphery of the discussion that are worth noting.

First, managers in the DI are likely to draw similar conclusions from the same overt sources of information as policymakers. I would further argue that under most circumstances intelligence managers probably are not captives of their consumers; they are likely to share the same view of the world, and they probably would be as skeptical as their clients if someone challenges what they see as reality.

Assuming these thoughts are generally true, an analyst meeting resistance from a supervisor to a change in judgment and seeking a higher probability of getting his or her new or different interpretation into print should initially assume that the manager does not find the new evidence or analysis compelling. If there is good will on the part of the reviewer, the analyst has a reasonable chance at overcoming the former's doubts and reservations. But if the manager's resistance is politically motivated—a far lower probability in my mind—then nothing will move him or her. Consequently, an analyst should envision a situation that will permit success.

Second, we focus on mangers as politicizers, and often forget that analysts can also have agendas other than producing the best unbiased analysis. There have been times in the past when one could question whether a particular line of analysis was aimed at enlightening or directing US policy. Even the way analysts package their judgments can lead to uncertainty about motivation. For example, I recall the plaintive remark of a branch chief: "I want to tell people the truth, but do we have to rub their noses in it?"

As to inadvertent bias in analysis, there are numerous traps. On many occasions we DI military analysts expressed delight that our views placed us dead center between the Defense Department ("on the right") and the State Department ("on the left"). That may have been the best place to be, but in 20-20 hindsight, one wonders how much of our analysis was influenced by our desire not to adopt the positions of our competitors.

While politicization can be a major impediment to providing the best intelligence, do not focus on it to the exclusion of equally important barriers. The key is to understand the nature of the problem.

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Writing to Communicate

One of the rites of passage for most new DI analysts is a briefing on the DI writing style. The ostensible purpose is to prepare people for formatting their products, but the end result frequently is to intimidate the new employee. The following is a composite of some of the briefings I have overheard:

> "Good morning, Mr. Phelps. Your mission, if you choose to accept it, is to learn to write in the DI style. This style is unique in the world; we believe that it came to the original intelligence analyst in a vision after he fasted for 40 days in the desert. We put our judgments up front, use topic sentences, keep all sentences short and to the point, avoid exotic words, and put an implications section at the back of the paper to transmit the full impact of the message. It will probably take you years to learn it, and the odds are that you will never succeed. If you fail, your branch chief will disavow ever knowing you."

I offer an alternative speech:

> "Good morning, Mr. Phelps. I have a mission for you that is far from impossible. I want you to take those skills that you have been using all your life, particularly analyzing and communication, and apply them to your job. We have a different format, but it should not be a problem. Put your judgments up front, and support them with clearly written, informative paragraphs. Some people can write better than others, but virtually all the people we hire should be able to write."

I have watched enough talented people stumble over intelligence writing to wonder whether our attitude towards it erodes their confidence and impedes their development. Why do analysts with advanced degrees and presumably much experience in writing sometimes fall apart when trying to put together a paragraph for an intelligence publication? How many cases of writer's block have we noted?

I suggest that as a test we modify our introduction to the intelligence arts by delivering a simple message at the outset: it is not mystical, it is communications!

Deadly Prose

When it comes to intelligence writing, analysts seem to be getting the message that boring is best, followed closely by dry, and uninteresting. Somehow the notion that we are just one of many sources available to consumers and that if we do not grab their attention we will lose them does not appear to be a prevailing view. The way our product is printed is first rate, our graphics outstanding, and even our formats are quite good. I am concerned that once a consumer starts to read, he or she may be turned off by soporific prose.

Far too often, scholarly equates to indigestible, and our titles could cure insomnia. I believe that many a DI analyst writing about the beginning of World War III could title his or her paper, "Massive Exchange of Thermonuclear Weapons Likely to Cause Severe Economic Disruption and Tax Most Medical Facilities." This is a straightforward, clear, and accurate title—and deadly dull.

I do not advocate using silly or irrelevant writing in our publications, but it seems reasonable to try and use our prose to engage policymakers. If I had to sell my paper, would anyone want to buy it?

Coordination

Most analysts appear to treat coordination with almost the same degree of enthusiasm as a trip to the dentist. One does it because it is required and not out of any expectation that the product might be improved. The implicit goal of the analyst seemingly is to take an article completely through the process without it being touched by other human hands.

Pride of authorship is just one factor in the distaste for coordination. We may also be recreating the norms of academic behavior. Professors and graduate students present their ideas and then defend them to the death. Although everyone is polite, it has never been clear to me whether anyone listens to anyone else—other than junior scholars who sit at the feet of the masters. On occasion, in convocations of academics, I have felt like I was attending a Borgia family reunion.

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Intelligence officers do not exist solely to impress anyone with their scholarship or to prove the fallacy of an opponent's views. Our responsibility is to provide policymakers with the kind of information and insight that will best enable them to do their jobs. If that comes from an individual effort, so be it. But in my mind there should be equal credit for the analyst who recognizes the clarity and relevance of another's ideas and incorporates them in his or her product. Thus, coordination should be an opportunity to gain additional knowledge or to test the validity of one's thoughts, not an exercise in stonewalling or one-upsmanship.

Assuming that being fair-minded and receptive are the starting points for effective coordination, there are a number of ways to improve the chances of getting a good result:

- Be clear in your mind why you have chosen your particular analytical approach. Explore the alternative explanations and also be prepared to depict your situation.

- Treat every suggestion seriously. "That is the stupidest idea I have ever heard" is not a response calculated to improve the coordination process.

- Be prepared to give ground. Ninety percent, or even 75 percent, of something is better than 100 percent of nothing.

- Be willing to change words as an act of good faith. Words often offend when ideas do not. You may be able to keep the same analytical line, if you define it differently.

- Be willing to be persuaded. Every old-timer can point to an occasion when he or she turned a piece 180 degrees on the basis of someone else's more perceptive argument. It does not happen often, but it is not a crime when it does.

- Take seriously the comment, "I do not understand what are you saying." We are in the communications business. If someone who is familiar with a subject is confused, consider the impact on the poor policymaker.

- If you disagree with specific coordination comments, write alternative words before consulting directly with the coordinator. With words in hand, you are in a much better position to influence the course of discussion.

- Be willing to concede several minor points to gain a major one. It is hard to resist, "I gave you what you wanted on these three ideas, can't you move closer on this other one for me?"

Still a Good Show

In presenting these pitfalls and problems, I would be remiss if I did not put them in perspective. I believe that we in the DI and the Intelligence Community as a whole generally have the right to be proud about the work we do and the printed and oral intelligence that we provide. What I have pointed to as needing attention are deviations from a product norm that is of high quality, thoughtful and relevant.

It has been a matter of pride to me, however, that intelligence organizations never rest on their laurels and are constantly be looking for ways to improve. If this were not so, it would have been pointless to write this article.

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TITLE: Stars on the Wall

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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A lasting tribute

Stars on the Wall

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*As part of its introduction to the CIA, Career Trainee Class [redacted] was split into syndicate groups to research and write a short article on some aspect of the Agency. As new employees, one group was interested in the Memorial Wall and the people that are represented by the stars. Who were they? How, where, and when did they die? Who selected the honorees and how? Why did so many employees know so little about who had come before them? This group set out to answer these and other questions, and this article is based on its findings.**

CIA has many ways to recognize and reward dedicated service, including intelligence medals and distinguished service awards. To honor those who have died in the line of duty, the Agency has established memorials. The most visible is the Memorial Wall in the main foyer of the Original Headquarters Building. Another is the "Air America" plaque, which honors CIA employees who died in East and Southeast Asia.

Background

In February 1973, the Honor and Merit Awards Board (HMAB) received a proposal to honor Agency employees who died while serving in Southeast Asia. The following month, the HMAB broadened this concept by approving a memorial dedicated to all Agency employees who lose their lives on duty. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) concurred, and the Agency's Fine Arts Commission (FAC) was tasked to develop plans for a memorial. Using the Department of State's memorial to its fallen employees as a model, the Agency developed the concept and selection criteria for the tribute.

The HMAB submitted its proposal to DCI Colby in an 11 March 1974 memorandum. Director Colby approved the memorandum, as well as a list of 31 employees who had died since the Agency's founding in 1947. The wall in the main foyer of the Original Headquarters Building, which faces the statue of General William Donovan, was selected as the site for the memorial. The inscription subsequently chiseled into the marble wall reads:

> In honor of those members of the Central Intelligence Agency who gave their lives in the service of their country

In lieu of the names of the deceased, which the Department of State lists on its memorial, stars were used to symbolize each honoree. A glass-encased "Book of Honor" also was placed beneath these stars. The book contains either the names of the deceased or a star representing a covert employee. As cover restrictions ease, more names may be authorized for inclusion in the book. The Agency and US flags flank the stars.

At a Glance

By the Fall of 1991, 23 additional stars had been added to the wall, bringing the total number of honorees to 54. Ninety-four percent of those memorialzed are men. Women are represented by three stars.


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tandem couple is also represented; both died in the same incident. Unlike the Department of State, the CIA does honor contractors in the memorial.

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The Directorate of Operations (DO) has suffered (b)(3)(c) the largest number of fatalities, Because DO employees work in a variety of situations around the world, their personal sacrifices take many forms.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
William F. Buckley, Chief of Station in Beirut, w(b)(3)(c)
kidnaped and died at the hands of his captors i(b)(3)(n)
1985.
Buckley's Agency affiliation was well publicized in both the US and foreign press. Consequently, cover restrictions regarding placement of his name in the Book of Honor were lifted.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Robert C. Ames, who died in the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut in 1983. Ames, a longtime DO careerist, was on TDY in Beirut as Director of

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IN MEMORIAM

On a corner pillar overlooking the main courtyard of the Original Headquarters Building is a memorial plaque dedicated to the pilots and employees of Civil Air Transport (CAT), Air America, Air Asia, and Southern Air Transport (SAT) who died in Asia between 1947 and 1975. Friends and family of the deceased also have dedicated another plaque, in the McDermott Library at the University of Texas at Dallas, which lists them by name.

These employees died while flying food and medicine into besieged areas, which often were military targets. In several countries, flights also evacuated persons fleeing advancing communist armies. The dedication of the pilots flying these hazardous missions was matched by their highly skilled maintenance and ground crews.

CAT, the original organization, operated refugee and resupply flights from 1947 to 1950 in support of Chiang Kai-shek's forces on the Chinese mainland. During the Korean War, when the US needed an air transport operation, the CIA purchased CAT. SAT operated under US Government contract from Japan, providing mostly administrative and "R and R" flights for military personnel in East Asia during the 1950s. Air Asia was originally organized to service SAT; by the 1970s, it had grown into the largest aircraft maintenance facility in East Asia.

Air America was established after the Korean War and operated under US Government contract. As the Vietnam conflict escalated, Air America's role in Southeast Asia expanded. Bases were established in major cities and in remote areas to support a variety of services, including the training of local national employees.

Although the majority of employees during the early years were former Flying Tigers, future employees were recruited from all branches of the armed services, as well as from several civilian sources. Over the years, each of these organizations had employees who were captured, declared missing, or died while serving their country. The last US helicopter that left the roof of the US Embassy in Saigon on 29 April 1975 was flown by an Air America pilot.

On Memorial Day 1988, DCI Webster dedicated the memorial to the men and women "who died while serving the cause of freedom in Asia."

the DI's Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Ames's alma mater, La Salle College, dedicated a plaque in his memory, and it is on permanent display in the Agency's Exhibit Rooms.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

Even though the majority of honorees have died while carrying out a mission, at least (b)(3)(c) deaths have occurred in personal residences and were attributed to an intruder or a terrorist. The most publicized case was the one involving Richard S. Welch, Chief of Station in Athens. Just before Christmas in 1975, Welch was gunned down in front of his home by unknown assailants. Some believe that the murder of Welch was facilitated by the exposure of his Agency affiliation in *Inside the Company,* a book by turncoat CIA officer Philip Agee.

Where and How

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(b)(1)
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No fatalities represented on the Wall occurred in what was once known as the Soviet Bloc.

The causes of death can be grouped into four categories:

- Accidents
- Deliberate violent acts, including executions, murders, and terrorist attacks
- Military conflicts
- Health

After 1975, the number of military deaths dropped off. Concurrently, fatalities due to accidents and deliberate violent acts rapidly increased and replaced military conflicts as the leading cause of death up to this day.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
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The Nomination Process

Any employee who believes that the service of a fallen colleague deserves to be recognized with a star can submit a request to the Awards Panel in his or her Office. The request should clearly state the circumstances surrounding the death. If the panel concurs, the Office director sponsors the nomination and submits it to the directorate's Honor Board. With this Board's approval, the respective deputy director writes a memorandum to the DCI, submitted via the HMAB, requesting that a memorial star be placed on the Wall. The HMAB has to receive the nomination within five years of the employee's death. Usually, however, requests are received within a few months of the death.

The Board

The HMAB is composed of seven members. Each directorate, including the DCI's Staff is represented. The Director of Personnel acts as the chairman, and the Chief of Protocol is the secretary. Board members are appointed by their respective directorates for a one-year term, but most generally serve much longer. One DI representative remained a Board member for nearly 10 consecutive years. The members are usually employees with extensive operational experience, and they are part of the Senior Intelligence Service.

The Board normally meets once a month, when it discusses nominations for intelligence medals and placement of stars on the Memorial Wall. The only nominations which the Board does not review are those for the Intelligence Commendation Medal and the Career Intelligence Medal, both of which are under the purview of the directorates' deputy directors. The Board reviews each submitted nomination, and it either accepts or denies them by majority vote. While the chairman votes only when a tie exists, the secretary never votes. Occasionally, members are polled by telephone in response to a nomination request.

While nominations for the Memorial Wall usually are made by memorandum from the deceased's home office or directorate to the HMAB, medal award nominations are made on Form 600 (edition date 1-90). There is no limit to the number of times either the Memorial Wall memorandum or Form 600 can be resubmitted to the HMAB.

Selection Criteria

The HMAB approves the nomination, if it meets the following selection criteria stipulated in an

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11 March 1974 HMAB memorandum to the DCI. The stated criteria are:

- Agency employees who lose their lives while serving their country in the field of intelligence would be eligible for consideration.
- Employees may be either in a staff or contractual relationship.
- Death may occur either abroad or in the US; the circumstances of death, however, have to be of an inspirational or heroic character.
- The death has to have occurred on or after 18 September 1947, the founding date of the CIA.

Because of cover and security concerns, no star can be placed on the Wall within one year after the death of the nominee. Upon approval, the Board writes a memorandum to the DCI requesting his concurrence. The DCI has never rejected a recommendation. The approved memorandum is then forwarded to the Office of Protocol, which coordinates the addition of the new star and informs the FAC of the approval. The FAC determines the exact line and row on the Wall where the star will be placed. One year later, the Commission hires a contractor to cut the star into the Wall, and adds either a name or star to the Book of Honor. Recently, it has cost $700 to add one honoree to the memorial.

If the Board rejects a nomination, the nominee may receive another award posthumously. The HMAB has to inform the nominating directorate of the reasons for the rejection. The directorate has the right to resubmit the nominating memorandum, if it can satisfy the Board's stated concerns.

Since the Memorial's inception, the HMAB has not had any problems interpreting the criteria, with the exception of the one that requires that circumstances of a death have to be of "inspirational or heroic character." The Board seems to accept the Department of State's interpretation of this particular criteria by not considering any death which results from pestilence, disease, earthquakes, or automobile and airplane crashes of a "routine" nature. The current Board has agreed not to change the selection criteria, and it will continue to discuss each nomination on a case-by-case basis.

A Reminder

Discussion of these facts and statistics about the Memorial Wall should never obscure the reality that each star represents a lost parent, child, spouse, or friend. Frequently, recognition of the type of work they performed in support of our national goals cannot be made public. The Wall thus is a constant reminder of those who have made the ultimate sacrifice for their country and of the risks inherent in the profession of intelligence.

~~*This article is classified* SECRET.~~

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AUTHOR: Carol Willett

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Mangling the mother tongue

Writing Below PAR

Carol Willett

In evaluating and ranking individual CIA officers stationed worldwide, Directorate of Operations' promotion panels rely heavily on written Performance Appraisal Reports (PARs). Promotion panels, which may have no direct knowledge of the individual in question, use PARs as the primary means to determine performance and potential relative to other officers at that grade. For this reason, each panel looks closely at the accuracy, tenor and scope of PARs.

PAR writers whose narrative fully and explicitly substantiates the grades assigned to measure performance are commended by evaluation panels. PAR writers whose language is vague, misleading, over-general or fails to address performance requirements are chastised and shown the error of their ways.

Because of the vast number of PARs reviewed by each panel, infelicitous phrases, malaprops, and mixed metaphors become collectors' items. The examples in this article are drawn from such collections. My occasional observations are in parentheses.

Some Worst Cases

"He managed to conduct a three-hour conversation in a language he had never spoken before." (A neat trick.)

"She is the shining light in the cemetery at night." (The gravedigger, perhaps?)

"The highlight of the period was Subject's tenacious pursuit of an elusive target which cannot further be identified."

"He merits an illegal but descriptive strong 6." (Notify the lawyers!)

"She is the cinderblock which holds this place together."

"Subject must stop trying to act as a male operative and instead capitalize on her advantages as a female in the same role." (Mata Hari lives!)

"On balance, Subject manages to break even."

"She is so good she must be an alien; she couldn't possibly be from planet Earth."

"She was born much too soon and is way ahead of her time; ergo, she is the best we could hope for!"

"This officer cannot be underrated."

"In addition to his strong performance, he manages to deal with the other vagrancies of the job." (A bummer.)

"He is one of a rare breed—a case officer who knows and understands his target." (What does this say about the rest of us?)

"Recently, he has encumbered some difficult cases."

"She is so good it's difficult to determine what she does best."

"I believe he can improve in each of his rated duties, but that this has been a very satisfying beginning which has pleased me, shows demonstrable strengths and fewer areas to develop, and which is a very sound base for the first full year of his tour." (Huh?)

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"While she readily seeks guidance herself, she rarely is at a loss for sound suggestions when doing so."

"His face-to-face dealings with ops personnel in another division frequently necessitate his making comments spontaneously, and he does this most competently." (No wires or strings?)

"Not to imply that she is without weaknesses, but I consider it a strength that she will let you know right off the bat when something is outside her ken."

"She is totally reliable, consistently does more than the job calls for and does it all with a smile on her face." (Let a smile be your umbrella!)

"He could use a tad more patience in his relations with those of his station colleagues who on occasion have different opinions."

"The rotating technical referent position has spun off to another employee." (Whirling dervishes wanted!)

"She frequently displayed good managerial behavior."

"She has an unusually close relationship with the Station's main liaison contact." (Some things are best left unsaid.)

"She never asks her subordinates to do what she is willing to do." (And what is she not willing to do?)

"Subject's new role placed her squarely in the path of incensed analysts and supervisors, any one of whom could have made a powerful enemy." (Were they armed?)

". . . has valiantly battled the impossible and has plied the waves of paper, bureaucracy and the halls of HQS." (In a boat?)

". . . retrieves highly sensitive and sometimes volatile records."

"She does not flap."

"When he stubbed his toe, he recovered with grace." (Yes, but can he do the work?)

". . . displays strong interpersonal skills interfacing with colleagues and a savvy understanding of the season." (Plays well with others and knows that it's winter.)

"Subject bore the brunt of their passions with equanimity." (By thinking of England?)

"This is a truly remarkable quality for an officer of his vintage." (Yes, but does he have a full bouquet?)

". . . acted as den mother to four CTs."

". . . a special TDY team tackled and recruited this target." (Drafted from the Redskins?)

"We will miss her bubbly, lilting laugh and fierce loyalty."

"In the best sense of the word, he is a hustler."

"This officer has manifested all the qualities of native intelligence." (How about foreign intelligence?)

"Frequent travel enabled her sharply to detail the synergistic relationshp which has developed over the years."

"Subject is a joy to supervise because he requires no supervision." (The ideal employee.)

"He has a definite military bearing; tall, erect, polite and firm."

"He comes to work to work and will continue to excel himself."

"She has launched herself on a accelerated trajectory of advancement." (But where will she come down?)

"She has become a multitalented, odd-job man." (A gender-bender.)

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"Subject spotted a trend of single females." (Also, a gaggle of geese and a pod of whales!)

"She contributes tremendous hours of uncompensated overtime."

The Last Word(s)

Finally, I offer this compendium of glittering generalities to avoid in writing PARs. Instead of using any of the below, just provide specific and pertinent examples.

"Subject demonstrated . . . sound judgment/accepted additional responsibility/is cost conscious/a team player/is talented/has excellent presence/is unfailingly helpful/can-do and prompt/steady/well organized/even tempered and tactful/has a keen intellect/is self-disciplined/works smoothly with her peers/is competent/determined/enthusiastic/cheerful/works with unabated enthusiasm/and indomitable energy/and is one of the few remaining fountains of institutional memory."

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Spying on ourselves

CIA in the Information Age

(b)(3)(c)

In the business world, organizations are becoming aware of the value in this "information age" of the body of information generated about their own operations. Banks, which had previously regarded their sole activities as lending and borrowing money, have been transformed into information brokers; information about money has become as valuable as money itself. Timely and constant feedback is essential to many service organizations, and it is at the root of the Japanese "just-in-time" approach to reducing inefficiency.

CIA is not in the business of selling information on the intelligence business; we will never be able to reap the profits that a bank might.

But CIA should be in the business of capturing information on how it functions for its own internal consumption. This would enable the Agency to do a better job of determining where the process of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination works, and where it does not.

Various factors have contributed to CIA's delay in developing the sort of "corporate intelligence" that is becoming essential in the competitive business world. Some have been technological, but many past technological obstacles no longer exist. Some are procedural, rooted in the peculiarities of our covert craft. There is no denying, however, that the profession has changed considerably in the last few years toward more internal communication and a necessity for cooperation and collaboration. The most persistent factors are found in the bureaucratic inertia of our organizational policies. But these also can be changed.

Some Suggestions

The following suggestions all stem from ways in which we might improve our performance by collecting, maintaining and applying corporate intelligence—by "spying" on ourselves:

- Overhaul the intelligence-collection cycle by improving analyst-collector communication to shorten the time delays and to capture better how we really value the information collected.
- Accumulate and retain information that identifies our experts and their expertise.
- Monitor our work in progress in order to know what we know at any given instant, and long before it is out the door as a finished product.
- Understand the market for our product by collecting and disseminating information on our consumers—the policymakers and their institutions—to those who need it.

Each of the proposals below prescribes increased reliance on computer information systems. Little of what is described, however, could not be implemented with existing resources. We often overinvest in the technologies, even as we have underinvested in a comprehensive plan for what we ought to do with them. Better use of information systems will only come from a coherent and corporate vision of what has to be done.

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Overhauling the Collection Cycle

The intelligence-collection cycle is too convoluted, too slow, and only really works well when its formal rules are bent. "Well, that is not what you do when you really need to get the information..." could be a part of our credo. And every one of my reports officer colleagues in the Directorate of Operations (DO) has his or her analyst to go to for *ad hoc* collection guidance. The self-fueling formal bureaucracy that governs collection guidance could be rebuilt by making greater use of passively collected information and tightening the analyst–collector loop.

We might try observing those who actually use the intelligence the collectors collect. The current SAFE, the flagship repository of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), is like a big bin of intelligence reports—collectors put information in, analysts take information out, and SAFE is none the wiser for it.

In the business world, however, databases and information providers vend information and produce meta-information. The process of acquiring information itself generates information, except at CIA, where we require that consumers do that by periodically filling out vague and uninspiring questionnaires. But we should know whether the intelligence we collect at considerable expense is valuable.

Passive collection at CIA similar to that practiced by the commercial world's marketing departments would let collectors know more about their analytic consumers without distracting those consumers. Analysts leave many traces as to the value they place on the collection they consume, by including bibliographies with their drafts. In addition, every SAFE cable saved for later use, regardless of whether or not it ends up as part of a published product, might be noted.

Improve Feedback

We also should streamline the mechanisms for soliciting more active feedback. One way would be to shorten the path between collector and consumer by removing any unnecessary intermediaries and delays.

Our cable system and our communication policies are products of the pre-World War I era. Although improvements have been made in the former, much of our *modus operandi* remains outdated.

Advances in modern telecommunications may make it possible for an analyst to communicate almost instantaneously with the appropriate collector. In the meantime, we should take steps to break down the remaining technical barriers and to make an unregulated resource into a functional system. In cases where close and timely collaboration could make all the difference, direct communication might be specifically mandated. In other cases, however, Agency policy considerations may dictate that analyst–field communications should stop at the equivalent of the DO reports desk, with Headquarters reserving the right to gist, reject or pass on questions, tasking and information.

In many cases, communication ought to proceed freely, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) develop rapport with Headquarters consumers, to requery a source, and to develop a feel for the substance of the collection.

In addition to using SAFE to note automatically analytic interest, it could be used to fill the role of a communications medium, putting analysts in touch with collectors in a smooth and seamless fashion. For example, an analyst, reading a cable on his or her screen, could type "reply," and fire back a source-directed requirement, a request for further information, or analytic comments on the quality of the report.

Such an automated system would not put such organizations as the Collection Requirements and Evaluations Staff (CRES) out of business. There would still be a managerial role to play in those cases where direct analyst–collector communication is infeasible or undesirable because of volume or sensitivity. CRES would have to represent Intelligence Community interests and serve as an intermediary between CIA internal communication channels and the less integrated, larger community.

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Identifying the Experts

We are heading into times when it will be increasingly important to work across multiple disciplines, bringing experts together, and using our internal expertise more efficiently to compensate for a decreasing ability to hire outside experts. Therefore, we need to be able to identify our own experts.

Electronic mail conferencing, something the Agency has enjoyed in CONFER, is one major tool for identifying expertise. To some, the exchanges made possible in CONFER represent the best of communication, and, to others, the worst. CONFER enabled me to build rapidly a network of technical contacts vital to my analytic work, including experts in components outside of my directorate, whom I might never have been able to meet via any other means. CONFER's critics would argue that it has been little more than an electronic version of the old water cooler, a place to hang out, waste time, and spread rumors.

Far more has been lost, however, because CONFER has almost never been championed by managers as a way to integrate Agency communities. Moreover, for lack of a corporate-minded sponsor, it has suffered death by a thousand cuts as a result of resource constraints and managerial skepticism.

As for purely passive collection, we should pool all the information relevant to each of us from a professional standpoint. Now it resides in numerous and incompatible databases, or it has never made the leap from paper to electronic form. When I, as a DI analyst, publish a paper, I have demonstrated expertise on a particular subject—someone to consult the next time the subject arises. Merely listing an analyst's phone number on a piece of finished intelligence is not enough. We should make his or her production part of a corporate information base. Analysts' training records, relevant experience from personal history statements, formal course work and travel also should be accessible.

Every Agency employee's experiences are potentially applicable to some sort of problem. Most of the help I have received covering my analytic accounts has, in fact, come from non-analysts. Similarly, I have seen projects in the DO and in the Directorate of Science & Technology that were starving for useful information I knew was in the heads of DI colleagues. In such cases, our information systems should play the part of "matchmaker."

Monitoring Work In Progress

Today, analysts act as filters, sifting through the news of the world for interesting items that stand out as anomalous, unexpected, or otherwise worthy of note. These items then enter the production process: the analyst starts drafting a current intelligence item, holds the information for possible use in a more comprehensive piece, or sends a copy up the management chain for discussion. But how long does it take for information to move up the hierarchy? How long does it take before the news spreads laterally? How often does someone see an item of interest only when the finished intelligence is on its way out the door in hardcopy form? How often was the product never seen by people to whom it would have made a difference, or who could have weighed in on the subject with a useful contribution?

We could automate the production "mill" down to its roots, turning the production process into a vast management information system. What if each analyst were able to plug his or her finds into a "corporate consciousness?" Cables, notes, concept papers and drafts could be sorted and prioritized by each analyst, using desktop information tools. And the analysts' personal models just would be a part of a branch's view of the world. The branch chief could manage the branch's collective issues, weighing in with new priorities and with the branch's own insights. This process would be repeated at each successive level of the hierarchy.

We could also substantially improve the lateral flow of information. Where information might have had to travel up a managerial chain and down again to reach other interested parties, or be passed via the "old analyst network" of former career trainee classmates and carpoolers, we could query each other's work in progress. Putting all finished intelligence drafts into the electronic web would make them instantly available to any manager or analyst with a need to know. When an analyst submits a concept paper to manage-

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ment, we could put it into the system, and we could include an abstract, keywords, and author's interests.

Why shouldn't the Deputy Director for Intelligence, or one of his subordinates, down as far as need to know dictates, be able to, in the space of a few minutes, determine what it is we know, or plan to be able to say? This is far from difficult; we have the information in hand, and most times it is already in electronic form. As with the unstudied tomes for collection guidance, the yearly production plan is an anachronism from a time when it really did take a year to compile what it is we thought we ought to know about.

Better Marketing

The ultimate end of our work is to deliver timely and pertinent intelligence to policymakers, and a better understanding of the market for our product can only make it more valuable. The application of corporate intelligence to our marketing would aid in matching up issues with the proper experts and in keeping better track over time of our consumers, both individuals and organizations.

Helping issues reach experts is directly related to a better understanding of our internal expertise. We need to ensure that this expertise is sought even when all of the questions are not explicit. An automated solution should not be so foreign to us, as it parallels actions taken more than a decade ago to improve the flow of information to the analyst through SAFE. If intelligence reports can be cast out onto the waters, to be captured by analyst profiles, we should be able to do the same with the questions our consumers need to have answered.

SAFE itself could be used to disseminate consumer questions to the analytic community. When a question covers a variety of issues or accounts, it could be drafted in the form of a descriptive memorandum of consumer interest and put into SAFE. Once in SAFE, it would enter the stream of information flowing to analysts, to be caught by finely tuned analytic profiles. Each memorandum would include information to put respondents in touch with a single Agency focal point, in order to maintain the control necessary to coordinate and avoid duplication of effort, and, through that focal point, with each other.

The mechanics of such a system would be simple. It would use the existing means for disseminating intelligence information to disseminate tasking information in a unification of currently separate but logically similar processes. We might accrue long-term benefits as well by capturing, in a single information base, the history of what we were asked, including questions we answered and the information that would let us map trends and refine our focus.

Retaining the questions we were asked raises the need to keep better track of our consumers by maintaining a useful corporate knowledge of our contacts. We produce countless reports on contacts with our consumers. My branch, division and office produce contributions to the weekly highlights; for all I know, the end result is a lifeless page in a volume destined for some dusty shelf. We also engage in a great many exchanges that never make it into any sort of corporate memory. All of this information could—and should—be captured as a corporate resource. Without a robust corporate memory, we skip along on anecdote and rumor. All too often, we go into meetings with consumers and counterparts from other agencies without a good feel for their positions, preconceptions, or expectations.

Dealing with issues is much the same as dealing with consumers. If an issue cuts across various regional and functional areas of expertise, we require collaboration. We have SAFE as a building block for disseminating issue information to a wider audience, and expanding SAFE to embrace questions as well as answers would make it a far better tool. But where is the corporate information base on our consumers? Ideally, an analyst should never produce finished intelligence without an understanding of all other relevant Agency statements on his or her issue, even if the piece refutes our past assessments. Why should we approach each consumer without a similar, corporate game plan?

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Conclusions

In the more than 40 years since its creation, the CIA has had ample time to develop wrinkle after wrinkle in its organizational structure. Even the briefest of surveys can turn up numerous cases where ideas have been or are being reinvented, and where opportunities are missed for lack of information which is in the hands of others. There is an increasing urgency for coordination and collaboration and for sharing information, however, as the post-Cold War world becomes more complex.

We could collect an abundance of intelligence within the Agency on our own comings and goings to know better what it is that we know. Much, if not most, of the "hardware" is already in place. All that is needed is a corporate policy to integrate broadly across the Agency the collection of information on our work with the work itself.

Spying on ourselves would render CIA far more flexible. By better understanding our performance, we would be better prepared for the next crisis, and more streamlined and efficient in the long term. If we could quickly identify our experts and lay our hands on our current thinking on fast-breaking issues, we could instantly reconfigure ourselves to meet the needs of the day. In the multipolar world of the future we will have more and more occasion to draw together disparate groups of experts who have effective ties to their collectors and who have an intimate knowledge of their consumers.

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TITLE: Communications to the Editor
The DO Culture: An Oxymoron?

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITOR

The DO Culture: An Oxymoron?

Charles Cogan's article that tried to sum up the Directorate of Operation's (DO) "culture" (*Studies in Intelligence*, Summer 1991, pp.23-28) which I thoroughly enjoyed, only treats part of the issue, as he undoubtedly was aware, and as his subhead Hard To Define suggests. One of shortcomings with the article from my point of view is that, rather than looking at the overall directorate professional corps, he focused only on the operations officer. There a(b)(3)(c) professional categories in the DO, most of which are filled with people who resent the operations officers' presumption that only they are the DO. I should note that during the course of my 30-plus years in the DO, I have been in the ops officer category.

Certainly, the ops officer/case officer is the dominant figure in the directorate, (b)(1) Virtually all the Deputy Directors for Operations have come from this group (Max Hugel is the only exception of which I am aware); they are the "top guns." This state of affairs is frequently justified by saying that the DO is an operations directorate, whose mission is to run operations, and which, therefore, should be managed by operations officers. In fact, of course, the basic mission of the DO is to collect information clandestinely and then disseminate it. Running operations is just a means to that end. Following that logic, the directorate should be commanded by Reports and Requirements Officers, one of the few categories in which I have not served.

A point Cogan makes, which is at the heart of the case officers' culture, is that the true ops officer loves the work. Finding ways to recruit an asset and then to run the case so as to derive the maximum benefit for the US Government is an exhilarating experience that more than makes up for the odd and long hours and for, at times, difficult working conditions.

Cogan is correct, too, in speaking of the ops officer as someone who basically dwells overseas. Despite new managerial emphasis on staffing DO branches at Headquarters with ops officers, the it's-in-my-blood case officer wants to be in the field.

The same feelings of excitement and commitment are found in the other categories of DO officers which are directly involved in operations. Overseas, Station or Base personnel usually see themselves as a part of the same team, working for the same goals. With few exceptions, the rancor and feelings of second-class citizenship are confined to Headquarters.

The DO is usually at the bottom of the heap in those parts of the bi-annual employee surveys dealing with personnel management. The deficiency derives largely from the case officer's preference for running agents and his or her disdain for tedious day-to-day bureaucratic tasks, including coping with personnel problems. A frequently voiced DO cliche is, "I don't know what I'll do when I grow up!"

The quasi-military approach taken by many DO managers ("Don't ask questions. Just do it!") reflects in part their interest in managing operations, not people. In part, too, the autocratic approach may arise from a feeling that "It is my turn, now." I recall one station chief who, upon learning that he was being appointed to head a division, said, "Now I will settle the scores of 20 years!" He did.

Cogan approaches the subject of elitism from various angles, including his conclusion that the ops officer is a "unique cultural phenomenon." He dwells on the comradeship among us, the sense of isolation from non-DOers, and our pleasure in each other's company. All true, from my experience.

Ages ago, when I took the Mid-career Course, we ops officers commented to each other about how much better we were than the rest of the class. We were always the first with our questions and our answers, while the our classmates from the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) were still staring at the floor. One of the wiser of us finally realized that we were verbal and glib as a group because of our training—and the personality types selected for that training. We were quick but shallow, and we had moved on without a backward look. Our DI counterparts, meanwhile were

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mulling over the question, seeking out the nuances and implications, and getting ready to offer a coherent, structured response.

I also agree with Cogan about the split personality required of a case officer or, at least, about the various "masks" he or she has to wear, depending on the operational situation. It is stressful to adapt to different sets of circumstance when dealing with or being concerned about the same people.

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This duality, coupled with the constant practice of the manipulation of others, can cause professional deformation. Those officers who take naturally to using con-artist skills on their fellow officers, on friends, and even on family are the scourge of the DO. (I have vivid memories of a former boss repeatedly manipulating the lives of his wife and daughter—sometimes, it seemed, just for the practice.)

I believe we can commit immoral acts as part of our professional life and still be moral in our personal lives. But it is not easy. In an environment which Cogan describes as "infinitely adaptable and slippable," it is all too convenient to see the distinction as shadings of grey. "Ethics" and "integrity" are buzzwords these days in the Intelligence Community; there is even a Presidential Council on Efficiency and Integrity.

From my parochial viewpoint, Congressional oversight committees have two salutary effects. First, they permit presumably objective outsiders to critique our (b)(3)(n) e if we are on target.

touches on this point; however clever and cunning the operation from a technical standpoint, it may be absolutely insane when seen in the larger context.

Second, and more important, the oversight committees help to keep us honest. "Plausible denial," at least to the Congress, is as dead as "democratic centralism." The play-it-by-ear and the-end-justifies-the-means schools of operations can no longer exist on a large scale.

Cogan writes that the cardinal offense in the DO is using manipulative skills in-house—"gaming one's own," he calls it. From my observation, the sin comes in doing it transparently. The more skillful manipulators are not as observable. In a perfect world, they would all get their comeuppance. In the real world, some appear not to have been caught (yet!).

In my youth, those who reveled in being privy to secrets were called "inside dopesters." As one who enjoys the language, I was delighted by Cogan's reworking of the concept to label it "anterior knowledge." It beats posterior knowledge every time.

Cogan's section on the detribalization of the ops officer was especially insightful, if a bit utopian. Senior officers have admitted to me that assignments to senior schools, sabbaticals, and even rotationals to other directorates are almost universally translated into wasted time in their careers. Perhaps, as Cogan urges, the ops officer has to be removed from a certain fixity of focus. Unfortunately for that officer, the rest of the command structure remains fixated.

The DO leadership should take Cogan's advice about overcoming our insularity very seriously, indeed. The era of "I never had any training and look at how successful I have become" needs to end, if the DO is to continue to fulfill its important HUMINT collection role.

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TITLE: U.S. Intelligence and Soviet Armor

AUTHOR: Paul F. Gorman, Major General, USA

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A case study in conventional military force assessment (with exhortations) for intelligence managers, collectors and analysts.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND SOVIET ARMOR

Paul F. Gorman
Major General, USA

This thinkpiece aims at 1) identifying a central, unresolved issue in conventional force assessment, and 2) conducting a tutorial for senior intelligence officers in associated problems of collection and analysis. It begins with a review of the centrality of maneuver armor to the Soviets, and a refutation of the commonly-held belief that NATO antitank guided missiles (ATGM) offset the Warsaw Pact's advantage in armor. There follows a retrospectus of recent trends and a laying out of the options open to designers of armor protection and armor penetrants, with a specific forecast of Soviet interests. Finally, there is an exegesis on intelligence implications, culminating in a broadly sketched plan of action.

SUMMARY

Soviet strategy in Central Europe is buttressed by armored vehicles—some 9,400 Soviet tanks are the most visible element of Soviet power there. Since 1968 the USSR has built over 65,000 armored vehicles for maneuver: nearly four times as many tanks as the United States, some three times as many armored infantry carriers. The best Soviet armored vehicles are clearly superior to U.S. counterparts, less because of technological breakthrough than the resolute, relentless Soviet materiel acquisition process. Soviet industry, supported by procurement funds for land force arms which triple U.S. outlays, grinds out new models which outstrip ours in quality and quantity. The near-term outlook is for more of the same: through 1984, the Warsaw Pact will outproduce NATO in large-gun, advanced-armor tanks more than 4:1. NATO's precision guided missiles (PGM) are unlikely to give the Soviets doubts about the continued efficacy of their armor, since their counters are both impressively numerous and redundant.

Nor are longer term prospects more promising. While U.S. innovations since 1974 promise two effective new tanks for the 1980s (the M60A3 and XM-1), plus a range of potent new tank penetrants and incapacitants, Soviet measures against U.S. anti-armor weapons, which we now know have been quite effective in the 1970s, could keep them well out in front of American developments throughout the 1980s. In the arms likely to dominate the outcome of a future battle for Central Europe—armored fighting vehicles and counterweapons—the U.S. Army, then, probably will remain qualitatively and quantitatively inferior. The domestic and international implications of this inferiority—were it generally appreciated—are grave indeed.

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What could change this bleak prognosis is better intelligence on the nature of Soviet armor and projectiles for tank guns, and on Soviet countermeasures against U.S. precision guided missiles (PGMs). Intelligence community leaders must appreciate that:

- It is true neither that antitank missiles have outmoded the tank nor that armor and penetrants have reached their respective technological performance limits.
- In the 1980s, fielded tanks could be uparmored to counter new threats, and upgunned via new ammunition to defeat unforeseen forms of adversary armor.
- An armor can be designed to fend off any *known* penetrant; a penetrant can be designed to defeat any *known* armor.

More than in any other field of armaments, the development of tanks and precision guided missiles is sensitive to and can benefit enormously from timely acquisition and interpretation of intelligence. The men and women of the U.S. intelligence community can thus exert powerful and immediate leverage on the crucial balance of conventional military forces arrayed in Europe.

Given perceived nuclear parity, apprehension over the balance of conventional armaments could bear decisively on the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance in peace, or its armies in war. Moreover, there are large sums of U.S. defense funds involved in decisions which turn on intelligence estimates of Soviet development of penetrants and protection. Most U.S. intelligence gaps pertaining to strategic weapons would, were they closed, scarcely affect on-going programs. But the intelligence shortfall *re* Soviet armor has already influenced billion-dollar decisions on the XM-1, TOW, and tank ammunition programs. Further clearing of uncertainty could have immediate impact. **Here is a case where modest improvements in intelligence could cause multiple reallocations of defense funds, and conceivably, become the linchpin in NATO's confidence and credibility.**

I. OVERVIEW

Armor in Soviet Strategy

A nation's outlays for war materiel telltale its anticipated style of combat. Over the past 15 years, armor for land force maneuver has stood second highest among the top 20 Soviet separate weapon systems procurement programs, and well up among general categories of weapons (see table, page 3). This investment has provided the USSR with an active inventory of about 50,000 main battle tanks—five times the U.S. fleet—and more than 30,000 modern infantry combat vehicles—three times the U.S. fleet.

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This emphasis leaves little doubt that the Soviet Union sees armor as its principal means of controlling land and people. This is so notwithstanding NATO's deployment of large numbers of precision-guided missiles and other antiarmor ordnance, and despite the strains armor procurement imposes on Warsaw Pact economies beleaguered by growing shortages of energy, manpower, and raw materials. The Soviets perceive armor as the makeweight in the conventional arms balance in Central Europe, now and for the foreseeable future.

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Table I.
Major Weapon Procurement Programs

Top 20 Individual Systems
(Ranked by Cost)

1965-79	1980-85
Flogger	Flogger
*Armored fighting vehicles**	*Armored fighting vehicles**
D-class submarine (with missiles)	Modified Foxbat
Y-class submarine (with missiles)	New SLBM
Hip/Haze	Backfire
Foxbat	SS-20
Fencer	Fencer
SS-11	SS-19
Backfire	Advanced fighter
Fitter	Follow-on to V-class submarine
SS-18	SS-18
Fishbed	Hip/Haze
Flagon A	New long range bomber
Candid	New large ICBM
V-class submarine	SA-X-10
SS-19	AA-X-9M
SS-20	Candid
SA-5	Hind
SS-9	SS-20
Hind	New class general purpose submarine

Soviet Weapon Procurement Categories

Top 10


1965-79	1980-85
Fighter/interceptors	Fighter/interceptors
ICBMs	ICBMs
Ballistic missile submarines	General purpose submarines
Helicopters	Bombers
*Armored fighting vehicles**	SAMs
SAMs	Helicopters
General purpose submarines	*Armored fighting vehicles**
Bombers	MR/IRBMs
Surface combatant ships	Transports
Transports	Surface combatant ships

*Weapon systems, equipment, and initial spare parts (exports excluded); includes main battle tanks (T-62, T-72) and four types of armored personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles (BMP, BMD, BTR-60, and BRDM). N.B.: 1979 expenditures for these were up 500 percent from 1965.

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Ground Force Divisions in Central Europe



Ground Force Strengths in Central Europe

	NATO		Warsaw Pact	
	US Only	Total	Soviet Only	Total
Active divisions*	4	27	27	58
Personnel	204,000	797,000	482,000	970,000
Tanks**	1,475	6,460	9,400	16,480



*Divisions vary in size and type from country to country.
**In active units.

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

Soviet Medium Tanks

	Main Armament	Armor	Weight	Overall Length	Year Operational
T-54/55 	100 mm	Steel	36 tons	6.2 m	1949/58
T-62 	115 mm smoothbore gun	Steel	37 tons	6.6 m	1961
T-64 	125 mm smoothbore gun	Laminate	38 tons	6.3 m	1970
T-72 	125 mm smoothbore gun	Laminate	41 tons	6.9 m	1974

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Soviet Combat Infantry Vehicles

	Main Armament	Speed Land	Speed Water	Capacity	Overall Length	Year Operational
BTR-60PB 	14.5-mm and 7.62-mm machine guns	80 km/hr	10 km/hr	3 crewmen, 8 troops	7.2 m	1961
BMP 	73-mm gun, 7.62-mm machine gun, Sagger or upgraded antitank missile	65 km/hr	6 km/hr	3 crewmen, 8 troops	6.7 m	1967
BMD with airborne units 	73-mm gun, three 7.62-mm machine guns, Sagger or upgraded antitank missile	80 km/hr	10 km/hr	3 crewmen, 6 troops	5.4 m	1970

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BACKGROUND

— In the 1920s and 1930s, the tank proving grounds of Russia were the womb of the Nazi panzer armies.

— Marshal Tukhachevsky was practicing "blitzkrieg" with actual tanks and close air support when Guderian *et al* were still experimenting with plywood mock-ups.

— Only the USSR exploited the genius of the American tank designer, Walter Christie, whose inventions underwrote World War II's best tank, the Soviet T-34.

— But Stalin's purges of Tukhachevsky and other Red Army leaders vitiated the effectiveness of Soviet armor, and Hitler's armor leaders nearly defeated a Soviet tank fleet outnumbering theirs by more than four to one, teaching the Soviets a powerful lesson in how many tanks are enough.

— The Soviets' military history of World War II depicts the Red Army's armor as the spearhead of victory. Yet in 1945, tanks comprised less than 6 percent of USSR ground forces; today, tanks are more than 25 percent. The current Soviet motorized rifle division has 16 times the tanks of its World War II counterpart, 37 times the number of armored infantry carriers.

— Since 1945 armor has been used frequently to underwrite Soviet politics in East Europe.

— Armor is fundamental to contemporary Soviet strategy in Europe, the Middle East (exports to client states), and Asia (forces opposite PRC, Afghanistan).

"The Soviets have been first in space, first in tanks, far behind in computers, and last in ladies' lingerie" . . . Robert Kaiser, *RUSSIA*.

The USSR builds and fields large numbers of armored vehicles because:

- That has been its practice ever since the nascent Communist state seized world leadership in armor development after the Rapallo Treaty in 1922.
- The Soviet armored vehicle industry is one of its largest enterprises, employing millions of workers, and consuming huge quantities of steel, other raw materials, and energy.
- Tanks and accompanying armored vehicles are *sine qua non* for the high-tempo, offensive operations prescribed in Soviet military doctrine for either nuclear or conventional warfare.

Even if, after Brezhnev leaves the scene, the new Soviet leadership wanted to divert resources from armor programs, it might well be stymied by sheer societal inertia: the USSR seems irrevocably committed to producing armor, in huge quantity, and of high quality.


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Soviet Armor Production


In recent years, Soviet tank and APC production has dwarfed that of the United States. Since 1968, Soviet factories have turned out over 65,000 armored fighting vehicles: about four times as many tanks, and about three times as many APCs as the United States. In 1979, production of outmoded models ceased, and at least one large plant at Omsk was refurbished. Assuming past production trends continue, total annual production of tanks could increase 30-40 percent over the next few years.

Deliveries of Armored Personnel Carriers



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Tank Deliveries



The Soviets have systematically modernized their armor inventories. Since the early 1960s, when the United States began to issue the M-60 series tank and M-113 series armored personnel carrier (vehicles which remain in 1979 our *only* armor production items), the Soviets have fielded no less than three types of main battle tanks and three new armored personnel carriers. Some 13,000-15,000 T-64 and T-72 tanks have been manufactured—more than the whole U.S. fleet of the M-60 series. Moreover, while U.S. forces are still dependent (with the M-60 series) upon homogeneous steel armor and rifled, manually served guns, Soviet T-64 and T-72 tanks are protected by more advanced armor and mount large-caliber, high-velocity, smoothbore, automatically loaded cannon. Soviet armored infantry vehicles have both smoothbore antitank cannons and on-vehicle antitank guided missiles as well as firing ports, while the U.S. M-113 mounts only a World War II vintage machine gun, and has no firing ports. Soviet tank crews have been reduced from four soldiers to three by the addition of automatic loaders, and the newer Soviet tanks incorporate both stabilization and electro-optical fire control instruments further to automate gunnery, and to increase first-round hit probability with less training.

It is *not* that Soviet armor designers have access to technologies beyond the reach of their U.S. counterparts. The United States could have built and fielded superior, or at least comparable, armored vehicles. To the degree that the Soviets today enjoy a technological advantage in their deployed, high-quality armor systems, that edge proceeds from compressed development cycles in close sequence, plus their willingness to put a partially developed vehicle into production and into operational

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units, allowing the vehicle to mature in use via product improvement.* Thus, the gap between U.S. and Soviet armor forces is less a function of advanced Soviet technology than of a resolute, relentless materiel-acquisition process:

ARMOR MATERIEL ACQUISITION PROCESS


United States	Soviet
Discontinuous and lengthy system development, product improvement, follow-on development.	Telescoped development, product improvement, follow-on development.
Turbulence in design, production and test teams resulting from discontinuous development.	Continuously operating design bureaus working on successive models.
Requirement for cost-effectiveness analyses based on operational tests stretches time prior to production decision.	Tests in operational units, production and improvement via retrofit in units.
Design for mission versatility, even at risk of complexity in manufacture and maintenance afield.	Designs for narrow missions, at low technological risk to insure better manufacturability, reliability, and maintainability.
Search for significant advances beyond current system capability, to limit of technology; "state of the art": a better system.	Acceptance of modest improvement over predecessor system, using "off-the-shelf" technology and design ingenuity: an adequate system.

*For example, although their T-64 tank, the mainstay of their forces in Germany, has been trouble-prone since its fielding, it has been improved over time via extensive and expensive modifications, including a whole new power plant. While such defects in a U.S. tank would have caused a major scandal, we could detect almost no perturbations in the Soviet defense establishment over their issue. During the 6 months (April-October 1979), improved T-64s were replacing older T-62s and T-55s among Soviet forces in Germany at the rate of about 100 per month.

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The Soviet materiel-acquisiton process for land forces is supported lavishly by U.S. standards. In fact, the estimated dollar cost of Soviet outlays for land force arms over the past decade has been three times the comparable U.S. outlays.




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The Question of Quality

The U.S. Army rates the best current Soviet tank clearly superior to its main battle tank:




1979

	PROTECTION	FIRE CONTROL 1/	MAIN GUN	MOBILITY 2/	NIGHT VISION	AMMO LOAD 3/	NBC 4/	AUTO LOADER 5/
M60		✓		✓	✓	✓		
T-72	✓	✓+	✓+	✓+	✓		✓	✓

NOTES:
1. T-72 possesses automatic electronic rangefinder, possibly laser rangefinder.
2. T-72 has "snorkel."
3. M60A1 has 60 rounds vs 40 rounds in T-72.
4. T-72 possesses antiradiation liner.
5. M60A1 does not have automatic loader.

By 1984 or 1985, when an upgraded version (designated XM1-E1) becomes available with both additional armor protection and a 120-mm gun, the U.S. Army expects the United States to be producing a tank as good as the Soviet follow-on to the T-72.



1984


	PROTECTION	FIRE CONTROL	MAIN GUN 1/	MOBILITY 2/	NIGHT VISION	AMMO LOAD 3/	NBC	AUTO LOADER 4/
XM-1	✓+	✓	✓	✓+	✓	✓	✓	
T80	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

NOTES:
1. Assumes 120-mm gun for XM1.
2. XM1 will have advanced torsion bar suspension, superior horsepower/weight ratio.
3. Assumes 120-mm gun for XM1.
4. XM1 will not have automatic loader.

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Similarly, the U.S. Army rates its current APC clearly inferior to its Soviet counterpart, the BMP:




1984

	MOBILITY 1/	NIGHT VISION 2/	NBC 3/	IFV 4/	AT 5/
M113	✓	✓			
BMP	✓+	✓+	✓	✓	✓

NOTES:

1. Judgment based on size, weight consideration.
2. BMP has passive IR sight.
3. BMP possesses collective protection, filter, chemical alarm.
4. BMP mounts 73-mm gun, has firing ports.
5. BMP mounts Sagger ATGM.

By 1984, as the United States Infantry Fighting Vehicle becomes available, the Army figures it may close the gap in quality, if not in quantity, compared with the BMP follow-on:



1979

	MOBILITY 1/	NIGHT VISION 2/	NBC	AT	CANNON 3/	RATE OF FIRE 4/
IFV	✓+	✓+	✓	✓	✓+	✓
BMP FO	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	

NOTES:

1. IFV will possess superior suspension, horsepower/weight ratio.
2. IFV will have thermal night sight.
3. Judgment based on IFV Bushmaster. automatic cannon
4. Judgment based on IFV Bushmaster. automatic cannon

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Confronted with the foregoing data, or comparable presentations, NATO supporters usually adduce two arguments which they feel offset putative Soviet strength in armor:

— In assessing armor, all of NATO's tanks, not just those of the United States, should be counted.

— NATO relies not just on tanks, but on antitank guided missiles (ATGM) and other advanced weapons to counter Soviet armor.

NATO vs. Warsaw Pact Tanks


Warsaw Pact tanks now outnumber NATO's (2:1 in peace, better than 2.5:1 postmobilization) and NATO is unlikely to improve its position by 1985. Quantitatively, the Warsaw Pact is likely to maintain about the same edge.

The first argument has merit, but proffers little comfort. Over the past five years (1975-1979) NATO's procurement of tanks has averaged less than half that of the Warsaw Pact.

While NATO is expected to add some 3,000 tanks to its inventory between 1980 and 1985, these increases will be mainly from new British procurement (about 100 120-mm gun Chieftain Challenger tanks) and U.S. POMCUS (prepositioned overseas

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
Main Battle Tank Mobilization in Central Europe 1980–1985 : M Day & M+15



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materiel configured in unit sets)—all M-60 series. Qualitatively, NATO will remain dependent on tank types with 105-mm or smaller main guns, and old-style, homogeneous armor, while the Warsaw Pact will be turning out larger numbers of tanks with guns of 120-mm or larger bore, and advanced armor. If only such large-gun, advanced-armor tanks be counted, the Warsaw Pact will probably outproduce NATO by more than 4:1.

This difference in quality is significant. Presented below is a U.S. Army comparison of the effectiveness of key tanks of the recent past and near future. The U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency* has used for this purpose a dynamic model of combat between two tanks (one-versus-one duel). The mathematical model is informed as feasible by data from battles (for example, the October 1973 War), and actual firings and other tests. It aggregates outcomes of duels at various combat ranges, in which each protagonist is 50 percent of the time fully exposed in the attack, and 50 percent in hull defilade defending. Variables in the model also account for time of firing, probabilities of hit and of kill, round reliability, and probability of sensing (using one shot to advantage in aiming the next). Thus, this duel model evaluates two tanks by comparing the vulnerability and lethality of each, plus their respective rates of fire and accuracy, combined significantly over range and engagement time. Thus


*AMSAA generated this analysis expressly for this paper; data are Confidential. Note, however, that the XM1-E1, due circa 1985, is not modeled.

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measured, the current and recent Soviet advantage in *quality*, tank for tank, is evident in the chart labeled "Tank Quality."

Tank Quality: The AMSAA View
(One vs. One Duels)



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The area on the chart labeled "Intelligence Shortfall" will be discussed at greater length in the concluding section of this paper, but suffice to say here that possible comparisons between current and prospective U.S. and Soviet main battle tanks are defined by the upper curve (T-70 lines), which is the 1974 intelligence projection used by the Army in seeking approval for its XM-1 development program, and the lower curve (T-64/72, T-80 lines), which represent current intelligence projections crediting Soviet armor with high protective prowess (upper bound, or worst case armor). Information available now indicates that the actual state of affairs is much closer to the bottom curve than the upper curve. In brief, the United States is now behind, tank for tank, and even when our developmental XM-833 depleted-uranium round for the 105-mm cannon becomes available, the XM-1 is likely to be no more than an even match for the T-80.

(b)(1)

U.S. Army data, were it available in Moscow, would confirm Soviet sensings of the superiority of their T-72 over contemporary U.S. tanks. The chart below draws on data from the U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, based on test firings, which compare the four main tank-killing weapons of the U.S. Seventh Army in Europe against three Soviet tanks: the T-62, and the T-72 with our high and low estimates of its armor thickness. The T-72 LB is a lower bound or "best case" version, the T-72 UB is an upper bound or "worst case" version. The U.S. weapons include the DRAGON and TOW antitank guided missiles, and two 105-mm tank cannon rounds: the M-735 is the current tungsten alloy fin-stabilized round, and the M-774 is the depleted uranium (Staballoy), fin-stabilized round about to be issued. The plots depict probability of kill assuming hit on an attacking, fully and frontally exposed tank:


	$P_{K/H}$*		
CURRENT WEAPONS	T-62	T-72 (LB)	T-72 (UB)
DRAGON ATGM	.65	.42	.18
TOW ATGM	.74	.48	.16
M-735 APFSDS	.77	.22	.22
COMING WEAPONS			
M-774 APFSDS	.78	.71	.50

* Probability of Kill Given Hit, Firer and Target Stationary, Target Fully Exposed, 0° Azimuth (Front).

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Probability of Kill Given Hit, Firer and Target Stationary, Target Fully Exposed, 0° Azimuth (Front)



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As may be seen, while all weapons have provided high assurance of kill against the T-62, the M-735—planned to be the most numerous round aboard U.S. tanks—is impotent against the T-72. Our two most powerful ATGM are marginal in a frontal attack against the lower bound-best case T-72, and virtually useless against the upper bound-worst case T-72.*

To sum, whether one uses informed U.S. or Soviet calculations, the conclusion is that NATO can expect, through 1984, no advantage over the Soviets in quality of armor or antiarmor weapons, and only a modest redressing of its present quantitative disadvantage.

---

*The graphic assessment techniques used here are in some cases original, and, in all, unusual. Among other problems intelligence faces, that of presenting comparisons in this field of armaments is most difficult. With vehicles protected by homogeneous armor, it has been easy to express lethality of threat weapons using as a common denominator the ability of each to penetrate some standard armor, such as "rolled homogeneous steel plate at 0° obliquity." But with the advent of nonhomogeneous armors, such as that we believe the Soviets employ on the T-64 and T-72, new comparative measures must be sought. As the U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory puts it: "The Soviet Union has fielded two new tanks, the T-64 and the T-72. As intelligence data on these tanks accumulated, it became apparent that (a) the T-64 and T-72 were very similar in most respects, and (b) both appeared to have an unconventional armor over most (or all) of their frontal areas. Continual analysis of the accumulating intelligence data has led to technical estimates of what this unconventional armor might be, and how well it may perform. If our estimates of what this unconventional armor could be engineered into the tanks [sic], then this armor also would provide substantially improved ballistic protection over that of an equivalent weight of homogeneous steel armor. Further, it appears that the magnitude of the improvement in ballistic protection with the unconventional armor is probably *not* some simple multiple of the equivalent weight of homogeneous steel armor, but instead varies from weapon to weapon in a complicated way.

"The advent of a new unconventional armor on fielded Soviet tanks causes two immediate problems. The first, biggest and most obvious problem is that we must immediately reconsider the capabilities of our existing and developmental weapons systems, and decide what actions are prudent in the face of this new threat. The second, less obvious, problem is that this reconsideration of the capabilities of our weapons systems is made much more difficult by the complicated phenomena involved in the terminal ballistics of attacking munitions and the unconventional armor as we perceive it now.

"When tanks were made of homogeneous steel armor, it was relatively easy to get a fair idea of the lethality of most weapons against such tanks by comparing the penetration capability of the weapon into steel armor to the known or expected thickness of armor on the tank. Thus, if a weapon could penetrate X mm of steel armor, and it had to penetrate Y mm of steel armor to reach the internal volume of the tank, then if X>Y the attacking weapon could be said to have some significant lethality, and the *more* X exceeded Y the greater the lethality was likely to be (up to a point). *Such simplistic concepts are not workable with the new unconventional armors.* Attempts to communicate weapons systems lethality against such armors have led to great confusion among DoD decision makers unfamiliar with the complicated terminal ballistics technology involved."

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
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Antitank Missiles

Does NATO's hope lie in more and better antitank guided missiles? In precision-guided munitions? Here, too, near-future prospects are bleak. As indicated above, even the numerous, once-formidable U.S. TOW ATGM is now a questionable asset. As the chart depicts,* when the Soviets deployed their T-64 and T-72 tanks, they ended nearly two decades of U.S. ATGM superiority. While it is possible that an improved (larger, faster) TOW-like missile may redress this deficiency vis-a-vis these current tanks, Soviet armor on the T-80 and T-80I could stymie this development as well.

*While the previous footnote deprecates such simplistic measures as those of ordinate, these can be used with some validity to rate the comparable ATGM warheads shown.

US ATGM vs. Soviet Tank



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
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Here are diagrams generated by the computer of the Ballistic Research Laboratory which portray the vulnerability of the T-62 and T-72 against frontal attack by DRAGON and TOW, the two ATGM now deployed throughout the Seventh Army. The depiction for DRAGON is valid for a 0° frontal attack from 100 to 1,000 meters range; that for TOW for a 0° frontal attack from 500 to 3,700 meters range:


Weapon:
DRAGON
From ground mount



Target:
T-62



Target:
T-72
(12/78) LOWER BOUND PROTECTION



Target:
T-72
(12/78) UPPER BOUND PROTECTION

Key:

- Internal volume perforated
- Internal volume not perforated
- No internal volume here


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
Weapon:
TOW
(Current)
From vehicle mount



Target:
T-62



Target:
T-72
(12/78) LOWER BOUND
PROTECTION



Target:
T-72
(12/78) UPPER BOUND
PROTECTION

Key:

- Internal volume perforated
- Internal volume not perforated
- No internal volume here

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These diagrams illustrate vividly the intelligence dimensions of the ATGM problem facing U.S. commanders in Europe today: our ATGM clearly can defeat the T-62, but the T-72—and the like-armored T-64—could be largely invulnerable to them. In fact, chances are better than 50-50 that either TOW or DRAGON would explode without effect against the nose of the T-72, even if that tank's armor is only of "lower bound, best case" toughness. In the upper bound, worst case, the probability of kill declines to less than .20. Prudence dictates a change in tactics to seek flanking, rear, or top shots for our ATGM—adjustments which to some extent will require them to sacrifice their range advantage, and render them more vulnerable to suppressive fires and infantry attack. (The U.S. Army is now developing an improved TOW missile which uses a larger warhead plus a nose probe to optimize penetration—but this will not appear until 1982.)

Tactics of Suppression

In any event, for coping with NATO ATGM the Soviets probably rely as much on suppressive fires as on armor protection. Soviet doctrine stresses four types of suppression for ATGMs and other antiarmor defenses: direct fire from tanks, supporting infantry fighting vehicles, and attack helicopters, and indirect fire from artillery and mortars.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization intends to use its tank superiority to overwhelm NATO ATGM. They believe that a high density of attacking tanks can saturate the defense in any given sector. They know tank guns can fire more rapidly than ATGM, and that Soviet tanks are heavily armored to the front, and built low to present a minimal target. Their crews are drilled in frontal engagement of ATGM while on the move. Whereas ammunition aboard U.S. tanks in Germany consists mainly of steel darts for killing tanks (less than 20 percent high explosive or incendiary rounds), Soviet tanks carry mainly high explosive antipersonnel rounds for ATGM suppression.

Aside from tanks, the Soviets prize for suppression other direct fire weapons which can reach deep into NATO defensive positions to destroy defending tanks and ATGM on vehicles or in bunkers. Here Soviet ATGM play a role. During the 1960s and 1970s, while the United States has fielded just two ATGM systems—DRAGON (range 1,000 meters) and TOW (range 3,000-3,700 meters)—the Soviets have fielded six. The latest Soviet antitank missile is the AT-6 SPIRAL, a radio-controlled, semiautomatic, command-to-line-of-sight system of 5,000 meters range. Although NATO has many more antitank weapons than the Pact, and will substantially increase its lead in numbers of fielded AT weapons over the next several years (through 1984),* most such weapons will be of short range and of doubtful use against advanced armor like that of the T-72. Considering only antitank systems with ranges greater than 1,000 meters, which are generally the more capable systems which figure in suppressive fires, by 1984 the Warsaw Pact will have increased its advantage over NATO by 70 percent. As for armored vehicles to move these and other infantry support weapons about the battlefield, the Pact has a clear superiority now, and will maintain a 5:1 superiority in infantry fighting vehicles through 1984.

Attack helicopters provide a type of mobile firepower most useful against ATGM, for which the Soviets are pressing hard. As the table on page 3 makes evident, helicopter procurement receives high priority in Soviet defense spending. Over the six months (April-October 1979), in Central Europe alone, the Pact increased its ground attack helicopters some 40 percent, and formed two new MI-24 regiments.


*For example, the U.S. VIPER, replacing the M72A2 LAW, will add many thousands of short-range AT rockets to the NATO inventory.

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Both the HIND D and HIP E are heavily armed with direct fire weapons which can suppress or destroy NATO tanks and ATGM. Both are being produced in large numbers, and by 1984 the Pact is expected to have a 1.7:1 advantage over NATO in attack helicopters.

Warsaw Pact Ground Attack Helicopters Figure II-15



	MI-8 Hip E	MI-24 Hind D
Year operational	1977	1976
Length (m)	18.2	17.3
Maximum useful load (kilograms, fuel and payload)*	4,500	5,300
Maximum combat radius* (nm)	95	120

*Maximum useful load and combat radius calculated with a maximum payload at maximum gross weight using a rolling takeoff.

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
(b)(3)(c)

As for artillery, which the Soviets regard as their main suppressive counter to ATGMs, the Warsaw Treaty Organization will maintain its current overall superiority in numbers of tubes (about 2.5:1) through 1984. Soviet artillery modernization programs include both mechanization (self-propelled guns/howitzers) and upgraded munitions, including bomblet dispensing rounds, flechette-type shrapnel, and proximity fuzes calculated to be especially effective against ATGM, even if protected by currently issued nylon blankets. The crucial difference for the force balance in Europe is perhaps best measured by relative firepower surge capabilities. These express on the Warsaw Pact (WTO) side the capability for fires to kill or blind preparatory to an attack, or ATGM suppression/obscuration during an attack. On the

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NATO side, these show maximum counterbattery fires. As the chart below makes evident, by 1984 NATO's relative inferiority will increase:



To summarize, through 1984 at least, large numbers of Soviet armored vehicles will weigh heavily in the balance of forces in Europe:

- The Warsaw Pact will retain numerical superiority in armor and will increase their qualitative edge.
- The Pact is building ever more effective counters to NATO ATGM in the form of both direct fire weapons on armored vehicles and on helicopters, and a preponderance of indirect (artillery) fires.

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
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II. THE OUTLOOK FOR ARMOR

Trends in Armor-Antiarmor Warfare

Tanks are designed to provide direct fire from cannon, machinegun, guided missile or flame weapons which are both armor-protected and mobile. Modern tanks are significantly more lethal than the armored vehicles which fought in World War II. Trying to hit another stationary tank at a range of 1,500 meters, the U.S. Army medium tank of World War II could fire 13 rounds, and would still have only a 50-50 chance of hitting. The standard U.S. medium tank of the mid-1970s commanded the same hit probability with a single shot.



The Sherman tanks of General Patton's Third Army had to close to within 500 meters of the German PzV Panther tank before the American 76mm gun could punch through the German's 4.8 inches of frontal armor. Current US medium tanks can penetrate nearly *twice* that much armor at *four times the range.*

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These charts plot characteristics of the main battle tanks of the two major tank-producing nations over three decades, up to the mid-1970s. Each point records the year in which a significant improvement was introduced. By 1975, the technical developments shown led many to conclude that the tank had been engineered to expectable economic limits.

TANK GUN SIZE


Modern tank guns are larger by one-third than the guns of 1945.

MUZZLE VELOCITY

The muzzle velocity of tank projectiles has more than doubled. Rounds travel nearly one mile per second.

FIRE CONTROL INSTRUMENTS


Range finders, computers of superelevation and lead, sights and other aiming aids have improved by a factor of 4.



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Improvements in gun accuracy and range have increased the area a single tank could command with its weapon.



ACCURACY OF RANGE FINDERS

Since most tank misses are caused by inaccurate range estimation, the unaided optical sights of WW II were replaced first by stereoscopic range finders, then by coincidence range finders, and finally, in the mid-'70's, by laser range finders.

ADVANCE IN TANK CANNON TECHNOLOGY

Taken together, these advances have increased hit probabilities ten-fold--and future tanks will mount guns of even greater range and accuracy.

Ph: Probability of hit

COMMAND OF GROUND

One implication of this increase in range and hitting power is that the tank influences much more terrain than formerly. The tactical reach of the modern tanker extends over 7 times as much ground.


Modern tanks have not only bigger guns, improved ammunition, and more sophisticated fire control apparatus, but armor protection roughly double that of World War II tanks. Nonetheless, the chief tank-producing nations have designed their main battle tanks to constrain bulk, and to balance increases in engines, track and suspension systems.

For example, while the modern U.S. main battle tank is one-third heavier than its World War II predecessor, it's equipped with an engine more than two times as powerful. Its agility has actually increased: its horsepower-to-ton ratio has *increased* by one-fourth, its ground pressure has *decreased* by one-fourth, and its maximum cruising range has increased by three times. Both the United States and the USSR have fielded amphibious light tanks, and many nations have developed various snorkeling devices for underwater fording. Tanks of the United Kingdom have tended to be

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somewhat heavier than U.S. designs over the period; Soviet and German designs have tended to be lighter. But virtually all new designs have added armor protection and firepower.



At the same time, mechanical reliability has advanced. During the German thrust through the Ardennes into France in May-June 1940, more than half the tanks participating went out of action due to mechanical failures. Modern main battle tanks are expected to average 300-400 km between mechanical failures.

Tank development accelerated in the 1970s with emphasis on increasing firepower and improving armor protection. Tanks appeared which can fire antitank guided missiles as well as cannon rounds. The missiles have much higher accuracy and greater range than cannons—50-100 percent greater. Such missile-tanks can hit tank-size targets nine out of ten times at a range of 3,000 meters.

Also, most modern tanks have been equipped with night vision devices. Active sights let soldiers see targets illuminated with invisible infrared beams out to ranges of 1,500 meters. More significant, there are passive sights with comparable range capability, which let the operator see targets by natural light (for example, starlight), or by detecting the heat emitted by the target (thermal imagery sights). Thermal sights are effective out to 4,000 to 6,000 meters.

Not the least of modern developments are tanks with stabilized turrets which materially aid gunners acquiring a target, and facilitate firing on the move.

In sum, the capabilities of modern tanks have been extended to as far as the tanker can see. What he can see, he can hit.

THE TANK, WITH ITS CROSS-COUNTRY MOBILITY, ITS PROTECTIVE ARMOR, ITS FORMIDABLE FIREPOWER, HAS BEEN AND IS LIKELY TO REMAIN THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT WEAPON FOR FIGHTING THE LAND BATTLE

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
While tanks are usually rated vis-a-vis another tank, it is well to remember that infantry-manned weapons are both a main target for tanks and a main threat to them. Tanks were invented to defeat the infantry defenses of World War I, and remained for nearly 50 years the nemesis of foot-soldiers. During World War II, shoulder-launched rockets with shape-charge explosives (for example, bazooka, panzerfaust) began to erode the tank's invincibility. But rockets, and the related recoilless rifles which followed soon thereafter, called for infantrymen courageous enough to duel a tank well within the lethal range of the tank's cannons and machineguns. By the 1970s, infantry weapons could outreach those of the tank, and their penetrating power outstripped the protective capacity of armor, leading many to anticipate the elimination of the tank as an effective instrument of war.

ANTITANK VS. TANK RANGES

The line across the middle of the chart shows the trend for the principal Warsaw Pact medium tanks. The other line shows the trend in range capability for the antitank weapon of the US Army Infantry in the same time frame. The leaping crossover was the result of introducing the tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile in the early '70's.

PENETRATION VS. ARMOR THICKNESS


Increases in armor penetrating capability kept pace with the increases in range and accuracy. This chart shows the trend in penetrating power of US weapons compared with the growth in the maximum thickness of armor of the Warsaw Pact tanks.



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Other nations, notably the USSR, progressively fielded anti-tank (AT) missiles and rockets of comparable range and accuracy and hitting power. Additionally, both the United States and the USSR improved shorter range weapons, so as to achieve high accuracy with light, man-packed, hand-held weapons within a range of 1,000 meters or so. The charts below reflect the ATGM status of the mid-1970s.



Ph* FOR CREW-SERVED WEAPONS

US and USSR crew-served infantry antitank weapons have tripled their range in less than 20 years.

Ph* FOR INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS

US and USSR individual antitank weapons have increased their ranges by four times in the past decade.

**Probability of hit*

Future Designs

Trends cited for both tank and antitank weapons have posed complex technical problems for armor designers, who must devise counters to antiarmor penetrants and incapacitants. *Penetrants* defeat armor by punching through it to attack the men or the machinery inside. *Incapacitants* impair the vehicle's ability to move, to shoot, or to communicate. Penetrants rely on one of three forms of energy: kinetic, chemical, or nuclear. Incapacitants may be either active or passive; the former might use chemical explosives or toxic gas, the latter physical obstacles. In general, armor developers are

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concerned with the following types of threat, and attempt to cope with them as indicated:

Threat Type		Example	Probable Design Counter
Penetrants	Kinetic energy	Armor-Piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot projectile (APFSDS)	High obliquity armor, especially for frontal surfaces; low silhouette; stand-off plates and skirting
	Chemical energy	High-explosive antitank (HEAT) rocket	
	Nuclear energy	Enhanced-radiation warhead (ERW) for artillery projectile	Anti-radiation liner
Incapacitants	Active	Pressure-fuzed blast mine; chemical (gas) mine	Turbines for high horsepower/ton; agile vehicles with rugged tracks and protected suspension; closed, filtered crew air system
	Passive	Tank ditch	

Over the past several decades most NATO antitank weapons have sought to exploit chemical energy penetrants: metal jets formed by the Munroe Effect, typically a warhead consisting of a metal-lined, conical cavity imbedded in a cylinder of an explosive. Shaped charge warheads have figures in almost all U.S. ATGM or AT rocket designs, from the World War II "bazooka" through TOW. Today's shaped charge designs achieve extraordinary penetrating power, readily perforating steel of five (or more) warhead diameters in thickness.* Even relatively small warheads—60-mm or so in diameter—can perforate armor of the T-62 or M60A1 tanks. Short-range, unguided, shoulder-launched rockets thus armed, such as the U.S. M-72 LAW, or the Soviet RPG7, provide the individual foot soldier with an organic self-defense capability against such tanks. Longer range, guided missiles, such as TOW, achieve high hit and kill probabilities at ranges beyond the reach of their cannon, and hence can be employed in defensive or offensive overwatch roles from highly protected or even unarmored vehicles, such as APCs or helicopters. Modern armor, such as that of the T-80, could change some or all of these tactical relationships. But in the meantime chemical energy warhead evolution proceeds apace, and some believe it can equal or surpass armor evolution.


Within the past ten years, NATO antitank weapons designers have also exhibited marked interest in kinetic energy penetrants. Unlike missile-borne chemical energy penetrants, which form their penetrators explosively on impact, and hence do not rely on projectile velocity to kill the target, kinetic energy penetrators accumulate their lethal energy as they are accelerated down a gun tube by expanding propellant gases. The capacity of any to penetrate depends upon its velocity at the target, and its length, diameter and density. To achieve deeper penetration with a fixed-mass penetrator, longer, thinner, faster and denser bullets are better in principle, and evolving in practice: the objective is a very high ratio of Length to Diameter, high L to D.

Early tank guns borrowed from small arms technology, and had rifled barrels firing short, steel, full-bore-diameter bullets. In the 1940s the sabot concept was developed. The sabot is a cylindrical shoe which carries a "less-than-bore-diameter" bullet down the barrel, impounds the propellant gases, provides structural support to the penetrator, and is discarded on muzzle-exit. Since the sabot's energy is not delivered to the target, designers attempt to minimize sabot weight and maximize


* Penetration is also a function of "standoff," the distance from base of cone to surface, and damage is a function not only of the jet, but "spall," pieces of armor blown into the interior of the target.

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Performance Characteristics for a Shaped Charge Warhead.



Typical Behind-Armor Spall Fragments Formed when a Shaped Charge Perforates Armor.

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penetrator weight, under the constraint that both must survive the violence of launch. Even with such constraints, the result is not that of a zero-sum game. Sabots opened the way to higher muzzle velocity and penetrators of denser if somewhat weaker alloys than steel, since structural loads on the penetrator can be reduced by good design. Rifled bores could still be used to spin the saboted bullet for accuracy, but the length-to-diameter ratio of such "spin stabilized" penetrators is limited to about six. Thus, spin-stabilized armor-piercing discarding shot (APDS) rounds reached some natural limits.

To achieve stable, accurate flights without spin using higher L to D penetrators, gun ammunition designers added fins to the base of the rod. Armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot ammunition (APFSDS) is now a main threat to tanks. Rifling was no longer necessary, but could be used depending on what other ammunition might be fired from the gun. With the T-62, the Soviets switched to a smoothbore, 115-mm tank gun, firing an APFSDS steel penetrator. Current NATO APFSDS penetrator designs use very dense uranium (staballoy)—for example, the U.S. M-774 round for the 105-mm cannon about to be fielded, and the XM-833, the very high L to D staballoy round, being developed for the mid-1980s.

Guns, of course, have the advantage over missiles in rate of fire, ability to "fire-and-forget," and relative invulnerability to smoke, fog, dust or other obscuration; NATO's modern, high-velocity guns and APFSDS penetrators are formidable tank killers, notwithstanding their comparative shorter range and inaccuracy vis-a-vis some ATGM.

These facts, of course, well known to the Soviets, must be cause for concern in their design bureaus. And this, in turn, should be a focus for the attention of U.S. intelligence collectors and analysts.

Probably the Soviets are also worried by NATO's tendency to develop ever larger shaped-charge warheads for ever more precise antitank guided missiles. (The Soviets' own Munroe Effect designs do not seem to be similarly driven. Some late Soviet ATGM, such as the AT-6, have featured warheads of smaller diameter than predecessor designs, leading to speculation that they may incorporate dual cones of explosive, one behind the other. Such an arrangement is something U.S. designers regard as theoretically feasible but, up to now, impractical.)

Perhaps even more worrisome for the Soviets must be NATO's propensity to develop missiles which climb and dive to attack normal to sloped armor, or other weapons for attacking the top, bottom, and rear of tanks, where heretofore Soviet designs have kept armor thin. Such NATO weapons include the new HELLFIRE ATGM, the 30-mm depleted uranium projectiles fired by the USAF A-10's automatic cannon, the 40-mm shaped-charge grenades fired by U.S. Army helicoptors or ground troops, and broadcast shaped-charge artillery submunitions in the form of grenades or mines. Even more dangerous will be forthcoming precision-guided munitions (PGMs) which employ various kinds of sensors to acquire the target, to either point and fire the warhead toward it, or to guide the warhead to it. These sensors generally detect and measure one component of energy from the electromagnetic spectrum, or a combination of such components. The energy may be in the form of energy reflected by the target or from its background, energy reflected off the target by a target illuminator, or energy emitted from the target due to its inherent operational or material properties. Such PGMs pose a severe threat because of their high probability of hit, but they offer the Soviet designer an additional facet to exploit in countermeasure design, since it may prove easier to foil the sophisticated sensor than to build armor to foil the kill mechanism (warhead/projectile).

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U.S. development effort and fielding of the family of scatterable AT and AP mines (FASCAM), and NATO interest in these systems, is undoubtedly of great interest and concern to the Soviets. These broadcast mines can be fired from 155-mm artillery, or strewn about by ground vehicle, fixed-wing aircraft, or helicopters. The individual AT FASCAM mine has a magnetic fuze and explosives formed in a type of shaped charge (Misznay-Schardin plate charge) about five inches in diameter. The mine is activated under the vehicles belly or tracks. The explosion penetrates up to 66mm of belly armor, yielding about a three-inch diameter hole. The mine requires about an 18-inch standoff for proper penetrant formation, and therefore its effect is readily attenuated by soil or other overburden. This suggests that enemy countermeasures to the FASCAM mine threat may include means to push dirt over the mine, for example, with a dragmat under the belly. Also, attempts to provide spall suppression liners in the belly region are considered likely. At present nothing is known of Soviet attempts to counter FASCAM mines through more rugged belly armor/track and road-wheel design, or the addition of equipment (for example, dragmat) to provide overburden, but intelligence should be looking for these.

Finally, Soviet designers appear to be quite conscious of nuclear penetrants, especially neutron radiation. They seem to have installed antiradiation liners on the interior of the T-64 and T-72 expressly to counter this threat, and future designs will probably include similar precautions.

Soviet Armor: A Forecast

Some commentators have held that tank design has been pushed to the outer limits of technology, and that the 1980s will see missiles dominate the battlefield. But he who sounds the death knell for the tank had best ask for whom the bell tolls. The press of technology seems to be disclosing more highly protective, weight-efficient armors as rapidly as missiles appear with unprecedented range and lethality. Soviet armor designers seem to be alert to their technical possibilities for defeating the threats described above. Presently, there are five basic approaches open to them:

- Homogeneous armor (e.g., U.S. M-60 series)
- Spaced armor (FRG Leopard 1A1 mZ.)
- Laminate armor (USSR T-64 and T-72)
- "Special" armor (U.S. XM-1)
- Reactive armor (FRG Leopard 3)

Homogeneous armor is by far the most common type. But even when constructed of high-grade steels, such as electro-slag purified steel or alloys, it is bulky, heavy, and inefficient against high L to D penetrators. U.S. tank designers aver that metallurgy—quality or metal—can contribute only 10-15 percent to modern armor protection. While they state they would reach for such a margin when weight and cost penalties permit, they prefer the much more cost-effective solutions available via use of certain laminar materials, or the geometry of spaced plate array, or the type and configuration of reactive armor. Soviet designers evidently agree, since the Soviets abandoned homogeneous armor for their main battle tank a full decade ahead of the United States.

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Spaced armor uses an outer-armor plate to cause premature triggering of attacking Munroe Effect warheads, an inner airspace, and a second armor surface finally to defeat the jet penetrant. In general, these designs have not proved to be as effective against modern penetrants as other approaches, but are being used to up-armor fielded tanks. For instance, the West Germans have sought to protect their Leopard 1 tank against Soviet missiles by such added-armor (Zuzatzpanzerung).




Figure 26. FRG Leopard Tank with *Zuzatzpanzerung*

The Soviets' last two production tanks—the T-64 and T-72—are believed to have **laminate armor**, steel layers sandwiching unknown material(s)—possibly silicates, ceramics, Fiberglas, or steel balls in a matrix—which affords tough, relatively light protection. Our present information leads us to believe that the armor designed for their next production tank (the T-80) will follow a similar approach. As discussed above, we have reason to believe that the Soviets already have under development a more advanced follow-on to the T-80, the T-80I, which they consider has even higher levels of protection. Such a tank could exploit **"special" armor**—like that which the United States has devised for the XM-1 (b)(1)
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Analyses conducted by the U.S. Army show that an effective medium tank satisfying perceived Soviet design constraints (interior volume, exterior dimensions, track pressure, turret balance, etc.), could be built using U.S.-style "special" armor, per the XM-1. But the Soviet "T-80I" may be built with **reactive armor**—steel plates sandwiching explosive cells which literally blow penetrants to pieces. The West Germans have been experimenting with such armor, and have found it promising enough to design a follow-on to the Leopard 2 around it. While U.S. experiments with reactive armor are as yet inconclusive, prospective tanks thus armored could be small, light, and agile.

One feature of laminate, "special" and reactive armor is high potential for upgrading armor protection on fielded tanks. By bolting on new laminate or "special" armor arrays designed to defeat specific threat penetrants, or by hanging reactive armor plates over vulnerable areas as a "battle dress" for tanks, a tank fleet can be substantially "uparmored." It is possible that the Soviets have already designed such

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ways to make their tanks proof against current NATO anti-tank guided missiles—TOW, HOT, MILAN, SWINGFIRE, etc., and that these methods may be applicable to the already fielded T-64 and T-72 (via add-on plates) as well as to the forthcoming T-80 and T-80I.

Both the T-64 and T-72 are relatively small, low tanks: they weigh 20 percent less, and their presented area is 30 percent less than that of the contemporary U.S. M-60 series tanks. From what we know of the T-80, it is also small and low slung. The Soviet predilection for small, low-profile tanks probably conflicts somewhat with the use of "special" armor, since it costs heavily in weight and volume, as the newest U.S., UK, and FRG designs attest. Use of reactive armor would facilitate the relatively light and agile tanks the Soviets favor. Given the breadth and depth of Soviet armor programs, as well as the extent of Soviet espionage within NATO, it seems prudent to credit the Soviets with involvement in both "special" and reactive armor technology. From past Soviet design choices, we would expect them to opt in the future for smaller, lighter, faster tanks, with a very large main gun and formidable armor, especially across the vehicle's frontal arc.

The Soviet designer is faced with a vexing problem when it comes to designing countermeasures against precision guided munitions which attack armored vehicles from the top. On the one hand, protecting against the kill mechanism (warhead) requires the same type of armor technology considerations discussed above, and may result in unacceptable weight and space penalties. On the other hand, protecting against the PGM's sensor may require detailed intelligence information on the operating frequencies and sensor logic used to process the measured target signal. To counter the sensor, the designer must develop some method of modifying the energy spectrum of the reflected and/or emitted target signature. The modification may consist of eliminating certain components in the energy spectrum of the target, or of changing the ratio between components of the energy spectrum in the signature. The intent of the signature modification is to make the target blend in with the background, or to make the target appear to the sensor as something which it is programmed to ignore (that is, a false target). Signature modification can be accomplished by simple means such as blankets, plywood shielding, or chaff, or by more complicated means such as jammers. We can expect strong Soviet intelligence efforts to inform their sensor designers of U.S. efforts in tank signature modification to preclude fielding expensive precision-guided munitions which could be *completely* negated by U.S. countermeasures.

Soviet tank designers, like our own, probably now believe that they can design armored vehicles proof against virtually any penetrant, *provided they are informed of its composition and size.* Probably too, they hold that they can design a penetrant or incapacitant for any tank *provided they know how it is protected.* Their intelligence service will no doubt strive to provide the key information in both respects.

Over the whole range of armament technology, that of armor/anti-armor weapons seems in unusual flux. It is far from being the case, as is often supposed, that missiles have won assured ascendancy over the tank, or that the lumbering mechanical monsters have been engineered to the limits of their potential. New armors, engines, fire control devices, guns and munitions have made possible tanks of new capabilities, including levels of protection beyond the penetrants of most current ATGM. The penetrant-protection race is likely to be intense throughout the 1980s. As of this writing, the Soviets can be expected to develop some or all of the following:

- Tanks with variable armor, and capabilities to "uparmor" existing fleets to meet perceived new threats.

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- Tank guns increased in range and accuracy, to redress much of the gun's disadvantage vis-a-vis the ATGM evident in the 1970s.
- ATGM with larger-diameter, heavier warheads, and nose probes for optimizing stand-off and attack angle, and/or multiple cones per warhead, as well as precision guidance mechanisms.
- Individual infantry weapons for top, bottom or rear attack of tanks, and deemphasis on direct-fire, shoulder-fired rockets or missiles for frontal attack.
- Infantry combat vehicles built with armor offering levels of protection comparable to that of tanks.
- Dragmats and bottom shields to counter broadcast mines.
- Trellis-like spaced armor to protect from top attack.
- Automatic range finders coupled with thermal imagery sights.
- Electronic detectors and emitters for countering threat lasers and PGM.
- Drapes for camouflage and thermal suppression.

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III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE

The Stakes

Like all nations, the United States nurtures myths about its strengths. We are confident, for example, that our national genius for war lies in applying advanced technology to solve military problems: early in the 19th Century, Eli Whitney's power-milled, interchangeable parts for muskets armed us against France and England; in the mid-19th Century, American inventors and industrialists made possible the first of the modern wars; in the late 19th to early 20th Century, machine guns invented by the Americans Gatling, Maxim, Browning, Lewis, and Thompson armed us for both internal and external wars. But it is a sober fact that in the world wars of the 20th Century what has counted militarily for the United States is less advanced technology than superior manpower resources and sheer preponderance of materiel. In 1918, Pershing overwhelmed German defenders in the Meuse-Argonne with fresh reserves. In 1944, Patton's slash across France was underwritten with dominance in numbers of tanks (overall 3:1), guns and planes—often not *better* weapons (for many compared poorly with German counterparts), but assuredly *more* weapons. And, it is also sober fact that World War III, were such a calamity ever to come in Central Europe, would pit U.S. soldiers against adversaries armed as our national myths would have Americans armed. We would have to fight that war in Europe outnumbered, against Soviet-equipped forces trained to thrust through our defenses in just days or weeks, before we could mobilize our reserves, long before our industry could be brought to bear. It is well to remember that Patton's numerical edge in armor in 1944 was achieved by five years of industrial mobilization in the United States, Detroit having begun war-volume tank production with the inception of Lend-Lease in 1939. We shall not have five years, or even five months, to turn our trickle of armor to full flow.

It is also well to remember that Soviet armor has, in at least one war, torn deep into American defenses: in Korea, 1950, when the vaunted U.S. 2.36-inch antitank rockets, the World War II "bazooka," exploded without effect on the frontal armor of North Korean manned T-34 tanks, more than one U.S. unit broke in panic, word spreading that U.S. weapons had failed. Victory of Soviet-built armor was one probable cause of the "bug-out fever" that ultimately infected our whole force afield, and presented General Ridgway with his greatest leadership challenge. But tactical panic in the Eighth Army in Korea, disastrous as it was, proved remediable. Panic in the Seventh Army in Europe could have catastrophic consequences. Potentially even more catastrophic would be the peacetime equivalent of battle panic among the peoples and parliaments of NATO: defeatist presumptions that the alliance's arms were futile against Russian armor. In brief, World War III would draw closer:

if the Soviets field invulnerable armored vehicles, or *think* they have done so;

if our NATO allies come to believe that Soviet armor is invulnerable; and

if U.S. soldiers lose confidence in their antiarmor weapons.

Short of these larger implications of the current penetrant-protection race, there are large sums in U.S. defense funds involved in decisions which turn on our intelligence estimates of Soviet development. The chart on page 14 identified the

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"intelligence shortfall" vis-a-vis the T-72 tank, depicting the billion dollar-plus XM-1 tank program directed toward a projected superiority which has diminished significantly over time as our estimate of the Soviet armor sharpened.

But, other development/procurement decisions were affected as well. For example, the U.S. Army has moved to protect its ATGM inventory by upgrading TOW's warhead to hole the T-72 UB (upper bound, worst case), a $100 million-plus decision. At the same time, it rejected reengineering of the DRAGON because weight, time of flight, and range could not be kept within tolerable limits for attacking the same threat armor. Had intelligence led the Army to put its credence in the T-72 LB (lower bound, best case estimate), the decision might have gone the other way: accept TOW as is, and up-engineer DRAGON. Similarly, confronted with evidence of the M-735 105-mm APFSDS tank round's dismal performance against T-72 UB armor, the Army reduced its purchase of that munition and transferred funds to the more capable XM-774 APFSDS. Yet, in 1980, these and comparable decisions pertaining to Soviet tanks fielded eight years ago still rest on uncertainty.

The Intelligence Cards

For Soviet armor developers, the penetrant-protection race is an open game: every move the United States makes is potentially known to our adversaries. In years past, in weapon system after system, we have seen the Soviets move to field counters before we could bring a lengthy development cycle to fruition. Conversely, for U.S. developers it is a closed game, our developers perforce proceeding largely uninformed of what their Soviet counterparts have under way. Often U.S. intelligence will collect early, sketchy information foreshadowing a new Soviet armor weapon system, but years pass before we are able to estimate its effectiveness. **Thus, a sure assessment of armor on the T-64 and T-72 tanks, which seem to have been issued to Soviet troop units as early as 1972, remains a significant intelligence shortfall.** The T-80, which underwent field trials with troops in 1976, is even more problematic, and the T-80I remains an enigma. Our information on current and coming generation Soviet antiarmor weapons—ATGM or PGM—is likewise sparse. However acceptable it may have been in years past to trust American technology and industry to equip U.S. troops well enough to cope with such Soviet unknowns, that trust scarcely seems prudent for the 1980s.

The U. S. Army properly takes the lead in tracking Soviet armor developments. Throughout the Army apparatus, there seems to be an understanding of the issues, and high priority accorded to resolving them. For example, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, has a special task force focused full time on collection and analysis *re* Soviet armor, and has used Army resources imaginatively in both respects. But this is an intelligence problem of much larger dimensions than the Army itself can tackle. Here are examples:

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What Sort of Intelligence Might Have Made a Difference?

- Exact warhead diameters and details of internal cone construction for late model Soviet ATGM (AT-4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) from which the effectiveness of chemical energy penetrants could be calculated.
- Dimensions of Soviet APFSDS rounds, particularly the length of the ogive (nose), the diameters of the projectile, from which L to D might be inferred.
- Evidence of use of staballoy (depleted uranium) penetrators; extent thereof.
- Data on the materials used in manufacturing Soviet unconventional armor, and the thickness thereof.
- Soviet capabilities with "special" armor.
- Evidence of Soviet interest in, or capabilities, for reactive armor.
- Date of issue of new model tanks or ATGM to troops.
- Data on new or advanced training techniques—for example, night firing, use of lasers for gunnery simulation, or very long-range target engagement—which portends new materiel capabilities.
- Other indications that Soviets are working with the developments previously listed.

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Recommendations

While it may have been reasonable in past years to assign to collection on the armor penetrant-protection race a priority lower than that for strategic armaments or tactical nuclear systems, two considerations urge reconsideration:

- Strategic nuclear parity raises the premium on non-nuclear weapons.
- Given the centrality of armor in Soviet strategy, increments of effort expended on better intelligence could exert strong leverage on the "conventional balance."

Some U.S. armor designers hold that there is no undertaking across the whole field of armaments which is in greater technological flux, none more sensitive to intelligence inputs, and few with higher stakes. This view seems well founded: while we have many intelligence shortfalls pertaining to nuclear weaponry—for example, the range of the BACKFIRE or the SS-20, refires for the SS-4/5, nuclear artillery in East Germany—few of these would, if overcome, cause any change whatsoever in U.S. defense programs. In contrast, intelligence on the armor of the T-80 or T-80I, or on Soviet 125-mm tank gun ammunition penetration potential, or on Soviet antiarmor PGM sensors, could alter the XM-1 tank and PGM programs directly and quickly.

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TITLE: The Missing Link Revealed

AUTHOR: James D. Burke

VOLUME: 28 ISSUE: Spring YEAR: 1984

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THE MISSING LINK REVEALED

James D. Burke

At 0635 GMT on 9 November 1983, a 21-year-old intelligence problem was solved. Two Soviet spacecraft in orbit about the planet Venus on that day began transmitting at five-centimeter wavelength and for the first time we intercepted the signal.

The existence of a five-cm wideband planetary data downlink has been known for many years. In a previous article, "The Missing Link," published in the Winter 1978 issue of *Studies in Intelligence* (Volume 22, Number 4), I described the first 17 years of the search for this signal and indicated how we came to be confident that the missing link existed. Here I tell how that confidence was at last turned into proof.

Nature of the Search

In principle, finding an unknown radio signal is simple. One merely tunes a sensitive-enough receiver to the right carrier frequency and there the signal is. In practice, the problem can become enormously difficult because of the numbers involved. To send data over multi-million-mile planetary distances, a spacecraft must beam a powerful signal toward Earth (spacecraft transmitter power and antenna size are, of course, limited) and the receiver on Earth must be a supersensitive one with a huge antenna of the kind used by radio astronomers. Even then, finding an unknown signal remains impossible unless one knows when, in precisely what direction, and at what radio frequency to look. The usable radio spectrum is so enormous relative to the bandwidth of a typical planetary signal that a blind search, simply tuning across the dial as one might do with a car radio in a strange city, has essentially zero chance of success. And the problem is in this case compounded by the fact that Soviet planetary spacecraft, unlike those of the United States, transmit only briefly and only over their home territory.

Thus to have even a slight hope of finding the signal, we have had to build up knowledge of where in the sky, when, and in what wavelength or frequency band to look. The where and when problems were solved many years ago. Soviet planetary spacecraft radiate a housekeeping telemetry signal on a frequency of 928 MHz,* which can be routinely recorded using large antennas on Earth. By tracking this signal soon after launch, we can learn the spacecraft's trajectory well enough to forecast its position in the sky during the months of transit to a planet, and if the spacecraft then goes into planetary

*The unit of radio frequency is the hertz, one cycle per second. A megahertz (MHz) is a million hertz and a gigahertz (GHz) is a thousand million hertz. A radio wavelength of five centimeters corresponds to a frequency near six GHz.

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orbit, we simply point at the planet from then on. (b)(1) Because the downlinks are usually commanded on only when the USSR is in view of the spacecraft, our deep-space downlink listening site must be in the eastern hemisphere, too.

We thus are left with the radio frequency dimension of the five-cm signal search, which (even assuming that we knew the where and when dimensions perfectly) has been an enormous block to progress. In the previous article, I recounted our efforts to narrow the search region using various weak collateral indicators such as Soviet announcements and exhibits. We were still left with a huge haystack in which our needle might be hidden.

Intelligence Priorities

In addition to its technical difficulties, there has always been a policy question affecting the search. The signals that we did intercept made it clear that the unknown link would be used primarily for sending high-rate science data, including planetary images from orbit. (b)(1) Apart from any skepticism as to the very existence of the latter, there was a legitimate concern over cost-benefit ratios. The required kind of searching is very costly: if not rigorously restrained, a single deployment could easily run up million-dollar bills. And the relation, if any, between Soviet planetary science and American national security is obscure. For these reasons, the search has always had low priority relative to other uses of the needed overseas facilities, equipment, secure communications, and personnel.

Nevertheless, it has proved possible to mount some sort of search operation at nearly every opportunity. Soviet planetary missions occur on the average every couple of years, and in one way or another we have covered most of them since 1962. During the late 1960s and early 1970s we had a high-quality intercept site at Asmara, Ethiopia. After we lost that, (b)(1) (b)(1) which, though handicapped by their more westerly longitudes, did record some good data. Through these means we gradually built up a strong circumstantial case for the existence of the wideband downlink, and our continuing inability to find it became a well-known subject in the SIGINT community. Encouraged by the spreading conviction that the signal did exist and would be found somewhere in the five-cm wavelength region (i.e., near a frequency of six GHz), we continued stubbornly, year-by-year and using whatever means came to hand, to grind the problem down.

A New Element: SETI

Meanwhile, a related drama was opening upon a wider stage. Scientists in several countries were beginning to take seriously the idea that other

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
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civilizations may exist in the cosmos and that the best way to find one is to listen for its radio signals. This proposal came to be known as SETI—search for extraterrestrial intelligence.

Now the SETI problem is many orders of magnitude more difficult than that of finding a Soviet spacecraft signal. An alien civilization could be anywhere in the heavens and could be radiating, at completely unpredictable times, signals anywhere in the electromagnetic spectrum. Some scientists made the obvious calculations and dismissed the whole subject on the ground that even if contemporary civilizations do exist on planets of other stars, our chances of finding one are utterly negligible.

But other scientists, and some very clever engineers, were not so pessimistic. Realizing that developments in electronic data processing would soon make it possible to search a radio spectrum thousands or even millions of times faster and more sensitively than ever before, they set out to gain support for a serious SETI program.

There followed a classic American struggle between the conventional and the new: first, a modest National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) project was approved and started. Then it won a Golden Fleece award from Senator William Proxmire and was stopped. Next it was started up again by private subscription; then the Senator relented and NASA funding was resumed. Today both public and private funds are available, and several small but healthy SETI projects are under way. Through all of these goings on, the search-system designers were quietly pursuing their goals. One product of



, exactly what is needed for SETI—and for finding unknown Soviet signals.

The 1983 Mission to Venus

Though rumors had been prevalent that the Soviets would launch radar mapping orbiters* to Venus in 1983, there was enough disbelief to prevent serious American SIGINT preparations until, on 2 and 7 June 1983, respectively,

*Radar must be used to map Venus because of the planet's permanent, total cloud cover.

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Venera 15 and 16 were launched. Since the trip to Venus takes only three months, there was then no time to lose. NASA and National Security Agency (NSA) people quickly considered the available options (b)(1)

But some kind of collection and search was desirable, especially since the data might aid in planning the American Venus Radar Mapper mission which had just been budgeted for launch in 1988. It was decided (b)(1)


Now our necks were a long way out. Hundreds of thousands of dollars had already been spent; and, an important American SETI project had been diverted from its plan. The prospects for discovery of the unknown Soviet link did not look very bright: during their three-month cruise to the planet, the two (b)(1) Still, TASS had announced that Venera 15 and 16 would orbit Venus and did not carry landers. (b)(1) So, with some apprehension but with good hope, we awaited the October encounters.

(b)(1)


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(b)(1)



(b)(1)



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There followed a week of near-total frustration in the search. (b)(1) (b)(1) and during the coverage period the Soviets made no use of the unknown wideband downlink (b)(1) Night after long, weary night, personnel searched for the five-cm signal (b)(1) watched the available time run out with no signal commanded on. When the operation ended without success, there was understandably some grumbling from people whose plans had been disrupted by it, and there was understandably a debate over whether to sink more money and time into the search.

Evidently intrigued by the problem, convinced of its seriousness, and aware of the major commitments and risks already undertaken (b)(1) sufficient to make the search worthwhile, could be expected.

We redoubled our efforts to understand (b)(1) the Soviets' probable intentions for the mapping. On 19 October, TASS announced that on 16 October Venera 15 had transmitted its first radar picture: ". . . a high-resolution display of a region adjacent to the pole with an area of more than one million square kilometers." The announcement added that the first month in orbit would be used for adjusting the trajectory, after which systematic mapping would begin. Since Venera 15 had arrived at Venus on 10 October and (b)(1)

(b)(1)

On 7 November the Soviets had released photos of the 1983 Venera spacecraft showing their large radar and telemetry antennas (b)(1)

Meanwhile, some (b)(1) radio astronomers, who enjoyed cordial relations with Soviet colleagues, had for several months been discreetly digging for

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(b)(1) might be found, and one of them came up with a frequency number: 5.9 GHz. We smiled at this, having heard a variety of such guesses over the years, but we were glad that it lay within the available search bandwidth, 5.6 to 6.3 GHz.*

Epiphany

(b)(1)

said:

"We have it (b)(1)


— and the 21 years of silence ended.

Aftermath

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On 15 March 1984 in Houston, Soviet scientists displayed stunning radar imagery of the wrinkled, volcanic surface of Venus. (b)(1) opening much of a strange new world to our eyes.

• • •

Delight and contentment at the final discovery of the wideband planetary downlink can be found in (b)(1) and that part of the American (b)(1) scientific community with access to the intelligence data. Most of the people who became interested in the problem two decades ago, and contributed to the search over the years, are still active and some of them now are senior managers in their respective organizations. The writer is grateful for their sustained support in what at times may have appeared as a quixotic endeavor. The success of the search is clearly due to their lasting belief that it was worth doing despite its many uncertainties. But it is also due to the devoted work of the skilled and patient operators and analysts who ingeniously took advantage of every method and every opportunity to find the unknown signal, and at last have brought it to light.

This article is classified SECRET.

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TITLE: ``I Keep Me Ears Open''

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

VOLUME: 29 ISSUE: Winter YEAR: 1985

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"I KEEP ME EARS OPEN"

(b)(3)(c)

"I keep me ears open." With this simple statement made in July 1776, and an accompanying "owlish wink," [1] the proprietor of a fashionable New York clothing store hinted to Benjamin Tallmadge, later named Washington's Chief of Intelligence, why he, one Hercules Mulligan, "a genial, chubby-cheeked" [2] son of Coleraine, County Derry, could provide information of such reliability and worth that some of it managed to save the General's neck at least twice during the War of Independence.[3]

As he fussed over British officers and their hated red coats, the tailor of Queen Street would eavesdrop on the banter between his patrons from the King's Dragoons because, he once said smiling, "generals have a way of talkin' sometimes when they're bein' fitted for an embroidered waistcoat." [4] Working under the cover of his business establishment, described as a "gathering place of the young elite," [5] the personable, engaging Irishman even went so far as to surreptitiously solicit intelligence data from his English customers. There was more than innocence in his inquiry as to when a British officer's uniform, brought in for alteration or repair, would be "needed" by its owner. Having secured a date, and coupled with similar responses from other soldiers, Mulligan would then quickly dispatch his trusted servant, Cato, to General Washington's headquarters in New Jersey with information concerning the redeployment of a particular unit of the numerically superior Tory forces that occupied the city.

During a late evening visit to his shop by a British officer seeking a new coat Mulligan gleaned through casual questioning that a plot was underway to take Washington alive, if possible, or dead, if need be. To the tailor the officer "vauntingly boasted that before another day they would have the Rebel general in their hands." [6] Having fitted the coat to his customer's satisfaction, Mulligan wasted no time in sending Cato the courier once again into the night with vital information for the American commander. Upon his return to New York from one such foray, Cato was captured and beaten by the British who were more than interested in his repeated trips to and from the city on the behalf of his

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[1] Corey Ford, *A Peculiar Service* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 78.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[3] Michael J. O'Brien, *A Hidden Phase of American History: Ireland's Part in America's Struggle for Liberty* (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 151-2.

[4] *Ford*, p. 78.

[5] Luciel M. Mulligan, "Hercules Mulligan, Secret Agent," *Daughters of the American Revolution Magazine*, (Vol. 105, No. 3, 1971), p. 234.

[6] John C. Hamilton, *The Life of Alexander Hamilton* as quoted in Ford, p. 235.

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employer, the tailor Mulligan. The loyal Cato revealed nothing, despite his thrashing.[7]

In 1781, two years after foiling the initial plot to take the General hostage, Mulligan again learned of an attempt on Washington's life. Using their own system of spies, the British under General Clinton had learned they might have yet another crack at their prized quarry. It was understood Washington was to travel to New England by way of the Connecticut shoreline. Hearing this, Clinton ordered his cavalry on to transport boats which would ferry them along the East River to Long Island Sound. Once on the Sound, the men were instructed to overtake the traveling American general and make him a prisoner of the King. Hercules' brother and confidant, Hugh, the owner of a successful importing firm, was given the task of stocking the British boats with provisions for the river journey. As the wares were supplied, Hugh advised his brother Hercules of the scheme. Hercules passed the information to Washington in time. Washington bypassed the shore route and entered Hartford safely.[8]

As much as he was an American intelligence triumph, Hercules Mulligan was a British intelligence failure. The son of Irish immigrants who brought him to America at the age of six,[9] Mulligan, by virtue of his ancestry, harbored no love for the English. Before he became part Washington's highly successful and very secretive spy enterprise, Mulligan was much more overt about his feelings toward Great Britain and her rule of his adoptive country. Building a prosperous tailor shop in the heart of New York's residential district—a place where one could purchase the finest in Irish linens and the like—Mulligan actively sought the independence of the colonies from the mother country. He was a "known member of the Sons of Liberty . . . and several important Revolutionary Committees: . . . "[10] So intense was Mulligan's zeal for the patriot cause that he persuaded the young Alexander Hamilton, a guest in the Mulligan household, to cast aside his early Tory sympathies and align himself with the rebelling colonists.[11] It was Hamilton, after he had come to America as a student from the West Indies and "found lodging" with Mulligan, who secured for his host the position of confidential correspondent of General Washington.[12]

And as a display of the Irishman's contempt for the British, Mulligan, five days following the signing of the Declaration of Independence and on the day it was read aloud to the city's residents, helped orchestrate the toppling of the statue to King George III that had for six years stood vigilant in Bowling Green. It is written that the lead from this despised and deposed symbol of British power was summarily melted down, providing the rebel cause with 40,000 badly needed bullets.[13]

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[7] *Mulligan*, p. 235.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] Michael J. O'Brien, The American Irish Historical Society, *The Journal of the American Irish Historical Society*, (Vol. XXVI. 1927). p. 97.

[10] Michael J. O'Brien, *Hercules Mulligan: Confidential Correspondent of General Washington* (New York: P.J. Kenedy and Son, 1937) p. 13.

[11] O'Brien in *The Journal of the American Irish Historical Society*, p. 98.

[12] Johan J. Smertenko, *Alexander Hamilton* (New York, 1932); in O'Brien, *Hercules Mulligan*, p. 41.

[13] O'Brien in *The Journal of the American Irish Historical Society*, p. 99.

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King's statue toppled . . . white-shirted hatchet-wielder may have been Mulligan.

Given Mulligan's inherent and demonstrated disposition regarding English rule, it seems all the more incredible that the King's soldiers would even patronize his shop, let alone engage him in conversation that could suggest Tory intentions. It is not, however, as if they did not at times suspect the tailor was up to more then simply lengthening a sleeve or shortening a trouser leg. Mulligan was arrested twice by the occupying forces, once on the say of Benedict Arnold.[14] But between the traitor Arnold's lack of evidence and Hercules' natural proclivity for the blarney, he was each time set free.

The tailor's activities also spawned a certain distrust by those on the side of freedom. In his attempts to milk information from his English patrons, the Irishman often resorted to flattery, stroking an ego to secure information. The mere fact so many redcoats paraded through a shop which sported the sign of the golden thimble and shears, as well as the designation "H. Mulligan, Clothier," [15] did not endear its owner to many of the city's patriot population not privy to Mulligan's real purpose in promoting his Tory trade.

[14] *Ibid*, p.101.

[15] *Ford*, p. 132.

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Through it all, nevertheless, the tailor/spy endured, "silent as to his really brilliant service." [16] He functioned outside the more formal espionage networks, such as the "Culper Ring," supplying Washington with the intelligence he both sought and valued.[17] So successful, in fact, was Mulligan in maintaining his anonymity that Tallmadge, in his capacity as head of the General's Intelligence Department, once despaired to his commander-in-chief that "he (Tallmadge) himself was not sure what it was Mulligan was doing," and could not the General at least give him a "hint of it." [18] There is no indication that Washington, who compulsively guarded the names and activities of his operatives, revealed anything to the frustrated Tallmadge about the New York-based spy. Both the principle of "need to know" and the protection of sources and methods were valued highly by Washington; he considered Mulligan's exploits of such sensitivity that the operational details remained unknown even to his own intelligence director.

Yet the Commander-in-Chief was to publicly acknowledge his appreciation to Mulligan one Sunday, known as Evacuation Day, 25 November 1783.[19] On that morning, the conquering General and four of his aides reviewed the remains of the victorious Continental Army near the site on Bowling Green where Mulligan and his firebrands had years earlier removed George III from his pedestal. The military ceremonies dispensed with, Washington then walked to the home of Hercules Mulligan, the tailor residing at 23 Queen Street, and took breakfast with his confidential correspondent. This was both the General's way of thanking the shopkeeper for his service during the conflict, and proving to the good citizens of New York that Mulligan enjoyed Washington's complete trust.[20] It was vindication for the tight-lipped operative who did nothing to dispel the notion held by some of his neighbors that he had collaborated with the enemy. During the war, the Irishman's reputation had been sacrificed somewhat to his cover. Long on honoring those who had served him, Washington became a steady patron of Mulligan's shop following the war. The only mention made by the General in his personal papers of Mulligan are cash memorandums, written in his own hand and now a property of the Mount Vernon Library. One such notation shows the war hero purchasing a new outfit from his Irish friend barely two weeks after his breakfast with him.[21]

Washington continued his patronage well into his presidency and, as a resident of the Capital City (then New York), bought much of his wardrobe from Mulligan. The enterprising businessman wasted no time in taking advantage of his newly acquired status. The sign hanging before the tailor shop was changed to read: "Clothier to Genl. Washington." [22]

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[16] John E. Bakeless, *Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes* (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Company, 1959), p. 364.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 240-1.

[19] *Mulligan*, p. 232.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Gen. Washington's Private Account Records for 1783, furnished by Ms. Ann Rauscher, library assistant, Mount Vernon Ladies' Association of the Union. 24 July 1985.

[22] *Ford*, p. 314.

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The affable Irishman, with his large family, prospered after the war, living well into his 85th year. He is buried in the graveyard of Trinity Church, near his compatriot, Alexander Hamilton.[23] A plaque recognizing Mulligan's achievements during the Revolution was unveiled on the 187th anniversary of Evacuation Day. It is located on the site, now a 24-story office building, where General Washington had breakfast with Hercules Mulligan, his confidential correspondent.[24]

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[23] Mary Darcy, "Hercules Mulligan: Washington's Own Secret Spy," in the The Eire Society of Boston *Bulletin* (Vol. 33, No. 4, February, 1975), no page.

[24] *Mulligan*, p. 320.

INTELLIGENCE TRIVIA

Miriam A. Quinlan

1. Which former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence was a member of the original Quiz Kids radio show?
2. Which former CIA officer was stand-in for Hollywood's most famous child star?
3. Vladimir I. Lenin, while living in exile in Switzerland in 1917, was denied a meeting with American officials at the Consulate in Bern because the duty officer advised him that all senior officials were gone for the day. Who was the duty officer?
4. What buildings in Washington, D.C. were named for outstanding women in history and of what intelligence significance are the buildings?

(Answers on page 91.)

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TITLE: The Imperative of Criticism

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Shmuel

VOLUME: 29 ISSUE: Winter YEAR: 1985

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THE IMPERATIVE OF CRITICISM *

A cardinal intelligence lesson of the surprise Arab attack of the 1973 Yom Kippur War was the need to strengthen the intelligence research bodies which had operated in Israel on the eve of the war. The underlying assumption was that the greater the number of intelligence bodies (and hence, the number of analysts), the lesser the probability of all making the same, sometimes critical, mistake. It is for this reason that parallel bodies of analysis (in addition to that already existing in the Military Intelligence) were developed. The civilian bodies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expanded the scope of their strategic-political research, and the intelligence sections of the regional military commands were given additional resources and functions in the field of military assessment.

Another conclusion was to appoint an Intelligence Adviser to the Prime Minister. The function of this adviser was to compare, analyze, and confront the different estimates of the various intelligence bodies. This appointment, however, was short-lived.

These well-known lessons relied, to a great extent, on tradition and practice of intelligence work common both to Israel and elsewhere. Less known, and more novel, was the decision to create, within the military intelligence framework, an internal function, which would independently review and criticize the final intelligence assessment product published by the Military Intelligence Research Unit. The innovation of this review function lay primarily in the fact that it expressed a recognition of the need to add yet another safety measure. Presumably, this function, by virtue of its in-house standing, would be better equipped and better able to express itself more freely, with more immediacy, and with a greater accessibility to the top military command—thus giving it greater powers of persuasion and warning in time of need. In this sense, the establishment of the Review Section was, and still is, unparalleled, not only in Israel's intelligence community, but also within larger and more established Western intelligence services.

The ten years that have elapsed since the creation of the Review Section provide an adequate perspective to examine this experiment, determine whether it has indeed been justified, and consider whether changing circumstances should not obviate its existence today.

Review as an Independent Analytical Factor

The production of intelligence in all military research bodies in the IDF, on the General Staff level, in IDF Regional Commands, the Air Force, and the

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Navy, undergoes a routine process of substantive and qualitative review within the usual command hierarchy. The creation of the Review Section was never intended—nor has it ever presumed—to replace this orderly chain of control. Its importance lies in the fact that it established a new independent level of review, whose attention was to be directed solely at the final intelligence assessment product. That being its main mission, the Review Section receives and is authorized to obtain all data relevant to every intelligence product it seeks to examine. As a result, it has the flexibility to choose and criticize (according to instructions, or more commonly, upon its own initiative) any subject it deems important. Experience has shown that the status which Review gradually acquired enables it to express itself without fear of veto from higher echelons, and exempt from the usually prevailing environmental pressures.

Review and Its Discontent

Critics of Review question its ability to encompass the broad range of subjects dealt with by the Research Unit of Military Intelligence. "How," they ask, "can the few people in Review deal in depth with the problems handled by the many seasoned analysts of the regional and functional desks?"

In principle, such criticism may be leveled against any review function, even a judicial one. In practice, however, the declared purpose of Review, as well as the expectations of it, have tended to minimize the relevance of this criticism. The personal qualifications of the officers selected to man the Review Section have typically been more than adequate to enable them to approach even a new subject with a fair degree of understanding and common sense. What is expected of the Review analysts is that they illuminate the subject under examination from a different angle; and it is precisely the combination of familiarity and distance that is apt to produce different conclusions. Had the opinions of the opponents of Review prevailed, the very system in which Intelligence Research operates would have been put in doubt. Here, too, commanding echelons review products written by subordinates, sometimes on subjects alien to the commanders' field of expertise. The fact that they do so reflects the same imperative and logic that apply to the workings of Review. To a large extent, the power of Review has derived from its purposely modest size. The fact that it did not grow beyond a very small nucleus of military and political experts means that, while it was never perceived as a threat by the regular research establishment, it was still able to concentrate on the few select issues that usually occupy the attention of most intelligence bodies at any given time.

Perhaps the main lesson of Review's work over the years is that it stands to gain the respect and approval of analysts in Research only if it concentrates on the final products and not on their authors. To achieve this end, Review must adopt rigid criteria of objectivity. It must relate, above all, to the internal logic of a completed intelligence assessment by first asking not if it is right or wrong, but whether it is self-consistent. Review must decide if a given assessment's conclusions actually arise from the available data, or whether there can be another important, legitimate conclusion. It must also determine if all the relevant data have been taken into account, and if those facts which have not been included are capable of altering the product's basic premises. Finally, Review must examine the conclusions of the assessment in order to make sure

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that the description of the situation is neither exaggerated nor underrated. Over a period of time, Review should also seek to find incongruities between product "A" and product "B" which deal with the same matter.

The record of Review proves that it has, indeed, been able to cope with the central strategic problems of Israeli intelligence. Moreover, its flexible mission and structure have permitted it to broaden its range of concern to additional areas. These include:

Non-military intelligence products: Even though the Review Section is a military body, it does not consider itself bound to review military publications only. As a result, it has at times fulfilled wider needs of Israel's general intelligence community. Review has thus taken upon itself to react, when the need arose, to the publications of the Mossad, the General Security Services, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and found these bodies willing to cooperate with it.

Special examinations: Review has been conveniently able to carry out examinations of subjects not necessarily related to a specific research product, but rather to problems of the intelligence gathering process.

Unpublished analyses: Finally, Review has allowed itself to scrutinize not only the logic of published but also of unpublished documents. Its request, "Justify why you didn't write," could at times provide analysts with a second opportunity and incentive to bring forth ideas and reservations that otherwise would not find adequate expression in the regular analytical product.

Review as a Devil's Advocate

Many intelligence officers tend to identify Review only with its role of a "devil's advocate," entrusted with producing converse assessments. The major function of intelligence review is thus popularly viewed as being the writing of antitheses.

In point of fact, this oft-described impression represents a narrow and a rather atypical dimension of the function of Review. Notwithstanding the importance and uniqueness of the devil's advocate function, in practice the writing of converse products has occupied but a small part of Review's work. As stated, the reason for creating the devil's advocate function was rooted in the wish to prevent another, Yom Kippur-like, collective misperception. Since an intelligence failure in Israel could spell a disaster, Review was authorized, in certain cases, to produce tendentious assessments by resorting even to unconventional and—from the point of view of honest intelligence work—"unacceptable" gimmicks of analysis. When the end (avoiding an enemy surprise) justifies all means, Review sometimes undertakes to prepare special documents, which draw selectively on data that support a preconceived conclusion. The guiding assumption of such writing is that the adverse documents would have persuasive logic, be based on actual intelligence materials, and present an alternate and internally consistent intelligence picture.

The expectation of a devil's advocate analysis, unlike that of other plain estimates, is that it would necessarily provoke an immediate re-examination of

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the positive assessments, and in the rare case that they may be found to be lacking in their persuasiveness, replace them altogether. In any event, the storm of ideas that would follow a devil's advocate publication was thought, in itself, to be a blessing to a sometimes overly confident, too self-content, group of analysts. While complacency has not been a common feature of Israeli intelligence, the devil's advocate was considered to be a useful whip for shaking up possibly negative group-think tendencies.

Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, actual use of the devil's advocate function has been scant, mainly for the following methodological reasons:

Negation's overkill capacity

When building his "case", the devil's advocate deviates from the natural order of the research. Instead of arriving at conclusions based on all the existing data, he seeks only those facts which fit and corroborate his preconceptions. In other words, he rejects the "signals" in favor of the "noises"—discarded in the process of the positive intelligence production. As a rule, the work of the devil's advocate almost always ends up in a "tailor-made" report which in other circumstances would be regarded as the ultimate manifestation of analytical bankruptcy. Since such reports aim at the prevailing estimates, they inevitably are bound to produce a vigorous response. As experience shows, the danger here is that in their hasty desire to refute the devil's advocate's "negative" thesis, opponents will ignore or attack even those elements in the analysis that cast a real doubt on the validity of some aspects of the positive analysis. Rather than refuting shaky estimates, the devil's advocate may thus actually entrench them.

The "cry-wolf" syndrome.

The use of the devil's advocate function must be reserved almost exclusively to truly critical events. It came into being for one express purpose: to warn against war, when a whole system dismisses such a probability, and that has continued to be its *raison d'etre* ever since.

It follows, therefore, that when risks of the enemy's potentially threatening actions are analyzed in the positive assessments, the need for adverse estimates diminishes. Devil's advocate documents may be written also in order to expose potentially positive developments; but while "war-search" may be said to be a mandatory obligation of the devil's advocate role, its parallel "peace-search" mission could be described in terms of a useful bonus only.

The various devil's advocates who have manned this position over the years have been sparing in their use of this aspect of Review. All have concluded that overuse of the devil's advocate system would erode its value and undermine their credibility in time of real need. The cry-wolf alarm thus has its drawbacks, even when it is qualified in a devil's advocate bulletin.

Nevertheless, the role of opposing estimates is justified, even if not a single one of them will ever be proven correct. The devil's advocate needs to be right only once in order to justify his existence. Although he will remain a complex figure in Israeli intelligence, his role will continue to be important. Since he is the only prosecutor who wishes to lose his case, his successes could be measured,

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paradoxically, by the number of his failures. Each of them invariably means that the whole system is right. The need for the devil's advocate will continue to exist as long as will the risk of sudden war.

Conclusion

On balance, it appears that the main significance of Review in the Research Unit of Israel's Military Intelligence lies in the fact that, having been established as a separate, independent body, it succeeded in becoming an instrument for the expression of minority opinions. There is hardly an intelligence service which does not encourage its members to voice dissenting views.

It is precisely because of the inherent uncertainties that affect most intelligence analyses, and the measured skepticism expected to characterize the good intelligence officer, that everyone recognizes the need to allow contrary ideas to reach the highest levels.

However, like the proverbial weather, everybody admits that something should be done about it, but no one actually does anything. Israel's Intelligence Corps is no exception. Despite repeated, almost ritual requests over the years by the Corps command echelon, only very few officers have chosen to present a dissenting opinion *in writing*. Even fewer have dared to append a minority opinion to a published estimate (as is permitted and encouraged in Israel's Military Intelligence). The contribution of Review in this regard cannot be denied, as it has actually institutionalized dissent. Its products, which pass no supervision, are often read by military and political decision-makers. Thus, even officers who were inhibited from stating differing opinions have been known to use Review as a convenient conduit for transmitting their views to higher levels. Fear of angering colleagues and superiors, or even mere laziness, discourages many from going to the trouble of recording, in writing, their dissenting views. While not helping them to fight independently for their own opinions, Review has, nevertheless, provided them with a satisfactory alternative to just keeping quiet.

Review's direct access to the Director of Military Intelligence gives it an advantage in rebutting conclusions which, it believes, reflect individual or collective misperceptions. Still, it is not necessary for Review to overrule that which it criticizes. The important point is that the adverse view be heard. What distinguishes Israel's Military Intelligence from other similar institutions is that, for over ten years now, it has actually paid officers for the sole task of injecting "second opinions" into the system.

The existence of the Intelligence Review Section has, of course, not been without its problems. It has not been able to completely solve personal recriminations which its documents sometimes raise. Even though Review officers criticize papers, not people, in the final analysis it is the live writers of the papers who tend to feel that they bear the brunt of the criticism. One finding in this respect is the direct correlation that exists between an analyst's professional involvement and his personal sensitivity. Thus, reactions to the formal, widely-distributed criticism of Review may at times become more personal than substantive. In their attempt to defend their theses, some, though admittedly not many, analysts have preferred to disparage every document issued by it. Review

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has often tried to take a philosophical stand toward such reactions, realizing that pride, honor, and jealousy, and not merit alone, will continue to affect Research's reactions to its criticism. In any event, Review's final address is the officers at the top of the Research pyramid. Once they are convinced, no other reaction should really matter.

Outbursts against Review are therefore expected to continue, especially, of course, when its views are proven wrong. Unfortunately, such outbursts will occur even when opinions of Review are proven to be right. Review is expected to fulfill in itself what it demands from others: to be able to draw conclusions from its own errors. Here, however, Review has always found itself to be in a more comfortable position. Since it has no direct functional responsibility over any given area, it could bear no penalty for incorrect criticisms that it issues.

This will continue to be both its advantage and handicap. Still, the Director of Military Intelligence and his second in command for Research (who are the two prime targets of Review) must remain open enough to justify Review, even to the point of mercilessly enforcing its view upon reluctant subordinates when it presents a sounder case.

In summary, it would be correct to state that over the years Review has come to be accepted as a legitimate feature of the Israeli Intelligence Research environment. This reality stems partly from the fact that the officers who have filled the posts of Review grew up and were all familiar faces within Intelligence Research. It also reflects the fact that many of the senior Research officers had themselves served in the Review Section, prior to their assignment and promotion to the different regional desks.

The mission of Review, by its very essence, induces unease and friction among Israeli military intelligence analysts. It is perhaps because of its disharmonious (though, of course, not disfunctional) character that foreign intelligence services have not adopted it. It is noteworthy, however, that despite its special nature, no one has ever suggested that Review be eliminated. On the contrary: the trend has been rather to strengthen the Review Section in both manpower and rank. The existence of Review has allowed many officers to give vent to their hidden, and sometimes repressed, views. This may be demonstrated by the fact that, from time to time, even those officers who reacted with fury against criticism of their own product nevertheless congratulated Review for daring to express their own critical opinion of a colleague's product.

So long as Review continues to receive backing from above and feedback from below; inasmuch as its officers are, and are perceived to be, impartial and intellectually honest; and as long as all recognize the proposition that the intelligence system, as a whole, is comprised of fallible human beings, the need will remain to preserve Review as an independent, unique body within Israel's Military Intelligence.

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
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aka Edgar Allen Poe

POEEDGR

(b)(3)(c)



Once upon my desk computer, as I read my "VM Tutor,"
Came a message from a user I.D. I'd not seen before—
While I nodded, nearly napping, this odd message came up, zapping
All the input I'd been tapping, tapping in for hours before.
"Someone's input error," I muttered, tapping data in once more—
Only this and nothing more.

But the same incessant message flashing on my screen sans presage
Filled me—drilled me with an irritation never felt before;
So that now to still the blinking on my screen I sat there thinking
"What's this idiot been drinking that would make him such a boor?!—
"Tis most likely just a hacker of the kind we all abhor;—This it is and nothing more."

Back toward the keyboard turning, all my rage within me burning,
In I typed the user's I.D., from him mercy to implore.
Not the least deference made he; not a minute stopped or stayed he;
But without delay repaid me with the message, "NEVERMORE."
"Let my heart be still," I uttered, and this mystery explore;— "Tis a nuke and nothing more!"

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Growing every moment tenser, "Ah!" I thought, "I still can censor
This rude user and his message which now burns me to my core."
So I got out of XEDIT, typed in "SET MSG OFF" and bet it
Would subdue my screen—instead it seemed to make it flash e'en more!
"Call the Trouble Desk," I cried, "a system breakdown they'll explore.
I can still go home by four."

Naturally, the line was busy, so I sat there in a tizzy—
Dialing, dialing o'er and over 'til my fingers all were sore.
I grew more downcast and dejected; suddenly my call connected!:
"If this fault could be detected, we would set things right once more.
But we think the fault's with you—this hasn't happened to us before.
Please don't call us anymore."

Logging off in desperation, I met this bizarre sensation:
No familiar "ENTER SWITCHING CHARACTERS" showed as before!
Rather, blinking even faster—oh, unmerciful Disaster!—
My computer was my master, and one strict command it bore:
With those sickening, shim'ring, luminescent letters gloating o'er,
Quoth VM3 "NEVERMORE."

"Be that word our sign of parting—I'm going home!" I shrieked, upstarting,
And I changed my shoes and grabbed my purse and headed toward the door.
"You know that's a violation," someone cried in jubilation—
"You must never leave your station without someone watching o'er."
"S.O.B.," I thought, but turning, I walked slowly 'cross the floor
And I took my seat once more.

As time passes, never flitting, still I'm sitting, STILL I'm sitting,
Though I'm glancing much less often at the clock above the door.
My computer—message beaming—now just lulls me into dreaming,
VDT—light o'er me streaming throws my shadow on the floor;
And my soul from out that shadow floats in (b)(3)(c)
To return home—nevermore!

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THE TANGLED WEB

(b)(3)(c)

Though fraud in other activities be detestable, in the management of war it is laudable and glorious, and he who overcomes the enemy by fraud is as much to be praised as he who does so by force.

—Niccolo Machiavelli, 1469-1527

The role of intelligence is vital to every aspect of deception operations from preliminary planning through each phase of execution. As intelligence is usually the principal target for hostile deceptions, an intelligence planner or analyst must be particularly aware that the intelligence with which he works can result from deception schemes initiated by his adversaries. Intelligence professionals can become knowledgeable concerning deception operations from study and analysis of past operations as well as from experience gained in their work.

A *strategic* deception may be said to have occurred whenever a nation, alliance, or coalition of powers, has deliberately misled its adversaries over some extended period of time concerning its strategic objectives or its capabilities to achieve those objectives. Deceptions which involve intentions are always more difficult to detect because the intent of a nation's leaders to achieve some particular objective may appear to be obvious at one time, only to have the nation later do something completely different. It is possible that deception has occurred, but it is also possible the change resulted from a shift in policy or a new leadership.

In deception operations two basic, almost self-evident principles are fundamental to success. One such principle came to be known during the Second World War as the *Magruder Principle*, after the staff officer who first described it as "telling the enemy what he already wants to believe." Magruder did not confine this precept only to things the target wanted to believe but included also what the target was inclined, or predisposed to believe. Another basic principle, the *rational core*, requires that in any successful deception, there must always exist a central core of accurate, verifiable information. Post-war Czechoslovakian defector (and one-time head of the Czech Disinformation Section) Ladislaw Bittman discussed this important point as follows:

> For disinformation campaigns to be successful, they must at least partially correspond to reality or generally accepted views. A rational core is especially important when the recipient enemy or victim is a seasoned veteran in such matters because without a considerable degree of plausible verifiable information and facts, it is impossible to gain his confidence. Not until this rational skeleton has been established is it fleshed out with the relevant disinformation.

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Strategic deceptions can serve more than one purpose, depending upon the context in which the deception is employed.[1] During World War II, the Allies fighting Hitler and his Axis partners employed a comprehensive deception plan, originally codenamed PLAN JAEL. Following the 1943 Tehran Conference, the codename was changed to BODYGUARD after Winston Churchill remarked, "In wartime, truth is so precious she must always be attended by a bodyguard of lies."

In the summer of 1943, another one of the early BODYGUARD plans, HUSKY, was employed successfully in support of the invasion of Sicily. A deception, codenamed OPERATION MINCEMEAT, used a corpse equipped with false but convincing battle plans and identified as Major William Martin, 09650, Royal Marines. The body of "Major Martin" was washed ashore in Spain where British Intelligence knew German agents would receive the plans quickly. MINCEMEAT helped to persuade the German staff that the Allies planned operations elsewhere rather than Sicily. The planning and execution of MINCEMEAT gave needed experience and encouragement to the Allied planners and intelligence staffs.

In advance of the June 1944 Allied invasion of Normandy, another of the BODYGUARD plans, FORTITUDE, proved successful in convincing Nazi leadership not only of a false debarkation area in France, but also that major tactical and strategic threats existed in Scandanavia (FORTITUDE NORTH) and in the Balkans (PLAN ZEPPELIN). Success of FORTITUDE plans caused Hitler to deny his generals permission to reinforce defenses in the main attack areas in Normandy and forced them to deploy their forces far from the battlefield. It became clear, as events unfolded in response to deception operations, that Hitler, von Rundstedt, Rommel and other German leaders were prepared to accept the deception myths as reality because each, for different reasons and purposes, was predisposed to believe the myths.

The discussion that follows will focus on Allied and German operations in Hungary. It will show the development and execution of Allied strategic deceptions under PLAN ZEPPELIN, German responses to the Allied deceptions, and illustrate how these activities affected the outcome of the war.

Historical Background

In preparing a deception plan which would cause Nazi leaders to divert resources into the Balkan-Carpathian areas, particularly Hungary, planners had to consider the regional history and background of events leading up to the Second World War.

The Hungarian nation had always been isolated from neighboring states by its exotic language and culture. Because of her geo-strategic location,

[1] Planners engaged in deceptions must exercise great care to ensure that an operation that can be successful on a short-term basis does not provoke some response which would adversely affect long-term goals. For example, in the 1930s Adolf Hitler sought to convince European powers that his military strength had increased significantly so that they might be intimidated and not oppose his short-term goals. His actions in support of this, however, provoked them into rearmament programs, which was the last thing he desired to happen. Hitler was then forced into costly propaganda campaigns in order to quiet their fears.

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Hungary was successively invaded and occupied by the Huns, Mongols, Turks and Austrians. An Apostolic Kingdom with close ties to the Roman Catholic Church, Hungary also contained large Protestant and Jewish minorities. After an Ottoman Turkish occupation of 150 years ended in 1686, Hungarians came under Austrian Hapsburg domination. The Hungarians proved to be increasingly troublesome subjects for the Hapsburgs and, during the Dual Monarchy (1857-1918), they were equally troublesome allies.

Following the World War I defeat of the Central Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary, there occurred a series of events that would determine Hungary's future role. After the 1918 Armistice, the Austrian King-Emperor, Charles IV, proclaimed a Social Democratic Republic in Hungary headed by Count Károlyi. This republic survived for less than a year before being overthrown by a communist revolt led by Béla Kún. Kún's communist government collapsed after 133 days. In the turmoil and confusion attending collapse of the communist revolution, an interim government was formed in March 1920, and Admiral Miklos Horthy was elected as regent and provisional head of state.

The victors in World War I relocated most of the European national boundaries. All of the nations allied with Germany were affected to some degree, but none more than Hungary. Prior to the Treaty of Trianon which Horthy was forced to sign in June 1920, Hungary consisted of a territory of some 125,641 square miles. The Trianon Treaty reduced Hungary's territory to some 35,863 square miles. The largest portion of the lost territory went to Romania and the new nations of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Poland and Italy received smaller portions of Hungarian territory. Thus, Hungary declined from a pre-war population of more than 20 million to 9.5 million and lost more than 3 million ethnic Hungarian citizens.

During 1927, Hungary signed a Treaty of Friendship with Italy. This act initiated a drift in her international relations which would later carry her into the Berlin-Rome Axis. The drift accelerated after 1938 when the Western Allies rejected Hungarian claims against Czechoslovakia.

Admiral Horthy tried to keep his country out of World War II. In 1938, while attending a naval review in Kiel, he bluntly told Hitler if Germany got into a war, she was bound to lose. When the war began, Horthy refused Hitler permission to cross Hungarian territory with his forces. In 1940, Hungary joined in the Tripartite Pact and signed a Treaty of Eternal Friendship with Yugoslavia. When Hitler launched his attack against Yugoslavia, Horthy initially refused permission for German forces to transit Hungary but then yielded, a grave decision which moved his Prime Minister, Count Teleki, to commit suicide. The following June, Hungarians were also forced to provide a token force when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in what was expected to be another quick German victory.

By early 1942, however, Soviet resistance was sufficiently strong that Hitler forced Horthy to commit his entire military force to the Russian campaign. With both Great Britain and the United States now allied with the Soviets and at war with Hungary, Horthy and his close associates were convinced the Western Allies would emerge victorious and were anxious to

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have an open line to Western leaders. The Hungarians also had very serious reservations concerning the Soviets.[2]

In 1942, Admiral Horthy persuaded Miklos Kallay to become his new Prime Minister. Kállay immediately made overtures to the West for a separate peace. His approach was founded on the erroneous supposition that British and American forces would reach the Hungarian frontier by the beginning of 1944, or possibly earlier. The situation would then make it possible for Hungary to join the alliance against Germany as the Italians had been able to do.

Some contacts were made with the West in 1942, but official talks did not begin until 1943, when the Hungarian journalist, Andrew Frey, was sent by Kallay to contact British and American diplomats in Istanbul. Later, Laszlo Veress, a diplomat, was also dispatched to Istanbul with a message to be delivered through the British Ambassador which stated that Hungary would not resist the allies if their forces reached the Hungarian frontier, and that instead, Hungarian soldiers would then turn against the Germans.

Early in 1943, Western Allies received overtures from Hungarians in Canada, Sweden, Turkey, Portugal, Switzerland and the Vatican. Allied intelligence staffs concluded that most of the overtures were independent and uncoordinated. It was also known that one of the Hungarian emissaries, Colonel Otto von Hatz, the Military Attache in Istanbul, was under control of the German Security Service. All of the Allied intelligence assessments agreed that if Hitler became convinced that Hungarians were about to defect, he would take immediate steps to occupy the country with German troops.

At this time, the Senior Deception Staff possessed the basic elements needed to implement PLAN ZEPPELIN in Hungary. The Hungarians as reluctant allies of the Germans were searching for a way out of their worsening situation. Hitler, who never trusted the Hungarians, was well aware of their desires and details of their negotiations, and was predisposed to overestimate the strategic importance of Hungary. The Germans were also aware that the "Balkan route to Vienna," an alternative operations plan advocated by Winston Churchill, called for Allied landings along the Adriatic Coast. (The "Balkan Route" had been rejected by the Allies in 1943 when the ANVIL/DRAGOON operation to land in Southern France was adopted.) Thus, the deception planners could employ the *Magruder Principle* and tell Hitler what he was inclined to believe already and continue to reinforce a "rational core" of intelligence indicating both a potential Hungarian revolt, or defection, as well as Allied operations in the Balkan-Carpathian region.

After 1938, from territories that had come under Nazi control, all German requirements for strategic materials could be met. Because the Germans had suffered military reverses in 1942 and 1943, however, Hitler and his staff were increasingly concerned about the availability of strategic resources such as copper, chrome, bauxite and especially petroleum produced in the Balkan-Carpathian region. (In 1943, German synthetic oil production had peaked to

[2] Hungarians disliked and feared the Russians. The Tsar had dispatched troops in 1848 to crush the abortive Hungarian revolt against the Hapsburgs and Hungarian troops had fought against the Russians in the 1914-1918 war.

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some 6.3 million tons per year, Romanian oil production provided an additional 2.4 million tons, and Hungarian deliveries had increased to about 0.8 million tons.)

Petroleum supplies for Germany were drastically reduced in early April 1943 when US bombers based in the Mediterranean began attacks on the Ploesti oilfields in Romania as well as on water traffic on the Danube River. By the end of May, Romanian production was reduced by one-half, and the relatively small Hungarian petroleum production became increasingly important. Hitler's concerns for the Balkan-Carpathian region were intensified. During the same period, Western deception operations under PLAN ZEPPELIN encouraged belief in Berlin that the Allies intended to advance into Germany, not only across the English Channel, but also through the Ljubljana Gap in Yugoslavia. German intelligence had reports that General George Patton was preparing to lead the Seventh US Army ashore near Trieste.[3]

Hungary Increasingly Desperate

On 17 August 1943, Deszo Újvary, Hungarian Consul General in Istanbul, told Sterndale Bennett, the British Minister, that Hungary had decided that it could accept the so-called Casablanca Formula for unconditional surrender and requested that Bennett so inform the other Allies. Ujvary emphasized that surrender was practicable only if the military situation made it possible. (Ujvary made it clear that Hungary would surrender only when Allied troops reached the Hungarian frontier.) On 9 September, the British Minister responded on behalf of the Allied governments and informed the Hungarians that in order for any terms to be considered for acceptance, the following must be included:

— Allied aircraft were to be facilitated in their operations over Hungary and not attacked or intercepted in any way;

— Secret radio communications were to be established immediately;

— All further discussions were to be conducted through Gyorgy Bakack-Bessenyey, the Hungarian Ambassador in Berne.

Kállay's efforts to negotiate some understanding with the West were encouraged by the Allies. Late in 1943, arrangements were made for British Army Colonel Charles Telfer Howie to escape from a POW camp in Silesia. Howie walked south to the Danube and was joined on his travels by a British Army Sergeant, Tibor Weinstein, a skilled radio operator who spoke fluent German and Hungarian (and who had been living in Budapest until 1937). Howie and Weinstein arrived in Budapest and were installed by Kallay in the Royal Palace and equipped with a radio. They were directed to contact the Royal Navy in Malta and arrange for reception of Kállay's representatives with new proposals for Hungarian peace terms. The British staff, which was coordinating with the other Western Allies in prosecuting PLAN ZEPPELIN,

[3] Actually, the Seventh Army was not then an effective force. Patton would assume command of the Third US Army in France, and Seventh Army would be activated under command of General Alexander M. Patch, for landings on the French Mediterranean coast.

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knew the German leadership was aware of many of the Hungarian overtures and believed Allied forces were preparing for a Balkan invasion. The British continued their contacts with Kallay knowing that the German counterintelligence was monitoring his activities.

Operation Sparrow

During the period between June 1943 and August 1944, several British Special Operations teams and one combined British-American team had been parachuted into Hungary on various covert and clandestine missions. These and other assets from OSS, SOE and SAS were co-opted by the ZEPPELIN planners to ensure that their operations in Hungary were compatible with the concurrent deception operations.

During the autumn of 1943, the OSS staff in Cairo developed a plan that had the objectives of producing either an anti-Nazi revolt in Hungary or a Hungarian defection from the war. The plan, later codenamed OPERATION SPARROW, required an OSS team to be parachuted into Hungary to deal with high-level Hungarian authorities in pursuit of those objectives. The idea for SPARROW originated from a proposal made by the Hungarian Military Attache in Istanbul, Colonel Otto von Hatz. Hatz had infiltrated an OSS intelligence net run out of Istanbul and through this net (codenamed CEREUS) suggested a plan that would bring about Hungary's withdrawal from the Axis. While there was some suspicion regarding Hatz in the Istanbul Station, neither OSS Istanbul nor Cairo staffs became aware that Hatz was a German agent until the Cereus net and its principal agent, Dogwood, were compromised. (Hatz' duplicity was known in Berne and OSS Headquarters in Washington. Although Istanbul Station was warned about dealing with Hatz, the warning was apparently disregarded due to enthusiasm in Istanbul Station for OPERATION SPARROW).

After the compromise of CEREUS/Dogwood was revealed, SIS insisted that since Hatz had been a German agent when he proposed what became OPERATION SPARROW, then SPARROW was also compromised—in fact, that it was a German idea, designed to result in the exposure of Allied agents. The deception operators countered that:

1. SPARROW might work anyway, i.e., there was a possibility that a Hungarian revolt or defection could occur.
2. The Americans doubted that the Germans had initiated the SPARROW plan.[4]
3. The fact that the Germans knew (through Hatz) about SPARROW enhanced deception being promoted by PLAN ZEPPELIN.

The decision was made to continue with OPERATION SPARROW. As of February 1944, General Donovan had ordered the control and direction of

[4] In the aftermath of the debacle in which the Istanbul Station had lost most of its credibility as well as its agents in Europe, Frank Wisner, well-known for his work in counterespionage (X-2), was sent to Istanbul as Station Chief to straighten things out. Wisner's investigation revealed that when the curtain fell on CEREUS/Dogwood Hatz had disappeared and counterintelligence turned up evidence indicating that he had been working for the Russians all along.

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SPARROW to be transferred to Allen Dulles in Berne. Dulles was in contact with a number of individuals and groups in Germany and German-occupied areas seeking to negotiate with the Allies for surrender. (This was one of the reasons why the earlier Allied response to the Hungarians had directed them to channel their efforts through their emissary in Berne).

The importance of adequate counterintelligence cannot be overemphasized. More effective counterintelligence would have limited the damage done by the Hungarian Colonel von Hatz in the course of these operations. Hatz' actions, despite his somewhat peripheral role, are nonetheless interesting. He was able to present the Germans, by whom he was paid and with whom he was allied, a plan that he could represent would deliver Allied agents into their hands and also expose Hungarians collaborating with the West. To the Russians, with whom he was working for a long time, he could offer the possibility of eliminating agents from the West and using the Germans to accomplish this. Since one of the objectives of Western Allied planning was to provide credible Social Democratic and anti-communist leadership for the postwar era, the elimination of intelligence networks in operational areas, such as Hungary, left the communist resistance to operate without significant competition. The price for deception of Nazi leaders and diversion of German military resources in this case would have to be paid by the Western Allies in the future. What Hatz was really up to is more difficult to judge. He was in a position to conclude that the possibility of the Western Allies moving into Hungary was remote, at best. He was certainly well aware that his Hungarian superiors believed the German cause was lost and probably believed this too. While Hatz may have been a long-time Soviet agent, either out of political conviction, or because he believed that the Soviets would be the principal power in his homeland in the future, it is also possible that he just wanted to be on the winning side and was feathering his own nest. Von Hatz was closely associated with General Kuthy, the Hungarian officer responsible for Signal Intelligence, and the German Intelligence Chief, Hoettl, was inclined to be suspicious of both Kuthy and Hatz. According to an official report made by Hoettl, after 15 October 1944, both Kuthy and von Hatz (who was now calling himself "Hatzeghy" without the "von") were unmasked as Soviet agents. A later report by Hoettl indicated that Hatzeghy became deputy chief of staff in the Bolshevik-Hungarian army,"but for all his cleverness he lost the confidence of the Russians even more quickly than Kuthy, and vanished forever in a Russian prison." (The Romanians have an old saying, "If you have a Hungarian for a friend, you don't need any enemies." Hatz' behavior lends credence to this view.)

On Monday, 13 March 1944, OSS Team Sparrow dropped from an RAF Halifax into Hungary, near the town of Nagykanizsa, close to the Yugoslav border. The team members had not been told that the Germans probably knew of their mission, but were instructed to establish contact with General Ujszaszy, Chief of Hungarian Military Intelligence and Security, to negotiate for the Hungarians to break their alliance with the Germans and join the Western Allies.

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On the Friday following their arrival in Hungary, the SPARROW team, commanded by Army Colonel Florimond Duke, assisted by Major Alfred Suarez and Captain Guy Nunn, met with General Újszaszy who informed them they would be negotiating with two Cabinet Ministers who were away from the capital over the weekend and would return in two days. On Sunday, Újszaszy summoned the team and informed them that the Germans had invaded Hungary; Budapest was surrounded and they must now consider themselves to be prisoners of war.

Hitler Had Swallowed the Bait

Hitler had learned of the dispatch of the SPARROW mission to Hungary from his Intelligence Service. Wilhelm Hoettl had been in Budapest as Chief of the German Security Service for Southern Europe. In his postwar memoirs, Hoettl said, "I was well-informed by Hungarian intelligence officers about all these negotiations (between the British SOE, the American OSS and Hungarian dissidents) and, in particular, the liaison between General Újszaszy and the American Colonel." Hoettl had reported these events to Berlin, and persuaded Hitler that Hungarian defection was imminent. According to Hoettl, the Fuhrer told his staff, "the intention of Hungary to conclude a separate peace must be thwarted if the southern section of the Eastern Front were not to be placed in the greatest danger."

The German occupation of Hungary ended the mission of the SPARROW team, whose members narrowly escaped execution. With some assistance from a German officer, they obtained treatment as prisoners of war and were transferred to Colditz Castle, near Leipzig, where they spent the remainder of the war. Újszaszy and an associate, Janos Kádar, were jailed for their part in SPARROW. Shortly thereafter, Újszaszy began working with Hungarian communists seeking to activate the Popular Front (a loose agglomeration of parties and individuals, temporarily united in anti-Nazi resistance) into liaison with the Soviets. Újszaszy, through his mistress, Katalin Kárady, a famous actress, was put in touch with Imre Kovacs, a Popular Front activist. Kovacs then put Újszaszy into contact with Laszlo Rajk, leader of the underground communist movement who enlisted Újszaszy in the cause. This started Újszaszy down a road that led him ultimately to Moscow. He was later heard broadcasting over Moscow radio and affadavits bearing his name were submitted in the Nuremberg war crimes trials. Újszaszy was never seen or heard from again after the war and his Hungarian friends assumed he had been executed.

The German invasion in March 1944 was timed to coincide with a conference in Berchtesgaden to which Admiral Horthy had been summoned.[5] When Horthy returned to Budapest, he was greeted by a German military honor guard and informed that his Minister of Interior, along with many prominent citizens and members of Parliament, had been arrested, and the country was under occupation rule. Horthy was then forced to accept the appointment of a Hungarian Nazi as Prime Minister, the banning of the Social Democratic and Smallholder Parties, and the roundup and liquidation of

[5] It was because of this conference that the two ministers Colonel Duke was supposed to meet were "out of town."

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Hungarian Jews. To ensure Horthy's compliance, Hitler ordered Colonel Otto Skorzeny to kidnap Horthy's son and hold him as a hostage.

At the time the orders were issued in Berlin to execute MARGARETHE I (as the plan for the invasion and occupation of Hungary was called), insufficient German troops were available. The forces in the West were depleted. Troops that were supposed to have been sent to reinforce defenses in France against the anticipated invasion had been diverted to the Anzio battle in Italy. Other German forces were greatly overextended in Russia and the Balkans (the latter, in anticipation of the Allied landings along the Adriatic.) Nevertheless, to execute MARGARETHE, further forces were withdrawn from these areas. Two divisions, for example, were removed from France and were not returned in time to be employed against the Normandy landings. German High Command Operations Chief, General Walther Warlimont, recalled after the war that "During the Hungarian operation, the Western front was left without a single battle-worthy, fully operational armored division at a moment when the invasion might come any day." Thus, OPERATION SPARROW triggered an unnecessary German invasion of Hungary with over 100,000 troops, including several armored divisions, that were desperately needed elsewhere.[6]

• • •

The successes achieved by the deception campaigns in World War II were realized in large measure because they could be directed against a highly centralized and concentrated totalitarian state. It was only necessary to influence Hitler and his immediate staff in order to achieve the desired results. The *Magruder Principle* was validated by PLAN ZEPPELIN. Hitler's lifelong obsession with the Balkans, the old underside of his native Austro-Hungarian Empire, his maniacal concern for petroleum his forces could no longer use, caused him to ignore the obvious indicators that there were to be no Allied attacks through the Balkans.

The Allied strategic deception campaign also offers lessons to those who would avoid falling victim to hostile deception campaigns. The intelligence establishment and its masters must deploy effective intelligence resources across a broad spectrum. They must also avoid being misled by selective consideration of information which reinforces a preconception or preferred conclusion. It is always wise and prudent to consider the capabilities of one's adversaries. The most reliable and precise intelligence concerning enemy intentions may be of great interest, but distinctly less relevant, if the capabilities to carry out the intentions are lacking. (The Allies could not have invaded the Balkans in 1944, for example, particularly after the landings in Southern France, simply because they lacked any capability to do so).

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[6] Hitler would repeat the diversion of forces into Hungary. In October 1944 a Hungarian delegation signed an armistice in Moscow and Horthy announced on the radio that Hungary was out of the war. The Germans arrested Horthy and Hitler gave orders to launch a counterattack in Hungary to secure the oilfields because he still expected an Allied counterattack through the Balkans. With Soviet forces poised to cross the Oder into Germany and the Western Allies about to cross the Rhine, the Fuhrer pulled troops from both fronts for his campaign in Hungary. These forces also included Sepp Dietrich's 6 Panzer Army, hastily withdrawn from the Ardennes campaign.

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TITLE: BOOK REVIEW: The Affair-the Case of Alfred Dreyfus

REVIEWER: John T. Kirby

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The Affair—the Case of Alfred Dreyfus. By Jean-Denis Bredin. George Braziller, Inc., New York; 1986; 628 pp.

The Affair by Jean-Denis Bredin (translated from the French by Jeffrey Mehlman) is a fascinating account of an extraordinary legal case with insights into intelligence and security tradecraft as they were practiced in turn-of-the-century France. It is a detailed reconstruction of the case of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, accused and convicted as a spy for Germany and confined in solitary for more than five years on Devil's Island off French Guyana. Much of the book reads like a gripping espionage novel.

Although the Dreyfus case may be known to many Americans in some detail, others are familiar with it only from French history courses or from the 1930s Hollywood film which starred Paul Muni as Emile Zola, the most famous and most loyal of Dreyfus' many prominent defenders.

There is much to attract readers of nonfiction writings on intelligence in this book. It is rife with details of the tradecraft and internal politics of French military intelligence and security services in the 1890s when France expected war with Germany to develop at any time. But it is also a careful sociological study of the most insidious influence in French politics and society of the period—antisemitism—which was the cause of Dreyfus' ordeal.

The scion of a wealthy Alsatian Jewish mercantile family, Dreyfus had one abiding passion; he was a patriot who loved the French Army in which he served as an artillery officer specialist assigned to the General Staff. Confronted one morning in his office by his military superiors without warning and made to write out a brief statement about himself, Dreyfus was soon charged with treason on the basis of the alleged similarity of his handwriting to that of a suspected spy in the General Staff.

After a long trial in which he maintained his innocence, he was convicted of engaging in espionage for Germany. He was discharged from the army in disgrace in a public ceremony witnessed by his family. The conviction was based on evidence contrived by his antisemitic colleagues and superiors on the General Staff. They had prepared detailed false documents incriminating him as a secret agent of the German embassy in Paris and even provided the judges with further falsified secret evidence which was never surfaced in the court.

A high-living Hungarian-French officer, Colonel Esterhazy, the real traitor in the case, had left a letter addressed to the German military attache in Paris, for whom he was a paid secret agent, containing a list of French military documents from the General Staff that he could provide for a price. The letter subsequently reached the French counterintelligence service whose collection assets included the cleaning woman at the German embassy who regularly passed along everything she gleaned from the wastebaskets of the attaches (this was described in French service records as "coming from the usual channel").

Dreyfus' brother worked unceasingly for a retrial on the basis of clear evidence of gross misconduct of senior military officials and glaring irregularities in the trial proceedings. When after a few years the case appeared to be losing its appeal to the Paris press, his brother planted a story in the London

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press intended to revive public interest. The story alleged that Alfred's escape from Devil's Island was being planned by his supporters. Military headquarters in Paris thereupon sent an urgent cable to Dreyfus' jailers to reinforce his security immediately. His limited view of the sea from his solitary cell was promptly cut off and he was shackled to his bed. His correspondence to and from his wife was subjected to ever heavier censorship (he wrote only of his innocence, his suffering, his love of France, his family and the army, and eventually of his despair because of his failing health).

After a political storm slowly developed in France over the case when official duplicity was exposed, Dreyfus was returned to France for a retrial. After interminable legal proceedings that brought down several governments and led to several self-expatriations and suicides, he was found innocent and was reinstated in the army with his former rank. He was allowed to resign from the army for health reasons after a short period.

When France entered World War I Dreyfus volunteered for active service. He was wounded in combat after distinguished service. He died in retirement, not of the wound but of complications derived from his incarceration.

This case was not the finest hour in French military (or intelligence) history. Dreyfus suffered total ignominy because of the cynical complicity of politicians and senior military officers, including the head of military intelligence and his senior staff aides in a veritable orgy of antisemitism.

Bredin, the foremost living expert on the Dreyfus case, has compiled a brilliant history of legal and social developments in France in the period. The book is superbly annotated and expertly translated, withal a monument to Dreyfus.

JOHN T. KIRBY

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TITLE: Our Men in Havana

AUTHOR: Nathan Nielsen

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TDY in Castro's prisons

OUR MEN IN HAVANA

Nathan Nielsen

It was hot in Havana on Wednesday evening, 14 September 1960. The three Agency technicians were sweating and stripped to their shorts as they worked in the apartment on the eighteenth floor of the Medical Building. David L. Christ, Thornton J. Anderson, Jr., and Walter E. Szuminski, of Technical Services Division, were installing listening devices. Their target: [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) Over the purring of the drill, they heard hammering at the door. Was it their Far East Division case officer with more equipment? [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

As Anderson recalls it: "I was in the bathroom plastering up. We had buried the power supplies and transmitters in the cavities beside the medicine cabinet. These are AC operated and that's where we had to pick up the power, and the mike wires were through the wall and down pinholes . . . Dave says, 'I better go see what they want.' Wally was over there drilling away and he says, 'Gee, I haven't heard from Dave; I better go look.' So he went, and I'm still plastering away and all of a sudden looked up and there's a guy with a .38 pointed at my eyes . . . And there are Wally and Dave spread-eagled against the wall, and the guy spoke English and he said do the same thing. . . . "

Cuban authorities had caught three Americans in a bugging operation at a time when US-Cuban relations were falling apart; when Fidel Castro was realigning Cuba from West to East; when counterrevolutionaries routinely were dragged to the wall and shot.

Thus, for Christ, Anderson, and Szuminski, began an ordeal that would extend for 949 days: arrest, hostile interrogation, the threat of death, trial, imprisonment, privation. Through all of it, they clung to their flimsy tourist cover. Their lives depended on it. They considered themselves to be in combat. And expendable. They not only survived, but prevailed; they mounted a major operation from within prison. After their release on 21 April 1963, they returned to an atmosphere of what for some 16 years appeared to be bureaucratic indifference. Eventually, in 1979, the Agency clarified the distinction between their roles as victims of a mismanaged operation and heroes of the aftermath, and honored each of them with the Distinguished Intelligence Cross, "for a voluntary act or acts of exceptional heroism involving the acceptance of existing dangers with conspicuous fortitude and exemplary courage."

This is an account of how they were thrust into harm's way, how close they came to summary execution, how they suffered, how they triumphed. It is also an account of what an Agency report described as "the operation which went wrong."

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Operation

The operation went wrong for several reasons, as detailed in a 27 October 1960 memorandum, "Compromise and Arrest of Agency Personnel in Havana, Cuba," from Chief, Operational Services to Deputy Director (Plans). Christ, Anderson, and Szuminski had been sent to Havana to install audio equipment in the (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) That could have been done with the support of the who had agreed to it. But reversed his position. The technicians were then given another assignment: to modify and improve audio equipment that a team headed by Christ had installed a month before in . . . After it was obvious that the operatio(b)(1) was out," the Far East Division case officer had written in his report, "it wa(b)(3)(n) decided to utilize the services of the technicians, *since they were in town* (emphasis added), to finish installation."

The critique took note of extenuating circumstances. "It is important to recognize that the political situation in Cuba which existed at the time of this operation called for rapid action. The officers of FE felt great urgency in improving and expanding their audio coverage of high priority targets in Cuba(b)(1) prior to the expected break in relations (b)(3)(n) was rated by FE as the number one Chinese Communist target in the Western Hemisphere. A break in relations between Cuba and the United States was sufficiently possible that the Havana Station had already started destroying files and strengthening stay-behind arrangements. The Audio Operations Branch of TSD was very short of technicians (two were on vacation) so the Chief of the Branch, Mr. Christ, decided to handle the assignment personally with the assistance of two officers from other components of TSD. On 8 September Hurricane Donna was approaching Florida and there was a good chance that air flights to Havana would be suspended. . . . "

But in the cold, harsh light of second-guessing six weeks after the event, reasons for haste do not count. Among the principal conclusions in the "Compromise and Arrest" memorandum:

> "Plans for this sensitive operation did not include coordinated details on emergency plans and story to be used in event of arrest and interrogation. Nor is there any evidence that the men who were arrested had received careful instruction on certain general rules of conduct and deportment which might assist them under interrogation.
>
> "The tourist cover used by the technicians was very light. The cover could not be expected to hold up if the Cubans conducted a thorough inquiry and intensive interrogation.
>
> "Violations of operational security occurred in the travel and housing arrangements of the personnel on TDY in Havana. . . .
>
> "Although officers of the FE Division went through the motions of coordinating with the WH Division they really did not provide WH with sufficient details to enable that division to discharge its responsibilities. . . .

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"Control, supervision and support of this operation by Havana Station was inadequate.

"The failure to provide lookouts during the critical phase of the drilling was a serious lapse. . . .

"The operation which was blown certainly did not receive the careful analysis and thorough action that an activity of this sensitivity requires. The whole question of sending the three technicians to Havana was considered in the light of the installation in [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] and only incidental consideration was given to (b)(3)(n) the more hazardous job in the [redacted] [redacted]

Also lodged in the memorandum was this ominous reference to the senior technician: "Mr. Christ was probably the most knowledgeable officer in the Agency of world-wide audio operations. It is not evident that proper consideration was given to the hazards to Agency interests of exposing Mr. Christ to arrest and hostile interrogation. Mr. Christ was in Cuba under tourist cover during August. He returned to the U.S. on 30 August and traveled again to Havana as a tourist on 8 September despite having advised a fellow officer in TSD that he believed he had been under surveillance during the first trip. His second trip to Cuba as a tourist at a time when few genuine tourists were traveling was questionable, particularly in light of the suspected surveillance. In deciding to participate personally in the installation Mr. Christ showed commendable professional enthusiasm but questionable judgment." Moreover, "The two technicians who accompanied Mr. Christ . . . did not receive a risk-of-capture briefing. . . . "

Interrogation

Caught in the act, with the audio equipment and evidence of its installation at hand in the apartment, the three Agency officers had only paper-thin tourist cover: driver's licenses, visas, credit cards, and their story. Christ had identification as Daniel L. Carswell, 42, electrical engineer, Eastchester, New York; Anderson as Eustace Dan-Brunt, 34, mechanical engineer, Baltimore; Szuminski as Edmund K. Taransky, 30, electrical engineer, New York City.

The difference between a hypothetical situation and their predicament became brutally clear to Anderson. As he put it: "I had never dreamed that if we got wrapped up, we'd be any more than deported. I didn't think I would come that close to getting shot." His career until then had been in engineering research and development. This was his first assignment to a field operation.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Szuminski recalls: "There was no doubt in my mind that if these guys figured out we were CIA, we were dead men." Early in September, on home leave from a tour in [redacted] and in Boston to see his parents, he had received a call from (b)(3)(c) [redacted] that cute branch secretary. Something was up. Could he interrupt his home leave to come to Washington? He then learned of the need for another technician on the Havana operation, and volunteered to go.

The Cubans kept the three Americans in the apartment all night after the arrest. "They didn't frisk us because we were in our shorts," Szuminski said.

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Arrested. From left, Anderson, Christ, Szuminski.

"We were taken to the rear bedroom and told to sit on the beds. There was always a guy sitting in the doorway, in the corridor. There was a long corridor with all the rooms coming off it. He could look to his left up the corridor, and look straight ahead and see us."

There was no interrogation the first night, while the Cubans waited to see who else might enter the apartment, but there was excitement. A Cuban shot himself in the hand. "Cubans are great for that," Szuminski said. "They play with guns, roll the cylinders. This guy was playing, and bam! Right in the hand."

Next morning, the Cubans moved the prisoners into the living room and took photographs of them and the equipment. (The photographs were to appear in the Cuban newspapers under headlines proclaiming the capture of American spies. Szuminski remembers the equipment was shown upside down. "They obviously didn't know which side was right.")

The Cubans then drove the Americans to G-2 headquarters for more photographs, fingerprinting, and initial questions about name, address, date and place of birth. "Just the booking took the whole day . . . About 5 o'clock here they come and ask for the watches, belt, and shoelaces, which gives you the clue that you're not leaving. They walk you through a little courtyard to the back and throw you into the holding cells." The Americans were separated, each in a cell jammed with Cuban prisoners. "You hear, 'What did you do?' 'Nothing.' Well, I didn't do anything either.' "

The interrogations were conducted in the middle of the night. Szuminski describes them: "One guy we called 'Bad Teeth' because he had some very large cavities in his front teeth. He spoke excellent English. Then there was the 'Football Player,' a big guy there to keep you under control. Usually a third person, a very young type, would wander in and out, almost like a disinterested third party."

"Bad Teeth" would ask, "What are you doing here? Why are you here? Come on, Mr. Taransky, tell us. Why, you work for the CIA, don't you?"

"Who, me?" Szuminski would reply. "No, I don't work for them." He, Anderson, and Christ stuck to their story: They were on vacation. A man from

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the American Embassy had asked them to help him with some electrical equipment. They decided they could help him out. CIA? FBI? No, nothing like that. (In Anderson's interrogations, the questions usually centered on an FBI connection.)

Tell all, or be shot, the interrogators warned them. Each prisoner, grilled separately, would be told: "Well, we know all about this. Your buddies have told us the whole story, so why don't you tell us the whole story?" The Cubans wanted to know if more peopl(b)(1) involved, and if there was more to the plot than bugging (b)(3)(n)

"There was a Texaco map I remember having in the apartment," Szuminski relates. "At the time there was a hurricane coming through the Caribbean. We were plotting the path of the hurricane with Xs on this map. They wanted to know, 'What's this map? All these Xs on here? What does that mean?' " Szuminski told them: "They're not ships. That's where the hurricane is coming." Diversions such as this, he believes, kept the interrogators from penetrating to the truth.

In the 29 days they were held at G-2, Christ, Anderson, and Szuminski each went through four or more middle-of-the-night interrogations. Szuminski characterizes his hour-long sessions with "Bad Teeth" as "really loose, not what you see in the movies." In addition to Szuminski's papers and cards identifying him as Taransky, "Bad Teeth" had in front of him a book, a guide to interrogation. "He used to play with the pages," Szuminski said. "He would skip through it, go over the last page and pick a question, and then he would ask it. He would hit the middle and pick a question and ask it. That was about the way he approached it. If he had started on page 1 and gone through it, we would have been dead meat."

Except for the night after their arrest, when they were kept in the bedroom together and could whisper, the three had no opportunity to concoct any more than the simple, absurd account of how they were tourists drawn into doing a favor for a man from the US Embassy.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Anderson detected an element of the hot and cold treatment in the interrogations. After spending all day in a steaming holding cell crowded with Cuban prisoners, he would be taken out for questioning. "I don't know how much malice aforethought there was in this 2 o'clock in the morning business," he said. "I sat in that room freezing my ass off. They are asking all these questions, and I said, 'Come on; let's turn this air conditioner off.' They didn't listen to you. They just kept on going."

The Cubans did not beat or pistol-whip their American prisoners. But there was often a guard playing with his gun. Szuminski recalls one occasion on which he complained to his interrogator when a particularly young guard was flipping the cylinder and pulling the trigger. "Tell him that men don't play

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with guns. It's only kids." The interrogator passed on the admonition in Spanish. "That kid shoved the gun back in his belt and sat there like he had been scolded by the schoolmaster," Szuminski said.

Anderson, asked how he faced the threat of death, replied: "You're really caught with your guard down because you're not prepared for this. You have to have a talk with yourself and make peace with yourself. That's what I did. In that particular cell where I was at night there was nothing to do. The noise level was awful and the stench and the heat were awful. The interrogations were going on and this guy had me pretty well convinced that they were going to shoot me if I didn't cooperate with him and tell them what they wanted to know." He remembered the case of a Marine colonel who had been captured in the Korean War and, under duress, had made a confession damaging to the United States. "And I kept thinking of my two sons. I just made up my mind that if I had to get shot that's where I was going to be and I wasn't going to do anything to disgrace my country. I didn't ever want to have any stigma passed on to my sons. I just became matter of fact about it—well, we'll see which way things go. I tried not to do anything stupid. But that's the way I felt. . . . I'm going to beat the sons of bitches and I'm never going to give in to them no matter what they do. Until they shoot me, I'm going to outlast them . . . We were like Marines crawling up the beach. We were in combat. We were expendable."

Anderson believes the Cubans, through surveillance prior to the arrest, had spotted Christ as the team leader. Anderson said that Christ, under interrogation, tried to blame the operation on the man from the US Embassy. "Dave was convinced [redacted] they couldn't do anything with him. Therefore he could put the whole thing on his [redacted] back. They'll take him to the States and never touch him. He (Christ) tried to shift it from us." (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

Trial

Anderson kept a calendar, which by the end of the 949 days amounted to five sheets of paper. He recorded, in his own code, what happened. If a *requisa* (search) was imminent, he would stash the calendar away in the only safe place, his shorts. He brought the calendar out with him.

After the 29 days in G-2, the prisoners were packed into a bus and driven to LaCabana. "I had never heard of LaCabana, except people said, 'Oh, my God, don't get sent there' . . . These galeras were really old ammunition storage places. They were underground like an igloo except the front and back were open. Some had dirt floors. The one we were in had a cement floor. Dave got a bed up there from a guy that was shot the night before . . . They put Wally and me down by the shit house . . . God, the flies and the stink. We didn't get any sleep. . . . "

It was a transient population. People were getting shot. Anderson recalls: "You actually hear them getting shot . . . At 2 o'clock in the morning you hear them going off, and you see what eight M-1's do to a person . . . There was a moat around this monument which made it like a castle fortress . . . And they would stand them up there and shoot them. We were right around the corner

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and of course the sound is echoed right down this galera . . . They would bring in these young milicianos. They would all yell and hoot. Like the old days with hangings. And a couple of guys would resist, you know, and they would come and shoot you in the legs and break your bones and then lay you down on your knees and you couldn't get up, and then shoot you. They were doing that. . . ." Over the moat was a drawbridge. "We were taken across that to our trial, and I could look down there and see where they were shooting. Red meat was still there."

Christ, Anderson, and Szuminski spent 101 days in LaCabana.

Szuminski described the trial, conducted on a Saturday, 17 December 1960. "It was a military tribunal. They had representatives from, I guess, all the services that they had. There was a fellow there in a naval uniform. The chief of the tribunal had a beard. Our friends from G-2 showed up. Hugh Kessler, the American Consul, was there . . . I guess it was a legal sort of trial. The prosecutor got up and he went on and on . . . You went up and sat on a chair in front of the tribunal. They'd ask the questions in Spanish. They would translate. Then you would answer. He would translate back to them."

The trial lasted about four hours. It was a victory, of sorts, for the defendants. The prosecution demanded not death, but 30-year prison terms.

"After the trial," Szuminski continued, "they take you downstairs and there is a green couch and a coke machine . . . Kessler was elated. 'You guys are great. Man, you're famous.' He thought we did a great job. So he bought us all a coke. He said, 'Okay, we'll see you next visiting day.' That's the last time we saw him. It was right after that they broke diplomatic relations. . . . "

It was to be their last contact with a US official for more than two years. Although Christ, Anderson, and Szuminski had not yet been informed of it, they had been convicted of "activities against the security of the Cuban state." In two days the court handed down the sentence: 10 years in prison. (News of the sentence did not get into American newspapers until 1961. The cover names, Carswell, Dan-Brunt, and Taransky, were intact.) • (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

Christ, Anderson, and Szuminski were to begin the longest, most lonely chapter of their ordeal.


Prison

On 22 January 1961 they were flown to the Isle of Pines, where Fidel Castro kept 6,000 political prisoners in structures designed to contain 4,500. The four principal buildings were called circulars, five stories of cells surrounding a guard tower. What struck Szuminski first was the noise. "We got there in the afternoon. We were walked between circulars 1 and 2 and then around the mess hall to circular 4. When you walk between the buildings and hear the roar of the people, you don't know what you're getting into. Your first impression is, 'My God, when I get in there, they're going to tear me apart limb from limb.'

• The name Dan-Brunt, however, was not intact in the newspapers. It appeared variously as Dan Brunet, Danbrunt, and Van-Brunt.

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Isle of Pines prison compound in recent overhead photography.

Because they all sounded like crazies. They don't talk to each other; they yell. When a Cuban sees his buddy across the building, they yell at each other."

The Americans milled around a few moments. Szuminski relates: "Next thing I know some guy is tapping me on the shoulder, saying, 'Hey, are you an American? Come on, we're going upstairs.' He grabbed my stuff and said, 'Come with me.' He was a Cuban. He didn't want another Cuban moving in with him. They are dirty. They never wash. Get a nice clean American . . . We grabbed Andy and Dave and got them in the cell next to where we were. A cell was essentially bare. There was nothing in there."

Szuminski's description of their new home, circular 4: "Inside there were individual cells but no bars, so we were free to roam. The cells were about 6 feet wide by 12 feet deep. There was provision for two bunks in each cell, but most of them didn't have bunks. You could have from two to 15 in a cell. If you had a lot of friends and they didn't have a place to sleep, then a community

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bed. You could buy a bunk from somebody if you had the going price of 30 pesos. If a guy had a bunk and he was hungry, he'd sell you the bed because he could then go to the prison store and buy cigarettes and the extra goodies."

They learned how a prisoner became hungry enough to sell his bunk. Breakfast was half milk, half coffee, and a piece of bread. The noon meal was rice and beans, supper a dish of beans. Szuminski, a lean 160 pounds at the time of arrest, wore down to 125 pounds or less on the Isle of Pines. Anderson believes it may have been less. "You could see every bone in his body," he said. Anderson weighed 170 pounds in September 1960. At the low point on the Isle of Pines "I weighed myself and calculated from kilograms to pounds and I think I was down to about 110." Christ, too, lost weight.

Their lawyer had arranged with a family on the island to send food to them, and in the first month they received lettuce, tomatoes, bread with butter, and even an occasional steak. But that ended after the first month. "I guess the lawyer thought it was getting too expensive," Szuminski said. "He didn't know if he was going to get paid." As the months wore on, the food became worse. "Pretty thin," Szuminski said. "Watery soup. Damn little protein. Cabbage, macaroni, fish soup. The macaroni was terrible."

Christ, in a memorandum dated 7 July 1964 to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of Personnel, set down his recollections of prison life. Because he was seeking a special commendation for Anderson and Szuminski, he wrote about them rather than himself. His commendation said:

"The Isle of Pines Prison . . . was the one most dreaded by all Cubans. For months on end (Anderson and Szuminski) felt no sunlight, only the dank filthiness inside the circulars. Food was incredibly bad. No facilities for occupying the mind were provided or permitted except occasional communist literature. Long months of prison . . . living in a strange country with different languages, thinking and personal habits, longing and concern for the loved ones at home, more than a year with no word of any kind from home, and then sporadic, closely censored mail—all these things and worse were the . . . routine.

"Added to this were unusually violent and trying pressures—threats and intimidations because they were Americans, frequent bloody riots, emotional breakdown and suicides. Then there were the "*requisas*" or searches, the attempted escapes, the turbulent period of the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and the October 1962 confrontation. Frequently the guards sent shots ricocheting through the building. For an entire year they lived in circulars mined with 6,000 lbs. of TNT; the severe lightning storms during these nights did not encourage sleep. For at least a year they were on the death list of one of the anti-American groups. There was practically no time during which they could really expect to get out of this situation alive.

"In retrospect, it is truly remarkable the manner in which they retained morale and complete emotional stability. They always maintained high standards of personal cleanliness and decency—their cells and personal effects were always the cleanest in the circular. They shared their food, (medications), and personal possessions with the Cubans and other Americans. They

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encouraged and stabilized the 'soldier of fortune' type Americans, some of whom were considering entering the communist rehabilitation program. They adopted the mentally ill American who on occasion became criminally insane. They circulated through the prison community making friends and giving encouragement. They were always leaned on for moral support when the news was bad. They interpreted and explained the news in support of President Kennedy and the United States Government. They studied Spanish and taught English. They gave lectures on the Constitution, capitalism, our legal and law enforcement system, elections and other aspects of American democratic life. They spoke on such subjects as the U.S development of nuclear electric power and the conversion of salt water for improving the underdeveloped areas of the world. In essence, they forgot their own problems by concerning themselves with those of others."

Christ, Anderson, and Szuminski found an abundance of disease, filth, bedbugs, lice, and rats in their environment with a shortage of medical care, sanitation, food, and water.* The water piped to the ground floor of the circular "had the smell of dead fish," Anderson said. "It was only good for showering or washing clothes." Drinking water was trucked in and dumped into a cistern. "We would go down with our little bucket and get our gallon or two of water, take it up to the cell, put it on the floor and put something over it to keep out the flies. And that's what you drank from. We never got dysentery because we were very particular. We did the dishes. The average Cuban when he would finish his rice and beans would throw the bowl on the floor and let it sit there until it hardened up and there was a crust all over it. Flies had been down in the crap room and were all over it. Then they wondered why they got dysentery."

Just getting a pail was an achievement. Christ acquired one by barter. They carried the brackish water up five flights in five-gallon cans to flush the toilets. "I think that's how I got my hernia," Anderson said.

Anderson laid some of the blame for the bad food in their environment on heredity. "The problem was the damn Spaniards came into Cuba and gave them the wrong diet for the climate. Rice and beans are the worst things you could eat in that climate," he said.


It was more than a struggle to keep their bodies functioning. They had to find ways to occupy their minds. From memory, they made a monopoly board. The game fascinated their Cuban cellmates. Anderson made a slide rule from a cigar box, working out the logarithms from an old engineering book that somehow had remained in the circular. "The slide rule served its purpose," he said. "It enabled me to do these little problems, and Dave was an engineer, too. I remember we got into descriptive geometry."

The American engineers made a radio. An ear piece had been smuggled in, and they scrounged up Russian transistors and pieces of tubing used for intravenous feeding. To make a battery, they acquired zinc from a pail, copper

* An indication of how Cubans assess prison conditions in their homeland came late in 1987 at federal detention centers in Louisiana and Georgia. Cuban detainees, fearing a return to Cuba, rioted and seized hostages.

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Ground view of circulars, 1984. Prison was converted to museum.

from a wire, copper sulfate from the sparse medical supplies. The radio worked like an overgrown crystal set. They could pick up broadcasts from a 50-thousand-watt New Orleans station.

They rarely spoke of religion. Christ was a Lutheran, Anderson an Episcopalian, Szuminski a lapsed Catholic. Anderson mused that if Szuminski should ever have an opportunity to get married, Elsie would be the girl for him. She would get him back to the church.

Christ and Szuminski had served in the Army, Anderson in the Marine Corps. Anderson looked upon the military training as a plus. "We were used to discipline and used to improvising if we had to." Many of their fellow inmates, political prisoners from the professional and wealthier layers of Cuban society, lacked that advantage. "A lot of these Cubans had been waited on by nannies all their lives," Anderson said. "They never picked up anything. They were used to having someone else do it. And if they didn't have someone to help them, I don't think they could survive. They had no preparation for life except to be waited on."

Depressed, disoriented, defeated, some of the Cubans resorted to suicide. "Usually they would jump off about the fifth floor and hit the concrete, and that was it," Anderson said. "They would carry them down to the hospital. The doctor explained that the liver and kidneys would break like a balloon."

The Americans prevented one suicide. "We were standing there on our little railing one day and Dave looks over and this guy is getting ready to jump. The Cubans all stepped back. They were afraid of him. Wally and I ran as fast and as hard as we could. And we grabbed him and pulled him back." The man was a Cuban journalist who had predicted Castro's downfall and consequently had been sentenced to 10 years. "He spoke with a Harvard accent," Anderson said. "US educated. Tall guy with bushy curly gray hair and a very

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distinguished beard, filthy as hell. I was almost afraid to put my hands on him. He was so filthy. He was so slimy. The first thing I did when I got back was to wash my hands."

One of the American soldier of fortune prisoners was in a similar condition of absolute filth, and had gone mad. Szuminski described the situation: "He would get into a fetal position and hide in a corner, which is what he was doing when we ran into him. And the Cubans would go in there and poke him with a stick. He would push them away and they would poke him some more. Finally he would growl. He would rant at them. They would run away. Then they would come back and poke at him again for amusement, like kids poking at a dog. Andy felt that we as Americans could not let this happen to a fellow American."

They befriended him, brought him to their own cell, cleaned him up, fed him, had one of the imprisoned Cuban psychiatrists talk to him, and determined that valium might help. Eventually, they obtained the drug for him.

As the months dragged by, a rare Red Cross package might get to them. They could tell from the way it was wrapped that it came from their friends in Technical Services Division. Perhaps it had been Elsie, the secretary Szuminski had an eye for. Whatever possessions they fashioned or acquired were at constant risk because of the dreaded *requisas*. From squealers amidst the prison population, the prison authorities would have learned of the existence of a radio, or weapons, or other contraband. A *requisa* was the way to find the stuff, and also a way to terrorize the prisoners.

"It's 7:30 o'clock in the morning," Szuminski related. "They ring the building with soldiers. 'Down the stairs!' they yell. 'Everyone down the stairs!' They get everyone lined up against the wall while the soldiers search the prison throwing all your stuff out. You're facing the wall. You're not allowed to look. The first guy to turn around is going to get it. And there you stand. They usually set up a couple of machine guns behind the prisoners. Snap! Clack, clack, click! They're loading the rifles, snapping the bolts, putting the heavy ammo in the machine guns. . . . "

One *requisa* lasted 15 hours, into darkness. The lights went out, and the jittery soldiers began snapping the gun bolts behind the prisoners. The Cubans, to a man, squatted; some of them, in fear, were defecating. Only Christ, Anderson, and Szuminski remained standing. "We felt that if we were going to get it in the back, we would at least take it standing up," Szuminski said. It impressed their fellow prisoners, who also were aware that the gringos had great technical expertise.

"The Invasion! "

Christ had been briefed on plans for an invasion of Cuba before he left Washington for Havana in September 1960, although he did not burden Anderson and Szuminski with this knowledge. Rumors of an imminent uprising were flying among Cuban prisoners in LaCabana during the winter of 1960-1961, and the rumors bounced around the Isle of Pines curculars through

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the spring. Szuminski remembers going to his bunk on a Sunday night in April 1961 thinking, "Tomorrow is Monday. Nothing ever happens on Monday."

He continued: "All of a sudden I woke up to the clatter of a .50-caliber machine gun. It was a machine gun emplacement up on this hill by the prison. It was shooting this way. . . . Right over the top of the circular a B-26 flew in straight. . . . The place went into an uproar. Guys were running around screaming, 'The invasion! The invasion!' My cellmate says, 'What you think, gringo?' 'Keep your head down,' I said. An American prisoner came running past. 'They're shooting a boat in the harbor!' he yells. 'Jesus, it is sinking!' So I decided to take a look. I went up to the sixth floor. There were very small windows up there, and you could see out to the ocean. There was a patrol boat out there. I caught the last sweep of the B-26. He just popped out of the clouds and made a pass. The patrol boat went down. The .50-caliber stopped shooting.The guards outside were panicked and running in all directions. They were hollering at the prisoners and shooting at the buildings. Then everything got super quiet . . . Of course, all meals were canceled . . . Next day it was pretty much the same thing. The guards were hollering to the prisoners to stay away from the windows. Anybody who gets close to the windows would get shot . . . And about the third day, the guys over in circular 3 were listening to Miami on their radio. The story started to get a little bit funny. And right away you know. Oh, there's something wrong here. . . . "

So much for the inside-prison view of the Bay of Pigs. For the prisoners, the consequence was to be far more dangerous. Castro had the circulars mined with explosives. Should there be an invasion or insurrection, those troublesome prisoners could be blown away.


Sabotage

Christ's memorandum of commendation for Anderson and Szuminski (again, saying nothing of his own role) outlined the story: "Their greatest performance came in November 1961, while they were living in circular No. 4, when the Cuban army installed 6,000 lbs. of TNT in each building. They were approached by a Cuban group who had found a small access hole down into the tunnel where the explosives were being installed. They were asked to take charge of the operation. They knew they should protect their cover and not draw attention to themselves; they also knew that every one of the 1,100 prisoners in that circular would be aware of their participation within a few days . . . They decided that the lives of the 1,100 men had to be protected, and that they, as Americans, had a special responsibility in the matter. The details of the specific operation would fill a book, but it is sufficient to note here that they successfully sabotaged the TNT installation and participated in planning the suicide break-out operation which would be required in the event of an invasion, and the discovery of the sabotage. When they were moved to circular No. 1, they consulted with the Cubans to protect that circular also. As expected, the entire prison population rapidly became aware of their contribution. . . . "

The operation has been mentioned in books, such as *Against All Hope*, by Armando Valladares (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1986).

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Cutaway view showing conduit/primer cord running from circular to hill with guard post and detonator.


Szuminski gave this account of the mining: "They brought in air compressors, and they started cutting holes in the support pillars of the building. All the way around it . . . They'd work with a jack hammer. They'd start it at 9 o'clock in the morning and go until 5 o'clock in the afternoon. It took them about three weeks to get all the holes dug. And then one night lots of trucks pulled up to the circular. . . . They were plugging in the TNT, in boxes. . . . There is a guy inside the circular who is in charge of bringing packages in for the prisoners. About 10:30 or 11 o'clock at night this guy hollers up, 'Hey, Sanchez, you've got packages downstairs.' A little bit of humor. . . . "

The lines to the explosives were threaded through plastic tubing, buried and running from the circular outside beyond the perimeter fence. The sabotage of the primer cord and the electrical circuit would have to be done from inside the circular.


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A very large Cuban ("built like the Michelin tire ad," as Szuminski put it) and a helper, swinging hammers, broke through the ground floor into the tunnel where the explosives were. A very small Cuban, a street-smart Havana youngster nicknamed "Americano," was slipped into the hole for reconnaissance. "So we sent 'Americano' down in the pit to see what he could find. Told him to bring back samples of everything he could find," Szuminski said. "The first thing was a primer cord and a sample of some of the blasting caps, a five-kilo block of TNT and some of the wire. Dave confirmed it was TNT. Andy looks at the primer cord. Good stuff. It was the real thing. So then we had to figure out how we would stop it. . . . "



Method of severing primer cord.



Method of shorting wiring to explosives.

Szuminski continued: "How do you stop primer cord from shooting? You put a gap in it . . . We had essentially zero to work with. We had no tools, no files, no saws, nothing like that. The only things we had were razor blades, knives, sewing kits." Using a spool from a sewing kit, they devised a way to put a gap in the primer cord without leaving tell-tale evidence that it had been tampered with. (See illustration.) To disarm the dual, electrical system, the trick was to slice through the insulation, twist the wires to short the connection, and let the insulation slip back in place.

Christ, Anderson, and Szuminski brought "Americano" into their quarters and trained him. He would have no light in the tunnel, so they had him lie on the floor with a blanket over his head and his hands outside. They taught him to attach a spool with pins to one end of a severed primer cord and shove the spool through the plastic tubing until the pins would catch and the cord could not be drawn back. They put him through the wire cut-and-twist exercise, drilling him until he was ready.

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"Americano" went down the hole and completed the mission. A guard, tugging at the primer cord, could not tell that it had been cut. The electrical circuit would pass a galvanometer test.

The operation could hardly have been kept secret. Within a week a visitor to the Isle of Pines ran up to the Americans and thanked them for stopping the TNT. Even so, they detected no evidence of an attempt to repair the sabotaged connections. Nor were they punished. The punishment would have been isolation in the pavillon, a place of no beds and no food other than slop thrown in once a day, where prisoners were kept naked for the swarming mosquitoes, where men went mad in 30 days.

To the prisoners, the mining of the circulars was more frightful than the missile crisis of October 1962, which for them meant alerts and blackouts, but a terror more distanced than TNT rigged to blow up under their feet. They were desperate enough to fashion weapons: grenades from the explosives "Americano" hauled out of the tunnel, a flame thrower from scraps of junk in the circular and from alcohol they distilled.

After 281 days in circular 4, the Agency officers were moved to circular 1.

Release

There had been an attempt to (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) they missed the clue. There had been fragmentary communication to the outside through their lawyer and through the Swiss, but little to give them hope.

On 16 March 1963 they had a visitor: James B. Donovan, the New York lawyer who a year earlier had arranged the exchange of U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers for Soviet spy William August Fisher (Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel) * and the bartered release of the Cuban exiles captured at the Bay of Pigs. Donovan told Christ, Anderson, and Szuminski that they would be coming out in another prisoner exchange. (Anderson told Donovan that he would rather stay in prison than be part of any transaction that would embarrass the United States.)

They were coming out . . . David L. Christ, the senior officer who bore the anguish of having led his team into disaster, who had been uncomfortable from the start with the operation and the case officer assigned to it, who suffered unending anxiety because he was in hostile hands and knew too much, who yearned for his wife and six children . . . Thornton J. Anderson, Jr., the gung-ho Marine who insisted that his comrades adopt his own iron discipline, who saw their roles not as prisoners but as combatants, the innovator who believed in drilling the mind . . . Walter E. Szuminski, the cool one, who dropped off to sleep the night after their arrest, who put some of the confiscated audio equipment out of commission under the eyes of the Cubans and then said he didn't know how it worked, who ruined a staged filming session by barking into the microphone that he was appearing on camera because he had been told to do it or be shot. (The lights had gone out. The producer had walked away shaking his head.)

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* (See "A Stone for Willy Fisher," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1986, Volume 30, Number 4.)

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The Cubans moved them from circular 1 to the pavillon, not to the punishment cells but to the less uncomfortable quarters. The food improved, and they were let into the sunshine. They left the Isle of Pines on a ferry boat for the main island, and were placed again in LaCabana. With 18 other Americans whom Fidel Castro swapped for four of his followers imprisoned in New York, the three Agency officers were flown to the United States. The passengers included the mentally ill man they had taken under their wing.

During the flight Szuminski was told that his mother had died. Anderson said, "That was very sad, the biggest shock . . . I sat down and cried with him."

The soldier of fortune types were first off the plane and into the camera lights. Security officers hustled the CIA men out of camera range to a safe house. "They brought my wife and my mother in. They brought Dave's mother and wife and brother in," Anderson said, "and the next day they let the wives stay there. Then the next day they got the women out of the house and started with the shrinks and medics and whatnot . . . Then all of a sudden our coming back leaked . . . The security guy told me the White House leaked it. Kennedy. That we were CIA types." The cover they had struggled so desperately to maintain for 949 days in Cuban custody lasted three days after their return. The cover names held—Carswell, Dan-Brunt (with the usual misspellings), and Taransky.

The three were separated. Szuminski was sent to Boston to see his father. Christ and Anderson saw their children again. Anderson's youngest son did not know him. The older boy barely remembered him. Gail Anderson had moved the boys from their Northern Virginia home to Florida. Living her husband's cover, she had found it increasingly difficult as Christmases came and went to explain to the neighbors why he could never get home leave from his "overseas" assignment. In Florida, too, the woman who moved in with two small boys and no sign of a husband was encountering raised eyebrows. "You pay a price for cover," Anderson said.

Returning to the Agency's embrace, Christ, Anderson, and Szuminski went through extended debriefings, medical and psychological evaluations, counter-intelligence questioning, the polygraph. When it all came out clean, they returned to work. They had thought the Director of Central Intelligence might want to call them in for a "well done" and a pat on the head. They were taken, instead, to the Executive Director. Szuminski would have preferred seeing Elsie, but she was overseas.

• • •

David L. Christ went into the Directorate of Science and Technology to create and populate new divisions and complete a highly successful career. Upon his retirement in 1970, he was awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit. (The Distinguished Intelligence Cross was presented to him, Anderson, and Szuminski in 1979, when his long-ignored memorandum of 1964 came to the attention of DCI Stansfield Turner.) After retirement, he founded an electronics research and development firm. He died of cancer on 9 December 1985. He is buried in Arlington Cemetery.

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Thornton J. Anderson, Jr., and Walter E. Szuminski returned to Technical Services Division for additional operational adventures, such as having their light aircraft hit by ground fire as they flew over Laos in 1968. They came through that and other narrow scrapes unscathed, but for Anderson, during a tour in [redacted] in 1975, there was tragedy: his youngest son was killed in a train-car accident.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Anderson retired in 1979. He and Gail live in a splendid house with a swimming pool in [redacted] (b)(6) Florida. Szuminski retired in 1980, but takes on contract work with the Agency. He and his wife and two children live in [redacted] (b)(6) His wife, of course, is Elsie.

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TITLE: We Watched the Gulf

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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Keeping the sea lanes open

WE WATCHED THE GULF

(b)(3)(c)

Since its inception in 1976, the Priority Exploitation Group (PEG), an organizational component of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), has been tasked with the timely and accurate exploitation of satellite imagery in support of national-level indications and warning (I&W), crisis monitoring, tipoff, and current intelligence reporting responsibilities around the clock, seven days a week. This support includes but is not limited to providing imagery-derived intelligence assessments of current or potential threats to the security of the US, her allies by treaty, US military and civilian personnel abroad, and US military, political, and economic interests. In the spring of 1987, however, decisions made by the President and supported in Congress modified PEG's mission, thereby altering not only the lives of 200 Agency, military, and government contract personnel but also the course of US involvement in the Persian Gulf War.

In the past, PEG has provided Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed support for limited periods in those areas which have traditionally been considered tactical and short term in nature, including support to US forces in Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) as well as up-to-the-minute assessments of the disaster at Chernobyl. With our emphasis on national-level (non-departmental) analytical support, it came as both a professional and a cultural shock when the US Pacific Command, and, later, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) charged us with providing direct, daily, tactial support on a continual basis to US Forces that would be at risk in the Persian Gulf. The memories of the *USS Stark*, struck by two Iraqi Exocet missiles in May 1987, were still fresh in everyone's mind.

In conjunction with the Congressionally approved US policy to escort reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf, NPIC was tasked in June 1987 to provide immediate, (b)(3)(n) tactical intelligence support to naval forces under the auspices of USCENTCOM, initially as an alert to the Reef Point reconnaisance aircraft, a specially equipped P-3 maritime reconnaissance aircraft that was to precede the reflagged tankers.

Multiple Targets

The major threat to these convoys was assessed to be from the Iranian Silkworm antiship cruise missile sites near the Strait of Hormuz and in the northern Gulf, near Al Faw. Additional threats, which included the mining of international waters and the antishipping attacks by Iranian forces, were no less serious from the 20 or so Iranian naval and air bases, the numerous Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) small-boat facilities, and the IRG staging sites on the offshore islands and drill rigs.

Approximately 80 Iranian targets were selected as being of primary or secondary interest. No distinctions were made, however, when a threat was perceived from a target which did not happen to be on the "hit list." This concentration of targets in so compact a geographic area routinely required imagery collection of lesser interpretability, usually no better than fair quality, in order to obtain maximum daily coverage. We were frequently forced to analyze a lot of "black blobs" in making life-and-death threat assessments.

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Meeting the Challenge

In July 1987, when our support evolved into direct assistance to the entire Operation Earnest Will (the escorted convoys), we were regularly supplying intelligence assessments within one hour of receipt of imagery. These reports took the form of General Service (Secret-level) messages to USCENTCOM and major field components, including those naval ships on station in the Gulf region. Usually, two messages were produced each night. They supplemented the continuous telephonic communications with USCENTCOM, the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC), the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Strategic Air Command. These calls provided an immediate alert to impending or potential threats to the convoys.

Another element of support provided by PEG included the transmission of selected imagery scenes through on-site specialized equipment to the CIA's Joint Imagery Liaison Element, which often provided field operators with critical information.

From 1 July 1987 to 30 June 1988, some 70 US-escorted convoys passed through the Strait of Hormuz. In that time, thousands of frames of satellite imagery of the Persian Gulf targets were acquired, 612 Earnest Will cables were issued, and 236 briefing boards on significant intelligence items were produced. These numbers, however, do not take into account the volume of pre-Earnest Will message support, the number of telephone calls to clarify specific USCENTCOM and other questions from Department of Defense elements, or the volume of messages issued on non-Earnest Will-related I&W issues. This tactical support included the near-undivided attention of an average of eight personnel (drawn from a nighttime contingent of 15 imagery analysts) and was accomplished regularly in addition to other national-level reporting requirements.

The Silkworm Threat

While several of the Silkworm sites along the Strait of Hormuz were identified before specific Earnest Will support was required, no fewer than six new sites were identified, targetted, and added to the established reporting procedures over the past year.

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We were not aware of any convoy passing through the danger zone that day but, given the situation and the all-too-possible lack of complete coordination inherent in any new operation, we issued the message. Later, we found that, while no convoy had passed that day, a US ship was in the threat envelope at the time and that the message was relayed to the correct parties. The ship in question, the crippled *USS Stark*, was being escorted home.


(b)(1)
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The December message and the events leading up to it provide some additional atmospherics. In October, two tankers, the *Sungari* and the *Sea Isle City*, had suffered Silkworm attacks while offshore at the Kuwati oil terminal of Mina al Ahmadi. That time, these ships, as well as most of the Intelligence Community, assumed that they were just beyond the reach of Iran's Chinese-manufactured missiles pointed their way from the captured Iraqi sites and the newly constructed Iranian sites on or near the Faw Peninsula. Drawing on that experience,

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Almost immediately after analyzing the activity, that vital information was passed to USCENTCOM and NMIC. It also was relayed to the Kuwaiti forces on Faylakah Island off Bublyan Island just south of Al Faw. When the missile was launched, it was engaged by SA-8 and HAWK surface-to-air missiles. Although they did not hit the target, the Silkworm itself failed in flight and fell into the sea. At least the warning process had worked.

For a short time, these Silkworm attacks also managed to dissuade the Soviets from using the port of Ash Shuaybah, only a mile or so south of Mina al Ahmadi, for transferring their war cargos bound for Iraq. Suddenly, barriers were rising in front of the petroleum export facilities at Shuaybah, radar reflector barges were being deployed offshore to deflect any more missiles, and air defenses were strengthened. Warning was being heeded.


In February 1988, we were able to provide additional, imagery-derived intelligence that could have had a significant impact on Gulf shipping and that may yet provide a greater margin of safety for mariners confronted by the Silkworm threat. While the simple construction of another Silkworm launch site (even if it was quite a bit more elaborate than the two previous sites) was not especially noteworthy in and of itself, its location was what caught our attention.

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While this specific point was rendered moot by the Iraqi

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offensive and the recapture of the Al Faw area, (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

Antimining Operation

Perhaps the most newsworthy and certainly most policy-relevant issue supported by NPIC during the entire crisis was related to the events leading up to the seizure of the Iranian naval ship *Iran Ajr* (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) In September 1987, we provided the initial tipoff, which later formed the basis of the "smoking gun" evidence that had eluded US military and policymaking officials.

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n) This information was relayed both textually and telephonically to USCENTCOM analysts, and an immediate signals watch was placed on the ship. When she was noted by our forces as being well beyond her normal patrol area off the coast of Bahrain, a specially configured helicopter was deployed from a US frigate. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

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the helicopter opened fire and *Iran Ajr* was hit. It subsequently was abandoned, and a SEAL contingent from another ship took it into custody the next morning.

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While the newspapers were full of accounts of initial "P-3 tipoffs" leading up to the seizure, the commanding officer of USCENTCOM stated that this military success and its resultant effect on international opinion was a direct result of NPIC intelligence support. Television films broadcast around the world of the Iranian action provided US policymakers with their most important, best-documented piece of evidence that not even the most brazen denials could quash.

Thwarting Small Boats

A little-touted but equally important contribution to the safety of US and allied personnel in the Gulf revolved around the aborted IRG attack on Saudi offshore oil platforms in October 1987. During the summer and early fall, the IRG small-boat forces, which had continued to harass Gulf shipping, were massing in the northern Persian Gulf. After the summer exercise, (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) many of these small boats—equipped with automatic weapons and capable of launching rocket attacks—remained at IRG bases in the Bandar-e Bushehr and Khark Island areas. Most of the small boats were removed from the water and were inactive for several weeks, until late September and early October, (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) The next day's newspaper accounts told of how "... the Royal Saudi Navy turned back an attempted attack on their offshore oil production facilities by as many as 60 of these small craft ..." with no loss of life on either side. Subsequent discussions revealed that the (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

These are the most striking examples of the tactical support provided by NPIC. The provision of time-consuming order of battle reports on a daily basis was much more typical of that support. As a result of the assistance rendered by NPIC and by several other intelligence organizations, many of which must remain unheralded, the military commanders charged with the implementation of Operation Earnest Will were able to incorporate the highest-quality intelligence reporting into their successful efforts to keep open international sea lanes in the Persian Gulf.

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Trends in transmission

New Links Between Intelligence and Policy

David D. Gries

No subject in intelligence has led to more debate and less agreement than the linkage between the intelligence and policy communities. Sherman Kent, Ernest R. May, Robert M. Gates [1] and others have explored the subject in books and articles. Colleges and universities teach courses on it. Yet some aspects of the linkage remain largely unexplored. What kind of intelligence is transmitted between the two communities? How is it transmitted? How do policy officers use it?

In the first decade after passage of the National Security Act of 1947, which laid most of the foundations for an intelligence community, only the most senior intelligence officers maintained regular contact with policy officers (deputy assistant secretaries and up or their equivalent). Intelligence officers were also less numerous in those days, and intelligence agencies were only partly accepted as players in Washington. The situation changed in the next three decades. The Intelligence Community grew rapidly, first during the Korean and Vietnam Wars and again during the Reagan years, and intelligence agencies gradually became established in national security circles. The result is that today intelligence and policy officers of all levels spend far more time together.

An important consequence of increased contact is that the formal and impersonal linkages of the past have become more informal and personal. Oral assessments delivered during face-to-face contacts now outnumber written assessments delivered through classified mail channels. The more senior the intelligence officer involved, the more likely that oral rather than written assessments will be conveyed. As a result, intelligence officers themselves have become part of the transmission system, and policy officers are using intelligence in somewhat different ways.

Growing Importance of Oral Assessments

Oral assessments are analytical evaluations or judgments as distinguished from current intelligence. They are conveyed during discussions at the countless informal meetings that dot the calendars of senior officers in national security departments and agencies and at the more formal policy-coordinating meetings held at various levels from assistant secretary to the President himself. These meetings offer opportunities for intelligence officers to provide direct policy support, as for example, when policy officers at a series of meetings in April 1990 solicited assessments of policy options concerning the Lithuanian situation. A senior officer from the mid 1970s—a deputy director, a national intelligence officer, an office director from one of the intelligence agencies—would notice a marked increase in this kind of contact today.

Oral assessments are also transmitted in briefings to a steadily widening audience. On any given working day dozens of intelligence officers give briefings on everything from Soviet agricultural policy to narcotics production in the Andes. On the receiving end are senior members of the Executive Branch, as well as members of Congress. The Intelligence Community is often at its best in these situations, because knowledgeable, working-level analysts usually deliver the briefings themselves. They speak from firsthand exposure to all the available intelligence.

There is another link, perhaps the most important one, that competes with meetings and briefings

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between intelligence and policy officers. It consists of casual contacts, impromptu discussions, telephone conversations, and conference calls. These channels are much less formal than meetings or briefings, and the oral assessments offered in them are less structured. Arguably, the most important oral assessments are transferred through these least formal mechanisms. They mirror the way the government is doing business in the 1990s: *ad hoc* arrangements, reliance on personal ties, and a high degree of informality. Casual contacts also avoid some of the pitfalls of meetings and briefings, where bureaucratic competition among agencies and principals sometimes diverts attention from issues.

Because people convey oral assessments, the influence of the messenger can overshadow the message. Just as a persuasive officer makes a weak assessment sound good, so a poor briefer destroys a strong brief. When personal relationships also exist between intelligence and policy officers, the dynamics of friendship come into play. Friends are trusted and listened to; strangers may not be. And when a policy officer over time develops confidence in an intelligence officer, that confidence is likely to be transferred to assessments even though they may not be good ones.

Changing Role of Written Assessments

Several kinds of written assessments continue to play a key role in linking intelligence and policy officers. Some policy officers—former Secretary of State George Shultz was a recent example—prefer reading to briefings. Among written products, the *President's Daily Brief* stands out as influential, even critical, in supplying assessments to the President and his inner circle. The *National Intelligence Daily* and INR's *Morning Summary*, which circulate at subcabinet levels, are also influential, and they have a much wider circulation among policy officers.

Four other categories of written intelligence deserve special mention:

— National Intelligence Estimates stretch back to 1950, when CIA's fourth Director, General Walter Bedell Smith, responded to President Truman's request of 10 October 1950 for an assessment of Soviet and Chinese intentions in Korea to take with him to his meeting with General MacArthur on Wake Island. Smith assembled the heads of all the intelligence agencies that afternoon in his conference room and, according to Ludwell Montague's account, insisted that they produce six Estimates on Korea by 8:00 a.m. the next morning. [2] Forty years later, the key judgments of National Intelligence Estimates reach an influential audience in Washington, where they are separately circulated to the President and Vice President and to Cabinet and subcabinet officers. As a result, key judgments of Estimates are among the few written intelligence assessments regularly read at the top of government.

— Unscheduled written assessments—generally short papers in the form of memorandums, discussion papers for meetings, executive briefs and typescripts—also reach high-level policy officers. Such assessments often are prepared at the request of one of these officers to meet a specific need, and they are assured of a small but influential readership. Their key characteristics are brevity and focus. They do not appear on production plans, nor are they supported by extensive research. Yet each year policy officers ask for more of them, thus confirming their value. They are part of the larger trend not only from written to oral assessments, but also from scheduled written assessments to unscheduled ones.

— Written scientific and technical assessments, such as those that evaluate conventional and strategic weapons systems or analyze advanced technologies and economic competitiveness, find a ready audience, especially at the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and Energy. The level of

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detail provided in these assessments is too great to convey in a briefing, and a written record is often needed for future use.

— Unevaluated intelligence—raw reports from clandestine agents, pieces of SIGINT or imagery that have not been subjected to analysis—also flows to policy officers. Occasionally, unevaluated intelligence lands on the desk of a high-level policy officer, even the President, and directly influences decisionmaking. More often, unevaluated intelligence flows at lower levels, where it converges with and is incorporated in written assessments sent to the same customers. The convergence has an unintended byproduct: policy officers and analysts have access to the same unevaluated reports and thus can challenge each other's judgments.

With the foregoing exceptions, scheduled written assessments, formerly the Intelligence Community's chief product, today mainly influence the policy process indirectly. Senior intelligence offiers and the staffs that support policy officers are now their principal readers. They rely heavily on them when preparing oral assessments and short papers. Scheduled written assessments thus have assumed a new and vital role, though not the one originally intended: they have become part of the foundation of the intelligence edifice, providing much of the analysis on which other intelligence products are based. Moreover, analysts who prepare scheduled written assessments are doing more than serving the policy process indirectly; they are honing their own analytical skills in preparation for the time when they will be making oral presentations.

Intelligence information conveyed by video cassettes is a special case whose market is growing rapidly. President Reagan was an enthusiastic customer. He recognized that biographic intelligence was more digestible when images and narrative were presented together. The picture of Qadafhi delivering a tirade has more impact than a written assessment alone. Because video intelligence combines the trend towards oral assessment with television's pervasive influence, it seems likely that in the future more intelligence will flow into the policy community in this fashion.

Foreign Policy Decisionmaking

Before exploring how policy officers use intelligence, it is necessary to reflect briefly on how foreign policy is made in today's Washington. Few observers believe that policy formation is an orderly process where facts are lined up, analysis applied, and decisions made. Some would contend that most policy officers avoid making decisions, unless forced by events. Delay is preferable to making a decision that might adversely affect US interests, disadvantage a department, or blemish the record of a policy officer by revealing him or her as wrong. Faced with these possibilities, policy officers slow down the process and seek safety by spreading the responsibility within a wide circle. The larger the number of participants in making a decision, the smaller the risk to any one of them.

Nor are most foreign policy decisions made all at once. Caution marks the process. The pressure of events almost always starts the process; incremental decisionmaking completes it. Of course, not all decisions are made—or avoided—in this way. The recent US action in Panama and the Nicaraguan election are examples of events that forced policy officers to act rapidly and decisively. But they are exceptions.

Usually the events that force policy officers to make incremental decisions are far less dramatic. They include clearing positions for meetings and informal discussions within the Executive Branch; coordination of briefing books, arrival statements, toasts, negotiating positions, and communiques for policy officers travelling abroad and for foreign visitors; approval of speeches, letters and talking points for senior policy officers; and dealing with Congress and the media. Contacts with the Congress require policy officers to clear briefings and testimony and

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respond to investigations, new laws, and legislative reports. Dealing with the media requires policy officers to get ready for questions and answers at press conferences, respond to op-ed articles, prepare for discussions with journalists, and try to limit damage from leaks. Although no one of these events is likely to prompt a major policy change, taken together they often nudge policy in new directions or make new policy.

Evolving Uses of Intelligence

Because policy officers rarely make decisions in an orderly fashion, intelligence is usually used inefficiently. The policy process is messy and marked by delay, sharing of risks, and incremental steps. The uses of intelligence are equally messy.

Defending Policy. Policy officers spend much of their time shoring up support for decisions already in place or generating support for recent decisions, so the use of intelligence to defend policy is not surprising. Examples of this include defense against Congressional criticism and sallies from bureaucratic rivals, as when a policy officer in one department uses an intelligence assessment to weaken the argument of another department. During the 1980s, policy officers dealing with Nicaragua spent most of their energy defending policy.

The policy officer as a defensive player reflects in part the influence of Vietnam, Watergate, and Iran-Contra. Vietnam spawned an aggressive press that today challenges assumptions underlying policy, searches for bureaucratic infighting, and grills policy officers whenever possible. Watergate sharpened skepticism of government institutions and actions. Iran-Contra pulled more foreign policy decisionmaking power away from the Executive and gave it to the Congress. Leaks to the press also play a role. The more open political system that has grown out of Vietnam, Watergate, and Iran-Contra has made it difficult to keep secrets. Against this background, policy officers have become counter-punchers.

Supporting Action. Next in importance among the uses of intelligence by policy officers is support of diplomatic or other actions, sometimes to the dismay of the Intelligence Community, which wants to protect its sources and methods. President Reagan used intelligence to put the responsibility on Libya for bombing a disco in Berlin in April 1986 and to hold the Soviets accountable for shooting down KAL 007 in 1983. He used it again to accuse Libya of constructing a factory to produce chemical warfare agents, and the Bush administration repeated the same accusation in March 1990. High-level policy officers frequently use intelligence to confront foreign countries with evidence of unfriendly activities, as when intelligence detected widespread election irregularities in the Philippines in 1986. [3] Subsequently, the White House issued a series of warnings to President Marcos.

Helping to Make New Policy Decisions. The use of intelligence assessments to assist in making new policy decisions is third in importance. Academicians identify this kind of decisionmaking as the principal use of intelligence assessments. Many would claim there is no other justification for maintaining a large intelligence community. But policy officers, as noted, spend more of their time defending policy and supporting direct action than in making decisions. Even when new policy decisions are being made, intelligence is not always used directly or consistently.

Nonetheless, intelligence assessments can and do help to identify policy options that will work, thus directly supporting decisions on new policies. This was the case in 1980, when President Carter based policy decisions on intelligence about preparations for imposing martial law in Poland. [4] The policy officer may use intelligence to answer important questions underlying portions of a decision, as when intelligence was used to establish Toshiba's violation of COCOM regulations. Or, after reaching a decision, policy officers may encourage distribution of a compatible intelligence assessment to unify the Executive Branch behind the decision, as when intelligence was used to demonstrate that the INF Treaty could be adequately monitored. On the other

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hand, policy officers generally prefer those assessments that buttress their preconceptions. Consequently, they often use intelligence selectively.

Acquiring Information. As the traditional foreign policy menu has lengthened to include narcotics, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation, the policy officer's need for information has grown dramatically. Often too busy to read widely in their fields and buffeted by daily events, policy officers draw down their intellectual capital. Intelligence assessments, when they are clear, concise, and timely, provide an efficient way to build capital. To fill specific gaps in their knowledge policy officers can also shape the flow of intelligence, though not its content, by requesting assessments that illuminate policies under review or highlight emerging issues.

Congressmen, and especially their staffs, also use intelligence to acquire information, thus helping to create a common fund of knowledge. This is a new development. In the 1950s and 1960s the Intelligence Community shared few assessments with the Congress, so that there was little commonalty in the information base of the Legislative and Executive Branches. The amount of intelligence conveyed to the Congress has picked up steadily since the 1970s, when permanent oversight committees were established. Today, the Intelligence Community supplies similar intelligence to both branches. Policy officers ignore this development at considerable risk.

Users of intelligence have little time for reading lengthy assessments, and they tend to acquire information informally over time as they encounter intelligence counterparts in meetings, briefings, and casual contacts. Thus a general knowledge of the Intelligence Community's conclusions about an issue is slowly accumulated, ready for use when a crisis occurs.

Lost Opportunities

It is no accident that, with the exceptions already noted, oral assessments and short papers have pride of place in the new intelligence—policy linkage, because they most closely match the penchant of today's policy officer for informality and personal transactions. That oral assessments have gained wide acceptance shows the attention intelligence officers are giving to their customers. Yet current practice leaves much to be desired. Too many policy officers fail to understand what intelligence can do for them. Instead of recognizing it as a useful resource, they view it as unhelpful or as a potentially competing input into the policy process. They also fail to give the Intelligence Community the guidance and feedback it needs. Some experienced policy officers know better. They identify a point of entry to the Intelligence Community, usually a deputy director, a national intelligence officer or an office director in one of the intelligence agencies. They keep their doors open. When requesting assessments, they frame questions carefully to ensure that the right issues are addressed.

Writing in *Lessons of the Past*, Ernest R. May advanced the notion that policy officers should depend more on historians. When historical experience is overlooked, May wrote, mistakes are common. [5] Similarly, when intelligence is overlooked, mistakes can occur. But the press of daily business on policy officers means that the Intelligence Community has to find better and more efficient ways to compete for attention.

Strengthening Intelligence — Policy Linkages

As the transfer of intelligence assessments to policy officers shifts from a predominantly written to a predominantly oral enterprise, the Intelligence Community should pay close attention to the consequences.

—The Intelligence Community should reinforce the trend towards producing oral assessments of all kinds and short papers. A higher standard of performance in oral presentations can and should be achieved through improved training. As short papers become the norm, the temptation to make

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them longer should be vigorously resisted. Particularly important, annual production plans covering scheduled written assessments should be scrapped; they are not needed in an environment characterized by rapidly changing requirements.

—There are pitfalls in the new game of oral assessments. Intelligence officers making oral presentations often operate alone, separated from the traditional process that subjects analysis to competitive review. Furthermore, a message that is delivered heavy-handedly runs the risk of wearing out the messenger's welcome among policy officers. For example, in 1962 Director John McCone lost much of his direct access to President Kennedy after the Cuban missile crisis. His oral presentations to the President were accurate, but, after missiles were discovered in Cuba, the President told McCone that "you were right all along, but for the wrong reasons." [6]

—The Intelligence Community does not keep adequate records of oral presentations, thus underscoring its failure to recognize their importance. Production records based solely on scheduled written assessments reflect yesterday's reality. They are inadequate for studies of production trends, and they overlook the contribution of oral assessments. A simple records system is needed to keep track of and give appropriate weight to oral assessments and short papers as well as to scheduled written assessments.

—The process through which policy officers task the Intelligence Community is too sporadic, complex, and cumbersome for a world that lives by speed and flexibility. Tasking is most effective when policy officers ask questions over the telephone or in face-to-face discussions, not when questions are submitted in writing. Similarly, most intelligence officers prefer to task their own systems with oral rather than written requests. The long, written tasking documents produced each year with such effort should be shortened and in some cases abandoned.

—Intelligence officers need to understand the policy process better. Too often they know more about how that process works abroad than in Washington. Few intelligence agency schools offer high-quality courses on the American foreign policy process. Rotational tours for intelligence officers in policy agencies offer another way to sharpen understanding of the policy process. Few intelligence officers should reach senior levels without these experiences.

Modern American intelligence is not yet 50 years old. Much has been accomplished to bring intelligence and policy officers together in a productive relationship. In 1965 Sherman Kent concluded in *Strategic Intelligence* that "of the two dangers—that of intelligence being too far from the users and that of being too close—the greater danger is the one of being too far." [7] Today, thanks to the oral assessments and short papers that flow through the informal and personal linkages between intelligence and policy, the danger "of being too far" has been reduced, though not eliminated. As resources tighten, a heavy burden falls on the Intelligence Community to make these new linkages and trends work better.

NOTES

1. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence* (Archon Books, Hamden, Ct., 1965); Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Uses and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 1973); Robert M. Gates, "The CIA and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter, 1987/88, pp. 215-230.
2. Ludwell L. Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-1953*, (Washington, D.C., CIA History Staff, 1970) (Declassified version released to National Archives under CIA's Historical Review Program in February 1990), Vol. II, pp. 26-30.
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4. Ibid.
5. Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Uses and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*, pp. 172-190.
6. Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (Yale University Press, 1989) pp. 136-137.
7. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence*, p. 195.

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TITLE: CIA, Ghana, and the (b)(1)

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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The Scranage Case

CIA, Ghana, and the

(b)(1)

(b)(3)(c)

This article is based on a Counterintelligence Analysis Report published by the CIA's Counterintelligence Center Analysis Group in January 1990.

In 1983, Sharon Scranage became the first known CIA employee to spy for an African intelligence service operating (b)(1) Scranage was assigned to the CIA Station in Accra, Ghana, and (b)(1) Ghanaians figured prominiently in her downfall—her lover, Michael Soussoudis (b)(1) A look at the roles and motivations of each explains what happened.

Sharon Scranage

Sharon Marie Scranage, born in October 1955, was one of three children in a close-knit family with deep roots in rural Virginia. Friends and neighbors recalled the Scranage family as "perfect" and Sharon as a "good kid." The Scranages were active in a local church, her father worked for many years at the Marine Base in Quantico, and her brother was a security man at the US Naval Surface Weapons Center at Dahlgren. The family were solid, self-respecting citizens, well known in their community. Scranage graduated in 1974 from high school, where she belonged to the honor society and was a cheerleader. After graduating from a Roanoke business college, she joined the CIA as a clerk-stenographer in May 1976 and was assigned to the Office of Imagery Analysis. She was promoted one year later.

Scranage married a security guard with a private firm in 1978. She divorced him in November 1980, Four years after their divorce, however, she kept him informed about her Agency employment and impending assignment to Ghana. (b)(6)
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(b)(6)

In April 1982, Scranage was assigned to the Africa Division in CIA's Directorate of Operations (b)(1) In May 1983, she was assigned to Accra as an operations support assistant. Despite her desire to go overseas again, Scranage noted before leaving for Accra that she was not "enthusiastic" but "would make the best of it."

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(6)

Michael Soussoudis

Michael Agbotui Soussoudis was born in April 1946 in Accra to a French-Ghanaian woman and (b)(6) Greek sailor. From 1966 to about 1983, he lived

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Figure 1
The Sharon Scranage Case: Key Players

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Sharon Marie Scranage



Michael Agbotui Soussoudis
Scranage's lover and Ghanaian case officer

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in West Germany and subsequently in the US. Soussoudis attended college in New York, where he married and later divorced an American woman. After he returned to Accra, he spent much of his time with American women. Friends and relatives called him a "playboy" and "more American than African."


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People's Daily Graphic

CIA IN GHANA ?

BEFORE HOLY WAR IT WAS AN ORDEAL

PUBLIC NOTICE

HUNI-VALLEY SECONDARY SCHOOL

UNIVERSITY OF CAPECOAST

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

328671 11-90

Figure 2. This feature article in the People's Daily Graphic was part of an anti-CIA campaign in the Ghanaian press.

Background

When Scranage arrived in Accra on 27 May 1983, Ghana was in a transitional phase marked by continuing revolutionary rhetoric tempered by some signs of pragmatism.

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Several days later, Scranage reported to CIA Headquarters, where the Office of Security had decided to interview her and give her a polygraph examination.

and Scranage quickly admitted having given classified information to the Ghanaians. CIA informed the FBI and the Departments of State and Justice of its preliminary findings,

(b)(1)

During interrogation, Scranage agreed to help the FBI lure Soussoudis to the US;

Scranage took annual leave from 29 June to 7 July to visit her parents. Soussoudis, who had arrived in the US, tried unsuccessfully to contact her during her leave.

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Upon her return to Washington, Scranage, at the instruction of the FBI, contacted Soussoudis and arranged to meet him at a motel in northern Virginia on 10 July. Soussoudis appeared at the motel and was arrested without incident. Scranage was arrested the following day.

Scranage was charged with espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, disclosure of identities of US intelligence agents, conspiracy to disclose classified information, and disclosure of classified information. She pled guilty. In November 1985, she was sentenced to five years in prison at Alderson, West Virginia.

In April 1986, a US District Judge reduced Scranage's sentence to two years, citing the disparity between her sentence and Soussoudis's treatment. Soussoudis had received a 20-year sentence for seeking information from Scranage about CIA agents in Ghana and Ghanaian dissidence, but he was allowed to return to Ghana in exchange for most of the agents—and their families—that Scranage had compromised.

Sharon Scranage was paroled in July 1987 after 18 months in prison. Michael Soussoudis went home in November 1985 to a hero's welcome.

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TITLE: In Memoriam: John Alex McCone

AUTHOR: Judge William H. Webster

VOLUME: 34 ISSUE: Winter YEAR: 1990

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In Memoriam



John Alex McCone (Portrait by William F. Draper)

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JOHN ALEX McCONE

TENURE AS DCI	29 November 1961–28 April 1965
BIRTH	4 January 1902, San Francisco, California
EDUCATION	Attended University of California
APPOINTMENT	Appointed by President John F. Kennedy, 27 September 1961 Sworn in as recess appointee, 29 November 1961 Confirmed by U.S. Senate, 31 January 1962
RELIEVED	Resigned, effective 28 April 1965
DEPUTY DIRECTOR	Lieutenant General Marshall A. Carter, U.S. Army
EARLIER CAREER	Private business Member of President's Air Policy Commission, 1947–1948 Deputy to the Secretary of Defense, March–November 1948 Under Secretary of the Air Force, 1950–1951 Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 1958–1960
LATER CAREER	Private business Counselor to the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, 1983 Received Presidential Medal of Freedom, 1987
DEATH	14 February 1991, Pebble Beach, California

John A. McCone, who served as Director of Central Intelligence from 1961 to 1965, made an enormous contribution to the security of this nation. He guided the Intelligence Community during a particularly trying time, and it was under his leadership that the Central Intelligence Agency provided vital information to President Kennedy and senior policymakers during the Cuban missile crisis.

Mr. McCone was sharp, tough, and demanding—qualities that made him a highly effective and widely respected leader. As DCI, Mr. McCone strengthened the Intelligence Community's capabilities and maintained its reputation for unbiased analysis. A strong advocate of technical collection, Mr. McCone created a new Directorate for Science and Technology and coordinated overhead reconnaissance program responsibilities with the Air Force.

Mr. McCone's long and distinguished career in government was marked by excellence, integrity, and selfless devotion to duty.

Judge William H. Webster

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TITLE: The Story of Herma Plummer

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

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A passion for truth

The Story of Herma Plummer

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If a list were to be made of the most prominent women who have served in CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO), many past and present DO officers would put Herma Plummer's name at the top. When she retired as a GS-15 in August 1968, she was awarded the Agency's Intelligence Medal of Merit. This was an appropriate tribute to an outstanding member of a generation of American intelligence professionals to whom much is owed.

Herma Plummer had a certain aura. One of her colleagues in the DO who worked with her in the early 1950s recalls her as an attractive, tall woman, always elegantly dressed. She would have been in her early forties at that time, and she already was an intelligence veteran. Newcomers to the DO regarded her with awe. One recently retired senior officer who knew Herm(b)(3)(c)in the early 1960s commented that she "was one of those OSS veterans one was expected to treat with due respect." Another senior officer who worked with her later in her career commented that "she has an attitude of indignation toward incompetence which sometimes suggests a tendency to confuse incompetence with sin." This uncompromising approach to business and her penetrating intelligence made her one of the premier counterespionage analysts of her time. Few of her coworkers would have been aware of the searing experiences which molded her earlier life and which led her eventually to Allen Dulles and the OSS.

Early Life

Herma's father, Louis Pulvermacher, was born in 1876 in Stawiszyn, Poland, a predominantly German area, and he was a Jew. After emigrating to the US, he began working as a journalist in New York City shortly after the turn of the century. He married Dora Holden, who also was Jewish. She was born in Czernowitz, Austria (Cernati, Romania) in 1880. Herma was born in 1908 in New York. She grew up in Germany and the US. She attended school in both countries, including Hunter College and Berlin University, where she took classes in international relations. She became perfectly bilingual in English and German, and she acquired her well-traveled parents' cosmopolitan outlook.

Sometime during the late 1920s, the marriage of Herma's parents apparently failed, and in 1928 Herma was in Berlin supporting an ailing mother through a series of secretarial and stenographic jobs with German and American firms. Letters of recommendation written by her employers at that time all praised her intelligence and bilingual stenographic skills. In 1930, she was hired by the US Foreign Service as a stenographer [1] at the American Consulate General in Berlin, where she soon would meet George S. Messersmith, a Foreign Service Officer reporting on political events in Germany. This remarkable man would play a significant role in Herma's life over the next 13 years.

Herma Pulvermacher seems to have led a normal life during this period. Sometime between 1928 and 1934, she became engaged to a young German. Berlin of the late 1920s and early 1930s suffered from the grinding depression that existed throughout Germany. But it remained an exciting, decadent city. National Socialism did not flourish in Berlin, and Adolf Hitler did not win a majority of votes there as he did in the rest of Germany.

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Berlin was a center of Jewish life in Germany, and it had the largest Jewish population of any German city. Following Hitler's ascension to power in 1933, life became increasingly difficult there for Jews, even for an American Jew. By this time, Herma had been working for Messersmith for three years.

In 1934, Herma was desperate to escape Germany with her dependent mother. Her meager salary of $1,200 per year did not allow her to save enough to get back to the US. She put her hope in appeals to the Foreign Service for a transfer. Messersmith, meanwhile, had been reassigned to Washington in 1933, and almost immediately thereafter to Vienna. He wrote to Thomas Wilson, Chief of the Personnel Division of the State Department, recalling that Miss Pulvermacher was "extraordinarily capable and one of the best stenographers I have come in contact with . . . (She) was a tower of strength to me. She was engaged to a young lawyer in Berlin when the new regime came in. She was a Jew, and, under the new laws and decrees, if they married the legal profession would be closed to him. He was going through with the marriage, but Miss Pulvermacher broke off the engagement rather than spoil his career. She has . . . suffered tremendously . . . as the result of the discrimination against the Jews . . . and when I left Berlin to go home in November 1933, she asked me to try to get a transfer for her to some other office as she felt she could not continue at Berlin."

Messersmith knew transfers were extraordinarily hard to come by for clerks. In addition, Messersmith's priggish successor in Berlin was loath to lose such an outstanding employee, no matter what the personal cost would be to her. In November 1938, she was still stuck in Berlin, and her situation was becoming increasingly desperate: "The air and atmosphere of Europe is lying so heavily on my heart and soul that it would be a tremendous relief to get out of it all. It is becoming so bad, and daily worse, that I cannot describe it to you. But I am sure you know all about it and you understand the necessity of my leaving here—after six years of National Socialism."[2]

Herma continued to write to every Foreign Service contact she had pleading for a transfer: "You have probably heard of the serious turn for the worse that conditions here [in Berlin] have taken. It is even worse than I had expected it ever to become. There is hardly a restaurant one can go to, not a single public bathing pool, and it is taking quite a chance to go to a theatre or moving picture house. I am really quite desperate and can hardly stand the atmosphere any longer."[3] Herma wanted to get out of Europe entirely, and she hoped for a transfer to "an Anglo-Saxon country," preferably Australia.

Colleagues and friends, especially the indefatigable Messersmith, who by that time was US Ambassador in Havana, continued to work behind the scenes to pull every string possible to extract Herma and her mother from Berlin. These efforts finally were rewarded in March 1939, when she was transferred to the American Consulate General in Mexico City. She used her Spanish language skills there, handling visa applications and interviewing callers. Sometime during this same period, Herma apparently became engaged to a young man in the US.[4]

Growing personal problems and increasing uncertainty in her life forced Herma to turn again to Messersmith. In May 1940, she was transferred to Havana to work as his confidential secretary.[5] Unfortunately, their reunion was short-lived. During the summer of 1940, her mother had to be placed in an institution in the US. At the same time, she learned that her fiancee was seriously ill. She resigned her position with the Foreign Service,[6] and she returned to the US to be nearer her mother and her fiancee. In December 1940, she went to work in New York for the Joint Distribution Committee, a philanthropic organization which distributed aid, primarily to Latin American countries. She was to hold this job until 30 November 1943.

OSS Service

In April 1942, Messersmith wrote a letter of recommendation to Allen Dulles reciting Herma's record. He also noted that "she had her name changed to Plummer legally in the United States. She has such a hatred of things German that she

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wanted to get even her name changed." He continued that "when she worked for me, she had my full confidence, which she never once in any way betrayed. As to her attitude towards Germany and towards the United States, and as to her Americanism, there is absolutely no doubt. As a matter of fact, she is almost a fanatic. Her faithfulness knows no limits. During the short time she was in Havana, I had reason to know of her extreme loyalty."

One senior intelligence veteran recalled a rumor that Herma had been Allen Dulles's secretary in [redacted] at some point during the war. The period in question parallels Dulles's establishment of his operation [redacted] following Operation Torch. Herma would certainly have been qualified to serve in such a capacity, but there is no record of her having been there. Her eventual assignment in OSS in Washington, however, was connected with the "Dulles organization" in [redacted]

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The record shows that in November 1943 Herma joined OSS. Her background and knowledge of the European environment probably was recognized immediately because, as of 8 December 1943, she had been assigned to X-2 with the title "Intelligence Officer." X-2 had been established as General William Donovan's counterespionage service. [redacted]

X-2 was headed by Donovan's friend and close associate [redacted] (b)(3)(c) Herma became a division chief "in charge of . . . work- . . . covering all aspects of their activity for Germany, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia."[7] She supervised 10 research analysts who handled operational reports, as well as directing the training and dispatch of personnel to the field. Her immediate supervisor was Richard Helms.

Herma must have been privy to some of the most sensitive operations of the war, including Dulles's contacts with Admiral Canaris and the frantic efforts towards the end of the war of the Chief of the German General Staff, General Heinz Guderian, and Field Marshal von Rundstedt, supreme German commander on the Western Front, to reach an accommodation which would permit surrender to the Western Allies while maintaining a front against the Soviets.

In October 1945, Herma was sent to assist Donovan during his sojourn in Nuremburg. He had been there since 17 May 1945 as Special Assistant to the US Chief Prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson. OSS had been designated as the US investigatory unit for the International Military Tribunal, the "Nuremburg Trials." Donovan had no policy powers in this capacity, and he clashed with Jackson over the decision to declare the German general staff and officer corps criminal organizations—something Donovan opposed. Donovan finally resigned from Jackson's staff when President Truman agreed to support the Soviets' demand for indictment of the general staff for war crimes.[8]

As head of the German/Swiss Desk, Herma probably played an important operational role at Nuremburg. Her work would have made her uniquely knowledgeable of the German intelligence services. And almost from the beginning of his stay in Nuremburg, Donovan had been engaged in the dissection of these services. Kaltenbrunner, head of the *Sicherheitsdiendst* (SD), had been captured in Austria before Donovan's arrival. He had revealed the existence of a functioning German intelligence network in the Balkans, from which the Soviets had ousted OSS, and he offered to help Donovan maintain it in exchange for amnesty.

The net was run by Wilhelm Hoetl, head of the Vatican/Balkan section of Amt VI, the foreign intellience section of the SD. Hoetl had been captured by Patton's 3rd Army. Donovan refused the deal, and, shortly thereafter, X-2, using Hoetl, captured the network's *centrale* in Steyr, Austria. The Balkan elements were revealed to the Soviets, who eliminated them.[9] During this period, General Bradley's Chief of Intelligence, General Sibert, and Allen Dulles also were holding discussions of consumate importance with General Reinhardt Gehlen, chief of German intelligence on the Eastern Front.

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In a 3 January 1946 letter from Nuremburg to (b)(3)(c) Herma expressed her "very best wishes for a happy new year and a successful and prosperous SSU [Strategic Services Unit, the "rump" organization of OSS, of which Herma was a part], or preferably a new organization, and an independent one. I understand from several letters I've had from Washington that the office is extremely busy, kicking, and not likely to die, which has made me very happy. I have had a most interesting experience here and have enjoyed it, but am ready to come back . . . " She thought it a good idea to return which you might wish me to visit. I think that such a brief tour might be extremely valuable and beneficial to the continuation of our work." As the letter indicated, Herma had found a home in intelligen(b)(3)(c) agreed to her itinerary. At the end of January, she returned to Washington via the suggested route.

Herma's closeness to Donovan ai(b)(3)(c) is reflected at the end of this letter: "The several weeks I was able to work with General Donovan were highly stimulating, and it was very regrettable, from more than one point of view, to see him leave. He wanted to be very warmly remembered to you."

SSU, with members, Herma Plummer included, was soon transferred to the War Department, to work under Brigadier General John Magruder. SSU was abolished on 19 September 1946, and its personnel were transferred to the newly created Central Intellience Group (CIG). On 21 October 1946, Herma Plummer joined CIG as a GS-12. In June 1947, writing of her work in the Central European Branch, Richard Helms described her as "one of the outstanding counterespionage specialists in the Organization."

The CIA Years

In 1948, Herma was assigned to where she conducted several important operations, including "the single most important operation run during the past five years," according to her chief, Bronson Tweedy.

In a subsequent recommendation for promotion to GS-14, Tweedy wrote: "That Miss Plummer happens to be a woman has not prevented her from attaining a very high level of proficiency in operations and intelligence work, and the question of her sex should not enter into any considerations of her qualifications, which already merit a well-deserved promotion." She was promoted in June 1950.

After a brief stay at Headquarters, Herma from June 1955 through March 1956 she served as deputy chief and as chief of operations and senior case officer.

Back at Headquarters, she was named deputy branch chief the unit responsible for operations One senior chief, who began his career during this period as one of Herma's young desk officers, remembers her fondly as a supervisor who brooked no incompetence but who also took the time to act as a mentor to her subordinates. He recalls many pleasant occasions when Herma would take her brood up the street from the where they worked to lunch at a small Italian restaurant.

In 1960, Herma became chief of She was described by a supervisor during this period as follows: "Miss Plummer attacks her work with great enthusiasm. Her experience has made her a genuine expert on the techniques of espionage—and what is rare among experts in this field—she manages to employ her expertise in a *non-doctrinaire, non-cultist* way. Rather, if she has any speciality in this line, it is as an exponent of common sense. She is an outstanding critic and analyst of operational situations . . . Her judgment [is] always shrewd, [and she] reserves her most exquisite scorn for colleagues who are *merely adequate.*"

There were signs of some friction, however, between Herma and certain senior NE Division staff members who had "a developed tendency to impose on the branch both operational and administrative decisions." Perhaps as a result of this, she transferred in 1961 to the East European Division

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Life was more harmonious for her there, as indicated in a memorandum written in 1963 wherein the division's chief of operations noted the "responsiveness of senior division personnel to her counsel and high regard in which her professional judgment is held throughout the division."

In 1963, Herma was assigned to She was indispensible because her savvy and field experience perfectly complemented his administrative background. She served as chief of operations, overseeing the work of all bases under She also represented the in a wide range of useful contacts in the diplomatic community, and invitations to a Plummer soiree were prized. She used her sophistication and ability to "move" among foreigners to good operational advantage.

Despite her formidable reputation, Herma still found time to cultivate professionalism in younger officers through personal contact, as well as example. One senior Agency official recalls that whenever he would visit during this period from his post in Eastern Europe, he inevitably would receive a call at his hotel from Herma inviting him to a meal and a chat at her elegant apartment. This officer regarded her as a role model.

Herma remained in until 1968, when she retired from the Agency at the mandatory age of 60. After spending approximately the next three years in Washington, D.C., she moved to Switzerland in 1971, where she lived until her death earlier this year.

An Assessment

To paraphrase a contemporary, Herma Plummer was an outstanding intelligence officer. Despite her proven ability as an agent handler, her most extraordinary asset was her ability as a case or project critic. No one else could review a file and find the holes, the contradictions, and the unasked and unanswered questions with comparable accuracy. She had a nose for phoniness, for window-dressing, for evasion, gilding and building up—for any kind of misrepresentation, witting or unwitting. This faculty was supported by an acute intelligence which made it possible for her to back up the evidence of her instincts and intuitions with arguments based upon reasonable and objective analysis. No matter what the case, her review would yield a penetrating and perceptive estimate of both the agent and the case officer and the relationship between them. This made her an ideal

Herma also had a striking ability to assess people. Here again was a formidable combination of intuition and instinct supported by intelligence, insight, and experience. Her chief in related that there had been some "odd cases..both with agents and with our own personnel, and there [was] not a time when [Herma] was not way ahead of any of the rest of us in detecting the fatal deficiency and following it up until the deficiency was exposed. In several cases, both among agents and among our own personnel, the persons involved had enjoyed good reputations. They had fooled a lot of people for a long time." This same individual wrote, " . . . by no means least important is [her] devotion to [the Agency] and [her] dedication to the business. [She] has been at it a long time, and has had a wealth of experience. It is safe to say that this is [her] life. [She] has a high sense of responsibility, a lot of courage, and a real love and enthusiasm for the job to be done."

One colleague from the early 1950s perhaps summed up Herma Plummer best when he said she had a passion for truth. This is the essence of the woman and of the profession she represented so well. Future practioners of the craft of intelligence, if they would preserve their professional honor and integrity, should strive to emulate Herma Plummer's uncompromising passion for truth.

This article is ~~classified~~ Secret.

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NOTES

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1. Her job description in [redacted] was the following: "Writing of important political reports (requiring) a thorough knowledge of [redacted] conditions, political and economic set-up, translation of official notes [redacted]

2. Letter to Messersmith, then Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, November 1938.

3. Letter to John G. Erhardt, Foreign Service Inspector, London; 9 November 1938.

4. Letter from Messersmith in Mexico, 10 April 1942, to A. W. Dulles.

5. Havana job description: "Confidential Secretary—extremely confidential work as private secretary to the Ambassador. Thorough knowledge of political conditions, highly confidential reports to the Department of State."

6. Actually, she applied for an extended leave without pay, but Department of State regulations did not permit this. She had to resign.

7. Work description: "Handling all incoming operation reports, analyzing them, preparing disseminations to other government agencies; supervision and direction of operations in the field, training of personnel going overseas, supervision of Headquarters staff; [redacted] political movements, etc."

8. *Wild Bill Donovan, The Last Hero.* By William Cave Brown, Times Books; New York; 1982; p. 744.

9. Ibid.

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The FBIS story

Listening to the World for 50 Years

David Shank

On 26 February 1991, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), the US Government organization that monitors foreign radios and other media, celebrated its 50th anniversary. While small and little known to the public, FBIS is a venerable institution to foreign affairs specialists in Washington. Intelligence analysts and policymakers depend on FBIS for textual reports concerning developments in foreign lands, ranging from war communiques and reports on acts of terrorism to peace initiatives and speeches by political leaders. With its ears always cocked toward foreign transmitters, FBIS often has been the first to tell official Washington about an important development abroad.

The Director of Central Intelligence and several of his predecessors paid tribute to the service on its golden anniversary. DCI William H. Webster hosted a ceremony and told FBIS employees he was one of their "principal consumers." Richard M. Helms wrote that "no other entity of the United States Government has contributed so much timely information to so many people in this country as has the FBIS." He recalled that in 1967 FBIS provided Washington with the first word of the start of the Six-Day War. Admiral Stansfield Turner wrote that "FBIS has to be one of the most unheralded, but valuable resources in our government." And President Bush stated in a congratulatory message that FBIS employees "perform a vital service" in providing information needed to respond to the ever-changing global political climate.

One example of this service occurred in 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis. FBIS flashed to the White House and other government offices the Soviet decision to dismantle the missile bases, citing a message from Nikita Khrushchev to President Kennedy broadcast in Russian by Moscow Radio. The Soviets, to make sure the message reached the White House as quickly as possible, had simultaneously dispatched it through diplomatic channels and broadcast it over the radio. The radio route proved to be faster, and President Kennedy responded at once to the message delivered by FBIS.

How It Began

President Franklin D. Roosevelt determined the FBIS anniversary date when, on 25 February 1941, he allotted $150,000 from his emergency fund to the Federal Communications Commission for monitoring foreign radios. He told the Secretary of the Treasury, who transferred the money the following day, that it was "for the employment of persons and means at the seat of Government and elsewhere for recording, translating, transcribing and analyzing certain radiobroadcast programs."

Radiobroadcasting technology had developed rapidly in the 1930s. Shortwave transmissions from powerful new stations could be heard over great distances. For the first time, the human voice could be transmitted over border defenses and into private homes. Nazi ideologues and other propagandists in Europe and elsewhere were quick to exploit this new tool of persuasion, and a "war of the airwaves" ensued.

In the US, academic interest in radio led to the establishment in Princeton, New Jersey, of the

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first facility to monitor and study foreign broadcasts systematically. The Princeton Listening Center, which was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, began recording and translating a limited number of foreign propaganda broadcasts in November 1939, three months after the BBC inaugurated a monitoring service in England. Social scientists began studying broadcasts from Berlin, Rome, London, and elsewhere in an effort to discern the goals of the originators, their techniques of persuasion, and the role of radio in international politics. A smaller facility was established in 1940 at Stanford University in California to listen to trans-Pacific broadcasts.

The monitoring reports of the Princeton center contributed to a growing concern in Washington over the content of foreign broadcasts, especially the appeals by contending powers in Europe for the minds of American listeners. There also was concern about the large amount of foreign programming beamed to the Americas that was not systematically monitored. Were belligerent powers speaking directly to ethnic groups in the US and neighboring countries? If so, what were they saying?

A Monitoring Program

Toward the end of 1940, the Department of State recommended to President Roosevelt that the US Government monitor such foreign broadcasts. Roosevelt referred the proposal to the Defense Communications Board, which took up the question at a meeting on 3 January 1941. The Department of State's representative on the board, Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, argued that the US was confronted with an aggressive and often subversive foreign broadcasting system and that it needed to establish its own monitoring facilities.

The board endorsed the monitoring proposal on 13 January 1941. It asked the Federal Communications Commission to devise a plan for monitoring foreign broadcasts. The FCC monitored domestic radio frequencies as part of its regulatory activities, and it had performed limited monitoring of foreign frequencies. The FCC's plan called for expansion of its own monitoring capabilities. Unlike Great Britain, the US had no national radiobroadcasting apparatus to which a monitoring service could be appended. The government also had no centralized information-gathering agency. On 21 January, the board approved a formal request to the President recommending the FCC plan and requesting the allotment of funds to the FCC.

The New Service

With the initial funding, the FCC began establishing the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS) to monitor foreign broadcasts. To assemble a staff and get the service into operation, the FCC hired the director of the Princeton Listening Center, Harold N. Graves, Jr., as senior administrative officer.

When the 26-year-old Graves arrived in Washington, an FCC official told him the monitoring service was being established "so that when we get into the war, we would be prepared," he recalled years later. "He didn't say 'if we get into the war,' he said 'when we get into the war,' which made a terrific impression on me," Graves remembered.

Graves organized the service into translating, reporting, and analytical components, supported by FCC radio engineers. FBMS headquarters was established in a converted warehouse just east of Union Station in Washington, D.C. Radio engineers at an FCC antenna facility in nearby Laurel, Maryland, recorded foreign radio programs on wax cylinders and sent them to FBMS. As translators were hired, they were put to work on the recordings; in a few months a sizable collection of transcripts was on hand. Editors and analysts also were hired and began work on the accumulated material, first producing a publication on German broadcasts to North America. In June 1941, a former CBS correspondent in Europe, Thomas Grandin, was hired to head the reports section.

Also in June, the FCC hired the first director of FBMS. He was Lloyd A. Free, a 1930 graduate of Princeton, former California lawyer, and editor of

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Public Opinion Quarterly at Princeton. Free was interested in radio and public opinion matters. He was familiar with the pioneering monitoring being done at Princeton and Stanford and in England.

FBIS DIRECTORS

Lloyd A. Free 1941-1942	Paul A. Borel 1969-1972
Robert D. Leigh 1942-1944	E. H. Knoche 1972-1973
Charles S. Hyneman 1944-1945	Don H. Peterson 1973-1980
Russell M. Shepherd 1945-1947	John F. Pereira 1980-1983
Lawrence K. White 1947-1950	John D. Chandlee 1983-1986
Alan M. Warfield 1950-1956	Harrison S. Markham, Jr. 1986
Roger G. Seely 1956-1968	Robert W. Manners 1986-1991
	Wayne R. Schreiner 1991-

With the support of FCC Chairman James L. Fly, Free and Graves moved quickly to get the monitoring service into operation amid ominous signs of approaching war. Many believed that if the US became involved in the war, the monitoring of enemy broadcasts would be more important to Washington than ever. Monitoring also would provide one of the few means of getting information rapidly from regions disrupted by hostilities.

In early July 1941, the FCC's station at Kingsville, Texas, began recording broadcasts to and from Latin America and airmailing them to FBMS headquarters for transcription. In the same month, headquarters employees began publishing a series of spot bulletins, summarizing Axis propaganda campaigns. Free recalled that "I started out arranging that every important government person in terms of the war-to-be would get a copy of our stuff."

In August, the service was in full operation. Its spot bulletins were replaced by a new publication, *Foreign Broadcasts: Highlights of* (date). The engineering staff at Laurel moved to Silver Hill, Maryland, from which monitored programs would be relayed over telephone lines to FBMS headquarters. A Washington newspaper reported that the service had "a wonderful collection of personalities in its employ—ranging from White Russian princes to Americans who have written librettos for Japanese operas, newsmen who beat the Nazis out of Paris by a day to academically trained psychologists."

A milestone was reached on 1 October 1941, when the first FBMS monitoring facility outside the Washington, D.C., area was established in a farmhouse on the outskirts of Portland, Oregon. It was the first of numerous field bureaus, and it would monitor Japanese and other Far Eastern broadcasts and send the translations to FBMS headquarters in Washington by teletype.

On 31 October, headquarters inaugurated a teletype service to the Washington and New York offices of the newly established Coordinator of Information, headed by Colonel William J. Donovan. The COI, later renamed the Office of War Information (OWI), was developing the US counterpropaganda capability and needed fast reporting. A wire service to the Department of State was set up the following month.


On 17 November, Dr. Goodwin Watson, a social psychologist from Columbia University, became the first chief of the analysis section. The following day saw the first regular issuance of the *Daily Report*, the service's primary publication that continues to this day in eight geographic volumes. By the end of November 1941, the FBMS staff numbered 215.

Monitoring Process

The job of radio monitoring was organized into a multistep process performed by specialists. The

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Monitors at FBIS Portland Bureau during World War II.

same basic process is followed today. Radio engineers and other technicians use antennas and receivers to pull foreign broadcasts from the airwaves and recorders to preserve them for later processing. Most monitoring is done according to a predetermined "coverage schedule" listing each broadcast station and program along with time and frequency. The coverage schedule differentiates between media sources that have to be covered live, those that have to be covered from recordings within 24 hours, and several other categories. The technicians also have to be prepared to receive and record announcements of military coups and other broadcast surprises.

Another technical task involves "cruising," sitting with headphones on and systematically scanning the broadcast frequencies for changes in previously established programming patterns. Newly discovered public affairs programs are listened to on a trial basis. If they appear to contain useful information, they probably will be added to the coverage schedule. Cruising surveys are also conducted to determine sites for new bureaus to fill coverage gaps.

In the early years of the service, the FCC provided radio technicians from its other components. Today, FBIS has its own technical personnel who, because of the increasing sophistication of equipment, are responsible for a more complex range of hardware.

After a program has been collected, a radio monitor takes over. Monitors are hired for their foreign language and translating skills and knowledge of foreign countries. A monitor listens to each program on the coverage schedule and prepares a summary in English of its contents by "items," the individual news reports, commentaries, and other segments that make up the program. From a typical 30-minute newscast, only a few items containing information of known or presumed interest to US Government consumers will be selected for full translation. Initially, monitors were required to be American citizens; they worked only in the US, although many had lived overseas. Today, most FBIS radio monitors are foreign nationals, and they work at

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overseas monitoring sites, typically referred to as bureaus, under the supervision of American staff editors.

Monitors pass their program summaries and translations to editors for the next stage in the process. One editor usually handles the output of a number of monitors covering broadcasts from a number of countries. Based on his or her familiarity with consumer requirements, the editor selects items for translation and edits, ranks, and categorizes translations for distribution over electronic networks or in published reports. Initially, experienced journalists were recruited as editors. Today, new FBIS editors come from a variety of university liberal arts programs, including journalism.

Somewhat to the side of this production line, a small number of media analysts carefully reads the material from certain countries. They prepare analytical reports on aspects of foreign developments of interest to Washington that appear new or significant. Initially, most were social scientists from academia who followed Axis propaganda techniques. Today, most new analysts have university training in area studies or political science, and they mainly write on political trends in a country or region.

Disseminating Information

The former newsmen who first managed the service set up an information dissemination system resembling newspapers and wire services. Urgent information was sent by teletype over telephone lines to printers in consumer offices. More routine information was disseminated in the *Daily Report* and other publications for government consumers. Later, after most of the monitoring product was produced at field bureaus and sent to Washington by teletype, the bureaus on request began sending copies of the information to field facilities of other US Government agencies. These "lateral consumers" included US embassies, military commands, and Washington officials on overseas negotiation missions. The bulk of FBIS production is still disseminated by these basic means, using computerized information-handling equipment.

World War II

In December 1941, a small FBMS monitoring post was established at Santurce, Puerto Rico, the first facility outside the continental US. At the same time, an FBMS monitoring bureau was established in Kingsville, Texas. On 6 December, the first issue of the publication *Weekly Analysis* noted that Tokyo broadcasts had become "hostile and defiant."

On 7 December 1941, FBMS became a "war agency" and the reporting of foreign developments related to World War II became its primary mission. The wire to the State Department went on 24-hour service; it soon was supplying an average of 25,000 words a day to 18 defense offices.

FBMS Director Free was in London when the US entered World War II. His mission was to work out details of a reciprocal arrangement with the two-year-old BBC Monitoring Service. He wanted to obtain British-monitored European programs that were unmonitorable in the US because they were broadcast on medium-wave frequencies. In return, he would supply the British with FBMS-monitored broadcasts from the Far East and elsewhere that the BBC could not hear. Both sides appeared agreeable to the exchange as a way of getting more information at little cost. With the US entry into the war, the "special relationship" between Washington and London would include the sharing of monitored radio broadcasts of other countries. FBMS field operations began immediately at the US Embassy in London, using monitored material sent by the BBC from its monitoring station at Evesham.

As the war progressed, a number of other field facilities were opened as a result of changing conditions. In 1942, the service, under a new director, Dr. Robert D. Leigh, and renamed Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, took over the operation of a monitoring station in San Francisco previously operated by CBS. It was given up after a new bureau in Hawaii provided superior reception of Japanese and other Far Eastern broadcasts. FBIS radio monitors and editors followed US military forces island-hopping westward toward

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Japan. A monitoring station was opened on Guam in January 1945 and one on Iwo Jima in August. Following the occupation of Japan, a small bureau was opened in Tokyo in 1946.

During the war years, there was much to monitor as the contending nations used radio to support their positions. Describing the situation in 1944, Dr. Leigh said:

> Around the world at this hour and every hour of the 24 there is a constant battle on the ether waves for the possession of man's thoughts, emotions, and attitudes—influencing his will to fight, to stop fighting, to work hard, to stop working, and to resist and sabotage, to doubt, to grumble, to stand fast in faith and loyalty.

At its peak during World War II, FBIS had about 520 employees. It wartime headquarters was at 1424 K Street, NW, a few blocks northeast of the White House. FBIS publications and customized teletype lines went to specialists at State, OWI, OSS, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Board of Economic Warfare, War Department, Army, Navy, and other governmental offices, and to Allied governments.

The working relationship was particularly close with OWI, which, by agreement, released much FBIS-monitored war news to the public. In 1944, OWI assumed most of the work of analyzing foreign propaganda, while FBIS concentrated most of its resources on monitoring. The two organizations also maintained a joint editorial office in London during the war.

By tacit understanding, FBIS handled voice broadcasts from foreign radio stations, but did not monitor military and other nonpublic radios. The US military monitored enemy military communications, and a separate component of the FCC, the Radio Intelligence Division, maintained watch for Axis spy radios.

Uses of Material

In March 1942, Nelson A. Rockefeller, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, said:

> Every phase of the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service's work has been of great assistance to us. The speedy transmission of monitors' reports over the teletypes is particularly helpful. The analysis of certain shortwave programs from the other American republics has proven useful in the writing of stories which our office then relays to various press agencies and radio stations. The *Daily Report* provides us with general and specific insights into Axis strategy, not only for the other American republics, but also for this country as well as for the rest of the world. The weekly *Analysis* gives us a perspective on what has been occurring from day to day.

And William J. Donovan called FBIS reporting an "invaluable service."

While FBIS workers grew accustomed to such praise from consumers, they often were somewhat in the dark about how their information wound up being used. "Very few of us can see the whole of our production process from beginning to end," Director Leigh told employees in 1942. "None of us sees, except occasionally, what happens to our product when it leaves our shop and arrives in the confidential or secret war agencies who use it." Leigh did say, however, that he knew of one case in which "a news item from a station in the morning had by mid-afternoon saved military equipment of more value than the money required to maintain FBIS for a year, and as surely saved dozens of lives."

In the summer of 1944, the third FBIS director, Dr. Charles S. Hyneman, said:

> We get an abundance of testimony to the great and strategic value of our material. More than once we were told that what we

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FBIS Guam Post, World War II.

> get from the air about internal conditions in Japan is just about all that anyone in Washington knows on the subject. We certainly get the impression that if our service were to be cut off, planning for both the European and Far East campaigns would be enormously handicapped.

FBIS sometimes also directly contributed to US military activities. From Guam in 1945, for example, FBIS closely monitored the Japanese domestic radio service for broadcast alerts to air raids and all-clear announcements, for the immediate information of 20th Air Force personnel in charge of the missions.

Postwar Restructuring

For a time late in 1945, it appeared that, because of a cut in the FCC budget, FBIS might be abolished, even though the Department of State and other official consumers said they would still need its information in peacetime. The war years had shown that monitoring was one of the fastest and cheapest ways of collecting a large volume of information on developments in and among foreign countries.

The Washington press, which had become familiar with FBIS reporting through OWI releases during the war, joined other proponents of retaining the

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BBC Monitoring Service headquarters at Caversham, west of London; 1953.

monitoring capability in peacetime. "The FBIS made notable contributions to our understanding of events and trends abroad during the war and would constitute a vital part of the comprehensive intelligence organization which we ought to have in peace," the *Washington Post* editorialized.

As a temporary measure, the War Department agreed to take over the service from the FCC until a permanent home could be found for it. In succeeding months, as Washington moved to reorganize the US intelligence effort on a peacetime basis, FBIS was transferred in mid-1946 to the new Central Intelligence Group, where it was renamed the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS became a founding component of the CIA when the latter was established in September 1947. The National Security Council on 12 December 1947 issued what is known as the "FBIS Charter" in the postwar intelligence structure. Its Intelligence Directive No. 6 directed the Director of Central Intelligence to "conduct all Federal monitoring of foreign propaganda and press broadcasts required for the collection of intelligence information to meet the needs of all Departments and agencies in connection with National Security." It also directed the DCI to "disseminate such intelligence information to the various Departments and Agencies which have an authorized interest therein." Subsequent authorizations covered the monitoring of foreign television and publications.


From 1947 to 1965, FBIS was a component of CIA's Office of Operations, which, starting in 1952, was an office in the Directorate of Intelligence. In 1976, in an exchange involving several offices, FBIS was transferred from the Directorate of Intelligence to the Directorate of Science and Technology.

With its postwar mission assigned, FBIS began positioning itself to serve as Washington's ears in the era characterized by the development of the Cold War with the Soviet Union and its satellites and clients, by the spread of communism on the Asian mainland, by the Arab-Israeli conflict, and by the decline of colonialism.

One of the first steps was to formalize the US-UK relationship, which had lasted through the war years on the basis of the gentlemen's understanding of 1941. After extensive negotiations, the two monitoring services agreed to work for maximum

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Technician at now-defunct FBIS Mediterranean Bureau.

coordination and minimum duplication in monitoring world radios, while sharing products. The DCI approved the FBIS-BBC coordination plans in 1948. The London Bureau of FBIS, collocated since 1943 with the British service at suburban Caversham, remained in place to edit and relay to Washington BBC-monitored material from the Soviet Union, Europe, and North and East Africa.

FBIS in turn supplied the British with material from East Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, West Africa, and other countries. Adjustments in the relationship would be made at annual meetings of the heads of the two services, alternating between Caversham and Washington.

The FBIS-BBC relationship has endured because of the considerable economic advantages of cooperation, a common language, and a generally similar political outlook on world events. FBIS officers attribute occasional strains to BBC pecuniary plights, profit-mindedness, high public profile, and a unionized work force. Washington authorities sometimes question US dependence on a foreign service for coverage of most Soviet broadcasts, while in the UK the BBC's involvement with a CIA component is sometimes questioned.

Field Bureau Deployment

FBIS monitoring in the postwar years was concentrated at two overseas sites and two domestic sites. To monitor developments in the Middle East and adjacent areas, FBIS in early 1949 opened "Medburo," a major listening facility in the eastern Mediterrnean on the north coast of Cyprus. It replaced a bureau in Cairo that FBIS had taken over at the end of the war from the British Ministry of Information. With the Cairo facility, FBIS had inherited numerous foreign nationals who worked for the British. In the postwar era, an

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increasing amount of the monitoring would be done in foreign countries by foreign national employees.

In 1949, a major bureau was built on Okinawa to monitor developments in China and other Asian countries. Because it was closer to the transmitters, it had better reception than the monitoring station in Hawaii, which was shut down. The existing post in Tokyo was retained and supplemented in 1952 by a small facility on the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido to monitor North Asian and Soviet regional broadcasts.

The two domestic field facilities monitored foreign shortwave broadcasts and trained personnel bound for overseas bureaus. Each also was considered a "fallback" site for overseas facilities, an important factor to many Washington managers in the Cold War years.

On the west coast, the facility established in Oregon in 1941 was succeeded by two in California—first at Reseda in 1948 and next at Santa Rosa in 1954. The West Coast Bureau was closed in 1970, by which time other bureaus had taken over coverage of most of its assigned stations.

An East Coast Bureau was opened in 1949, a few miles down the Potomac from the District of Columbia. It replaced the World War II antenna facility at nearby Silver Hill, Maryland. East Coast Bureau closed in 1968, after transferring its coverage responsibilities to a new bureau in Puerto Rico. The new bureau was expected to be the best-ever monitoring facility, partly because it incorporated a "wire grid-lens antenna," which resembled a spider web of wire suspended over and around the bureau operations building. But radio reception was disappointing, and the bureau was closed in 1973. Its coverage of South and Central America was taken over by two smaller facilities, a new bureau in Paraguay and one in Panama dating from 1962. An even smaller bureau covered Cuban broadcasts from Key West, Florida, where it was established in 1960.

Other small bureaus were opened to keep an ear on regional developments that could not be monitored from Cyprus and Okinawa. These included facilities in Austria and West Germany in 1949, South Vietnam in 1951, Nigeria in 1961, and Thailand in 1967. Of these, only the bureaus in Austria and Thailand remain open in 1991.

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Overseas Setbacks

In the mid-1970s, a series of abrupt political and military developments overseas resulted in the loss of several established FBIS monitoring sites, requiring an arduous realignment of coverage facilities. The first casualty was Mediterranean Bureau on Cyprus. On 20 July 1974, the bureau was caught in the fighting during the Turkish invasion of the northern part of the island. There were no serious injuries to personnel, who were evacuated by helicopter to a British ship three days later. The building, however, was damaged and abandoned. Because no other single site could be found that could duplicate the lost bureau's coverage, FBIS decided to set up a number of "minibureaus" that together could cover the Middle East. Within weeks, minibureaus were established in Tel Aviv, Athens, and Beirut.

In 1975, a new bureau in Amman, Jordan, replaced the Beirut unit, and FBIS returned to Cyprus with a new bureau in Nicosia. The Athens unit closed in 1981, leaving the minibureaus in Tel Aviv, Amman, and Nicosia to cover the region formerly covered by Mediterranean Bureau. Between 1979 and 1986, a bureau in Bahrain was devoted to coverage of Iranian media. US concern over the Soviet move into Afghanistan led in 1980 to the establishment in Islamabad, Pakistan, of a technical unit to monitor Afghan and regional Soviet radios. The monitored programs are relayed to the BBC in Caversham for translation.

The second abrupt closing took place in South Vietnam on 29 April 1975, as communist forces

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approached Saigon. Staff employees at Saigon Bureau smashed their monitoring equipment and were evacuated. Bangkok Bureau, established in 1967 partly as a fallback position for Saigon Bureau, assumed coverage of Vietnamese radios.

The third closing involved African Bureau in Kaduna, Nigeria. Since 1961, it had monitored the radios of West and Central African countries. It closed on 2 April 1976, after being ordered to do so by the Nigerian Government, which was reacting to press outcries over the FBIS connection with CIA and the US policy on the war in Angola. The closing left FBIS with no presence in Africa. Efforts to reestablish coverage of African broadcasts finally resulted in the opening of Abidjan Bureau in Ivory Coast in 1979 and Swaziland Bureau in 1982.

The loss of Mediterranean Bureau in 1974 brought home to FBIS managers the risk of concentrating coverage in a single bureau situated in an unsettled region. They looked at Okinawa Bureau, the largest overseas FBIS facility, and the pressure to which it occasionally was subjected by leftist Japanese politicians and media. As a precaution, they decided to establish, in advance of a possible closure of Okinawa Bureau, small bureaus in Hong Kong and South Korea, while retaining the option of opening a third site on Guam. Hong Kong Bureau became operational early in 1976, and the following year it took over the BBC's Far East Unit and the US Consulate General's Press Monitoring Unit, both experienced in reporting on developments in China. Seoul Bureau also was opened in 1976. As part of this realignment in the Far East, Hokkaido Unit was closed in 1976.

The loss of three bureaus due to circumstances beyond US control led to consideration of a different approach to monitoring as the era of communications satellites developed. A study was made to determine whether radio transmissions could be collected overseas and then relayed by satellite to a central translation and processing facility in the US. The conclusion in 1977 was that the approach seemed technically possible, but at the time there were too few satellite channels available to carry the high volume of programming FBIS was monitoring. Moreover, old hands believed that FBIS could not find and hire in the US monitors with the language skill and firsthand area knowledge of its overseas corps of foreign nationals.

At about the same time, FBIS was transferred from CIA's Directorate of Intelligence to its Directorate of Science and Technology. Many FBIS editors, analysts, and linguists initially felt a little out of place among the engineers and technicians of the DS&T, but they recognized that the DS&T was in a better position to apply the "dose of technology" FBIS was perceived as needing.

Expanded Media Coverage

Initially, FBIS monitored the only medium that in 1941 appeared to be a threat, the foreign shortwave radios that broadcast propaganda audible in the US. Later, by establishing overseas facilities closer to foreign transmitters, the service added to coverage shorter range, mediumwave radiobroadcasts generally intended for non-US audiences. Foreign press agencies, which also used radio frequencies to disseminate information, were added to coverage in the quest for war news of interest to Washington.

In 1967, FBIS acquired by merger with CIA's Foreign Documents Division responsibility for coverage of foreign publications. Although FBIS field bureaus had done some reporting from the local press, the bulk of foreign publications scrutiny was performed in Washington by FDD language officers, who also provided foreign-language support to other CIA components. FDD, about the same size as FBIS, traced its roots back to the Washington Documents Center, which was set up in February 1945 as an Army-Navy clearing station and evaluation board for captured enemy documents from the Far East. Early in 1946, the center absorbed two other organizations engaged in exploitation of captured enemy documents, the Pacific Military Intelligence Research Service and Op-32F141. The Office of Naval Operations managed the center until late 1946, when it was made part of CIG and renamed. Like FBIS, FDD became a charter member of CIA in 1947, first as a branch then as a division.

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A study in 1967 recommended merging FBIS and FDD into a single media-monitoring service. FDD was transferred to FBIS and renamed Production Group. It retained responsibility for the scrutiny of publications received at Headquarters, while FBIS field bureaus increased their coverage of locally available publications. Much of FDD's material was published by an off-site subsidiary, the Joint Publications Research Service.

JPRS was established in 1957 to contract for the services of freelance translators, enabling FDD to expand its translation capability without hiring more staff linguists. FDD staff officers, familiar with CIA guidelines for the collection of information, selected responsive articles from the foreign press and forwarded them to JPRS for assignment to translators and for publication. To mask its role in the selection of JPRS-published material, which was available to the public through the Department of Commerce, CIA did not acknowledge its connection with JPRS. After JPRS became a component of FBIS, the service favored disclosure of the CIA-JPRS affiliation, which finally was acknowledged in 1974. In 1974, FBIS also made available for public sale, again through the Department of Commerce, all eight regional volumes of its *Daily Report.*

TV gradually was accepted as a source of FBIS reporting as it evolved from an experimental medium of entertainment to a popular medium of mass communication. TV monitoring involved several problems: the signal was monitorable only within a radius of some dozens of miles from the transmitter, compared to hundreds or thousands of miles for radio transmissions; FBIS lacked technical familiarity with video equipment, the specifications of which differed according to country; and consumers were ambiguous in defining their needs.

Initial video monitoring involved taking still photographs of foreign military hardware and the use of bulky reel-to-reel recorders by technicians to videotape occasional documentary programs. By the 1980s, the regular monitoring of selected foreign TV news and public affairs programs was facilitated by the availability of programs on communications satellites, which greatly increased the areas in which they could be monitored, and by the introduction of cassette videotapes and lightweight recorder/players. In 1985, FBIS began relaying the intercepted signal of Moscow TV to CIA Headquarters for viewing by analysts.

Using a similar capability, in 1982 FBIS started monitoring Soviet press facsimile transmissions, used to send mockups of next-day Moscow newspapers to regional printing plants. By translating articles from the "pressfax" transmissions, FBIS provides Washington analysts with front-page information before it is publicly available in the Soviet capital.

The proliferation of small computers in the early 1980s led to the development in a number of foreign countries of electronic data bases on subjects of intelligence interest. Production Group of FBIS took the lead in surveying and exploiting these electronic sources of information. Small Science and Technology Units were set up in Japan, Belgium, and Italy, where, as paying customers of the electronic services, they extracted information on foreign technological advances. They also collected at regional trade shows and conferences technological and commercial brochures, research papers, and other publications, internally referred to as "gray literature." Unlike the information furnished by most FBIS sources, this specialized material usually was not intended for the general public, but was openly collectable.

By this time, the expanded scope of FBIS collection made the service the primary supplier of "open source" information to the Intelligence Community.

Technical Modernization

An internal study in 1981 pointed out that FBIS was still handling information much as it had done in World War II. Information received from the field by teletype, for example, was still being edited by pencil before being retyped for publication. FBIS was years behind newspapers and other

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processors of large volumes of information in switching to computers. As a result, FBIS was authorized to undertake a multiyear technical moderization program. This involved replacing typewriters with computers for information handling, the monitoring of foreign broadcasts from communications satellites, and a communications system capable of relaying monitored TV programs from Europe to Washington.

Even with more modern equipment, FBIS struggles to keep up with the rising volume of media information available worldwide. More information than ever before is publicly available because of geopolitical changes favoring the free flow of information and technical advances fostering information services and communications. FBIS consumers, with their information appetites whetted by innovative commercial services available on home TV sets and personal computers, expect their government service to keep pace. They want information delivered to them electronically. They also want to see more live TV from world crisis spots, as well as FBIS-produced video compilations on selected subjects.

In 1941, a limited number of officials in Washington's small foreign affairs community wanted monitored information on foreign political and military developments and analysis of the propaganda reaching American ears. In 1991, a far greater number of consumers also want information on terrorism, narcotics trafficking, trade and economic competitiveness issues, the spread of chemical and nuclear weapons, threats to the environment, and many other topics. Their expressed needs produce pressure on FBIS to provide more information from more sources. FBIS is responding by making increased use of computers in translating, disseminating, and storing information and by establishing by the end of 1991 its first monitoring facility in Eastern Europe. Thus, as it marks 50 years of service, FBIS is characterized by continuing change as it strives to meet official Washington's requirements for information.

This article is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

Other Articles in *Studies in Intelligence* About FBIS

"The BBC Monitoring Service and Its U. S. Partner," by (b)(3)(c) Vol. 2, No. 3, Summer 1958. (C)

"Scooping the Soviet Press," by John D. Chandlee, Vol. 6, No. 1. Winter 1962. (C)

"The Last Days of the FBIS Mediterranean Bureau," by (b)(3)(c) Vol. 18, No. 4, Winter 1974. (S)

"Soviet Television: A New Asset for Kremlin Watchers," by (b)(3)(c) Vol. 29, No. 1, Spring 1985. (C)

"A Rite of Passage in Tokyo," by (b)(3)(c) Vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 1987. (S)

"The Brzezinski Initiative: FBIS and the Muslim World," by John D. Chandlee. Vol. 31, No. 3, Fall 1987. (S)

"High-Intensity Annoyance," by (b)(3)(c) and Douglas Naquin. Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring 1990. (C)

"Veni, Vidi, Vid-int," by Maureen Cote. Vol. 34, No. 3, Fall 1990. (U)

Current FBIS Monitoring

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Products and Services	*Consumers*
• 24-Hour Headquarters Wire Service (55,000 words daily)	Some 50 US Government offices, including White House; CIA; Pentagon; Department of State; DIA; USIA; VOA; Library of Congress; Customs; Treasury; and Energy.
• Wirefiled Field Reports (300,000 words daily)	600 US Government addressees, including diplomatic posts, military bases, negotiators, plus selected friendly governments.
• *Daily Report* and Other Regional and Topical Publications (200 million words annually)	25,000 copies go to official consumers; 4,000 other copies go to subscribers via National Technical Information Service.
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• Media Analysis Reports	US Government offices receive 1,000 copies; NTIS subscribers receive 150 copies after a six-month delay.
• TV Video	CIA analysts see selected foreign telecasts live; other official consumers get videotapes on request.
• Translation Index	US Government offices.

FBIS Milestones

1941 Following President Roosevelt's allotment of initial funding, FCC establishes Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service at 316 F Street, NE, in District of Columbia; *Daily Report* and wire service inaugurated; propaganda analysis begun; first field bureaus opened; cooperation with British initiated.

1942 Headquarters moves to 1424 K Street, NW; name changed to Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service.

1945 Following cut in FCC's postwar funding, FBIS personnel transferred to War Department.

1946 FBIS transferred from War Department to new Central Intelligence Group, Office of Operations, and renamed Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

1947 Headquarters moves to former Briggs School at 22d and E Streets, NW; with establishment of CIA, FBIS becomes a component; National Security Council Intelligence Directive 6, "FBIS Charter," issued to CIA.

1948 FBIS-BBC Monitoring Service reciprocal monitoring arrangement replaces wartime gentlemen's agreement on monitoring cooperation.

1949 Headquarters moves to South Building, 2430 E Street, NW.

1950 Headquarters moves to Quarters I temporary structure on Ohio Drive, south of Lincoln Memorial.

1952 Office of Operations, including FBIS, is transferred to CIA's new Directorate of Intelligence.

1954 FBIS is authorized to monitor foreign TV broadcasts.

1956 Headquarters moves to 1717 H Street, NW.

1965 Headquarters moves to 1200 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Va., and is elevated from division to office status upon disbandment of Office of Operations.

1967 Foreign Documents Division, responsible for coverage of foreign publications, is transferred to FBIS from CIA's Office of Central Reference and renamed Production Group.

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1968 (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

1970 First *Daily Reports* go on sale to public.

1974 Mediterranean Bureau abandoned because of Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

1975 Saigon Bureau abandoned as communist forces approach.

1976 FBIS transferred from CIA Directorate of Intelligence to Directorate of Science and Technology; African Bureau closed on request of Nigerian Government.

1981 Monitoring of broadcasts from communications satellites begins.

1983 Limited electronic word processing introduced at Headquarters.

1985 Live foreign TV first supplied to CIA analysts, via satellite.

1987 Headquarters moves to Reston (b)(3)(c) in western Fairfax County; new Headquarters information handling system and wideband trans-Atlantic communications system inaug(b)(1).

1988 (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

1991 50th anniversary observed.



FBIS Director R. W. Manners (left), at FBIS 50th anniversary observance on 26 February 1991, with guest Harold N. Graves, Jr., who helped establish the service in 1941 at the age of 26.

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TITLE: OSI and Arms Control Monitoring

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

VOLUME: 35 ISSUE: Summer YEAR: 1991

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A formidable task

OSI and Arms Control Monitoring

A new age of arms control treaty implementation has been ushered in by the on-site inspection (OSI) associated with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and, most recenty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). There is, furthermore, a bilateral chemical weapons agreement with the Soviets to be implemented, and some prospect for the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention to be concluded next year. These also contain provisions for OSI.

In the early 1980s, there was little expectation within the US administration that the USSR would ever accept OSI provisions. Previously, the US had proposed OSI as early as the 1960s, when nuclear testing limitations were first being negotiated, resulting in the characteristic Soviet refusal. Except for the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, the Soviets had consistently refused to agree to any on-site activity.

In the late 1980s, as with so much else in the USSR and Eastern Europe within the past few years, the situation suddenly changed. Moscow accepted OSI across the board, and negotiations began in earnest. To a large extent, the US was taken by surprise. Having fully expected the USSR to maintain its historic posture and continue to refuse OSI, the US was not ready to specify its detailed requirements and modalities for OSI. Indeed, it did not understand all the implications of OSI. The Soviets were even less prepared; they looked to the US to provide all the initial draft language upon which negotiations would be based. Consequently, even though the general OSI concept has been around for almost 30 years, a lot of new ground had to be broken in a short time. This process continues even today. Each new treaty has its own peculiarities, and so for each treaty new ways have to be discovered to implement OSI and to use OSI information.

Two Kinds of OSI

OSI refers to all activities performed by the inspecting or verifying party, say the US, in the inspected or host country, say the USSR. There are, however, two distinct kinds of OSI. There is inspection of declared activities and facilities, and there is inspection of undeclared facilities, also called suspect site or challenge inspection. Declared-site inspections can occur only at places identified ahead of time by the treaty parties. These are the only kind of inspections allowed in the INF and TTB treaties. The concept of challenge inspection, to allow access to non-declared sites where prohibited activities may be taking place, is contained in the CFE treaty, and it is being negotiated in other treaties.

Advance notice of inspection has to be given in all cases. The amount of advance notice may vary from one treaty to another, but the inspected party will always know ahead of time when and where the inspection team will arrive, how long it will stay, and what the inspection procedures will be. Moreover, the inspected party is responsible for providing the transportation for the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site. This gives the inspected party considerable opportunity to prepare the site for inspection, and, in extreme cases, to delay or prevent arrival of the inspection team. Of course, such actions would be "cause for concern." They would be discussed in

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the consultative body associated with each treaty, and they could possibly result in a *demarche*. But they can be attributed to bad weather, faulty equipment, or human error, and there can be no doubt that the inevitable protest would be viewed by the inspected party as preferable to the "smoking gun" detection of an actual treaty violation.

OSI is expensive, and so it is fair to ask the fundamental question, "What good is OSI?" An argument has been made that there is little likelihood of a treaty party trying to cheat at an inspection site while inspectors are present. If one believes this statement, it follows that there is little that OSI can do to help catch cheating, because such cheating presumably would be taking place somewhere or at some time when inspectors are not present.

OSI is often called a "confidence-building measure" (CBM), meaning that if the inspections demonstrate that one side is accurately providing information about the inspected sites, then the other side has some increased confidence that the provisions of the treaty are being observed. CBMs probably provide some political benefit.

Leaving political value aside, the intelligence question to be asked is, "How much, if at all, does OSI improve treaty monitoring?" Some qualitative value for National Technical Means (NTM) can be expected from OSI in all treaties from the added information that may help us better use the data from intelligence sources. In only the TTBT treaty, however, can a quantitative improvement of NTM be readily determined. It may be that only the TTBT offers the opportunity for such improvement.


The TTBT

In the TTBT and its associated Joint Verification Experiment (JVE), the inspectors have the opportunity to acquire fundamental data about the geology at the nuclear test site and also to measure the yield of the nuclear explosion more accurately than ever before. Besides providing direct yield estimates, these data tell quite a bit about how the observed explosion, or any other past or future explosion in the same vicinity, interacts with the Earth. In other words, the on-site data tell us about the seismic disturbances caused by the explosion, help us to understand better the seismic signature, and consequently have a direct impact on the quality of NTM monitoring. The single data point obtained from the JVE has already allowed significant improvement. As more such data is gathered over time, further improvement will be possible.

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


The Joint Verification Experiment

The JVE was an outgrowth of the Nuclear Testing Talks. It was conducted during the summer of 1988, and it served as a rehearsal for actual verification activities which will take place under the provisions of the two treaties limiting underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons. In the JVE, the US and the USSR each measured the yield of a nuclear weapon test near 150 kilotons conducted by the other country.

According to the JVE agreement, the JVE was conducted for the "purposes of elaboration of effective verification measures for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests of 1974 (TTBT)." The JVE consisted of two nuclear explosions, one at the US Nevada Test Site (NTS) and the other at the USSR Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS), each to have a planned yield between 100 and 150 kilotons.

In addition to teleseismic measurements, each side had the opportunity to measure and record local geological and geophysical data. Each side also can conducted on-site measurements of the yield of each JVE explosion using a scheme called hydrodynamic yield measurement, which, being done at the site of the nuclear explosion, is inherently much more accurate than the seismic technique. For the Soviet JVE, the initial on-site hydrodynamic yield estimate was 118 kilotons, with an uncertainty (F-factor) of 1.16. This means that there is a 95-percent certainty that the actual yield of the explosion was between 102 and 137 kilotons.




Another way to express the quality of these estimates is in terms of the probability that the actual yield was above the treaty-obligated threshold of 150 kilotons. From the OSI estimate, there is a very low probability—essentially zero—that the JVE was a violati(b)(1)
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For the purpose of determining if the test was under 150 kilotons, as required by the TTBT, the on-site measurement is preferable to the teleseismic.

The JVE provided the US with the first validated yield of a Soviet nuclear weapon test. As such, it is a unique and invaluable addition to the information on which we base our NTM estimates of yields of Soviet nuclear weapons tests. It was stated in the JVE agreement that

> "Because the JVE is not designed to produce statistically significant results, it cannot by itself establish statistical proof of the accuracy of any particular yield measurement method."

Although the US insisted on this statement, it has no real practical significance. The phrase "by itself" is key in the following discussion, because the JVE result was not used by itself, but rather was combined with an extensive body of seismic data to improve—decrease—the uncertainty in our estimates of Soviet underground nuclear tests.



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The single JVE has already had a profound effect on the quality of teleseismic yield estimates by significantly reducing uncertainties of yield estimates for explosions at the Soviet JVE site at Shagan River. US NTM now has a much better capability for estimating the yield of Soviet nuclear tests at the Shagan River area. As on-site yield measurements are made at other locations, US capabilities using NTM also will improve for these areas.

OSI's Treaty-Monitoring Value

In only the TTBT is it possible to use information gathered during OSI to improve directly our method of monitoring Soviet activities when inspectors are not present. Only TTBT OSI offers the prospects of quantitatively improving treaty monitoring via NTM.

Given a choice, on-site yield measurements would always be preferable. At its best, a teleseismic estimate does not provide the confidence possible from OSI. But when OSI is not available, for whatever reason, the US still has an improved NTM method because of past OSI opportunities.

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TITLE: Honoring the Heroes of Telemark

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

VOLUME: 37 ISSUE: Spring YEAR: 1993

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50th anniversary

Honoring the Heroes of Telemark

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History was both made and celebrated at CIA Headquarters on 10 February 1993. A ceremony was held in the atrium of the new headquarters building to open a photographic exhibit commemorating the 50th anniversary of the sabotage raid in Norway on the heavy water plant at Vemork in the province of Telemark. A detailed account of the raid, "The Action at Vemork," by Claus Helberg, was published in the Winter 1992 edition of *Studies in Intelligence*.

The raid was conducted by nine Norwegian saboteurs, including Helberg, who had been trained in England. It resulted in a significant delay in Germany's efforts to build an atomic bomb. The Germans needed the heavy water as a moderator in their efforts to activate an atomic pile. The raid was the first successful paramilitary effort in history to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Over 93 persons lost their lives in the two-year battle for heavy water in Norway. But the sabotage raid was conducted so skillfully that not a shot was fired, and there were no casualties. After the war, the US Government awarded six of the Norwegian saboteurs the nation's highest civilian award—the Medal of Freedom with Bronze Palm.

Helberg and the chief of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, Maj. Gen. Alf Berg, who retired on 1 May 1993, were honored guests at the ceremony, and they were officially welcomed by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Adm. William O. Studeman. After being presented a commemorative copy of his *Studies in Intelligence* article, Helberg gave a brief acceptance speech in which he thanked those present for the opportunity to attend the ceremony. He was followed by Major General Berg, who commented on the little-known positive effect that the raid had on the morale of the Norwegian public during the German occupation.

The following day, Helberg held two seminars at CIA Headquarters, in which he described the background and operation of the sabotage raid. Both seminars played to capacity audiences of enthusiastic employees.

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Claus Helberg at CIA Headquarters

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TITLE: Communications to the Editor:
An Unworkable DI Process

AUTHOR: (b)(3)(c)

VOLUME: 37 ISSUE: Spring YEAR: 1993

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COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITOR

An Unworkable DI Process

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argued that most of the DI is troubled by the process and that some were "pessimists" who believed the entire edifice was rotten; some were "cynics" who believed it cannot be fixed but are content to live with it; and some are "optimists"—no further definition of this breed, whom I have never encountered, is necessary.

I would argue that there is another group, "the guerrillas," who regard the review process as a major liability in the DI's war for the consumer's attention—a war we are losing. The guerrillas believe that most of the edifice is rotten, are not content to live with it, and believe that the process should be focused on winning the war. Because the guerrillas see the costs of the war as they interact with consumers regularly, they are in no way advocates of gentlemanly debate.

The DI is fighting for the minds of its consumers. It competes with the proliferation of readable, fast, and informative open-source publications and electronic information services. Standing at their side are small intelligence shops at almost every agency we profess to serve. These undermanned but not outgunned units cull intelligence from much of the same sources the DI uses, and they get it quickly and efficiently to consumers they see every day, targeting the information with deadly accuracy.

Meanwhile, in the DI, an Intelligence Memorandum (IM) on the same subject on which the most interested deputy assistant secretaries have already been briefed, wends its way to its fourth or fifth reviewer. This situation prompts the guerrillas to ask: If the review process is killing us slowly, is this any time for reasoned debate?

I believe that most guerrillas would concede the DI does a good job in many respects. For example, task forces and working groups under considerable pressure put together publications rapidly, and daily intelligence is served by editors who ask the right questions and put out a corporate product of which we can be proud. But this is a small proportion of what the DI does. IMs, which were envisioned as quick responses on current topics, remain bogged down in the same old process.

It is particularly troubling that many of the genuine strides the DI made under the prodding of former DCI Gates—a cult hero to DI guerrillas because of his demands for alternative scenarios and more creative ways of looking at problems—are hurt by a process that brings these products to a consumer too late. I have even heard reports that consumers would be willing to bear the burden of split infinitives and the occasional misplaced comma if the information could be made more timely.

The Russian military had a saying: "The perfect is the enemy of the good." It strikes the guerrilla observer as a cold irony that if the DI does not follow that advice it is likely to face the same budget constraints as those who made the phrase famous. At this point, an "optimist" might dismiss a radical change by saying that we cannot allow standards to slip without losing a product that has a unique corporate identity. According to the guerrillas, however, something has to be done or this painstakingly created product will be dismissed by consumers.

As a first step toward greater timeliness, each DI paper that faces the review process should bear a "policy due date." This date would verify to everyone that the paper is policy relevant and that someone in the producing office has had contact with the potential recipients of the information and knows when they want it. The author or his immediate supervisor should know the policy atmosphere so well that he or she can easily argue why this particular

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date works. Someone with authority should have a daily tracking sheet for the product, using the due date as an absolute barrier: if the paper is not produced on time then the entire project gets trashed, and no one gets credit for his effort. If for some valid reason the product cannot be produced on time in writing, an oral briefing should be delivered.

Another way to speed up the process would be to allow each reviewer a single shot at the paper. Most managers should be able to fix what troubles them in one reading. As self-confident achievers, they should be able to trust their judgment and allow a paper to go forward after one look.

If the DI does not take such steps to break the bureaucratic gridlock inherent in the existing review process, the guerrillas believe much of the work of the Directorate's well-trained and dedicated experts will be of little value to its key consumers.

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Approved for Release: 2014/09/10 C00624392

TITLE: Dedication of the Wildflower Memorial Garden

AUTHOR: R. James Woolsey

VOLUME: 37 ISSUE: Summer YEAR: 1993

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A living tribute

Dedication of the Wildflower Memorial Garden

R. James Woolsey

The following remarks include those made by Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey on 30 June 1993 at the dedication of a memorial wildflower garden to honor the victims of the 25 January 1993 shootings that killed two CIA employees and wounded two others near the main Headquarters entrance.

The wildflower garden is on an embankment on the right-hand side of Route 123 coming toward CIA Headquarters from the George Washington Parkway. Ernest Berger, Fairfax County Dranesville District Supervisor, presided at the dedication. He took the lead in arranging for the memorial garden on behalf of area citizens and garden clubs and with support from the Virginia Department of Transportation.

Mr. Berger opened the ceremony with the following remarks:

Today, I think we are going to have a splendid program. The heavens certainly cooperated, and I am just so grateful that all of you are here. Long before the tragedy that took place here last January, I had the idea that we would want to plant wildflowers throughout the Dranesville District. And, after the tragic events that took place here, several people came forward—many are here today—and helped me raise the money privately to plant these wildflower plots throughout the district. In the next few years, I think the entire district will absolutely bloom. But we have set aside this plot today and that is why we are here. So, thank you again, for coming.

(The Pledge of Allegiance was then led by Nicholas Starr, who was seriously injured in the shooting.)

Invocation

The invocation was then delivered by Reverend Jerome Fasano of St. Catherine of Sienna Catholic Church in Great Falls, Virginia:

Creator of all that is beautiful today, we gather together fully aware that at times your will to surround us with the beauty of this world is sometimes frustrated by violence and hatred on the part of some of your children, who show no respect for your gift of life to us.

Nonetheless, as we gaze on this place, where the beauty of living things should serve to remind us of your gift of life itself, we are sadly reminded of those whose lives were tragically ended here. Each time we pass this place, we will be reminded of the martyrdom and suffering of individuals guilty of no crime but struck down for their dedication to the principles and security of this great nation which they sought to serve so faithfully.

We ask you who can even draw good out of evil circumstances to reward those who have suffered injustice and convert all hearts filled with hatred and bitterness which so cause the beauty of your creation to be obscured. Let this living memorial help us never to forget those who have died as these flowers serve to bring pleasure in the future to those of us who gaze upon them here; may the souls of those who have died bring pleasure to you in paradise throughout eternity.

Your will is not that we die, but that we live. As beautiful new life blossoms here from seeds in the ground that may appear dead to us, so may you raise up those who have been slain without pity or mercy to a new and eternal life. Enable us to find ways to put an end to the violence that robs your creation of its loveliness, and help us to learn that mercy and forgiveness are our powerful weapons in our struggle against evil, far more effective than the weapons held in the hands of our enemies.

Throughout our history, you have manifested your special love and care for all those who have suffered from violence, hatred, and oppression. We commend

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Lansing Bennett and Frank Darling to the healing mercy of God who binds up all our wounds and enfolds us in his gentle care.

Deliver us, Lord, from those who do evil. Preserve us from all their criminal acts. Save us from those who devise evil in their hearts and stir up strife amongst us. Help us to learn that hatred can be overcome by love, and forgiveness of our enemies can heal us of our pain, and even move them to repentance. Protect each of us from the violence of others. Keep us safe from the weapons of hatred, and allow us to live in tranquillity and peace. May God bless us with His mercy, strengthen us with His love, enable us to walk in charity and peace, and grant eternal life and happiness to those who have been tragically taken from us. Amen.

Remarks by DCI Woolsey


Good morning. I'm Jim Woolsey, the Director of Central Intelligence. Last January, 100 yards from this spot, five of our colleagues were shot, and two were killed. Now, five months later, we are still searching for the killer, although we know who he was. And we all re-experience the shock, the outrage, and the sorrow of those moments when we either witnessed or first heard of this tragedy, and we re-experience them particularly when we are driving by this intersection.

We continue especially to concentrate and to mourn the passing of Frank Darling and Lansing Bennett. They and their colleagues who were wounded were and are part of families that loved them deeply, and they were valued and treasured colleagues. But they also were and are part of a larger community here in Northern Virginia and in the United States. A community that shared their laughter and their lives.

It is now particularly fitting that this larger community has offered this extraordinarily apt and appropriate memorial. I especially want to thank Ernest Berger, Dranesville District Supervisor; the White Oak Nursery; Ed Mainland and the Virginia Native Plant Society; and Ms. Cheramie, Ms. Staunton, and Ms. Haynes. Their actions and those of their friends and colleagues remind all of us that we are part of this larger community.

We who work inside these fences often think that not only does the outside world not know what we do but that it does not care. It is particularly lovely to be told in this way that we are not isolated and that we do have friends and appreciators on the outside

DCI Woolsey at the dedication ceremony.



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of the fence—people who recognize that the CIA is an important, vital part of the struggle in the world against terrorism and for democracy and freedom.

The frontlines of this struggle are now from time to time in the United States, and last January the frontlines were at this intersection. Frank and Lansing died, and Nick and Calvin and Steve were wounded in that struggle against terrorism because they worked for freedom. They were victims also in part of a different kind of weapons proliferation than that against which we normally struggle overseas.

Frank and Lansing, I am announcing today, that their lives and their sacrifice will be marked by memorial stars in the CIA lobby, along with those of their colleagues over the years who have given their lives in the cause of freedom. This garden, too, marks their and the other sacrifices in a wonderful way with color and flowers as the seasons pass. But most of all, we will mark their sacrifices and their lives in our hearts and in the work that we do continuing with what they have done. Thank you.

Additional Remarks by Ernest J. Berger

My dear honored guests, Mr. Director and friends. It is with a true sense of sadness that we gather here today. However, it is enormously important that we are here to honor in some small way the men whose lives were taken from us and those that were wounded here in defense of our nation. We, the community, and, indeed, the nation must understand that as surely as any soldier defends his country on the battlefield the events of last January are exactly the same.

The vital work that takes place in the building behind us here is rarely known, but our nation is secure and our people are protected as a direct result. The price of freedom, my friends, is constant diligence through intelligence and a strong defense. We must not allow anything or anyone to distract us from that goal. We do not live in a peaceful world, and there are always those who are bent on destroying our way of life in this the greatest nation that ever existed.

This blatant act of terrorism which we remember today and this plot that we will dedicate in memory of Frank Darling and Lansing Bennett who lost their lives and to the other victims demonstrates clearly the price that we pay for our freedom. Nothing we can do or say will erase that tragedy that took place. But we can remember. Each time the community in general drives by and each time, Mr. Director, you and your colleagues, your fellow employees enter or exit these grounds, we will honor and remember.

As incredible as it seems, within these small seeds that we are going to plant here in a few minutes, there is an insatiable power to produce something living and to perpetuate itself forever. It is fitting then that we have chosen these wildflowers to help us remember.

The power of the seed to burst through any obstacle should remind us that we must be just as powerful in defense of this nation. The flowers themselves, each spring as they burst forth, will remind us once again of our intelligence heroes and the tragic events that took place here. Thank you.

Benediction

The benediction was given by the Reverend John Sonneday of Immanuel Presbyterian Church in McLean, Virginia:

> Let us go forth now to give as God gives daily to us in the redundant beauty of woodland and flower. In the nurturing interaction of family and friends in the enriching privilege of a society democratic and free, may your memories of Lansing Bennett and Frank Darling continue to inspire your qualities of courageous living. May you be grateful for their lives lived, for their example of service to country, and for the assurance of life beyond life. And may all of our love of family, neighbor, and country ever be an expression of God's love for all humankind. Amen.

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Life on a conveyor belt

Writing Speeches for DCIs and DDCIs

Craig R. Gralley

CIA has always offered a unique set of job opportunities, unmatched by any private corporation or other government agency. During my 15-year career, I have sought a number of unusual assignments, but the one that stands out was my stint as the DCI's principal speechwriter. From 1990 to 1993, I had the pleasure—and more than occasional anxiety—of serving Directors of Central Intelligence Webster, Gates, and Woolsey, as well as Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence Kerr and Studeman.

Some mistakenly believe that the DCI is surrounded by "professional" speechwriters like Peggy Noonan or Tony Snow who wrote for Presidents Reagan and Bush. In DCI Casey's era, however, a decision was made that the DCI needed skilled writers who were first and foremost intelligence officers with an understanding of the people, process, and substance of intelligence.

All DCIs and DDCIs that I worked for took a strong hand in developing their remarks. Our most senior executives take their public appearances seriously, and they work hard to develop a positive public image of the Agency and Intelligence Community. Time pressures and the crush of important business, however, make it difficult for them to focus more than a couple days in advance of a scheduled speech, so they need the help of several speechwriters. In my view my role as chief speechwriter was to work with the DCI and provide him with solid research, some novel ideas, a rational structure for approaching a speech, and a clever aural package for showcasing it.

First Experience

My initial foray into speechwriting began in November 1988, when a vacancy notice crossed my desk in the Directorate of Intelligence. The Office of Public Affairs was looking for a staff speechwriter, and on a whim I answered the announcement. I was attracted by the possibilities of writing for the DCI, and, in researching speeches, gaining something of an insider's view of the Agency.

As part of the interview, I was given a "timed speechwriting assignment" on a topic of my choice. I was allowed a couple days to complete the task, but I waited until the night before my speech was due before starting to draft the seven-page text. Nevertheless, I produced a totally forgettable speech on nuclear proliferation. (I soon learned that, while procrastination irritates all senior managers—especially the DCI, the valued skill of producing a quality text at the 11th hour is one you develop at your own risk.)

As luck would have it, at the same time that I applied for the speechwriter position my home office "selected" me for a rotational assignment to the National Security Agency (NSA). Because this was an offer that I could not easily refuse, I told the Public Affairs people to "call me in two years," and I promptly forgot about becoming a DCI speechwriter.

A Summons

Eighteen months later, while at NSA, I received a telephone call. The caller asked if I were still interested in writing speeches for the DCI. "Sure," I said, "but I have another six months to go on this rotation." I was told that this was not a problem because "the DCI wants you back." (I learned later just how anxious my new supervisors were to make the match. There had been several other candidates for the position, but they had

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been spooked by stories of late-night calls by frantic DCI Executive Assistants looking for never tasked—and never written—speeches.)

When asked if the job had potential to destroy my career, I was told that it did not, "if you do it right." Armed with that reassurance and my seven-page writing sample, it was not long before I found myself in DCI Webster's office for a get-acquainted session. As I entered the room, I was met by the Judge, and he motioned toward the couch. The DCI walked over to the couch to join me. He had a kindly face, slightly reddened, and he looked somewhat smaller than he did when he appeared on TV. His easy manner lulled me into thinking I was in the pressence of my kindly grandfather. And then he spoke.

"Tell me, Craig, what experience do you have writing speeches?" Pause. "What makes you qualified to be my speechwriter?" Pause. "Well," I said, "I know something about intelligence." Gulp.

I do not remember much more about our first half-hour session. It was a blur punctuated by periods of intense anxiety, as the DCI, with a lawyer's precision, dissected my background and laid bare my rather limited qualifications.

As I shook the DCI's hand and made a quick dash toward the door, the Judge turned to me and said, "If I had the time, I would draft my own speeches, but I do not, so I would like you to do it for me."

The Staff and the Job

With that vote of confidence, I returned to the Ames Building, ready to tackle the awards ceremonies, the major public speeches, and the Congressional testimony. I became the head of the Speeches and Appearances Staff, an efficient branch of six persons in the Office of Public Affairs. Two members of my staff responded to invitations; among other assignments, they advised the DCI and DDCI on which speeches to accept, and they worked with host organizations to complete the arrangements. We had two other speechwriters and a secretary.

I soon realized that, without access to the DCI, speechwriting is a hit-or-miss proposition. And you are more likely to miss because you cannot anticipate a DCI's likes and dislikes.

It did not take long to understand that DCI Webster particularly enjoyed appearing before legal groups—a considerable challenge for a speechwriter who had no legal expertise. I was constantly offering outlines and themes that could be steered away from purely legal issues and toward something more international and intelligence oriented, such as "A Lawyer in Public Service." The final speech would be short on "lawyer" and long on "public service."

Another New Boss

I worked for Judge Webster for about six months before he retired and Bob Gates was named by President Bush to be the 15th DCI. I was a bit apprehensive about the change. I had found my original instincts about the Judge to be accurate—he was an intellectually sharp and decent man. Bob Gates had a reputation for being brilliant and tough-minded but also highly demanding.

In my first session with the new DCI, we discussed the style and content of speeches. The DCI said, "If the truth be known, I like writing speeches more than this other stuff. But I just do not have the time . . . ." I knew where this conversation was going, but I just bit my tongue and nodded in agreement. Before I left his office, the DCI offered to lend me his box of favorite quotations. "But you have got to promise not to use some of the material—I collected a few of these quotes before the era of political correctness."

We continued the practice started under Judge Webster of meeting once every few weeks. My staff would provide a list of coming speeches, and then we would go down the list and discuss themes and recommend approaches for each.

DCI Gates had an acute ability to focus on each of the proposed themes and to provide immediate guidance typically organized in topic sentences. He could rattle

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seven or eight statements off the top of his head, each succinct and logically developed from an earlier point, and outline its conclusion. He also would offer advice on who to contact for information. The DCI would go straight down the list of six or seven speeches, and the meeting would be over in 20 minutes.

An Assembly Line

The only way you knew Bob Gates liked your work was that he gave you more. Judging from the number of speeches that we wrote, he evidently liked what we did. Despite the loss of a speechwriter, our staff produced about 100 speeches a year for the DCI and DDCI—up from about 90 the year before. And the speeches were longer, too. Full-text speeches for DCI Gates typically ran 20 to 30 pages or more. Earlier speeches ran between 15 and 20 pages.

When people ask what it was like to produce so many speeches, I remind them of the old *I Love Lucy* rerun in which Lucy is at the end of a conveyer belt trying to pack pies into boxes. Speeches, just like those pies, keep coming. And you try not to get overwhelmed. To help prevent speeches from falling off the conveyor belt, I was given a laptop computer so I could draft speeches at home on my own time.

A Farewell Address

Despite Bob Gates's no-nonsense and highly organized approach to our work, there were times that he pushed us to the wall. DDCI Dick Kerr's Agency farewell party was one of those times.

Early on, I had a bad feeling about that speech. I contacted the DCI's Executive Assistant to see if the DCI wanted any support in drafting remarks for the retirement ceremony, which included the presentation of the Distinguished Intelligence Medal to the DDCI. Two weeks before the ceremony, I was told, "Do not worry about that speech . . . Bob wants to do that one himself."

Over the years I have developed a sixth sense about the pace of events on the seventh floor and whether a senior executive will have enough time to draft a speech. I was queasy about this one, but, because my staff was already working on a half-dozen speeches at the same time, I had no desire to "make work." I did not pursue it.

My apprehension was justified. On the day of the ceremony I received a call at 5:30 a.m. from the DCI's Executive Assistant: "Bob thought he'd get a chance to work on the speech, but the time just slipped by. He wants you to do it, and he wants a draft on his desk by 11:00 a.m. today." (Nothing focuses a speechwriter's attention quite like having a few hours to produce a 15- to 20-minute speech for an anxious DCI.) She added, "You'd better get down here right away and work out of the front office so you can get it done."

While my wife drove like a madwoman down Georgetown Pike, I flipped through *Simpson's Contemporary Quotations* searching for ideas that would help me set the proper mood for the occasion. I knew the ceremony had to have a special quality. The DCI's remarks had to be clever and funny, and, at the end, just a bit melancholy. I also knew it would be a challenge to distill the essence of a brilliant career that spanned three decades. Kerr was an analyst's analyst, a homegrown Agency hand who made it to the top—and I wanted to get it right. Nothing sinks a speech or a speechwriter faster than having a senior Agency officer in the audience say, "You missed the mark on that one" or, "That is not the Dick Kerr I know."

When I reached Headquarters, my mind was teeming with a host of unformed ideas on how to approach the speech. I raced through the DDCI's personnel file, gathering facts from PARs written long ago—tidbits that I hoped when blended together would provide a composite picture of Dick Kerr that would in some way foreshadow his ultimate success. I learned that he was a sergeant in the Army and that he started at CIA as a GS-7 industrial analyst in the Office of Central Reference. I bounced ideas off anyone who walked past my desk, while keeping an eye on the clock.

Of course, anything that could go wrong, did. While drafting the speech, the computer crashed twice, and I was beside myself wondering if my remarks had evaporated. After some frantic calls to the ADP Staff, the

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speech was dredged up from the recesses of the computer's memory bank and safely stored on a computer disk. I delivered the speech to the DCI's office with just a few minutes to spare.

The DCI used about 80 percent of the speech—a success by speechwriting standards. He used the speech as a framework for adding his own special and personal remarks about Kerr. It was a good example of how DCIs and DDCIs used the speeches we provided as points of departure and as ways of approaching important subjects that they had been unable to focus on because of the press of other business.

A Scuttled Speech

There also are times when the DCI or DDCI prefers not use the prepared text, and there are times when you wished they had never seen the text. On one memorable occasion, Dick Kerr was called in literally at the last minute to fill in for the DCI before an Office of Information Resources symposium.

As Kerr approached the stage, I could see he had my speech tightly rolled up in his right hand. Once behind the podium, he raised it high above his head. "I have this . . . speech here. It was written by some . . . speechwriter." Within the first five seconds of his presentation, the DDCI had disowned the prepared text—not a good sign. As I slumped lower in my front-row seat, Kerr continued to rail against my prepared remarks. "It says that in an era of instantaneous communications, CIA will be challenged by CNN. But I do not believe it and neither should you."

I was grateful that his speech was brief, but the bad news traveled fast. By the time I reached my office, word of the DDCI's performance had preceded me. I knew, as did my supervisors, that Kerr was trying to add some drama and controversy to the conference. I had no intention, however, of reminding the DDCI that the speech was written for the DCI and that it represented his views.

A Unique Challenge

Despite the array of uncontrollable events that can conspire to ruin a speech, it is surprising that DCI public appearances typically went off without a hitch. This was due in no small measure to the hard work and close coordination of the Speeches and Appearances Staff, DCI Security, and the Protocol Office.

Speechwriting differs substantially from any other form of writing. The expository writing style used to create an intelligence report has to be adapted for speechwriting or risks falling flat in front of the DCI and the audience.

Moreover, the time demands associated with drafting intelligence assessments and speeches are different. Writing an assessment is like running a marathon; supervisors have a general idea when they want the paper released, and, in the meantime, the report goes through a near continuous draft-edit-draft cycle. Writing a speech, however, is like running a 50-yard dash. You know that the DCI will be appearing before the World Affairs Council of Boston this Friday and that he will want a good speech by Wednesday. Heaven help you if you have not delivered the speech on time, because Wednesday morning you can expect to receive a call from the DCI's Executive Assistant telling you the Director is looking for his speech. It seems as if everyone in your chain of command drops by your office to ask, "Where is the speech?"

The feedback on a speech is immediate, and it can be brutal. Deputy Directors and Office chiefs are frank in their appraisal of a DCI's performance. If the performance does not meet their expectations, the principal speechwriter quickly becomes the most exposed target. I am glad to say those times were few, and I was fortunate that management deflected most of the spears.

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A Memorable Occasion

There are few experiences that surpass writing a speech that fits the mood of the occasion and hits the DCI and the audience just right. Of all the speeches that I wrote, the most effective was the one used to mark the dedication of the Berlin Wall Monument, which took place outside the Southwest entrance of CIA Headquarters on a crisp December afternoon in 1992.

I have always believed that the speeches about people and their quiet, heroic actions call for a special effort from speechwriters. The annual Memorial Day ceremony held in the lobby of the Original Headquarters Building, medals presented posthumously in the DCI suite, and other similar occasions demand the best that a speechwriter can provide. These ceremonies are important, not only for family members in the audience, but also for the Agency because they say much about how we recognize achievement and pay tribute to individual sacrifice.

All these remarks are difficult to draft because they require a personal commitment on the part of the speechwriter. The Berlin Wall Monument dedication ceremony was no exception. In researching the speech, I was continually reminded of our Agency's contribution—a contribution that fell heaviest on earlier generations who worked behind the lines and willingly assumed great personal risk and even death.

I knew it would be a ceremony rich with symbolism. During the course of my research, I also learned that the Original Headquarters Building and the Berlin Wall were being built at the same time, strengthening the link between CIA and the Cold War. But the speech could not stop there; while our new monument served as a reminder, it also offered a fresh challenge:

> Our work is not over. There are other walls to tear down—the wall built by tyrants who would deny others their freedom; the wall that imprisons those addicted to illegal drugs; the wall of fear created by the terrorist; and the wall of defiance, built by those who seek weapons of mass destruction.

It was gratifying to be in the audience that bright December afternoon to watch the crowd's response to the remarks by DCI Gates. The speech seemed to strike a resonant chord, and the DCI seemed energized by the ceremony. Now, when I walk by the monument, I feel a special pride in having played a role in its dedication.

Rich Rewards

During my nearly three years as chief speechwriter, I experienced a roller coaster of emotions. It was frustrating, and, at times, unbelievably pressure-filled. I remember being called into work at 2:00 a.m. to find the author of an obscure quote for DCI Webster, who was giving a speech halfway around the world. Dick Kerr asked us for the name of a little-known boxer who went a few rounds with Norman Mailer, just moments before Kerr was to introduce the author. My staff received a call from one DCI on the way to the airport requesting a funny sports story—within the next five minutes—to open a commencement speech at Notre Dame.

You learn a lot about yourself when you have to be creative, facing a blank sheet of paper while the clock counts down. The rewards, however, were incomparable. There were opportunities to travel with the DCI and DDCI and to participate in functions usually reserved for senior Agency officials.

But those are not the memories I will cherish the most. I had the opportunity to produce a quality product that, with little tinkering, went straight to the DCI. I also had an opportunity to interact with senior Agency officers and to be privy to their hopes for the future. Most of all, I had an opportunity to work with a tremendous staff and a highly dedicated group of people in the former Office of Public Affairs.

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Consequences of miscalculation

Intelligence Assessment in the Peloponnesian War

(b)(3)(c)

Seer of misery! Never a word that works to my advantage! Always misery warms your heart, your prophecies—never a word of profit said or brought to pass.

Agamemnon speaking to his intelligence officer Calchas in The Illiad, *by Homer.*

The consolidation of responsibility for the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence—political, military, and economic—in a distinct government organization is a fairly recent innovation. Often, the consolidation is the byproduct of some national disaster that could have been avoided—some commission concludes—if only all the pertinent information had been available to one organization responsible for assessing its significance to the national interest. Over time, however, the memory of the disaster fades and the more traditional government bodies begin to resent the new organization and to question the necessity for an organization that duplicates functions they could better perform themselves. In the interest of efficiency, pressure builds to pare back the responsibilities of this consolidated organization and recreate the old order that existed before the dimly remembered disaster.

Donald Kagan of Yale University, in the first comprehensive reassessment of the Peloponnesian War since the turn of the century, makes a compelling case that the tragedy of classical Greek civilization was an avoidable disaster. The war, Kagan argues, was caused by political leaders who made "bad decisions in difficult circumstances" and not by inevitable historical forces as Thucydides argued. Kagan shows how flawed assessments of their opponent's intentions led to bad decisions that contributed to the outbreak of war and then hindered efforts to shape an effective strategy either to prosecute the war or to negotiate a stable peace.

The Peloponnesian War frequently marks the starting point for the study of the relationship between politics and strategy. Kagan's work, however, shows that the war is also a good starting point for the study of the relationship between intelligence assessment and the formulation of policy. Kagan reconstructs the circumstances surrounding the key political decisions involved in the war to challenge the conventional wisdom on the Peloponnesian War and to argue for alternative courses of action that could have been pursued if the available information had only been seen a bit differently.

Athens Versus Sparta

In Kagan's view, the political analyses underlying the decisions that led to the Peloponnesian War were based on false historical analogs that ignored information that did not fit the selected pattern. Thucydides, for example, explained the origins of the Peloponnesian War as, "The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war *inevitable*." This is accurate, according to Kagan, if applied to the first Peloponnesian War fought from 460 to 445 BC but not to the later war that crippled Greek civilization.

The formation of the Athenian-led Delian League in 478 and 477 BC to prosecute a war of revenge against Persia confirmed Athens as a power of the first rank and as a rival to Sparta for leadership of the Greek world. Influential political figures in Sparta began to see the evolution of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire as a threat to Sparta's hold on the Peloponnese. Athens's expanding political role began to generate tensions because midcentury Sparta was not prepared to share hegemony in the Greek world, while Athens was not prepared to check its ambitions to placate Sparta. Eventually, the political tensions in the evolving relationship between the two powers led to war.

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In Kagan's view, the Thirty-Years' Peace that ended the first Peloponnesian War established a new political structure for the Greek world. Reflecting the new balance of power, this treaty implicitly divided the Greek world into two blocs with Athens abandoning all holdings in the Peloponnese. In return, Sparta granted de facto recognition of the Aegean-based Athenian Empire. To stabilize political relations, the treaty prohibited existing members of each alliance from changing sides. Athens also negotiated a treaty with the Persian Empire in 449 BC under which Persia recognized Athenian hegemony in the Aegean while Athens agreed to halt military operations against Persian territory.

The Athenian Empire was now an established fact and, Kagan argues, neither Athenian nor Spartan interests preordained another resort to war. Athens was secure, provided it maintained control of the empire whose economic strength underwrote the Athenian navy as the dominant force in the Aegean. The Athenian navy secured Athens's food supplies from the Crimea, ensured Persian behavior, and enforced imperial discipline among island and coastal states that might be tempted—given the decline in Persian power—to give domestic expenditures priority over the finance of the empire.

Sparta was secure, provided it maintained the legendary army that enforced Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnese and ensured that Athenian ambitions remained limited to the maritime realm. According to Kagan, the Thirty-Years' Peace clearly defined Athenian and Spartan vital interests and established the basis for a stable relationship between the respective alliances.

The Outbreak of War

The second Peloponnesian War, Kagan argues, was an example of two large powers being dragged into a conflict that did not involve their national interests by smaller allies engaged in a regional crisis. Civil strife in distant Epidamnus led to a confrontation between Corcyra—a major independent power—and Corinth, an ally of Sparta. Corcyra could not stand alone against Corinth and sought an alliance with Athens, arguing that Athens could not allow Corcyra's navy—whose 120 ships represented the only other significant peacetime fleet in the Greek world—to fall under the control of a member of the Peloponnesian League.

Corcyran emissaries also argued publicly in Athens that Corinth was really a proxy for Sparta and that Corinthian actions were preliminary maneuvers for a future war between the two alliances. The Corinthians publicly denied the charge and argued that Athens should remain out of the dispute if Athens wanted to avoid war.

Athens was in a difficult position. Although the Athenians did not want a confrontation with a member of the Peleponnesian League, Corinth and its allies—which did not include Sparta—had used their economic strength to build a fleet of more than 100 ships to challenge Corcyra. Therefore, a Corinthian-dominated Corcyra would shift the strategic balance of Aegean naval power in favor of the Peloponnesian League. Because the existing balance of power between the Athenian navy and the Spartan army had been a key factor in maintaining the peace since 445 BC, Athens felt it could not allow the formation of a superior navy without jeopardizing its vital interests.

Athens, unsure of Sparta's potential response to the crisis, adopted a strategy designed to hold Corinthian ambitions in check while trying to keep its actions within the terms of the Thirty-Years' Peace to placate Sparta. The Athenian strategy, formulated by Pericles, was to make a defensive alliance with Corcyra and send a small naval force to join Corcyra's navy as a political deterrent against Corinth. The Athenian leadership, Kagan argues, felt that Sparta would see the move as proper because Corinth had initiated the confrontation. Corcyra was also an independent power free to join either alliance under the terms of the Thirty-Years' Peace.

Corinth—frustrated in its desire to bring Corcyra to heel—asserted that Athens was violating the spirit of the Thirty-Years' Peace and raised the specter of Athenian expansionism in an attempt to influence the domestic debate in Sparta over the crisis. When the Corinthians initiated a naval battle at Sybota despite Athens's warnings, Athens and Corinth stood at the brink of war.

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The crisis became more complex as Corinth and Athens maneuvered for advantage. Kagan holds, however, that a settlement could have avoided a general war until Athens made a critical error that forced Sparta to reassesses Athenian motives. Sparta was apprehensive, but, as an imperial power with similar problems, sympathetic to the Athenian argument that its actions were necessary to maintain hegemony inside its alliance. Indeed, Kagan argues, there is evidence that Sparta was putting pressure on its allies to behave because the number of cities actively supporting Corinth decreased from eight to two as the crisis progressed. Corinth's motive in trying to widen the dispute was also transparent, and Sparta resisted being drawn into the crisis despite Corinthian propaganda portraying Sparta as the dupe of a wily Athens.

The critical error came when Athens imposed economic sanctions—the Megarian Decrees—on Megara, one of the two cities to aid Corinth during the crisis at Corcyra. Pericles calculated that the economic sanctions would punish Megara and dissuade others from supporting Corinth without directly attacking Megara, a member of the Peloponnesian League. Megara, however, was strategically located on the isthmus between Athens and Sparta, and the Athenian action could be interpreted as an attempt to bring Megara to heel and secure the approaches to Athens before war with Sparta. Megara had also figured prominently in the outbreak of the first Peloponnesian War and a sense of deja vu began to influence events.

Corinth immediately attacked the Megarian Decree as economic imperialism directed against Sparta and its allies. Sparta could remain aloof to a Corinthian-inspired dispute with Athens, but it could not maintain leadership of the Peloponnesian League for long if it ignored an act of aggression against a member. Sparta sent an emissary to Athens to secure the withdrawal of the Megarian Decree as the price to avoid war. Athens refused to withdraw the decree, and war followed.

Kagan believes the war was avoidable if the political leadership had made a more dispassionate assessment of the political situation. Athenian policy was driven by the need to keep the Peloponnesian League from gaining control of the Corcyran navy. Kagan argues there were no signs that Sparta—which ultimately determined the League's security policy—wanted to challenge Athens's naval power. Indeed, Sparta had worked to keep the crisis localized by refusing to back Corinth until the Megarian Decree raised questions about Athens's real intentions. Sparta allowed the policy of the League to fall hostage to Corinth's regional aspirations.

Both sides fell into a diplomatic game of move and countermove that assumed the other side would see the logic of its position and seek a solution to the crisis short of war. Instead, Sparta and Athens ended up revisiting issues that had already been decided by the previous war. However, as Kagan points out:

> . . . international relations and war are not chess. They often provoke strong emotions that overcome reason and cast intelligence aside.

Political Objectives and Military Strategy

Kagan presents a powerful case that both Athens and Sparta ensured the war would develop into a prolonged stalemate by adopting strategies to prosecute the war based on inaccurate assessments of their opponents' intentions and of their own capabilities. When war broke out, Athens adopted the limited political objective of a return to the status quo ante. Athens also limited its military operations to naval raids throughout the Peloponnese designed to inflict attrition on Sparta and its allies by destroying outlying cities and their garrisons. The leader of Athens, Pericles, based this strategy on information from sources in Sparta that stated that many influential Spartans, including King Archidamus, wanted peace with Athens and had entered the war reluctantly. In Pericles's view, Kagan argues, Sparta would quickly seek to negotiate a peace after Athens demonstrated it had the power to hurt Sparta. Pericles, however, ignored information that the domestic political dynamic in Sparta had changed with the outbreak of war.

On declaring war, Sparta had publicly stated that its political objective was "to liberate Greece." Sparta's political objective could be achieved only by the destruction of the Athenian Empire. Regardless of its

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information on the prewar debate in Sparta, the Athenian leadership, Kagan argues, should have recognized that Sparta had not set this objective lightly and that Athens needed to be prepared to fight for its very existence. Sparta intended to achieve this objective by sending its army to devastate the countryside of Attica in the belief that the threat of economic ruin would force the Athenian army into the field for destruction by the Spartan army. Then, Sparta would impose a political settlement for a quick victory.

Sparta, however, based its strategy on an assessment of Athenian behavior in the first Peloponnesian War. Sparta failed to consider that agriculture was no longer the basis of Athenian society, and Spartan strategy did not strike at the new heart of Athenian power—the empire and the Athenian navy. Sparta did not know that Athens had anticipated Sparta's actions and that Pericles had won domestic political support for a policy of abandoning the countryside to the Spartan army. But Sparta should have recognized that something was amiss when Athens did not oppose the Spartan invasion and withdrew its forces behind the walls of Athens.

Both sides had made critical errors in formulating strategies to win the ever-elusive "quick" victory. Pericles, however, had designed a strategy to affect Sparta's political calculations based on an outdated understanding of the prewar situation in Sparta. He ignored the information that indicated that the political situation had changed dramatically after the decision for war. Sparta set its strategy based on what had worked in the last war. Sparta's assessment failed to consider how the strategic situation, and Athenian vulnerabilities, had changed in the last 20 years. Athens and Sparta had blundered into the long war they had both hoped to avoid.

The Premature Peace

Kagan argues that Athens squandered an opportunity for a viable negotiated settlement to the war in 421 BC. By 425 BC, Athens recognized that its defensive strategy had led into a strategic cul de sac and Athens began to conduct offensive operations to seize territory in the Peloponnese as bases for sustained operations against Sparta. Athenian forces took Pylos, within 50 miles of Sparta, and the island of Cythera off the south coast of Laconia. The victory at Pylos also yielded approximately 300 valuable Spartan prisoners whose lives were forfeit if Sparta conducted further operations in Attica. The prisoners represented one-tenth of the Spartan army, and 180 of them were from upper-class families in Sparta. Sparta was not prepared to write these men off, and their capture effectively halted further offensive operations by Sparta. When escaped Spartan slaves began to seek refuge in nearby Pylos soon after its capture, Sparta confronted the specter of a domestic revolution that could shake the foundations of Spartan power.

With Sparta on the defensive, Athens moved against Megara on the isthmus between Attica and the Peloponnese in a bid to end the war. The capture of Megara would bottle up Sparta in the Peloponnese and leave it with no effective way of striking at Athens. Sparta would be forced to negotiate on Athenian terms before the continued pressure from Athenian bases undermined Sparta's alliance and domestic stability. Athens's fortunes, however, waned when the attempt to take Megara failed. Further heavy Athenian losses in the Battle of Delium convinced Athens that the time had come to trade existing advantages for peace.

The inconclusive Peace of Nicias ended the first phase of the Peloponnesian War in 421 BC. The basic provisions of the treaty called for the mutual return of territory and prisoners, with Athens to return Pylos, Cythera, and the Spartan prisoners from Sphacteria. Athens's primary objective was the return of Amphipolis that had risen in revolt against Athens. Now allied with Sparta, Athens had to regain Amphipolis to secure the critical shipping route to the Black Sea. Amphipolis, however, refused to honor the terms of the treaty with the support of the Spartan governor, Clearidas. Several Spartan allies, including Thebes and Corinth, still hoped for the destruction of Athenian power and refused to swear oaths to respect the treaty.

The Athenians, according to Kagan, failed to appreciate that they held the strategic advantage and had enough political leverage over Sparta to force a favorable settlement. Athens should not have squandered its position until Sparta faithfully executed the treaty. Otherwise, Athens should have sought some change in the strategic

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situation to replace the advantages it negotiated away. Sparta could not risk major operations against Athens provided Athens continued to hold the Spartan prisoners and the bases in the Peloponnese. The war would still be uncomfortable and costly, but Sparta could not win without some significant change in the strategic situation.

Nevertheless, Athens accepted the treaty and returned the prisoners while retaining Pylos as a bargaining chip to secure the return of Amphipolis. In Kagan's view, the Athenian leadership allowed recent reverses, reinforced by the war weariness in Athens, to pressure it into accepting a treaty that it should have rejected. The actions of Thebes and Corinth showed that some of the smaller powers wanted the war to continue, and the position taken by Clearidas at Amphipolis raised questions about either Spartan good faith or its ability to enforce its wishes against internal opposition. As a result, the only substantive result of the treaty was to give Sparta a breathing space to recover while creating new sources of friction. By 418 BC, Sparta and Athens clashed again at the Battle of Mantinea, and full-scale war had resumed by 413 BC.

Political Assessment and Intelligence

The blunders of the Greek leadership highlight the dangers involved whenever political leaders act as their own intelligence officers. The Greek leaders on both sides were intelligent, skilled, and experienced. They were intimately familiar with their opponents and, not unnaturally, thought they understood their opponents' political, economic, and military positions. They formulated policies that they judged to have a good chance of success. Once implemented, however, the political leadership tended to resist making changes that suggested some fundamental flaw in its original policy.

The Greek leadership had made repeated mistakes in the runup to war and, when war finally broke out, it defined political and military objectives inadequate to resolve the underlying dispute. The Greek leaders on both sides needed a Calchas, a seer of misery, to present an assessment of the factors affecting their opponents and the likely outcome of holding to the current course of action. Lacking an independent view, the political leaders found it difficult to assess objectively the consequences of their actions and make needed changes in strategy. The information was readily available to the leaders on both sides, but it was not examined in any systematic way.

The tragic outcome of the Peloponnesian War, Kagan argues, was not inevitable and was not the result of historical forces beyond the control of the Greek leadership; *it was the consequence of miscalculation.* The modern intelligence officer, like the strategist, should study the war's lessons. As Thucydides admonished, such events might "happen again, in all probability, in the same or a similar way."

Political Intrigue in the Peloponnesian War

Covert political operations were an important component of strategy during the war. Significant Greek cities were normally walled and could withstand lengthy sieges. As a rule, the best way to take a city was to find an ally inside willing to switch alliances in return for domestic political advantage or pay. Seeking political allies in each other's camp, the Spartans frequently approached oligarchs in the Athenian Empire while the Athenians sought to bolster democratic factions in the Peloponnesian League. Both supported rebellious members of the opposing alliance with little regard for their political convictions. Athens's unsuccessful attempt to take Megara was triggered by an offer from the city's democrats to change alliances provided Athenian forces would lay siege to the city.

Covert operations sometimes generated unpleasant domestic political consequences. The Athenians, disaffected with the progress of the war, deposed Pericles from office in 430 BC and brought him to trial on a charge of embezzlement. At his trial, Pericles defended himself by saying he had spent the funds "for a necessary purpose" which ancient sources say probably involved bribing foreigners in the interest of the state. Pericles lost the case.

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A look to the future

Television and Intelligence

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October 1996. International peace talks aimed at resolving a protracted regional conflict are about to open. Preparatory discussions are at a critical stage. At this inopportune moment, the government of one of the key regional players, the US Government's major ally in the area, begins to experience growing pressures from religious radicals. Capitalizing on domestic problems as well as the prospect of an unacceptable compromise involving territorial exchange and the status of disputed religious sites, fundamentalist elements have intensified a campaign of violence against tourists and government officials.

2300 Washington time, 23 October. As evidence of a deteriorating security situation in the threatened regime's capital is collected and analyzed, the senior watch officers from around the Intelligence Community meet in a NOIWON to discuss the situation. Reports from the US Embassy and CIA station have taken on an increasingly urgent tone, and CNN is reporting that police have failed to disburse a crowd and that groups of militants are moving through several of the major hotels assaulting foreigners. At least a dozen foreign nationals are reported to have been seriously injured in street assaults, and unconfirmed reports indicate that three foreigners—none American—are dead.

While the NOIWON is in session, the duty producers of the television production staff at CIA, NSA, State, and DIA are meeting in a parallel conference. The senior duty producer, a rotational designation this evening held by the producer at the Defense Intelligence Network (DIN), opens the discussion.

"My understanding is that the situation is about to cross the threshold for issuing a CRITIC. What we need to decide is what we can contribute to an understanding of the situation. We're getting good attaché reporting that we could use on a Special Report. Anybody else?"

"This is NPIC. We've got some fairly useful imagery that can address some issues of crowd size and locations."

"What about movement at military facilities around the capital," asks the DIA producer.

"Nothing yet, but we're working on it. If we do a followup report later tonight, we should have something."

"This is CIA. We have some recent work on factional conflicts in the Brotherhood that we can report, plus we're getting a pretty good flow of information from the station."

"Can you give us anything on some of the personalities involved in the Brotherhood?"

"Sure. We have just put together some information on radical leaders, and we can give a quick summary of who's who."

"Good. NSA, what about SI?"

"Well, we've been reporting on the military and security services' concerns that, if the government didn't really crack down hard on the extremists, things were going to get out of hand. Beyond that, we have lots of police and security communications on the current trouble but no unusual military communications. It looks like the security forces think they may have underestimated the crowd size this morning but that, overall, they are confident of keeping the lid on."

The duty producer announces the first decision of the night: "Okay, I propose we break into the Community's broadcast systems in 11 minutes with a Special Report

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that I will schedule for 12 to 15 minutes. After the initial segment, which will be 'broadcast' format only, I propose we go interactive with 'write' privileges for the White House, the other watch centers, and CENTCOM, with everyone else restricted to 'read only.'" The reference is to which viewers will get to comment or ask questions, using language borrowed from computer jargon. "Anybody have any heartburn on that? If not, I will propose a three-minute opening summarizing the situation from previous reporting, followed by two minutes apiece from NPIC, CIA, NSA, and DIA, in that order. State, I would like you to close the roundrobin with two or three minutes from your folks putting some of the regional context into the picture. At that point, we open the lines for questions and comments. Okay?"

"This is CIA. The NIO (National Intelligence Officer) for Warning and the regional NIO are in the Operations Center reviewing the situation with the Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence. Do you want to see if we can get them on?"

"See if they're available. We could use them for an interactive wrap up. If there are no other questions, I will ask you to alert your respective technical folks that we want the network in exactly 10 minutes. The script for the opening segment is being done now and you should have a faxed copy in a few minutes. With this timeline, we are looking for factual errors only—not wordsmithing! Hold on, everybody. I've just been told we have the defense attaché on the phone; we're going to keep her on hold and interview her during the DIA segment."

Minutes later, customers receiving classified television over the DIN or other classified networks hear an announcement to stand by for a special Intelligence Community report on the developing situation. Viewers with their televisions tuned to CNN or some other commercial station receive both an audio signal and a subtitle alerting them to switch to their classified delivery channel.

"We interrupt regular programming to bring you a report on the situation. Over the next few minutes, CIA, DIA, State, NPIC, and NSA will provide the most recent information available to the Intelligence Community on the events you've probably been observing over CNN. First, a summary of previously reported information. . . ."

This is not a description of a current Intelligence Community capability. Nor is it an excerpt from a coming post–Cold War Tom Clancy novel. It is a projection of a capability the community may choose to develop in the near future to provide customers with real-time information on critical situations. It is also a logical and necessary extension of current efforts to explore how television can be used in the delivery of intelligence.

The State of (Classified) Television Art

The Persian Gulf war changed the way policymakers and intelligence agencies used and thought about television. Television has been a significant element in American political life since at least the 1960 election, and Vietnam made television more important to policymakers. Almost exclusively, however, the importance of television was in permitting a president to advance his policy views or, especially in Vietnam, was seen as a key tool in measuring how the American people viewed a president and his policies.

By the late 1980s, however, with the withering of the totalitarian state and with the technical advances that allowed television transmissions to originate from one- or two-person teams armed with their own satellite transmitters and receivers, open-source, commercial television became an increasingly important real-time source of developing information. The suppression of the democratic movement in China, the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet Union were witnessed worldwide. The President of the United States saw the Berlin Wall fall in real time; so did millions of others.

If these events and others presaged the coming of age of television as a source of information to policymakers in times of rapidly developing events, the Persian Gulf war marked its full coming of age. From the public diplomacy waged well by the United States and its allies and abysmally by Iraq to the extraordinary, unprecedented coverage of Desert Storm, television was an important participant in the Gulf crisis. CNN was at the eye of this particular storm, with its correspondents providing virtual forward air observation on the first Allied

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attacks on Baghdad, and other correspondents becoming embroiled in controversy over such issues as the "baby food factory" and the nature and use of the heavily reinforced bunker bombed by the Allies late in the fighting.

For the Intelligence Community as for everyone else, television proved a central source of information. It also provided intense competition. Having developed in a world in which totalitarian regimes effectively controlled the flow of information from and to their countries, the Community for years had extraordinary advantages over open-source media in access to information and the means to assess and disseminate that information in a timely fashion.

By the time of the Gulf war, the Community retained those advantages in certain areas, while in others open sources had competitive or even better access to information and the capability to beat the Community on timeliness. That is not to say open-source information was more accurate than that provided by the Community. (One CNN anchor had a wonderful proclivity for referring to the Patriot as an "anti-anti-missile," seemingly advancing it to the level of a metaphysical rather than merely a technological achievement.)

But the perception or at least the suspicion developed that open sources had the edge on the Community. While participating in a briefing for members of the Senate, complete with the normal and necessary, "I'm sorry, Senator, we can't provide that information at this classification level" responses to certain questions, my colleagues and I were startled when one Senator strode out of the room announcing, "I can get better information from CNN." One particularly bold member of the briefing team intercepted the Senator outside the room and assured him that he might in fact get faster information from CNN, but not better information. On another occasion, I was on the phone with a member of the NSC Staff when someone from the CIA Operations Center stuck his head in my door and announced that we had received confirmation of another Scud launch on Tel Aviv. Ever the customer-friendly analyst, I passed this on to the NSC Staff member, promising, "I'll call you back when we determine the exact impact point." "That's okay, don't bother," came the reply. "I can get that on CNN."

Community Reaction to Television

If you cannot beat them, as the phrase goes,. . . Within a few months of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the DIN became operational. Intelligence agencies had used television for years as a training medium; several had closed-circuit television systems for the broadcast of commercial or classified information. But the DIN was something different: a network planned as an alternative means of delivering information to consumers. Emphasizing briefings, summaries, and a range of special reports as diverse as the interests of the Defense and Defense Intelligence communities, the DIN established itself as a major step by the Community to respond to the competition from open-source television.

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With even this fragmentary evidence as a baseline, the Community's efforts have taken on a renewed focus and urgency. In June 1994 the Deputy Director of

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Central Intelligence called for the creation of an interagency executive steering group to coordinate the Community's video broadcast efforts. This group, chaired by the Director of Military Intelligence, Lt. Gen. James Clapper, was charged with moving the Community's efforts "to the next plateau." As implied in this directive, the future seems to offer a simple choice: either the Community will do a better job of using the television medium or the resources employed in the existing television efforts will be reapplied elsewhere. Continuing at the present state of operations does not appear to be an option. Where do we go from here?

The Codeword CNN Issue

One concern raised in Congress and elsewhere about the Intelligence Community's use of television is summarized in the phrase "We don't want a Codeword CNN." Before accepting this as a doctrine of what "they" want, this dictum needs to be examined. If the concern is that the Community will spend millions of dollars to produce something that looks like CNN *and provides information available through CNN*, the skeptics are correct. In television as in print and other media, the Community must accept the reality of increased open-source access to much of the world's information. Any Community television effort must focus on that information unique to the Intelligence Community, that is, information that could not have been obtained readily, if at all, from open sources.

On that issue, there should be little debate. The cost/benefit analysis inherent in this exercise should not, however, apply only to television, nor should televised intelligence have to clear some higher threshold of performance than that required of other media.

In several respects, including a passion for timeliness and a willingness to use multiple formats (CNN versus CNN Headline News) to provide service to their viewers, the Community's television efforts have much to learn from CNN, as well as from other open-source networks. Government is being pressed to find benchmarks from leaders in private industry, and CNN is the benchmark provider of time-sensitive televised information. The Intelligence Community should be encouraged to use the best techniques and practices of the commercial television industry, not be criticized for it. We should not be encouraged to use classified television media and systems to duplicate the information available to our consumers through CNN. And we should be rebuked if we try to build three or four "codeword CNNs," each acting with minimal recognition of the existence of the others. In television, perhaps more than through any other medium, the Community of the future needs to function more cooperatively than ever before.

The (Video) Community of the Future

Cost alone should drive us to this conclusion. Television is and will remain an expensive dissemination medium, and duplication of effort should be discouraged. To their credit, the television centers in the Community have recognized this and have been meeting regularly since early in 1993 to establish and maintain a continuing dialogue on standards, techniques, and programming. More needs to be done in coordination efforts, but the principle seems well established that Community cooperation will be one of the key measures of the success or failure of classified video dissemination.

The technical problems facing this effort are significant but not critical. Commercial television routinely moves information across networks and even across differing technical standards for screen definition and so forth. The Intelligence Community should be able to do the same. The truly critical issue is bureaucratic, not technical. Can the Community demonstrate a willingness to put a premium on providing joint or at least coordinated services to the consumer? In the end, we will have no choice, because the consumer will demand this level of service, and Congress is unlikely to tolerate (or fund) anything else.

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on dedicated (and probably duplicate) capabilities. The Defense Department's Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) will carry much of the Community's video needs. At some point, data compression techniques may allow use of existing secure telephone lines for multimedia presentations, including full-motion video.

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Each agency of the Community, as it develops a television capability, is likely to experience the same mix of "local" and "network" audiences and needs. Here, again, the Community need only look at the network-affiliate relationship in commercial broadcasting for a model on which to develop our operations. Affiliates of the major commercial networks generally purchase that network's programs; at the very least, they have first call on those programs within their local area. They may choose, however, to supplant a network program with a program of greater local interest, on a continuing or ad hoc basis. The Community network, most likely arrayed around a DIN hub, could do the same.

Other models of value from commercial broadcasting include CNN Headline News and its "predictable programming" format. Anyone familiar with Headline News who wants to catch up on the current headlines knows to tune in on the hour and the half-hour. Entertainment, business, or sports viewers no doubt know the "slot" for the segments of interest to them. A Community service should look closely at this format.

Viewers of the morning news programs, *Today* and its competitors, are also familiar with the national-local time sharing used on those shows. *Today* originates from New York for most of its two hours, with scheduled local segments placed in its formats. Viewers in Washington get *Today in Washington* segments, and viewers in Omaha and elsewhere get similar features

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The commercial industry also offers lessons on the technical side, including the need for technical compatibility and flexibility. To the greatest degree possible, the Community video service of the future must operate using existing or planned multipurpose communications links and facilities, rather than expecting expenditure

To cite one hypothetical but plausible example, assume a future nuclear accident at Chornobyl'. In a post–Soviet Union environment, Ukraine, instead of concealing the disaster, immediately requests help from the West, with the US European Command tasked to take the lead in organizing logistics for the effort. An integrated system based on the components noted above could provide EUCOM, Department of Energy, and other forward personnel with continuing visual support from the best expertise available from US Government agencies and the National Laboratories. It should even be possible for teams on site at or in a damaged facility to transmit live television back to stateside analysts for advice and commentary.

To be blunt, no one will turn to the Community in search of Emmy-winning graphics or special effects. In the end, consumers will be looking for information, and the test will be whether we can use all the systems at our disposal to link the consumer in need of information to the person or persons who can provide that information. All else is peripheral.

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In building an intelligence television system that can meet this test, it will be essential to provide both systems and procedures that will ensure technical compatibility and operational integration across the various agency-based networks. This will be especially true in providing time-sensitive support. Developing the procedures that make for an effective Community presentation in this area will require significant effort and probably a good bit of trial and error. The tradeoffs between timeliness and coordination, for example, are likely to prove especially difficult, and it is at least possible that time-sensitive support will emphasize comprehension—providing the consumer with the latest from a range of sources, over formal coordination. The interactive component that will almost certainly factor into any future Community effort will make it even more difficult to provide the level of precision achievable in print media. Precision and formal coordination are likely to suffer in pursuit of timeliness. How much can they suffer and how can their loss be limited through training of personnel and careful delineation of procedures are serious issues; they must be addressed and their implications understood as the Community expands its use of video.

One factor has to be kept in mind as we evaluate the implications of the use of television. Our viewers will be accustomed to the medium; they have, after all, grown up with it. This means that implicity they will make comparisons between the service provided by the Community and what they get on commercial television. Those involved in Community television efforts have to be alert to the need to make it clear to viewers (and to themselves) that some measure of comparison between commercial and intelligence television is possible and permissible. We have to be even clearer in identifying those areas in which the two are different. In that respect, we have to acknowledge the "slippery slope" from intelligence, through journalism, to entertainment. With all due respect to journalists and entertainers, we are neither. We may borrow techniques and formats from both, but we have to be clear about the need to develop our own way of doing business. As the Director of DIA has recently made clear, the DIN is a rapid, flexible medium for intelligence dissemination.

One of the keys Congressional and executive consumers and overseers ought to use in measuring the Intelligence Community's performance in using television is the level of cooperation among the elements of the Community. Another is the Community's ability to use the television medium in its most effective role: as a medium of unparalleled responsiveness and flexibility in transmitting information in time-sensitive situations. If television can meet that challenge (which more accurately translates into if the Community can meet this challenge), then the investments being made in broadcast capability will prove justified. In not—if we limit ourselves to reporting on events after the fact, or if we fail to maintain the qualitative edge of emphasizing information not available through open sources, or if we operate without a sense of corporate responsibility—then we should not be surprised to find our efforts described as poor attempts to compete with CNN at many times the cost of a commercial cable hookup.

Taking the Intelligence Community into the television medium will require significant technical investment. To an even greater degree, it will require the development of procedures to handle a difficult range of procedures governing classification and distribution. Most of all, however, it will require the corporate will to take on these other issues and problems in pursuit of a common objective.

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(b)(1) 50 USC 3024(i)
(b)(3) P.L. 86-36

Epilogue

The future may be closer than the body of this article would seem to imply. By late 1994 several events had coincided to accelerate the pace of broadcast video development in the Community.

The creation of the Executive Steering Group was one of those events, confirming the Community's commitment to the video broadcast medium. At the same time, CIA has engaged its analytic resources in DIN operations at unprecedented levels.

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[redacted] emphasized or accelerated three trends. First, the need to move toward time-sensitive, crisis-driven use of the broadcast medium. [redacted] the DIN produced a range of live programs originating from DIN studios in the Pentagon and from NSA, heretofore the hubs of DIN operations. The truly remarkable aspect of these programs, however, was the live remotes from [redacted] Intelligence Task Force in the Pentagon [redacted]

Second, [redacted] demonstrated the vitality of the video medium for two-way dissemination. The need to move intelligence from national producers to tactical users had long been at the center of Community planning for video broadcasts. Understated if not overlooked in this process had been the degree to which, in actual operations, the communications path is reversed; it is the person on the scene who has information to contribute back up to the national producer, who then becomes a user of tactical information.

Finally, the [redacted] effort demonstrates that a combination of good sense and technical realities will counter any tendencies toward duplicative use ("the four-codeword CNNs problem") in broadcast video operations. Without leaning too hard on sense, the communications bandwidth required for multiple and competing broadcasts simply does not exist. And it almost certainly will not exist until we reenter a period of fiscal abundance. In the long run, as Keynes said, we are all dead.

Consumers of [redacted] broadcasts received timely, all-source intelligence, in the best and fullest sense of the term. In several instances, personnel from [redacted] Intelligence Task Force were able to comment on raw intelligence received only a few moments before. Though limits to the wisdom of such instant analysis undoubtedly exist and need to be incorporated into the operating procedures used in video broadcast dissemination, the overriding fact of the [redacted] test case was the seemingly implicit acceptance of interagency communication and integration in broadcast presentations.

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The cloak

Cover as a Shield for Operational Activity

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Of all the appurtenances used by practitioners of the world's second-oldest profession, few are more important or less appreciated than the concept of cover, the basic subterfuge that permits spies to work their craft. Cover has been used for thousands of years with varying degrees of success. Used properly, it can live up to its reputation as the intelligence officer's sine qua non, but its improper use, including that which is known as the old Winsockie syndrome,[1] can bring Cassandra's fate to the clandestine operative and put at risk the most painstakingly crafted operation.

Largely as a result of the popularity of spies and espionage as themes for countless films and books, most people understand the concept of cover.

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Cover in CIA

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Because of the highly personal nature of cover, there are many definitions for the word, but one of the best descriptions is found in the Rockefeller Commission Report:

> Many CIA activities—like those of every foreign intelligence service—are clandestine in nature. Involved CIA personnel cannot travel, live, or perform their duties openly as CIA employees.

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Accordingly, virtually all CIA personnel serving abroad and many of the Agency's professional personnel in the United States assume a "cover." Their employment by the CIA is disguised and, to persons other than their families and coworkers, they are held out as employees of another government agency or of a commercial enterprise.

Cover arrangements frequently have substantial domestic aspects. These include the participation of other US Government agencies, business firms, and private citizens

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Ancient History

The Scriptures contain a number of references to spying and covert activities. In one instance, Moses dispatched 12 men, each the leader of an Israelite tribe, on a mission to the land of Canaan to spy on the enemy. Presumably, they used some form of cover because sure death awaited any Israelite who was unlucky enough to be captured by the Canaanites. In another Old Testament passage, Joshua sent two agents on a covert mission to survey the defenses of Jericho. Disguising themselves as visitors, they found lodging with a local woman who was recruited to provide "intelligence and operational support." Because of her loyalty and help, the woman and her family were spared when Joshua's forces destroyed the city after his trumpets brought down Jericho's walls.

In Greek mythology, the Trojan War provided an excellent example of the use of cover. The war between the confederated Greeks and the Trojans, abductors of Helen, had raged for 10 years when the Greeks developed a brilliant strategy. Pretending to abandon their siege of Troy, the Greeks left behind a huge wooden horse. The Trojans, believing the horse to be a sacrifice to Athena, opened the city gates and paraded it through the streets of Troy. During the night, Greek soldiers hidden inside the horse opened the gates to the Greek army, which then destroyed Troy. The Trojan horse could be called the first "cover facility."

Early American Cover

The Revolutionary War in America provided a fertile field for espionage, and both sides used numerous agents. American and British agents, who did not "live" their cover, were captured and dealt with severely. Nathan Hale used the cover of schoolmaster to collect information on British defensive positions and order of battle in New York City. At age 21, he was caught, tried, and hanged by the British. A similar fate awaited Major John Andre,[4] chief spymaster for Gen. Sir Henry Clinton. Although Andre was warned to remove his uniform and assume civilian cover, he refused. Andre was hanged by the Continental Army after being caught with detailed information on West Point and its defenses which he had received from Gen. Benedict Arnold. The British enjoyed considerable support in the colonies, and they had a large pool of well-placed sources, including Edward Bancroft, who provided intelligence to the Crown while under cover as the secretary-assistant to Benjamin Franklin.

Gen. George Washington, America's first spymaster,[5] said, "The greatest benefits are to be derived from persons who live on the other side," a clear reference to productive agents who managed their cover well. To prove the point, Washington ran an asset named John Honeyman, ostensibly a Tory cattleman and butcher who had excellent access to British order of battle and other information of intelligence value to the Continental Army. Honeyman provided intelligence that lead to the American victory at Trenton, which lifted the spirits of the Continental Army and demoralized British forces.

The Civil War

Ten years before the Civil War, as the political, economic, and social rift grew wider between north and south, a farflung loose confederation of clandestine operatives applied cover and other tradecraft tools to a serious mission. Adopting names from the rapidly growing railroad industry, these stalwarts called themselves "brakemen," "firemen," "conductors," and "station masters." They were organizers, conveyers, and safehouse keepers of the Underground Railroad who offered their farms, homes, and businesses as sanctuaries and rest stops for runaway slaves. They also donated their time, wealth, and sometimes their lives to their cause.

Thousands of individuals supported the Underground Railroad, but the real clandestine work was done by a few using such natural cover as ministers, tradesmen, and businessmen. They included Rev. Jermain Loguen, Frederick Douglass, Allan Pinkerton (who ran an underground depot at his coopers shop near Chicago),[6] Josiah Henson, and Harriet Tubman. After the war

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began, many members of the Underground Railroad used their clandestine skills to serve as spies and scouts for the Union.

The capitals of the opposing forces in the Civil War were less than 100 miles apart, and the battlelines were irregular and porous. This created the perfect milieu for spies on both sides. For example, if farmers from Pennsylvania were good at assuming regional accents, they could easily pass themselves off as farmers from Virginia and vice versa. Clandestine agents on both sides also posed as merchants, traveling salesmen, plantation owners, lawyers, socialites, actors, minstrels, and bankers.

Two of the many notable Civil War agents were Rose Greenhow and Elizabeth Van Lew. The widow Greenhow, under the cover of a Washington socialite, manipulated secrets from many military and civilian callers while in the service of the Confederacy. At one point during her stay in Washington, she was frequently visited by unmarried President James Buchanan. The extent of any information "Rebel Rose" might have received from the President, however, is not known.[7] The overall quality of her reporting was highly regarded by her superiors in Richmond, and it contributed to the Confederate victory at the first battle of Manassas.

Elizabeth Van Lew, a wealthy spinster and abolitionist, ran a successful spy ring from her Richmond mansion. "Miss Lizzie" or "Crazy Bet," as she was called, calculated correctly that no one strongly pro-Union would be seen as a spy. By playing the role of an addlepated pro-Unionist, she roamed the city and nearby countryside, memorizing the size of military units and their deployments, and contacted other Union sympathizers. She sent her reports on the thin defensive ring surrounding Richmond directly to Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. In another impressive feat, she penetrated the home of Jefferson Davis by placing one of her agents on the household staff of the president of the Confederacy. This operation produced intelligence of such value that the Union attack against Richmond was made considerably easier. After the war, a grateful US Government appointed Elizabeth Van Lew Postmistress of Richmond.

Even the great counterespionage agent, Allen Pinkerton, the Scottish-born detective and the Union's first spy catcher, used cover. Posing as a Charleston broker, he penetrated and disrupted the plans of a Maryland-based secessionist militia organization that planned to assassinate President-elect Lincoln. William Alvin Lloyd, a publisher of railroad and steamboat guides to the southern states, was another expert at the use of cover. He used his occupation as a transportation expert as cover to spy for the Union, although he sent his intelligence reports directly to President Lincoln. Arrested several times by Confederate authorities, Lloyd maintained his cover and was always released. Belle Boyd, the "Cleopatra of the Confederacy," and Lafayette "Lafe" Baker were other noteworthy spies who used various covers for clandestine collection efforts during the Civil War.

Cover in Other Conflicts

In the era between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, Washington placed little significance on the systematic gathering of intelligence. The US Army's attitude toward intelligence was summarized in this adage:

> The brainy join the Corps of Engineers, the brave go to the Infantry, the hard of hearing to the Artillery, and the stupid to Intelligence.[8]

The destruction of the battleship Maine in Havana harbor on 15 February 1898 shattered the nation's complacency. Edward Breck, a former university student in Heidleberg who spoke excellent German, gathered intelligence on Spanish military and political targets while under cover as a German physician in Spain. Breck was so effective in his cover role that he was quickly absorbed into Spanish social and political circles. Eventually, he met and elicited information from the Spanish grand admiral on the whereabouts and the state of readiness of the Spanish fleet. Later, the US Navy used Breck's intelligence to find and destroy the Spanish Navy, an action that virtually ended the Spanish-American War.[9]

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There were spies galore who operated under a multitude of covers during World War I, but no review of the genre is complete without mentioning Margareta Gertruda Zelle, also known as Mata Hari. As an international dancer, she traveled to Paris, Berlin, London, Rome, and Madrid. She used her boudoir to elicit secret information from government officials in each of those capitals and sold it to the highest bidder. Some historians claim that Mata Hari was executed for revealing the foibles of a number of high-level French officials, who were pilloried in the press.

There are times when cover can be too successful. After World War II, MI6 established a tailor's supply shop in Vienna that ostensibly sold Harris tweed. In reality, the British planned to tunnel from the basement of the premises to an underground conduit and tap the telephone lines between Soviet Army Headquarters and Moscow. Unfortunately, Harris tweed became quite a fashion in Vienna and the "shopkeepers" were kept so busy selling bolts of tweed that they spent more time selling than tunneling. Overwhelmed with orders and unable to focus on the tunnel audio operation, the highly successful "shopkeepers" finally closed their doors. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer received a tidy sum from this operation, but it was to be another five years before a consortium of intelligence agencies embarked on another tunnel operation in Berlin.[10]

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NOTES

1. "The Old Winsockie Syndrome." By W. B. Lavender. *Studies In Intelligence*; winter 1990.

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4. "Major John Andre: A Gallant in Spy's Clothing", *Studies in Intelligence*; winter 1992.

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5. Spying for America: The Hidden History of US Intelligence. By Nathan Miller. Paragon House, 1989.

6. The Underground Railroad. By Sharon Cosner. Franklin Watts Publishing; New York; 1991.

7. Spies for the Blue and Gray. By Harnett T. Kane. Ace Books; New York; 1954.

8. Spying for America, p. 218.

9. Ibid., p. 171.

10. Ibid., p. 326.

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Charting a Technical Revolution

An Interview with Former DDS&T Albert Wheelon (U)

Ed Dietel



Albert "Bud" Wheelon, 1966. (U)

"Wheelon developed three new satellite systems that formed the backbone of the Agency's overhead program for...decades. Perhaps even more extraordinary...[he] was only 34 when he became DDS&T."

Ed Dietel served in CIA's Office of General Counsel.

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Editor's Note: Albert "Bud" Wheelon only worked in CIA for four years, first as Director of the Office of Scientific Intelligence from 1962 to 1963, and then as Deputy Director for Science and Technology (DDS&T) from 1963 to 1966. Nevertheless, his contribution during that period was so important to the Agency's subsequent development that he was named a Trailblazer during CIA's 50th Anniversary celebration. Among his other accomplishments, Wheelon conceived and put into development three new satellite systems that formed the backbone of the Agency's overhead program for the next several decades. Perhaps even more extraordinary is the fact that Wheelon was only 34 when he became DDS&T. (U//FOUO)

The son of an aeronautical engineer, Wheelon grew up in Los Angeles and earned his B.Sc. from Stanford in 1949, and his Ph.D. in physics from MIT in 1952 at the age of 23. He amazed his professors by passing the two-day Ph.D. qualifying exam soon after arriving at MIT, despite the fact that he had not taken many of the courses ordinarily needed to prepare a graduate student for the grueling exam. Wheelon was not without outside interests. He first got to know MIT's influential President, James Killian, by working with him to form a rugby football club, which is still a part of student life there after 50 years. (U//FOUO)

In the following interview excerpts, Wheelon discusses his early work on ICBM guidance systems for the Air Force, (b)(1)

CIA's role in satellite reconnaissance in the 1960s, and the three new overhead systems he set into motion while DDS&T. (S//NF)

Ed Dietel of the CIA History Staff's oral history program interviewed Dr. Wheelon on 17 October 1998, in the latter's home in Santa Barbara, California. (U//FOUO)

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Shortly after graduating from MIT, Wheelon joined the newly created Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, a high technology firm in Los Angeles founded by Simon Ramo and Dean Wooldridge. (Ramo-Wooldridge merged with Thompson Products in 1958 and renamed itself TRW in 1965.) The Air Force's advisory "Tea Pot Committee" of prominent scientists and engineers called for a crash program to develop an ICBM in 1954, and the Air Force responded by creating the Air Force Western Development Division (WDD) in Inglewood, California, under Brig. Gen. Bernard Schriever. WDD, in turn, employed Ramo-Wooldridge to provide systems engineering and technical direction for the entire project. (U//FOUO)

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When I went to work for Ramo-Wooldridge, their only job was to support the Tea Pot Committee, which was chaired by [former AEC commissioner and world-renowned mathematician] John von Neumann. It also included Prof. Clarke Millikan of Cal Tech, Ramo and Wooldridge, Charles Lindbergh, Jimmy Doolittle, [MIT professor and, later, Special Assistant to President Kennedy for Science and Technology Jerome] "Jerry" Wiesner, and [Hughes Aircraft General Manager and member of President Eisenhower's Scientific Advisory Committee Laurence] "Pat" Hyland. A breakthrough in the H-bomb design had just taken place, and so they were chartered to rethink the ballistic missile program that would carry such weapons. This was von Neumann's charge. The committee was all very top secret, but it needed some staff work done. I was the only one available. It was like being the only graduate student with 10 full professors, with each one giving me an assignment once a day, and then I would work all night trying to get the answers. It was a lot of fun, and I learned a lot. I also got to know these people. To be in on that activity from the first day was really exciting, although I was just out of school, and they were all quite senior. (U//FOUO)

Talk about youthful hubris! I worked for the Tea Pot Committee for about a week, and then got my clearance. I asked, "Okay, what's the job around here?" Wooldridge answered, "We are going to build a missile that's going to go 5,000 miles, and it is going to hit within a mile of the target." I was so inexperienced and optimistic I said, "That's a good idea, let's get started." I had no real idea how hard it would prove to be. (U//FOUO)

I spent nine years working on the long-range missile project. It began in a clandestine way and was actually run out of a former Catholic school in Inglewood. Closed by the diocese, the school was rented by the Air Force, and about 20 of us started Atlas, Titan, and Thor programs there. Jim Fletcher, who was twice the head of NASA, was my boss. I worked on guidance systems and tried to understand how to guide long-range rockets. I made some fundamental contributions, and I still get requests for the work I did during that period. (U//FOUO)

There were two main efforts to build ballistic missiles, and they were competitive. The Army's at Huntsville, using the German group out of Peenemunde around von Braun, and the Air Force effort to make long-range rockets under Ben Schriever, with Wooldridge and Ramo as architectural advisers. The factories that built components were all over the country for both teams, but those were the two centers. The Navy later got into the business with the submarine-launched Polaris, Poseidon, and Trident missiles. The Air Force long-range missile program was centered in Inglewood right by the airport. I was one of the foot soldiers in that operation. Occasionally, I would brief the von Neumann group, because of the work I was doing. (U//FOUO)

First Contact with the CIA (U)

My connection to the Intelligence Community (IC) began in 1957 and was the result of improbable coincidence. We had worked hard since November 1953 trying to make our missiles work. For several years, it had not been going well because we had not yet learned how to build long-range rockets. Although I was far from an executive during this time, my visibility was a little higher than one might have expected. (U//FOUO)

CIA had been running U-2 missions since 1956, but I had no inkling of that program. At that time, photo interpreters were primarily converted forestry majors from college and had little technical experience outside of photogrammetry. Someone finally went to [DCI Allen] Dulles and [DDCI and Air Force General Charles] Cabell and said, "Look, we are running these incredible risks to fly these missions, and yet we are not getting much in the way of technical information." They argued that "We simply must get some people who are building our own missiles to come in and look at this material." Dulles agreed, and they formed JAM SESSION in September 1957, working at the Steuart Building, downtown at the old National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).[1] (U//FOUO)

[1] JAM SESSION invited 26 US experts on nuclear and missile technology to Washington to work alongside Agency photo interpreters for three weeks to maximize exploitation of U-2 photography on the Soviet nuclear and ICBM programs. (U/FOUO)

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Schriever's ICBM group on the West Coast was asked to send somebody. As they always do, they selected two fellows who were senior but who ran into some sort of difficulty on the way to Washington. At the last minute, I was selected and went to Washington. I had no idea what I was getting into until somebody handed me a briefing form for TALENT KEYHOLE and other materials. I was suddenly parachuted into the wonderful world of NPIC. They also gave us access to COMINT and the telemetry data, which they did not know what to do with either, by the way. So it was purely accidental that I became involved in intelligence activities. (b)(3)(c)

"Well," I thought, "thank heaven the government has the wit and the courage to create a U-2 program and is willing to run these risks." I kind of knew where we were in the missile business, and was amazed at how far along the Soviets were. It looked to me like we were in a real horse race. It also seemed to me that there was a lot of good information that needed analysis. A lot of good data was being taken, and not much was happening to it. Everybody is kind of a photo interpreter, and you know what it means if you have got the background. It is like reading X-rays. If someone has looked at lots of cases of lung cancer, he can spot it pretty accurately. My sense was that a lot more could be done with the telemetry data that was being gathered. It was a gold mine waiting to be developed, and it seemed to me that a real contribution could be made in that area. (C)

"I kind of knew where we were in the missile business, and was amazed at how far along the Soviets were. It looked to me like we were in a real horse race."

I thought the people at NPIC and CIA were terrific. The dedication and the commitment of the career intelligence officers were quite remarkable. It occurred to me that doing intelligence analysis was a lot like doing crossword puzzles. It is also the closest thing to doing physics that I have ever found, which is probably why I was attracted to it. Let me explain how physics is done. You do an experiment and get a result. You usually do not understand it completely. You think a little bit and generate an explanation for the data. You go back and forth between theory and experiment to do physics. It seemed to me that the intelligence business was just the same. You have a lot of incomplete experimental data. One has to work with only a small fraction of the puzzle pieces and try to establish a hypothesis that could explain the data at hand. This model usually makes other predictions which can be compared against other data and suggest further collection efforts. The intellectual challenge is the same as doing science. (U//FOUO)

The Soviet Missile Telemetry Puzzle (U)

We all worked hard at the Steuart building for a month, and then I went back to Los Angeles. Schriever and Ramo asked me about this experience. I responded that, "I thought we did some good. We lifted up the tent flap and saw what was inside. There is a lot more that can be done there, but that is not our job." But Schriever picked up on this. He had been part of the U-2 development and had a keen interest in reconnaissance. Schriever said, "That was a good effort, but we ought to keep this going." He arranged to have the Air Technical Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base create an intelligence cell at BMD, Ballistic Missile Division [as the Air Force's Western Development Division was now named]. They assigned a project officer, a communications person, and security guy full time to us. Ramo directed me to find good people in our organization to become cleared. When we started working on the data, it was really a continuation of JAM SESSION on the West Coast, and we called it WESTWING. We had the U-2 photography and some COMINT. One (b)(1)

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(b)(1) Often we did not know the collection site, but it did not matter. What was

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Much to its credit, NSA [with the Air Force and the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence] organized a community effort to solve this problem in 1958, drawing largely from nongovernmental groups. This led to the establishment of TEBAC [Telemetry and Beacon Analysis Committee] in 1960. It was then that I first worked with [future Secretary of Defense William] Perry. Actually, we had been classmates in school at Stanford, but we met in this business when Bill was at Electronic Defense Labs. Future DDS&T Carl Duckett was involved down at Huntsville and had been part of the JAM SESSION operation. This group met every three months and provided an important clearinghouse for new results and difficult problems.

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It was a

“Often we did not know the collection site, but it did not matter. What was

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community effort, like doing a family crossword puzzle at Thanksgiving. Gradually, we got all

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I still had another job at TRW designing guidance systems for the missile program, and we started the Minuteman program in 1960. And I had a larger hand in that program than just guidance. I might add that I had no relationship to the CORONA [satellite reconnaissance] program during this period. I was just working on the missile programs; only a few people were involved in CORONA. (U//FOUO)

CIA and TRW (U)

Our relationship with this group at Wright Field was not going well for several reasons. They felt that our work should not be distributed if it did not support the Air Force position in USIB [the United States Intelligence Board]. They felt that our job was to support their policy positions and not to do research. They refused to circulate work that we did that did not agree with their official position, whatever it might be. (U//FOUO)

There was an important debate going on at that time, as to whether

(b)(1)

but the Air Force position was that it was large, perhaps because they wanted to build MX. So they suppressed our results. Finally [Ruben] “Rue” Mettler [director of Space Technology Laboratories, a Ramo-Wooldridge subsidiary] and I and Jimmy Doolittle—who was then involved—said “We just cannot go on like this. We are not here as part of a propaganda machine; we are here doing serious analysis. Our standards and theirs just are not the same.” TRW withdrew from the program, and that was difficult. Mettler and I put our important relationship with the Air Force on the line and lost some friends in the process.

(b)(3)(c)

Director of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) Herbert “Pete” Scoville and Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) Robert Amory had known of our work and stepped in. They said, “We will

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sponsor your analytic effort as a service of common concern for the Community." We had to think hard about that because our primary customer was the Air Force. It seemed to us that CIA understood what the problem was. They offered, "Look, we will publish your work, whether it agrees with our position or not. We will simply fan it out to the Community for whatever constructive purpose that serves. We will try to get you the raw data. All we ask is that you have integrity in the research you do." That sounded pretty good. It was also clear to us that they had a good deal more influence in terms of getting us data than the Air Force had, or were at least prepared to try a lot harder. So, in the summer of 1960, we started. This effort became Project EARSHOT, an OSI project that became a Community asset. (S//NF)

There was another issue for the analytic effort that we had been fighting and losing. NSA had been collecting data but did not know what to do with all the information. We learned that it was sitting in a vault at NSA

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

Well, Scoville solved this problem almost immediately when EARSHOT began. Pretty soon we could

(b)(1)

photography. It was an exciting enterprise and did a lot of good for the estimates. (S//NF)

Joining the CIA (U)

When Wheelon agreed to join the Agency in 1962, he did so with the understanding that it would be for at least three but not more than four years. (U//FOUO)

I still had a job to do at TRW. I was by now director of the Radio Physics Lab, but my heart was really in this intelligence analysis. When Pete Scoville moved up to become Deputy Director for Research, he and Bob Amory approached me, saying "Will you come back and fill in for Scoville?" This was in February 1962, and I thought about it hard and finally said, "Okay, I'll do it." I had missed World War II and Korea. World War II because I was too young—16 when it was over. During the Korean War, I was a graduate student at MIT. I went down at my own expense to Washington to volunteer for the Air Force. MIT President Killian and others in the physics department found out about it. They said "This country needs nuclear physicists, not second lieutenants in the Air Force." They called their friends in Washington and killed it. They were probably right, but I had not served in the military. I thought, "Well, it is my time to go." (U//FOUO)

I was awfully young—just 33 at the time. I was also pretty brash. People at CIA knew of the work that I had done before coming, so they were accepting. I believe they were also a little concerned that I might make unaccustomed demands. A mixture of applause and apprehension marked my arrival. Others in the Directorate of Intelligence were very welcoming. Paul Borel [Director, Office of Central Reference] and Otto Guthe [Director, Office of Research and Reports] and Jack Smith [Director, Office of Current Intelligence] were saying, "Good, got a real scientist around here, a real technologist." They saw it as strengthening the intellectual capital of the Agency. For the people within OSI, it was a time of adjustment. Pete [Scoville] was a comfortable person. They knew him well and enjoyed a warm relationship with him. By contrast, they had none with me. So that was different. Several of them thought they might have succeeded Pete. (U//FOUO)

The biggest problem was that I had been told that OSI would go with Scoville to the Directorate for Research [which was renamed the Directorate of Science and Technology in August 1963]. That was my understanding when I accepted the job. I arrived in Washington to find that Ray Cline had replaced Amory as DDI and was successfully insisting that OSI not be moved. I suddenly found myself working for a man I had never met and, frankly,

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I did not much care for. I admired his intellectual gifts, and he worked hard. On the other hand, he felt that analysts are fungible and that an economist could do just as well on a scientific problem as a scientist. He may have been right, but that was not my belief. Had I known that this was the situation, I certainly would not have joined the CIA. (U//FOUO)

All of a sudden, I had transported my family across the country, taken a big pay cut, folded up my house in California, and rented a place in Washington, and I was working for a man who really did not understand what I was trying to do. Instead of working for Scoville, who understood perfectly and would provide support, I needed to persuade a stranger that what I was doing was worthwhile. (U//FOUO)

In addition, OSI was a little edgy with a new, young director. There was obviously a lot of talent in the office, not all of which was being used effectively. Future DDI Sayre Stevens was a good example. When I arrived, I asked him, "What are you working on, Sayre?" He responded, "Soviet windmills." I said, "You must be kidding." He said, "No, this is my assignment." I said, "Look, there is a real job to be done around here. We have to start doing it." Future DDS&T Les Dirks was a Rhodes Scholar and a MIT-educated physicist. He was quite young but obviously talented, and I soon found important things for him to do. (U//FOUO)

I went around re-aiming people. That irritated some folks, but I felt that we had a lot of important

"I went around re-aiming people. That irritated some folks [at CIA], but I felt that we had a lot of important problems to solve."

problems to solve. I felt that the EARSHOT group I had left on the West Coast was going pretty well in the missile area but that we needed to generate similar activities drawing in national expertise and close-couple it with the Agency, rather than occasionally interviewing people. I went to the Livermore Laboratory of the AEC and set up a project to evaluate Soviet and Chinese nuclear weapons activities. We set up a similar project at Sandia. (b)(1) There was a pattern then of trying to augment the indigenous CIA capabilities with outside expertise. I believe that went okay. It seemed to go well and did not crowd the old hands in OSI. (S//NF)

Still, someone from the [Office of] the Inspector General (IG) showed up to interview me. He said in essence, "We have got some unhappy campers in OSI. What do you have to say?" I responded, "Well, I guess you are probably right. There is a land shift going on here." Inevitably, some people feel discomfited, but I was hired to accelerate this activity and make it more relevant, and OSI under me was nowhere as comfortable as it had been under Pete. It was also doing a lot more intelligence analysis and doing it better. (U//FOUO)

The Cuban Missile Crisis (U)

I worked long hours during my first summer at CIA. I was there until about 10 p.m. almost every night. My wife and kids were still on the West Coast, because we could not sell our house, and I was living at Howard Roman's house while he and his family were away. I did not have much to do at night, so I started reading clandestine reports, which I had never seen before. Although many were uninteresting for our work, I became convinced during those summer months that something was going on in Cuba. There was one report that really caught my attention, but the sheer number of reports indicating missile deployment on the island bothered me. (U//FOUO)

An estimate underway by Sherman Kent's Board of National Estimates was addressing the question: Will the Russians put missiles in Cuba? The estimate was clearly coming down on the side that they would not. That was the signal that President Kennedy hoped to hear from the Agency. DCI John McCone was getting married again after losing his wife during his first year, and he was out of action. He had disagreed with this approach, but he was not around to enforce his view. DDCI [and Army Lt. Gen.] Marshall Carter was left to deal with whatever came up. The estimate was rolling forward on this basis. I was reading the clandestine reports, but I was not central to estimates on Soviet intentions. Nonetheless, I went to Kent and had a long discussion. I said, "Sherm, look, I am new around here, so you should discount a lot of what I say. I am

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not a professional intelligence person, but it looks to me like the evidence is overwhelming that they have missiles down there." It was late, but we talked for several hours. Finally, he said, "I respect your view, but this is the way we are going." (U//FOUO)

(b)(1)

It said that they were moving large, trailered loads at night. These loads were so long that they could not make the corners and had to remove the corner mailboxes that are used in Cuba and other countries. The report said that they had to cut the posts down to get the trucks around the corners. I thought to myself, "People do not make that up, it must be real." I then concluded, "If he has got that part right, he has probably got the rest of it right. It looks to me like they are putting missiles in there." I mentioned my concern to Carter, "I think we are heading down the wrong track on this estimate, but I am pretty new around here." We actually had a debate in the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, where I was chairman, but I was alone in my view on Cuba. Sidney Graybeal was the Agency rep and he argued against me, taking Kent's line. He said, "Oh, you can't believe those clandestine reports anyway." I had brought the reports with me. I said, "It looks to me like they are putting in missiles," but everybody hooted me down. I said, "Okay, I am just the chairman." (S)

When it was over, McCone invited me to his office and said, "You and

"I had brought the reports [on Cuba] with me. I said, 'It looks to me like they are putting in missiles,' but everybody hooted me down."

I were the only ones that got that one right. I will tell you how I got my answer, if you will tell me how you got yours." I told him the story I just told you, and he told me his version. He explained his view: "They put SA-2s in Cuba first to keep us from learning about something important. The only thing that important was nuclear rockets." We had quite a conversation at that time, and I believe he judged that I was prepared to take an unpopular position. I believe he liked that in me. (U//FOUO)

Following the missile crisis, another fellow from the IG staff came to see me. In essence, he was there to scold me, saying "How come you broke ranks with the DDI and the Office of National Estimates? How come you went against the grain?" I said, "You ought to be glad that somebody around here is yelling fire when there is a fire going on. You have got a nerve coming into my office and trying to brace me with an organizational loyalty issue. Where do you get off?" He was stunned, and left. There was the fraternal, go along, get along attitude in many parts of CIA. (U//FOUO)

Taking Over the S&T (U)

Pete Scoville resigned from the Agency in 1963. He had become frustrated with what he perceived was lack of support from DCI McCone for his agenda in the Directorate for Research. In addition to impressing McCone during the Cuban missile crisis, Wheelon had the backing of James Killian and Jerome Wiesner. One of Wheelon's first acts as DDS&T was to urge McCone to reverse the erosion of CIA's responsibilities for overhead systems, which had been losing influence since the foundation of the National Reconnaissance Office in 1961. (U//FOUO)

I made the following case to McCone, "There are a number of important things in this Agency. Killian and Land have urged you to build up the technical capabilities of the Agency. Of those activities, the most important thing is overhead reconnaissance. In my view, only that collection technique can really answer the tough questions we face. We need to do more and better reconnaissance. And there is a lot more that can and should be done. CORONA only scratches the surface, and we cannot use the SR-71 [the supersonic spyplane, also known as the Blackbird] and the U-2 over the Soviet Union because of the Eisenhower commitment. Satellites are not only the best way, they are the only way we are going to get those answers." (U//FOUO)

I expressed my belief that, "The Pentagon—not necessarily the Air Force—the Pentagon wants to take over this activity. They want the Agency out of it. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara has made that plain to you. He sees the Agency as a hobby shop doing some R&D and generating

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requirements." McNamara had told McCone that is how he saw the Agency role, so there was no dispute about that. (U//FOUO)

The Pentagon's own space programs were not going well. They had just canceled the ADVENT communications satellite program. They had also canceled the SAMOS reconnaissance satellite program. By contrast, CORONA was going well, and space was becoming a big thing. From McNamara's point of view, he was working hard to consolidate space activities under the Air Force. The other services kept saying, "How do you reconcile that edict with CIA programs?" I think he saw the CIA role as an untidy arrangement. He and McCone differed on Vietnam. I also believe that McNamara was the consummate empire builder. He believed in tidy government, and found this collaborative arrangement between the Agency and the Air Force as silly. Perhaps it had made sense originally, but it no longer did, now that he was there and doing things properly. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Eugene Fubini aided and abetted that view, as did future Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. (U//FOUO)

Back to my conversation with McCone. I said, "When you get right down to it, the NRO is really a post office box for the Air Force. The only capability that the NRO has is the Air Force, and they in turn rely on industry. I know how that system works. The question before the country is simple: "Do we want to go to a sole-source arrangement and grant an exclusive franchise for reconnaissance to the Air Force? Or do we want to have competing activities? The fact is that the Air Force has done a miserable job with its own space programs. SAMOS has been an unqualified disaster. By contrast, the Agency's program in this area has been an unqualified success." (U//FOUO)

"I said [to DCI McCone,] 'I believe that strategic reconnaissance is even more important than nuclear weapons right now. To turn this thing over as an exclusive franchise to the weak player is a disservice to the country.'"

Then I reminded McCone, "When you were head of the AEC, the Air Force approached you and said that the people at Los Alamos are fighting the development of thermonuclear weapons. We need them." So you created Livermore out of whole cloth. Lawrence, Teller, Herb York, Johnny Foster, and Harold Brown got some plutonium and started designing weapons in Pleasanton, California. All of a sudden, Los Alamos was bringing out new designs, and things started to move. I said, "You went along with that decision. I believe that strategic reconnaissance is even more important than nuclear weapons right now. I believe that, for the good of the country, to turn this thing over as an exclusive franchise to the weak player is a disservice to the country. I believe that we should be willing to bear the burden of untidiness and duplication in the government in return for getting good reconnaissance. You can decide it either way. If you decide that you want the benefits of competition and want to keep the Agency in this business, then you will have to do things entirely differently. The course that you have followed so far has been facilitating this drift toward an exclusive dependence on the Air Force." (U//FOUO)

I did not frame it, "You have to do this, if I am going to do that." I said, "This is the national policy issue." I said, "If you come to the belief that the country needs two [programs], and you want to keep the Agency in, and you are willing to commit every bit of your prestige and energy to that end, then I will help you. I believe I can do the technical part. But you must reverse course and run the risk of sacrificing your prestige on this altar." (U//FOUO)

I believe my argument was also that the Air Force inevitably is going to come up with other solutions that are tailored to its needs—not national needs. I said, "The Air Force cares about the country, but they fundamentally have a different job. Therefore, somebody has got to worry about what the President needs before the war starts, and that is our job. And we need a different mechanism that is tuned differently, that is aimed differently, that is motivated differently to do that job. And the Agency three times now has shown it can do it—U-2, SR-71, and CORONA. It is likely to keep on doing it unless

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the flame is snuffed out, and we are at the eve of snuffing out that flame, Mr. McCone. Scoville's resignation forces that issue on you. What role do you want the Agency to play? I believe you must make up your mind. What is good for the country here? I will go along with whatever you say." I did not threaten to quit; there was none of that. But I said, "The most important thing this Directorate can do is to support a continuing reconnaissance program. If you do not want to do that, then you have to think long and hard about what you *do* want the Directorate to do, and then we will talk further. But the first issue and the one that really matters, is, what about reconnaissance? What about reconnaissance, Mr. McCone?" (U//FOUO)

He was persuaded by those words, and said, "I will throw myself into this battle." His last words at the Agency, on the last morning he was there at the morning meeting, were, "I want to apologize to you folks for not having done more to fix the NRO problem." I believe that that was the burden on his heart as he left. (U//FOUO)

Developing New Overhead Systems (U)

Let's talk about three systems, each of which originated in my first six months on the job as DDS&T. This began in July of 1963. Hughes had been working with NASA and DoD to put Syncom-II into a stationary, geosynchronous orbit. When I read on the front page of *The Herald Tribune* that they had succeeded, I thought, "This has a lot to do with our business. For a first time, we

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(b)(3)(c)

There were a good many technical questions that had to be answered. One was the antenna design. [Future Associate DDS&T] Lloyd Lauderdale gets a lot of the credit

(b)(1)

I will never forget the day when they finally came in with a model and manually cranked it up—the thing actually deployed. I said, "Come on, let's go up and see McCone." We showed it to him, and he agreed to go forward. (S//NF)

The second problem posed a far more subtle question. If you stand on a high place, you will hear everything in addition to what you are looking for. The question is, would the other transmitters that we were not interested in swamp out what we were interested in? In

(b)(1)

It was a go/no go question. We gave that job to Bill Perry, who had just left EDL to set up his own company in Palo Alto. I went to Bill, for whom I had a high regard, and said, "The key question in this new project is whether or not we can do this. Will you please go off to one side and work with NSA to see what the background data look like. Please tell us whether we are on the right track? There is no point building this system and having it be a flop." After about six months, Perry took us through it all and the answer was yes, we could make it work. On that basis we proceeded. (S//NF)

The second system was generated by a need that came out of my Cuban missile experience. We needed to build a system that could provide pictures in near real time. On one of my few days off, I was watching a professional football game from San Francisco. I remarked, "If I can watch a football game from San Francisco, we can get pictures back from the satellite! Technology has come along sufficiently to do so." I put Dirks to work on that with the mandate "to build a near real-time system and bring photography into the current intelligence arena." (S//NF)

Dave Packard took it upon himself to come around and talk to people who were to be involved in the project when he was Deputy Secretary of Defense. He came to see me, and he asked me what assurance could I give him that we could do our part. I was able to say that we could do our task with confidence. This depended on building a new and much more capable traveling wave tube. This program was primarily Dirks's success, although Duckett and Helms deserve much credit for pushing it along. (S//NF)

System number three was a CORONA improvement, which is to say a new broad-research system. CORONA was having some troubles, and we got [Stanford Professor Sidney] Drell and his group to come in and take a look. We finally solved the problem. (S//NF)

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Independent of that problem, it was clear that the photointerpreters were having trouble finding some facilities in the miles of 70mm film that we were bringing back [from CORONA missions]. I went to NPIC head Art Lundahl and I said, "Art, what is the problem? Do we need to give you better resolution?" He said, "I think so." We decided to do some experiments. We took some high-resolution SR-71 pictures and degraded them to various levels. We gave these pictures to the photointerpreters and found out how many times they got the right answer as a function of what the resolution was. They evidently needed something a good deal better than CORONA was then delivering to make a significant improvement in their performance as photointerpreters—who I figured were my consumers, even though they did not work for me. (S//NF)

Because the Drell panel was then meeting, I asked, "How hard can we push CORONA by the product improvements that we have been making?" The same answer came back from our own people, from Itek [which built the CORONA camera], and from the Drell group—that we had pushed CORONA about as far as we could. It has a focal length that could not be changed. The film is what it is. To build a high-resolution search system, we would simply have to start over. I believe I talked that over with [Polaroid Corporation President and member of President Johnson's Science Advisory Committee Edwin] Land, and he agreed.[2] I got chief of the Special Projects Staff Jackson Maxey and future chief of the Office of Special Projects John Crowley involved in this. I said, "How do we build a search system, same coverage, but with a lot better resolution?" (S//NF)

That began the search for a new search system. Our first move was to place a contract with Itek, to see if they could design a new system. They worked under our funding for most of 1964, trying to develop a follow-on to CORONA that would have the improved performance. (U//FOUO)

The relationship with Itek was a rocky one. One, they were not making much headway. Two, Jack Maxey was a strong-willed man, and I believe he tended to give them a good deal more direction than they felt they needed. Behind the scenes, Fubini had approached Itek and said, "Look, CIA is not going to build satellite systems any more. You are wasting your time. If you jump ship with the Agency and work with us, we will make sure you are the contractor for an Air Force-sponsored system like this."[3] (U//FOUO)

During a meeting of the Land Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, Land was called out of the meeting. He came back about a half hour later and said, "I have to tell you that Itek no longer wants to participate with the Agency on the Advanced Search System, they want to have the contract terminated and cease work." We were dumbfounded. It was like the day Kennedy was shot; everyone remembers where they were. I asked Land if they had given any reason but he said, "No, not really, they just want out." It was not clear whether it was a technical problem or in the management capability, but they wanted out. (U//FOUO)

[Franklin] "Frank" Lindsay [Itek's president], who had once been at the Agency, said, "We have got a mess here that I need to straighten out." So he came down to have lunch with McCone and me. McCone was a lot rougher than we thought. Lindsay gave an explanation that did not make any sense at all. About the best he could say was that the working relationship had a lot of friction. I had not been working with them, so it was not an attack on me, but he said the people who work for Wheelon were tough to get along with. McCone did not buy it at all, and Lindsay was ushered out of the lunch without having his hand shaken. (U//FOUO)

I said, "Mr. McCone, I believe we have to take this seriously. It may be that, unbeknownst to me, our people are heavy-handed. They have a lot of other contractors in various parts of this. With your permission, I would like to go around and check on them and see if there has been any trace of this elsewhere." He said, "I believe that is exactly right, you go and check." I

[2] Land chaired the "Land Panel" of the President's Science Advisory Committee. The panel had as its responsibility oversight of the country's satellite reconnaissance program. (U//FOUO)

[3] According to NRO's historian, Dr. Wheelon's recollection of events in Itek's withdrawal from the NRO/CIA follow-on imaging system is not shared by company executives, who fault business practices in connection with the contract. (U)

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started going around to all the contractors that worked for the Agency. I found that, whatever the merits of the Itek problem, no one else was experiencing it. (U//FOUO)

I came back and gave my report, and I said, "It looks to me like this is an Itek-specific problem." It is clear that they had been under a lot of pressure. Under Secretary of the Air Force and NRO Director Brockway McMillan had made it absolutely clear that McNamara did not want the Agency developing new systems. The only question was, had they pulled the trigger or had Itek sensed where their best interests lay? (U//FOUO)

Meanwhile, with Itek out of it, the need remained. Dirks, Lauderdale, and I began to think about it. The reason for starting this system was not a desire to build a new system but to meet a need. We were working with Perkin-Elmer at the time on the SR-71 camera, and I asked them if they had any ideas. They said, "Coincidentally, we have an invention in the lab, which might be of interest to you." So with that, we began to work with Perkin-Elmer. (S//NF)

Some Observations on DCI John McCone (U)

(b)(1)

"John McCone walked in, looked around the room with those blue eyes and said 'Who authorized that mission?' I made a quick calculation to myself that '...today is as good a day as any to quit this outfit.'"

(b)(1)

John McCone was an aloof guy. I believe he had the finest mind of anyone I have ever worked for. He was an excellent analyst. He had an incredible memory, and was intellectually tough and honest. Having said that, I will tell you that he was not a good manager of people. He was billed as a manager, but had no sense of how to motivate an organization. (U//FOUO)

The U-2 mission (b)(1) was a high-priority effort. When they put pressure on me to plan it, I had counseled McCone and Kennedy that it was a long way in, and I was not sure we could make it. Air Force Brigadier General and Director, Office of Special Activities, Jack Ledford and I were at a Christmas party at McCone's house on a snowy night. McCone dragged us into his study to say, "I just want to reiterate to you two how important this thing is." I responded, "I know that, and I want to reiterate to you that it is a long way in, and I am not sure we are going to make it." The Taiwanese U-2 pilot was about ready to take off. I had been asleep for about three hours, and the phone rings. It is the Ops Center in OSA [Office of Special Activities], and this plane has been shot down going in. I joined Ledford and the Ops people in our control center.

(b)(1)

As usual, I went to the morning meeting and asked Ledford to come with me. John McCone walked in and looked around the room with those blue eyes of his and said, "Who authorized that mission?" I made a quick calculation. I said [to myself], "Well, today is as good a day as any to quit this outfit." I responded, "I have a piece of paper with your signature, and Mac Bundy's, and Bob McNamara's, and Dean Rusk's, on it telling me to do it." DDCI Carter said, "That's right, sir, you ordered that mission." One could have heard a pin drop in that room. McCone closed his book, got up, and left the room. The subject was never mentioned again. Do not ask me, I cannot explain it. He was a great director, but he had a few little shortcomings here and there. (U//FOUO)

Most people were scared to death of John McCone, but I was not—perhaps because I was not trying to build a career in CIA. I will tell you this story. Helms and I ran a (b)(1) operation in Cuba as part of the MONGOOSE program to destabilize the Castro regime. I was involved in it because of some technical things we were doing. It

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was a mess, with high-speed boats firing .50-caliber guns. And one of John McCone's J.P. Hendy freighters sailed right into the middle of this. It was shot up by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The next day, McCone got Helms and me in his office to say, "You guys almost sunk my ship yesterday down there." I looked at Helms, who was senior to me by quite a bit, and I thought, "He knows how to handle these things." Helms did not say a word. So, finally, I said to myself, "Well, it is another good day to quit." I said, "Mr. McCone, you knew that operation was going down. A lot of good men got killed down there yesterday. It is up to you to keep your ship out of the way." McCone said, "I guess you are right," and that was the end of it. (U//FOUO)

I do not mean to paint myself as a hero; it is just that on a number of occasions I stood up to McCone on a matter of principle. I thought it was important, and I believe he responded well to that. But I did not see anybody else doing it. I believe that people more directly involved were just intimidated by him, his wealth, and the fact that he was all business. I was young and brash. (U//FOUO)

On Cooperation (U)

Why is it that people like [IBM physicist and longtime government consultant Richard] Garwin, and Perry, and I spent so much of our life working for the government instead of doing science? You learn physics like you learn to be a silversmith: through the apprentice process. You cannot read a book and become a physicist; you have to work with a physicist. Our contact with our professors was a feature in our maturing, in our becoming physicists. (U//FOUO)

Many of the faculty at MIT had been deeply involved in World War II, and they continued to serve the government after the war. They were much in demand in Washington and were constantly going back and forth. Their advice was wanted because they were the high priests of a new era. They had developed a conviction about what government plus science could do together. They had a feeling that nothing was more important than national security. We got all that from them during our apprenticeship. We watched them make choices on how to spend their time, and they always spent it for the country. Each one of us came away from those relationships feeling that the country came first. (U//FOUO)

Before the war, science was supported by private money. The Palomar telescope was built with private money. The Mount Wilson telescopes were built with private money. Ernie Lawrence's cyclotrons at Berkeley were built with private money. There were no R&D contracts, except those that kept a couple of airplane companies going with development programs. We learned that lesson for the first time in our country's history. After the war, we said, "Look, we have got a good thing going here, let's keep it going." So the National Science Foundation was born, the Office of Naval Research, all the funding at Lincoln Laboratory, Los Alamos, Livermore, and so on. We said, "Look, we have a winning formula here of extraordinary technologists plus government funding." And it really worked. (U//FOUO)

I believe that game plan has pretty well run its course. What started out as a fantastic adventure has gradually become trench warfare involving procurement regulations. Grants are becoming just another paper translator and doing things by the numbers. So I think a lot of the excitement has been lost. Men of good will and great ability once did amazing things together at incredible speeds. That does not describe the defense industry today. Where you do see that today is in Silicon Valley and the software firms. They have that kind of verve and acceleration, but the government is not part of that. (U//FOUO)

In a way, I believe this golden moment of partnership between the government and science has grown tired. The Agency was always a little different. It worked with Kelly Johnson at Lockheed and others in the way things had been done during the war. That is why people wanted to work with the Agency, because it was a carryover from an era that had been lost at DoD. (U//FOUO)

Reflections on the Agency (U)

After leaving the Agency, Wheelon joined Hughes Aircraft, where he eventually became Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. He also served as a member of the

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President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1982 to 1988. (U//FOUO)

When you go to work for the Agency, you have to admit that you are not going to have it all. Never have a yacht. You are not going to have your own jet. But there is a camaraderie and a sense of commitment and dedication and being with other people who are really superior to those on the outside. (U//FOUO)

"I was really spoiled by the Agency. Spoiled by its integrity. My time at CIA was just the best four years of my life."

I was really spoiled by the Agency. Spoiled by its integrity. I had a good deal of trouble adjusting when I left the Agency. Not being able to depend on people. Always having to recalibrate. My time at CIA was just the best four years of my life. It was the highlight of my life. Not before or since have I had that kind of feeling of commitment or bonding or confidence in my colleagues. I simply never worked with such a fine group of men and women. (U//FOUO)

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An Intelligence Challenge

Verification Implications of Commercial Satellite Imagery (U)

Capt. Marc A. Viola

"Technical means that monitor compliance with treaties have the potential of becoming the same technical means used for targeting weapons more accurately. This situation is the verification paradox."

Capt. Marc A. Viola is a US Air Force Departmental Requirements Officer.

High-resolution commercial satellite imagery (CSI) products are expected on the global market within a year. With resolutions as high as 1 meter, their imagery could be used as an "international technical means" in treaty verification. CSI will also have threatening applications, with implications for the US Intelligence Community (IC).

The United States has monitored national security interests with its own imagery collection system, but the rest of the world has not had this luxury until now. The availability of 1-meter data presents problems for US policymakers unaccustomed to the idea of America being scrutinized by other nations. Policymakers have to decide whether it is important to protect American citizens or to contribute to international verification efforts. For CSI to succeed at verification and thereby increase international stability, the United States will have to become more tolerant of this potential worldwide intelligence source. Another troubling development is that the IC can no longer assume that American citizens and world leaders will blindly trust US intelligence revelations. The IC will have to be more forthright in providing information on world events and ready to face unsubstantiated and unqualified claims. US intelligence efforts can expect commercial researchers to constantly challenge the IC's credibility.

Verification Paradox

Technical means that monitor compliance with treaties have the potential of becoming the same technical means used for targeting weapons more accurately. This situation is the verification paradox. Verification tools are only as scrupulous as those who use them. Few readily notice the "irony that the machines that spy on nuclear weapons also are used for guidance systems to deliver those same weapons with deadly accuracy."[1] The same holds true for CSI systems that have resolution capabilities sufficient for targeting. Even in the most well-meaning of agreements, "the same technology, the same capability, can be used to help combat and to help negotiate agreements with...opponents."[2]

The emergence of high-resolution CSI systems could create as many problems as solutions for the IC. Whether CSI can contribute to deterrence may lie with the US Government's ability to appreciate potential implications *before* they occur. Policymakers and intelligence planners have to face the implications and potential problems of using commercial satellite imagery for treaty verification.

International Monitoring Proposals

Proposals for using CSI for international monitoring already exist. In 1993, Dr. Bhupendra Jasani, a Senior Research Fellow at the

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Department of War Studies of King's College in London, submitted one of the first. *Jane's Intelligence Review* featured Dr. Jasani's "The Value of Civilian Satellite Imagery" in its May 1993 issue. Jasani proposed several concepts for CSI monitoring of peacekeeping using SPOT imagery.[3] Dr. Jasani's proposal comes from a European perspective, which gives insight into the foreign expectations for satellite reconnaissance. The proposal also comes from a perspective where high-resolution satellite reconnaissance capabilities are not a given, as they are in the United States.

Jasani envisioned making imagery data "freely available to member states," and "[carrying] out verification and cease-fire monitoring tasks under the UN umbrella," or even having these functions directly controlled by the UN, under the Security Council, without national or regional influences. [4] These proposals, however, cut off potential business opportunities to outside imagery suppliers. International lobbying and competitive "blocs" could influence the selection of CSI contacts by those wishing to foster their own national CSI industry sales. Suppliers, such as the United States, with more capable imagery systems may find themselves closed out of potential overseas markets. The IC might submit that it has more experience with worldwide monitoring, and therefore is better suited to control CSI tasking.

Laurence Nardon submitted a somewhat different proposal to the London-based Verification Technology Information Center (VERTIC) in 1995 to use CSI for monitoring known nuclear weapons testing areas



Trained imagery interpreters, exploitation specialists, and analysts are the only ones qualified to judge that what is perceived in an image is, in fact, real.



around the world. Nardon believes that:

> *Satellite images could provide proof that tests were being prepared and allow for test sites to be localized far more precisely than seismic measurements. What is more, they would have a stronger political impact on public opinion when published than other verification methods.*[5]

To untrained public opinion, however, photographic images constitute "undeniable proof." This "seeing is believing" philosophy is dangerous if anomalous assessments are allowed to affect national policy decisionmakers. Trained imagery interpreters, exploitation specialists, and analysts are the only ones qualified to judge that what is perceived in an image is, in fact, real. Carefully planned deception programs can wreak havoc on image-based monitoring proposals.

Nardon, nonetheless, proposes a viable tool for determining the status of nuclear test sites. The concept was originally proven in 1964, when a KEYHOLE-4A US photo-reconnaissance satellite confirmed China's first atmospheric nuclear test.[6] With a resolution of approximately 10 feet (2.4 meters) the KH-4A was a foreshadowing of the anticipated capabilities of the commercial imaging satellites expected by the year 2000.[7] These capabilities are commercially possible, and expensive retasking might not be necessary with numerous satellites providing revisit times of under a week.

The Nardon proposal requires 120-by-150 km SPOT images, which cover broader area then Jasani's higher resolution 60-by-40 km proposal. Fewer images at lower resolutions might reduce overall costs, but they also make detection of key indicators difficult, if not impossible. Timeliness is another issue. In 1989, the Carnegie Endowment needed only 25 working hours to identify and report on the suspected locations of French IRBMs at Plateau D'Albion using commercially available SPOT imagery.[8] At nominal cost, routine, wide-area SPOT imagery orders cost $3,300, but delivery takes several weeks. The only way to ensure quicker delivery is by paying heavy rush order premiums, driving up Nardon's original cost estimates.[9]

Libyan Case Study

Interpretations of CSI have already demonstrated the ability to detect, identify, and characterize treaty violations. In 1987, US intelligence collection systems detected a Libyan chemical weapons facility at Rabta.[10] In 1990, US intelligence sources then noted that a "fire on March 14 at the Rabta plant had caused extensive damage, knocking it out of operation" for what some US officials believed would be at least a year.[11] This assessment, however, was challenged by CSI. SPOT imagery analysts concluded that "*there may have been a small fire in a building some 800 meters from what is thought to be the main factory... [but]*

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Ten-meter resolution SPOT imagery. (Reprinted courtesy of SPOT Image Corporation.)

the main plant seemed to be undamaged."[12] With this revelation, SPOT demonstrated that it, and potentially all subsequent CSI assessments, could publicly upstage the credibility of an IC assessment.

Threatening Applications

The threat posed by CSI was put to the test by several studies which judged its effectiveness for intelligence collection and targeting. As previously noted, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was one of the first with its "A Peek at the French Missile Complex."[13]

The Endowment was also testing SPOT's Open Skies sales policy. If SPOT sold imagery of sensitive areas in its own country, it would probably sell imagery of other nations without restriction.

In a very short time, imagery interpreters at the Carnegie Endowment identified controlling headquarters, security fences, perimeter roads, barracks, bunkers, and 18 probable launch silos. According to the Endowment, the imagery resolution was good enough to detect recent activity in areas that were subject to "deliberate clearing."[14] The study commented that with "seven-meter data...significant military detail [such as]...large vehicles...would begin to appear."[15] The Carnegie Endowment was convinced that even 10-meter data imagery is usable in an intelligence capacity over denied areas, and sufficient to target weapons.[16] With 1-meter resolution data, the applications increase exponentially.

Dr. Jasani conducted a second study in 1993 of the Golan Heights which detected, identified, and analyzed military positions on both sides of the Israeli-Syrian cease-fire line. The results were impressive. Radars, anti-aircraft gun sites, barracks, airfields, aircraft shelters, ammunition storage areas, helicopter pads, SAM sites, perimeter fences, liquid storage areas, and roads all were distinguishable with 10-meter resolution SPOT imagery. The analysis went as far as to characterize construction methods and activity levels:

> *Possible helicopter pads...can also be seen. These have different surfaces [one]...is probably made from concrete and...[the other] is probably unsurfaced. The runway...is likely to be under repair as there are no tyre [sic] marks or bright, sharp edges.*[17]

Distinguishing these characteristics again demonstrates that CSI is useful for intelligence collection and targeting weapons. SPOT-quality imagery could not, however, target precision-guided munitions against individual pieces of military equipment, but requirements for targeting nuclear-tipped weapons need not be precise. Therefore, foreign military combatants have commercial access to a collection source sufficient for nuclear weapons targeting.

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Threat Scenarios

The most threatening application of CSI is nuclear missile targeting against targets within the United States. Fortunately, emerging and hostile adversaries do not possess intercontinental delivery systems. The open nature of the United States precludes the need for satellite imagery for targeting most US targets. There are, however, a few denied areas in the United States. Satellite imagery might be required if adversaries desire targeting sensitive US military facilities where access is denied.[18] CSI may be used for a terrorist attack against one of these facilities. The immediate concern for policymakers, intelligence planners, and tactical commanders is assessing if foreign customers are buying commercial satellite imagery of sensitive facilities within the United States.

An attack against US forces stationed abroad does not require advanced delivery systems. This was made clear during Operation Desert Storm's Iraqi Scud attacks. If these attacks had been made with a nuclear-tipped weapon, the toll would have been catastrophic. Commercially available 10-meter resolution SPOT imagery allows targeting for short-range delivery systems against stationary targets. Fortunately, US engagement forces can be highly mobile, requiring attackers to have more frequent targeting updating than is currently available. Future CSI constellations, however, might provide updates that mobile forces cannot evade.

A more likely scenario is an adversary using CSI to target forces while they are staging. Targets might include logistic heads, rendezvous points with other coalition forces, exercises, buildup periods before war, or even during a postconflict withdrawal of forces. CSI provides over-the-horizon targeting information, allowing adversaries to strike US forces with nuclear weapons while they are still far enough away to spare damage to their own forces. The main prerequisite is that adversaries possess delivery systems in their operational inventory.

Conclusions

Although commercial imagery systems can detect visual indicators, they can never replace existing national technical means of treaty verification. Commercial imagery will augment existing systems by increasing the number and timeliness of satellite observations. Imagery technology is readily available, the need among nonsuperpower nations exists, and the systems are poised for launch. By facilitating early detection of threats, CSI can contribute to deterrence. As an international technical means of monitoring treaties, CSI can increase confidence in international agreements without putting inspection personnel in harm's way. International technical means can reveal mutual capabilities between opponent nations, thereby reducing doubts and fears of possible surprise attacks.

With the advent of greater numbers of higher resolution CSI systems, the possibility that commercial imagery will be used for military targeting purposes increases. Existing 10-meter resolution SPOT imagery is already adequate for targeting nuclear weapons. The primary demand for high-resolution CSI will probably be for building military targeting packages. Only after that priority is satisfied will nations use imagery to monitor treaty compliance. The IC should expect no less from nations seeking to preserve their own security.

No matter how good the resolution of CSI becomes, reliable imagery intelligence will always require interpretation, exploitation, and analysis, fused with other sources. Photo-interpreters, exploitation specialists, and imagery analysts require adequate training and equipment before image data constitute imagery intelligence. The fact that 1-meter resolution imagery will become readily accessible on the global market does not mean that customers will necessarily know how to turn that imagery into military intelligence. Determining which imagery system will most effectively satisfy intelligence requirements depends on the competence and experience of the photo-interpreters, exploitation specialists, and imagery analysts.

A greater threat to the IC may come from anomalous reporting based on commercially available satellite images. Untrained customers increase the risk of publishing misleading reports. Customers may have never seen satellite images before, yet will be ready to report what they believe they see. Policymakers will demand answers from the IC, forcing responses to a flood of unsubstantiated reporting. If anomalous reporting is sufficient to overwhelm the IC's ability to respond, it may seriously degrade the effectiveness of US intelligence efforts to conduct comprehensive verification strategies.

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NOTES

1. "Spy Machines," *NOVA*, No. 1412, 13 October 1987.

2. Kosta Tsipis, MIT Physicist, on "Spy Machines," *NOVA*, No. 1412, 13 October 1987.

3. Dr. Bhupendra Jasani, "The Value of Civilian Satellite Imagery," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1993, p. 235.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 235.

5. "Nuclear Monitoring by Satellite," *Indigo Publications Intelligence Newsletter*, 27 April 1995, p. 2.

6. Philip J. Klass, "CIA Reveals Details Of Early Spy Satellites," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 12 June 1995, p. 171.

7. Kevin C. Ruffner, Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, *CORONA: America's First Satellite Program* (Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, 1995), p. xv.

8. Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, *GRAYSCALE*, Imagery Analysis, 4 January 1989, pp. 3-5.

9. "Special arrangements have been made to get SPOT imagery (to the media) within a few days for fast-breaking stories. However, this kind of delivery cannot be routinely provided and is expensive. The delivery time for civilian imagery is usually several weeks or more, even for imagery that has already been acquired and archived." From US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *The Future of Remote Sensing From Space: Civilian Satellite Systems and Applications*, OTA-ISC-558 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, July 1993), p. 153, Table C-3 notes.

10. David B. Ottaway, "Behind the New Battle with Libya," *The Washington Post*, 8 January 1989, p. C4.

11. Michael R. Gordon, "US Says Fire At Libya Arms Plant May Be A Hoax," *The New York Times*, 31 March 1990, p. 3.

12. "Small Fire, Much Smoke," *The Economist*, 314, No. 643, 31 March 1990, p. 42.

13. Reprinted in "A Peek at the French Missile Complex," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 45, No. 7, September 1989, pp. 20-23.

14. Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, *GRAYSCALE, Imagery Analysis*, 4 January 1989, p. 3.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

17. Bhupendra Jasani, "The Value of Civilian Satellite Imagery," *Jane's Intelligence Review 5*, No. 5 (May 1993), p. 238.

18. US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *The Future of Remote Sensing From Space: Civilian Satellite Systems and Applications*, OTA-ISC-558 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, July 1993), p. 164.

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A Commentary

CIA's Intelligence Sharing With Congress (U)

(b)(3)(c)

Editor's Note: The following article is excerpted from the remarks made by the author while he served as a panelist at a 20 March 1997 public conference at Georgetown University. The conference was co-sponsored by Georgetown's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). The subject of this event was Congressional acquisition and use of intelligence. The discussions centered around a CSI-sponsored monograph by L. Britt Snider, Congress as a User of Intelligence, *portions of which appeared in* Studies In Intelligence (Vol. 40, No. 4, 1996).

I would like to pick up on something that [former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence] Dick Kerr mentioned at the outset. I want to focus specifically on the phenomenon of the President's own finished intelligence being used by Congress to question and attack the President's foreign policy initiatives—something that makes the foreign policy processes of the US Government absolutely unique.

In that respect, I would like to question one line in Britt's introduction [to his monograph]. Britt asserts that changes in the political dynamics brought about by expanded intelligence sharing are now commonly acknowledged. I think it is something of an exaggeration to say that the political dynamics are commonly and widely acknowledged. I would agree that those who are actually engaged in the intersection of policy and analysis, primarily analysts and working-level policymakers, are quite familiar with the consequences of basically full- and real-time access to intelligence on the part of Congress. But I am struck by how little understood this phenomenon is by almost everyone else: by the media, by the academic community, and, strangely enough, by the senior echelons of our own foreign policy structure in the executive branch.

When I was invited to be on this panel, I asked what you wanted from me, and I was told to provide some anecdotes, so let me try to make my point by giving you some personal experiences of my own.

The first anecdote goes back to August 1974, almost two years before the oversight system was put into place and the flow of intelligence to Congress was institutionalized. I was then chief of the Indochina Branch in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. The Indochina war had entered its depressing final months. I had just drafted a National Intelligence Estimate on Cambodia that said that the Lon Nol government was going to fall to the Khmer Rouge in a matter of months, if not weeks or even days.

It just so happened that, at the time this Estimate was produced, a vote was scheduled in the Senate on the next year's economic assistance package for Cambodia. Everyone in the administration knew the situation was hopeless in Cambodia, and nobody needed an Estimate to tell them this. As a matter of fact, everyone knew the Lon Nol government was not going to survive long enough to see any of this money, even if Congress were to approve it. But the Ford administration

> **"... those who are actually engaged in the intersection of policy and analysis ... are quite familiar with the consequences of basically full- and real-time access to intelligence on the part of Congress."**

(b)(3)(c) who served in the Directorates of Intelligence and Operations, is a Senior Associate at the Walker Institute of International Studies and Adjunct Professor of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina.

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> **Kissinger was furious, and poor Bill Colby got the full brunt of his wrath.**

nevertheless was making a full-court press to win this vote in the Senate. [Secretary of State] Henry Kissinger felt strongly that the spectacle of the United States openly abandoning an ally under these circumstances would be disastrous in terms of our credibility in the region.

While I do not know what transpired between DCI Colby and Congress on Cambodia, or how much pressure Colby felt himself under, what I do know is that the NIO [National Intelligence Officer] for East Asia, Bill Christison, received a call from Colby and was told to take the Estimate right off the presses, carry it downtown, and brief it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That seems so commonplace today, but in 1974 it was a startling idea. [Such briefings] had been given a few times in the past, but always at a time and place of the administration's choosing. And this seemed like a strange time and place.

I remember Christison's puzzling over Colby's order. It was not even clear exactly what "briefing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee" meant—this was such a new concept. And his instructions from Colby were vague. But downtown Bill Christison went. The "briefing" to the foreign Relations Committee consisted of about a 45-second encounter with two staffers of the committee. Bill opened the Estimate and showed them the Key Judgments. They looked at the first paragraph, which said something like "It is hopeless in Cambodia," and they said, "Thanks, Bill, this is just what we are looking for." They snatched the document out of his hand and left the room. The next day, the vote held on the Senate floor, and the administration lost. The Cambodia aid bill went down.

I do not know if that Estimate changed a single vote—maybe not. It certainly did not affect the outcome. Congress was in open revolt on Indochina, and I do not believe there was any chance that the vote was going to be won. But the White House was not so sure. Nor was Kissinger. In fact, Kissinger was furious, and poor Bill Colby got the full brunt of his wrath. Not only was Kissinger furious, he was also dumbfounded, flabbergasted. [His reaction was,] How could this be? This cannot happen. This is the President's National Intelligence Estimate. How could this go to Congress? It cannot happen.

Looking back, I believe [this episode] may have been the rough prototype for the system in place now, although at the time none of us were smart enough to know that. In fact, I remember discussing Kissinger's reaction with Christison. I distinctly recall telling Bill that I bet this was the last time we ever send a National Estimate down to Congress. So much for my crystal ball.

Kissinger's utter surprise and consternation was an understandable reaction, because this was essentially the first time that [Congressional use of executive branch finished intelligence to attack an important Presidential foreign policy initiative] had occurred.

This brings me to my second anecdote. I had subsequently become the Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence, working for [then Deputy Director for Intelligence] Dick Kerr, who told me not to screw things up, which I immediately proceeded to do. The first dominating international event after I moved into this job and got my instructions from Kerr was the decision to reflag the Kuwaiti tankers and provide them with naval escorts in and out of the Persian Gulf. This immediately set off a classic squabble between the White House and Congress over the War Powers Act, with Congress saying, in effect, By God, you did not consult us, you have sent American troops in harm's way, and we are going to invoke the War Powers Act. And the White House replying, so to speak, There is no danger here; what we have done does not change anything, and the Persian Gulf is as safe as it can be.

Then the CIA stumbles into this nasty little argument, doing what any proper premonitory analytic service would do: it self-initiated a memo examining likely foreign reactions to this US course of action. And the memo turned out to be absolutely prophetic. It concluded that the Iranians would feel obliged to react to this US intervention. It worried about the threats from Iranian mines and from Silkworm cruise missiles the Iranians had recently installed, and it concluded that the United States was moving into a dangerous situation and that sooner or later there was going to be trouble.

I do not quite remember the exact mechanics of how this [CIA analysis] reached the Hill, but reach it it did, where it was greeted with howls of

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glee. The phone rang in the DDI suite. I do not know where Kerr was, and I am sure the phone call was for him, but I got to answer it. It was an angry National Security Adviser, this time Gen. Colin Powell. As Yogi Berra said, "It was *deja vu* all over again." My first anecdote immediately sprang into mind as I sat there and envisioned the sparks flying out of the receiver. It was the Henry Kissinger of 1974, without the German accent. Not only was Colin mad as hell, he was also flabbergasted. He said, in so many words, Tell me I am dreaming. This cannot happen. This is impossible. How could this happen? Unacceptable. This is impossible, I must be in a nightmare. Wake me up.

I do not know exactly why, but I believe it is quite clear that when this [blowback against executive-branch policy stemming from intelligence sharing with Congress] does occur, senior policymakers are never quite ready for it, cannot accept it, and do not quite understand why it happened. I do not believe this has sunk in; I do not believe it has been incorporated into everyone's consciousness. And our senior policymakers are by no means alone. I believe the media do a miserable job of understanding this. When something like this happens and it surfaces dramatically in the public view, the media typically misunderstand and misrepresent it.

Britt Snider uses the example of the Haitian estimate of 1993, which was a rather blatant instance of some people on the Hill making selective use of material in a National Estimate to ambush an administration's foreign policy position. How was it portrayed by the media? Was it portrayed as a good example of historic changes and events and decisions made in the mid-1970s that altered the American foreign policy process in an important way, giving the Congress a lot more traction in foreign policy and making the President's job of managing foreign policy a lot more complicated? No. How was it presented by the media? How did it resonate around the country for a couple of months or more? It was, There they go again—those rogues at CIA are undermining their own President in the field of foreign policy. Well, whatever mistakes may have been made in the way that Estimate was presented on the Hill, this was a completely bogus interpretation, and the media completely missed the larger, profoundly important point about how the American foreign policy process had evolved in the past 15 years.

The media are not alone. From my point of view, the academic community in some ways is even more remiss. During my brief fledgling career as a novice academic, I have come to the conclusion that most university-level courses on the American foreign policy process are absolutely mute on this subject [intelligence sharing with Congress, and the repercussions thereof, as a major change in the US foreign policy process]. It is as if time was frozen in the 1960s. I believe the current scholarly literature on foreign policy processes has little discussion of this—almost none. I am not aware of any Ph.D. theses being done in this area, although I can think of some wonderful case studies that could be the basis for doctoral dissertations.

The media and the academic community do not quite get it. I believe Britt's paper is important because it may be the first step for raising the general public awareness of how our processes have evolved and of the constitutional implications. So I really welcomed Britt's study.

Like Dick Kerr, I was a little skeptical, Britt, when you said this morning that you thought agreement could be reached on not using intelligence in political settings for political purposes. You were kidding about that, weren't you? That is a rhetorical question.

I would be satisfied if we could just get people on the Hill, in the executive branch, and in the Intelligence Community together in the same room and agree on a description of the American foreign policy process, of how the intelligence sharing system with Congress works. If everyone could reach a mutual agreement on what happens, I believe it would do a lot toward taking some of the tension and shock out of the relationship when this unique aspect of our system works its way through. Maybe national security advisers would not be so angry and shocked when the inevitable consequences of sharing intelligence with Congress surface. I believe and hope, Britt, that your paper is going to be an important first step in educating senior policymakers and the public at large.

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Defense and Arms Control in the Carter Administration (U)

Robert M. Gates

> **"The conventional wisdom is that, as the Soviets built up in the late 1970s, President Carter pursued an essential antidefense policy that weakened the country. The conventional wisdom, once again, is wrong."**

Editor's Note: The following article has been extracted from an unpublished chapter from the author's book, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War, *published in 1996.*

In December 1997, I reluctantly left the NSC Staff to return to CIA, taking my cue from the fact that the last time there had been a change in party control of the White House, virtually the entire NSC Staff had been let go. I preferred to go under my own steam and at my choosing rather than let someone else make that decision for me. I had immensely enjoyed the NSC, however. Further, nearly everyone from the bureaucracy who has worked in the White House has a terrible reentry problem on going "back home." You go from writing for and assisting the National Security Adviser and the President—often very directly—to a place many rungs down the ladder in a big agency, and work you once did directly for the big boss now has to go through multiple layers of the bureaucracy—often a bureaucracy determined to put you back in your proper place as rudely as possible in order to restore your perspective and sense of reality. It was a difficult transition for me.

Carter and Defense: Perception and Reality

As the Soviets were building and deploying four new ICBMs, expanding and modernizing their ballistic missile submarine fleet, strengthening the ABM around Moscow, and developing a new strategic bomber for the first time in a generation, what was the United States doing? The conventional wisdom is that, as the Soviets built up in the late 1970s, President Carter pursued an essential antidefense policy that weakened the country. The conventional wisdom, once again, is wrong.

US defense spending by 1977 had been declining for more than a decade, especially if Vietnam operational expenses are set aside. Carter says in his memoirs that the defense budget, measured in real dollars, not counting inflation, had declined 35 percent over the preceding eight years, even as the Soviet budget had been growing at about 4 percent per year. We especially neglected investment, conventional forces, and research and development. Intelligence capabilities suffered badly, the program losing about half its budget over a dozen years.

Enter Jimmy Carter

People forget that the Democratic Party nominated its most conservative candidate in 1976. He was a graduate of the US Naval Academy who intended a career in the nuclear Navy until the death of his father led him to resign his commission and return home to Plains, Georgia. He was a fiscal conservative, a small businessman with a keen eye for the bottom line.

When the Carter administration arrived, there was no discounting the

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magnitude, reality, or importance of the Soviet strategic or conventional military buildup. But there was a desire to look at that threat in a context of national power, a broader perspective than just military capabilities. The result was the President's signature soon after arriving of Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 10, "Comprehensive Net Assessment." This commissioned a comparative examination of every aspect of US and Soviet national power—strategic and conventional military, economic resources and production capability, technology innovation and productivity, intelligence, political institutions, and more. National Security Adviser Brzezinski was in charge, and he brought Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard University to Washington to manage this mammoth undertaking. CIA was a participant and an important contributor but by no means a dominant influence in the preparation of the report.

The assessment was largely complete by midsummer, and it drew the following conclusions about military capabilities:

- In strategic capabilities, the Soviets were judged to have an advantage in ICBM and SLBM launchers, megatonnage, and throw weight. The United States had the advantage in warheads, bombers, MIRVed launchers, combined bomber and missile payload, and accuracy. The assessment predicted that these capabilities would level out in the 1980s.

- In conventional forces, the report stated that, since the late 1960s, the Soviets had acquired a new main battle tank, improved their chemical and biological warfare capabilities, had new armored personnel carriers as well as self-propelled artillery, and the most comprehensive ground-based air defense system in the world. The United States had a new tank and new tactical aircraft, but its conventional forces had experienced great turbulence and attrition over the past 15 years. The United States retained a large advantage in naval forces and in its ability to move forces around the world (power projection), despite real Soviet improvements in these areas.

While PRM 10 was balanced in its evaluation of comparative national power and found that the United States had a significant economic, technological, and diplomatic advantages over the Soviets, the report was far from sanguine about the future. For example, it stated, "The striking incompatibility of most US and Soviet outlooks and values, due as much to similarities as to differences, suggests that cooperation will remain limited, misunderstanding will persist in many areas, and competition will predominate." It went on that the overlap in zones of potential military intervention by the two countries is "much greater" than before and "hence, so is the possibility of Soviet-US military interaction." Finally, "The probability is high that the Soviet Union will take one or more military initiatives during the next eight years which could produce a Soviet Union cricon [crisis/confrontation]." It went on that the Soviets' record of behavior, their new military capabilities, their redefinition of their interests in the Third World, nuclear parity, changes in the US military posture, and a possible desire by the Soviets to establish themselves as the global equal of the United States all mean that "the Soviet Union will be able to take military initiatives...with somewhat less risk that the United States will make any military response."

And the implications:

- "The most significant change that has occurred in the power relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union in recent years has been the growth in Soviet military power in relation to that of the United States."

- "At present, there is rough equivalence in strategic forces and asymmetrically in overall military capabilities. The United States is significantly ahead in most nonmilitary aspects of national power...."

- "Trends favorable to the Soviets or against the United States in key areas are: strategic forces, conventional forces in Europe, mobilization and force projection, short-run economic interaction payoffs, covert action capabilities, and diplomatic relations, especially in Africa and Latin America."

All things considered, looking back, the assessment was realistic, accurate, and fairly tough minded.

At a meeting of the Special Coordination Committee on 4 August 1997, chaired by Brzezinski, a number of guidelines were agreed on in view of the findings of the new assessment. The administration should, they concluded:

- "Maintain the overall balance of military power between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies at least as favorable as that which now exists."

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- "Prevent or counter Soviet use of military force to gain influence over other societies."
- "Attempt to achieve the above goals in collaboration with our allies, through cooperation and agreements with the Soviets when possible and through appropriate actions and programs when agreements prove impossible."
- "Enlist the participation of the Soviet Union in international institutions and secure Soviet cooperation in achieving solutions to global economic, social, and resource problems."
- "Take political, economic, diplomatic, and ideological initiatives in cooperation with our allies to reduce Soviet influence in and control over other societies where that influence adversely affects US interests and values."
- "Within approved budgetary constraints," the participants in the meeting called for US strategic and conventional military forces to pursue a number of detailed goals aimed at increasing capabilities and flexibility.

In sum, the Carter administration's view of the Soviets, their military gains of the preceding years, and their likely behavior formed a realistic basis for the formulation of strong policies. And that view in terms of military capabilities was quite consistent with the estimates prepared by the Intelligence Community in 1976. A dozen years of single-minded Soviet effort and a huge expenditure of resources had enabled the Soviets to close the strategic gap and establish a favorable military balance in Europe and offered them the potential to gain superiority in a

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number of areas, depending on what the United States did. Those who, after the Soviet Union's collapse, would argue that the Soviet military threat was overstated would have found few in either political party or in the American Government generally in 1976 or in 1977 who would have agreed. In fact, in retrospect, it is quite clear that the sober assessments were very much on the mark.

With a realistic assessment of Soviet military strength and capabilities, how then did Carter get his reputation for being antidefense? I believe it was his rhetoric, his deep-seated ambivalence toward the Soviet Union, his lack of support for defense budget increases, several of his unilateral initiatives, and because he turned down two major weapons programs that came to him during his term—the enhanced radiation weapon (ERW, neutron bomb) and the B-1 bomber. What he did ultimately support, and it was a great deal, he supported grudgingly, often under enormous pressure and usually only after agonizing indecision. With the atmospherics now so far distant, the reality is that Carter's record on defense looks more robust today than it did at the time. The peaks and valleys of the day-to-day struggle fade from view, as do the occasions when the President made a decision not because he wanted to but because his hand was forced or when he yielded to the counsel of his senior advisers.

President Carter's approach to defense looked decidedly skeptical up close:

- In January 1977, he cut his first defense budget, already barebones, by more than $6 billion. The difference in the Soviet and US reactions to this move was instructive and illustrates how differently Carter was viewed in Moscow and in Washington. On 31 January 1977, Acting DCI Hank Knoche sent a paper to the White House on the Soviet view of the proposed cuts that contended that the Soviets would welcome the cuts but would not regard them as a clear indicator of administration intentions over the longer term—and that the Soviets would not reciprocate. The Agency said that the Soviets would regard the cuts as minor adjustments resulting in only a slight reduction and forcing only small delays in strategic programs. We speculated that the Soviets saw Carter's budget decisions on the B-1 program as a step toward full authorization after further review, only slightly deferring the MX, and promising further cruise missile developments despite deferral of the submarine-launched cruise missile. At the same time, we thought the Soviets would be concerned that decisions improving the US force posture in Europe, our ability to execute war in Europe, the aircraft sheltering program, improved military storage capabilities, and the increase in the civil reserve air fleet demonstrated Carter's intent to redress weaknesses in the US posture in Europe. So, even though Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Brzezinski would have to fight Carter every step of the way on increasing defense spending in 1977

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and 1978—and usually lose—the Soviets saw in his decisions much cause for concern. In Washington, this budget decision was seen as a harbinger of an antidefense approach, with more to come:

- Carter canceled the B-1 bomber development program in June 1977 on Brown's recommendation. Carter and Brown believed that the B-1 would be vulnerable to the Soviets' extraordinary air defense system and, further, that its mission could be more effectively performed by cruise missiles and eventually (because it was still unclear whether it would work) by a new, secret weapon, the Stealth bomber. Carter believed the B-1 would be a waste of billions of dollars.

- Early in the administration, as part of a new SALT proposal, the President indicated to Secretary of State Vance that he was prepared to give up both the B-1 and the Trident ballistic missile submarine program if an agreement on deep reductions seemed possible.

- In April 1978, against the advice of Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski, Carter decided to defer production of the ERW. In so doing, he antagonized Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany and other allies. In Carter's view, no ally wanted the weapon deployed on its soil, and he also regarded it as a political liability. He perhaps did not fully realize the effort that had been made by Vance and others to shape an allied consensus to go forward with production and then to deploy if insufficient progress were made in arms control negotiations. Even Vance acknowledged later that, "The impact of the neutron bomb decision at home and abroad was very damaging."

"The KGB undertook a massive propaganda campaign in Europe against the neutron bomb in July and August 1977."

Carter's perception that the Europeans did not want the ERW and public criticism in Europe itself of ERW (which influenced the European leaders) probably were shaped to some extent by one of the most aggressive covert operations ever mounted in Europe by the Soviets. The KGB undertook a massive propaganda campaign in Europe against the neutron bomb in July and August 1977. The objective was to affect Carter's decision regarding production of the bomb. The high point of the effort was concentrated from 25 July to 14 August. On 30 July, for the first time in nearly three years, TASS issued a statement on US foreign policy denouncing the ERW. Propaganda during the week of 1-7 August focused significant attention toward support of the "Week of Action" organized by the World Peace Council, a Soviet front organization, for 6-13 August. On 9 August, *Pravda* published a statement and appeal by 28 Communist parties against production of the bomb. During 6-13 August, Peace Councils in Eastern Europe held protest meetings and passed resolutions; the Peace Committee in Istanbul sponsored a demonstration in front of the US Consulate General; front groups delivered protest notes to US Consulates in Stuttgart, Frankfurt, and Dusseldorf; and other front organization sponsored various events worldwide targeting the ERW. Many articles prepared by the front groups were published in Communist newspapers in Italy, France, Belgium, Austria, and Greece.

The second and more damaging type of commentary was coverage by the non-Communist press stimulated by the outpouring of press in the USSR and Eastern Europe. This coverage was prompted by anti-Americanism, doubts about the viability of NATO, hopes of maintaining Europe's special status with the Soviet Union, and honest dislike of the neutron bomb. There was propaganda paydirt in this kind of commentary. Papers in Europe went on an editorial binge as the essentially objective sector of the media felt obliged to carry both sides of the argument on ERW. Thus, on 23 August, the *International Herald Tribune* published a signed article by Soviet Nobel laureate Nikolai Semenov parroting the Soviet line. Although a parallel article by a US Congressman rebutted Semenov, the Soviets were ecstatic; they used the Semionov article and where it had appeared in editorial replay and broadcasts all over the world.

There was a further major effort on the propaganda front by the Soviet delegation at the Pugwash meeting in Munich in late August. The Soviets pushed a single theme—the dangers of the neutron bomb and the consequent need to mobilize world opinion and pressure against the United States. The same themes appeared in Libya, Peru, India, Cameroon, Benin, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Mauritius, Ghana, Afghanistan, Japan, and Ethiopia.

As the Agency reported to the White House in September 1977, "The volume of propaganda against the neutron bomb, the timing and programmed developments within that

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outburst, and reoccurrence of identical themes suggest only one possibility: an intricate Soviet propaganda campaign involving heavy Moscow media play, an East European cacophony, international front group action, direct media placement where possible in non-Communist areas, and stimulation in the West of critical media commentary. The Soviets were successful." More than that. They had successfully exercised a propaganda infrastructure in Europe that they would expand to try to defeat deployment of NATO's intermediate nuclear response to the SS-20s in the early 1980s and again later, worldwide, against the Strategic Defense Initiative.

During the campaign, Carter had called for US troop reductions in South Korea. He reaffirmed this position as US policy in a press conference shortly after taking office, to the consternation of the South Koreans, the Japanese, and other Asians. Again, virtually all the President's senior advisers were opposed. There was also strong opposition in Congress and the Pentagon, but the President remained adamant. According to Vance, only Brzezinski supported Carter on this. The issue festered until the summer of 1979, when Carter was to visit South Korea after the Tokyo Economic Summit. A short while before the trip, the Intelligence Community got into the act by producing a National Estimate that said earlier estimates of North Korean troop strength had understated the threat by as much as a third. In fact, reviewing earlier work and revising their methodology, the intelligence experts suggested that the North had as many as nine more divisions than previously estimated. Naturally, the Estimate leaked and, for all practical purposes, the idea of troop reductions in South Korea was dead. This contribution by intelligence analysts surely did not endear them to the President, who probably thought he had been sandbagged. (I do not believe that he was. One maddening aspect of intelligence for a policymaker is that the experts are always reviewing and changing earlier assessments, particularly on numbers of troops and equipment.)

- My recollection is that Carter was most unenthusiastic about going forward with a new ICBM for the United States, the MX. Beginning in 1977, there had been continuing studies on the optimum mode of deployment for this missile to enhance its survivability in case of nuclear attack. (There were a multitude of basing schemes, ranging from the serious to the hilarious). According to Brzezinski, Carter during this period kept asking Brown if keeping the triad (ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers) was still necessary, and, at one meeting, complained that the perception of Soviet superiority had been created by "this group"—referring to his senior advisers. He ultimately approved going forward with MX but, in Brzezinski's view, only because virtually all his advisers strongly supported it, including Secretary Vance. And, because, as Senator Sam Nunn and others made clear, SALT II had no chance of being ratified without it. Carter, in fact, approved MX on 8 June 1979, only days before leaving for Vienna to sign the SALT II Treaty.

These major decisions, and a number of lesser ones, including those on the budget, formed (and form) the basis for the view that Carter was weak on defense. As in the case of the B-1, he took a great deal of time to study the issues, including the technical aspects, and I am convinced that he made up his mind based on the facts. Somehow, though, he seemed unable to stand back and see that a series of these decisions all in the same direction formed a pattern—and that pattern established the basis for the attacks on him as antidefense. He seemed not to understand the cumulative political impact of a number of discrete decisions.

These defense decisions, coupled with Soviet assertiveness in a growing number of places around the world, conveyed the impression of a weak President. It is to Brzezinski's credit, I believe, that privately he warned Carter about this. For example, as early as November 1977, Brzezinski wrote him that "Public perception of your foreign policy is that it is 'soft' because of Cuba, Vietnam, Korea, SALT, B-1. You should consider taking some 'tough' decision...."

There is another side to the Carter record on defense, however, and it looks stronger from a distance of 15 years—indeed, it looks as it must have to the Soviets at the time. Whatever may have been Carter's attitude or rhetoric, he continued the strategic modernization programs begun under his predecessors for the air-launched cruise missile, the MX, completion of the MIRVing of Minuteman, and the Trident ballistic missile submarine and new submarine-launched missile. He approved and funded development of Stealth aircraft technology that led to wholly new kinds of tactical and strategic attack aircraft. Indeed, with the sole exception of the B-1, Carter sustained virtually every major US strategic modernization program and

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began an important new one. The perception of new US strategic power and strength in the first half of the 1980s as new weapons began being built and/or deployed was, in fact, Ronald Reagan reaping the harvest sown by Nixon, Ford, *and* Carter.

But there was more:

- In May 1977, at Carter's initiative, the leaders of NATO agreed to specific steps to address negative trends in the conventional and theater nuclear balance, and a long-term defense program of military improvements for the Alliance was agreed unanimously. These were major achievements.

- As an outgrowth of PRM 10, the comprehensive net assessment, Carter signed Presidential Directive 18 in late summer 1977 that established "essential equivalence" as the US strategic objective and also approved creation of the Rapid Deployment Force, the forerunner of Central Command and the military organization that commanded and fought the Persian Gulf war more than 10 years later.

- On 30 May 1978, the North Atlantic Council met in Washington and agreed to a defense program intended to build up the antitank weapons and the integration of air defenses.

- A year later, in May 1979, with Harold Brown taking the lead, the NATO Defense Planning Committee agreed that all member states would increase their spending on defense by 3 percent per year through 1985 in order to redress some of the imbalance that had development between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. This was a major political, as well as practical, achievement.

- In December 1979, NATO reached the all-important decision to counter the Soviets' deployment of the three-warhead SS-20 missile in the European theater (which had begun in 1976) with its own deployment of 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles. Although West German Chancellor Schmidt had first sounded the alarm in a speech in London in October 1977, US leadership and pressure had been critical to the 1979 deployment decision.

- As part of the price imposed by Senator Nunn for his support of SALT II, in the summer of 1979 Carter agreed to increase the defense budget by 5 percent after inflation (the administration had been planning on 2 to 3 percent.

- With a Presidential Directive signed in November 1979, major new initiatives were begun to improve US military command and control, including greater endurance and flexibility. This also would give the United States the capability to manage a prolonged nuclear conflict.

- Following the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in his State of the Union address on 23 January 1980 Carter asserted America's strategic interest in the Persian Gulf. He said, "Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." This statement of US policy, which became known as the Carter Doctrine, would be enforced by both Presidents Reagan and Bush.

- In March 1980, Carter signed another directive providing for the first time in a generation comprehensive guidance for mobilization.

- In May 1980, the President approved Presidential Directive 59, codifying significant changes in US strategic doctrine and targeting. Building on changes instigated by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in the Ford administration, this new directive provided much greater flexibility in US targeting and more emphasis on military, command and control, and defense industry targets in the USSR. New and broader requirements were placed on US command and control for managing war. In essence, and as noticed by the Soviets, PD 59, together with several other directives signed by Carter in 1979-80, enhanced US deterrent capability by obviously moving toward an enhanced warfighting capability. The President would have more options than only massive retaliation. This was not a new concept, but Carter's directives for the first time moved the Defense Department toward a comprehensive ability to acquire and implement the tools to make the concept real. (Debates over targeting resulted in some interesting ideas. The Polish-descended Brzezinski, for example, asked Defense to look at a targeting strategy in which only Russian targets were hit, sparing all the non-Russian ethnic areas of the Soviet Union. Defense politely allowed the idea to die quietly.)

- In the summer of 1980, Carter directed the development of a serious program for ensuring the continuity of government—the

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survival of the presidency and executive authority—in a war.

Regardless of Carter's enthusiasm or lack of it for some (or even most) of these measures, the cumulative impact was to provide a strong foundation for Ronald Reagan to build on. The Reagan administration's diagnosis of the US strategic posture was not terribly different from the one that Brzezinski provided to Carter at the 4 June 1979 NSC meeting on MX: the United States had considerable advantages over the USSR in all nonmilitary aspects of the competition; only in combination with our allies did we have an advantage over the Soviets in military power; the strategic nuclear balance was "deteriorating faster than we had expected" and would continue to do so into the early 1980s; there would be a "strategic dip" in the early 1980s, when the United States could not maintain essential equivalence and a balance no worse than that existing in 1977; the strategic gap of the early 1980s "could produce damaging political perceptions and encourage assertive behavior." In terms of the conventional military balance, unfavorable balances existed in the Far East and the Middle East–Persian Gulf, although the balance was improving in Europe. I suspect that only in the latter case would the Reagan administration have had reservations. And this was not just the hardliner Brzezinski speaking. Vance agreed that the basic trends were adverse. Brown said that by 1985 the Soviets "would have greater strength than the United States in almost every military category, no matter what we do." CIA Director Turner and JCS Chairman David Jones agreed with Brzezinski. Only the President was skeptical.

"I believe that the Soviets saw a very different Jimmy Carter than did most Americans by 1980, different and much more hostile and threatening."

It is worth pausing to look for a moment at how the Soviets saw the strategic balance during this period, in part because I believe that the Soviets saw a very different Jimmy Carter than did most Americans by 1980, different and much more hostile and threatening.

After the normalization with China, I wrote Brzezinski on 2 January 1979 that I believed we were "entering a period of abnormally great Soviet paranoia, fed by a growing sense of isolation and Moscow's perception of a US-Chinese-Japanese-NATO cabal against the USSR." I saw three major events in 1978 that adversely affected long-term Soviet security interests and represented serious setbacks:

- The Soviets had been stunned by the suddenness of the announcement of Sino-US normalization, and they surely also had noticed that the announcement took place almost immediately after the United States said it would not oppose Western arms sales to China.
- After being wooed by both China and the USSR, Japan threw in with China in the Chinese-Japanese Treaty of Friendship to be signed in early 1979. I said I thought this was a major event and had been underreported in the West. "Asia's greatest economic power and its largest country had put aside more than half a century of official hostility and declared their desire to work together—explicitly for economic cooperation and implicitly to prevent Soviet hegemony."
- NATO, concerned over the Soviet military buildup in Central Europe, new Soviet weapon systems, and Soviet behavior in Africa, had resolved to strengthen the Alliance militarily. I noted that in the United States Democratic pressure to withdraw troops from Europe had virtually disappeared and that there was no pressure for an early MBFR agreement. I said that NATO defense spending was back on the upswing, and that all these developments marked a major failure by the Soviets in their efforts to weaken the Alliance.

In the memorandum, I cited an article in the Soviet military newspaper, *Red Star*, which dealt with normalization and the prospect of isolation. Two quotes make the point:

> *Everyone is free to choose an ally for himself as he sees fit. The Fuehrer once boasted that he was prepared to enter into an alliance with the devil himself in order to achieve victory.*
>
> *The alliance of American imperialists, Japanese revanchists and Chinese great-power chauvinists is directed against the vital interests of all peoples. It has and can have no future.*

I concluded that, "We face a much more dangerous USSR now than in recent years. Soviet options are limited. Moscow will not cede the Kurile Islands to reach accommodation with Japan, and it will not allay Western fears by ending support for

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the Cubans in Africa. I believe we will see more threats (especially directed toward Western Europe) and offensive/subversive action in Africa, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. We are in for some rough times ahead with the USSR, and we should expect no restraint from Moscow in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, or the arms race." This was nearly a year before the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

Turner briefed Carter in more concrete terms in May 1980 about the Soviet view of the military balance. He said that the Soviets knew they faced superior NATO seapower and airpower, a cohesive Alliance with the advantages of the defender. He suggested that the Soviets felt strongest in the Third World and in areas contiguous to the USSR, where they had easy access, or where their surrogates were firmly entrenched. Turner observed that the Soviets saw their military forces as being their strongest suit and providing a "permissive environment" and vehicle for foreign policy in the Third World. The Soviets were also aware of the perception abroad that they would make further gains in the years ahead. The DCI continued that the Soviets no longer felt as constrained by the US strategic posture, but also knew well their own deficiencies and tended to overrate the West. He predicted this would lead to continued conservatism in Soviet thinking about their own force structure and size vis-a-vis the US and NATO. He also noted the Soviets' respect and envy of the US technological potential and their fear that it might be unleashed. Turner concluded that CIA expected the Soviets to continue to plug away at trying to acquire all the capabilities for war winning, even without the certainty that they would succeed in the effort. On balance, "The Soviets feel more comfortable in the 1980s with their military capabilities against the United States and more willing to use their strength as an active tool of foreign policy."

"Turner concluded that CIA expected the Soviets to continue to plug away at trying to acquire all the capabilities for war winning, even without the certainty that they would succeed in the effort."

We received a small insight into Soviet paranoia about the United States a few weeks later. On at least two occasions, there had been failures of the US early warning computer system leading to combat alerts of US forces. During the first half of June 1980, we later learned that the KGB had sent a message to all their residencies reporting this and saying that the "failures" were not the result of errors but were deliberately initiated by the Defense Department for training. The KGB circular stated that the Soviet Government believed the United States was trying to give the Soviet Union a false sense of security by giving the impression that such errors are possible, and thereby diminish Soviet concern over future alerts—thus providing a cover for possible surprise attack.

Finally, as National Intelligence Officer for the USSR, at the end of October 1980, I did my own alternative view to the conclusions of the just-published strategic estimate. Once again, I said, that from the Soviets' perspective, they were an isolated superpower facing the combined hostility of the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and China. At the same time, they faced problems in Eastern Europe, instability on their southern border, and serious economic problems. Meanwhile, in their view, the United States was pursuing programs intended to reverse strategic trends since the mid-1960s—Trident, MX, cruise missiles, TNF, a strategy aimed at a US first-strike capability, superiority and/or a European-Soviet nuclear conflict. Further, I thought the Soviets saw dim prospects for relief through SALT, no impact from SALT on forces from arms control in the 1980s, and pressures building in the United States for more programs, not fewer.

I said that I thought the Soviets saw an increasingly hostile strategic environment in the 1980s, including a major US buildup threatening Soviet military gains of the preceding 15 years; the United States adopting strategies and buying weapons raising the prospect of a first strike and possible US superiority; and little help for the Soviet Union from SALT. (This was based on programs Carter had in place.) I predicted that the Soviets would:

- Continue SALT to slow down and constrain whatever US programs they could.
- Assume no constraints due to SALT through the mid-1980s.
- Leave open the possibility of de facto observance of SALT I and some of SALT II while going all-out on weapons programs unconstrained by the treaties.

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- Tighten their belts internally and try to build economic ties to US competitors.

- Pursue opportunities to create problems for the United States in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, Central America, and Africa, while trying to detach Europe from the United States.

Carter and SALT II: The Best of Intentions

If President Carter's principal advisers were in substantial agreement on the strategic balance and outlook, they were badly divided over what to do about the problem—and Carter himself was ambivalent. The very public disagreements between Vance and Brzezinski on how to deal with the Soviet challenge, and Carter's equally public inability to decide between them or even reconcile their views for himself, was very damaging to the administration and to the country. Nowhere was this more evident than in the President's speech on 7 June 1978 at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis. He said there that the United States was prepared for either confrontation or cooperation, but that the choice was up to the Soviets. Virtually all press accounts of the speech characterized it as a Brzezinski draft text and a Vance draft text slapped together by Carter and as symptomatic of his inability to move one way or the other. Interestingly, Brzezinski contends in his memoirs that the image of two compressed drafts is not right and that Carter developed the speech text on his own. Vance's memoirs support the press version, that Carter drew from both drafts and stitched them together.

> **"In SALT, as with his human rights policy, Carter broke all the rules as far as the Soviets were concerned."**

Whatever the case, disarray and confusion were real, not just perceived. This led to a "push-me pull-you" dynamic that helps explain why confrontations with the Soviets too often resulted in unpredictable under or overreactions by the administration. The most common feature was mismanagement due to too many hands on the steering wheel. This helps explain why the administration bounced between harsh rhetoric and "soft" actions—and the next time reacted in just the reverse way, why the administration would seek negotiations with the Soviets on a broad range of tough issues and then watch them stall out, and how the relationship with the Soviets could be so sour virtually throughout Carter's term in office.

Interestingly enough, the one exception to this picture was SALT. There was agreement in the administration from the President on down in support of arms control in general and SALT in particular. Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski all were committed to success and worked together reasonably successfully to achieve it. They did succeed in negotiating a new agreement with the Soviets, but their handling of the treaty after signature, as well as domestic politics and Soviet actions, virtually eliminated any hope of ratification by the Senate.

In SALT, as with his human rights policy, Carter broke all the rules as far as the Soviets were concerned. In contrast to SALT I and the US negotiating position under Ford and Kissinger and under the influence of Senator Jackson, Carter was determined to seek deep reductions in the strategic forces of both sides.

Preparations were intense for Vance's first trip to the Soviet Union in March, and a number of meetings were held among Carter's senior advisers to forge a SALT proposal. Two general approaches were developed, one that would essentially pick up where the Vladivostok accords and subsequent negotiations left off with a view to reaching a quick agreement, and a second that called for significant reductions in the overall level of strategic delivery vehicles from 2,400 to 2,000. In contrast to public perceptions at the time, judging from their memoirs and my memory, while all agreed in principle on the desirability of deep reductions, Vance and Brzezinski both pragmatically preferred the first approach—modest reductions—because they believed the Soviets would reject deep cuts. It was the President himself who decided that the deep-cuts option should be the preferred alternative. A few days before his departure for Moscow, Vance called in Ambassador Dobrynin and briefed him on the deep-cuts proposal. The Ambassador reacted quite negatively, giving Vance a foretaste of what was to come in Moscow.

Unfortunately, it was only a mild foretaste. For the Soviets—Brezhnev and Gromyko—reacted quite strongly, rudely rejecting not only the deep-cuts proposal but also the fallback position that built upon the Vladivostok agreements. The impact of the rejection was magnified by what would become characteristic of the Carter administration—leaks, backstabbing, and recriminations.

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After various officials who had been with Vance in Moscow and others who remained in Washington finished backgrounding the press, the news stories were full of accusations of miscalculation, of overreaching, and so on. It was not pretty, and it would not get any better.

Somewhat later, we on the NSC learned that Dobrynin had told Moscow after Vance's trip that the President's SALT proposals were simply an effort to achieve a propaganda advantage and that no consideration should be given to the idea that it was a serious proposal. He praised Brezhnev's and Gromyko's firm handling of Vance, expressing the view that Carter had calculated that the Soviets had a greater political and economic stake in détente than the United States. He also said that the Soviet position during the Vance visit had not aroused any significant criticism in the United States, and so Moscow should keep the propaganda pressure on for the Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva in May. Finally, Dobrynin observed that Carter wanted to reach agreement on SALT and thus would seek a compromise—that despite right-wing influence in the White House (take that, Brzezinski!) Carter might moderate his position.

We and CIA speculated that Dobrynin's harsh line might have been intended to reduce his own vulnerability because of his prediction in January that Carter's foreign policy was not likely to differ in principle from Ford's. Dobrynin admitted uncertainty that spring about Carter's future policy toward the Soviet Union, an uncertainty many of us felt was probably widely shared among Soviet leaders.

"I think Brezhnev wanted to give Carter a jolt, let him know that the Soviets could not be jerked around and that they could make life difficult for him."

CIA did an analysis of Vance's March trip to Moscow sometime later and concluded that the Soviets' reaction had reflected their irritation at losing earlier negotiating gains, amplified by their fears of new US military technologies contemplated or under development. The analysts thought that the Soviets had reacted with a hard line to redirect pressure back onto the American side, thus relieving the political and propaganda disadvantage under which they were temporarily placed and avoiding the internal difficulties of formulating new positions themselves.

I believe the Soviets reacted so strongly to Vance and the deep-cuts proposal for two reasons. First, SALT was very controversial in Moscow, with the military quite averse to the entire process, which was driven by Brezhnev. The Soviet leader had invested a lot of personal capital in the Vladivostok meeting and the arrangements that came out of it, and I believe he was angry that Carter right out of the chute wanted to junk it all and start over with a proposal that departed so far from what the leadership had worked out with the Soviet military brass. In this vein, I also think that the "deep cuts"—which were only 250 missiles and bombers lower than what Kissinger had offered—signaled a new approach toward real rather than symbolic reductions and thus departed in principle from previous SALT efforts. Second, I believe Brezhnev also was reacting not just to the SALT proposal but in response to Carter's perceived interference in Soviet internal affairs with the human rights campaign and the overall scratchy start with the new American President—who was clearly a very different breed of cat than either Nixon or Ford. I think Brezhnev wanted to give Carter a jolt, let him know that the Soviets could not be jerked around and that they could make life difficult for him.

There is no need here to repeat the subsequent, tortuous history of SALT II. Vance met with Gromyko again on May 18-20, after intensive discussions in Washington with Dobrynin that at times involved him discussing the details of negotiating positions directly with the President. The talks were back on track and focused on narrowing differences, but included reductions—though not as deep as originally proposed by the US side.

The next round of talks in September were expected to be very important, and CIA prepared a paper for the President offering a Soviet perspective on SALT. The Agency restated an old theme at the outset, that the Soviets wanted to secure and, if possible, enlarge their hard-won strategic gains of the past decade and enhance the Soviet military-political position vis-a-vis the United States while simultaneously reliably controlling the risks of nuclear war. CIA said that SALT was important to the Soviets:

- To influence the broad political environment of US-Soviet relations, including braking US arms programs even without an agreement.

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- To register and reinforce the co-equal superpower status of the USSR.
- To keep the Soviet Union in the forefront of US foreign policy and security concerns.
- To maintain the strategic nuclear balance as the crux of US-Soviet relations, thus overshadowing Soviet disadvantages in other aspects of the global competition with the United States, that is, economic strength and technological prowess.
- To avert US weapons or force developments that could sharply upset the strategic balance (stopping US ABM efforts was the major case of this kind).
- To protect their strategic gains—they regarded the Interim Agreement and the Valdivostok accord as sanctioning a continued Soviet advantage in heavy ICBMs.
- To constrain future US strategic developments in the areas of likely US advantage at minimum cost to the USSR, that is, cruise missiles.

CIA told the President in this 19 September paper that the Soviets believed the "correlation of forces" was shifting inexorably, if gradually and unevenly, in their favor, but that they still "fear the potential of American technology and industrial capacity in an unconstrained arms race." It went on that "the conception of SALT as a forum in which the two sides conscientiously and jointly attempt to work out 'fair' agreements to stabilize their strategic relationship along mutual assured destruction lines is alien to the Soviet political mind." The paper said that the Soviets' strong reaction to the March US proposals had reflected

"The issue of whether progress in SALT should be linked to Soviet behavior elsewhere came to a head in March 1978."

Soviet irritation at losing earlier negotiating gains, amplified by Soviet fears of new US military technologies contemplated or under development. The Soviets had reacted with a hard line to redirect pressure back onto the American side, thus relieving the political and propaganda disadvantage under which they were temporarily placed and avoiding the internal difficulties of formulating a new position themselves.

CIA predicted that in the September talks the Soviets could be expected to:

- Exploit any openings offered by new US proposals to bring the negotiating framework back closer to the Vladivostok lines.
- Demand stringent cruise missile constraints.
- Try to work out a mutual understanding to extend the SALT I Interim Agreement and reaffirm the ABM Treaty.
- Not produce substantial new proposals of their own as long as they believe the US position on a new negotiating framework remains fluid.

Vance and Gromyko and then Carter and Gromyko met as scheduled in September in Washington, and the sessions gave the negotiations a strong push. The CIA memo had been on the mark in foreshadowing the Soviets' approach and attitude.

Despite the progress in September 1977, the issues were complicated in themselves, and they were further complicated by difficulties in the broader relationship. This, in turn, seriously aggravated the relationship between Vance and Brzezinski. The two had a fundamentally different notion of how to deal with the Soviets. Vance believed that the way to inhibit Soviet assertiveness around the world was to pursue SALT and other negotiations all the more vigorously. He wanted to contain regional problems to the region and not allow them to affect the broader US-Soviet relationship, especially SALT, which he sought to insulate from the continuing confrontations with Moscow. He saw the Soviets acting opportunistically but not as part of any larger plan. He conceded growing public and Congressional concern over Soviet international behavior, but believed most of it was generated by Brzezinski's and NSC staffers' backgrounders to the press—thus, a "self-inflicted" problem.

Brzezinski, who supported SALT throughout, also believed that the United States had to respond aggressively to Soviet interventions and meddling around the world, that the United States had to raise the cost of such adventures to the Soviets. If the Soviets and Cubans sent forces to Ethiopia, the United States should send a carrier task force to hang off the coast. And so on.

The issue of whether progress in SALT should be linked to Soviet behavior elsewhere came to a head in March 1978. In a press briefing with Vice President Mondale on 1 March, Brzezinski said that the United States was not imposing any linkage between Soviet aid to Ethiopia and new limits on strategic weapons, but he added that "linkages may be

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imposed by unwarranted exploitation of local conflict for larger international purposes." He went on to observe that tensions in the bilateral relationship and increasing Soviet aggressiveness would jeopardize support for any arms agreement. Brzezinski regarded what he had said as a statement of fact, not a policy recommendation. The press portrayed it differently, and Vance saw it differently.

The next day, at the National Press Club, the President noted that Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa "would make it more difficult to ratify a SALT agreement...." He added, "The two are linked because of actions by the Soviets. We don't initiate the linkage." The same day, 2 March, Vance told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there was no linkage between SALT and the situation in Ethiopia. This specific disagreement, and the basic difference of outlook it represented, would plague and divide the administration to the very end.

Another year was spent negotiating the significant remaining differences on SALT. During that time, substantial agreement was reached on the Backfire bomber (including a production limit of 30 per year), cruise missiles (range, definition, and numbers), and encoding of telemetry (the signals sent back to Earth by a missile, which were intercepted by both sides and enabled them to ascertain the technical characteristics of the missile). There was further infighting in the administration as Vance pushed for faster completion: "...some of the President's political advisers were worried about the attacks from the right, and were concerned about the SALT head count in the Senate. They recommended

"Turner sought a complete ban on telemetry encryption and refused to accept an agreement worked out by US and Soviet negotiators in Geneva."

that we deliberately slow down the negotiations and toughen our positions.... I disagreed emphatically." Vance also expressed his concerns that the normalization of relations with China (orchestrated for Carter by Brzezinski) had caused the Soviets to go slow on SALT.

CIA also complicated the administration's efforts on SALT by insisting that the treaty address satisfactorily the issue of telemetry encryption. Every missile being flight tested sends signals back to the ground that provide measurements of performance. US intelligence over the years learned not only how to acquire these signals from Soviet missiles, but also how to derive a great deal of information about the capabilities of the missiles from the signals. Over time, however, the Soviets increasingly encoded these signals, thus denying the United States the information it needed to inform our military and to monitor SALT agreements. In the final months of the SALT II negotiations, Turner insisted that US intelligence had to have access to unencoded telemetry signals necessary to monitor Soviet compliance with the treaty provisions. He had the administration over a barrel. Unless the DCI could assure the Senate that US intelligence could adequately monitor Soviet compliance with a SALT treaty, it had no chance of being ratified.

Turner sought a complete ban on telemetry encryption and refused to accept an agreement worked out by US and Soviet negotiators in Geneva. He worried that the Soviets would say they were willing not to encode telemetry relevant to monitoring the treaty provisions but without conceding that any telemetry actually was related to the treaty. The issue was complicated further by the fact that US intelligence had no intention of telling the Soviets which channels we needed to monitor—indeed, talking about telemetry encryption at all to the Soviets back then created consternation in the SIGINT community. Turner made himself very unpopular with Vance and others in the administration in the late winter of 1978–early spring of 1979 as he stuck to his guns on what was needed for adequate verification. At the end of the day, he failed to get all he and the Intelligence Community sought, but he achieved considerably better terms on telemetry encryption than the negotiators had been prepared to demand.

The telemetry issue was made harder by the fact that the Iranian revolution had eliminated US access to its Tacksman monitoring sites in northern Iran and significantly reduced the quality and quantity of telemetry we could collect. Those in the Senate skeptical of the treaty knew this and used it to full advantage. Brown tried to reassure the Senate publicly on 17 April 1979, when he issued a statement that said that regaining our full capabilities would take until 1983-84 but that regaining enough to verify adequately Soviet compliance with SALT II would take about a year. He concluded, "My judgment is that our monitoring will be such as to provide adequate verification as to Soviet compliance with the curbs on

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new or modernized weapons." And, in fact, the senior Intelligence Community leadership, the SCC, and the Congress spent an extraordinary amount of time and effort in the spring of 1979 figuring out how to replace Tacksman. The answer was found in China.

Despite these tensions inside the administration, in a brief upturn in the relationship, SALT II was completed in May, setting the stage for a summit and signing ceremony in Vienna, Austria, on 18 June 1979.

In preparation for the summit, CIA provided a great deal of material to the White House and a major briefing on 6 June. Every summit with a Soviet leader has a certain ritual attached to it. Massive briefing books are prepared addressing every conceivable subject that might come up, the background of the issue, and a recommendation on what the President should say. It usually is pretty stilted stuff. Also, for the last 20 years, CIA has prepared a biographic video of the Soviet leader. The videos would not win any Emmys, but they gave a President who had not met his counterpart a sense of the person as an individual—his likes and dislikes from food and liquor to sports and exercise, how he moves and talks, how he deals with subordinates and other leaders. The video footage itself normally is simply from Soviet or other television files but with the narration prepared by CIA from classified sources.

The briefings for Carter were in this pattern, tackling Brezhnev's behavior as a negotiating partner, biographic material and a video, and his objectives at the summit. They also addressed more substantive issues such as the Soviet economy, foreign policy on the eve of the summit, decisionmaking, SALT III objectives, and perceptions of human rights issues in the bilateral relationship.

The CIA experts' briefing for Carter focused first on Brezhnev himself. They said there had been a significant deterioration in his physical condition, that he was now a tired old man, albeit one who could discuss substantive matters in a reasonable and responsible fashion. They told Carter that Brezhnev liked expensive clothes, fast and ostentatious cars (Nixon had given him a new Lincoln and a new Cadillac), thoroughbred horses, stiff drinks, spicy foods, soccer, boar hunting, duck shooting, and beautiful women. The experts said that Brezhnev regarded Carter as inconsistent and that the Soviet leader was clearly put off by the US human rights policy.

On substantive issues, the CIA briefers made the following points:

- As the summit approaches, Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership "can view their position in the world with considerable satisfaction. Part of the Soviet mood is a sense of momentum in the USSR's favor in the Third World."

- "The long-term outlook for the Soviet economy remains bleak." In the short term, according to the briefers, industrial production was nearly stagnant, agriculture troubled, and the near term outlook "gloomy." "The briefers also noted that longer term prospects are worse," with the Soviets facing energy problems, adverse demographic trends, and severe shortages of meat and quality food. In addition, consumer incomes and expectations are poor.

The briefers stated that, "Although the leadership recognizes the need for change, the Soviet system is not designed to make this transition easy. The foundations of the system—directive planning, centralized allocation of resources, administratively set prices, and incentives oriented toward quantitative production goals—discourage innovation and encourage redundancy and waste in the use of resources." The leadership believes it can alleviate the system-based barriers to innovation and managerial efficiency without jeopardizing strong centralized control. "We do not think halfhearted reforms will be any more successful in generating technical progress and production efficiency than they have in the past. Brezhnev and his colleagues must come to grips with hard choices over resource allocation in the very near future."

With respect to Soviet defense spending, the briefers noted that Brezhnev and Kosygin frequently alluded to the weight of the arms burden on the economy and recognized that the high levels of their defense spending impose economic costs. The experts predicted, however, that qualitative factors would push the Soviets' defense spending up in the 1980s as they pursue high-tech solutions to current force deficiencies and future US threats. They concluded by observing to Carter that the importance for the Soviets of SALT II was not in immediate savings but in future cost avoidance: "Now that the Soviets are relatively more comfortable with the strategic balance, they have a strong economic interest in avoiding an acceleration in military spending, especially in the strategic area, where the costs to them are uncertain but probably significantly higher than to us."

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This briefing and others like it for a least the preceding year directly addressed the issue of Soviet economic difficulties and the potential impact on defense spending. The Intelligence Community was unusually unified at least in framing the central issue: "The Intelligence Community is largely agreed that the outlook for the Soviet economy over the next five to 10 years is more bleak and the prospects for policy choices more uncertain than at any time since Stalin's death. This leads to the question whether these bleak prospects may induce the leadership to shift substantial resources from projected defense spending to other sectors of the economy, particularly investment."

Briefings carried out, and preparations complete, we headed to Vienna. I went on the advance trip to prepare for the President's visit, and it was a pleasure to return to the city where I had spent several months on the SALT delegation. My major contribution on the advance team was to get added to the President's itinerary a stop by the world-famous chocolate shop, Demel's. Others could worry about security, SALT, and so on, but I clearly had my priorities in order.

The meetings took place in the US and Soviet Embassies in Vienna, alternating between them. As Brzezinski's assistant, I attended several of the meetings and lurked around the periphery of the others, talking to Soviets and picking up tidbits of information. Once an intelligence officer, always an intelligence officer.

I could not get over how feeble Brezhnev was by then. Going in and out of the embassies, two huge—and I mean *huge*—KGB officers held him upright under his arms and essentially carried him. Col. Bill Odom, Brzezinski's military assistant and a noted Soviet scholar in his own right, and I were trapped in a narrow walkway at one point and, as the KGB half-carried Brezhnev by, we were nearly steamrollered. At another point, Col. C. G. Fitzgerald, an old Soviet hand, saw Brezhnev's bodyguards literally carry him up the stairs without his feet touching the ground. When Fitzgerald was shouldered aside (as Odom and I had been) on the steps, he began to fall and one guard, still carrying Brezhnev with his left arm, reached out with his free right arm and with a "careful, Mr. Colonel," broke Fitzgerald's fall and lifted him to an upright position.

"The Intelligence Community is largely agreed that the outlook for the Soviet economy over the next five to 10 years is more bleak and the prospects for policy choices more uncertain than at any time since Stalin's death."

During the meetings, Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov did not hesitate to correct Brezhnev when he misspoke or made a mistake, and he would often turn to them with questions or for them to comment. More than once after finishing a presentation, Brezhnev would turn to Gromyko and ask "Did I do all right?" He was still clearly in charge and they clearly still deferred to him, but he was enormously dependent upon them for support. He was a very infirm old man, with a shuffling walk, slurred speech, and a puffy appearance. A doctor who observed Brezhnev in Vienna said, "He looked eerily like a zombie being wheeled from point to point, with only minimal comprehension of his surroundings." There were occasional flashes of the old Brezhnev when a subject interested him—especially hunting and fishing, teasing us Americans, or interrupting the President to agree or disagree.

I found Defense Minister Ustinov an intimidating presence. He wore his marshal's uniform (he won his marshal's baton in Party infighting, not a real battlefield) the entire time. (His rows of medals reminded me of a cartoon where a man tells a similarly decorated officer caught in the light "Hey, dim your lights!") In his mid-70s, Ustinov had headed the Soviet arms industry for the Party since the middle of World War II. He was very spry and alert. He deferred to no one but Brezhnev. He was accompanied by Chief of the General Staff Marshal Ogarkov, who also wore his uniform and came across as a very tough customer. In their meeting with Harold Brown and General Jones, Ustinov did almost all the talking, was very persistent and tough, and at times almost preemptory with the US side. Bill Odom thought he was the most impressive of the four Politburo members at the summit, and he told me that in the military meeting he thought Ustinov had seized the discussion initiative, pressed his case relentlessly, and showed great command of the issues.

Another Politburo member at the summit was Konstantin Chernenko. He gave the impression of an influential assistant to Brezhnev, which he was, but as having little authority apart from that role. He did not speak at all in the meetings or on any

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issue of substance. When he was called aside by Brezhnev, it was to perform some staff-type function. When meetings would conclude and the Soviets would walk down the hall, it would be Brezhnev and Gromyko together, Ustinov and Ogarkov together, and Chernenko—white-haired and florid faced—alone, bringing up the rear. The US participants all agreed that he was not the sort to succeed Brezhnev and that he would quickly disappear with Brezhnev's departure. I shared that view and, based on what I had seen personally of Chernenko in Vienna, when I later returned to CIA, disparaged his chances of succeeding either Brezhnev or his successor, Andropov. I was wrong.

I also met Brezhnev's "national security adviser," a mousy little guy named Aleksandrov-Agentov. He carried little weight on the Soviet side, certainly far less than his American counterpart on our team. He did have a certain sense of humor. At the Vienna opera attended by the leaders, he remarked to one of our delegation, "The smaller the country, the longer the opera." He also commented, "Isn't President Carter from Georgia? We had a leader from Georgia for 30 years (Stalin)."

There is no disputing that every Soviet-American summit was a big deal. The world watched closely, hoping that the two military Goliaths would make progress toward reducing the chances of war and putting some constraints on their arms race and global competition. I helped prepare for some 10 of these meetings over a 17-year period and participated in on-site preparations for half that number. Every President, according to historians, from Franklin D. Roosevelt on, and certainly the five I watched personally, was convinced that if he could only get a Soviet leader alone, "press the flesh" and get to know him, that they could somehow break through the political and ideological blinders. I do not believe that that ever happened. But I do believe that the periodic summits, like arms control, kept the lines of communication open, allowed the leaders to take the personal measure of each other, and probably helped prevent miscalculations. They did not change the course of events in any appreciable way, but they helped keep the lid on.

It is hard to imagine two more different individuals than Carter and Brezhnev. Both were committed to achieving SALT II—it was the only arms control agreement of which I am aware that was sealed with a kiss (between Brezhnev and Carter). But their summit and that agreement was just a brief, pleasant interlude in a four-year relationship marked by confrontations, harsh rhetoric, aggressive opportunism by the Soviets, and, largely behind the scenes, an increasingly tough US reaction. Apart from normalization with China, the Carter administration's military and covert response to the Soviets was overshadowed by the President's decisions on B-1 and the neutron bomb and the rising tide of criticism that he and his colleagues were failing to react to the Soviets at all. Even as SALT II was being completed and then signed, events were under way around the world that would, by the end of 1979, make SALT II irrelevant politically and—somewhat unfairly—forever seal Jimmy Carter's reputation as a weak President.

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British Penetration of America's First Diplomatic Mission (U)

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The capitals of Europe [in the 18th century] were full of international spies. The technique of deciphering intercepted dispatches attained a high degree of perfection. Corruption was the conventional instrument of diplomatic success. The art of dissimulation and deception was a necessary part of the equipment of any minister of foreign affairs.

Samuel Flagg Bemis.[1]

"Perhaps the greatest irony in the whole story of the penetration of the American Commission is that, while British intelligence activities were highly successful, British policy was a total failure."

About 220 years ago as the American colonies were fighting for their independence, the Continental Congress established a three-man American Commission in Paris with the objective of formalizing a treaty of alliance against Britain. Its efforts were to be discreet, if not entirely covert, and its success or failure would determine the outcome of the war for independence.

The Commission was a counterintelligence disaster from the start. Its physical security was poor, its personnel security nonexistent, and its three commissioners had no real counterintelligence awareness. Because France was a "friendly" country providing covert assistance to the revolution, the three Americans apparently felt comfortable and secure under the "protection" of the French Government. They underestimated the ability of the British to operate against them in a third country.

The British coverage of the Commission was highly professional, comprehensive, and aggressive. It included the theft of documents, penetration agents in the Commission, access agents, and manipulations of the principle targets based on personality assessment information. The British had a complete picture of American-French activities supporting the war in America and of American intentions regarding an alliance with France. The British used this intelligence effectively against the American cause. From their coverage of shipping activities, the British were able to seize badly needed supplies destined for George Washington's army. The British Minister in Paris also used timely and accurate intelligence on American supply efforts and paramilitary activities in the English Channel to force the French Government to become less blatant in its support for these activities.

Perhaps the greatest irony in the whole story of the penetration of the American Commission is that, while British intelligence activities were highly successful, British policy was a total failure.

Establishing Ties to the French Government

The geopolitical rivalry between Britain and France provided the American colonies with an excellent opportunity to play on French desires to weaken the British worldwide. The French, still smarting from their defeat in the Seven Year's War, were eager to assist the colonies—if their chances for success were good.

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In December 1775, Julien Achard de Bonvouloir, an agent of the French Foreign Ministry, approached Benjamin Franklin in Philadelphia to inquire about the seriousness of the colonies' dispute with Britain. During three secret meetings with members of the Continental Congress's Committee of Correspondence, de Bonvouloir was told that the colonies would soon declare independence from Britain and that the American Army would be able to defeat the British. He was asked if France would support American military efforts against the British, and he broadly hinted that France would.

Within a few months, the Committee of Correspondence sent one of its members, Silas Deane, to Paris to obtain military supplies and to probe the French Government's attitudes toward a declaration of independence and a treaty of alliance against Britain. In his instructions to Deane, Franklin provided the names of several trusted individuals in Europe worthy of contact, including Dr. Edward Bancroft of London.

A Valuable British Spy

The American-born Bancroft was an old friend of Franklin's, and he was a respected scientist and businessman in Britain. The two had met in London in the early 1770s, when Franklin was a colonial business agent. He had acted as a mentor to Bancroft, sponsoring him for the British Royal Society in May 1773 and involving him in a land speculation deal in the colonies. Franklin believed him to be well connected in Britain and sympathetic to the American cause. Deane had also known Bancroft, having tutored him for a brief period.

Deane wrote to Bancroft on his arrival in France, and he arranged to meet with him in Paris on 8 July 1776. Deane was impressed with Bancroft, and he discussed with him the status of negotiations with the French Government regarding an alliance. Within two days of Deane's arrival in Paris, Lord Stormont, the British Minister in Paris and the local head of British intelligence, advised London that "Nathan Rumsey," the British codename for Deane, was in Paris.[2] Stormont was instructed to keep Deane under surveillance. Bancroft and Deane continued their discussions until 26 July, when Bancroft departed for London. They then maintained an active correspondence.

Shortly after Bancroft's return to London, American-born businessman Paul Wentworth called on him to discuss his visit with Deane. Wentworth had been a businessman in London for many years and had befriended Bancroft in the late 1760s. In 1769, he hired Bancroft to work on his Surinam plantation for a few years. In 1772, as political problems grew in the American colonies, Wentworth was recruited by British intelligence to report on colonial activities and on other Americans in London.

It is not clear whether Bancroft was under British control before his trip to Paris to meet Deane. Some historians speculate he had been recruited as early as 1772, along with Wentworth; his specific efforts against the American Commission in Paris can be traced to August 1776. Whether a previous relationship had existed, or surveillance on Deane had identified Bancroft as a potential asset, Wentworth's visit resulted in Bancroft providing an account of Deane's mission to France. This report, dated 14 August, provided detailed intelligence information, as well as operational information which could be used to monitor American-French activities through other intelligence resources. It was well received by the British, and two days later Stormont was advised of the full extent of Deane's mission in France.[3]

In October, Bancroft returned to Paris to visit Deane. This trip resulted in a report to Wentworth about additional secret French military aid and the status of discussions on a Treaty of Alliance. Bancroft now enjoyed Deane's complete confidence.

At about the same time, Wentworth formalized his arrangements with Bancroft for reporting on American activities in France. The terms of agreement are noted in a December 1776 letter from Wentworth to William Eden, the undersecretary of state in the Northern Department of the British Foreign Ministry, and the official responsible for coordinating intelligence collection in the Foreign Ministry against the American Commission in Paris:

> *Dr. Edwards [Bancroft's covername] engages to correspond with Mr. Wentworth and to communicate to him, whatever may come to his knowledge on the following subjects. The progress of the Treaty with France, and of the assistance expected, or commerce carried on in any of the ports of that kingdom. The same with Spain, and of every other court in Europe. The agents in the foreign islands in America, and the*

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means of carrying on the commerce with the northern colonies. The means of obtaining credit—effects and money; and the channels and agents used to supply them; the secret moves about the courts of France and Spain, and the Congress agents, and tracing the lives from one to the other. Franklin and Deane's correspondence with Congress, and their agents; and the secret, as well as the ostensible letters from the Congress to them. Copies of any transactions, committed to papers, and an exact account of all intercourse and the subject matter treated of, between the courts of Versailles and Madrid, and the agents from Congress. Subjects to be communicated to Lord Stormont. Names of the two Carolina ships, masters both English and French, descriptions of the ships and cargoes; the time of sailing, and the port bound to. The same circumstances representing all equipment in any port in Europe together with the names of the agents employed. The intelligence that may arrive from America, the captures made by their privateers, and the instruction they received from the deputies. How the captures are disposed of.[4]

As compensation, Bancroft would receive a salary of 500 pounds a year, a recruitment bonus of 400 pounds, and, later, a pension of 200 pounds a year. By 1780, his annual salary had increased to 1,000 pounds.[5]

A Sophisticated Adversary

By the time of the American Revolution, the concept and practice of collecting intelligence was well established in the British Government. While no centralized organization issued requirements and analyzed reports, these responsibilities were handled by King George III, through his Prime Minister Lord North. The two major elements of intelligence collection on American activities in France and the rest of Europe were Eden's network operating out of the Foreign Office and Admiralty intelligence reporting to the Secretary of the Royal Navy. Eden concentrated on political intelligence and the Navy on shipping intelligence. In the case of American activities in France and throughout Europe, these reporting areas often overlapped. Eden specifically targeted American-born British subjects in England for recruitment.

“By the time of the American Revolution, the concept and practice of collecting intelligence was well established in the British Government.”

In Paris, Lord Stormont ran several reporting sources on American activities at French ports. These sources included John Barton and Company, a British firm at Bordeaux; David Allen, A. Keith, and John Williams, a distant relative of Franklin's at Nantes; and John Hunter at Rennes, who also covered activities at Brest, St. Malo, and L'Orient. These assets' reporting was passed through the British Foreign Office intelligence network. Stormont also controlled agents targeted against the French Government and the American Commission, with the able assistance of Horace Saint Paul, another senior British official at the Mission, and Thomas Jean, a personal assistant to the minister, who did much of the "on-the-street" work. Stormont's agents included one in the Archives Section of the French Foreign Ministry, who was able to provide official minutes of the first meeting between Franklin and French Foreign Minister Count de Vergennes on 28 December 1776.[6]

The shipping intelligence obtained by the British was particularly effective from May 1777 through April 1778. During that period, the British intercepted every supply ship bound for America carrying correspondence from the Paris Commission to the Continental Congress. In effect, the Congress was rendered deaf in terms of the activities being conducted on behalf of the revolution in Europe.

Another element of the British intelligence effort was the interception and reading of mail by the British Post Office. Watch lists were established of suspected addressees and return addresses, and letters were opened and the contents copied for passage to British intelligence. One of its most productive operations involved reading the mail from William Carmichael, a secretary at the Commission, to his mistress in England. The post office also had an extensive list of accommodation addresses, which Franklin and Deane used for their English contacts, and read these correspondences routinely.

The American Commission in Paris

Pleased with Deane's initial successes in obtaining French support for the American war effort, on 26 September 1776 the Continental Congress appointed an official Commission to France. It was composed of Franklin,

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Deane, and Arthur Lee, an American-born lawyer living in London, who was also a correspondent for the Committee of Secret Correspondence. The Commission officially opened in late December 1776, with Franklin as the de facto head of the mission. It was located in the Hotel de Valentinois, in the Paris suburb of Passy.

Unfortunately, there were serious personality clashes in the Commission. The split within the Commission was clear from the start—Franklin and Deane against Lee. Personal and business rivalries existed, and the sometimes brittle emotional personalities of the individuals made for an unpleasant environment.

This situation provided British intelligence with opportunities to manipulate the three commissioners and the working environment within the Commission. Had mutual trust and respect existed, the Commission might have been more aware of the behavior of its employees and looked more objectively at why the British were so well informed of its plans and activities. According to an American historian:

> *From 1776 to 1781, it is not too much to say that the British Foreign Office was far better informed of American activities than was Congress itself. Franklin's embassy at Passy, it now appears, was almost a branch office of the British Secret Service.*[7]

Franklin's personal and professional dislike and distrust of Lee stood in the way of his giving objective consideration to Lee's suspicions regarding Bancroft's activities, about which he started warning Franklin in early 1777.

"British intelligence collected personality assessment data on all the commissioners and had excellent profiles on Franklin and Lee from their time in England."

The French were quick to notice the lack of unity among the American commissioners, and Bancroft made sure that British intelligence was aware of the personality conflicts.

British intelligence collected personality assessment data on all the commissioners and had excellent profiles on Franklin and Lee from their time in England. The British would have used this information to decide the best type of access agents to send against each target, and their knowledge of Franklin's and Deane's conflict with Lee should have enabled them to shape further their elicitation and manipulation activities.

A Wide Net

By December, the Americans were running a variety of clandestine activities against the British from France. These included:

- Covert purchases and shipments of military supplies, weapons, and clothing for the American Army.
- Covert purchase of European-built ships for use in carrying supplies, transferal to the American Navy, and privateer activities against British vessels.
- Management of secret military and financial aid from the French Government.
- Involvement in a sabotage operation resulting in the burning of a portion of the Portsmouth Royal Navy Dockyard and a vessel at Bristol port by James Aitken, alias John the Painter.
- Directing "nonattributable" privateering activities out of French and Spanish ports against British naval vessels and merchantmen.
- Political action operations throughout Europe and England against British policy in the colonies.
- Propaganda operations in France, England, and the Netherlands in support of American objectives.
- Financial influence operations in European banking centers to enhance the credit standing of America.
- Secret negotiations with the French Government for a military alliance against Britain.

With the Commission and its three distinct personalities representing such a rich and concentrated target, British intelligence moved quickly and effectively to cover its activities.

Bancroft, at Wentworth's direction, traveled to Paris in January 1777 and further ingratiated himself with Deane and Franklin. On returning to Britain, he expressed confidence that he could obtain a position within the Commission. This suited

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British intelligence, and a cover story was created to justify Bancroft's move to Paris. This cover story related to the 15 March publication in the *London Chronicle* of John the Painter's confession. The confession included the fact that Deane had given John a letter for Bancroft, and that John had told Bancroft of his activities. In reality, Bancroft published a response to these charges in the London press, and no threat to him existed. Deane and Franklin, however, readily accepted Bancroft's statement that he no longer felt safe in England. Surprisingly, the French, who had agents keeping an eye on the Americans, also believed the cover story.[8] Bancroft departed London on 26 March 1777 and joined the Commission as a private secretary, with access to all its papers.

Access Agents

While Bancroft was reporting from inside the Commission, British intelligence was busy recruiting American access agents to send against the commissioners. The recruiting officer was Rev. John Vardill, an American Anglican clergyman and a former assistant rector of Trinity Church in New York City. He worked for British intelligence from 1775 to 1781, reporting on American sympathizers and recruiting Americans. Two Americans he recruited were targeted against the Commission: a businessman named Jacobus Van Zandt (who reported under the pseudonym George Lupton) and Capt. Joseph Hynson, a Maryland sea captain.

Van Zandt, the son of a wealthy New York merchant, was living well above his means in Paris, and he had numerous bad debts. Vardill learned of Van Zandt's situation and, during a visit to London, Vardill recruited him by providing funds to pay off Van Zandt's debts. He then directed Van Zandt to befriend Deane, who was always on the alert for a profitable business deal.

Van Zandt used his family's reputation to develop a social relationship with Deane, and he was able to elicit some useful information on military shipping plans. Deane often invited him into his living quarters, and Van Zandt stole various documents which Deane kept there. Overall, Van Zandt's reporting was high in quantity but not in quality. Much of what he reported from Deane was also being reported by Bancroft, and his information was a useful cross check on the latter's reporting. At least one piece of Van Zandt's reporting proved to be of significant operational value to the British: he was able to provide a list of the cover names and addresses used by the Commission to correspond with its contacts in Britain.

Van Zandt's questions soon became too obvious, and the business deals Deane had hoped for were not forthcoming. Deane dropped contact with him in early 1778. Having lost his access, Van Zandt was terminated by Vardill.

Vardill had better luck with Captain Hynson, who managed to befriend Franklin and Deane for over six months. Hynson was originally spotted by his British girl friend and her landlady in London, after he boasted of being tasked to obtain an English ship to sail to America for transfer to the American Navy. He also bragged that he would be carrying secret correspondence from the American commissioners in Paris to the Continental Congress. Vardill recruited him, using a combination of threats and financial rewards, specifically to obtain the official correspondence that he was to carry back to America. Some historians believe this was part of a British intelligence operational testing scheme to vet Bancroft's copies of Commission correspondence. Hynson's contributions to British intelligence included military shipping information and American plans to purchase European ships for American use. His sources of information were Deane and Franklin; American sea captains involved in moving supplies and vessels to the colonies; and William Carmichael, an assistant to both Franklin and Deane.

Hynson's most important intelligence success was his theft of the Commission's official correspondence to the Continental Congress from January through June 1777. This correspondence, which he had been scheduled to carry was subsequently entrusted to another American seaman, Captain Folger, who was prepared to sail earlier than Hynson. During a social drinking session in mid-October, Hynson replaced the correspondence in Folger's dispatch pouch with blank papers, and the correspondence was not discovered as missing until Folger reached the American shore. Hynson passed the correspondence to Lord Stormont's assistant.

Hynson was rewarded with a one-time payment of 200 pounds and a lifetime pension of 200 pounds per year. British Foreign Ministry intelligence chief Eden personally delivered the correspondence to King George III on 20 October 1777. Later that month, possibly while intoxicated, Hynson wrote to Deane from London, noting his association with the

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British and offering to become a double agent for the right price. Deane was not interested, and Hynson was no longer welcome at the Commission.

William Carmichael, a source of Hynson's and a probable recruitment target of the British, was an American businessman from Maryland residing in Europe who volunteered to help the Commission in a clerical position. He served as an assistant to both Deane and Franklin from late 1776 through 1777. His duties, in addition to preparing papers for the Commission, involved handling commercial and military shipping procedures and activities related to American privateers operating from French ports. He also had a mistress in London who lived in the same house as Hynson's mistress.

There is no firm evidence that Carmichael was under British control, but he told Hynson of activities at the commission and details of American shipping and privateering plans, knowing that Hynson was passing this information to the British. Thus, he was close to the edge of actively assisting the British, if he did not actually cooperate with them.[9]

Carmichael also wrote detailed letters of the activities at the Commission to his girl friend in London. British intelligence intercepted these letters, and one might suspect that his mistress may have been encouraged to ask the right questions to keep the information flowing. His gossipy letters produced valuable assessment and operational information for British intelligence. Carmichael left Paris in 1777, but later he appeared in Madrid and became an assistant there to John Jay. He continued to write interesting letters to his mistress on his activities in Madrid.

“There was no real physical security at the Commission itself.”

Sloppy Security

There was no real physical security at the Commission itself. The public had access to the mansion, documents and papers were spread out all over the office, and private discussions were held in public areas. Commissioner Arthur Lee was appalled by the lack of any physical protection. He wrote:

> *Count Vergennes had complained that everything we did was known to the English ambassador, who was always plaguing him with the details. No one will be surprised at this who knows that we have no time or place appropriate to our consultation, but that servants, strangers, and everyone was at liberty to enter and did constantly enter the room while we were talking about public business and that the papers relating to it lay open in rooms of common and continual resort.*[10]

If anyone at the Commission had a counterintelligence awareness, it was Lee. He carried it to extremes, however, seeing spies everywhere. Early in his career as a commissioner, he was the victim of a document-theft operation. This experience certainly contributed to his suspicious nature.

The Purloined Journal

In June 1777, Lee went to the court of King Frederick the Great in Berlin to seek assistance for the revolution. Learning of his arrival, the British Minister in Berlin, Hugh Elliot, used a German servant from his mission to bribe several employees of the hotel where Lee was staying. Elliot was a young and rather inexperienced diplomat, but he had a flair for intelligence work.

Elliot had the hotel employees observe Lee's habits and daily schedule for several days. They reported that he spent many hours each day writing in his journal. The Minister quickly decided that he wanted the information in that journal. He tasked his German servant to obtain a key to Lee's room from the hotel employees and to duplicate it. On 26 June, Elliot was advised that Lee was to travel that day to the country for a social occasion. His servant stole Lee's journal from his room and took it to Elliot's residence, where several people were waiting to copy it.

The copying went slower than anticipated, and much remained to be copied about the time Lee was to return to the hotel. Elliot then decided to stop Lee from returning to his room until the copying had been completed. At this point, his sense of operational security became somewhat flawed. He went to the hotel and waited in the lobby until Lee arrived. He then approached Lee casually and engaged him in conversation. He said that, when he had heard Lee speaking English, he was so happy to hear a familiar language that he had to talk to him.

Two hours later, Lee finally broke away and got to his room. He immediately noticed the loss of his journal

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and reported the burglary to the local police. Meanwhile, Elliot hurried back to his residence and retrieved the journal. He then donned a disguise, returned to the hotel, and gave the journal to one of the employees in his pay. She returned it to Lee, claiming that it had been left at the door to his room.[11]

The ensuing investigation identified Elliot as having been involved, and King Frederick publicly blamed the British Minister for the theft. In the diplomatic demarche which followed, King George III resorted to "plausible denial," and publicly rebuked his Minister. Privately, he rewarded Elliot with 1,000 pounds for obtaining such valuable intelligence.

Double Agents

Lee's poor judgment in protecting his secret journal information also extended into his efforts to collect intelligence on the British. In an attempt to collect information in London, he selected two brothers, Thomas and George Diggs, as his agents. Both were rogues, whose reporting was sparse and inaccurate. They were also in the pay of the British, passing to him useless information or information that the British wanted him to know. Lee exercised equally poor judgment in his appointments within the Commission.

In early 1777, John Thornton, a British Army major on inactive duty, met Franklin and expressed concerns about the treatment of American prisoners in Britain. Franklin had long been interested in this subject,

"Franklin, as the mission head, has to bear primary responsibility for the lack of security and counterintelligence in Paris."

and he obtained Thornton's agreement to return to Britain to investigate the prisoners' conditions and to pass some funds from Franklin to them.

Thornton returned to Paris in January 1778, having apparently accomplished his mission. He then expressed interest in a position at the Commission, confiding that he might be able to obtain intelligence on British political thinking from his circle of contacts in London. Lee hired him as a private secretary. Among other duties, Lee sent Thornton to the French Channel ports to gather information on the British Channel fleet. Thornton reported back that the fleet was mobilizing into a large force, when it was actually quite weak.

About two months after Lee hired Thornton, Franklin received word from contacts in London that the major was a British spy. Under pressure from Franklin, Lee dismissed Thornton and hired another American, Rev. Hezekiah Ford, as his private secretary. Ford also was a British spy. He had been a British loyalist in Virginia and fled to London to avoid arrest. He was well known to John Jay and others in the Continental Congress as having pro-British sympathies.

Fixing the Blame

While all three commissioners share in the blame, Franklin, as the mission head, has to bear primary responsibility for the lack of security and counterintelligence in Paris. By the time he arrived in Paris in late 1776, he was elderly and had little interest in the administrative aspects of the Commission. Franklin was widely recognized as a statesman, scientist, and intellectual. While highly respected, he was also vain, obstinate, and jealous of his prerogatives and reputation. He had decided that his role would be that of an "agent of influence" among the politically powerful in France. He found it convenient to allow Deane to handle the Commission's housekeeping affairs while he moved among the wealthy and powerful social elite. Also, the Commission was "under protection" of the French Government, and Franklin may have underestimated British capabilities to operate in a friendly third country. In any event, he did nothing to create a security consciousness at the Commission.

In addition, Franklin's personal association with Deane and Bancroft and his dislike of Lee caused him to brush aside Lee's accusations against both men. Intellectually, however, he realized that spies posed a serious threat. In January 1777, in response to a letter from a lady friend, Juliana Ritchie, warning him of spies, he wrote back to her:

> *... it is impossible to discover in every case the falsity of pretended friends, who would know our affairs; and more so to prevent being watch'd by spies, when interested people may think proper to place them for that purpose; I have long*

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observ'd one rule which prevents any inconvenience from such practices. It is simply this, to be concern'd in no affairs that I should blush to have made publick, and to do nothing but what spies may see and welcome. When a man's actions are just and honourable, the more they are known, the more his reputation is increas'd and establish'd. If I was sure, therefore that my valet de Place was a spy, as probably he is, I think I should not discharge him for that, if in other respects I lik'd him.[12]

Because Franklin was involved in numerous activities which he would not want to have been made public, such comments seem somewhat ingenious. His attitude, however, is all too familiar among some policymakers and statesmen. His ego may have overwhelmed his common sense. Like many government officials before and after him, he may have believed that he knew exactly what he was doing and that his judgment required no additional verification. If this is correct, then he had forgotten a basic rule which he stated years earlier as "Poor Richard":

If you would keep your secret from an enemy, tell it not to a friend.

The second, most important commissioner, Silas Deane, was an aggressive Yankee merchant, with a well-honed taste for personal profit. He readily accepted the association of anyone proffering a business deal. He was also willing to share information about the plans of the Continental Congress or the French Government that might assist him in his business endeavors. Seeing, and approving, his own motivations in others, he readily overlooked Bancroft's suspicious travel as business-profit oriented. These traits, well known to British intelligence, allowed Van Zandt, Hynson, and Carmichael to use him as a source of secret information. He had more ambition than principle, and he was driven by greed.

The third commissioner, Arthur Lee, had difficulty getting along with people. He had "... an egotism that sometimes assumed monstrous proportions."[13] He was not liked nor trusted by either his fellow commissioners or by Vergennes. While he did have a suspicious nature, his attitude toward counterintelligence was erratic. He suspected everyone, until he developed a personal relationship with them, and then they became loyal based upon that relationship. This particular trait was useful in enabling Thornton to gain Lee's confidence in January 1778, by confiding in him that Bancroft was in London speculating in the stock market for himself and the other commissioners.

As is usually the case with a counterintelligence disaster, there is sufficient blame to share among all the participants.

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92. Stevens, op. cit. No. 1805, p. 2.

93. Bemis, *Ibid.* p. 480.

94. Hendrick, op. cit., pp. 284-85.

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96. Smyth, Albert H., editor, *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, New York: Macmillan, 1905-07, Vol. 7; p. 11.

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Two Memoirs

British Intelligence Activity in Riga, 1934-1940 (U)

Donald P. Steury

"This made Riga a hotbed of espionage, in which Western intelligence agents operated side by side with revolutionaries, counterrevolutionaries, and adventurers from all over Europe."

Between the two world wars, the three Baltic states assumed an importance in international events out of all proportion to their size, strategic potential, and location on the periphery of Europe. At the end of World War I, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania had emerged as newly independent states from the wreckage of the Russian Empire. These three tiny countries were unshakably Western in outlook, but they remained at the center of rail and riverine lines of communication that extended deep into Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine, the legacy of 200 years of Russian domination. To Western business interests—and especially to those in Germany—this made the Baltic states ideal locations for "springboards" from which to establish economic contacts with the Soviet Union. To Western intelligence services, these same ties to Northern and Eastern Europe made the ports of the Baltic states ideal bases from which to mount clandestine intelligence operations against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

This was especially the case with Riga. Then, as now, the capital of Latvia, Riga was home to a small, economically powerful minority of Baltic Germans, to which the Bolshevik Revolution had added a large community of Russian emigres. Both groups retained extensive ties to their home countries, and both were rife with conspirators who were often only too eager to cooperate with Western services. This made Riga a hotbed of espionage, in which Western intelligence agents operated side by side with revolutionaries, counterrevolutionaries, and adventurers from all over Europe. As if to cater to this burgeoning espionage trade, Riga was also the home of the Minox Corporation, producers of the famous miniature camera, first manufactured there in 1938 and soon to become the favorite of spies everywhere.[1]

Britain's "man in Riga" at the outbreak of World War II was Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officer Leslie Nicholson, posted there in 1934. In 1966, Nicholson published *British Agent*, an account of his SIS experiences in Riga and elsewhere, under the pseudonym "John Whitwell." His memoirs were reissued in 1997 with a new introduction by Canadian scholar Wesley Wark.[2] Wark's model introduction evaluates Nicholson's career as an intelligence officer, tells a bit about Nicholson himself, and puts the whole story in perspective.[3] This is useful, because Nicholson's memoirs are often maddeningly vague. They reveal little about the SIS, apart from the fact that it did exist and that Nicholson worked for it. Wark's introduction enhances the value of the current edition of Nicholson's memoirs by clearing up Nicholson's fuzzier passages and by adding much-needed information. To complete the picture, Nicholson's memoirs should be read in conjunction with *Baltic Countdown*, the 1984 published account of these same years in Riga written by Peggie Benton, wife of Nicholson's assistant, SIS veteran Kenneth Benton.[4]

Peggie Benton had no official function at the British legation until after the outbreak of war. Her account

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thus is primarily that of an intelligence officer's wife. Throughout the book, Benton maintains her husband's cover as a consular official, but there is an underlying subcurrent that conveys the tensions and strain of living a double life in a small foreign country.[5] At the same time, Benton provides the living context for Nicholson's narrative of his experiences as an intelligence officer. Her brief narrative is an engaging account in its own right.

The SIS, also known as MI-6, was founded in 1909, after it was realized that the Foreign Office was formulating policy with little knowledge of the outside world, apart from bits of India and perhaps Wales. Although it quickly acquired an exotic reputation, SIS operated on a limited budget. It arguably survived World War I only by becoming virtually synonymous with the Passport Control Office (PCO), widely perceived in British ruling circles as serving a useful function. Almost all SIS officers operated under PCO cover abroad. By the 1930s, however, it had become little more than a fiction, especially after former SIS officer Compton Mackenzie revealed his own PCO cover in his memoirs, published in 1932 in violation of the Official Secrets Act.[6]

SIS officers generally did not collect intelligence on the countries in which they were based. In fact, they frequently cooperated with the local service. Because the primary targets for SIS officers abroad were Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and the Soviet Union, SIS stations tended to be concentrated on the peripheries in places like Prague, Vienna, and Riga.

The SIS's principal interwar recruiting ground was the British Army of the Rhine, disbanded at the end of the 1920s as Britain's partial occupation of Germany came to an end. The SIS sought young, single men who could speak a foreign language, had lived abroad, and could supplement their meager pay with a small pension. Nicholson was virtually archetypal: at 27, he had served as a corporal in the intelligence corps and could speak French and German. After being recruited in 1930, he attended a communications course. He then left for his first assignment, in Prague. En route, he stopped in Vienna, where, in the course of a conversation with his predecessor, he received what he said was the sum total of his training in tradecraft:

> *"Could you give me some idea of how to begin?" I asked him imploringly. "Are there any standard rules?...or could you give me some practical hints?"*
>
> *He thought for a bit. "I don't think there are really; you'll just have to work it out for yourself. I think everyone has his own methods, and I can't think of anything I can tell you."*[7]

This scenario strains the credulity of the reader. Although both Wark and SIS historian Christopher Andrew have taken it at face value, Nicholson's story seems far more likely to be his way to avoid going into operational details than a true statement of the intelligence training he received. Elsewhere in the book, he avoids the PCO issue by claiming to have worked under cover as a businessman. He also describes the use of cutouts in contacting his agent networks, which suggests that he was given some instruction or at least inherited established procedures that could serve as a practical guide.[8]

"... perhaps the most interesting aspect of Nicholson's memoirs is the way they seem to epitomize Britain's lackadaisical approach to intelligence matters in this period."

Having said that, it is true that perhaps the most interesting aspect of Nicholson's memoirs is the way they seem to epitomize Britain's lackadaisical approach to intelligence matters in this period. Apart from his language ability, it is difficult to see why SIS hired Leslie Nicholson. Described by Benton as, "ex–Black–Watch,...with the most incredibly polished shoes,"[9] Nicholson reveals little affinity for people who are not British, although he apparently moved easily through Riga's high society.[10] Nicholson himself recounts being told that he was conspicuously English and stood out as such in a crowd.[11] He also seems to have been quite gullible at times. While in Prague, a confidence trickster persuaded him that he was developing an atomic bomb in the basement of his castle.[12] In Riga, he appears to have been the object of a failed blackmail attempt resulting from his relationship with "a very beautiful White Russian girl called Nina," who may or may not have been a Japanese or Soviet spy, or perhaps both.[13]

All in all, it is difficult to judge Nicholson's effectiveness as an intelligence officer from his memoirs. Writing in the mid-1960s, Nicholson was understandably reticent about the agents in his employ, many of whom would have been

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living under a Communist regime. Moreover, the prewar SIS archives were closed, as they still are.

The contacts Nicholson does mention by name tend to be colorful characters with exotic backgrounds who did not survive the war or could be tracked down later in the West—Artur Schmidkoff, for example, head of the Latvian secret police, who used a skull as an ashtray and introduced himself as "the most feared man in Latvia";[14] or the enigmatic "Uncle Sabastian," a former Tsarist cavalry officer from an old Baltic German family with close connections to the White Russian emigre community.[15] Typically, Nicholson uses Schmidkoff to spin a tale about the Zinoviev letter, and he makes no attempt to characterize the working relationship he must have had with him—Schmidkoff surely was aware of Nicholson's actual status as an intelligence officer, barely concealed by his PCO cover. Nor does he more than hint at the basis for his relationship with "Uncle Sabastian" and his White Russians. This last is part of a much larger omission in the book; Nicholson does not describe any collection against Soviet targets, even though the Soviet Union was the number-one priority for SIS until well into the 1930s.

The effectiveness of the Soviet security apparatus precluded operations from within Soviet territory (there was no PCO in Moscow), so SIS collected Soviet intelligence from its stations in Finland and the Baltic states.[16] Nicholson's silence on the subject notwithstanding, collection against the Soviet target must therefore have dominated operations out of Riga until at least the summer of 1938, when the Gestapo's crackdown on networks run out of Austria and (later) Czechoslovakia enhanced Riga's value as a base from which to collect intelligence on Nazi Germany.

“Agents were rewarded only occasionally for their efforts, and sometimes they were treated harshly, apparently on a random basis.”

It was against the German target that Nicholson ran the one major network described in his book, which he refers to as the "Alex" group (Alex 1, Alex 2, and so forth). The Alexes concentrated on German rearmament (Alex 1 was a disgruntled former employee of Krupp's armament works), and they submitted reports from Prague, Kiel, and East Prussia.[17] In addition, Nicholson used a cabaret singer who toured German ports with her bandleader husband and a prewar copy of *Jane's Fighting Ships*, picking up what had to have been pretty low-grade information on German naval dispositions.[18]

Perhaps Nicholson's most interesting source is the one about which he says the least—his liaison relationship with the Latvian director of military intelligence. Nicholson says only that his contact with this source ended with the appointment of a new, pro-German director on the orders of the Army chief of staff.[19] Nicholson hints at a dark conspiracy and does not specify a date, but this probably occurred on or about 7 June 1939, when Latvia and Estonia each signed a mutual nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany. The two countries subsequently adopted a pro-German stance, which included changes of personnel, in a vain effort to escape Soviet domination.

On the counterintelligence side, Nicholson's record was rather good, apart from the incident with the "very beautiful White Russian girl." He proudly records obtaining the code used by German agents in the Baltic, and he reports one of the Alex network taking a sample of German secret ink off the body of an agent. He also obtained the blueprint of a simple, but effective, model of telephone tap from a "down-and-out Czech technician."[20] Of course, Nicholson's agents were subject to the usual risks, and he relates how one of them was doubled. On this occasion, he was saved by the double agent's chance encounter with a source reporting to "Daniel," an agent under nonofficial cover, identified by Wesley Wark as working for SIS officer Col. Claude Dansey.[21]

Nicholson complains bitterly about the "seemingly inconsistent way in which London evaluated reports." He records that intelligence compiled with great difficulty frequently received "scant recognition." Agents were rewarded only occasionally for their efforts, and sometimes they were treated harshly, apparently on a random basis. Once a decision about a network or an agent was made, it was hopeless to try to get it reversed.[22]

Perhaps the low point of Nicholson's relations with London was reached on 21 August 1939, when he received the following cable:

> *Ribbentrop [the German foreign minister] believed talking to Hitler 9 p.m. tomorrow night from the old Austrian embassy Moscow stop Arrange tap land line and record conversation stop Top priority Ends.*

Nicholson rushed to comply. After considerable effort, however, he discovered that the task was impossible.

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> **Peggie Benton's account of two years in Riga is a bittersweet memoir of a city on the edge of disaster.**

The land lines between Moscow and Berlin ran through Poland, and there was no way he could tap them from Riga. If he had been able to record this conversation, he would have learned of the nonaggression pact being negotiated between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. By secret protocol to this pact, Stalin and Hitler agreed to a fourth partition of Poland and delineated "spheres of influence" in the Baltic states. Lithuania went to Germany; Latvia and Estonia went to the Soviet Union. At a stroke, Latvia was condemned to Soviet occupation, while thousands of Latvians were consigned to imprisonment and death in the *Gulag*.[23]

Knowing the terrible destiny that awaited Latvia and its people, it is difficult to read about these years without a sense of the tragic fates that lay ahead for many of the persons that one meets in accounts of the period. The years 1938 and 1939 were a time of crisis for the Baltic states as their leaders tried to concoct some kind of security arrangement that would protect them in the time of troubles they knew was coming. The League of Nations proved to be worse than useless. A military alliance, the so-called Baltic Entente, foundered on the endemic hostility between Poland and Lithuania on the one hand and the stubborn neutrality of Sweden and Finland on the other.[24] The Soviet Union had signed nonaggression pacts with all the Baltic states, but their leaders were not foolish enough to attach any value to them. Great Britain and France, aware of their own limitations, refused to offer any hope of support. Finally, one by one, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania signed nonaggression pacts with Nazi Germany, in the vain hope that German support would be a lesser evil than Soviet annexation. But Hitler betrayed the Baltic states, trading them to the Soviet Union for half of Poland and a free hand in the West.

In the West, these events had to be viewed in perspective with the much larger dramas being enacted in Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The bloodless German conquests of 1938 and 1939 created a two-fold dilemma for the SIS, in part because they gave the Gestapo the opportunity to roll up the painstakingly created networks run from those countries, in part because the tissue-thin SIS cover arrangements meant that the Gestapo entered the newly acquired territories with nearly complete knowledge of the identities of the British intelligence officers they would find there.

A further problem was that German expansion created a surge in visa applications as the victims of the Nazi terror sought desperately to escape. Sympathetic to the plight of these refugees, SIS officers in Central Europe found themselves swamped by their PCO duties and barely able to carry out their responsibilities as intelligence officers.

The new Nazi regime in Austria allowed the British intelligence apparatus to remain in place over the summer, but then moved to expel known SIS officers before the planned invasion of Czechoslovakia that autumn. Capt. Thomas Kendrick, the Passport Control Officer in Vienna (and before then, in Prague) was the first to go.[25] Arrested on trumped-up charges on 17 August, he was released after two days of interrogation. Fearing that they might soon be arrested, London recalled its intelligence staff in Central Europe. All volunteered subsequently to return.[26] The mood of crisis continued to escalate, however: in October, Kenneth Benton, then acting PCO in Vienna, was ordered to Riga on 24-hour notice.[27]

The Bentons arrived in Riga on 12 October 1938. Kenneth Benton's transfer brought Nicholson some sorely needed support, and it also signaled a shift in British policy and a consequent reordering of intelligence collection priorities.[28] The Soviet Union probably was Nicholson's primary intelligence target until 1938, when, with Benton's arrival, collection efforts out of Riga shifted to Nazi Germany. Benton, however, minimized Nicholson's efforts in this direction. "We only had two intelligence sources," he recalled, "One was a Latvian and the other was not an agent but a liaison with the head of the Latvian military intelligence service, which was useful...most of my time was spent in visa work...."[29] With the outbreak of war, however, the Passport Control Officers retreated into the depths of the consulate to concentrate on their more important intelligence work, the task of handing visa applications being turned over to nonprofessional staff.

Peggie Benton's account of two years in Riga is a bittersweet memoir of a city on the edge of disaster. Her compelling depiction of Riga and its inhabitants conjures up a world that is almost unknown in the West. At the same time, she inevitably was in the center of events at the British Embassy—including covert activity—and describes life in diplomatic circles with humor and verve. For example, she recounts delivering the

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sealed diplomatic pouch ("the bag") to Thomas Preston, charge d'affaires in Kaunas, then the capital of Lithuania:

> *"And what about the bag," I asked. "Everything all right?"*
>
> *"I suppose so," Kenneth replied a little flatly. "As a matter of fact, Preston didn't even open it. He just said, 'Thank goodness my laundry's back from Riga. There's no one here who can iron a dress shirt properly.'"*

Preston then spent the next two days giving the Bentons an impromptu performance of a ballet he was writing, before sending them on their way.[30]

With the outbreak of war, Peggie Benton joined her husband in the PCO, ostensibly to help process visas, but also on cipher work. As she was conversant in Latvian and German and had taken the trouble to learn Russian, she also was used for translations. Somewhat disingenuously, she describes sessions spent with an unknown "semi-overt" agent referred to as "our friend," who read aloud from the Soviet newspapers, translating them into German as he did so.[31]

Meanwhile, the conquest of Poland left the Baltic states surrounded by Nazi- and Soviet-occupied territory, with attendant police measures and wartime controls. Direct communication by sea with Great Britain also was cut off, the more so when Germany occupied Denmark and Norway in April 1940. Thus isolated, Riga's value as an intelligence base must have been considerably diminished, although Nicholson continued to receive intelligence from Kiel through the Alex network. He also smuggled refugee Polish soldiers to Britain and made a vain effort to set up a network in German-occupied Poland.[32]

The situation deteriorated rapidly, however. In October 1939, the Soviet Union forc11ed the Baltic states to sign "mutual assistance" treaties that permitted Soviet troops to be stationed on their territory at selected strategic points. Soviet interference in Baltic internal affairs began almost immediately. That same month, the Baltic Germans were "recalled to the Reich," or rather to Poland, where they were settled on farms appropriated by the German Government from their Polish owners as part of a deal struck with Stalin. Over the winter, the Soviet Army was preoccupied with its bungled invasion of Finland, but, in June 1940, as German troops completed their conquest of France, the Soviet Union occupied all three Baltic states after fabricating a series of diplomatic "incidents." Puppet Communist governments were established that immediately applied for membership in the Soviet Union. Arrests and executions began.

The position of the British legations in Riga, Tallinn, and Kaunas quickly became untenable. Diplomatic personnel were evacuated early in July, with the PCO's intelligence personnel remaining somewhat longer. With the Baltic isolated from Great Britain by Nazi territory, Nicholson and the Bentons had to return home via the trans-Siberian Railway—an epic journey that both Nicholson and Peggie Benton describe in some detail. After home leave, the Bentons went to Madrid, while Nicholson remained in London. Nicholson's memoirs, like Peggie Benton's, effectively end with his return from Riga.

Peggie Benton writes perhaps with a greater sensitivity than Nicholson, but each has left a singular account of a singular time and place. Ultimately, however, both memoirs are unsatisfactory for the same reason: for security reasons, they leave too much unsaid. In 1966, when *British Agent* first appeared, the Cold War was at its height, and this was understandable. In 1984, when *Baltic Countdown* went to press, the Soviet Union was teetering, and it was tolerable. But the incompleteness of these accounts remains frustrating, the more so because Riga has emerged from 50 years of purgatory to remind us of how much of that world is forever lost. Eventually, the prewar SIS archives may be opened, and at least one dimension of that time and place will be further revealed.

Notes

98. H. Keith Melton. *The Ultimate Spy Book*, (New York: DK Publishing, 1996), pp. 70-71.

99. John Whitwell, *British Agent*. Introduction by Wesley K. Wark. London: Frank Cass, 1996; 224 pp. (Classics of Espionage). Original edition: "John Whitwell," *British Agent* (London: William Kimber, 1966).

100. See also Wesley Wark's "Our Man in Riga: Reflections on the SIS Career and Writings of Leslie Nicholson," *Intelligence and National Security* (1966), which contains the substance of the introduction published with Nicholson's memoir. I am grateful to this article for pointing out the existence of *Baltic Countdown*.

101. Peggie Benton. *Baltic Countdown*. London: Centaur Press, 1984. In 1995, Kenneth Benton contributed a brief memoir of his own, "The ISOS Years: Madrid, 1941-43" (*Journal of Contemporary History*, 1995). As might be expected from the title, however, this article discusses his wartime experiences in Madrid and touches only briefly upon his prewar career as an intelligence officer.

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102. In the Library of Congress, Peggie Benton's book is filed under the interesting category, "Memoirs: diplomats' wives—British." There are only two other entries, both dating from the 19th century.

103. Christopher M. Andrew, *Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (New York: Viking, 1986) pp. 351-52. Mackenzie published numerous volumes of memoirs. The relevant one is *Greek Memories*. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1932; 1939).

104. Whitwell, p. 26.

105. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33, 60-62.

106. Peggie Benton, *Baltic Countdown*, p. 12.

107. Nicholson makes a revealing statement in his memoirs when he passes off the "Balts" (by which he means the Baltic Germans) as "the only minority of any importance" in Latvia. In fact, the Baltic Germans, although economically powerful, comprised only 3 percent of the population at the time; even before World War II, they were vastly outnumbered by both resident Russians and Jews. Baltic Germans did, however, dominate society in Riga itself. To someone who spent all his time in Riga, in certain limited social circles, the Baltic Germans might have appeared to be more important as a group than they actually were in interwar Latvia.

108. Whitwell, p. 111.

109. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-40.

110. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-13.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 63. Nicholson records that Schmidkoff disappeared when the Soviets occupied Riga (p. 134).

112. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59, "Uncle Sabastian" apparently escaped to Sweden (pp. 219-20).

113. Andrew, p. 285.

114. Whitwell, pp. 70, 71, 114.

115. *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

116. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

117. *Ibid.*, pp. 113-14.

118. *Ibid.*, pp. 107-110; Wesley Wark, "Our Man in Riga," p. 634.

119. *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

120. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96. Germany later exchanged its interests in Lithuania for additional Polish territory. Among those who died in Soviet labor camps was Kärlis Ulmanis, then President of Latvia and great-uncle of Guntis Ulmanis, the current president.

121. Poland was the only militarily significant power in a position to help the Baltic states. In 1923, the great Marshal Josef Pilsudski, then President and later de facto dictator of Poland, engendered the eternal hatred of the people of Lithuania by annexing Vilnius (Wilno), Lithuania's historical capital and the city of his birth. Whatever hopes may have existed previously for a Polish-Lithuanian rapprochement, compromise thereafter became impossible.

122. It was from Thomas Kendrick that Leslie Nicholson supposedly received his two-sentence briefing on tradecraft. Andrew, p. 347.

123. Nigel West, *MI 6 British Secret Intelligence Service Operations, 1909-45* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1983), pp. 58-59. Christopher Andrew (pp. 395-97) makes the connection between the impending German attack on Czechoslovakia and Kendrick's arrest. Although there is no documentary evidence for this, it seems logical. Also, Andrew points out that the Gestapo could have arrested Kendrick any time after March 1938; delaying the arrest until August ensured that Kendrick could report on the German sword-rattling that began in May.

124. Peggie Benton, p. 11.

125. Historians are now generally agreed that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's confrontation with Hitler in Munich spelled the end of his policy of appeasement. However much they might dither over the next year, from that point on the British Government was moving inexorably toward war with Germany. For the most readable, authoritative account, see Donald Cameron Watt, *How War Came. The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-39* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989). For the relevance of Munich to the SIS operations, see Andrew, pp. 395-97.

126. Kenneth Benton, p. 367. It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Nicholson's description of his activities. However, presumably Benton counts the Alex network as one "source"; Alex 1 was German, but Alex 2 was a Latvian—since he continued to work for SIS after the Soviet occupation (and apparently was picked up by the NKVD) he may have stuck in Benton's mind more than his German colleague. See Wesley Wark's analysis of these discrepancies in his introduction, pp. xxvi-xxxii.

127. Peggie Benton, pp. 26-28.

128. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-03. Because Soviet newspapers were available in Great Britain, it is unclear what purpose this may have served. Wesley Wark identifies "Our Friend" Alex 2—he does not indicate on what evidence. Wark, p. xxx.

129. Whitwell, pp. 114-15.

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Unclassified

A Proud Record

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research at Fifty (U)

Mark Stout and Dorothy Avery

> *INR's ability to provide Department principals with the information and analysis they need for effective diplomacy derives from the expertise of our people, the independence and objectivity of our analysis, and the fact that we are close to the policy process. We provide the right product to the right people, when they need it.*
>
> Phyllis E. Oakley,
> INR Assistant Secretary

Authors' Note: This brief history was prepared as part of the activities marking INR's 50th anniversary in 1997. It is intended to chronicle some of the highlights of INR's development but not to be a comprehensive survey of that development or of the world events surrounding it.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is a direct lineal descendant of General "Wild Bill" Donovan's Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which gained renown during World War II for its operations overseas. The OSS also had a large and effective Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch, which was transferred to the State Department when the OSS was disbanded in September 1945. Secretary of State Byrnes dismembered the branch, but it was reformed in early 1947--a few months before the creation of the CIA--by Secretary (and General) George Marshall.

INR's original 1,600 employees probably would not recognize it today. Equipped with much of the latest technology, it is smaller now then it has ever been, with about 275 employees.

But the most important evolution has been in INR's role in supporting US foreign policy decision makers. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Bureau was made up of analysts with an academic bent who not only put current developments into perspective but also were charged with compiling substantial basic intelligence studies for the Intelligence Community (IC) series known as the *National Intelligence Surveys* (NIS). The view then was that INR could make its greatest contribution to US foreign policy by doing basic research, as the OSS R&A Branch had done. INR also had limited access to the Secretary of State in its first few years. But, in 1950, daily morning briefings were instituted at Secretary Dean Acheson's request.

Roger Hilsman, Director of INR from 1961 to 1963, divested the Bureau of its NIS responsibilities and focused resources on more immediately policy-relevant tasks. Hilsman had good access to Secretary Rusk and to President Kennedy. In 1973, Director Ray Cline launched the daily *Secretary's Morning Summary* (SMS) to provide timely analyses keyed to the Secretary's agenda, marking definitively the transition to an emphasis on current intelligence. In the mid-1990s, INR began to organize support to diplomatic operations abroad, a program using state-of-the art communications technology to provide near-real-time intelligence and analysis to US officials engaged in border security, sanctions monitoring, and other support to diplomacy in hotspots around the world.

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Today, INR's attention is focused on a much wider array of places and problems than it was during most of its history. Twenty-four-hour television news coverage is now both a resource and a competitor, and the Internet has drastically expanded both the range and the quantity of information on subjects as diverse as political movements in Bosnia, refugee flows in central Africa, and European concerns about financial problems in Asia. The only certainty for INR is that its contribution to national security will continue to evolve, and that it will remain a fascinating and rewarding place to work.

1940s: A Phoenix From the Ashes

With Executive Order 9621 of 20 September 1945, President Truman abolished the OSS and transferred its R&A Branch to the Department of State. The order established the Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS) as a holding place for these former OSS elements. By close of business 31 December 1945, IRIS was to have been abolished and Secretary of State Byrnes was to have established a new State-based intelligence entity, using whatever IRIS resources he chose.

Truman wrote to Byrnes:

> *I particularly desire that you take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies. . . through the creation of an interdepartmental group, heading up under [sic] the State Department which would formulate plans for my approval.*

Truman, by asking State to develop a plan, was giving the Department an opportunity to make State the center of what was to become the IC. On 28 September, Alfred McCormack, a New York corporate lawyer and a colonel in the War Department's G-2, was appointed the first Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence. He took charge of IRIS's 1,600 officers, including a number from preexisting State Department research entities, and set to work planning IRIS's successor within the Department.

McCormack had to focus on meeting State's intelligence needs and to contend with strong opposition--from both inside and outside the Department--to State's prospective lead role in a national intelligence structure. The War and Navy Departments sought to persuade Truman that the State Department should not be the center of the new intelligence structure and, indeed, that the structure should be decentralized.

The military found an ally in Assistant Secretary for Administration Donald Russell, a former law partner of Secretary Byrnes. Russell shared both the concern of many Foreign Service Officers that State's traditional diplomatic function would be overwhelmed by the intelligence component, and the belief that this component was redundant to the work done by the desks.

Russell and the regional office directors (today's assistant secretaries)--particularly Spruille Braden, responsible for Latin America, and Loy Henderson, responsible for the Near East--believed IRIS should be dismantled and its divisions reassigned to the regional policy offices. As a handwritten Russell postscript on a memo to the Secretary put it: "Intelligence is only as good as it is translated into action. Where is that? The geographic desks."

McCormick supported only by then Under Secretary Acheson, opposed this plan on several grounds. In particular, he argued:

> *The centralization of intelligence research in offices which have no responsibility for operating decisions makes it possible to attain an independence which would not be possible if research were the responsibility of the operating offices. Research subordinated to offices whose primary responsibility is operating decisions would inevitably tend to reflect policy views.*

The McCormick-Russell dispute, characterized by one regional office director as a "knock-down, drag-out fight," continued for months and even spilled into the press. There was a brief pause for the

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formation of the Office of Research and Intelligence (ORI), essentially a renaming of IRIS, to meet the President's requirement that IRIS be abolished before the beginning of 1946, but the debate soon resumed.

While Byrnes equivocated, the fight grew nastier. One head of a geographic office was said to "[need} research people, but does not want any of McCormack's intelligence characters in his organization." Suspicions were even voiced that some of McCormack's key subordinates who had come over from the OSS were Communists. A Russell subordinate later claimed in testimony before a Senate committee that the merger of various wartime agencies into State was designed to get Communists into the Department, and the plan for a centralized intelligence office (which, he claimed, was drafted by Alger Hiss) was intended to put them in control.

State's intelligence management paralysis, brought on by the McCormack-Russell dispute, and key Department officials' distaste for intelligence allowed others to persuade President Truman to change his mind about putting State in charge of the national intelligence organization. In February 1946, the Central Intelligence Group--the CIA's immediate predecessor--was created.

On 22 April 1946, Secretary Byrnes adopted the Russell plan, giving ORI's analytic assets to the desks and leaving only an entity called the Advisory Committee on Intelligence (ACI), and the Office of Coordination and Liaison. McCormack resigned the next day. He was replaced briefly by Dr. William L. Langer, a Harvard historian who had been head of the OSS's R&A Branch. Langer served only until August 1946, when he was replaced by William A. Eddy, another OSS veteran.

State's dispersal of responsibility for intelligence analysis to the regional bureaus did not work well: the analysts never physically moved to their respective country desks. By January 1947, problems had emerged that made clear that the ACI was proving unequal to its responsibilities. For example, its authority on security issues was being challenged by the research (intelligence) division chiefs in the Latin America and Near East offices. Allegedly, these disputes were causing "certain intelligence centers" to withhold information from the State Department on the grounds that the Department manifestly could not maintain the level of security required for intelligence activities.

On 10 February 1947, the new Secretary of State, Gen. George Marshall, accepted the recommendation of Eddy and Acheson that he once again consolidate all the Department's intelligence functions in the Office of the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, later known simply as the "R Area." INR--albeit by a different name--was born.

Early Years

In terms of personnel, INR was at its zenith during the late 1940s and the 1950s. It had more staff than any time since--about 700 people. Moreover, INR participated directly in many interagency activities under National Security Council (NSC) auspices.

INR's analytic focus also was different from today. Some 40 percent of the Bureau's budget during this era came from CIA and supported analysts whose job was to write for the NIS. These were comprehensive studies whose goal was to include everything a warrior or a warrior-diplomat might need to know in order to fight against or alongside any country in the world. As analysts do today, the analysts writing for these surveys also examined current developments and wrote reports related to policy concerns. For example, the Far East section's Japan analysts addressed issues related to US occupation policies, while its China specialists monitored the struggle between the Communists forces and the US-backed Nationalists.

INR Leadership

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Special Assistants for Research and Intelligence

Alfred McCormack, 1945-46
William L. Langer, 1946
William Alfred Eddy, 1946-47
W. Park Armstrong, 1947-57
Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., 1957

Directors of INR

Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., 1957-61
Roger Hilsman, 1961-63
Thomas L. Hughes, 1963-69
Ray S. Cline, 1969-73
William G. Hyland, 1974-75
Harold H. Saunders, 1975-78
William Bowdler, 1978-79
Ronald I. Spiers, 1980-81
Hugh Montgomery, 1981-85
Morton I. Abramowitz, 1985-86

Assistant Secretaries for INR

Morton I. Abramowitz, 1986-89
Douglas P. Mulholland, 1989-93
Toby T. Gati, 1993-97
Phyllis E. Oakley, 1997-present

In February 1949, the "Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government," chaired by former President Hoover, looked into problems that had become apparent in INR. The Hoover Commission, after noting that INR had rocky relations with the regional offices/bureaus, recommended that it cut back on the production of the academic studies that were the Office's primary products--foremost among them the NIS--and place greater emphasis on more immediately useful intelligence. The Korean war soon proved the validity of the Hoover Commission's recommendation to focus more on current intelligence.

Korea, Suez, and Hungary

Neither INR nor the IC predicted the outbreak of the Korean war on 24 June 1950 or China's entry into the war later that year, but resources were quickly marshaled in response to the crisis. By late afternoon on 25 June, INR's Estimates Group had prepared an *Intelligence Estimate* on the invasion which was passed immediately to Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary with responsibility for the Far East, and George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff and Counselor of the Department. The *Estimate* concluded that North Korea sought a military victory within seven days, and that, without US help, South Korean forces were doomed to defeat. The *Estimate* further concluded that "the move against South Korea must . . . be considered a Soviet move" and assessed the implications almost entirely in a Soviet context.

During the war, special Assistant W. Park Armstrong played a key behind-the-scenes role, both heading up INR's analytic effort and working on more general staff issues. He was a regular attendee at strategy meetings, typically briefing on the military situation, including sometimes on the activities of US forces. Armstrong played a similar role during the 1956 Suez crisis when he was dispatched to New York in

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early November to meet UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold. Armstrong gave him an intelligence briefing pointing to the immediate need to deploy a UN force.

To cover the Korean war, INR's staff received a temporary boost--25 positions for the last three months of FY 1951--but this occurred in the context of a broad effort to downsize. Five months before the 1953 cease-fire, INR had shrunk10 percent from its June 1950 size. A 1955 study by a Bureau employee notes a pattern familiar to today's analyst: the increasing workload was accommodated "by means of uncompensated overtime, procedural improvements, the emphasis on current intelligence and estimates at the expense of other forms, and the elimination of worthwhile but comparatively lower priority work."

The simultaneous Suez and Hungarian crises also presented INR with "severe challenges," as Armstrong described the problems caused by downsizing. He testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee that, whereas in calendar year 1954 the Bureau gave 1,765 briefings to "top officials of the Department" and in 1955 gave 2,072, in 1956 that number was 2,640. INR responded to an increased number of taskers from both regional and functional bureaus; prepared *Intelligence Estimates*, sometimes overnight; and maintained "an almost continuous alert."

Civil Service-Foreign Service Mix

The Bureau underwent various reorganizations during the 1950s, including the 1957 reorganization during which the name INR came into use. In terms of personnel, the most significant development was the 1954 integration of the majority of INR personnel into the Foreign Service. Though initially disruptive, the action helped erode the barriers between INR and the policy bureaus. Although most Civil Service employees opted to join the Foreign Service, a portion (mostly women) of the analysts remained in the Civil Service.

Over the years, the Civil Service component (today, about 72 percent) has provided continuity and historical perspective. Foreign Service Officers assigned to the Bureau have brought in-country experience and a policy-oriented perspective, while gaining a deeper understanding of their assigned region and honing their analytic skills.

A Turbulent Decade

When Dean Rusk became Secretary in 1961, he brought in Roger Hilsman, another OSS veteran who had also been a senior official in the Congressional Research Service, to head INR. Rusk met every morning with Hilsman and his successor, Thomas Hughes. President Kennedy also knew and liked Hilsman, who used this relationship on occasion to give INR analysts the opportunity to brief the President. For example, an INR Soviet analyst helped prepare Kennedy for his first television interview after the Cuban missile crisis.

Shortly after Hilsman assumed control of INR, Rusk gave him two tasks. The first was to examine the Bureau's organization and to optimize it to provide intelligence studies pertinent to the conduct of foreign policy and the representation of the Department within the IC. This task was similar to the Hoover Commission's recommendation in 1949. The second task was to review and improve the interdepartmental process for coordinating sensitive intelligence activities to ensure that they supported foreign policy goals.

Hilsman carried out the first task in large part by divesting the Bureau of one of its major missions, drafting the political and economic sections of the encyclopedic NIS. Hilsman's changes reduced INR's staff from about 700 to 350.

The second task was administratively harder to accomplish, but, after one attempt that was blocked by CIA, the Department centralized intelligence coordination activities in INR in 1961. This critical job included coordinating special intelligence activities, reconnaissance missions, and clandestine collection operations. During this period, President Kennedy, disillusioned with the CIA after the Bay of Pigs invasion, sent a letter to all US Ambassadors giving them the authority "to oversee and coordinate" all

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US Government activities in their host countries. This was a significant departure from guidance in previous Presidential letters that had exempted intelligence activities.

Hilsman reports that he had become aware of the impending Bay of Pigs invasion by correlating various reports with remarks let slip by DCI Allen Dulles. Sensing that the plan was weak, Hilsman had sought Rusk's permission for INR to write an analysis of the operation. Rusk ordered him not to, saying that the whole issue was far too sensitive. After the debacle unfolded much as Hilsman had feared, Hilsman determined that he had an obligation to offer his Bureau's analysis wherever it might be helpful. Rather than ask permission in advance, he would deal with the consequences afterward.

This lesson may help explain why Hilsman was often willing to challenge Defense Secretary McNamara. Indeed, Rusk more than once brought Hilsman to White House meetings and then sat back while Hilsman and McNamara argued the issue at hand, sometimes in rather harsh terms. Thomas Hughes, Hilsman's deputy and successor at INR, probably also took this lesson to heart, as evidenced by INR's bold analytic stand during the Vietnam war.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Hilsman also played a key role in the Cuban missile crisis. In August and September 1962, concern was growing that the USSR was supplying a significant buildup of offensive forces in Cuba, though the IC played down the likelihood that the forces might include nuclear missiles. The Community, in a Special National Intelligence Estimate on *The Military Buildup in Cuba*, unanimously judged that, although the USSR "could derive considerable military advantage" from the establishment of nuclear missile sites in Cuba, it was unlikely to do so. INR and the Community were proved wrong, however, when the missiles were identified in U-2 imagery on 15 October.

The CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, Ray Cline, a future Director of INR, alerted Hilsman, and Hilsman in turn alerted Rusk. Hilsman went on to play a minor role in Kennedy's "ExCom" (executive committee) that handled the crisis. But his key contribution was as a link in the Washington-Moscow communications chain that ultimately led to resolution of the crisis. On 26 October, Soviet Embassy officer Aleksandr Fomin urgently summoned ABC reporter John Scali to a lunch so he could convey a message from Moscow outlining a possible deal under which the missiles would be removed in exchange for a US pledge never to invade Cuba. After the lunch, Scali went straight to Hilsman's office and typed a memorandum of conversation which Hilsman circulated in the government.

The Vietnam Test

Hughes became Director when Hilsman left to head the Far East Bureau. Early in Hughes's tenure, INR's analysis of the Vietnam war caused the Bureau to run afoul of Defense Secretary McNamara. On 22 October 1963, INR published a Research Memorandum entitled *Statistics on the War Effort in South Vietnam Show Unfavorable Trends*. This report concluded that despite the positive spin put on the Vietnam situation by the Defense Department and the US military command in Vietnam--on whose statistics the paper drew heavily--there was "an unfavorable shift in the military balance." The report, like other INR analytic papers at the time, was distributed to the White House, the CIA, and the Pentagon.

McNamara and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were furious. The JCS wrote a rebuttal that McNamara sent to Rusk under the following note:

> *Dean, attached is the State memo re the war in Vietnam. Below it are the comments of the Chiefs. If you were to tell me that it is not the policy of the State Department to issue military appraisals without seeking the views of the Defense Department, the matter will die. Bob.*

McNamara also demanded that Hughes and INR's Vietnam analyst be reprimanded. Rusk summoned the two and explained the situation. Hughes argued that it was virtually impossible to separate military appraisals from political appraisals. Furthermore, he continued, when he took the helm at INR he was

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promised that the Bureau could pursue its analyses independent of policy control. If INR's analyses were to be controlled by McNamara, then he, Hughes, would quit. Rusk brushed the issue aside, saying only, "Well, at least you know how strongly Bob feels."

Despite giving Hughes the impression that he would drop the issue, Rusk wrote back to McNamara:

> *It is not the policy of the State Department to issue military appraisals without seeking the views of the Defense Department. I have requested that any memoranda given interdepartmental circulation which include military appraisals be coordinated with your Department.*

This prevented INR from circulating analysis of military developments outside the Department but did not curtail its critique of such matters for Department officials. In general, INR was skeptical about the efficacy of US actions and the capability of the South Vietnamese regime to defeat the more determined and better organized Communist forces supported by China and the Soviet Union. This view was most notable in a series of Community *National Intelligence Estimates* (NIEs) between October 1964 and December 1965. Throughout the war, INR produced hundreds of papers analyzing developments and issues affecting the course of the war, negotiations, and the post-1973 struggle, irrespective of their "fit" with the current US policy position, occasionally straining relations between the Bureau and policymakers.

1969-1979

Hughes left office in 1969, and he was succeeded by Ray Cline, another OSS veteran. Cline brought INR analysis squarely into the current intelligence arena by inaugurating the SMS, published daily since 9 March 1973. The SMS initially was produced jointly, and for the Secretary's eyes only, by the INR Watch and the State Department's Operations Center (S/S-O) and consisted almost entirely of summarized intelligence, press, and Embassy reporting. INR took over sole responsibility for the SMS in 1987, established a separate SMS staff, and expanded analytic coverage of current intelligence. Bureau analysts thereafter prepared short assessments for the SMS as well as the longer (one-page) analytic essays that had long been a feature of the publication.

The SMS is INR's flagship publication. Though it no longer is for the Secretary's eyes only and is circulated to many in the Department, principal officers overseas, the NSC, and senior officials in other US Government agencies, it continues to focus on the Secretary's priorities.

Some other areas of Cline's directorship of INR did not, however, mirror his success in establishing the SMS. Cline was frustrated during his tenure, believing the Bureau never had the staff or authority to do all its work. He also had little access to Secretary Rogers. The Director praised INR's "younger Foreign Service Officers with a flair for research," but he had a rocky relationship with the "haughty Foreign Service Officers in the regional bureaus," which he called little baronies. He wrote, for example, that:

> *The Director [of INR], although clothed in the rank and privileges of an Assistant Secretary of State, had to rely on his connections in CIA and the White House to get things done and make an impact in high-level intelligence matters, mainly because by and large the rest of State officialdom still did not really value an independent analytic approach that sometimes threatened already established policy positions.*

Photo

Caption: Three current/former INR Assistant Secretaries and seven Deputy Assistant Secretaries honor *Secretary's Morning Summary* Editor Henry Myers (seated, second from left) at his retirement luncheon in 1995. Standing: Phyllis Oakley (current Assistant Secretary), Tom Fingar, Toby Gati, Jennifer Sims, Mark Lowenthal, and Dan Kurtzer. Seated: Jim Steinberg (current Deputy National Security Adviser), Henry Myers, Morton Abramowitz, and Jon Wiant. The three INR Assistant Secretaries are Oakley, Gati, and Abramowitz; Fingar, Sims, Lowenthal, Kurtzer, Steinberg. and Wiant are current or former Deputy Assistant Secretaries.

INR's general practice of hewing to its own analysis was sometimes honored in the breach, with

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unhappy consequences. In May 1973, an interagency assessment of prospects for an Arab-Israeli war, concurred in by INR, found no reason to believe that "hostilities will...become inevitable or even probable." In a 31 May memorandum to Secretary Rogers, however, INR said it saw the threat of war with "a little more urgency" and concluded that, if the diplomatic situation in the Middle East continued relatively unchanged, "our view is that the resumption of hostilities by autumn will become better than an even bet." By autumn, however, INR pulled back from that analysis and rejoined the IC consensus that war was not imminent. Secretary Kissinger, in his memoirs, specifically refers to new INR and CIA analyses that by 30 September led him to believe that a war would not break out. The war started on 6 October.

Cline was succeeded by William Hyland, a member of Kissinger's inner circle and his key adviser at the NSC on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) issues. During Hyland's tenure (1973-75) and that of his successor, INR had extensive access to the Secretary. This heightened reliance on INR derived in part from Kissinger's preexisting relationship with Hyland but also reflected Kissinger's distrust of CIA analyses. Kissinger made clear that he expected State's policy bureaus to include INR in their deliberations, particularly on SALT issues, where they were expected to get a Hyland clearance on critical papers.

Hyland gave high priority to strengthening INR's capacity for analysis of politico-military questions, especially those involving strategic weapons. Taking positions from elsewhere in INR, he created the Office of Strategic Affairs, which took on issues such as SALT and later nuclear proliferation, and the Office of Political-Military Affairs and Theater Forces (PMT). This new office was quickly put to the test by the 1974 war in Cyprus, the first of many military actions it would cover. INR's Cyprus analyst briefed President Nixon.

PMT also played a significant role in conventional arms control issues such as the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in Europe and analysis of conventional arms transfers, the control of which was of great interest to the Carter administration.

Hyland's successor, Harold (Hal) Saunders (1975-78), also was in Kissinger's inner circle, having been his Middle East expert on the NSC staff. Saunders continued to function in that capacity while Director of INR. He weathered the transition from the Ford to the Carter administrations, staying on as Secretary Vance's INR Director.

In early 1977, Vance directed Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning (later President Clinton's National Security Adviser and a self-avowed fan of INR analysis), Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) Roy Atherton, and William Quandt of the NSC to undertake a thorough review of the Middle East situation. This review helped inspire the administration's efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East that culminated in the 1978 Camp David accords. The group that did this review was to remain essentially intact all the way through Camp David, even after Saunders became NEA Assistant Secretary in April 1978.

During this time, INR institutionalized the practice of regular CIA/State Department policy bureau/INR meetings to encourage more effective intelligence coordination in Washington. In addition, the State Department and CIA established regular meetings between the Secretary and the DCI in response to recommendations of the Church and Pike Congressional committees to foster improved dialogue between the two agencies. These meetings continue today.

In 1976, INR broke new ground in the application of previously classified imagery intelligence assets. Working with the US Agency for International Development, INR arranged for U-2 aerial surveys of Guatemala following the severe earthquake that killed more than 20,000 people and destroyed the country's infrastructure. An INR officer carried the film to the Government of Guatemala for use with the international relief effort.

1980s

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Starting with the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan--of which INR warned Secretary Vance--and running through the tenures of Secretaries Haig and Shultz, INR was a key player in a broad governmental effort to use intelligence to advance the Western cause against the Soviet Union. One public example of this was the series of State Department *Special Reports* on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan written primarily by INR analysts. INR analysts also gave numerous background briefings to journalists on this and other subjects, such as chemical weapons use by the Soviets or their proxies. In September 1983, INR Director Hugh Montgomery--the last of five OSS veterans to head the Bureau--reportedly helped smooth the way for Secretary Shultz to use NSA signals intelligence in public condemnation of the Soviets for the shootdown of Korean Airlines flight 007.

Former Ambassador and career Foreign Service officer Morton Abramowitz headed the Bureau from 1985 to 1989, becoming its first Assistant Secretary in 1986. During his tenure, INR analysts had to develop new frameworks to assess the Gorbachev revolution, unprecedented changes in China, the ouster of Marcos in the Philippines, and the proliferation of missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. This was also the period of contentious analyses of and US interventions in Central America.

Secretary Shultz instituted regular Saturday morning sessions at which INR analysts provided briefings and participated in roundtable discussions of emerging issues. Abramowitz worked especially closely with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael Armacost, undertaking a number of sensitive diplomatic and factfinding missions.

During the 1980s, especially under Abramowitz, the intelligence policy and coordination side of INR continued to grow. The Reagan administration's vigorous use of covert action to accomplish foreign policy objectives meant that INR was busier than ever in oversight and coordination of these sensitive programs. INR also expanded its role in coordinating defense intelligence activities and sensitive law enforcement operations.

For a bureau whose publications have consistently focused on classified analysis, INR in the 1980s also marked perhaps the most high-profile use of one of its unclassified publications. Starting in 1982, the Department published a series of *Foreign Affairs Notes*, drafted by INR, highlighting Soviet disinformation. The 1987 issue, *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-87*, exposed various outlandish Soviet claims being picked up in newspapers around the world. Most notably, it debunked Soviet allegations that AIDS was the result of a Pentagon biological weapons program.

At first, the 1987 report attracted little attention, but a copy found its way to Mikhail Gorbachev's inbox. During an October meeting in Moscow, Gorbachev waved the copy in Secretary Shultz's face and assailed him over it. This led to "a rather acrimonious exchange," as Shultz told reporters. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet newspaper *Izvestiya* published an article reporting that the Soviet Academy of Sciences did not believe the AIDS virus was artificially created at a Pentagon weapons lab.

Abramowitz followed up on efforts initiated by Director Montgomery to upgrade the Bureau's information-handling systems. The first version of INRISS, the INR Information Support System, was inaugurated during Abramowitz's tenure, and INR took its first steps into the electronic age.

When James Baker became President Bush's Secretary of State, he tapped Douglas P. Mulholland, a career CIA economist who had headed Baker's intelligence unit at Treasury, to be INR's second Assistant Secretary. Mulholland continued the emphasis on providing timely, focused, and policy-related analysis begun by Hilsman and endorsed by each of his successors. INR retained its independent voice in addressing such post-Cold War issues as the collapse of the Soviet empire, revitalization of the Middle East peace process, Tiananmen and its aftermath in China, and the North Korean nuclear weapons program. As it was in the Abramowitz era, INR was often in the minority--many times a minority of one--when the IC tried to reach consensus on developments in a world where many old verities were suddenly inappropriate.

Photo

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Caption: On 9 August 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher (second from left) and National Security Agency Director Vice Admiral J. Michael McConnell (far left) presided over a ribbon-cutting ceremony hosted by Toby Gati, INR Assistant Secretary (third from left), inaugurating the NSA Cryptologic Support Group located in INR's 24-hour Watch. At far right is Barbara McNamara, then-NSA Deputy Director of Operations, currently NSA's Deputy Director.

Mulholland guided the Bureau through its coverage of two crises of world significance: the Gulf war and the coup in Moscow. During the 1990-91 Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, INR's analysis that Iraqi military resistance would collapse once combat started turned out to be remarkably prescient. INR also proved its ability to sustain 24-hour-a-day analytic coverage for months on end.

The Gulf war was the first "CNN crisis," during which INR analysts were not only able to exploit the network as a valuable source but also were compelled to compete with it, ensuring that the written products delivered to policymakers provided real-time, intelligence-based analytic insights not available on their TV screens. During this period, INR provided many classified and unclassified imagery briefings to coalition partners, other governments, and, as appropriate, to the foreign press in support of diplomatic operations to counter false Iraqi propaganda and strengthen international resolve.

Photo

Caption: Six former chiefs on INR attended INR's 50th anniversary celebration at the Department of State on 8 December 1997. Five of the six joined current Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research Phyllis Oakley (third from left) for this photo: (left to right) Hal Saunders (1975-78), Tom Hughes (1963-69), Phyllis Oakley (1997-), Douglas Mulholland (1989-93), Toby Gati (1993-97), and Roger Hilsman (1961-63). (Not pictured is Bill Hyland, 1973-75).

Throughout the Desert Shield/Desert Storm period, the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly unstable. When the coup took place in August, INR again went to 24-hour analytic operations. The NSC tasked INR to coordinate consolidated IC situation reports for distribution throughout the government--an effort honored with an IC award from the DCI.

During Mulholland's tenure, INR also saw the need for a more centralized US approach to tracking suspected terrorists and preventing their entry into the United States. INR created a computerized, all-source database to provide timely support to consular and immigration officials. In its 10 years of existence, the program has detected 807 suspected terrorists applying for visas; 248 suspected hijackers, hostage holders, assassins, bombers, and other terrorist felons have been denied US visas.

1990s: A New World

Toby T. Gati was the first chief of INR (1993-97) whose entire term took place after the breakup of the Soviet Union. She had a keen interest in Russia and its evolution, the UN, and international peacekeeping, and promoted the use of INR and IC resources to address these issues. Her interest in multilateralism, which reflected that of the US Government generally, brought INR analysts into new analytic and operational arenas. Thus, for example, analysts participated in internationally sponsored election monitoring in such farflung places as Cambodia and Bosnia and served as political advisers to Operational Provide Comfort aiding Kurds in northern Iraq.

Gati launched *Peacekeeping Perspectives*, an in-depth biweekly on multilateral conflict management and humanitarian operations. The publication became popular throughout the government, drawing kudos from, among others, Madeleine Albright, then Ambassador to the UN. *Peacekeeping Perspectives* was destined to have a short lifespan, however, because attitudes to peacekeeping operations changed after their limits and complexity became evident on the streets of Mogadishu. The journal published its last substantive issue on 14 December 1995. Other Gati innovations--the distinctive green INR logo, standardization of publications formats, introduction of analyst *Viewpoints*, and the entry of most INR and analytic products onto Intelink, the IC's version of the Internet--continue.

INR took other bold steps into the information age during Gati's tenure. A nearly $4 million upgrade of

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INRISS gave Bureau analysts state-of-the-art information-processing capabilities and e-mail connectivity with other IC agencies. A National Security Agency Cryptologic Support Group was integrated into the INR Watch.

After the Dayton accords of November 1995 ended the military conflict in Bosnia, that country became the venue for the first field trial of a key Gati priority--Support to Diplomatic Operations, with the April 1996 establishment of the Diplomatic Intelligence Support Center (DISC) to provide analytic and collection support to senior US diplomats in Bosnia. In 1997, the DISC was awarded the prestigious Killian Award by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Another innovation for INR was establishment of its War Crimes Unit, comprising State and other IC officers to oversee information-sharing with the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal looking into war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.

Gati was succeeded in 1997 by Phyllis E. Oakley, a career Foreign Service officer and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of INR. Immediately before rejoining the Bureau as its 17th chief, Oakley had served as Assistant Secretary for Population, Refuges, and Migration.

Mark Stout and **Dorothy Avery** worked for INR.

Unclassified

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Unclassified

A Continuing Need for Protection

Legislative and Judicial Safeguards for US Intelligence Personnel (U)

(b)(3)(c)

Remember Phil Agee, who I consider a traitor to our country? The guy encouraged the publishing of names of those serving under cover, sacrificing their lives. And Counterspy *magazine did publish names, including the name of Richard Welch, our station chief in Greece, who shortly thereafter was gunned down in Greece outside his residence.(1)*

Former President George Bush

17 September 1997

Former President and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Bush's mention of Philip Agee, the former Directorate of Operations (DO) officer turned traitor, was made to retirees attending festivities at CIA Headquarters recognizing the Agency's 50th birthday. It also coincided with the 15th anniversary of the enactment of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (IIPA), legislation that was created partly in response to Agee's activities.

On 23 December 1975, Richard Welch was shot down near his residence in Athens(2) by three gunmen shouting in Greek.(3) Following the murder, DCI William Colby revealed that Welch, ostensibly a First Secretary at the US Embassy, was a CIA employee.(4) A previously unheard of terrorist group, the Revolutionary Organization 17 November, claimed responsibility for the killing.(5)

The incident provoked widespread examination of both the quality of cover for American intelligence officers(6) working overseas and of the activities of Americans who purposely engaged in exposing the identities of clandestine operatives. With respect to the former, Welch had lived in the same house as his CIA predecessors, and he was not listed in the State Department's biographical book of senior diplomatic personnel.(7)

Equally important, Welch had been fingered in *Inside the Company: A CIA Diary*, the 1975 book written by Agee that detailed hundreds of alleged officer identities. In addition, Welch had been named as a purported CIA employee in an article printed in the Washington quarterly *Counterspy*, a publication supported by a group of disaffected former intelligence officers who called themselves "The Fifth Estate." Agee served on *Counterspy's* advisory board.(8) The contents of the *Counterspy* article were in part reprinted in an English-language publication entitled *Athens News*. The Greek piece went so far as to include both Welch's address and telephone number. Once Welch had been identified publicly in Greece, members of 17 November simply needed to wait outside his home in order to ambush him.(9)

More Accusations

After Welch's death, the editors of *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, a leftwing publication that

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continues in print, visited Kingston, Jamaica, and Maputo, Mozambique. In Kingston, the "journalists" held a news conference at which they claimed that 14 American Embassy employees were spies and provided the officials' addresses, telephone numbers, and the license-plate numbers and colors of their automobiles. Within 48 hours, the residence of one official had been raked by submachinegun fire and an explosive device detonated, causing extensive damage. A few days later, a separate attempt apparently was made to kill another of the alleged intelligence officers.(10)

Following the visit to Mozambique by *Covert Action's* staff, a Cuban Counterintelligence (CI) team arrived in Maputo. The Cubans forcibly detained an American diplomat there and offered him a sizable sum of money to spy for Havana. Mozambique subsequently declared the diplomat, three other Embassy officials, and two wives *persona non grata*.(11) Three months later, one of the four officials expelled from Maputo was PNG'd from Zambia, amid similar allegations of being a CIA employee.(12)

The IIPA

The various hostile actions against US intelligence officers gave impetus to the efforts to enact legislation aimed at punishing those who sought to expose their identities. In 1982, after protracted legislative wrangling, the final text of the IIPA was signed into law at CIA Headquarters by President Reagan, who said "...the enactment of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act is clear evidence of the value this nation places on its intelligence agencies and their personnel."(13)

The legislation provides for three criminal penalties:

- Section 421(a) applies to those who have had access to classified material that identifies a "covert agent" and who intentionally disclose the identity knowing that the United States is trying to protect the identity of the agent and that the beneficiary is not authorized to receive classified information. For purposes of the entire act, a "covert agent" is a US intelligence officer who has served overseas within the past five years; a US citizen (a source) who is either residing overseas providing Foreign Intelligence (FI) or CI to a US intelligence agency or residing domestically and providing FI or CI to the FBI; or a non-US citizen (an asset) whose prior or present relationship with the US Government is classified. The penalty under 421(a) is a fine of up to $50,000, not more than 10 years in prison, or both.

- Section 421(b) is identical to 421(a), except that it applies only to those who in the course of authorized access to classified material discovered an agent's identity and disclosed it. The penalty is a maximum fine of $25,000, not more than five years in prison, or both.

- Section 421(c) states that, "Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States," discloses the identity to an individual not authorized to receive classified information will be fined no more than $15,000, will serve no more than three years in prison, or both. It is important to note that under 421(c), unlike either 421(a) or 421(b), the disclosing individual need not have had access to classified information.

- In addition to the IIPA's three crimes, Section 423(a) mandates that the DCI submit to the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees, "an annual report on measures to protect the identities of covert agents, and on any other matter relevant to the protection of the identities of covert agents." Although reports were submitted in 1983 and 1984, available information indicates that since 1985 no such account has been sent to Congress.

Section 421 (c) predictably was of great concern to civil libertarians. Some posited that an American citizen could be imprisoned for independently investigating intelligence entities and disclosing the names of covert agents. There also was consternation over the "reason to believe" standard that governed to what degree a violator had knowledge that he was impairing US intelligence activities. Law review articles and public debate were spawned from what was bemoaned as an unacceptable encroachment on the First Amendment at the height of the Cold War.(14)

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Despite such concerns, the IIPA has been largely dormant. This is especially true for IIPA's clause to prosecute those who have never had access to classified information, the very part of the Act that was the target of the overwhelming majority of its critics.

Two Convictions

Since the Act's passage, only two individuals have been convicted under its auspices: CIA employee Sharon Scranage and US Marine Sgt. Clayton Lonetree. Scranage was stationed in Accra, Ghana, in the early 1980s. She had an affair with a purported businessman who, as a cousin of Ghana's head of state, had been tasked with penetrating the CIA's operations in Ghana. Scranage revealed the identities of a number of assets to her lover, resulting in severe damage to the CIA's equities in Ghana.(15)

Scranage was charged with 18 criminal counts, including espionage charges. Under a deal brokered with prosecutors, she pled guilty to only two counts under Section 421(a). Although Scranage initially was to serve five years in prison, her sentence later was reduced to two years with an opportunity for release after 18 months.(16) The case is an example where the Act was used as a shotgun litigation approach, in which Scranage was given room to acknowledge her failures in return for a lesser penalty than would have accompanied an espionage conviction.(17)

Lonetree was also convicted under the IIPA. He aided the Soviets while detailed to Marine Security Guard detachments at US Embassies in the Soviet Union and in Austria.(18) Besides revealing details of American activities in Moscow, Lonetree also admitted to disclosing the identities of intelligence officers serving in the US Embassy in Vienna.(19) He was charged with violating the IIPA, in part because under the military justice system all potential charges arising from a particular incident have to be presented at the same time. This is in contrast to civilian courts, where, though a defendant may be found not guilty of a charge stemming from the incident involving alleged criminal conduct, prosecutors may subsequently try the defendant again on other counts. In any event, Lonetree was convicted on a host of violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including a General Article incorporation of Section 421(b) of the IIPA.

Neither conviction was particularly significant. Both Scranage and Lonetree were subject to other criminal charges. If IIPA had not existed, both still would have been incarcerated for their treason.

Deterrent Effect

The IIPA, especially section 421(c), has had some positive impact. *Covert Action Information Bulletin* no longer focuses on uncovering identities. And Philip Agee has stated his intention to abide by the law. According to press reports attributed to a former officer in Cuban intelligence, Agee was for years a paid agent of Havana. A vocal opponent of the US Government, the Cubans purportedly fed him his lines.(20) He reportedly also instructed Nicaragua's Sandinistas on how to detect US intelligence personnel and tried to recruit a member of the US Embassy in Mexico City under the guise that he still worked for the CIA.(21)

After the Department of State revoked Agee's passport privileges in 1979, he began using a Grenadine passport. Since then, he evidently has been using a passport issued by Germany, his wife's native country. Agee reentered the United States in 1987 after 16 years abroad, and he continues to visit America for speaking engagements. In 1987, Agee insisted, "I never regretted, and still don't, naming the names of agents and exposing the operations" but that, in reference to the IIPA, "I don't think that there's any need to break the law."

Statutory Burden

To prosecute a member of the media under Section 421(c), the Department of Justice (DOJ) would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the news organization was engaged in "a pattern of activities

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intended to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States."(22) The IIPA categorically exempts investigations of intelligence failures and journalists. According to the Senate Judiciary Committee report on the IIPA:

> *A newspaper reporter, then, would rarely have engaged in a pattern of activities with the requisite intent to "uncover" and "expose" covert agents. Instead, such a result would ordinarily be "the (anticipated) side effect of his conduct". . . . To meet the standard of the bill, a discloser must be engaged in a purposeful enterprise of revealing names--he must, in short, be in the business of "naming names."(23)*
>
> *According to the Act's sponsor, Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island: We have carefully differentiated between the journalist who may reveal the name of an agent in a news article and the person who has made it his purpose and business to reveal the names of agents, and has engaged in a pattern of activities intended to do so. Clearly, the legitimate journalist would not be engaged in such a pattern of activities.(24)*

The limited extent of the IIPA is perhaps best summed up by the House-Senate Conference Committee report, which states that the Act:

> *. . .does not affect the First Amendment rights of those who disclose the identities of agents as an integral part of another enterprise such as news media reporting of intelligence failures or abuses, academic studies of US Government policies and programs, or a private organization's enforcement of its internal rules.(25)*

This high standard effectively restricts the IIPA's clauses to two classes of individuals: outright traitors, who, in any event, are subject to concurrent espionage charges; and those who clearly espouse an interest in harming the Intelligence Community (IC) and have engaged in a consistent pattern of behavior to accomplish their goal. Going beyond these two circumscribed categories violates both the Act's express burden and its purpose as enunciated by Congress.

Establishing a "pattern" is intellectually tricky. If an individual reveals identities and has done so before, but adds cushioning language such as calling for a criminal or Congressional investigation, is that individual guilty of trying to impair foreign intelligence activities? Or is the individual simply an intelligence critic? Where is the line drawn between investigator and miscreant? As a matter of practicality, journalists with mainstream publications or academics at distinguished institutions are not apt to be labeled the latter.

The government also has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the perpetrator had "reason to believe" that his or her activities would impair or impede US intelligence programs. This criterion originally was opposed by civil libertarians because it did not require a suspect to have concrete premeditation or intent to harm US intelligence activities. Nonetheless, the "reason to believe" standard is problematic because it turns the trial into a subjective inquiry into whether the defendant had "reason to believe." Many defendants would maintain that under no circumstances did they presume that they were harming US intelligence capabilities.

At times, the DOJ has been accused of being timid in seeking IIPA prosecutions. In the conference committee report for the 1997 fiscal year intelligence appropriations bill, Congress admonished that, "The conference report expresses the sense of Congress that the DOJ be more forceful in enforcing the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which was a provision strongly supported by the House."(26) Such a direct apparent censure of DOJ is noteworthy because Congress's language in establishing the IIPA and the statute itself ties DOJ's hands. Congress's 1997 decree also could have been meant to provide explicit recorded guidance for DOJ to be more aggressive in seeking IIPA charges. The budget statement certainly demonstrates there is at least some degree of political will to address more actively the issue of exposed covert identities.

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Practical Obstructions

Despite Section 421's textual constraints, the CIA does refer matters to the DOJ for investigation. With Section 421(a) and (b) violations, there are procedural impediments inherent in any investigation of an unauthorized disclosure. The information may have been disseminated to a large number of individuals. The DOJ or the FBI also may deem that the disclosure is not sufficiently damaging to justify expending the resources for a prosecution. Section 421(c) violations are somewhat less susceptible to the procedural obstacles of Section 421 (a) and (b) violations because pinning down who revealed the identity usually is a less arduous exercise.

Another Act

Nonetheless, Section 421(c) prosecutions remain difficult because the American tradition of public courts does not accord well with trials involving classified information. The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)(27) provides a statutory rubric for reconciling a constitutionally enshrined open-court system with the need to protect sensitive national security information. Of particular interest in CIPA is Section 6(c), entitled "Alternative Procedure for Disclosure of Classified Information." In short, the Act authorizes courts to substitute a summary or subset of facts of certain classified information in lieu of the complete text which otherwise would have been disclosed at trial. For example, instead of revealing the contents of an entire report, the government could merely present a summary of particularly key information within it. CIPA involves two sets of rulings by a judge: an *ex parte* decision regarding what the defense counsel may see; and a subsequent determination of what actually will be presented at trial, as argued by both the prosecution and the defense. If, after the first decision, the prosecution refuses to turn over sensitive material to the defense, the judge may dismiss the case.

CIPA's Section 6(c) was refined by the common law creation of what has become known as the silent witness rule. The procedure allows a witness to point to classified information on papers which the prosecution, defense counsel, defendant, judge, and jury all possess, rather than having the witness respond orally. The aforementioned parties also may don headphones to hear testimony. In this manner, classified material is kept from the public record. Under CIPA and case law, the defense counsel may be required to be security screened for access to classified material; the jury, however, cannot be security cleared. Furthermore, the judge has the discretion to determine what material may be eligible for substitution, if the silent witness rule may apply, and the degree to which court records will be sealed.

Thus, there is an inherent uncertainty in any IIPA prosecution as to what extent an identity will have to be confirmed by the government in the course of a criminal proceeding. The CIA may be reluctant to acknowledge an intelligence identity in court for the very reasons that the CIA does not wish identities to become public in the first place. A report often may contain a number of alleged identities, some of which are incorrect. By confirming what is accurate, the CIA is forced to separate publicly what may be a few grains of wheat from a significant amount of chaff. As a result, trials hold the potential for being more damaging than the initial disclosure. The CIA consequently is left with an unpleasant dilemma: confirming an identity may further risk sources and methods, but refusing to prosecute the offender de facto encourages similar disclosures in the future.

A remedy to the problem could be to tighten CIPA to force judges to seal all court records involving classified information and to issue instructions, on penalty of being imprisoned for contempt of court, that no court personnel or member of the jury should disclose or discuss the identity outside of the courtroom. Staunch civil libertarians perhaps would object to such a measure as further eroding the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to a public trial. Such a revised rule for CIPA would merely extend CIPA one step further on intelligence identities, a narrowly tailored area in which the government has an overwhelmingly compelling state interest. It would not security-screen jurors or otherwise tamper with the jury system; jurors would remain free to speak about information not directly related to the identity of a covert officer, source, or asset or information otherwise restricted under CIPA.

Judges could object to these proposals on the constitutional grounds that Congress was interfering with

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the separation of powers. Such criticism is mitigated by the fact that the judges would be free to decide what evidence would be admissible. The restrictions would be limited to deciding who beyond the jury and counsel heard the material. This is an administrative determination that neither infringes on the independence or integrity of the court, the key criteria set forth in *Mistretta v. United States* (488 U.S. 361 [1988]), in which the Court validated the Congressionally imposed system of sentencing guidelines.

Section 421(c)'s problems regarding having to make inadvertent disclosures in open courts in order to obtain convictions brings the analysis full swing back to Sections 421(a) and (b) because courts traditionally have held that employees or others who enjoy access to classified material may contractually waive legal rights. If an intelligence officer may sign away his First Amendment right to free speech, then cannot the same officer also contract away his Sixth Amendment right to a public court?

A Secret Court System

Such an argument is made all the more interesting by recent developments in establishing the first quasi-adversarial, secret civilian court system in America, the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC). The ATRC is authorized under the aegis of the Federal Anti-Terrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996. Its mission is to determine whether the United States may deport lawful permanent resident aliens and other noncitizens suspected of involvement in terrorist activities.

To understand the ATRC first requires examining the advent of secret courts with special jurisdiction. This type of judicial body was the direct consequence of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which authorized the establishment of a small and shrouded Federal court to entertain warrant applications for electronic surveillance of agents of foreign powers located within the United States.28 The Act was in amended in 1994 to include physical searches, the pursuing of warrants for which was then authorized in 1995 by President Clinton under Executive Order 12949.(29)

The FISA Court is composed of seven district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice who sit for seven-year terms and who periodically travel to Washington to hear FISA applications. In the event a petition is denied, a special three-judge appellate panel appointed by the Chief Justice and drawn both from district courts and appellate circuits may invalidate the initial warrant decision and authorize the surveillance operation. If such a reversal is made, the written decision is dispatched to the Supreme Court, which has the power to review it.

As FISA exclusively examines warrant applications, no defense counsel or defendants are present. The court sits in a classified environment, and its records remain under seal and are protected by strict security standards. Court personnel, including judges, are subject to security screening by the FBI.(30)

For nearly two decades, FISA stood on the cutting edge of the division between the need for national security and an open-court environment. The Act was tapped during the investigations of Ames and of convicted former FBI agent Earl Pitts. The court has never turned down a government warrant request, which means the appellate mechanism has never been used. FISA judges have, however, annotated warrant applications or advised that they be resubmitted in a revised format.(31) The Act has never been challenged in court, save for fleeting arguments by former CIA employee Harold Nicholson that FISA was unconstitutional. Nicholson subsequently chose to plead guilty to espionage charges and received a reduced sentence of 23 years, seven months, rather than pin his hopes for ever gaining freedom on the Act's alleged flaws.

The ATRC

FISA's ability to anger civil libertarians was partially usurped in 1996, when Congress introduced the ATRC, which is equally as secret as FISA but which encompasses an area of the law that previously entailed a public adversarial process. Although as early as 1998 no case had yet to be presented to the ATRC, extensive preparations have been made to establish its procedures. The court is composed of five district court judges selected by the Chief Justice for five-year terms who sit in Washington when

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hearing associated cases.

Under the Anti-Terrorism Act and procedures promulgated by the ATRC's presiding Chief Judge, judges hear classified evidence in an *ex parte* proceeding that includes specially cleared defense counsel but not the defendant. This is an unprecedented departure from traditional criminal procedure. Under the ATRC, a "special attorney," drawn from a discreet list of previously cleared counsel, would *in camera* defend his client but is prohibited by statute from subsequently sharing the substance of the proceedings with that client. This creates a trial with a de facto defendant in absentia, albeit only a room away. Unlike FISA, which established a separate appellate panel, the ATRC's appeal is handled under seal and *ex parte* by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Although the ATRC is nominally "public," the court in reality is secret. Evidence may both be presented and remain under seal without opportunity for examination by the defendant or admission into the public record. The ATRC's constitutional justification is that the potential damage from revealing intelligence sources and methods to the defendant is so grave and the penalty of exclusion of a noncitizen from the United States so minor that the amount of secrecy in ATRC's quasi-adversarial proceedings is allowable. The ATRC is a major step toward addressing the need to protect sensitive national security information during a trial.

If the ATRC is upheld as a constitutionally permissible means of conducting a court proceeding, an argument is to be made that IC employees, including staff members of the Congressional oversight committees, should be subject to similar secret courts pursuant to their employment contracts. This line of reasoning can be taken one step further to advocate a similar closed court for American citizens who are not members of the IC but are accused of violating Section 421(c). Although the latter could foreseeably be politically untenable, a closed court for IC employees would be similar in principle to the military justice system. Americans could avoid being prosecuted in the secret IC court by simply not joining the IC, just as Americans may currently avoid prior restraint by not becoming employed by the IC. A secret IC court system would dramatically reduce the practical problems inherent in prosecuting unauthorized disclosures.

Prior Restraint Controversy

The issue of prior restraint, in which the government would be able to exercise prepublication review over the media, is another subject of heated controversy. There is a plausible argument that a government censor should have access to prepublication proofs of articles that may reveal identities, but the mere mention of this sort of system provokes cries of an Orwellian repression of the media.

As the Supreme Court noted in *Near v. Minnesota* (283 U.S. 697 [1931]), reports on troop and transport unit movements are not protected by the First Amendment. Most hopes for prior restraint, however, were jettisoned in the aftermath of *The New York Times v. United States* (403 U.S. 713 [1971]), the 6 to 3 landmark decision which declared that the government could not censor *The New York Times* when the newspaper proposed to publish *The Pentagon Papers*, a 7,000-page compendium of leaked classified analyses. As Chief Justice Burger pointed out in his dissent, however, the case is susceptible to much criticism. The decision was hasty, bypassing the normal route of district and appellate findings. Burger quoted Holmes in *Northern Securities Co. v. United States* (193 U.S. 197 [1904]):

> *Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest that appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure that makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.*

The "hydraulic pressure" in *The New York Times* was the public's distrust of the Vietnam policies of various administrations. To have prevented publication of the papers would only have increased that distrust. This case remains the controlling one for prior restraint.

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That said, prior restraint does not have to entail unilateral government censorship. The DOJ could request an injunction against publication of certain identities and refer the matter to a court using CIPA procedures where the reporter and publisher would receive a fair hearing.

The United States would not be alone in censoring publications. The UK's Official Secrets Act of 1911 rigorously controls the dissemination of classified information and has led to a vigorous system of prior restraint. Israel has an active censorship system for military and intelligence affairs. Both France and Germany have laws authorizing prior restraint. Limiting prior restraint in the United States to intelligence identities (or even classified analyses) would be a narrower schematic for restricting speech than exists even in these democracies. Furthermore, in past cases where the United States Government has known that the publication of an identity is forthcoming, prior restraint would have been useful.

A Continuing Concern

Despite the end of the Cold War, intelligence personnel remain at risk in many parts of the world. In the past few years, several significant terrorist actions were taken against official Americans:

- In 1993, Mir Aimal Kasi opened fire on CIA employees waiting in vehicles to enter CIA Headquarters in Langley, killing two.
- In 1995, three employees of the US Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, were gunned down at a traffic intersection. Two died.
- In 1996, 19 US military personnel were killed in the bombing of the Khobar Towers barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.
- In 1996, 17 November carried out a rocket attack on the US Embassy compound in Athens. In all, 17 November allegedly is responsible for murdering four Americans and injuring 28 . Media reports indicate that the same .45-caliber pistol that killed Welch was used in the June 1997 assassination of a Greek shipping tycoon. No member of 17 November has ever been caught.(32)
- In 1998, the bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, resulted in the deaths of 12 Americans.

In addition, the advent of the World Wide Web carries with it extraordinary opportunities to unearth covert identities. Using a web-search agent, electronic sites may be scoured in seconds. For a fee, one may access and cross-index articles from thousands of domestic and foreign publications going back to the seventies. A one-time disclosure of an identity in even an obscure periodical is easily traced in this manner. While such an approach may be expensive for the average individual, it is a simple exercise for a foreign intelligence service or a reasonably sophisticated terrorist group.

For example, as a test, a commercial database was accessed and searched for the classified acronym of a sensitive intelligence program. In seconds, the database had provided an article from a reputable publication that described the project in detail. Nothing prevents a hostile intelligence service, terrorist group, or deranged individual from entering the name of a suspected covert employee and discovering that he or she, according to such and such article, previously was an alleged spy in X country.

Because of such continuing threats, the IIPA's Section 421(c) should be amended to:

- Excise the clause that an individual has to be involved in a pattern of activities intended to expose covert identities.
- Remove the *mens rea* standard that the violator has to have reason to believe such actions would impair US intelligence activities and thus reduce the offense to one of strict liability.
- Apply the Act to those who purport to reveal identities in addition to those who disclose actual

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identities.

Furthermore, the definition of "covert agent" under Section 426(4)(a) should be revised to omit the requirement that an intelligence officer must have served outside the United States within the past five years to qualify for protection under the Act. Congress also should explicitly state that the statute is universally applicable and that no segment of the population, be it the media or otherwise, is immune from prosecution for revealing identities. Finally, the applicable fine should be increased, perhaps to $50,000.

If such proposals were adopted, Section 421(c) could read:

> *Whoever discloses any information that identifies or purports to identify a covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.*

While such a revision would expand the scope of Section 421(c) beyond IIPA's original apparent intent, it would greatly enhance protection of the identities of US intelligence officers. Removing the requirement of a "pattern" of activities would mean that any instance an identity is revealed or purported to be revealed, regardless of how it was obtained, would be actionable.

Terminating the "with reason to believe" *mens rea* burden would end arguments regarding subjective versus objective standards and would refine the crime to one of strict liability: either the identity was disclosed or purported to be disclosed, or it was not. Mistake of fact therefore would not be a defense because the augmented statute would proscribe the act of claiming to identify covert agents rather than just the more limited act of actually identifying a covert agent. While strict liability for a felony is not common to most criminal infractions, it is present in public safety measures (worker safety and automobile speeding) and the protection of minors (selling alcohol to underage individuals and statutory rape). Pursuant to *United States v. Balint* (258 U.S. 250 [1922]), strict liability is constitutional so long as its existence is made clear by Congress.

Expanding Section 421(c) to cover both individuals who actually expose identities and those who only purport to disclose identities is crucial to tightening up Section 421(c)'s procedural loopholes. When the statute applies to those who claim to reveal identities, regardless of the accuracy of the information, the IC is not forced into confirming the identity. The offense is boiled down to a simple question: did or did not the individual intend to disclose an identity? There would be no examination of CIPA, the constitutional implications of clearing defense counsel or secret courts, or instructing judges to penalize jurors for talking outside the courtroom after the case ends. If the author actually reveals an identity but claims that his work is fictional, the exercise could return to these complications. The number of instances where this occurs, however, should be quite small because presumably no media member would claim that his work product is fictional.

A necessary corollary to revising Section 421(c) is the removal of Section 422(b), which protected those who have not had access to classified information and who did not engage in a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents from prosecution for conspiring to violate Section 421(c).

The IIPA's definitions under Section 426 artificially limit the Act's protection to the five-year period following an officer's last foreign duty. Yet identification of an officer much later in life still endangers sources and methods. In addition, as former covert officers may live overseas after leaving the CIA, identification later still could substantially disrupt the former officer's current lifestyle. If Congress insisted on a time limit, more reasonable substitutes could be :

- Protecting the identity as long as the officer either remains under cover or has periods of cover time in his history.
- Extending the five-year limit to 25 years.
- Starting the five-year, or perhaps 15-year, clock after the officer ends employment with US

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intelligence.

Finally, to erase the boundaries created by legislative intent under the IIPA, Congress should explicitly state that its sense is that the IIPA be applied universally and that no particular US citizen be immune from prosecution under the IIPA. The Act still would not cover disclosures authorized by the appropriate representative of the executive branch or by the covert agents themselves. If Congress felt it necessary, it could extend this authority to the chairs of the intelligence oversight committees, although this would be at odds with the position taken by the executive branch on classified information.

There is a strong argument that a strengthened IIPA would not violate the First Amendment. Holmes's eloquent yet concise exposition on free speech and the Constitution in *Schenk v. United States* (249 U.S. 47 [1919]) applies as much today as did in 1919, when it was handed down:

> *The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. . . . The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.*

A Question of Trust

Perhaps a 15th anniversary initially may seem a subjective benchmark to use to advocate amending the IIPA. In recent years, however, a host of attacks targeting official Americans has occurred, and cover mechanisms are being challenged as never before. Without a precipitating tragedy such as Richard Welch's death to serve as a rallying cry, there is little bureaucratic incentive to push for Congressional change. Nonetheless, the United States should be morally obligated to do its best to safeguard its covert operatives in their unique endeavors. To do less would be to abrogate the trust that our officers, sources, and assets place in the United States to protect them.

Notes

1. Remarks by former President Bush at CIA Headquarters (Retirees Day), Public Affairs Staff, CIA.

2. "Secrecy, "Dirty Tricks" at Heart of CIA Battle," *U.S. News & World Report*, 12 January 1976.

3. Steven V. Roberts. "Greeks' Search for Killers of CIA Man Unfruitful," *The New York Times*, 25 December 1975.

4. Laurence Stern. "Welch Death May Figure in Hill Battle," *The Washington Post*, 29 December 1975.

5. News Briefs, *The Wall Street Journal*, 29 December 1975, p. 1A.

6. Although the CIA is not the sole part of the US Government that sends clandestine intelligence officers overseas, for purposes of this paper, officers will be referred to exclusively as from the CIA. See "Testimony, March 6, 1996, Harold Brown, Chairman, Commission on the roles and Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence," *Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony*, 6 March 1996, disseminated electronically via LEXIS/NEXIS.

7. J. F. terHorst. "Lists of U.S. Agents Abroad Abound," *Detroit News*, 7 January 1976.

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8. Smith Hempstone. "Our Times," via original dissemination, 6 January 1976.

9. "Greek Committee Reveals the CIA Menace in Athens," *Athens News* 25 November 1975.

10. "Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1981," United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Report No. 97-2-1, 6 October 1981.

11. "U.S. Aides Called Spies, Ousted," *Facts on File World News Digest*, 13 March 1981. Electronically disseminated via LEXIS/NEXIS. See also: William J.Casey, "Statement for the Record for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Legislation on 7 April 1981."

12. "U.S. Diplomats Expelled," *Facts on File World News Digest*, 3 July 1981, electronic dissemination via LEXIS/ NEXIS. See also: Carlye Murphy. "U.S. Disputes Spy Allegation by Mozambique," *The Washington Post*, 6 March 1981, p. A24.

13. Ronald Reagan. "Remarks of the President at Bill Signing Ceremony at CIA Headquarters," press release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 23 June 1982.

14. Judith Schenk Koffler and Bennett L Gershman. "National Security and Civil Liberties: The New Seditious Libel," *69 Cornell L. Rev. 816*, April 1984. See also: Susan D Charkes. "The Constitutionality of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act," 83 Colum. L. Rev. 727, April 1983.

15. Blaine Harden. "Ghana Mixes Capitalism, Radical Foreign Policy," *The Washington Post*, 24 August 1986, p. A24.

16. "Defendant in Spy Case Tells Why He Sold Secrets to Soviet Officials," *The New York Times*, 10 April 1986, p. A15.

17. CIA Clerk Pleads Guilty in Leaks," *Chicago Tribune*, 14 August 1985, p. 8. See also: "Woman Admits Two Counts of Spying," *The Bergen Record Associated Press*, 13 August 1985, p. A05

18. Richard Norton-Taylor. "Sex and the Unemployed Spy," *The Guardian*, 27 May 1995, p. 23.

19. "Ex-Marine May Wed Lover in Spy Scandal," *The Arizona Republic*, 25 December 1994, p. A36.

20. Robert C. Toth. "CIA Critic Agee Reportedly Paid by Cuba," *The Los Angeles Times*, 10 August 1992, p. A1.

21. James Risen. "Once Again, Ex-Agent Agee Eludes Grasp of the CIA," *The Los Angeles Times*, 14 October 1997, p. A1.

22. 50 U.S.C.A. 421 (c).

23. Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1980, 24 September 1980, pp. 15, 17.

24. Statement of Senator Chafee on S.2216 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 5 September 1980, pp. 2, 7.

25. Conference Report of the House-Senate Conference Committee on the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 20 May 1982, p. 8.

26. "FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act (Conference Report)," Congressional Press Release, *Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.*, 24 September 1996.

27. 18 U.S.C.A. App.

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28. 28. 15 U.S.C. selections 1801-1809

29. Executive Order 12949, 19 February 1995. See also: Jim Wolf. "Judge Grants Singapore Trip," *Reuters North American Wire*, 14 February 1997. Distributed electronically via LEXIS/NEXIS.

30. "Security Procedures Established Pursuant to Pub. L. No. 95-511, 91 Stat. 1783, by the Chief Justice of the United States for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review." (1978). See also: Royce Lamberth. "Intelligence on the FISA Court," *Legal Times*, 14 April 1997, p. 18.

31. Royce Lambeth. "Intelligence on the FISA Court," *Legal Times*, 14 April 1997.

32. Leonard Doyle. "The Cold Killers of 17 November Who Always Go Free," *The Guardian* (London), 28 September 1997, p. 14.

(b)(3)(c) was a law clerk with CIA's Office of General Counsel while attending Stanford Law School.

Unclassified

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Unclassified

The Oral History Program

An Interview With Former General Counsel John S. Warner (U)

Editor's Note: The celebration in 1997 of the 50th Anniversary of the CIA served as a reminder of the Agency's fascinating history, with all its successes and its failures. Fortunately, it is still possible to speak with and learn from individuals who were present during the Agency's earliest years. One of those individuals, John Warner, provided to multiple interviewers his recollection of his time with CIA. Although Mr. Warner retired in 1976, he continues to write and speak about the issues concerning intelligence and national security law. He noted that his remarks are snapshots from the past and are illustrative of matters that arose in the history of CIA. One should not draw broad conclusions before exploring the full details of the incidents mentioned.

Photo: John Warner

John Warner served as the Agency's General Counsel from 1973 to 1976. He was present at the creation of CIA, serving as Deputy General Counsel in the Central Intelligence Group in 1946 and remaining in that post with CIA until his appointment as General Counsel in 1973. From 1957 to 1968, Mr. Warner served as Legislative Counsel while maintaining, for most of those years, his post as Deputy General Counsel.

Through the course of his career, John Warner witnessed--and frequently played an important role in--many of the major events and decisions that have shaped the Agency. From designing the legal framework for the Agency, through the evolution of the Agency's relationship with Congress, to Watergate and the damaging revelations of the 1970s, John Warner was on the scene.

Mr. Warner was born in Washington, DC. He began working in a bank when he was 16, and he worked his way through college and law school. He was finishing his master's degree when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The day after completing his degree, Mr. Warner enlisted as an aviation cadet, was trained to fly B-17s, and eventually completed 35 combat missions in Europe. While home on leave, Mr. Warner met James Donovan, General Counsel of the OSS, at a Washington cocktail party. The two hit it off, and Donovan arranged to have Warner transferred to the General Counsel's office of OSS in December 1944.

The following excerpts, preceded by brief introductions to the excerpted topics, were obtained from two interviews with Mr. Warner that were done under the auspices of the oral history program of the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

On the origins of CIA. *John Warner quickly befriended Larry Houston, another OSS lawyer, who went on to become CIA's first General Counsel. After the war, the two moved with the clandestine collection and support components of OSS, renamed the Strategic Services Unit, to the War Department until the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), was created in January 1946. Houston and Warner together drafted the legislative proposals to establish the CIA. These were to be a part of the National Security Act of 1947, but the Truman administration preferred to keep the CIA component of that Act more general. Their work was eventually encompassed in the CIA Act of 1949.*

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John Warner (JW): [Thomas] Troy's *Donovan and the CIA* states [DCI Hoyt] Vandenberg commissioned preparation of a bill to create the CIA and sent it to Clark Clifford [then Special Counsel to President Truman]. Houston's recollection of this event is somewhat different. He recalls that he and I had written a substantial part, if not all, of the legislation prior to Vandenberg's arrival on the scene.

While working on other problems, I discovered a Federal statute, the Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1945, which provided that a government entity set up by Presidential directive could not exist for more than one year without legislation. Technically, CIG was an entity without legal standing.... That's why we sat down and wrote as quickly as possible. In fact, I wrote the first drafts.

I was a young lawyer, never practiced, never been in government, and so what do you do? I went to the Executive Order, which established the CIG, to pick up what CIA was to be, and then I went to the OSS Appropriation Acts, because that was the only statutory thing about OSS. It was probably the smartest thing I ever did, because that was the guts of what later became the CIA Act of 1949.

On unvouchered funds. *One of the key provisions of the CIA Act of 1949 permitted the Director to expend funds "for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature" on his own authority without having those expenditures subject to audit by the GAO. These funds are known as "unvouchered" or "special" funds. Mr. Warner explains below that the Congress accepted CIA's need for unvouchered funds because the GAO had worked with OSS and understood that the Agency's mission required them.*

JW: The authority for unvouchered funds... that's the guts of the ability of CIA to do its work... to run espionage operations and covert action requiring the highest security. Every other agency in government, whatever vouchers they create are reviewed by the GAO, and they can take exception to it and so forth...

George Washington was the first one to get unvouchered funds. In fact, in the first Congress he said there ought to be a statute authorizing this, and there was. And it's been repeated over the years, except that CIA was the first Agency that got it up to 100 percent of its funds.

Because... the way things started, GAO was on the premises in OSS, and we learned to work with them. And [OSS General Counsel] Jim Donovan even submitted requests to them for an opinion. It was advisory only because it involved unvouchered funds. And there were other questions we would talk to GAO about. So when they were asked [by the Congress] for comments, they said, "Well, we would generally be against this kind of thing, but in view of the mission of CIA, we think it's necessary." Now that's a big step to get the Comptroller General to agree that at least half our money would not be looked at by him. It's also interesting [that] about the same time the Atomic Energy Commission, which was a separate agency, was asking for a big chunk of unvouchered money, and Congress said, "No" and the Comptroller General said, "No."

As you may or may not know, there were a couple of Communists who were members of the Congress, in the House, and they objected all over the place. They objected to the unvouchered funds, and they objected even to the concept [of the CIA].

On the DCI's authority to bring foreign nationals into the country. *One of the more controversial clauses of the CIA Act of 1949 gave the DCI permission to bring up to 100 foreign nationals into the United States each fiscal year, regardless of whether they qualified under the immigration laws.*

JW: Essentially, what happened is, [Senator] McCarran, who was head of Senate Judiciary, which has jurisdiction over immigration matters, said this is an impingement on the immigration authorities. [I explained] to him that this was not an immigration matter, that this was an operational matter to bring a very important alien into the country without regard to all the special provisions of the immigration laws and that probably, very rarely would we get to 100. As it turned out... for many years [there were only] seven or eight a year. But we had to report to McCarran. We said, "We'll give you a yearly report," and he said okay. That was the controversy. It wasn't on the substance of the thing, it was jurisdiction.

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On the Office of General Counsel.

JW: I don't know how long it took us to get 10 lawyers [in OGC], but maybe five or six years. And there were no cases that brought us into court as a party, [although] we were increasingly involved with courts in one way or another. [In] private suits where someone was undercover . . . we would try to work arrangements with he judge or with opposing counsel. We'd clear the opposing counsel and brief him: "Look, it has nothing to do with your suite but would you respect this [operational equity]?" And they did. Running through all this, touching base with the judge or opposing counsel was the theme. Never put a false document into court. Never. If you had to take chances on the security involved, you'd do that, but you'd never put a false document, or direct an employee to put a false document. . . . We were lawyers, you just don't lie to a judge . . . .[S]omething that ran through most of our work was the question of preservation of security and compliance with the law. And, of course, the United States with all its laws is the most difficult country in the world. We have so many laws.

On agent contracts. Below, Mr. Warner discusses the case of an agent who sued the Agency for breach of contract. In the Totten case that Mr. Warner refers to, the estate of a Union spy sued the government, claiming that it breached a contract that had existed between the spy and President Lincoln. The Supreme Court ruled against the spy's estate, arguing that, "The secrecy which such contracts impose preclude any action for their enforcement."

JW: There's a long history on that, it's a Civil War case, *Totten.* Where a Union spy sued for back pay. And it went to [the] Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court said there is no basis for any such action. In the one case that came up, we cited the *Totten* case. There had been no citing of it for many, many years. Now there's a lot of them.

On the Marchetti case. *Victor Marchetti served with CIA from 1955 to 1969. Most of that time he was a Soviet military analyst, but, for the last three years of his career, he worked as a staffer in the DCI's office, including a stint as executive assistant to DDCI Rufus Taylor. It was from that vantage point that he learned much about the Agency's covert actions, which he sought to expose in a book after he left the Agency. Upon learning of Marchetti's plans to publish, the Agency on 18 April 1972 successfully sought an order in a US District Court forbidding him to disclose any information about CIA and requiring him to submit his manuscript for review before publishing it. John Warner wrote an article on this episode, and the article, "The Marchetti Case: New Case Law," was published in Studies in Intelligence in the spring of 1977.*

JW: A publisher came to us and said, "Here is a manuscript I think you ought to look at because it looks like it has some sensitive things in it." Prior to this, we'd often thought about what you do when someone threatens to publish or put out classified information. We thought that you would want to get an injunction to prevent him from publishing. Now to get a temporary injunction you've got to have a pretty compelling case....

Well, we had studied this in a theoretical way and looked at commercial contracts to protect proprietary information and thought we could go on a contract theory [arguing that a mutual agreement to protect classified information should be enforced] because everyone signed a secrecy agreement.... Colby called, he was Executive Director then, and [he asked] whether we ever thought about going to court [to prevent disclosure]. I said, "We sure have." . . .

[DCI Richard] Helms was concerned about being in court.... But Larry [Houston] and I went to see him and explained it. He went to talk to Nixon about it...and Nixon said, "Well, if it's that bad, or important, have your lawyers talk to my lawyers." So Larry and I went to see John Ehrlichman, and by then we had a pretty good reading from various directorates on how sensitive some of the material [Marchetti intended for publication] was.... Obviously, when we go to court [the Department of] Justice is our lawyer. And so we talked to Irwin Goldblum [a lawyer from the Department of Justice], and we prepared the necessary papers....

So what we have here is the first time that the CIA as a plaintiff went in to guarantee and protect its

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rights and we won. [E]very time you go in court you are losing something. But for me this Marchetti case is precedent shattering. We go in as a plaintiff to protect ourselves....

On the Snepp case. *After the Marchetti case, it was clear that CIA had the right, by virtue of the contractual provisions of the secrecy agreement, to review works that current and former Agency employees planned to submit for publication. The Agency knew that Frank Snepp, who had worked for the Agency from 1968 to 1976, intended to publish a book, and that he and his lawyer assured then DCI Stansfield Turner that he would submit his manuscript for review prior to publishing. He reneged on that promise, however. In the ensuing legal battle, the Agency successfully prevented Snepp from receiving his royalties from the publication of Decent Interval.*

JW: [In the Snepp case that followed Marchetti] for purposes of the trial, CIA's position was, "We are not alleging that there is any classified information in this book. We are just saying he violated his contract." He didn't submit [to the Agency the information he intended to publish], although he had signed a secrecy agreement.... The Supreme Court ruled [in favor of enforcing the secrecy and prepublication review agreements] and approved the forfeiture by Snepp of all profits from his book. So Marchetti and Snepp. I just felt these are tremendous victories the little old lawyers won.

The Freedom of Information Act. *The Freedom of Information Act, which Mr. Warner discusses, entitles anyone to request and receive copies of records in the possession of the executive branch of the Federal Government unless those records fall within certain exempted categories.*

JW: [W]e get to FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] [and] the FOIA amendments. These...impacted every government agency, but particularly the security agencies. The day after it became effective, Morton Halperin put in at least five letters [requesting information from] us, and seven or eight to others... and he was practically a member of Senator Kennedy's staff in getting the amendments passed....

Now [before the FOIA amendments became law,] we sa[id] this should be vetoed, it's unconstitutional.... It provides, if the Agency doesn't answer in 30 days, that they can file suit. You know, ridiculous. Then, of course, courts don't pay any attention to that, but it's wrong to put on the statute books something that no one is going to pay any attention to... so we recommended that the President veto it, and he did. And it was overridden.

On Congressional oversight: *Before the formation of the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, formal Congressional oversight of CIA was performed by small subcommittees of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. These committees were among the busiest in the Congress, and their members occasionally did not have time to hold hearings on CIA, even on important matters like its budget. The substantive committees, such as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, often asked for briefings on world events, but Warner notes that Agency officials would brief on operational matters only to the CIA subcommittees of Appropriations and Armed Services.*

JW: In the first few years I was there, I would...go to each of the committees [and say] "Please, will you hold a hearing so we can brief you." To our own subcommittees, [we briefed on covert action] and other operational matters. But...how well they were briefed is another matter because, if you only met with them once, and there was some event occurring worldwide, that [significant event] got the attention. We did not give them anything in writing. I don't think they had safes.

House Foreign Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations...they would call us... now and then for sensitive intelligence briefings.... We felt we were just as responsible to the Congress as we were to the President. The Congress created us, plus Congress gave us our money. In other words, we were realists. We drew the line when it came to operations.... It was never intrusive. They would ask for an explanation. They might halfheartedly "tsk, tsk," if you missed something...but they never jumped on us. Never.

[We were asked to give] a budget briefing, Sunday afternoon, in the House Office Building in the Capitol at 1 p.m. Okay, I said fine.... Sure enough, there we all are 1 p.m., Longworth Building.... It was sort of a crowded room and Clarence Cannon greets Dulles, "Oh, it's good to see you again Mr.

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Secretary." He refers to [Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rather than DCI Allen Dulles] but he knows it is the CIA budget. [Allen] Dulles is a great raconteur. He can tell story after story. He reminds Cannon of this, and Cannon reminds him of that, and they swap stories for two hours. And, in the end: "Well, Mr. Secretary, have you got enough money in your budget for this year, the coming year?" "Well, I think we are all right, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much." That was the budget hearing. Now [some members, including then representative Gerald Ford] were visibly disturbed by this.... So I pulled [them] aside and I said, "Gentlemen, would you like me to arrange a briefing either here or at the Agency on our budget?" And they... thanked me. And we did [have another briefing] without, obviously, telling the Chairman. And that's why I got to be such good friends with Gerry Ford.

When we began getting into a lot of matters before the Church and Pike Committees... there was a strong core of resistance in the Directorate of Operations. They didn't see why it had to be done. There is still that group that thought Colby did too much [in the way of providing information]. And they were wrong.

On the Church Committee: *On 22 December 1974, The New York Times published an article by Seymour Hersh that alleged CIA had seriously violated its regulations by conducting widespread, illegal operations against domestic dissident groups, such as the anti-Vietnam war movement. Other stories of a similar vein followed, and, in early 1975, the Senate voted to create the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities under the chairmanship of Senator Frank Church. The House followed suit by establishing a similar committee under the chairmanship of Representative Otis Pike.*

JW: Church came out with that "CIA is a rogue elephant" statement before he ever had a hearing.... He was running for President.... So they got their charter and I remember vividly Colby and [I] went down to visit Church and his committee counsel.... The purpose of our going down was to establish agreed-on procedures for dealing with classified information, both in terms of personnel and in terms of documents. Church listened politely. Colby said, "We want your people to have standard kinds of safes, we will send security people down to brief your staff people on what kind of safe, or we will provide the safes. We will help you with your procedures for handling documents. We will ask your staff people to undergo investigation and sign secrecy agreements. Now, Senator Church, your clearance consists of the vote of your state that elected you." Patting him on the back.... Colby said, "I see no problem with that," despite the fact that Church had called the CIA a rogue elephant before the hearings ever opened.

The Church Committee issued a report and issued a later legislative proposal.... Very critical, but their report says, which Church signed as Chairman, "CIA has been responsive to the Presidency throughout." No rogue elephant. No one ever saw that in a headline. A lot of their recommendations, and proposed legislation, were ridiculous. This is again the staff. Senators don't read these reports in detail....

On MKULTRA: *MKULTRA was the principal CIA program for the research and development of chemical agents designed to control human behavior. Begun in 1953 out of fear that the Communist countries had made significant progress in mind control, the program lasted for 10 years and eventually focused on using LSD to obtain information from individuals and to control their behavior. On 27 November 1953, Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian employee of the Army, fell to his death from a New York City hotel window eight days after having been administered a dose of LSD by a CIA officer as part of an experiment. The program continued after OlsonÕs death and included the administration of LSD to individuals.*

JW: [In many cases of high-profile flaps,] OGC didn't have the full, unadulterated story.... Because the operators, in part, partook of Helms's view of things. Don't get the lawyers in it. That's part of the operational kind of thinking.... About the Olson case.... The fellow that jumped out the window [allegedly because he was unwittingly administered hallucinogens by the Agency]...we didn't know it was part of a program that did this and did that, but it was quite clear that we had the essence of it that he had agreed that he would be a subject. And no one can say for sure whether this led him to jump out the window, but it was not unreasonable to suppose that it did.... [A]gain, we weren't told the entire story of the program. We were told strictly the elements around this one case. It never occurred to us to raise a question about the propriety of the program.

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I've often thought, without making a decision, that we should have been more proactive.... We never went looking for things that would raise questions. When things came to our notice we would act on it[, but we] never went looking for things, which is really an IG function.

On Watergate: *The five burglars who broke into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee on 17 June 1972 all had CIA connections. Their leader, James McCord, had worked in the Office of Security, and the others, all Cubans, had worked with CIA on the Bay of Pigs operation. A longtime former Agency employee, Howard Hunt, then working for the White House, was also implicated in the burglary. It later emerged that Hunt had used CIA equipment in breaking into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Ellsberg had been the source of The Pentagon Papers leak.*

JW: The first time I got involved in Watergate, the US Attorney for the District of Columbia [Earl Silbert] asked if I would come by.... And so I went down there, by myself, and he was there with one other person...and started asking me these various questions.... Up to that time I had, in no way, been involved in anything relating to Watergate, nor did I know the Agency was in any way involved. So the question came as somewhat of a surprise.... Develop some film for Hunt? So I had these two pages of questions, I just can't remember all of them, but they were all, a number of them were things that had more or less appeared in the newspapers, so I knew what in the hell was cooking. I wrote this memorandum and sent it to the Director [Helms].... [Helms] addressed [a] meeting and expressed concern: "What are we going to do about this?" Not one person spoke out until I did. I said, "Dick [Helms], no matter what, we've got to respond to this. A US Attorney for the District of Columbia need answers. I haven't the slightest idea what this is about. None of these questions mean anything to me." [Helms] expressed his concern about involving CIA in the Watergate problem. I said, "Dick, we've got to respond. Now, if you've got some problems that I don't know about you may want to talk to the Attorney General, I don't know, but until I know more about it I can't give you any suggestions."... Eventually, the data was given to me in writing, and I put it together in some sort of package and took it back to the US Attorney.

On the need for secrecy.

JW: We overdid it some ways.... I think in some of our dealings with other [US Government] agencies we overdid the secrecy bit. We should have been more forthcoming.... There are a lot of reasons to be suspicious of CIA, or any government agency. I hear on television programs about this introduction of drugs in Los Angeles. But, on the other hand, what happened with DCI Gates, and others, is that they've opened up a lot of the Agency that they had to do, and should have been done earlier. Before, you go back to the 1950s, and everything is secret...the fact that we exist is almost secret.

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Lessons From the Frontline

Increasing CIA's Value Added to the Senior Policymaker (U)

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The position of "Special Adviser to the Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States"--a position I occupied at the Department of State for two years--is a symbol of the strides the CIA has made over the past several years to get to know our customers better and to provide them better service. The decision to dispatch a senior officer from the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) on nonreimbursable detail to the front office of the bureau responsible for former Soviet Union affairs was made by John McLaughlin, then Director of the Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis, at the advent of a new administration in early 1993. Many other CIA positions have been established at State, but this was--and remains--the only one where a senior officer sits directly in the front office of a bureau and serves primarily in an intelligence liaison function.

Striving for Relevance

The purpose of establishing a position directly attached to the front office of the bureau (not yet officially a bureau but operating as one for all practical purposes) was to improve CIA's ability to understand the policy priorities and concerns of the bureau and thus to allow us to adjust and target our intelligence support to the needs of the Ambassador-at-Large and his staff. Serving as a facilitator between the bureau and CIA provided me a perch from which to see the strides the Agency has made in re-orienting itself toward an array of products tailored precisely to the needs--and often the specific requests--of policymakers. I was impressed with the responsiveness of DI analysts and other Agency officers to policymaker requests and to the quality of the product provided day after day. Sometimes it was a map, chart, graph, an informal note, or a phone call. And sometimes the best service was simply putting the right two people in touch.

Gratified as I was to see day in and day out the quality of the product and the can-do attitude of our people, I also learned just how much further we can go to improve our support to senior officials in the executive branch. Working in proximity to senior officials brought home just how difficult it is for us to stay relevant--providing products that the senior policymaker cannot do without. In addition, I was often frustrated by our failure to contribute more. Just as American business finds itself in an increasingly competitive environment, the Intelligence Community (IC) is in a similarly tough struggle for the attention of the policymaker. I sometimes felt like a soldier on the frontlines, trying my best to gain access for our information and analysis but not always feeling that I had succeeded.

Some say that the problem is that we now have to compete with CNN and other purveyors of 24-hour information and analysis on world affairs. I believe it is more illuminating to understand the problem as competition for time and access to officials who have a sobering array of demands on their schedule--not only from other sources of information and analysis, but also from foreign officials, the Washington ambassadorial corps, American interest groups, Congressional committees, journalists, and many others who are demanding a piece of the policymaker's time. In this environment, they have little time to read

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or to be briefed on anything by anyone. They will sit still for a CIA memorandum or briefing only if it is clear that what they will get out of it is essential to their agenda.

Room for Improvement

I came away from my two years at the Department convinced that there is more that we have to do if we want to survive in this environment.

State is only one of CIA's key customers, and, in some respects, it is a unique organization. But my conversations with others who have served on policy details suggests that there are common patterns. Based on my experience, I believe that there are several areas that demand attention if CIA hopes to further strengthen its support to senior policymakers and make itself more relevant to the policy process.

Living with the Customer. Living at the Department, sitting in staff meetings, and joining in informal discussions gives one a critical leg up in understanding the issues being weighed and options being considered in the early stages of the policy process. It is impossible to duplicate this kind of access with occasional parish or phone calls. Yet, the DI still does not have this kind of access in most bureaus at State (and elsewhere). Expanding the number of such liaison positions could have a big impact on the relevance and timeliness of our . Of course, there are some serious barriers to such an expansion. There are those in State--and no doubt in other agencies--who would just as soon not see a larger CIA presence. And, in the current resource environment, adding more detailees would probably mean reducing the number of officers we have devoted to other important tasks. Nonetheless, the benefits of expanding our corps of CIA representatives on the frontlines would be well worth the investment.

The creation of the Office of Policy Support in the DI provides an opportunity to take a close look at the costs and benefits of expanding our cadre of policy support representatives and perhaps re-examining the current assignments of DI officers already deployed to see if they should be repositioned to give us more return on our investment. The Office should also take a close look at how these representatives can be provided better logistic and computer support. The logistic support I received was improving during my tenure at the Department, but it was still far from what it needed to be to guarantee that we were in a position to provide top-quality service on a daily basis.

Better Service for the "Second-Tier" Official. We have made great strides over the last year or two in upgrading the relevance and sophistication of our support to the president and other principals via the *President's Daily Brief* (PDB) and associated products. That progress only magnifies the gap that already existed between the quality of our support for the principals and the support we provide to the next level down--the undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and senior directors at the NSC. I lived with this difference at State. Because I also facilitated PDB support for the Deputy Secretary of State from my position as Special Adviser to the Ambassador-at-Large, I observed on a daily basis the kind of quality support for the deputy secretary that did not make it beyond his office at State. Similarly, I confronted, on a daily basis--in my morning intelligence briefings for the Ambassador-at-Large and his deputies--the difference in quality between the PDB and the *National Intelligence Daily*, now the *Senior Executive Intelligence Brief* (SEIB). There are potentially great gains to be had from efforts to target products specifically to key second-tier officials, to upgrade the quality of the daily intelligence support they are provided, and, to the extent consistent with security concerns, to make some of the products provided to PDB principals available also to their key advisers at the next level down.

The point of launching the SEIB was to start a process of significantly upgrading support for this tier of senior officials. There are a lot of tough decisions that lie ahead if the new publication is to fulfill that potential.

One-Stop Shopping for "the Facts." Spending two years with some of our most demanding customers forced me to think hard about what constitutes CIA's "value added" for the busy policymaker. There is no question that one of the most important things policymakers need from us is not analysis, but "facts"--data, maps, graphics, and information. One of the most appreciated products we provided to the Department during my tenure was a Venn diagram exhibiting the complex interconnections among the

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array of European international institutions. This diagram was used in many high-level meetings and passed to a number of foreign officials.

Despite the proliferation of other sources of "facts" about international affairs, the IC is at no risk of losing this business area. There are a couple of reasons for this. No one else can come close in responsiveness or comprehensiveness. Moreover, the proliferation of sources actually adds to the policymaker's difficulty in tracking them all and figuring out which ones are important. In this sense, there is a real need we can fill--monitoring and filtering this intimidating flow of information--and thus offering one-stop shopping for the policymaker when he needs an unbiased account of what is out there. I have heard it said that this area is not CIA's business, that we should concentrate on intelligence and let others provide the data that are available from other, more open sources. I would argue that we should recognize this as a business area where CIA and the other members of the IC have real competitive advantage. Senior policymakers need our help, and no one else outside the IC can come close to providing the quality of support that we can provide.

Essential Analysis. I have heard CIA analysts complain that senior policymakers want our information but do not really want our analysis. This is not the case. For a variety of reasons, they need and want our analysis--background and context, assessment of the evidence, and implications--as much as the facts themselves. One of the requests I fielded most often was from senior officials who already had some piece of information or reporting and wanted our help in assessing it validity, importance, and context.

While our analysis is wanted, I was often reminded, during my time in the Department, that it is not always highly regarded. In some cases, complaints about the quality of our analysis may disguise unhappiness that our conclusions conflict with the policymaker's agenda. But other barriers of our own making sometimes stand in the way of our analysis being taken seriously. It comes down to what might be summed up as expertise. In offering analysis, we are competing with academics, think tanks, journalists, and the policymakers themselves who have extensive background, language training, and time on the ground in their area of responsibility. In this situation, it is difficult for intelligence analysts who cannot demonstrate the same background, expertise, and time on the ground to be taken seriously. I left the Department reinforced in the belief that the renewed emphasis that the DI is putting on building expertise and augmenting language skills is vital to our future.

Stronger Community Partnerships. Advancing these objectives will not be possible without stronger partnerships with some of our IC colleagues, especially in light of the limits that prevent our throwing more resources at the problem. There is certainly a substantial amount of cooperation already: as far as CIA and State go, for instance, my INR colleagues and I worked hard at making our relationship a cooperative one on a daily basis. But there are many missed opportunities for greater cooperation. INR and CIA are at the moment far from thinking and acting as partners in providing top-quality intelligence to senior customers at State. This situation is the result of the current structure of relationships. Stronger partnership with INR is one way for CIA to make progress toward better serving senior customers at State, and certainly a necessary route to gaining acceptance for a larger number of Agency officers serving in capacities similar to mine. INR officers could in some places substitute for DI officers as CIA's forward observers in State bureaus, facilitating CIA as well as INR support and providing the Agency the kind of daily feedback that we need to stay relevant.

Early Bird Service. Serving on the frontlines at State also gives one some perspective on the ongoing discussion about the need for a "24-hour" DI. The biggest window for direct intelligence support in the office of the Ambassador-at-Large is first thing in the morning, when the Ambassador and his deputies look for an update on developments in "their" part of the world. The SEIB and the INR *Summary* are part of that support, but each day a large share of the need is for an update on events that develop in the region after the SEIB and the INR summary have gone to press. Because of the current publication cycle, the working day in most countries in the area of responsibility of the bureau for the former Soviet states starts in the middle of the night and is just about to wrap up by the time our policymakers come into the office. Early each morning, I found myself scrambling with phone calls and e-mail to put together a morning update on the latest developments for my principals. Sometimes, the quality of this support depended on my ability, flying solo, to monitor Russian television news programs on the State grid and to add my own interpretation. Gratifying perhaps, but not ideal and sustainable in the long run.

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This sometimes frenetic early-morning routine convinced me of the potential value of extended hours of operation that would allow CIA to fulfill this customer need for such support in a higher quality fashion than I could operating on an ad hoc basis. This does not necessarily mean a round-the-clock operation. Even a shift to earlier morning hours for at least part of the analytic corps could add significant value to what I and other CIA representatives can now offer.

An Even Greater Effort

Our goal should be to provide support to senior policymakers so timely, relevant, and essential to their agenda that they will seek us out to acquire it. The reality is that we too often have to work hard just to get them to pay attention. Making our products and services irresistible will require devoting even more effort, energy, and resources to the problem of direct customer support.

The DCI's Strategic Direction lays out essential steps to improving the quality of our analysis and operations. But his initiative will have been in vain if we do not give equal priority to identifying and implementing actions that will ensure the analysis we produce adds essential value for those customers the CIA was established to serve. They will sit still for a CIA memorandum or briefing only if it is clear that what they will get out of it is essential to their agenda.

Senior policymakers need our help, and no one else outside the IC can come close to providing the quality of support that we can provide.

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US Coast Guard At Work

Maritime Counternarcotics Operations (U)

Lt. M. W. Raymond

On 25 July 1995, an extensive multi-agency intelligence effort prompted the USS Cape St. George with a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment aboard to intercept the fishing vessel Nataly I that was suspected of trafficking a multiton shipment of cocaine from South America to Mexico. Sending a Coast Guard team to board the vessel was to be the culmination of the cooperative effort, and a record-breaking seizure was anticipated. After a two-day search using all types of inspection techniques, the boarding team discovered the first of what turned out to be more than 12 tons of cocaine in two hidden compartments[1] within the vessel's fuel tanks. Many in the Coast Guard and in the Intelligence Community (IC) wondered why it took so long to find such a large amount of cocaine on a 112-foot fishing vessel.[2]

The case of the Nataly I is just one example of how the use of hidden compartments by maritime narcotics traffickers continues to frustrate counternarcotics efforts by law enforcement agencies. The hidden compartments being used today reflect a higher degree of complexity and intricacy and the application of greater resources. Law enforcement officers search for today's sophisticated hidden compartments with many of the same techniques that have only slightly improved over the past several decades. Rather than simply responding to the traffickers' advances, a new examination is needed to re-engineer the process of detecting hidden compartments.

A Longstanding Problem

For more than 200 years, the Coast Guard and other law enforcement agencies have faced the problem of hidden compartments. The Revenue Cutter Service, as the Coast Guard was known before 1916, was created in 1790 specifically to halt maritime smuggling and to enforce customs laws and regulations. During the 1930s, the Coast Guard was called on to enforce Prohibition in what is commonly called the Rum War. Since 1970, the Coast Guard and other law enforcement agencies have been targeted against all types of smuggling ranging from weapons to luxuries to illegal alcohol. Throughout all these efforts, the Coast Guard repeatedly sought to discover hidden compartments.

In the 1970s, the smuggling of marijuana from South America to the United States greatly increased. Due to lax law enforcement efforts, the traffickers initially smuggled their marijuana in converted fishing vessels, making little attempt to conceal their contraband. As the Coast Guard increased its efforts, the traffickers shifted to smaller loads and instituted better methods of concealment.

The marijuana traffickers' initial concealment efforts appear rudimentary when compared to some of the methods used today. The traffickers first tried to make their fishing vessels appear more legitimate. The marijuana was often wrapped in plastic and hidden under fish and ice in their fish holds. If law enforcement officers boarded their vessel, the traffickers hoped that the boarding teams would not look under the fish and that the fish odor would mask the smell of the marijuana. This method became less effective as the Coast Guard took on more fisheries law enforcement responsibilities and subsequently

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became more proficient in inspecting fishing holds and catches during boardings.

Fishing vessel Nataly I. Photo courtesy of the US Coast Guard. (U)

With the decrease in the amount of marijuana being smuggled in each individual load, the traffickers also used the construction of hidden compartments within their vessels. They often sectioned off compartments of the vessel or constructed false bulkheads to create dead space[3] for concealing their contraband. The newly constructed bulkhead was then disguised to match the remainder of the compartment. Traffickers often used the dead spaces in living areas such as underneath the crew's berthing and behind closets. The large amount of wood paneling within the living areas on coastal freighters created many opportunities to construct hidden compartments. New carpet, linoleum, and even galley appliances frequently hid the accesses to hidden compartments. The traffickers also used fuel and water tanks to conceal their contraband. Initially, they completely converted tanks to hold marijuana, but, as law enforcement efforts began to "sound" fuel and water tanks and to open their access covers, the traffickers improved their methods to make the tanks look legitimate.

Cocaine bales seized aboard the Nataly I. Photo courtesy of the US Coast Guard. (U)

Hidden compartments were also constructed on pleasure craft such as sport fishers, sailing vessels, and cabin cruisers. Because of the large number of similar vessels, they blended in well with normal maritime traffic patterns and were less likely to be boarded. These vessels contained all types of nooks and crannies that could be used as hidden compartments. Once the traffickers stored their contraband within a space, they installed new fiberglass to cover it. They painted the new fiberglass to match its surroundings, and they concealed their work behind the vessel's furnishings or under carpeting. While these hidden compartments concealed less contraband than those on larger vessels, they were much less likely to be detected.

In the early 1980s, the dramatic increase in cocaine trafficking from South America brought new challenges in the efforts to detect hidden compartments. Cocaine has a much greater value, and a much smaller amount of cocaine than marijuana could be smuggled while still achieving a similar, if not greater, amount of profit. Small compartments and parasitic containers that previously could not be used to conceal marijuana profitably could now be used to hide cocaine. In addition, cocaine could also be concealed in areas not previously considered, such as inside compressed air and propane tanks.

Creative Concealment

To further disguise their hidden compartments, traffickers have often used imaginative ploys to make the search as inconvenient as possible. For example, Haitian narcotic traffickers commonly place Santeria-based[4] religious displays near their hidden compartments. These displays typically contain crucifixes, voodoo altars and dolls, candles, incense, spices, and herbs. The traffickers believe these displays will protect their contraband, and they also know that boarding teams hesitate to tamper with religious objects.[5]

In addition, the areas to be searched are often made as distasteful as possible. Staterooms are covered with dirty laundry, foul-smelling (and seasick-inducing) foods are cooked in the galley, and engineering spaces are hot and filthy. The bilges of an engine room usually contain several feet of murky oil and water mixtures. Fish holds often contain thousands of pounds of fish that have to be moved to inspect the compartment fully. Even sewage tanks have been found to contain hidden compartments or to conceal the access to hidden compartments.[6]

Checking Measurements and Using Dogs

One of the most effective tools for locating hidden compartments is the process of conducting a complete space accountability [7] of the vessel. False bulkheads and hidden compartments within paneling are best discovered through the process of admeasurement. The internal measurements of a compartment

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are taken and compared with the external measurements to determine discrepancies. On smaller vessels, this process can be conducted quickly.

This process can become more complicated, depending on the size of the vessel, the number of levels and compartments it contains, and the amount of cargo that interferes with the measurement. A thorough space accountability inspection of a 150-foot coastal freighter can take days. When boarding teams determine there is a possible discrepancy in the measurements, often the only way to resolve the discrepancy is to conduct an intrusive search and access the bulkhead. This usually involves drilling a hole with a power drill and inserting a bore scope to inspect the space.

Law enforcement agencies often have also used dogs to locate narcotics. Although often successful on land, the dogs do not always adapt well to the marine environment, and the logistics of transporting the dog to a suspect vessel can be difficult. As a result, canine units are used primarily on suspect vessels brought into ports for more in-depth inspections. Even then, their effectiveness is decreased by the traffickers' use of airtight packaging and the planting of false scents such as coffee grounds, fabric softener sheets, diesel fuel, and commercially available dog repellents.

Current Challenges

Recent trends show that talented craftsmen are constructing hidden compartments and disguising the possible indicators. A better constructed hidden compartment often leaves less space missing during the admeasurement process. While a foot or more of missing space may quickly arouse suspicion, the boarding officer may attribute only 3 or 4 inches of unaccounted for space to insulation within the bulkheads. Depending on the height and width of a bulkhead, a discrepancy in the depth of a compartment of as little as a few inches can conceal a large amount of contraband.

Currently, the most challenging hidden compartments to locate are those concealed within fuel tanks. Because of the size of the tanks and difficulty in accessing them, it is hard to locate the hidden compartment without bringing the vessel into a port and emptying the tanks. The fuel has to be pumped from the tanks, and the space has to be certified to be gas free before the boarding team enters the space to inspect it. While the tactics for inspecting tanks are facilitated by smaller tanks or those with a large amount of contraband, they are often impractical when a small amount of contraband is hidden within a large tank.

The tanks on coastal freighters are normally irregular in shape, subdivided with baffles, and contain several thousand gallons of fuel, thereby making volume calculations extremely difficult. In addition, a compartment with 50 to 100 kilograms of cocaine will often displace only a small amount of the fluid in the tank. In this case, the only practical way to discover the compartment is to empty the tank and visually inspect its interior.

More Sophistication

Several seizures in the past few years show that the traffickers have taken the construction of hidden compartments to an even higher level of sophistication. The Coast Guard seized the coastal freighter Phoenix in December 1993 after an extensive dockside search ultimately located 1,031 kilograms of cocaine in a void constructed underneath and between two fuel and water tanks. The boarding team did not locate the hidden compartment until the water tank was emptied and a person was able to enter the tank. The boarding officer then used a pole to bang on the adjacent bulkhead in the fuel tank. When the crew member in the water tank could not hear the pole or feel the vibrations, it was determined there was a void between the two tanks not represented on an available set of the ship's drawings.

Once the boarding team believed there was unaccountable space, they found a narrow shaft leading down between the two tanks. A well-disguised weld was found at the top of the shaft exposing the compartments. At the bottom of the shaft, another welded plate was disguised with paint and an oily water mixture. This weld eventually led to the void containing the cocaine. The entire compartment required extensive modifications to the vessel; without prior intelligence, it would have been extremely

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difficult to detect.[8]

The seizure of the sailing vessel Michael Angelo in November 1995 is another example of the current high quality of workmanship. The 50-foot-long catamaran contained four hidden compartments that held more than 2.5 metric tons of cocaine. Two of the hidden compartments were in the forward portions of the hulls, and they were disguised to look like floatation chambers with the fiberglass coating identical to the fiberglass in the rest of the compartment. When the Coast Guard boarding team grew suspicious and used a power drill to access the space, it initially discovered only foam, which bolstered the master's claim that the compartment was designed to improve the vessel's buoyancy. Fortunately, the boarding team had a long drill bit that went through 4 inches of the foam to reach what ultimately was determined to be cocaine.

The boarding team discovered the other two hidden compartments on the Michael Angelo behind the woodwork in two of the vessel's staterooms. The intricateness of the woodwork and the lack of any apparent access disguised the hidden compartment. In addition, the interior of the compartments was covered with carpet to lead anyone drilling from above to believe that they had drilled into a living space.[9]

In November 1992, the sailing vessel Vigil was seized for smuggling 417 kilograms of cocaine in a series of hidden compartments created within a second hull constructed outside the original hull. The double hull went undetected until the vessel was directed into the US Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and pulled from the water. The traffickers had installed the hidden compartments on both sides of the vessel, with each adding only 5 inches to the beam of the vessel and running 38 inches down the hull. The fiberglass coating on the second hull matched the original hull, and it completely hid where the two sections of the hull met under the water line. On the deck of the sailing vessel, the accesses to the hidden compartments were covered with aluminum plates and concealed with rubber decking. Further disguising the hidden compartment, the vessel's lifeline supports were attached above the rubber matting.[10]

Improving Intelligence Cuing

As traditional boarding procedures locate fewer hidden compartments, intelligence cuing becomes more crucial to the success of maritime counternarcotics efforts. With the fusing of information from a variety of sources, the boarding officer charged with searching for contraband can begin with several clues. To assist the boarding officer, these improvements can best be accomplished by educating intelligence professionals concerning hidden compartments and the ways their intelligence reporting can be expanded. More specific intelligence cuing can be a valuable tool for overcoming the growing complexities of hidden compartments.

Sketch of sailing vessel Vigil. Photo courtesy of the US Coast Guard. (U)

Intelligence reporting that states precisely where the contraband is located is rare. Typically, intelligence concerning a suspect vessel merely states that the vessel is believed to be carrying contraband, but it gives no specific location. While this information helps to locate the vessel, it contributes little once a boarding team is on board and begins its search. As the Nataly I case demonstrates, it still took the boarding team two days to find the 12 tons of cocaine--an unusually large amount. Typically, the amount of contraband is several hundred pounds.

Knowing that contraband is on board does not provide enough information to ensure that a seizure will be made. Without an exact location, intelligence that helps to narrow the focus of the boarding ***team's search is vital.***

Helpful Information

There are various types of information about the concealment of contraband, other than its actual

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location, that can narrow the search. If it is known whether the contraband was loaded at sea or is scheduled to be transferred to another vessel at sea, it could be easier to discover and seize the contraband. This information can help rule out a hidden compartment that could only be detected in a shipyard. If the contraband was brought on board first, the contraband probably would be hidden in a compartment under the cargo or in a fuel tank. If the contraband was brought on board afterward, it makes it physically more difficult to hide it in such compartments.

Other important pieces of information include the manner in which a hidden compartment is constructed, the craftsmen who constructed it, and the materials used. While it may not be possible to know exactly where a hidden compartment is located, this type of information helps to focus the boarding team's search. This information could include whether the vessel was recently in a shipyard undergoing modifications or whether a craftsman suspected of modifying other suspect vessels worked on the vessel. In addition, merely knowing what materials were used to construct the hidden compartment can give the boarding team important indicators to look for while conducting its search.

Cocaine discovered during search of s/v Vigil. Photo courtesy of the US Coast Guard. (U)

One of the greatest obstacles to improve intelligence cuing is the fact that a large majority of the intelligence professionals who work maritime narcotics trafficking issues are not fully aware of the complexities involved with hidden compartments. A better knowledge of what constitutes a hidden compartment, combined with knowing what information law enforcement officers want, ideally will lead to more specific and helpful intelligence cuing. In many cases, more specific information is available, but it is not recognized as important. Intelligence that narrows the search can come from archival research, previous boardings and seizures, related cases, and confidential informants. The key is for intelligence professionals to understand the hidden compartment problem, appreciate the types of cuing that would assist boarding teams, and know which sources of information are available.

Not Enough Expertise

One reason that intelligence professionals do not report more specifically on maritime trafficking is that there is a lack of knowledge concerning specific smuggling techniques and the intelligence cuing that could help detect them. These professionals, outside the other law enforcement agencies, usually do not have prior experience with narcotics-related intelligence. If the law enforcement agencies want better and more specific intelligence, they need to do a better job of educating the intelligence professionals concerning their needs.[11]

While education concerning the intricacies of hidden compartments is crucial, the analysts also have to understand the vast array of information available concerning suspected vessels and their crewmembers. Most vessels have a past history of being used to traffic narcotics. In fact, there are many vessels that have been repeatedly seized over the past 20 years only to be sold at auction or returned to their owners after paying a fine.

In addition, intelligence professionals need to look for connections between vessels suspected of smuggling narcotics. Vessels controlled by the same organizations often will have similar hidden compartments. If the craftsmen who constructed a hidden compartment can be identified, additional vessels they have worked on can be potentially identified and tracked. An example of this type of linkage is the Michael Angelo and a similar catamaran, Maria del Mar, which had hidden compartments in the same locations. Both vessels were owned by the same organization, and the same shipyard made their modifications. It was a case of combining the available information and then looking for connections between the different suspect vessels.[12]

A significant problem with accessing this array of archival information is that it is spread over many databases with no one person or agency able to access all of them. These databases contain a wide assortment of information from the Federal, state, and local levels; they include historical case files, message traffic, criminal records, commercial information, and registration files.

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Tracking Vessel Modifications

When hidden compartments are constructed, no matter how well the installation was done, the structure of the vessel has been altered. The key is to determine the original structure of the vessel, track the modifications made to the vessel over time, and then be able to present this information to the boarding team.

Coastal freighter undergoing a weeklong search at the US Navel Station. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Photo courtesy of the US Coast Guard. (U)

The best picture that can be given to the boarding team is a copy of the ship's plans, which are the blueprint for the vessel and provide an important map for the boarding team to follow. Most plans are presented in several views and give a spatial view of the entire ship that allows a better look at the relationships between compartments. Plans often include measurements that can be checked against the current layout of the vessel. While many of the suspect vessels can be more than 40 years old and have been modified many times over the years, the blueprints provide a good place for the boarding teamto begin.

The seizure of the coastal freighter Phoenix demonstrates the advantage that a copy of the ship's plans brings to a search. After approximately a day of searching for the suspected hidden compartment, the Customs Service agents working with the Coast Guard received a copy of the Phoenix's plans from one of their offices. The plans were instrumental in the space accountability inspection that led to the discovery of two hidden compartments under and between the fuel and water tanks.[13]

A long-term objective should be to create a library of ships' plans for suspect vessels. This would require an extensive effort to collect these plans from routine boardings, various databases, and previous seizures. During the postseizure collection and analysis, a trained intelligence officer searches the entire vessel for important clues. The vessel's blueprints are often located during these searches, and the blueprints are added to the postseizure case file. Once collected, these plans would need to be digitized and electronically entered into a database to allow the plans to be pulled by teams preparing to board a suspect vessel.[14]

Even vessels that have not been seized before have likely been boarded many times by the Coast Guard and Customs Service in the past 25 years. Frequently, individual vessels are boarded multiple times during a one-year period. During each of these boardings, the team has the opportunity to inspect the vessel and report any suspicious areas. Often, a hidden compartment may be located, but, because the vessel was not carrying contraband on that particular voyage, the vessel was not seized. While it is a violation of US law for a US-registered vessel to possess a hidden compartment, even if empty, the United States is unable to enforce these laws on foreign-flagged vessels on the high seas. These suspicions can be documented only in Intelligence Information Reports to allow future boarding teams to learn from the previous discovery.

Using Scientific and Technical Intelligence

As hidden compartments become more difficult to locate, the use of scientific and technical intelligence to find them and the contraband they contain becomes more important. And new technology is being applied to locating narcotics concealed in hidden compartments. The deception used in hidden compartments primarily involves visual deception that can be countered with scientific and technical intelligence applications. These technologies either detect abnormalities in the ship's construction or actually detect the contraband. With legal and operational constraints limiting the scope of boardings at sea, the use of new technologies allows portions of a vessel to be inspected without harming the vessel and decreasing the duration of the boarding. The challenge is to identify these new technologies and apply them in ways that can be upheld in courts of law.

Much of the scientific and technical intelligence being used to aid in finding contraband was not

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originally designed for the maritime counternarcotics mission. There are many constraining factors that have to be considered when a certain type of technology is considered. The maritime counternarcotics mission is a unique effort and is not always compatible with the uses found in other parts of the government or in the commercial sector. The technology has to be portable, able to withstand the harsh maritime environment, and be cost effective. Such serious obstacles often limit promising ideas.

Technological Tools

Two general devices are used to locate hidden contraband. They first look for the contraband and its residue that may be scattered throughout the vessel. They are comparable to a drug-sniffing dog in that they seek to locate the actual contraband. The second type of device helps look through objects to determine what is inside. They can allow the inspector to determine what is in the interior of areas such as fuel tanks and bulkheads without resorting to intrusive searches. The results of these tests narrow the scope of the search to those areas of the vessel that are most likely to contain contraband.

One promising new innovation is the IONSCAN, which is a highly precise piece of test equipment originally designed to detect explosives. Once it was identified as a potential tool, the Coast Guard Research and Development Center reconfigured it to detect trace amounts of illegal narcotics within vessels, automobiles, and cargo containers. Narcotics leave an invisible but measurable amount of residue on every surface with which they come in contact. Swatches of test paper are used to sample surfaces and people's skin that may have narcotic residue. When the swatch is tested using the IONSCAN, a reading is given on a computer terminal that indicates the concentration of the sample. The higher the concentration, the more recently the object or person was in contact with the narcotic. The IONSCAN has been shown to be more sensitive than canine detection units, and it is not affected by scents planted to confuse dogs.[15]

Random IONSCAN test samples can be taken in large numbers during the inspection of merchant vessels suspected of smuggling narcotics. The samples are taken from areas throughout the vessel, and the locations are recorded. Once the samples are tested using the IONSCAN, the results are noted on a sketch of the vessel corresponding to the location where they were taken. Using the diagram of the different concentrations of contraband as a map, the boarding team can better focus its search. The areas with the highest concentrations are most likely to be near where the contraband is hidden or along the contraband's on-load route. This technique has allowed boarding teams to reduce the number of areas of the vessel needed to be closely scrutinized, and it has led to the discovery of the contraband concealed in elaborate hidden compartments.[16]

The IONSCAN is also used to connect suspected traffickers to the seized contraband. When a hidden compartment is located and the contraband is seized, it frequently is difficult to determine legally which of the vessel's crew were involved in smuggling. Routinely after a seizure, some or all of the vessel's crew are acquitted at trial because the defendants denied any knowledge of the smuggling, and the government could not legally demonstrate each individual's connection to the contraband. Positive IONSCAN test results taken from the suspects' skin can now be used to identify which members of the crew handled the contraband.

Density meters are the most common type of technology used to inspect objects or structures that could contain hidden compartments. They are hand-held devices that emit radiated gamma energy into the object over which they are passed. The greater the density of the material within the object, the higher the amount of gamma energy that will be reflected back into the device. The measured density is displayed on an LCD display. The resulting density measurements are then studied to determine if there are abnormalities that would indicate whether the object being inspected has been modified. Contraband concealed within a bulkhead would give a different density than the normal construction of a bulkhead.

Use of X-rays

The X-ray devices commonly used in airports and at cargo ports are similar to density meters. The

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Customs Service uses X-ray devices in their cargo inspections to allow an inspector to examine the interior of an object without opening it. Large boxes, crates, and even bins of fruit are forklifted onto X-ray machines allowing their interior contents to be inspected. The Customs Service has installed a large X-ray machine in Arizona that can X-ray an entire cargo container.

While these X-ray machines are only used ashore with bulk cargo, they demonstrate the potential for portable shipboard use. The challenge is to design portable X-ray devices that can be carried on boardings and be used to inspect areas that otherwise cannot be inspected without a destructive search.

Countermeasures

Once these devices are mass-marketed, the traffickers will likely purchase the devices and test them to discover their limitations and to develop countermeasures. While the technology eventually might be defeated, it does require the traffickers to react constantly and to try to conceal their contraband in smaller amounts and in more expensive locations. And there is another serious obstacle to applying new technology. While a promising technology may be available within other parts of the government, the program's classification may be so sensitive that its employment restricts its use. Procedures used during a search have to be openly disclosed to the defense during the criminal prosecution. If these devices cannot be demonstrated in court and adequate legal protections cannot conceal their use, then the device will not be able to be widely used. This in turn makes it unlikely that the devices will be distributed to operational units.

New Approach Needed

Today's narcotics traffickers are engaged in a multibillion-dollar trade that knows no limit as to the amount of money and technology dedicated to concealing their contraband. Their efforts cannot be solely countered with the same techniques that have slowly evolved over the past several decades. The IC's experience with camouflage, concealment, and deception theory provides a framework for examining the problem of hidden compartments with a more appropriate perspective and offers methods for countering hidden compartments. A reengineered strategy, well grounded in tactical deception theory, would allow the United States to improve its intelligence cuing, refine its ability to track modifications made to suspect vessels, and make better use of scientific and technical intelligence to locate hidden compartments. The implementation of such a strategy would go a long way toward ensuring that even the most advanced hidden compartments are located.

Notes

1 Hidden compartments are portions of a vessel constructed or modified for the purpose of illegally smuggling something into or out of a country.

2 Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, Washington, DC, to Defense Intelligence Agency and others, IR 4 112 0003 95, subject: "Post-Seizure Analysis of Seized Narcotic Vessel Nataly I, FDIN 95-069933," 111323Z September 1995.

3 Dead space is unused space within bulkheads and decks that usually cannot be accessed. It can be a product of the vessel's design in which a use could not be found for the space. An example of this type of dead space is where a perpendicular bulkhead meets the curvature of the vessel's hull. The space between the hull and the bulkhead is unusable and simply sealed off. Dead space can also be purposely created with false bulkheads or decks.

4 Santeria is a Caribbean religion that combines elements of Roman Catholicism with African voodoo.

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[5] US Coast Guard Maritime Intelligence Center (MARINCEN) Maritime Smuggling Techniques Report 2-94, Haitian Freighters (Miami, FL: US Coast Guard MARINCEN, 19 August 1994), pp. 10, 12, 22.

[6] US MARINCEN, Maritime Smuggling Techniques Report 3-92, S/V Blue Whale (Miami, FL: US Coast Guard MARINCEN, 20 July 1992), pp. 4-5.

[7] Space accountability is the process of verifying the content of all the space within a vessel to ensure there are no hidden compartments. One-hundred percent space accountability is usually not possible unless the vessel is brought pier-side for a several-day-long comprehensive search.

[8] MARINCEN, Maritime Smuggling Techniques Report 1-94, M/V Phoenix (BH), (Miami, FL: MARINCEN, 11 January 1994), pp. 1-6.

[9] 9.S/V Michael Angelo, produced by Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) 5D, 16 minutes, 22 November 1995, videocassette.

[10] MARINCEN, Maritime Smuggling Techniques Report 1-93, S/V Vigil, (Miami, FL: MARINCEN, 19 March 1993), pp. 2-7.

[11] Lt. Cdr. Robert M. Dean, USCG, J-232, Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) East, interview by author, 5 June 1996.

[12] "Authorities Detain Cali Cartel's Jose Castrillon Henao" (text), PA 1904020596 Panama City Circuito RPC Television, 18 April 1996.

[13] Lt. Christopher J. Tomney, USCG, Chief, Coast Guard Operational Intelligence School, interview by author, 22 March 1996.

[14] Capt. Thomas Brown, USN, Director, J-3, Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) East, interview by author, 5 June 1996.

[15] US Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Security, Hearing on Drug Interdiction, Hearings 104th Congress, 1st session, 28 June 1995, pp. 32-35.

[16] Ibid., pp. 33-34.

Lt. M. W. Raymond is a member of the US Coast Guard.

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Determining the Cost and the Burden

Analyzing Soviet Defense Programs, 1951-1990 (U)

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From the early days of the Cold War, the economic potential of the Soviet Union was a prime intelligence question. In 1951, Max Millikan, the first director of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) in CIA, identified five objectives for foreign economic intelligence in support of US national security:

- Estimating the magnitude of potential military threats to the United States and its allies by calculating the level of military operations a potential enemy's economy could sustain.
- Estimating the character and location of future military threats by examining how the potential enemy is allocating its resources.
- Assisting in judging the intentions of a potential enemy by monitoring changes in its economic policies.
- Helping policymakers to reduce possible military threats by telling them how economic measures could impair a potential enemy's economic capabilities.
- Assisting in the estimation of probable development of the relative strength of the East and West blocs in the near term, assuming hostilities are avoided.[1]

When Millikan formulated these objectives, the Korean war was on, and the possibility of conflict with the USSR was real. At the same time, knowledge of the Soviet economy was sketchy. As Millikan put it, his office in the first half of 1951 "was engaged in taking an inventory of its ignorance concerning the economy of the Soviet Bloc."[2] Soviet economic statistics were of little help. Publication of detailed statistics had ceased for all practical purposes after World War II. Data on national aggregates such as national income or industrial production greatly exaggerated real growth, while information on defense outlays was limited to a single line of uncertain coverage in the state budget.

Within a few years, dozens of analysts were focused on putting together a picture of the Soviet economy industry by industry. The military economics branch in ORR tried to estimate Soviet defense spending. Another branch began reconstructing Soviet national accounts and compiling independent estimates of real growth in the components of GNP--industrial and agricultural production, consumption, and investment.

Building-Block Measures

Such was the beginning of CIA's building-block measures of Soviet national output and defense expenditures. Essentially, this approach meant compiling estimates from the ground up by filling in the empty boxes in accounting frameworks encompassing Soviet defense-related economic activity and total economic activity. The work on Soviet GNP was able to borrow heavily from the pioneering work carried out at Columbia, the RAND Corporation, and Harvard by a group of specialists on the Soviet

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economy. The effort to cost Soviet defense programs, on the other hand, had to start essentially from scratch by assembling information on all the physical measures of defense activity and multiplying them by the estimated costs of these activities.

These costs were then aggregated by military service; resource category (procurement, construction, personnel, operations and maintenance, and R&D); and military mission (strategic offense and defense, general purpose forces, and command and general support). Thus, the Agency came to grips with Millikan's second objective for foreign economic intelligence--information on how a potential enemy was allocating its resources. Soviet GNP and defense programs were valued in rubles to assess Soviet decisions on the allocation of resources and to measure real growth in defense and in dollars to permit comparisons with the GNP and defense programs of the United States and other countries.

Building an Evidentiary Base

The evidentiary base for the defense and GNP estimates at first varied greatly but improved considerably over time. After the mid-1950s, a great deal of information relevant to the GNP calculations became available. By the mid-1960s, the methodology and the data were available to estimate GNP by sector of origin and end use in 1955 ruble prices and in current prices and to compare US and Soviet GNP in both ruble and dollar prices. From then until the breakup of the Soviet Union, the estimates were almost continuously reviewed and improved, but these were variations on a theme and not radical new departures. Throughout their history, the estimates of real growth in GNP rested on the premise that while Soviet value statistics--that is, the ruble value of industrial output were badly flawed, statistics on physical output--tons of steel, square meters of cotton fabric--were sufficiently reliable to support the building-block approach.

The evidence for the defense estimates was quite different. National intelligence collection provided the information on Soviet defense production and procurement and order of battle, and this information became increasingly accurate after the early 1960s with each enhancement in US overhead reconnaissance capabilities. But operating rates, maintenance practices, and the like had to be estimated by a variety of methods, and the acquisition of several Soviet maintenance manuals helped. Identifying the resources committed to military R&D, however, was a problem until almost the end of CIA's costing effort. For most of the period, military R&D had to be inferred from a small sample of Soviet statistics on the financing of science. In the 1980s, an effort to build an R&D estimate from the bottom up by collecting intelligence on more than a thousand Soviet R&D establishments finally succeeded--and reduced the previous estimate of its growth of military R&D markedly.

Finding prices to attach to the estimates of military activity was another problem. Prices were generally available for military pay and allowances and other personnel costs. Defector reports supplied the information on military pay in rubles, and US dollar pay rates for equivalent ranks or occupational specialties were obtained from the Pentagon. Ruble and dollar prices for much of operations and maintenance (O&M) and construction could be found in Soviet publications and in CIA research on the relative ruble and dollar costs of the different kinds of construction work and some of O&M. During the 1970s and early 1980s, a large number of contracts with US defense firms provided estimates of the dollar cost of manufacturing most of the more expensive items in the Soviet procurement and spare parts accounts. Intelligence on ruble prices was scarce, however. Not until the 1980s had enough ruble prices been collected to firm up the ruble estimates of Soviet military procurement and the maintenance part of O&M.

The question of what to include in the definition of defense outlays was an issue from the beginning. For comparisons with US programs, the Soviet activities were selected to match as well as possible US spending on Department of Defense (DoD) national security programs, defense-related nuclear activities of the Coast Guard, and the present value costs of retirement, disability, and survivors' benefits for active-duty military personnel. When estimating the cost of Soviet military programs, a broader definition was used, one that included civil defense troops, railroad troops, construction troops, MVD troops, and civilian space outlays.

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Figure 1. Soviet GNP and defense outlays, 1950-90 (1982 rubles). (U)

What the Estimates Showed

It is instructive to review what CIA's defense spending and GNP estimates, as they matured in the late 1980s, suggest about the relation between defense and the economy in the postwar USSR. The first thing to look at are the estimates of Soviet defense spending and GNP in 1982 rubles (Figure 1). If prices of an earlier year are used, the rates of growth of both defense and GNP would be marginally lower and the ratio of defense to GNP a bit higher, but the overall picture would be much the same. In constant 1982 prices, the share of defense in GNP declines from 24 percent in 1951 to 14 percent in 1959. It then varies only within the range of 14 to 16 percent between 1960 and 1990. This calculation provoked a good deal of controversy over the years as it was taken to represent the burden of defense on the Soviet economy.

One can isolate different stages in the growth of Soviet defense spending and relate them to developments in the economy generally. The building-block estimates set out in considerable detail the changes in the composition of GNP or defense spending. This detail permitted analysis of changes in the USSR's economic policy--the third of Max Millikan's objectives for US foreign economic intelligence. The average annual rates of growth shown for defense in Figure 1 certainly do not reflect the monotonic rapid growth that is perhaps the prevailing public perception. Meanwhile, the continuous decline in the rate of growth of GNP suggests the underlying forces that led Soviet leaders to constrain defense spending and finally caused Gorbachev to introduce his ill-fated reforms.

The immediate explanation of the changes in the growth of defense spending are complicated, but a few of the prime movers can be identified. In the 1950s, Khrushchev's demobilization was the major factor. In the 1960s, defense spending grew rapidly, propelled by growth in procurement of missiles, ships and submarines, space vehicles, and aircraft as well as the post-Khrushchev buildup in general purpose forces. Thereafter, the growth of defense subsided as procurement increased less rapidly in 1970-74 and then leveled off in 1975-84. Outlays for O&M and R&D continued to rise, although at a slower pace then formerly. After Gorbachev came to power, there was a three-year acceleration in defense spending marked by a spurt in outlays for aircraft and missiles, and then a sharp decline in defense, spurred by a downturn in outlays for aircraft, land arms, and space-related equipment.

Figure 2. Dollar cost of US and Soviet military programs, 1951-64 (1972 dollars). (U)

At minimum, the trends described in Soviet defense spending suggest some questions for historical research on Soviet military policy during the Cold War. For example:

- Was the slower growth in real defense spending after 1975--and the plateau in procurement--the result of conscious policy decisions? If so, what was the cause?
- What role did the US defense buildup beginning in the late 1970s play in the spurt in Soviet defense spending in 1985-87?

Interest in CIA's estimates of Soviet defense outlays and GNP within the US Government and in Congress, however, centered more on the dollar comparisons than the ruble measures. Unfortunately, the records necessary to put the defense comparisons on a single-dollar price base are no longer available. Figure 2 shows the comparison of the dollar cost of Soviet and US defense programs from 1951-64 expressed in 1972 dollar prices, and Figure 3 covers the period 1965-89 in 1988 dollars. According to these comparisons, the cost of US defense programs exceeded the dollar equivalent of Soviet programs by roughly one-fifth in the earlier period, while the dollar equivalent of Soviet military spending in 1965-89 was slightly greater than US spending.

In the 1980s, some variants of these comparisons were constructed--one to take in a broader definition of national security outlays and another to construct a NATO-Warsaw Pact comparison. The comparison expanded to include the so-called cost of empire, civil defense, and the like pushed up Soviet spending relative to US outlays by a couple of percentage points in the 1980s, but the NATO-Warsaw Pact

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comparisons showed the dollar-equivalent cost of NATO defense programs 15 percent larger than Warsaw Pact programs over the period 1976-86.

Figure 3. Dollar cost of US and Soviet military programs, 1965-89 (1988 dollars). (U)

Comparisons of Soviet and US GNP first presented by CIA in the 1950s had a receptive audience, given the concern then that the Soviet Union was on its way to overtaking the United States in the economic realm. When DCI Allen Dulles testified before Congress in 1959, he projected Soviet GNP growth through 1965 at 6 percent per year and industrial growth at 8 to 9 percent per year. These rates, he said, would raise Soviet GNP to about 55 percent of the US level by 1970 and Soviet industrial production to perhaps 60 percent of the US level. Dulles concluded by saying:

> *The Communists are not about to inherit the world economically. But while we debunk the distortions of their propaganda, we should frankly face up to the very sobering implications of the Soviets' economic program and the striking progress they made over the last decade.*[3]

The most recent CIA estimates of Soviet and US GNP show Soviet GNP rising from a little more than a third of US GNP in 1950 to a little less than half in 1965 to 60 percent in 1975 before falling to less than half in 1990. These calculations, which represent the geometric average of comparisons made alternatively in ruble and dollar prices, have been criticized as being overly generous to the Soviets, but subsequent research by Russian statisticians suggests that they are not badly out of line. The point is that, by the mid-1970s, it was clear from the Agency's publications that the fears of the USSR's becoming the foremost world economic power were unfounded. The dollar comparisons of Soviet and US GNP--and later of NATO and Warsaw Pact GNP--proved to be invaluable in forecasting the relative strengths of the East and West blocs--Millikan's fifth objective for the US Government's foreign economic intelligence.[4]

How the CIA Estimates Were Used

Analysis of Soviet economic prospects provided the framework for analysis of the Soviet economy both in the US Government and in the academic community after the original partners--Harvard and the RAND Corporation--left the field. In the early 1960s, the Agency's estimates disclosed a sharp slump in Soviet economic growth to a skeptical world. In December 1963, DCI John McCone told President Johnson and the NSC about the Agency's most recent assessment of the Soviet economy: economic growth had slowed drastically, and the USSR's grain and gold reserves were lower than previously estimated, accounting for Soviet attempts to find long-term credits in the West.

Gradually, the CIA estimates of slumping Soviet growth and then stagnation gained general acceptance. Between the early 1960s and the early 1980s, the few critics of the GNP estimates thought they understated Soviet achievements. Only recently have revisionist claims been heard that the CIA estimates overstated the rate of increase in Soviet GNP.

The Defense Spending Estimates

The focus of interest in CIA's estimates of Soviet defense spending shifted over time. During the 1950s, when the USSR's economy was on a roll and the Soviet armed forces were in the midst of a partial demobilization, Max Millikan's first objective of foreign economic intelligence had been met. The estimates of the cost of defense programs and the size of the Soviet economy demonstrated that the economy could continue to support the then existing level of defense effort and more.

Then, in the Kennedy administration, the Pentagon pressed hard for finer breakdowns of Soviet defense spending as an aid in defense planning. This was the era of cost effectiveness calculation in the DoD. Fred Kaplan, in his book *The Wizards of Armageddon*, describes the use of CIA's dollar estimates in Pentagon deliberations over a damage-limiting strategy to employ against Soviet strategic forces.[5] The calculations indicated that any combination of civil defense, an ABM system, and antibomber defense

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system was a losing proposition. As Kaplan put it, the studies showed:

> *For each extra dollar that the Soviets added to the attack forces, the US would have to spend $3 to protect 70 percent of its industry, $2 to save 60 percent ...and the same $1 to defend a mere 40 percent.*

Until the end of the Cold War, the DoD continued to be an eager customer for the estimates of the dollar equivalent of Soviet military programs. In 1977, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, in a memorandum to the DCI, declared that the reports and analysis being produced on military economics were "the basis of the comparative economic analysis employed by Defense." He added, "The dollar estimates provide the best, single aggregated measure of US and Soviet defense efforts."[6] In 1991, when CIA announced its intention to discontinue the dollar estimates, Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, wrote Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) John Helgerson "to urge that CIA continue its work on dollar cost estimates of Soviet defense programs."[7] Marshall supported his request by stating:

> *Dollar cost data has [sic] been the major foundation for my office's work on a military investment balance report that top defense officials have found very useful in characterizing broad trends in our security situation. For all its limitations as an indicator of the military balance, dollar costing allows dissimilar systems and activities to be aggregated so that broad trends in national military capabilities can be depicted. Moreover, some activities not ordinarily compared in "bean counts" can be measured in dollars, for example hardening and sheltering programs, or command, control, and communications activities. Even intangible factors such as training and readiness can be valued at the dollar cost of the activities that foster them.*

CIA analysts used the ruble estimates to help determine whether certain large Soviet military programs would be undertaken, and, if so, what the likely schedule would be. For example, an air defense analyst decided cost constraints would prevent the USSR from deploying more than 600 AMB launchers instead of the 6,000 sites then proposed by many in the Intelligence Community (IC).[8] CIA projections of certain large aircraft programs were also cost constrained.

As CIA's Office of Strategic Research (OSR) proceeded with its research on Soviet military spending, it found that, in the process of filling all the boxes in its accounting framework, it was uncovering information--as Marshall noted--on Soviet defense activities that had been neglected in intelligence analysis. It learned about operating rates and maintenance practices, which shed considerable light on Soviet military readiness. By contracting with US defense firms to provide dollar costs of Soviet weapons, OSR also learned a good bit about Soviet manufacturing technology and capabilities.

Perhaps the most visible contribution of the defense spending estimates, however, was to the debates over US defense budgets. The US-Soviet comparisons figured heavily in the presentations that successive presidential administrations made to Congress and the country. While Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger at the beginning of his 1975 annual report said that, "The Soviets now devote more resources than the United States in most of the significant categories of defense" and showed a chart comparing US and Soviet defense spending.[9] He emphasized even more strongly the adverse trends embodied in the spending estimates by telling the armed services committees, "If they continue to grow at 5 percent or 7 percent per annum, and we continue to shrink, then it is plain that sooner or later the divergence will become so great that we will be in very substantial trouble."[10]

Under Democratic administrations, the pitch was much the same. William Kaufman, a consultant to DoD through most of the 1970s, said that, beginning in 1973 and 1974, he "turned very strongly to the CIA estimates as a basis for indicating why the US defense budget ought to be increased."[11]

Thus, the US-Soviet defense comparisons were featured in DoD Congressional testimony, Defense posture statements, and in the DoD publication *Soviet Military Power*. The comparisons, however, lost their popularity when the dollar-equivalent cost of Soviet defense programs began to fall below the cost of US programs in the 1980s. Robert Gates, as DDI and later as Deputy Director of CIA, had long been

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skeptical of the dollar estimates and tried to abolish them in the early 1980s; pressure from consumers in the Pentagon and Congress, however, forced a resumption of the dollar costing. When Soviet military spending moved downward in the late 1980s, consumer demand for the dollar estimates weakened, and Agency managers decided the time was right to drop them.

Connection Between Defense Spending and the Economy

With the slowdown in Soviet economic growth, Max Millikan's first objective for foreign economic intelligence again came to the forefront--the calculation of how much military spending a potential enemy's economy could sustain. Generally, the Agency's economic and military analyses of the Soviet Union were imperfectly integrated. Even when they were, and when they highlighted economic pressures on Soviet military programs, there was great skepticism in the IC.

In 1964, 1976, and the early 1980s, the IC did focus on the question of economic constraints on Soviet defense spending. A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) was commissioned in 1964 following the turnaround in the analysis of Soviet economic prospects. After reviewing the deteriorating economic situation, it said there had been a "continuing struggle between those who believe that the national interest requires greater attention to an invigorated agriculture and those who oppose any weakening of the priority accorded the development of heavy industry and a preeminent defense establishment."[12] Khrushchev's plans for boosting the production of chemicals and consumer goods and an announced 4-percent reduction in its official defense budget convinced the US Intelligence Board that the USSR "would make every effort" to hold down outlays on defense and space. The estimate declared that, while defense outlays might decline, it was more likely that they would grow at a slower pace.[13] In any case, Khruschev was ousted within the year, and the decade of the 1960s produced the highest average annual growth in real Soviet defense expenditures in the postwar period.

In 1965, another NIE on Soviet defense policy argued that, even if defense outlays increased by 20 percent in the new five-year plan period (1966-70), the Soviet economy could shoulder the burden and at the same time gradually modernize Soviet industry and raise the population's standard of living.[14] It added, however, that defense programs would be "increasingly subjected" to reviews of their cost and effectiveness.

When Soviet economic growth slowed still more in the 1970s and CIA published an extremely pessimistic appraisal of Soviet economic prospects, the view that military programs were not threatened remained entrenched in CIA publications. Thus, a memorandum to holders of NIE 11-4-78 provided a grim description of the USSR's economic situation, including a "growing possibility of social instability," and reported that "if military spending continues to grow at 4 percent per year, the increment in national output going to defense could rise from 1/5 to as much as 3/4," severely limiting the leadership's scope for maneuver. Still, the "projection of Soviet military spending most consistent with available evidence suggests that pressures in favor of continuing the existing arms buildup are likely to offset any inclination toward change that might arise from the leadership's growing economic concerns." If necessary, "appeals to a more extreme patriotism" and "repressive measures" would be used to increase production and maintain domestic control in face of mounting military budgets.[15]

How tenuous the connection was between defense burden measures and CIA's projections of Soviet defense programs was apparent in the Agency's reaction to the abrupt increase in the estimate of Soviet defense outlays in 1976. Asked by Senator Charles Percy of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress how defense was impinging on the civilian economy and what effect growing consumer demands would have on an economy still spending so much on defense, the Agency replied:

> *The new CIA estimates of Soviet defense spending--50 to 55 billion rubles in 1975--have altered significantly our perceptions of the economic costs of the Soviet defense effort. Analysis of the complex issues of economic burden and resource allocations is still in its preliminary stage. However, it is clear that the Soviets are far more willing than we thought to forego growth in the civilian sector (and consumer satisfaction) in favor of expanding military capabilities.*

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The response went on to say that "there are no indications that the leadership has seriously considered diverting resources from military use in response to consumer demands." It asserted that the Soviet population had "traditionally" recognized that programs to boost industrial production and defend the country justified "a slow growth in living standards."[16]

Developments in the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the process of the IC's coming to terms with the deceleration in the estimated growth of Soviet defense spending restored the defense burden as a factor in projecting Soviet defense programs. In 1983-84, the discussion of the origins of the slowdown unearthed an array of possible causes, but they centered first on adaptations to current difficulties in the economy while playing down the possibility that a strategic decision had been made to limit the growth in the defense budget.

The debate over Soviet defense policy heated up when Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985. CIA analysts thought that his ambitious investment program in support of his goal of modernizing the USSR's production base would "leave little or no room for increasing defense spending procurement above its recent rates."[17] In fact, according to CIA's estimates, Soviet defense spending accelerated in the first year of the 1986-90 plan, and Gorbachev later said that this growth had been planned. Gorbachev probably believed his focus on labor discipline and a shakeup of the party and managerial ranks would result in productivity gains that would permit substantial growth in both defense procurement and the production of equipment for investment.

CIA's analytic line at the time was that the capacity to produce the strategic weapons coming on line was already in place, suggesting "that Gorbachev can handle the defense/growth tradeoff for the time being." The real test for Gorbachev would be when demands to expand and renovate defense industries are renewed. "If the modernization program is not going well, Gorbachev will have to deal with military leaders asking for more defense-related investment and advocates of devoting even more resources to modernization--here the plan begins to unravel and choices have to be made."[18] The reforms in the economy introduced in mid-1987 proved to be disruptive rather than corrective. According to Marshall Sergey Akhromeyev, a decision to plan a cutback in defense was taken in mid-1988.[19] At this point at least, the connection among developments in the economy, the defense burden, and decisions on defense spending was clear enough.

So, in every case, the IC concluded that Soviet economic difficulties would impinge only marginally, if at all, on Soviet defense plans. What mattered was the technological competition. How would lagging technology limit improvements in Soviet military capabilities? In general, the IC reasoned that in the Soviet Union defense had such an overwhelming priority that economic problems would not constrain growth in the allocation of resources to military programs. Only when Gorbachev's perestrokyka was foundering did the idea of economic constraints on the defense budget gain a foothold in the national estimates arena, and even then the majority opinion rejected the notion that the USSR would unilaterally reduce its defense spending as it did in 1989.

Erosion in the Credibility of the Estimates

Why the concept of economic constraints on the USSR's defense budget was not taken more seriously, especially after the mid-1970s, is still unclear. Before 1976, one main reason surely was the woefully incorrect CIA estimate of the level of Soviet defense spending. A joint analysis of the Soviet defense burden in 1975 by the Office of Economic Research and OSR reported that the Soviet defense effort took less than 8 percent of GNP and only 10 to 15 percent of industrial production. Moreover, even though defense expenditures had been growing by 3 percent per year, GNP had been increasing faster. The paper's key judgments were:

> *The Soviet leaders have not acted as though costs have been a major factor in their military decisions. Defense programs have been well funded, even during periods of lagging economic growth, and the followthrough on new programs has been strong.*

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Defense costs are unlikely to constrain the Soviets unduly in the future. Political priorities favor continued emphasis on defense, and expected economic growth should permit continued increases in defense spending.[20]

The sharp upward revision in the ruble defense spending estimates in 1976 changed the estimate of the defense burden radically. Instead of 6 to 8 percent of GNP, defense spending was now 12 to 14 percent, more than twice the share of defense in US GNP. Moreover, analysts were forced to revise their description of Soviet defense industry as impressively efficient, and able to turn out hardware at relatively low cost. By the time the paper was being written, new information on Soviet prices for military hardware indicated that the ruble prices being used in the CIA estimates were much too low. Then a Soviet emigre provided a figure for procurement that was much higher than the current CIA estimate. A standdown in the spending estimates was ordered while the new intelligence was digested. When new estimates were produced in the fall of 1976-77, procurement in rubles was higher by two-thirds in the 1971-75 period, and total defense spending had increased by 55 percent.

The abruptness of the change in the defense spending estimates compiled in rubles badly eroded their credibility among policymakers and in Congress. One Senate Armed Services Committee staff member told an outside panel reviewing CIA's defense spending estimates that "there are a number of people who believe this analysis is intentionally misleading, that it somehow comes out to exactly what it is that the administration would like to argue on Capitol Hill. I mean they totally reject it."[21] President Nixon complained that American presidents were being supplied by CIA with figures on Russian defense spending that were "only half of what the Agency later decided they had been." He added, "Thanks to this intelligence blunder, we will find ourselves looking down the nuclear barrel in the 1980s."[22]

Policymakers were also confused by the Agency's delayed call on a slowdown in the growth of real defense spending after 1975. At the annual convention of the American Newspaper Publishers' Association in 1979, President Carter insisted that at that time neither the United States nor the USSR had the upper hand in the strategic competition, but he then said, "What causes us concern is not the current balance but the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup. During the past decade, the Soviets have steadily increased their real defense spending, year by year, while our own defense spending over that decade has had a net decrease."[23] In January 1979, Carter had defended his decision to push higher US defense budgets by saying, "In the last 10, 15 years, the Soviets every year have had above and beyond inflationary costs a 4- or 5-percent increase in allocation of funds for defense purposes."[24]

The Agency's Soviet defense spending estimates continued to be used in support of rising US defense budgets in the first Reagan administration. Then, in February 1983, CIA published a dollar comparison paper that said, "This year's review shows a period of almost no growth in the dollar costs for Soviet procurement from 1976 to 1981." It said that new evidence on major procurement items that "became available in 1982" led to a changed assessment. The result was a "procurement plateau" that had lasted longer than previous pauses in procurement and one that "may signal a secular change in the pace or composition of procurement."[25] Moreover, largely because of the lower estimates for procurement, the new Agency estimate showed substantially slower growth in total defense spending after 1976.

Before it was published, the paper was briefed to the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and to Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. DCI Casey brought the news to President Reagan, saying in effect, "We have a problem,"[26] at a time when the Secretary of Defense was testifying before Congress on the need for increased spending for defense. The draft encountered strong resistance in the NIC, while the Secretary of Defense reportedly "went nuts."[27] So the controversy continued through most of 1983, although the focus shifted to the reasons for and likely duration of the slowdown rather than its existence--at least through 1982.[28]

Meanwhile, critics of administration foreign policy seized on the estimates as evidence that the policy was wrong. Raymond Garthoff wrote that talk of a "relentless Soviet buildup "was mistaken" and that the "spending gap" was no more solid than other gaps (bombers, missiles, ABM civil defense) that had

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been headline news.[29] In a later analysis of Soviet foreign policy, Garthoff emphasized that President Reagan's spending gap was "deflated by its own intelligence estimates."[30]

At the same time, there were alternative estimates of Soviet defense spending. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute presented a series that replicated the Soviet official defense budget for almost every year from 1955 to 1988. London's International Institute for Strategic Studies took the official defense budget from 1955 to 1974 as a base and added some rubles for military RDT&E and military security forces.

On the other hand, some other estimates had Soviet defense spending increasing much more rapidly and to much higher levels than CIA's estimates.[31] These more threatening estimates were seized on by those advocating larger defense budgets because they buttressed the position of those who believed Soviet defense spending had been rising rapidly ever since the early 1960s and supposedly demonstrated that mounting economic difficulties had not influenced defense policy.[32]

The organizations that identified themselves with the alternative estimates--most prominently the Committee on the Present Danger--were led by influential people in the foreign policy field--for example, Paul Nitze, Eugene Rostow, and David Packard. According to Fred Kaplan's count, 32 members of the Committee on the Present Danger joined the new Reagan administration in 1981 (including the President himself).[33] Their presence could not help but further weaken the authority of CIA's defense spending estimates in policymaking circles.

How Good Were the Estimates?

Now the estimates of Soviet defense spending and GNP are history and potentially useful only for historical research--depending on how reliable they are. In this context, the revisions in GNP and defense spending estimates that Soviet or Russian statistical agencies have made over the last decade, the judgments of external review panels and Western experts, and some alternative estimates of Soviet and Russian leaders and scholars are of interest.

Official and semiofficial revisions. Little has been done by Russian or other Confederation of Independent States (CIS) statistical agencies to remove the distortions in Soviet-era statistics on GNP or production generally. The statistical agencies of the CIS states have other fish to fry.[34] The problem is not with the official data on GNP in current prices, incomplete as they are. They agree quite well with the Agency's estimates. But Western and Russian observers reject the price indexes that have been used to convert GNP in current prices to GNP in constant prices. International agencies have been working with CIS statistical authorities to improve the price indexes in the post-Soviet era. There seems to be little hope, however, that these authorities will go back in time and redo the indexes of the Soviet period.

The official statistics on defense spending are even worse. Not until 1989 did the Soviets abandon the transparently false figures that had been reported as allocations to defense in successive state budgets. The new figures given for 1988 and 1989 are more than three times higher than the old budget entries, but still much less than the CIA's estimates. Part of the difference is because some security-related outlays are reported elsewhere in the state budget (KGB border guards, militarized internal security troops, and the like), but the revised defense budget has not been generally accepted in the West or by many Russian officials and academics.[35]

Moreover, this dispute concerns Soviet defense spending in current prices. Neither the Soviets nor the Russians have reported a series representing the growth of defense spending in constant prices. If they had, it would have been suspect for the same reason as the official estimates of growth of GNP, national income, or industrial production in constant prices--the lack of reliable price indexes to convert defense outlays in current prices to a constant-price basis.

External reviews and assessments. The CIA estimates of both Soviet GNP and Soviet defense have been repeatedly examined and assessed by outside experts. The methodology underlying the GNP estimates

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was set out in a series of unclassified publications [36] and reviewed at three conferences of academic experts.[37] In addition, four independent external review panels examined and assessed CIA's research on Soviet GNP.[38]

In broad terms, the review panels (except for the GAO report) found little to quarrel with the estimates of GNP in rubles but thought the estimates of Soviet GNP in dollars were probably overstated due to the failure to account fully for the qualitative superiority of US goods and services as compared with the Soviet counterparts (Figure 4). As two of the panels reported, the GNP measures have stood the test of the time and the marketplace. Two major groups investigating the economic history of the Soviet Union are using the Agency's GNP estimates.[39]

From the early 1970s, the defense spending estimates came under the scrutiny of a panel of outside experts established by DCI Richard Helms. The DCI's Military-Economic Advisory Panel, meeting twice a year, reviewed the methodology underlying the estimates and recommended improvements. In 1982, DDI Robert Gates commissioned a special panel of outside experts (the Working Group on Soviet Military-Economic Analysis) to revisit the question of the quality and the utility of the defense spending estimates. Two reports were given to the DDI in July 1983.[40] The Working Group said, "Overall, and in spite of the range of deficiencies that we will delineate...the CIA does an excellent job of estimating Soviet military expenditures."[41] The panel established at the request of the House Permanent Select Subcommittee on Intelligence (HPSCI) came to a quite different conclusion. It thought the available information "insufficient to support any reliable estimate of Soviet defense spending by any known method of estimation.[42]

Soviet and Russian statements. During the past several years, a number of prominent Soviets have given figures for Soviet defense spending--usually given as a share of Marxist-style national income or GNP. Former Soviet leaders President Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Politburo member Ligachev, and Minister of Defense Yazov put Soviet defense spending at or near the lower range of CIA estimates of Soviet military spending in current rubles (Figure 5). Their pronouncements in turn imply defense spending substantially higher than the new official defense budget announced in 1989. Some other--mainly nonofficial--Soviets believed the defense burden to be much greater than that suggested by Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Ligachev--as high as 200 billion rubles.

Figure 4

PFIAB Panel Report*
(July 1983)

- "CIA's quantitative estimates of past Soviet output levels and rates of growth are the best available." (p. 3)
  --"Have stood the test of the marketplace." (p. 3)
  --"None of the alternative measures have been proven to be superior to those of the CIA." (p. 4)
- The estimates have greater margin of error than those for Western economics, but in Panel's judgment, "Error is not likely to be so large that its elimination would change one's assessment of the strengths and weakness of the Soviet economy."

*President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Panel, "An Evaluation of CIA Work on Soviet Economic Capabilities, Problems, and Prospects," 7 July 1983.

Rowen Panel Report*

(May 1985)

- SWG concludes that there are reasons to believe CIA has overestimated Soviet economic growth. (p. 12)
- "In any case, several members of the group doubt that the cumulative distortion between reported

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Soviet performance and reality could be more than 10 to 15 percentage points, in the aggregate over the past decade." (pp. 17-18)
*Rowen Panel, Report of the Soviet Working Group, May 1985.

HPSCI Panel*

(1991)

- "The main findings (re GNP growth) have stood the test of time well." (p. 37)
- "Our most significant critical conclusion is that certain CIA products during the 1970s and 80s may indeed have tended to overstate the size of the Soviet economy relative to the United States. . . ." (p. 47)
*Daniel M. Berkowitz, Joseph S. Berliner, Paul R. Gregory, Susan J. Linz, and James R. Millar. "An Evaluation of the CIA's Analysis of Soviet Economic Performance, 1970-90." *Comparative Economic Studies*, 35, 2:33-38, summer 1993.

GAO Report*

(September 1991)

- CIA used "generally reliable methodologies" in measuring GNP but had to employ a "considerable degree of judgment."
- --"As a result, these methods are unlikely to produce accurate estimates of Soviet GNP in rubles." (p. 25)
- "CIA has probably overestimated the relative size of Soviet GNP as compared with US GNP, although any failure to capture a significant portion of the second economy in its estimates could offset the amount of overestimation."
- *United States GAO, Soviet Economy: Assessment of How Well the CIA Has Estimated the Size of the Economy, GAO/NSIAD-91-274, September 1991.

Figure 5. Soviet defense expenditures selected Soviet statements and CIA's estimate. (U)

Three observations seem warranted regarding the conflicting Soviet declarations concerning the size of the USSR's defense budget. First, there are enough statements by top Soviet leaders to indicate that they believed the new official defense budget understated the real amount by one-third to two-fifths. Second, the various references to the defense burden are sufficiently vague and different to indicate that even the Politburo was relying on incomplete and unverified evidence. Third, if the leadership was uncertain about the level of Soviet defense spending after having ordered the Ministry of Defense to develop an honest total, little credence should be given to the back-of-the-envelope calculations of academics and journalists who had no access to the accounts of the Ministry of Defense, the security organs, or the defense-industrial ministries.

Net Assessment

Whether efforts to reconstruct Soviet defense spending will ever succeed is questionable. The impediments include the elusive subsidies granted to defense production, the possible off-budget financing of defense programs, and the difficulty of estimating the cost of services provided free or at large discounts to the military by local governments and nondefense ministries.[43]

What can be said of CIA's building-block estimates is that they reflected the best intelligence available on the physical elements of Soviet military programs and forces. It was these quantities that determined the trends in CIA's spending estimates. When 1970 ruble prices were substituted for 1955 ruble prices, the level of defense spending in CIA estimates shifted upward, but the rate of growth was little affected.

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Similarly, when 1982 ruble prices were substituted for 1970 prices, the level of spending jumped by more than two-thirds, but the rate of growth of defense outlays in 1956-75 increased from only 3.5 to 3.6 percent per year. Even a much more radical shift in relative price weights (from 1982 ruble prices to 1989 dollar prices) makes little difference in the estimated rate of growth: defense outlays in 1966-88 rise by 2.8 percent per year in rubles and by 2.0 percent per year in dollars.

The controversy over the levels and rates of growth of Soviet defense spending probably will never be settled to everyone's satisfaction. The statistical authorities of the CIS states show no inclination or capacity to revisit this problem. The building-block approach, however, avoided most of the dead ends that alternative approaches based on Soviet aggregative statistics encountered. The building-block estimates also are consistent with revelations by Soviet leaders in a position to have informed judgments about the size of the USSR's defense budget and the volume of production of military hardware. If these estimates are to be challenged--especially with respect to trend--the underlying estimates of force levels, operating practices, and production must be overturned.

The post-1985 discussion of Soviet military budgets, however, does suggest that one of the virtues claimed for the ruble estimates--that they were what the Soviet leaders were looking at in making their decisions--may lack substance. It seems clear that the leadership thought there was little inflation so that the distinction between spending in current as opposed to constant or "comparable" prices was of small importance. But the weight of the evidence seems to point to the leadership's not knowing what the all-inclusive defense budgets were. Thus, the principal usefulness of the Western estimates probably was to give the West a sense of the trends in real Soviet defense outlays and the role they played in the growth of national output and in the decades-long economic slowdown in the Soviet Union.

Notes

1 Max Millikan. "The role of ORR in Economic Intelligence," CIA/ORR, 1 August 1951, pp. 1-3.

2 Ibid., p. 1.

3 Statement by Dulles to the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States, 13 November 1959, in Washington, DC, pp. 20-25.

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5 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, New York: Touchstone, 1983; pp. 321-327.

6 Ibid., p. 10.

7 20 May 1977.

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9 Interview with Rae Huffstutler, former chief of CIA's Office of Strategic Research and of the Office of Soviet Analysis, 3 June 1994. In the event, only 60 were deployed.

10 Report of Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, FY 1977 Authorization Request and FY 1976-1980 Defense Programs, 5 February 1975, pp. I-7 ff.

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11 Interview with Schlesinger, 9 March 1995.

12 Testimony before the Selin Panel of the Working Group on Soviet Military Economics, 24 March 1983.

13 SNIE 11-5-64, Soviet Economic Problems and Outlook, 8 January 1964, pp. 5-6.

14 Ibid., p. 7.

15 NIE 11-4-65, Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy, 14 April 1965, p. 10.

16 NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena, 7 July 1981, pp. 17-18.

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18 Douglas MacEachin, "Gorbachev's Economic Strategy and Soviet Defense Spending," 13 December 1985.

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20 "Topical Interview with Marshal Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev," Moscow television service in Russian, 1700 GMT, 9 October 1989.

21 CIA. The Economic Impact of Soviet Military Spending, ER IR 75-3, April 1975, p. 1.

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23 Richard Nixon, The Real World, New York: Random House, 1980; p. 26. The "nuclear barrel" reference was a gross non sequitur. To the extent that US defense budgets were influenced by the Agency's estimates, it was the dollar estimates that were in play, and these changed little when the ruble estimates were revised.

24 Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy Carter, 1979, p. 695. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980.

25 Ibid., p. 176.

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27 Interview with Rae Huffstutler, 3 June 1984. Huffstutler was then Director of the Office of Soviet Analysis in CIA.

28 Interview with Robert Gates, 12 May 1994.

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30 Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985; p. 596.

31 --, The Great Transition, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994; p. 41.

32 See, e.g., William T. Lee, CIA Estimates of Soviet Military Expenditures: Errors and Waste. Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute, 1995; pp. 119-153 and Steven Rosefield, False Science. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books, 1982; pp. 178-196.

33 In this connection, the National Strategy Information Center published one of Lee's monographs in 1977 as well as Rosenfield's 1982 book.

34 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon. New York: Touchstone, 1984; p. 386.

35 The Chairman of the Russian State Statistical Committee suggested in 1992 that this was a task best left to academies (P. Guzhvin, "Doveriya k Statistike Trust in Statistics," Vestnik Statistiki, 9: 16 September 1992.

36 See James H. Noren, "The Controversy Over Western Measures of Soviet Defense Expenditures," Post-Soviet Affairs, 11, 3:328-296, 1995, for a discussion of the circumstances under which the revised defense budget was compiled and the doubts that knowledgeable Soviets/Russians had about its accuracy.

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39 An Evaluation of CIA Work on Soviet Economic Capabilities, Problems, and Prospects. A report commissioned by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 7 July 1983. Report of the Soviet Working Group, a report of a panel chaired by Henry Rowen at the request of Robert Gates, Deputy Director of CIA, May 1985; United States General Accounting Office, Soviet Economy - Assessment of How Well the CIA Has Estimated the Size of the Economy, report to the Honorable Daniel P. Moynihan, US Senate, GAO/NSIAD-91-274, September 1991; and the HPSCI report (cited in reference 42).

40 Thus, the International Comparison of Productivity (ICOP) Project in the Netherlands uses the CIA estimates. ("In my view the RAND-CIA material in the growth of Soviet output by industry of origin for the period 1928-90 is as good as we are likely to get...," Angus Maddison, "Economic Performances of the Former USSR, a Quantitative Evaluation").

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42 Working Group on Soviet Military Economic Analysis, Report of the Working Group on Soviet Military Economic Analysis, p.8. The report was reproduced in Berkowitz, Daniel M. Joseph S. Berliner, Paul R. Gregory, Susan J. Linz, and James R. Millar, "An Evaluation of the CIA's Analysis of Soviet Economic Performance, 1970-90, Comparative Economic Studies, 35, 2:33-58, summer 1993.

43 The subsidies issue is particularly troubling. As noted earlier, Soviet civilian and military leaders argued that a true defense budget could not be compiled until a price reform had been completed. According to Vadim Kuznetzov of the Foreign Ministry's USA desk, it would take several years (the early 1990s) to introduce a new system of accounting in which defense industries have to pay their own way rather than live on state subsidies (Washington Times, 1 August 1998). He explained, "Under the old system, a truck could cost many times less for the military than for a collective farm."

(b)(3)(c) served in the Directorate of Intelligence.

Unclassified

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Unclassified

A Long Legislative Journey

Passing the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (U)

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From February 1979 to February 1982, I served as the Directorate of Operation's (DO) officer in the office that handled legislative affairs for CIA. At the beginning of this period, the office was called the Office of Legislative Counsel and was in the Office of the Director of CIA, with Frederick P. Hitz serving as Legislative Counsel. With Director William Casey's arrival at CIA, the Office of Legislative Counsel was replaced by the Office of External Affairs, which was responsible for legislative affairs between Congress and CIA. Robert Gates headed that office, and his successor was Billy Doswell, for whom I worked until I returned to the DO.

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA) of 1982 was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan in a ceremony at CIA Headquarters on 23 June 1982. This legislation was the culmination of the efforts over several years by many people both inside and outside CIA to provide legal protection for DO officers serving under cover. The legislation has helped to discourage media disclosures of the true identities of DO officers.

Backdrop

The idea of obtaining legal remedy to the problem of malicious identification of CIA officers serving under cover did not spark much interest before 1975, when the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, headed by Senator Frank Church, was established. The Church Committee's investigation of US intelligence activities and the investigation of its counterpart in the House of Representatives, the Pike Committee, placed the CIA under public scrutiny. No matter how one reads the reports, they criticize the Intelligence Community (IC) in general and the CIA in particular for some of their past activities. This criticism appeared to open the door for private US citizens with less than noble motives. With the assistance of disaffected former CIA employees, these citizens began an effort to destroy CIA effectiveness. In the late 1970s, publications such as Counterspy, Quicksilver Times, and the Covert Action Information Bulletin came into existence with part of their stated purpose being to identify CIA officers under cover. With former CIA malcontents such as Philip Agee listed on their masthead, and with the cooperation of John Stockwell and others, these forums learned the methods of guessing the names of CIA officers posted abroad. With the assistance of the now-classified Department of State's Foreign Service Officer (FSO) listing, they named names and provided the entire professional history of a number of CIA officers. Some were serving overseas during that period.

The Beginning

Senator Lloyd Bentsen introduced agent identities legislation in the Senate in 1975 after Richard S. Welch, the CIA chief in Athens, Greece, was gunned down in front of his home. This murder occurred

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within a month of the time he was publicly identified by a local newspaper, which drew on information that came from Agee in the Counterspy publication. There was little or no legislative action taken on identities legislation between 1975 and the 1980s.

On 30 January 1980, Deputy Director of CIA Frank Carlucci testified before the Subcommittee on Legislation of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) about the IIPA.[1] He made a strong case in his testimony supporting a carefully crafted legislative remedy to safeguard "the nation's intelligence capabilities without impairing the rights of Americans...." He also made the point that identification of US intelligence officers serving overseas requires "specialized knowledge" of those who had worked in the US intelligence establishment.

In May 1980, Carlucci was interviewed at CIA Headquarters by an ABC news correspondent. The main topic of the interview was "charter legislation," which was viewed by some as a remedy to alleged CIA abuses uncovered four years earlier during Congressional hearings. In the context of passing a charter for CIA, the seeds of the idea for providing legislation "making it a crime to disclose the names of CIA operatives working abroad" was born.[2] Carlucci indicated that CIA supported such legislation, and he suggested that, where information is legitimately classified, CIA would favor making it a criminal offense to publish CIA officers' or CIA agents' names. This was one of the first public pronouncements by a CIA official on a possible legislative remedy to naming names. When asked if he had "a problem" with the First Amendment implications, Carlucci replied that this had been looked at by the Justice Department; while there were First Amendment issues, the framing of the legislation could be done in a manner so as not to "interfere with First Amendment rights."

Incident in Jamaica

(b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

At 2:30 a.m. on 4 July 1980, in Kingston, Jamaica, the house of [redacted] was attacked wi(b)(1) gunfire and a bomb. The attack occurred while he was asleep and his family was away on holiday. Le(b)(3)(c) than 48 hours earlier, [redacted] had been named publicly in Jamaica as a "CIA agent." [redacted] was among 15 people named as CIA agents at the US Embassy in Kingston by a man who identified himself as Louis Wolf, editor of the Covert Action Information Bulletin headquartered in Washington, DC.[3]

The shooting incident was widely reported in the US media. Wolf reportedly "accused CIA of trying to undermine the socialist government of Jamaica" and "also supplied biographical information about those he named."[4] The articles also noted that "Wolf was co-author of two volumes called Dirty Works along with Philip Agee."[5] Several of the news articles on the shooting also noted that there was no law on the books that would permit prosecution of Wolf for publicizing the names of those he said were connected with CIA. In reaction to the incident, CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Herbert Hetu, said that "The CIA has unsuccessfully sought legislation that would make it a criminal offense to identify intelligence officers who are working under cover."[6]

DDCI Carlucci, a former FSO, ordered the news articles collected and sent to all members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), of the HPSCI, and to the leadership in the Senate and House of Representatives. In the unclassified covering letter, Carlucci said, "We can ill afford to wait until another member of the US overseas mission comes home in a casket before the Congress addresses this pressing problem."[7]

The incident intensified the debate about passing legislation protecting CIA employees serving under cover. Suddenly, every news outlet was voicing an opinion.

Some Momentum

During July 1980, this same debate was being held in both houses of Congress. Following the [redacted] (b)(3)(c) incident, the Congress appeared to be ready to act. The HPSCI "rushed out a bill to outlaw the (b)(1) publication of any information obtained from either classified or unclassified sources that identifies a

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covert agent."[8] The bill's stated intent was to halt the work of such people as Louis Wolf. On 25 July 1980, the HPSCI approved its version of the bill (HR 5615) by a voice vote. On 29 July 1980, the "SSCI voted 11 to 0 for a bill (S 2216) that would make it a crime punishable by as much as three years' imprisonment for private citizens to disclose the identities of 'covert' intelligence agents in certain circumstances."[9] It was also noted that the voting in both committees indicated that, unless the Judiciary Committees of Congress intervened, some kind of bill might become law, leaving the First Amendment questions to the courts to decide. The bills were then referred, respectively, to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.

Opposition

Prospects seemed favorable for the passage of some sort of legal protection, but there were questions in the media about protecting First Amendment rights, and there were Senators and Representatives who continued to question the necessity of such legislation. Meanwhile, the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee began open hearings on the HPSCI bill. On 26 August 1980, the subcommittee reported the bill with amendments that weakened it. The bill as reported would outlaw disclosures by "present and past government officials but not by outsiders."[10] This weakened version would make it difficult to prosecute private citizens such as Louis Wolf. Those Congressmen who proposed the weakening amendments called the unamended bill "clearly unconstitutional" and used this standard to prevail.[11]

The amended bill was referred to the full House Judiciary Committee, whose chairman was Congressman Peter Rodino. He reportedly believed that the bill in its weakened form was still unconstitutional, but he recognized that it had formidable support. He and his allies said they thought such a bill would "outlaw the revelations of a wide range of CIA misdeeds."[12]

During the House deliberations, the DCI and the DDCI were on Capitol Hill each day answering questions and providing information on CIA's stand on this important issue. [redacted] lawyers assigned to the DCI, put together "fact sheets" which responded to misconceptions that opponents of the legislation sought to distribute. The Carter administration policy supporting the legislation was being distorted by its opponents, and these were attempts to ensure the misconceptions were addressed with factual information. The committee approved a stronger version of the bill on 3 September 1980, despite calls by opponents that it was unconstitutional. By a 2-to-1 margin, the committee rejected its subcommittee's view that such a law could deprive private citizens, especially journalists, of First Amendment rights. The proposal to limit the bill's scope to persons with access to US Government secrets was also rejected by a 2-to-1 margin. The stronger bill (HR 5616) was voted out of the House Judiciary Committee by a vote of 21 to 8. When it came to a floor vote in the House, it stood a good chance of passage. (b)(3)(c)

In the Senate

The battle was not yet won, and the action switched to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which was scheduled to take up the SSCI bill (S 2216).

During the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, allegations were made that the CIA was devising "a whole gamut of artificial government titles and phony positions for US intelligence officials working overseas."[13] The critics said the proposed new law would allow CIA to use the Peace Corps for intelligence purposes, which Carter administration officials denied. This loose linkage of the CIA to the Peace Corps was damaging to the chances for passage of a strong bill out of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Carter administration was put in the position of trying to prove the negative, a position hard to defend, especially when the CIA regulations governing such matters are classified.

On 17 September 1980, the Senate Judiciary Committee by a vote of 8 to 6 gutted the bill with four amendments, one of which specifically denied the use of the Peace Corps and of the Agency for International Development for intelligence purposes. The bill moved to the Senate floor for debate.

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Chances for passage were dimming because of the rush to recess for the fall election campaign and wrangling over what the legislation should contain. In late September 1980, the proposed legislation was shelved in the Senate when the majority and the minority leaders agreed that passage was not feasible.[14]

On 2 October 1980, the Congress went into recess for the elections. A lameduck session would occur after the recess, but it probably would not address the legislation. Thus, all efforts would have to begin again in the new Congressional session in 1981, when there would be a change in party leadership of both houses of Congress. In December 1980, the Covert Action Bulletin published what was said to be the names of eight senior CIA officers serving under cover overseas.

An Aside

During my own work in 1980 in behalf of this legislation, an unforgettable incident occurred. I volunteered to help distribute information on the Carter administration's version of the legislation to the staff of each member of the House of Representatives. The information spelled out the objectives of the proposed legislation. I was assigned to go to the offices of each member of the California delegation and to drop off material. The idea was not to lobby but to be certain that each member had the opportunity to be aware of the President's position on this subject. Other, higher ranking members of the Carter administration made direct contacts with Congressmen and Senators. I went to one Congressman's office, introduced myself to the secretary, told her I represented CIA, and provided the information packet. The Congressman evidently heard me in the outer office, and he asked the secretary to show me in. I had no idea what he wanted. For the next 20 minutes, the Congressman pilloried the CIA, accusing the Agency of having "fronts" that stole official US Government funds and of all kinds of other felonies. I just sat back and let him rant on. When he was finished, I thanked him for his views. He escorted me to the door, and he said, "I hope you get a job someday where you will do something for your country."

This episode illustrates the depth of feeling on both sides of this issue by members of Congress. When I returned to the Agency and told Fred Hitz about the incident, he laughed and said, "Welcome to legislative liaison work."

Another Attempt

With the change in the leadership in Congress from Democrat to Republican, the Agency's plight in many areas received renewed attention. Senator Barry Goldwater, the new chairman of the SSCI, said, "I think the CIA is going to find a very cordial reception here. It is difficult to discover any opposition to intelligence. We've learned a lot."[15] Another bill was to be introduced in the new Congress that would make it a criminal offense for past or present CIA employees to release the names of Agency officials. President Reagan appeared to be determined to "restore the muscle of the CIA and make it an important element in his administration's global strategy."[16] As DCI, he nominated William Casey, who had served in the OSS of World War II.

On 2 February 1981, Senator John Chafee introduced S-391, a bill to "amend the National Security Act of 1947 to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of information identifying agents, informants and sources. . . ."[17] The bill was entitled the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. Senator Chafee issued press releases and wrote letters to the media backing the bill.

The chances for passage "in the light of the hawkish sentiment in Congress aroused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 and of more conservative tones of Washington since the national elections"[18] were judged good. At the same time, however, the American Civil Liberties Union, an opponent of such legislation, said that, if enacted, the legislation would be tested in court.

On 25 February 1981, two identities protection bills, HR 4 and HR 1659, were introduced in the House of Representatives. Thus, the issue of identities protection was on the docket in both houses of Congress early in the new session--a good sign for eventual passage.

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New Hands at CIA

In February 1981, William Casey became DCI. The Office of Legislative Counsel was soon "dis-established" and downgraded by an executive decision. Casey also abolished the Office of Public Affairs. His rationale for the move was that the Agency had too high a profile with Congress and the media.

Fred Hitz eventually departed CIA to go into private law practice. The office that handled Congressional affairs was renamed Office of External Affairs and was led by Robert Gates. Billy Doswell, a well-known Congressional lobbyist from Virginia, was brought in to head the office responsible for Congressional affairs.

Expulsions From Mozambique

In early March 1981, the Mozambique Government expelled four US Embassy personnel from the country, claiming they were part of a "major foreign espionage network." US officials disputed these charges, and a State Department spokesman said the expulsions had been ordered after a Cuban espionage team had seized one of the Americans and failed to recruit him as a spy. The State Department also said it was "not coincidental" that the expulsions came shortly after a group of Americans who published an anti-CIA bulletin had visited Mozambique. (Louis Wolf had recently visited Mozambique. 19) These expulsions lent urgency to the passage of identities protection legislation.

Meanwhile, the intentional identification of CIA officers overseas continued. The April 1981 issue of Covert Action Information Bulletin published the alleged names of 12 Embassy officers along with extensive biographic information.20

Casey's Support

DCI Casey's backing for passage of the legislation was strong and unflagging. He wrote letters to Senator Patrick Leahy and others who had specific questions on S-391. He also made personal calls to Senators and Representatives urging passage of the legislation. These efforts were especially important during July 1981,when the Senate Judiciary Committee was considering the bill. Casey deserves a lion's share of credit for the eventual passage of protective legislation.

A Supreme Court Decision

On 29 June 1981, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the government on the question surrounding the withholding of Philip Agee's passport. This was a legal boost for passage of the identities legislation. DCI Casey noted in a letter to HPSCI Chairman Edward Boland that "This opinion goes a long way toward dispelling any residual concerns about the constitutionality of the identities legislation."21 Senator Chafee distributed the essence of the Supreme Court decision to all Senators, and also mentioned in his letter that his bill had accumulated 41 co-sponsors.

The Peace Corps Problem

In June, Loret Miller Ruppe, Director of the Peace Corps, wrote a letter to DCI Casey noting the consideration of the identities legislation and outlined the 20-year policy separating CIA from the Peace Corps.22 She requested a response and suggested both letters be shared. . . "with appropriate members of Congress so that there will be no mistake as to Peace Corps' total separation from the function of intelligence gathering." Casey's response assured Miller Ruppe that he had no intention of seeking to use the Peace Corps to provide cover for clandestine intelligence collection. He also noted that there was a longstanding policy barring use of the Peace Corps and that it was reflected in CIA regulations. This exchange was a fatal blow to those who used this allegation to delay the legislation.

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Committee Activity

In mid-July, the majority and minority leaders on the Senate Judiciary Committee agreed that the identities bill would be voted on at a committee meeting on 15 September. Most were optimistic the committee vote would be favorable, but, after the disappointment of 1980, no one took anything for granted. Also, the delay in bringing the bill to a vote in the committee reflected the deep feelings of Senators on both sides of the issue. Senator Biden, an opponent of S-391 as written, stated that he was "counting on the press and the editorial boards of this country to focus on S-391."

On 22 July, the HPSCI approved its version of the identities bill (HR-4). The House of Representatives was expected to pass HR-4 readily, despite opposition from civil libertarians and press organizations.[23] There were differences between HR-4 and S-391, and supporters of identities legislation hoped that S-391 would be the version that became law because its scope was broader.

On 23 September 1981, the full House of Representatives passed the Intelligence Identities Protection Act by a vote of 354 to 56 with 23 abstentions. The original bill was amended on the House floor to make it stronger than the one reported out of the HPSCI. The amendment, which used language from S-391, was offered by Representative John Ashbrook and passed by a 226-to-181 vote. This made HR-4 and S-391 almost identical and boded well for eventual passage and signing into law. The Ashbrook amendment led HPSCI Chairman Boland to repudiate the bill.

The passage of the amended version of HR-4 was a major step, but the Senate still had to act. Delay was the Senate opponents' tactic; everyone was aware that, once S-391 got to the floor of the Senate, it would pass. On 14 September, Senator Thurmond, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, had received a letter from President Reagan which stated that, "I cannot overemphasize the importance of this legislation." This letter made it clear passage of S-391 was a Reagan administration priority.[24]

(b)(6) the wife of (b)(3)(c) (b)(1), whose house was machinegunned in Jamaica, also wrote a letter to Senator Thurmond urging him to support and expedite the passage of the intelligence identities bill without further delay.[25]

A Weaker Version

On 6 October, the opponents of the bill won the day when the Senate Judiciary Committee voted, 9 to 8, to weaken the identities bill via an amendment introduced by Senator Biden. The Committee then voted the amended legislation out of committee by a tally of 17 to 0.

Thus, the bill's opponents, knowing they could not stop its passage, succeeded in weakening it by amendment. While the differences between the Chafee version and the version voted out of the Judiciary Committee were arcane and legal in character, the latter version made it much harder to prosecute anyone under the statute if and when it became law. The opposition was using more subtle approaches to weaken any law passed. But HR-4 and S-391 were substantially the same bill. It finally appeared that success was near.

Senator Chafee, meanwhile, continued his lobbying efforts for S-391 and circulated a letter to his fellow Senators outlining his efforts to get the bill passed. He also made it clear he would offer an amendment on the Senate floor to return the bill to its original form.

In mid-November, the vote count had 40 Senators for passage of a strong bill, 33 against, and 27 undecided. It was to these 27 that the White House and other supporters of the bill turned their attention.

Action Delayed

On 4 December, the White House released a statement by President Reagan announcing his signing into

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law the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982.[26] In the last paragraph, the President noted his "hope that I will soon be able to sign the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which has passed the House and is awaiting floor action in the Senate. I strongly support this measure, preferably in the form in which it was passed by the House of Representatives; we must act now to protect our intelligence personnel. . . ." But there was much action in the Senate before the President was to get his wish. The Act was scheduled to be brought to the floor in mid-December, but that was not to be. A threatened filibuster by Senator Bradley forced a delay on the bill as Congress hurried to conclude its 1981 session. The Senate leadership put the bill aside temporarily, thereby delaying any action on it until 1982.

Final Action

On 1 March 1982, agreement was finally reached to take up S-391 again, with the Chafee amendment being the first item of consideration. The debate went on for some time. Although I had left the Congressional Relations staff in February for re-assignment in the DO, I continued to follow the bill's progress.

The Senate accepted Senator Chafee's amendment (called the Chafee-Jackson amendment) by a vote of 55 to 39. Thus, a stronger version of the bill would be considered by the full Senate. The opponents had lost their battle to make it less effective.

The final vote in the Senate, taken on 18 March 1982, was 90 to 6.[27] The bill then had to go to a conference committee. The House of Representatives approved the conference report on 3 June by a vote of 315 to 32. On 11 June, the Senate approved it by a vote of 81 to 4. On 23 June 1982, President Reagan, in an outdoor ceremony at CIA Headquarters, signed into law a bill making it a crime "to disclose the names of US intelligence agents, even if the information is obtained from public records."

I was on assignment and did not get to the ceremony. As a case officer, I was used to this role. I just wanted protection for case officers and their families. The staff director of the SSCI kindly sent me a letter thanking me for my efforts in working for the passage of the Act. I am as proud of it as I am of any of my accomplishments while working at CIA.

Notes

1 Statement of DDCI Carlucci before HPSCI's subcommittee on Legislation, 30 January 1980, on H.R. 5616, the "Intelligence Identities Protection Act."

2 *The Washington Post*, page A32, 8 May 1980. Senator John H. Chafee sought to add an amendment to this effect to the so-called charter bill. The bill never came to a vote.

3 News article by Lloyd Williams of the Associated Press; Kingston, Jamaica, 6 July 1980 edition of *The Philadelphia Inquirer*.

4 News article by Jo Thomas of *The New York Times*, 4 July 1980.

5 News article by Jeremiah O'Leary, *The Washington Star*, 6 July 1980.

6 *The New York Times*, Washington, DC, 4 July 1980.

7 Unclassified letter from Carlucci to various members of Congress, 8 July 1980.

8 *The Washington Post*, article by Celia W. Duggar, 26 July 1980.

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9 *The New York Times*, article by Charles Mohr, 31 July 1980.

10 *The Washington Post*, article by George Lardner, Jr., 27 August 1980, p. A5.

11 *The New York Times*, article by Charles Mohr, 27 August 1980, p. A13.

12 *The Washington Post*, article by George Lardner, Jr., early September 1980.

13 *The Washington Post*, article by George Lardner, Jr., 16 September 1980, p. A13.

14 *The New York Times*, article by Charles Mohr, 2 October 1980, p. A20.

15 *Time* magazine, 19 January 1981, p. 21.

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Congressional Record*, 2 February 1981, Vol. 127, No. 18, p. S 935. Also pp. S 839 to S 842.

18 *The New York Times*, article by Charles Mohr, 6 February 1981.

19 *The Washington Post* article by Caryle Murphy, 6 March 1981, p. A 24.

20 *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, No. 12, April 1981.

21 Casey letter to Boland, 15 July 1981.

22 Ruppe letter to Casey, 25 June 1981.

23 *Congressional Quarterly*, 25 July 1981, p. 1350.

24 Letter from President Reagan to Senator Thurmond, 14 September 1981.

25 Letter from (b)(6) to Senator Thurmond, 14 September 1981.

26 White House press release, 4 December 1981.

27 *The Washington Post*, article by George Lardner, Jr.; 19 March 1982, p. A 5.

(b)(3)(c) served in the Directorate of Operations.

Unclassified

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The Evolution of US Army HUMINT

Intelligence Operations in the Korean War

John P. Finnegan

The traumatic experience of the Korean conflict was a watershed in the evolution of Army intelligence. Within six months, the Army found itself facing two major intelligence disasters: it was caught unprepared by the initial North Korean invasion of June 1950 and by the massive Chinese intervention in November of that year. In response, the Army hastily improvised a clandestine human intelligence (HUMINT) organization, building on a small existing intelligence unit, the Korean Liaison Office (KLO)). By the end of the Korean war, the Far East Command (FECOM) had fielded a large Army-controlled clandestine collection apparatus, closely linked with similarly large operations in the fields of partisan and psychological warfare. More important, the Army had begun to take steps to create a permanent and professional HUMINT service that could carry out positive intelligence collection operations.

Lack of Intelligence

The sudden outbreak of the Korean war on 26 June 1950 came as a shock to US leaders. In hindsight, this is not surprising. Since the onset of the Cold War, the nation's intelligence assets had been targeted almost exclusively against the Soviet Union. In addition, intelligence responsibilities in the Far East were badly fragmented. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Far East Command (FECOM), the major theater headquarters in the area, no longer had any jurisdiction over the Korean peninsula: authority over the area had devolved to the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) after the last American occupation forces left in mid-1949. Because the KMAG had no positive collection capability, Korea was an intelligence vacuum.[1]

Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2, did maintain a residual intelligence organization in Korea, the KLO. The reports generated by this small office, however, received little attention in a preoccupied Tokyo. Similar reports submitted by an Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) team that also remained in Korea were likewise disregarded. Intelligence emanating from the small CIA presence in Korea received an equally cool reception from FECOM. Intelligence that came the way of these elements was procured largely through liaison with Republic of Korea (ROK) sources. As such, it was deemed unreliable, and the information received was often conflicting. Intelligence officers back in Tokyo had heard "wolf" cried too often to believe that anything was actually going to happen. Lack of intelligence resources and hard data was paralleled by a lack of intelligence perception. Because the North Korean destabilization campaign against the South had failed, it was too easily assumed that the North would turn to political initiatives.[2]

The advance of T-34 tanks across the 38th parallel shattered the illusions of FECOM policymakers. The rapid collapse of ROK forces meant that only outside military help could prevent a Communist takeover of the whole Korean Peninsula. At the direction of the President and acting under the authority of the UN, FECOM quickly moved to intervene. But it found that in the field of intelligence, as in almost everything else, five years of peacetime occupation duty had

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left American forces in Japan less than well equipped to meet an outside challenge.[3]

On paper, FECOM controlled substantial intelligence assets. MacArthur's intelligence chief Willoughby had over 2,500 intelligence personnel at his disposal, but these elements were organized to support an army of occupation. The largest single intelligence component within FECOM was the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment, targeted against Japanese subversive elements. It reported to MacArthur in his capacity as Supreme Commander Allied Powers, not as head of FECOM. The four Army divisions in Japan had no organic CIC detachments.[4]

A large Military Intelligence Service Company of Japanese interpreters supported the 441st CIC Detachment, but there were only two Korean linguists at G-2's disposal. FECOM's Technical Intelligence Section had been discontinued in 1949. The PHOTINT capability of the command had shriveled. Cryptologic resources were equally lacking. The Army Security Agency, Pacific (ASAPAC) had two companies and two detachments in the Far East, but these were trained and equipped for fixed-site operations, and could not easily be shifted to the field. ASA was not able to deploy a tactical unit in Korea until October, when a company was shipped from the United States.[5]

A Need for HUMINT

The adverse combat situation confronted by FECOM and the Eighth Army in Korea during the summer of 1950 created a critical need for hard intelligence. With other assets unavailable, this could only be provided by HUMINT. An organization was quickly built around the nucleus of the KLO, using personnel from the 441st CIC Detachment. To carry out its mission, the KLO hastily recruited Korean peasants, gave them sketchy training, and airdropped them behind enemy lines with instructions to return with intelligence reports. In addition, it set up Tactical Liaison Offices (TLOs) at division level to recruit Koreans as line-crossers to gather clandestine HUMINT. Although it operated in support of Eighth Army and its tactical commanders, the whole structure remained firmly under Willoughby's control.[6]

Agent casualties were high, and the quality of intelligence produced unsatisfactory. But, in the early stages of the war, it was all the UN forces had. Nonetheless, the KLO tried to improve the collection situation as early as August 1950. One basic problem was that both agent insertion techniques used by the KLO--parachute drops and line-crossing--were intrinsically hazardous, and even parachute agents had to exfiltrate through enemy lines to bring back their reports. The KLO came up with the idea of using small boats both to land its agents behind enemy lines and to retrieve them, thus bypassing the dangers of the fighting front. The cooperation of the ROK Navy was necessary for this effort, however, and this was difficult to obtain. The whole idea was temporarily abandoned in September, when the needs of the forthcoming amphibious operation at Inchon absorbed all available shipping.[7]

Some Improvement

By the time of the Inchon landing, the intelligence picture in FECOM was improving. The theater had received additional intelligence assets, and focus on the Korean problem at the national level was producing results. The rapid collapse of the North Korean Army appeared to make further efforts at establishing a permanent intelligence organization unnecessary. But the very success of UN forces exacted a price: intelligence elements repeatedly had to displace to keep up with the pace of the advance, and this disorganized the intelligence structure and impaired its operational capabilities.

The Chinese Threat

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The coming of November brought a new threat, the possibility of intervention by Communist China. Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai had publicly announced that China would enter the war if US forces crossed the 38th parallel. Although the United States had decided to ignore this threat as a bluff, American intelligence was aware that 400,000 troops of China's best formation, the Fourth Field Army, were being concentrated just across the Yalu River in Manchuria. Some of these forces crossed over into Korea in October and early November, sharp clashes with UN troops ensued, and Army intelligence discovered the Chinese presence by finding that US and ROK forces had taken Chinese prisoners.[8]

The meaning of all this remained enigmatic. The Chinese soon disengaged, and the Chinese prisoners of war, when interrogated, claimed they were members of "Special Military Units" which at first were assumed to be only token cadres from the Fourth Field Army. While Army intelligence realized the Chinese did have the military capability for a full-scale intervention, it doubted they would pursue such a course. If the Chinese had failed to intervene in August, when the Eighth Army was trapped in the Pusan perimeter and intervention could have been decisive, it seemed irrational for them to intervene when North Korea had been broken. It appeared more plausible to assume that the Chinese presence in Korea was in the nature of a face-saving gesture.[9]

The hard fact was that FECOM again found itself reduced to speculation about enemy intentions because it still lacked the intelligence resources needed to resolve the problem. Manchuria was off-limits to photographic reconnaissance because of diplomatic considerations, limited aerial surveillance of Korea was unproductive, and other sophisticated collection mechanisms were targeted exclusively against the Korean problem and lacked the linguistic and technical capability to switch quickly.[10]

With his armies on the threshold of victory--the vanguards of the Eighth Army were across the Chongchon River in western Korea, those of X Corps nearing the Yalu in the East--MacArthur was in no mood to be deprived of triumph by the mere specter of a Chinese Army. He decided to subject the question of just what Chinese intentions might be to an acid test. On 24 November 1950, he ordered his widely dispersed forces to attack into the unknown.[11]

KLO Handicaps

The UN offensive ran head-on into 30 Chinese divisions that had secretly crossed over from Manchuria. The attack became a fighting retreat. The Eighth Army fell back from the Chongchon with heavy losses; X Corps began the difficult process of cutting its way back through the mountains to the port of Hungnam. By mid-December, as UN forces continued their retreat, the Chinese once more disengaged. Pursued by an overwhelming force, the Eighth Army found itself completely ignorant of how this force was disposed or where it might be attacking next.[12]

At this critical juncture, FECOM turned once more to clandestine HUMINT to meet its pressing need for intelligence. But the KLO organization (now officially titled the Far East Command Liaison Group, Korea) was in no condition to meet the requirements. There were no agent assets in the areas in which the Chinese were advancing. The KLO did have the capability of inserting parachute agents in "blind drops," using Air Force C-47s, but the AVIARY program, as it was called, operated under severe disabilities. The standard of agent training was low, and the KLO had no radios suitable for agent work and no agents trained in radio operation. In a desperate attempt to clarify the tactical situation, the KLO was reduced to dropping 12 two-man agent teams equipped with smoke grenades north of UN lines to establish the location of the Chinese forces. Only a few teams ever managed to signal Air Force spotter planes, all with negative results.[13]

The 442d CIC Detachment

Map of North Korea (U)

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In these darkest days of the war, FECOM responded to the intelligence challenge by setting up a new unit to conduct an expanded program of clandestine HUMINT. The 442d CIC Detachment was activated on 20 December 1950 in Seoul with 50 assigned personnel to take over operational control of the KLO central office and the division level TLOs. On paper, the 442d was a normal CIC unit, organized under a standard cellular Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE 30-500) and commanded by a regular army officer, Col. C.A. Dickey. In reality, it was a highly unusual organization assigned a positive clandestine collection mission that went far beyond the CIC's normal responsibilities.[14]

The 442d had a turbulent beginning. Two days after the unit was officially activated in Seoul, the deteriorating military situation forced it to establish a rear headquarters in the city of Taegu. The rest of the headquarters soon followed to escape the second Communist occupation of the South Korean capital. But the rapid revival of the Eighth Army's fortunes under its new commander, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, put an end to further UN retreats. Working from a secure base, the 442d was able to upgrade the FECOM clandestine HUMINT program between January 1951 and the first armistice negotiations in June, making significant accomplishments in the areas of agent insertion, communications, and training.[15]

Until early 1951, agents had been inserted by line-crossing and by parachute drop. At the TLO level, hundreds of Korean peasants were sent to gather limited information about enemy dispositions in front of the UN lines. The KLO had its own line-crossers; it also paradropped smaller numbers of Korean agents on long-range collection missions, using Air Force AVIARY C-47s controlled by Eighth Army's Special Activities Mission. Both techniques resulted in heavy losses of agents. To remedy this situation, the 442d began to supplement its ground and parachute insertion methods by using boats to land agents behind enemy lines, a course first suggested in the summer of 1950.[16]

SALAMANDER

Confronted by an unacceptable loss rate among their line-crossers, the TLO teams of the 3d and 25th Infantry Divisions began transporting agents by small boats around the enemy's flank on the west coast of Korea. At the same time, the 442d CIC Detachment's headquarters element implemented a much larger program of amphibious espionage and was given the codename SALAMANDER. This involved the use of Korean-manned fishing boats to insert long-range agents deep within enemy territory. SALAMANDER operations were initially conducted from the numerous islands off the Korean west coast that were to the rear of the enemy's lines. These islands were rendered more or less secure from hostile attack by the UN naval blockade, and many were already in the hands of anti-Communist North Korean partisans.[17]

The first SALAMANDER operations were mounted from the island of Paengyong Do, just below the 38th parallel. They soon moved to a more advanced base at Cho Do, strategically located just five miles off the North Korean coast. The position gave the 442d's agents access to the whole west coast of Korea up to the Yalu river. To complement this west coast operation, the 442d later initiated plans to establish an east coast SALAMANDER base on the bleak and inhospitable island of Yodo. This move would provide intelligence coverage of another enemy flank, as well as allow agents to provide extensive lateral coverage of North Korean positions, because they could land on one coast and exfiltrate from the other. Because the native fishing boats used by the operation were both small and unseaworthy, the 442d quickly took steps to secure fast American craft.[18]

Better Communications

Agent communications were also improved. Until the end of December 1950, radios had been unavailable, and the 442d's agent handlers were forced to wait until an agent actually returned to base before they could procure any intelligence. The situation gradually improved in 1951. Radio teams equipped with SCR-300 walkie-talkies were provided for both AVIARY and

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SALAMANDER operations.

The use of voice radio allowed agents to furnish Army intelligence with information on a real-time basis. But this was not a panacea. Voice radio had its limitations; its short range meant that relays had to be used--SALAMANDER agents passed their messages through the Cho Do base--or that aircraft had to hover in the immediate area of the agent radio teams, risking compromise of the mission. An additional complication was that some of the Air Force crews who provided communications support to AVIARY operations were inexperienced, because they flew the mission for an average of only two weeks. Many agent radio teams were lost. Continuous wave (CW) radios, with their longer range, would have helped, but agents had not yet been trained in Morse code.[19]

On the other hand, at least agents were now provided with some minimal training. In March 1951, the 442d set up a training school at Pusan that provided 20 agents at a time with a basic two-week course of instruction. (The facility moved to Taegu in June.) After completing training, the new agents went to the TLO teams and the 442d's central office. Unsurprisingly, American intelligence personnel rated the new breed of agents as "far superior" to their predecessors. For example, reports noted that the new agents "appear to be enthusiastic" and "have a basic idea of the mission."

Better training seems to have been partially offset by increased enemy security measures. Line-crossing continued to be a hazardous operation, and agent capture rates increased, although a surprisingly large number of detained agents were able to escape and make it back to UN lines. At any rate, the new recruitment and training program made it easier to obtain replacements.[20]

Improved Capabilities

The growing efficiency of FECOM's clandestine HUMINT operations was paralleled in other intelligence fields, as language and other problems were resolved. The overall improvement of intelligence capabilities took place during a period when the Eighth Army's fortunes were on the upswing. As early as mid-January 1951, UN forces had been able to mount a limited counterattack. In March, Seoul was recaptured. While MacArthur was relieved for insubordination in April and replaced by General Ridgway, UN forces continued to push the enemy back across the 38th parallel. On 23 June 1951, the Soviet UN Ambassador announced that North Korea was now interested in peace talks, and Ridgway offered armistice negotiations to the enemy commander.[21]

Peace was not at hand, however. Although peace talks began and the UN forces halted their advance, there was no ceasefire. Negotiations dragged on for two years, accompanied by a static war of attrition in which hills changed hands from time to time in bloody skirmishes while the main battleline remained stable. No longer forced to respond to the intelligence crises of the moment, FECOM began to build up an elaborate semipermanent clandestine HUMINT structure to meet the needs of a new kind of war.

The Liaison Detachment

The new effort was conducted under a revised organizational structure. The 442d CIC Detachment was inactivated on 26 July 1951, and its personnel and assets transferred to a new organization, the 8240th Army Unit. (In addition to its Korea-based assets, the 8240th consisted of a headquarters element in Tokyo and a logistic element in Sapporo, Japan.) The former KLO/TLO organization now became known as the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea. The Liaison Detachment, commanded by Col. William I. Russell, had an authorized strength of 104. Because of a shortage of intelligence specialists, and the Army's decision to return gradually all CIC personnel to their normal assignments, it took some time to gather the necessary numbers. Colonel Russell started out with only the 50-odd people he had inherited from the 442d.[22]

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The tight personnel situation led to a new development in agent training--agent nets--that were set up by the summer of 1951. These consisted of permanent agent organizations behind enemy lines, linked to headquarters by radio control and supplied and reinforced by SALAMANDER and AVIARY operations. These nets were now entrusted with training, thus allowing the school at Taegu to be shut down. Under the new arrangements, each net recruited its own agents (many from the large refugee camps on the island of Koje-do), put them through a two-week training course, and sent them to the frontline TLO teams for assignment in the field. Agents who successfully completed five line-crossing missions were given two weeks of additional training and then went into the SALAMANDER or AVIARY programs.

The new approach was not completely successful. In practice, only 25 percent of agents managed to complete as many as four line-crossing missions for the TLOs. Centralized training was revived in October, when three nets were consolidated and a new school set up in Seoul. Ultimately, a compromise between the two approaches was reached: the nets provided basic agent training and the school became responsible for advanced radio and parachute training.[23]

New Sources of Agents

In addition, the Liaison Detachment found new sources from which to procure agents. A Korean religious group with many adherents in the North, the Chando Kyo, was tapped to provide an agent network. Chinese POWs who rallied to the UN side were dispatched on order of battle missions. Finally, the Liaison Detachment acquired 124 agents formerly employed by the ROK Army's Headquarters Intelligence Division (HID). These agents had been operating from bases on the Korean east coast, both at Yodo, where there were already Liaison Detachment operatives, and on islands in Wonsan Harbor. Because the HID had run out of funds, the US Army picked up the tab and the people.[24]

The Liaison Detachment also further improved agent communi-cations. By the summer of 1951, it was at last possible to set up a 10-week Morse code course for agents, which permitted the nets to use long-range CW radios. By September, an elaborate communi-cations system was in place. A network of safehouses forward of UN lines received intelligence reports from agents via voice radio. The reports were then relayed back to the various TLOs by means of Morse code. The safe houses employed SSR-5-R CW radios; the TLOs were equipped with the standard Army AN/GRC-9's. Message traffic was then passed on by the TLOs to Liaison Detachment headquarters. The main SALAMANDER base at Cho Do communicated with headquarters and its west coast agents by similar means.[25]

By the fall of 1951, the Liaison Detachment began to reevaluate its procedures for inserting long-range penetration agents. The SALAMANDER operation, which used boats to land and retrieve agents, had been very successful. By contrast, the AVIARY program, which dropped parachute agents deep within enemy territory and then required them to make it back to UN lines on their own, produced less satisfactory results. Although AVIARY operations were intensively pursued--111 agents were parachuted in during a single month--the rate of return was discouragingly low. At one point in October, the Liaison Detachment contemplated reducing its airborne operations by 50 percent. Instead, it decided to adopt a new technique. Agents would be dropped in teams close behind enemy lines, wearing enemy uniforms and carrying small arms. In this way, they could impersonate enemy patrols and, if necessary, shoot their way back to UN lines. Use of this tactic, along with better screening of agents and more specific intelligence assignments, greatly reduced losses and gave AVIARY a renewed viability.[26]

CCRAK and the Liaison Detachment

The Army's clandestine HUMINT effort in Korea had now become part of a wider secret war, waged on an extensive but uncoordinated basis. In parallel with the Liaison Detachment's

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operations, the Eighth US Army was supporting a growing partisan effort on the Korean west coast that was based on the same islands that served as SALAMANDER bases. These islands also provided bases for various clandestine operations undertaken by the US Air Force, which used them to gather intelligence and to support the escape and evasion of downed fliers. The CIA was another player in the secret war.[27]

To better coordinate these fragmented efforts, a new theater-level structure was created on 10 December 1951, called the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK). CCRAK was an umbrella organization set up to impose centralized control on the secret activities of the armed services, the CIA, and the ROK allies. At the same time CCRAK was formed, the Army decided to place all its covert and clandestine efforts under a single headquarters. The Eighth Army's 8086th Army Unit, which had been running the partisan effort, was dissolved. The Liaison Detachment took over its functions and assets.[28]

The Liaison Detachment thus became a miniature Army version of the World War II OSS, with responsibilities for secret intelligence and special operations, the first time these two functions had been combined in a single Army organization. The arrangement had a certain logic to it. In accordance with existing doctrine, it moved control of partisan warfare from the field army to the theater level. The reorganization also provided the Liaison Detachment with a partisan force that could protect its island bases and provide it with supplementary intelligence reports. And the Liaison Detachment was finally in a position to prevent partisan operations from inadvertently jeopardizing intelligence activities.[29]

More Manpower

This increase in the Liaison Detachment's responsibilities brought with it an increase in personnel. By February 1952, the Detachment had 150 assigned or attached personnel on board; by the time a ceasefire was finally concluded in the summer of 1953, the Detachment had a strength of 450. (Even then, there were complaints that the Detachment still had too few intelligence personnel to fulfill mission requirements.) While Army strength in Korea remained stable from 1951 on, the proportion of resources devoted to intelligence and covert activities was much expanded. Because UN policy ruled out additional territorial gains on the battlefield, the secret war was the only combat arena in which efforts could be intensified.[30]

A good part of the growth permitted by this strength increase went into expanding the clandestine HUMINT effort. By 1953, a large, formidable organization had been fielded. The Liaison Detachment's Intelligence Division controlled five separate Intelligence Commands. Each had its own geographic area of responsibility (although one command conducted operations on both coasts of Korea and across the frontlines), but the commands were also allowed to penetrate North Korea, Manchuria, and China proper to the extent their resources permitted. The five commands directed the activities of 17 separate agent nets, all with radio links to the appropriate command headquarters.

No fewer than 2,100 agents reported to the Liaison Detachment. Badger Net alone had 450 agents. Three hundred of these were in North Korea, either in permanent cells or as temporary inserts; the rest were at headquarters, in training, or in reserve.[31]

Intelligence Production

The nature of the game meant that the structure was not perfect. The necessity of setting up a clandestine organization in a denied area under wartime conditions had forced compromises both in administration and in the caliber of recruited agents. (In light of the fact that it was not until 1953 that TLO agents received the same pay as day laborers working for the Eighth Army, the latter deficiency is particularly unsurprising.) Some nets produced only inconclusive results, and no evidence exists that any were able to supply high-level intelligence on enemy plans.

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Nevertheless, by the end of the war the Liaison Detachment had become the chief producer of HUMINT for the whole CCRAK organization, furnishing up to 1,000 intelligence reports a month, most graded by consumers as being of significant importance. This represented a five-fold increase over the detachment's output in 1951. The Liaison Detachment's contribution to CCRAK was as great as that of the Air Force's clandestine service, ROK Army G-2, and the CIA's collection element combined.[32]

Paying a Price

This elaborate clandestine HUMINT apparatus was not built without a certain price. The Korean agents bore most of the costs and risks, and their losses had been high, especially in the first stages of the effort. But Liaison Detachment personnel also met their deaths trying to insert agents. An Air Force C-46 went down over North Korea one night in February 1952, carrying three Detachment personnel, seven Air Force crewmen, and six Korean agents and an interpreter.

In April 1953, the ill-omened Fizzle Net, operating from Yodo on the east coast under the 4th Intelligence Command, ceased to exist when the American lieutenant serving as project officer was ambushed and killed with his agent party in a landing attempt that went awry.[33]

Partisan Warfare

The expansion of the partisan operation that the Liaison Detachment had taken over from the Eight Army at the end of 1951 was even more striking. The private army of guerrillas inherited by the Liaison Detachment originated in the various groups of anti-Communist refugees from North Korea who had fled to the islands off the western coast of Korea in the winter of 1950-1951. The Eighth Army had taken these groups in hand in early 1951 and used them to form a partisan force. So-called donkey units of partisans were assembled around a hastily trained indigenous cadre and used as a raiding force against the mainland. The islands from which they operated were strategically located behind enemy lines and were protected from enemy attack by the UN naval blockade and ROK garrisons. Because the partisans required only a few American personnel as advisers, they represented an effective, inexpensive force multiplier for the Eighth Army.[34]

By September 1951, the donkey units on the Korean west coast had been grouped into two regiments named Leopard and Wolfpack. In addition, a company assigned the designation Kirkland had been organized on Yodo Island off the east coast of Korea. At this point, the increased activity and visibility of the partisans began to provoke a violent North Korean reaction. Some of the more vulnerable islands on the west coast came under enemy attack. This posed a threat to the partisans and to the SALAMANDER HUMINT operations of the Liaison Detachment. The end result was that the guerrillas had come under Liaison Detachment control.[35]

During the course of 1952, the Liaison Detachment expanded the initially small Kirkland force on Yodo to regimental strength. The Leopard and Wolfpack organizations on the west coast were also built up. Operating from their island safehavens and assisted by a sprinkling of American advisers and US logistic support, the partisans waged a lively little war of their own. That year, the partisans optimistically claimed to have inflicted 51,000 casualties on enemy forces. Partisan casualties, however, were not light: the partisans had to defend their own island bases in addition to mounting offensive raids, and some islands changed hands two or three times. More than 2,000 partisans became casualties in 1952, and more than half of these were killed or listed as missing in action.[36]

PAIR

The Army viewed this kind of amphibious warfare as a success. In the Korean war's wider context,

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however, the partisans were more of a nuisance to the enemy than a real threat. They were never able to establish any bases on the mainland or conduct operations larger than raids. Moreover, landing operations were hampered by the harsh Korean winters and, on the west coast, by the enormous tidal fluctuations that regularly turned beaches into vast and impassable mudflats.

Meanwhile, even more ambitious schemes were under way. In April 1952, FECOM produced a *Guerrilla Operations Outline, 1952*. This proposed adding an airborne dimension to the existing partisan amphibious operations. FECOM decreed that "all commands will qualify paratroops." Accordingly, paratroop trainees were cadred out of the existing Leopard, Wolfpack, and Kirkland formations and grouped in a unit that officially became the 1st Partisan Airborne Infantry Regiment (PAIR) in November 1952. At the same time, the Leopard, Wolfpack, and Kirkland units were redesignated respectively as the 1st, 2d, and 3d Partisan Infantry Regiments.[37]

The first contingent of the 1st PAIR's new airborne troops was committed to action in early 1953. On the night of 23 January, a flight of three Air Force C-119s guided by a B-26 Pathfinder aircraft airdropped a special 97-man "Green Dragon" unit behind enemy lines to set up an operational base for guerrilla activities. The fate of this first (and, as it turned out, only) major employment of partisans in an airborne role was not a happy one. After a long delay, the party made radio contact with headquarters and reported taking heavy casualties. Reinforcements and supplies were promptly flown in to sustain the Green Dragon force. But when the final cease-fire was concluded in June 1953, the last radio message to reach the Liaison Division from Green Dragon was a curse. The operation had been compromised, and was under enemy control.[38]

The whole episode became just another part of the generally melancholy story of airborne special operations during the Korean war. The 8240th Army Unit and its Air Force counterpart repeatedly launched behind-the-lines sabotage missions. Hundreds of Koreans floated down on night drops into the black hole of North Korea and were never heard from again. In 1952, the 8240th had paradropped "Mustang Ranger" teams of partisans behind enemy lines on half-a-dozen occasions to attack enemy railroad lines. The teams varied in size from 5 to 20 men. They all met the same fate. After the "Green Dragon" operation had commenced, additional large sabotage teams drawn from the ranks of the 1*st* PAIR were sent in. None survived.[39]

In 1951 and 1952, the Far East Air Force had dropped some 200 sabotage agents of its own on 19 separate missions directed against North Korean facilities. The agents accomplished practically nothing, and only one party ever returned safely to UN lines. Despite these unpromising precedents, the Liaison Detachment's Guerrilla Division had laid plans in the spring of 1953 to use the 1st PAIR's "Southwind" element in yet another attempt at mounting sabotage operations. It proposed to parachute in 48 two-man teams to blow up North Korean railroads. Perhaps fortunately for all concerned, the mission was never implemented.[40]

The failure of the Green Dragon operation did not become apparent until the fighting had ended. Thus, during the first part of 1953, the Liaison Detachment was encouraged to lay down plans for an ambitious and greatly expanded program of guerrilla warfare. In addition to building up the 1st PAIR, the Detachment expanded two of its original regiments to provide additional forces for seaborne raids and assaults. The overstrength 1st Partisan Infantry Regiment was split up, allowing the formation of a new 6th Partisan Infantry Regiment. In similar fashion, the 2d Partisan Infantry Regiment contributed personnel to form a new 5th Partisan Infantry Regiment. The regiment based on the Korean east coast, the 3d Partisan Infantry, was too small to break up in this way, but its members were given airborne training. (There was no 4th Partisan Infantry Regiment, because Koreans allegedly associated the number four with bad luck.) [41]

A Small Army

As a result of these preparations, the Liaison Detachment had fielded what amounted to its own Korean Army by the time of the July 1953 ceasefire. The six-regiment force had a strength of

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more than 17,000 troops. The small American cadre assigned to the partisans included 55 personnel from the Army's newly organized 10th Special Forces Group.

This guerrilla army possessed 300 trucks and trailers; was equipped with its own freighters, crash boats, and fishing vessels; and consumed 7500 tons of supplies a month. Rice accounted for the bulk of the supply allotment; each partisan was issued 100 pounds a month, some for personal consumption, the rest for barter. The partisans also had their own chaplains, band, and travelling entertainment troupe. The Liaison Detachment even published a house magazine for them, *The Parachute*.[42]

All this was something of a triumph for American-style organization. There were, however, some liabilities. Understandably, there was a certain rivalry between the American-controlled partisans and the regular ROK forces. Also, the partisan operation had swollen to such a size that some now questioned its effectiveness. While partisan raiders had served as a useful adjunct to UN forces, their value when used in large conventional units was open to dispute, especially because of the nature of their training and equipment.

The question was never fully resolved. A ceasefire occurred before the new partisan structure could be committed to battle, the guerrillas were forced to evacuate their island bases which lay north of the Demilitarized Zone now demarcating North and South Korea, and most of the partisan units were disbanded.[43]

Psywar Activity

In 1953, the Detachment also expanded its responsibilities to include psychological warfare, or "psywar." This might seem to be an odd area of involvement for what began as an intelligence organization, but there were precedents. The OSS had conducted psychological warfare operations in World War II, and Army doctrine closely linked covert operations and psychological warfare. By mid-1953, the Liaison Detachment was providing classroom training to Koreans in psychological warfare and preparing propaganda leaflets for distribution in the enemy rear. In addition, it was using propaganda to sustain the morale of its own partisans.[44]

Evaluation

The KLO and its successor organizations, the 442d CIC Detachment and the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea, occupy a unique place in the history of Army intelligence. The KLO started out as a small residual FECOM intelligence presence in Korea, increased in scope as a result of the North Korean invasion, and then was redesignated and further expanded during the darkest days of the war. Ultimately, it was redesignated once more and given responsibility for the whole Army covert and clandestine effort in Korea. Its particular pattern of organization, however, would not provide an operational model for Army intelligence in the future. The Liaison Detachment's structure was revamped almost as soon as the fighting in Korea ended.

Essentially, the Liaison Detachment was a creature of the Korean war. Its efforts produced a certain long-term impact: the Army was made aware of the potentialities for conducting positive human intelligence collection in peace as well as war. Moreover, certain Special Forces operations in Vietnam would later parallel, but not replicate, Liaison Detachment activities in Korea. Generally, however, the organization's accomplishments and the lessons learned from them went down a historical memory hole and passed into oblivion along with other aspects of America's "forgotten war" in Korea.[45]

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Notes

(1) John K. Singlaub, *Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Summit Books, 1991), pp. 156-166.

(2) Bruce W. Bidwell, "History of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff," (US Army Center of Military History unpublished ms., Vol. VII, Chapter III), p. 22.

(3) On the overall unreadiness of the Eighth Army in the summer of 1950, see Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987), pp. 48-50.

(4) US Army Intelligence Center, "History of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Volume I: Introduction and Background," (Unpublished ms., 1959), p. 101.

(5) Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ FEC, "Historical Report, 1 January-30 October 1950," p. 103, RG 338, NARA; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, "Summary of Major Activities Relating to the Korean Conflict, 25 June 1950-8 September 1951," US Army Center of Military History; S.L.A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet: Defeat of the Eighth Army by the Chinese Communist Forces, November 1950, in the Battle of the Chongchon River, Korea* (Nashville: Battery Press, 1987), p. 5.

(6) Of the early parachute agents, Marshall noted that "Frequently the Commanding General's plane was used to carry these men into nowhere." *The River and the Gauntlet*, pp. 3-4. The TLO, as one officer put it, was basically a "glorified reconnaissance unit" designed to obtain order of battle information by using agents to conduct shallow penetration missions. To ensure it remained under GHQ FECOM control, the TLO was also assigned a notional strategic intelligence mission. Agents were a mixed bag whose numbers included high school-age children, women, the aged, and deserters from both the North and South Korean armies. Author's interview with Russell K. Leick, 20 January 1985.

(7) Marshall grimly noted that in these operations, "Only the loss rate fulfilled expectations." *The River and the Gauntlet*, p. 5; 442d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, Historical Report, 1 March 1951, RG 319, NARA. Returning agents ran the risk of being mistaken for enemy infiltrators and shot by troops from their own side. Ed Evanhoe, *Darkmoon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 13.

(8) Roy E. Appleman, *United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), p. 761.

(9) *Ibid.*, pp. 753, 761-764.

(10) *Ibid.*, pp. 769-770; Historical Report, 442d CIC Detachment, 1 March 1951, RG 319, NARA.

(11) James F. Schnabel, *United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), p. 278.

(12) Upon assuming command of the Eighth Army, General Matthew B. Ridgway recalls that all he had in the way of intelligence about the enemy north of his lines was a map showing "A big red goose egg...with '174,000' scrawled in the middle of it." *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, as told to Harold H. Martin (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974), p. 205. The situation did not quickly improve; in February 1951, Ridgway reported that, "We have a curtain beyond the range of our immediate combat intelligence activities which I find extremely difficult to pierce." Roy E. Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1990), p. 312.

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(13) Memorandum for Record, Far East Command Liaison Group, 17 December 1950; Command Report, 442d CIC Detachment,1 January 1951, RG 319, NARA.

(14) GO 86, GHQ FEC, 8 December 50-AMENDED by GO 87, GHQ FEC, 11 December 50; Foreword, Historical Report, 442d CIC Detachment,1 March 1951, RG 319, NARA.

(15) Command Report-December 1950, 442d CIC Detachment.

(16) *Ibid.* Parachute operations were particularly costly: a former AVIARY operations officer estimated that only 20 percent of agents dispatched managed to make it back to UN lines. (However, he thought it possible that an unknown number of the agents who failed to return were stranded North Koreans who had used AVIARY as an airline ticket home.) Until agents could be furnished radios, these operations also involved long delays in procuring intelligence: because of the distances involved, paradropped agents commonly took two to three months to complete their missions. Author's interview with Winston J. Morgan, 30 January 1985.

(17) Historical Report, 442d CIC Detachment, 1 March 1951.

(18) *Ibid.*; Historical Reports, 442d CIC Detachment, April 1951, May 1951, June 1951, RG 319, NARA.

(19) Memorandum for Record, Far East Command Liaison Group, 17 December 1950; Twenty UHF-VHF air-sea rescue sets had been acquired in mid-December, but had arrived without operating manuals and proved to be of insufficient range to be useful. Command Report-December 1950, 442d CIC Detachment; Historical Report, 442d CIC Detachment, June 1951, RG 319, NARA. Once voice radios became available, airborne radio control support was provided by the C-46s of the 438th Troop Carrier Command staging out of Japan. Historical Report, 442d CIC Detachment, April 1951, RG 319, NARA.

(20) Historical Reports, 442d CIC Detachment, April 1951, May 1951, July 1951, RG 319, NARA.

(21) Schnabel, *United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction, passim.*

(22) GO 53, GHQ FEC, 24 July 1951; Historical Report, Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea (FEC/LD(K)), 8240th Army Unit, 1 August 1951. Eight Navy personnel were assigned to the unit in a temporary duty status.

(23) Historical Reports, FEC/LD (K), 1 September 1951, 1 October 1951, 1 November 1951, RG 319 NARA.

(24) Historical Report, FEC/LD (K), 1 November 1951.

(25) *Ibid.*

(26) Historical Reports, FEC/LD (K), 1 August 1951, 1 November 1951.

(27) *Guerilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950-1953* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Aerospace Studies Institute, 1964), pp. 64-72; Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), p. 103.

(28) *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea*, p. 86; Paddock, *US Army Special Warfare*, p.103. One knowledgeable Army officer dismissed CCRAK as "a hodgepodge intelligence operation." Singlaub, *Hazardous Duty*, pp. 181-182.

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(29) *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea*, p. 86.

(30) Historical Report, FEC/LD (K), 1 April 1953, RG 319, NARA.

(31) *Ibid.*

(32) *Ibid.*

(33) Historical Report, FEC/LD (K), 1 March 1952; Combat Command Report, Summary of Operations, Intelligence Division, FEC/LD (K), 1 June 1953, RG 319, NARA.

(34) *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea*, pp. 64-65, 70-71, 80-84.

(35) *Ibid.*, p. 89; Historical Reports, FEC/LD (K), 1 November 1951, 1 March 1952, RG 319, NARA.

(36) Historical Report, FEC/LD(K), 1 March 1952; Monthly Command Report, HQ, Partisan Command, FEC/LD (K), 4 April 1953, RG 319, NARA.

(37) *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea*, pp. 96-99.

(38) *Ibid.*, pp. 148-150.

(39) Evanhoe, *Darkmoon*, pp. 157-160.

(40) *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea*, pp. 146-150.

(41) Monthly Command Report, HQ Partisan Command, FEC/LD (K), 4 April 1953.

(42) *Ibid.*; Combat Command Report, Summary of Operations, Intelligence Division, FEC/LD (K), 1 June 1953; Command Report No. 7, FEC/LD (K), 6 August 1953, RG 319, NARA.

(43) Evanhoe felt that exacerbating this rivalry was the "large influx of South Korean citizens into partisan ranks whose only reason for volunteering was to escape being drafted into the South Korean Army," as well as the fact that "Many of those recruited were pimps, thieves, and other undesirables who were hiding from South Korean authorities and wanted to use duty with the partisans to escape." *Darkmoon*, p. 163. Combat Command Report, Summary of Operations, Intelligence Division, FEC/LD (K), 1 June 1953; Paddock, *US Army Special Warfare*, p. 103; Command Report No. 7, FEC/LD (K), 6 August 1953.

(44) Monthly Command Report, HQ Partisan Command, FEC/LD (K), 4 April 1953.

(45) Command Report, FEC/LD (K), September 1953, 1 October 1953, RG 319, NARA; GO 269, HQ USAFE, 27 September 53; Richard H. Shultz, Jr., *The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy's and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), *passim*; John P. Finnegan, *The Army Lineage Series: Military Intelligence* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1998), pp. 124-127.

John P. Finnegan is a historian with the US Army.

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A Fond Farewell

Honoring the Office of Communications (U)

George J. Tenet and Richard D. Calder

Editor's Note: Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet and Deputy Director for Administration Richard D. Calder made the following remarks in the CIA Auditorium on 29 September 2000, when a Meritorious Unit Citation was presented to the former and current members of the Office of Communications in recognition of more than 50 years of outstanding service. (U)

DCI Tenet's Remarks

I am delighted--but not at all surprised--at the great turnout today. I learned long ago that our communications officers, past and present, share much more than a title. They share a powerful bond of commitment to their mission, their Agency, and to each other. (U)

And that is true whether you cut your teeth on HF or SKYLINK or your teeth--and a few fingers--on the torn tape of a teletype machine. The men and women of our Office of Communications have always been there for CIA and for our country.(U)

The great traditions that we celebrate today have roots that are deep and strong. They extend back more than half a century, back before the founding of our Agency, back to the cataclysmic struggle of World War II. (U) With freedom in the balance, secure communications among the Allies was essential. That included one of the first American-built "hot lines"--a radiotelephone link between the White House in Washington and the Cabinet War Rooms in London. (U)

The technology was crude, the reception was bad, and the weight was 55 tons. But the link was critical enough to warrant the closest protection. The British end of the system was in a well-guarded, underground bunker in a small room disguised--so the story goes--behind a false bathroom door allegedly reserved for Churchill himself, a door that only the most bold or the most desperate would ever dare to open. (U)

You have heard about the decisive contributions of communicators to the success of our wartime parent, the OSS. General Donovan was absolutely correct. The best information, gathered at the greatest risk and sacrifice, is worthless unless it gets to the right people at the right time. (U)

General Donovan prized his communicators for their skill and dedication. He would sometimes even take the staff of his Message Center out for beers. That was when we knew enough to have our Headquarters right up the street from a brewery. (U)

A few things have changed since then. For one, the brewery is gone. But communications--safe, swift, and sure--remain at the very heart of intelligence and espionage. That is a truth that the communicators of CIA have proved over and over again. (U)

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The demands that we place on you have always been heavy. Engineering. Maintenance. Cryptography. Administration. Security. Leadership. And much, much more. All to be performed under difficult, often dangerous, conditions. (U)

As President Clinton wrote: "The men and women of the Office of Communications have endured many hardships. They have been in the thick of battle, survived coups, civil unrest, bombings, natural disasters, separation from family and isolation--all in the highest spirit of patriotism and dedication. Without their sacrifice, the intelligence mission of the United States could not be accomplished." (U)

The Office of Communications has always focused on achievement, not recognition. Excellence was expected of commo officers. If your post was in a war zone, off you went. If it was a singleton Station deep in the jungle, off you went. (U)

As serious as the challenges have been, are today, and will be tomorrow, they have never matched the will and capacity of our communicators to meet them. And they never will.(U)

For your greatest legacy is not only the two words "can do," but also the ones that you inevitably put right beside them: "will do." To me, that is the spirit of the Agency's communicator, the spirit of the history that you and your predecessors have written, a history of technical excellence and human valor. (U)

The examples of that excellence and valor are many. I could never hope to do them justice here today. But from the earliest days, the mission has come first. In the late 1940s, as our bases in China closed amid the advance of Communist armies, our valiant communicators developed three priorities: keeping their links open as long as possible, destroying or dispersing their equipment, and getting away safely. The order of those priorities was no accident. (U)

The selfless values of the Office of Communications--forged in war and passed along ever since from generation to generation--have inspired countless acts of bravery:

- The officer who climbed a flagpole atop a seven-story building to repair a vital antenna that had been blown away.
- The officer who--at an embassy under siege--continued to destroy classified material while the floor tiles buckled from the heat of fires below.
- The officer who came to view artillery rounds, car bombs, and kidnapping attempts as just another day at the office.
- And, finally, the officers who endured 444 days of captivity, emerging far stronger than those who took them hostage and who hoped in vain to break their spirit. (U)

These patriots are not abstract figures from some distant past. Each and every one of them is right here with us this afternoon. They are heroes in a community of heroes. (U//FOUO)

Whether under pressure or under fire, the men and women of the Office of Communications provide the secure and reliable networks that modern intelligence demands. The motto "first in, last out" is no cliché. It is a reality that reflects the central role you play. (U)

I have been privileged to see that reality for myself, here at Headquarters and around the world. Wherever I go, secure communications go with me. Faxes, laptops, STU-IIIs, satellite links--the whole package. It is almost magical to watch those command posts materialize again and again in what seems like the blink of an eye. (U)

But I know that magic does not do it--commo people do. Specifically, my guys Mike and Jeff and

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the rest of their team. I have learned a few of the secrets of their success: first comes talent, care, and passion. The second secret: no matter what the circumstances, they always seem to have a backup to the backup to the backup. (U)

There is, of course, a third secret which--like all the others--applies to the entire Office of Communications: incredible cohesion and teamwork. And incredible support from family and friends. You stand on many broad shoulders. (U)

I want to pay special recognition and tribute to the love and steadfast support of spouses, children, and other family members who made your service possible and who dealt with your danger. With grace and caring, they accepted your excuses for being missing from family action on behalf of your country.(U)

When I approved a new structure for CIA's information services, a structure that I believe will give us even greater strength and agility, I knew that it would be up to all of us to live up to the example of those who have gone before--to build on their heritage of daring, courage, and vision. (U)

The best have never seen commo as a job, but as a sacred mission with which very, very few are entrusted. As you move into a new structure--and with it a new era--the last thing I want you to do is forget who you are or where you come from.(U)

There is no prouder tradition of service and excellence in US intelligence than that of the men and women of our Office of Communications. Your work is at the core of our success. (U)

And, as DCIs have done since the birth of this Agency, and as my successors will do long into the future, I will continue to rely on you and your colleagues to provide the communications that make our work for American possible. (U)

The traditions, values, and spirit of the Office of Communications--the things that helped it do the seemingly impossible for our country for more than 50 years--have to be preserved. They can be. They must be. And I pledge to you today, that with your help, they will be. To do anything less would dishonor your service. You have my enduring admiration and respect. Congratulations. I am proud to serve with you and your families. May God bless you all. Thank you. (U)

DDA Calder's Remarks

If the past is any indication of the future, we can be certain that the beginning of the 21st century will be turbulent and unpredictable. Only a decade ago, who would have imagined the stunning geopolitical shifts that we now accept as reality--the breakup of the Soviet Union, the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, a peace process in the Middle East, the demise of apartheid in South Africa, the economic emergence of China and the Pacific Rim? And who but a small band of futurists and technologists would have predicted the incredibly rapid commercialization and spread of new technologies such as cellular and wireless communications, notebook computers, DVDs, Palm Pilots, global positioning systems, digital cameras, multimedia workstations, interactive cable, the Internet's emergence as an electronic superhighway, and more? (U)

Organizations, too, have been buffeted by a tidal wave of unimaginable changes. Once-invincible companies such as IBM, General Motors, Sony, Eastman Kodak, Aetna, Apple Computer, and even Microsoft--previously unquestioned models of organizational excellence--have experienced severe performance problems and, in many cases, sudden shifts of leadership. Even in the public sector, once-venerated institutions such as the World Bank and the UN have had their very existence questioned, while governments around the world from the United States to the UK to Australia have been reviewing, reinventing, downsizing, and privatizing their basic operations and services. (U)

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There is little doubt that this fast-track, kaleidoscopic pace of change will continue, or even accelerate. In fact, stories of organizations "hitting the wall" are becoming almost a routine feature of the business press. The question for us at CIA is how to ride the crest of this tidal wave of change and still be effective and preserve the security of the country. (U)

In this era of turbulence, the Agency cannot escape the need to reskill its people, reshape its mission portfolio, redesign its processes, and redirect its resources. Transformation is an imperative for every organization. And CIA is certainly no exception. The real issue is whether transformation happens belatedly in a crisis atmosphere or with foresight in a calm and considered atmosphere; whether the transformation agenda is set by more prescient outsiders or derives from our own point of view about the future; whether transformation is spasmodic and brutal or continuous and peaceful. I am reminded that Samuel Goldwyn once said, "Only a fool would make predictions--especially about the future." Nevertheless, I am very confident that the Agency has a strategy for coping with the future's inherent unpredictability. (U)

Director George Tenet has set out a bold Strategic Direction for CIA. He has chosen not to speculate on what might happen in the future; rather, he has challenged us to imagine what we can make happen. He has argued that our ability to reconfigure quickly our products, structures, and skills is absolutely essential in maintaining our relevance in a world that is shaken, not stirred. And he is demanding that we leverage technology more effectively in all that we do. His vision for technology is captured in the words, "speed, connectivity, and volume." Our way of acknowledging that at the heart of all the change that is swirling around us is the much-hyped, much-maligned, but absolutely critical information highway. This highway is our link to the global community, our digital pipeline for collaboration and for the networking of intelligence. Technology also is converging on the information highway. With the merging of communications and computing technologies, the Agency needs a new approach to managing its technical infrastructure. We want to be certain we are developing our people appropriately to deal with tomorrow's technology challenges. In short, it is time for a strategy reboot. (U//FOUO)

For our communicators, our communications technicians, and our commo engineers, this change in strategy means opportunity. The communications network remains central to the Agency's success. It is the vital link between Headquarters and our Stations and Bases around the world. Demands on this network are growing. In addition to cables, we now support a vast array of new technologies requiring greater sophistication in operating, maintaining, and securing these links. But the same is true at Headquarters. Our internal networks are equally vital to our success. By managing both our internal networks and our external networks as a single entity, we can much more effectively utilize the skills of our people. Equally important, this new focus will enable us to better develop the talent of our people and provide more opportunity for them to learn and manage emerging technologies. (U//FOUO)

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(U//FOUO)

Given our strategy for making our technology platforms in the field and at Headquarters as similar as possible, our communicators, technicians, and engineers now have greater assignment possibilities. The walls that separated how we operated in the field from how we operated at Headquarters are coming down. For our communicators, an assignment at Headquarters no longer needs to be dreaded. There certainly will be opportunity for our people to continue to enhance their understanding of and familiarity with technologies that will be increasingly common to both the

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field and Headquarters. Moreover, we believe we will be better able to plan and deliver training in this new environment so we can keep the skills or our people as fresh and competitive as possible. (U//FOUO)

Some things will not change. Our dependence on the dedication and can-do spirit, that has been so emblematic of the Office of Communications over the past 53 years, will not lessen. Given the increasingly uncertain environment in which we live and our growing dependence on technology, we will need to be very prudent in ensuring that we do not dilute exemplary commitment to mission that has characterized our cadre of communication officers. On any visit overseas, I am always awed by the quality and the commitment of our communicators, by their enthusiasm for understanding and integrating new technologies into their locations, by their growing indispensability in managing the proliferation of computers to the field, and by their growing prominence as "the" center of excellence as other agencies seek them out for their expertise and advice. (U)

Ultimately, everything that we are doing ties back to an essential theme of the DCI's strategic intent: putting our people at the heart of our organization. Inspiring them with the power and excitement of our mission; providing them with challenging jobs; offering them ample learning opportunities; helping them appreciate the unique talents of our diverse work force; and encouraging their entrepreneurship. (U)

Creating a new organization in the Agency is not an overnight program. It requires hard work, experimentation, persistence, and energy. And because it is not a controllable, predictable process, it also requires that we have the confidence to allow a variety or people, with different viewpoints and perspectives, to shape and reshape the future. But for those of us trying to recreate the CIA for tomorrow, this is one of the most daunting but exhilarating endeavors we will ever experience. (U)

I am reminded of a huge, white placard I saw several years ago on the side of a bus. It contained just four lines of text. The words have stuck with me over the years, and I would like to share them:

To achieve greatness: start where you are, use what you have, do what you can.

--Arthur Ashe

I find his message both inspiring and illuminating. It makes profound change manageable and makes personal change part of life. Start where you are, use what you have, do what you can. (U)

A Brief History of the Office of Communications (U)

The progenitor of the Office of Communications (OC) was the Communications Branch of the World War II OSS. By 30 September 1945, when the OSS was deactivated, Communications had become an organization consisting of 1,193 officers, civilians, and enlisted men who had operated communications facilities in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, China, and the United States in support of OSS operations designed to acquire intelligence information on Axis activities. (U)

By 18 September 1947, when CIA opened for business, the pattern of communication operations was clear, but several years were to pass before a worldwide area concept would be totally implemented. Overseas, Communications Area Headquarters were established to manage and operate the communications networks which were the

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primary means of secure US Government record communications between all official installations and Washington, DC. (U)

In the 1950s, the prevailing modes of communications used by OC were Morse Code, manual and high speed, and a limited amount of 60 words per minute (WPM) radioteletype. In most cases, one-time-pad cryptographic systems were employed, although some of the larger high-volume stations were replacing them with offline, one-time-tape systems. Demands for secure, reliable communications between Headquarters and field sites increased. A World-Wide Communications Plan was developed and approved by DCI Roscoe Henry Hillenkoetter on 25 April 1950. This became the blueprint for OC's future operations. The CIA Communications Division was re-established as the Office of Communications on 1 July 1951, by DCI Walter Bedell Smith. (U)

OC has witnessed many changes over the past 53 years--from manual Morse Code and a limited amount of 60 WPM radioteletype to the current local area network configuration; from High Frequency (HF) radio to satellite communications (SATCOM). In the spirit of the World-Wide Communications Plan "and contained forward-looking proposals," OC continued to keep pace with rapidly changing technology and was committed to being a national asset providing secure and reliable world class telecommunications and information services for our partners and customers. (U)

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Supporting Policymakers

Intelligence and US Missile Defense Planning

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Providing intelligence support to the US Government's complex endeavor to field an effective ballistic missile defense system is a daunting task. The acquisition of such a system is a major undertaking of the Department of Defense with expenditures on the order of $4 billion per year.[1] The cost of deploying the limited national missile defense system currently under consideration has been estimated at $26 billion by DoD and $30 billion by the Congressional Budget Office.[2] Moreover, missile defense has become a major domestic political issue, capable of stirring the emotions of politicians and voters alike. It is also a diplomatic issue, involving both constraints imposed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) of 1972 and opportunities for expanded collaboration with friendly nations.

Beginnings of Missile Defense

The modern missile age began on 8 September 1944 when the first one-ton warhead of a German V-2 ballistic missile exploded in London.[3] Within a short time, the British devised a scheme for downing V-2s by concentrating antiaircraft artillery fire in a segment of the sky through which the missiles would be passing. British leaders abandoned the scheme, however, when they realized that duds in their barrage would fall back on London and cause more damage than a V-2.

Washington's postwar studies of Germany's missile efforts uncovered plans for a long-range missile capable of striking targets as far away as New York city. As a result of this and other information, within a year of the war's end, the US Army Air Forces (predecessor of today's Air Force) had commissioned two technical studies to examine the feasibility of an antimissile system that could destroy incoming missiles at altitudes up to about 100 miles and ranges out to 500 miles. Meanwhile, the US Army had initiated its Nike antiaircraft missile program, which led to America's first antiballistic missile interceptor, the Nike-Zeus. In 1958, the Defense Department consolidated the Air Force and Army programs, giving the Army primary responsibility for developing missile defenses for the United States.

During this period, the Soviet Union was also hard at work on missile defenses. By 1959, Moscow had completed the preliminary design of its first system. In March 1961, the Soviets carried out a test in which an interceptor destroyed an ICBM. The first American success came over a year later with an intercept of an ICBM warhead by the Nike-Zeus in July 1962. The US system evolved over the next few years into a two-layered system called Nike-X, which comprised the Nike-Zeus (renamed Spartan); a shorter-range, high-acceleration companion missile named Sprint; and a phased-array radar. Both the US and the Soviet systems relied on nuclear warheads to accomplish the kill of enemy reentry vehicles.

In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson attempted to interest the Soviets in an arms control treaty that

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would constrain the deployment of missile defenses, but the effort was unsuccessful. His administration then decided to deploy a limited version of Nike-X, called Sentinel, which would be capable of defeating an ICBM attack from a country with relatively unsophisticated missile technology, such as China.

When Richard Nixon entered office in 1969, he modified the Sentinel program so that it would protect America's ICBM fields against a Soviet attack and the rest of the continental United States against attack by a weaker foe. This new program, named Safeguard, passed the Senate by a narrow margin in the summer of 1969. Deployment preparations began at Grand Forks, North Dakota, shortly thereafter.

Like Johnson, Nixon pursued arms control agreements with the Soviets. His administration embarked on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty negotiations, one outcome of which was the 1972 ABM Treaty, which restricted both countries' deployment of missile defense systems. The original treaty allowed two fields of no more than 100 interceptors each, one protecting an ICBM field and the other the national command authority. In 1974, a Treaty protocol reduced the two allowed ABM fields to one.

As a result of technical shortcomings, Congress shut down the Safeguard system in early 1976, a scant few months after it had become operational. The problems that precipitated the program's demise included the vulnerability of the central phased-array radar to nuclear attack and the degradation in radar performance that would result from defensive US nuclear detonations. The Soviets, on the other hand, continued with their system. Today, Russia has the world's only deployed ABM system, although knowledgeable observers believe it suffers from the same limitations as Safeguard.

Setting the Stage for SDI

The United States did not give up on missile defense in 1976, but refocused its research on non-nuclear means to disable enemy reentry vehicles. The principal concepts pursued by the Army and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) were kinetic kill--achieving a physical collision between the interceptor and target warheads--and directed energy--sending beams of light (laser radiation) or particles at or near the speed of light to disable a target booster or reentry vehicle. While this R&D was proceeding through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the Soviet Union was fast at work upgrading its ICBM force, improving accuracy and installing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on each of its huge SS-18 boosters. Washington concluded that Moscow's upgrades increased the vulnerability of US ICBM's to a Soviet first strike, thereby reducing America's retaliatory and thus deterrent capability.

When Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in 1981, he embraced the view of a number of prominent Americans--among them Senator Malcolm Wallop, Dr. Edward Teller, and Admiral James Watkins, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--who favored missile defense as a response to the Soviet buildup. On 23 March 1983, underscoring that it would be "better to save lives than to avenge them," the President announced the establishment of a formal program to investigate the feasibility of missile defenses for the nation.[4] Formally called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), this new program quickly was dubbed "Star Wars" by the media. It was administered by an organization called the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), headed by USAF Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson, formerly program manager of NASA's space shuttle program. Abrahamson reported directly to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. SDIO's initial steps included assuming control of the missile defense research and development programs underway in DARPA; the Army, Navy and Air Force; and the Defense Nuclear Agency. These programs focused on hit-to-kill interceptor development, target signature observations from space, and directed energy systems, mainly high-powered lasers. Funding averaged about $3 billion per year in the mid-1980s.

SDI prompted intense debate over whether it conformed to provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

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Nevertheless, by 1987, SDIO had developed a Phase I architecture consisting of three sensor systems (ground-based, boost-phase, and space-based), two interceptor elements (exoatmospheric reentry vehicle interceptor system and space-based interceptor), and a command and control element (battle management, command, control and communications, or BMC3). It was a multilayered system designed to defeat a major fraction of Soviet ICBMs launched against US cities or the ICBM fields that constituted the core of the US deterrent. Secretary Weinberger gave permission for this architecture to go into the concept exploration and definition phase of acquisition in September 1987. Two years later, the notional architecture was modified to reduce system vulnerability to enemy attack. Constellations of small interceptors and detection and tracking satellites--"Brilliant Pebbles" and "Brilliant Eyes"--were substituted for the original relatively small number of large satellites.

Post-Cold War Shift

The Cold War ended in 1991. Proponents of missile defense attributed the collapse of the Soviet Union to SDI, saying that Gorbachev knew that Moscow did not have the resources to compete with the United States in the missile defense arena. The threat of a massive Soviet ballistic missile attack against the United States virtually evaporated. At the same time, however, according to a thorough review of America's security needs initiated by President George H. W. Bush after he took office in 1989, the likelihood of accidental or unauthorized missile launches against the United States and the probability of missiles being used in regional conflicts involving US forces were increasing,

The first operational engagement between offensive and defensive missiles occurred during the Persian Gulf War. When Iraq began launching modified SCUD missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia in 1991, the United States modified its Patriot system, originally designed for air defense, to attempt to intercept the SCUDs. The results were mixed, but promising. As a consequence, President Bush endorsed a redirection of SDI to an architecture known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, or GPALS, comprising theater missile defenses, national missile defenses, and an overarching space-based surveillance system.

Congress took an active role in missile defense issues in the early 1990s. The Missile Defense Act of 1991 directed the Secretary of Defense to pursue a limited national missile defense (NMD) system aggressively, compliant with the ABM Treaty, for deployment by 1996 or as soon afterward as technically feasible. It also called for the development of advanced theater missile defense systems by the mid-1990s. Congress amended the act in 1992 to focus more attention on theater defenses. In the FY1993 authorization bill, Congress eliminated the requirement for fielding NMD by 1996 and placed greater emphasis on compliance with the ABM Treaty. It also removed the timetable for deploying advanced theater defenses, but directed the Pentagon to establish a Theater Missile Defense Initiative.

The Clinton administration embraced the trend toward theater missile defenses (TMD) and de-emphasized NMD. In May 1993, SDIO was renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), ending the SDI and GPALS eras. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's bottom-up review of defense needs resulted in a sharp reduction in spending for missile defense from $39 billion for the period FY1994 through FY1998 to $18 billion for the same period, less than half. Of the $18 billion, $12 billion was earmarked for fielding effective TMD in the shortest possible time, $3 billion went for research to support a speedy deployment of NMD should a serious threat to the US homeland suddenly emerge (called a "technology readiness" program), and the remainder was to be spent for technology development.

After the Republicans assumed control of the House and Senate in early 1995, Congress undertook a major reassessment of the ballistic missile defense program. As a result, Congress upgraded the NMD program from "technology readiness" to "deployment readiness" status. A Joint Program Office for NMD was established, reporting directly to the head of BMDO. This program was structured to offer the president, after three additional years of development, the option of ordering

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the deployment of a limited NMD system that would be ready for use three years later.

In September 1999, the Intelligence Community (IC), prodded by a nine-member bipartisan commission headed by former (and current) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, published a report that concluded that the ballistic missile threat to the US was greater than previously assessed; that even rogue nations like Iran could develop, in as little as five years, long-range missiles capable of reaching the US; and that the US might have little or no warning that such a threat had developed.[5] In June 2000, the administration announced that President Clinton would make an NMD deployment determination within six months. However, test failures and delays, as well as Russian resistance to modifying the ABM Treaty, caused the president in early September to postpone his decision, leaving the issue for the follow-on administration to deal with.

Identifying Threats

Intelligence analysts and collectors have multiple responsibilities for supporting the complex NMD decisionmaking process. The IC's contributions range from helping to determine the magnitude and timing of the threat--identifying probable enemies and providing the technical specifications for their ballistic missile systems--to assessing probable international reactions to US plans.

Beginning in 1995, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) issued a series of reports addressing current and future ballistic missile threats to the United States. The IC's report in September 1999 identified which countries were most likely to present ballistic missile threats to the United States over the next 15 years, absent significant political or economic changes in the threat countries or the world at large. Based on the limited data available and the judgment of engineers, the report concluded that the *most likely* ICBM threats would come from Russia, China, and North Korea, but that Iran would *probably* become a threat and Iraq could *possibly* become a threat within the time period. The latter three countries' missiles were likely to be fewer in number, limited to smaller payloads, and less reliable and accurate.[6] Nonetheless, in terms of technical development, the estimate projected that during the 2001-2005 period, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq could test ICBMs of varying capabilities--some capable of delivering several-hundred kilogram payloads to the United States.[7]

Intelligence estimates on major issues that involve strategic danger to the United States or its armed forces demand an all-source intelligence collection approach. Each member of the IC contributes what it can and all inputs are considered simultaneously in drawing the final conclusions. Satellites listen for telltale signals that suggest a test may be forthcoming and look for activities at test ranges. Agents seek documents giving project details and schedules and report on any shortages of materials or engineering design flaws that could delay missile programs. Collectors scan scientific treatises and monitor foreign country media for clues. If a test appears imminent, a US or allied aircraft or ship might move into position to collect technical data with radars and optical instruments.[8]

Collection, however, cannot answer all the questions. US missile experts need to interpret the data. They help to answer questions about whether an enemy "could" attack the United States, leaving the "will" or "would" questions to the judgment of the political analysts. Timing is critical. Fast action by policymakers can get ahead of the intelligence curve and render predictions inaccurate. According to *The New York Times*, for example, assessments of the pace of North Korea's missile development stimulated US diplomats to hold discussions with the North Koreans in early 2000, which apparently led them to slow down their efforts.[9] The constantly shifting nuances of official US policy on missile defense also present challenges to the IC's effort to ensure that its contributions remain relevant.

Providing Technical Specifications

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In addition to evaluating the threat environment, intelligence has a major role to play in identifying the detailed characteristics of enemy missile systems that will determine the design of US defenses. If these characteristics--such as the radar cross section or infrared signature of the reentry vehicle--are unknown or incorrect, the ABM system is likely to fail. Similarly, US system designers need to be alerted to any countermeasures, such as decoys or antisimulation (making reentry vehicles and decoys all look different), that an enemy missile system might employ to defeat these defenses. Accuracy is especially critical when the defensive system relies on hit-to-kill interception to disable the enemy payloads and decoys alike, as opposed to a "kill-everything" nuclear detonation.

Critical data on foreign missile systems are often unavailable, magnifying the challenges faced by the Intelligence Community. An enemy may have stringent information security measures, preventing US access to its missile program secrets. The country may not have decided which countermeasures to employ, preferring to learn more about the US system first. Or, due to competing priorities, our government might choose not to dedicate the necessary resources to this single intelligence problem to ensure a higher probability of collecting the needed data. And some data may remain uncollectable in any event.

When intelligence assessments are made based on incomplete data, the process may benefit from a "red team" approach--that is, employing one or more groups of US or Allied scientists and engineers to play the role of the enemy countermeasures designers, charging them to come up with various means they believe would defeat the US system. SDIO and BMDO sponsored such an undertaking.[10] The director of this program reported to the Director of Threat and Countermeasures, a position occupied by the author for eleven years, who reported in turn to the Director of SDIO/BMDO. This ensured a measure of independence from the program managers who might be inclined to shape the countermeasures work to preserve the promise of their systems.

In the early 1990s, with the aim of strengthening objectivity, Congress considered transferring countermeasures research from SDIO/BMDO to the Department of Energy, whose national laboratories, principally those at Los Alamos and Livermore, would perform the red team work. A review of the program by the Defense Science Board resulted in constructive recommendations, but the program was kept with its parent organization.[11]

Given that countermeasures analysis focuses on foreign activities directed against a US weapons system, a red team approach might conceivably be handled by the Intelligence Community; however, resource shortfalls, shifting priorities, and lack of proximity to data handicap potential IC leadership. The Community is not well resourced to take on major programs of a unique nature that benefit a single customer, unless, of course, it is the President or the National Security Advisor. During the early-to-mid 1990's, for example, lack of funding for measurement and signatures intelligence programs (MASINT) necessitated that SDIO/BMDO assume funding responsibility for one collector, then discontinue that support in order to take over responsibility for another, lest the latter cease critical operations supporting both the missile defense and intelligence communities. Other types of resources tend to be in short supply as well, namely engineers and scientists knowledgeable about ballistic missile systems and subsystems. The matter of priority also plays a role, with the defense customer's requirement for information at fixed points in his design schedule competing with unexpected crash projects for national policymakers that necessitate the redirection of key personnel. In addition, to understand the nature of the systems to be "defeated," red team members must keep up with the nature and progress of the US ABM program. One cannot do this remotely; it requires at least a part-time onsite presence, which the IC finds difficult to achieve. As a result, the IC has not assumed responsibility for countermeasures red teaming, although the Director of Central Intelligence formerly assigned an officer to provide managerial control over BMDO's countermeasures assessment efforts.

Gauging Foreign Reaction

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The IC plays a key role in helping policymakers anticipate international response to US missile defense plans, thereby enabling Washington to weigh potential political costs and benefits before moving ahead. Considerable controversy revolves around the relationship between US missile defense planning and the 1972 ABM Treaty with its 1974 protocol. The Treaty permits the two parties to deploy a limited defensive system in one small geographic area to defend either a cluster of ICBM's or a national capital. Defending national territory as a whole is expressly forbidden. To deter--or protect against--a missile attack by so-called "rogue" nations, however, US defense experts consider some form of territorial defense essential, with deployments in locations not permitted by the treaty.

When the Cold War ended, the United States decided that its treaties with the USSR would remain in effect with the successor states, primarily Russia. If Washington moves ahead with deploying some form of missile defense beyond that expressly permitted by the ABM Treaty, the US has the choice of negotiating changes with Russia, withdrawing unilaterally from the treaty according to its provisions (six months' notice), or reneging on its earlier stand by declaring that the treaty is null and void because the Soviet Union that signed it no longer exists.

Tinkering with or abrogating the Treaty, in the eyes of key world nations, runs the risk of spawning a new arms race among the United States, Russia, and China. In 1972, the ABM Treaty was seen as a bulwark against unfettered nuclear arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. By limiting defenses, the reasoning went, each country could sustain an effective offensive deterrent against attack by the other with a limited number of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, a doctrine that became known as Mutually Assured Destruction. In reaction to current US missile defense planning, even those countries that already have substantial missile systems of their own consider their deterrent capability potentially threatened, noting there is no guarantee that the United States will not expand an initially small system focused against threats from "rogue" nations to a much larger system.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's Countermeasures Program

Throughout its existence, BMDO has allocated from $20 to 30 million per year to threat and countermeasures work. About 60 percent of this has gone specifically to red team efforts carried out primarily by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, the US Air Force Research Laboratory, and the Planning Research Corporation.

One particularly innovative effort, developed in response to a review by the Defense Science Board in 1991, was called the "Skunkworks" program--later renamed the Countermeasures Hands-On Program (CHOP). It comprised a series of teams of highly educated but largely inexperienced, young engineers who emulated adversary nation engineers charged with finding ways to defeat a proposed US missile defense system. Each team was assigned a specific adversarial country and given a specific system or tier of systems to defeat under notional battlefield conditions. Controllers, in consultation with referees from the Intelligence Community, regulated the information that the teams were given about the US system and the technology that they were permitted to apply. Early on, each team identified up to twenty concepts it believed held promise for accomplishing the mission and then narrowed the list using criteria such as the likelihood of successful operation, estimated effectiveness, and ease of fabrication. The team then proceeded to build a prototype and subject it to standard laboratory testing. Because of budgetary limits, only the most promising of the countermeasures developed by the teams between 1993 and 1999 were moved to a flight test phase. Each of the flight-tested devices performed largely as expected and provided useful

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information to US missile defense system planners. Subsequent reports by the teams helped the Intelligence Community search for evidence of real work on countermeasures of similar nature being undertaken by potential adversary countries.

A second innovation attacked the problem of predicting which countermeasures were most likely to be employed by an adversary, given the dearth of hard intelligence. Called the Threat Risk Assessment Program (TRAP), this initiative examined various countermeasures concepts on the basis of their expected effectiveness and their difficulty of implementation. Two matrices were developed for each US defense system evaluated, including Patriot, Theater High Altitude Area Defense, Navy Area Defense, Navy Theater Wide, and National Missile Defense. The first matrix arrayed the system's critical functions--such as search, detection, tracking, discrimination, endgame, and kill assessment--against various types of countermeasures, including jammers, signature modification, decoys, debris, evasive maneuvering, and hardening. It assessed the impact of each countermeasure on each critical function. The systems engineers and the red team made these evaluations collaboratively based on notional designs, CHOP prototypes and experiments, and computer simulations. Next, the red team estimated the likelihood an adversary would employ each countermeasure, based on the countermeasure's technological complexity, the adversary's engineering capabilities and perception of the countermeasure's effectiveness, the weight and other performance penalties a countermeasure would impose, the measure's expected reliability, its ease of maintainability in the field, and so on. Then a second matrix was constructed arraying the estimated effectiveness of a given countermeasure against the likelihood it would be employed. Clearly a countermeasure that ranked high in both effectiveness and likelihood would constitute a significant threat to the US system.

Through intelligence collection and analysis, including the red team concept, the US Government has gained an understanding of both the enemy missile threat and how various levels of defenses would perform against the threat. This understanding, although not perfect, allows the missile defense decisionmakers to estimate the cost of achieving a desired level of protection.

Attempts to predict foreign response to potential US actions almost always suffer from a dearth of hard information. This is not so much because of weak intelligence collection capabilities as it is because foreign leaders tend not to make firm decisions until they see what action the United States actually takes. This forces the intelligence analyst to rely more on historical and cultural data, mirror imaging, polling, and other techniques to form his or her judgments. The lack of firm data inevitably leaves the process vulnerable to the mindsets and preconceptions of the analysts--and their reviewers and customers--which further reduces the chance of accurate predictions.[12]

Conclusion

The strategic stakes and high cost of moving forward with a missile defense system mandate close support from the Intelligence Community, despite the challenge of producing sophisticated and objective analysis while working with limited data. It becomes critical to pool the specialized expertise of each sector of the IC, work closely with system designers as well as policymakers, and employ all possible analytic tools to avoid individual and corporate mindsets. Supported by the IC, BMDO has strengthened traditional analytic processes through innovative red teaming and threat risk assessments. It is the nature of intelligence, however, that unequivocal answers to the key questions of threat and response simply cannot be provided. In their place, the IC provides an array of probabilities and possibilities to assist the nation's leaders in their continual search for the best

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approach to missile defense.

This article is unclassified in its entirety.

Notes

(1) Ballistic Missile Defense Organization press release, "FY2001 President's Budget," 4 February 2000.

(2) Congressional Budget Office, "Budgetary and Technical Implications of the Administration's Plan for National Missile Defense," April 2000.

(3) The brief history of the US antiballistic missile program presented here is drawn largely from materials provided by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's historian, Dr. Donald Baucom.

(4) The full text of former President Reagan's speech is available on line at: www.tamu.edu/scom/pres/speeches/rrsecure.html.

(5) Appointed to chair the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States by the Director of Central Intelligence, Rumsfeld was selected from among candidates proposed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Majority Leader of the Senate, and the minority leaders of both houses of Congress. The publicly released version of Commission's report is available at: http://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/. The unclassified version of the NIC's report "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015" can be found at: www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html.

(6) NIC report, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States through 2015."

(7) Statement for the Record to the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services on "The Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States," by Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, 9 February 2000. See: www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/nio_speech_020900.html.

(8) Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 155-157, 182, 221-226, 231, 262, 278.

(9) Jane Perlez, "U.S.-North Korea Talks on Missile Program Set for March," *The New York Times*, 31 January 2000, p. A1.

(10) Michael C. Sirak, "BMDO: 'CHOP' Shop Helps Create Robust Missile Defenses," *Inside Missile Defense*, 21 April 1999. For budget information on BMDO's countermeasures program, see: www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/bmdopress.pdf.

(11) See "The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's Countermeasures Hands-On Program (CHOP): Origins and Evolution," 11 August 1997, pp. 3-6. Report is available from the author of this article.

(12) For a discussion of the issue of superiors overruling analysts wrestling with sparse evidence, see Harold P. Ford, *CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998), pp. 143-152.

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
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Opening the Door a Crack

American Cryptology During the Korean War

Thomas R. Johnson

Editor's Note: The Korean peninsula was divided at the 38th parallel as part of war settlements decided at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. Less than five years later, on 25 June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. In response to a United Nations (UN) call for troops to restore peace, the United States committed ground, air, and naval forces to the conflict before the end of June. Pushing northward, UN forces reached the China border on 20 November, triggering a Chinese assault across the Yalu river into Korea. Fighting eventually stalemated near the original border between the two Koreas. An armistice, signed on 27 July 1953, provided for the continued presence of US troops on Korean soil. The United States suffered more than 140,000 casualties during the engagement. A peace treaty has never been signed.



Corrected map from classified volume American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989, Book I, (Ft. Meade: National Security Agency, 1995)

Allied silence about the role of cryptology in World War II was broken in 1974 by the publication of Frederick Winterbotham's *The Ultra Secret*.1 The world had waited almost 30 years for the beginning of a declassification program for World War II communications intelligence (COMINT). A few spare historical accounts written during and immediately after the war represented most of what the National Security Agency (NSA) and the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) had been willing to divulge, until, at last, enough pressure was mounted for a more general declassification effort. Larger and larger volumes of World War II documents emerged into public view, until by the end of the century virtually no bars remained to a complete release.

With Korean war cryptology, we are still in the early stage of declassification fifty years after the outbreak of the war. NSA has recently declassified a few historical summaries, but has not yet begun to release any reports from the war itself.2 So what do we know about cryptology in Korea? Some of our knowledge preceded the official declassification effort. When Clay Blair wrote his history of the Korean war in the 1980s, he incorporated some tantalizing bits and pieces about the role of exploited North Korean messages, especially as it related to the Pusan

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perimeter.3 More recently, researcher Matthew Aid has ferreted out a larger part of the story.4 When we put what they have published together with the accounts recently released by NSA, we can assess what we know and, by implication, what we do not yet know.

Postwar Letdown

Korea can best be understood in terms of World War II, which has been described as a "SIGINT [signals intelligence] War."5 By the end of the war, the Americans and British, with help from the Canadians and Australians, were able to read most of the important cryptographic systems that the Axis nations employed. Harry Hinsely, the British intelligence historian and direct participant in matters cryptologic, has written that the war was probably shortened by six months as a result of SIGINT successes. I would put the number at four to six months. Even if it were only four months, try running the numbers on likely additional Allied casualties over that period. Or, looking at the issue in another way, if the Russian troops were on the Elbe in May 1945, how far west might they have moved by September?

Among the generals and admirals who benefited from COMINT, expectations rose. Not knowing or understanding the black arts by which these things were done, they believed that the codebreakers could do anything they set their minds to and that their successes would continue into the trackless future.

Within years of the end of World War II, however, American cryptology was a hollow shell of its former self. When the soldiers and sailors went home in 1945, so did the cryptologists. Permanently lost to cryptology were (b)(6) (b)(6) as well as mathematicians (b)(6) and a host of others. And this was just on the American side. The British lost, among others, (b)(6) (b)(6) credited by some as the inventor of the modern digital computer. The loss of talent was accompanied by a catastrophic budgetary collapse.

The lack of resources was compounded by bureaucratic infighting. A wartime feud between Army and Navy cryptologists continued into the post-war period. Then a new group--the Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), established on 20 October 1948--joined the fray. Although the USAFSS began as a weak sister, it benefited from the Air Force's ability to get money from Congress and soon became the largest of the three service cryptologic agencies. It also became the most parochial, separating itself from the cryptologic community by physical as well as psychic distance by setting up its headquarters in San Antonio, Texas.

Amid all the bickering came signs of professional failure. Until 1948, the Army and Navy had been reading many of the codes of the new prime target, the Soviet Union. Then, in the space of less than a year, the lights went out. The USSR changed everything--its codes and ciphers, its communications procedures, and the very equipment that it used. The cryptologic community referred to what had happened as Black Friday. In fact, it didn't happen on a Friday, but evolved over several months. The bottom line was the same: the cornucopia of exploitable messages disappeared and Washington was caught short.

Woe piled upon woe. In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan, and Mao and the Communists came to power on mainland China. Their communications were no more exploitable than those of the Soviet Union.

In 1949, the feuding cryptologic agencies attempted a union of sorts, called the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). AFSA, however, lacked the authority to control its nominal subordinates. Instead of one umbrella agency overseeing three military service departments, four more-or-less coequal organizations competed for resources in a shrinking pool. Moreover, as a creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), AFSA gave priority to military requirements, resulting in bitter complaints from civilian customers, especially the CIA and the State Department. At AFSA's founding, the United States was already unable to exploit the communications of its two principal antagonists and it was just months short of its next major war.

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Wake Up Call in Korea

When it came to COMINT on Korea, AFSA had no arrows in its quiver. Like the rest of the Intelligence Community, it had only the most tenuous and insubstantial requirements to work with--keeping a general eye on the Soviet posture on the peninsula and little else. No one in the US Government seemed worried about Korea, and AFSA, preoccupied with jurisdictional disputes, gave it little attention. It had plenty of other work to keep it busy. Even worse, AFSA had no technical expertise on Korea. It had only one self-taught Korean linguist, no Korean dictionaries, no Korean typewriters, and no books on Korea. Until April 1950, it had no Korean communications collection of any kind. As it happened, late in 1949 one of its units in the Far East had collected some traffic that looked like Soviet communications, but, when finally analyzed months later, turned out to be Korean. On 21 April 1950, AFSA tasked an Army Security Agency (ASA) unit near Kyoto, Japan, to collect more Korean traffic. By mid-June, however, Kyoto had collected virtually nothing.

Following World War II, Korea had been left outside the American defensive perimeter in the Far East. When the North Koreans invaded the South in June 1950, they met little opposition. Republic of Korea (ROK) armed forces numbered barely 100,000 poorly armed and inadequately trained infantry troops against a North Korean army of about 135,000 fully trained soldiers with tanks and artillery. The United States had only a 500-man Korean Military Aid Group on the peninsula--it was designed to show the flag, not defend the country. The US contingency plan for Korea was to evacuate posthaste to Japan.

After initial hesitation, the United States responded to the UN call for troops and entered the fray. President Truman ordered Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Japan to scrape together a defensive force and send it to Korea. American forces began arriving at the South Korean port of Pusan in late June, and Gen. Walton Walker, commander of the US 8th Army, hastily assembled American forces and remnants of the ROK Army to try to hold a line.

ASA, the Army's cryptologic organization, was caught just as flat-footed as everyone else. Initially, Walker had little or no SIGINT support. The first ASA contingent did not arrive until 9 September, six days before the US landing behind enemy lines at Inchon. This contingent was an advance unit from Hawaii, with minimal capability. ASA's plan was to support 8th Army with one communications reconnaissance battalion at Army level, and a battalion assigned to each of the three subordinate corps; however, it took the first designated Army SIGINT unit--the 60th Signal Service Company at Fort Lewis, Washington--three and a half months to arrive on the scene.

Filling the Breach

The Air Force actually beat ASA to Korea. Its first representative, (b)(6), arrived in Taegu on 19 July 1950, almost two months ahead of his Army counterparts. Using equipment borrowed from the USAFSS unit in Tokyo, he attempted to set up a tactical SIGINT organization to support the 5th Air Force. (b)(6) however, found that the 5th Air Force already had SIGINT support, courtesy of one (b)(6) A murky figure, (b)(6) lived in Seoul, had a reserve commission as an Air Force major, and headed the local Office of Special Investigations. Quite on his own, he had set up a hip-pocket SIGINT intercept and reporting service using native Koreans. The most prominent of these were (b)(6) a former North Korean Army radio operator and cryptanalyst, and (b)(6), a captain in the ROK nav(b)(6) had served with the Japanese SIGINT service in World War II and, having been interned in Hawaii for a period of time, had a good grasp of English. Together, they had a going concern. (b)(6), in turn, reported the material as thinly disguised HUMINT. The 5th Air Force didn't want (b)(6) After taking possession of his badly needed equipment, they sent him back to Japan.

This development did not accord with either the plans of MacArthur's intelligence chief (G2) or

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US cryptologic doctrine.(b)(6) was sent back to Korea twice, finally managing to set up a direct support organization. In November, he repossessed his equipment and incorporated the unit established b(b)(6) for language support. By this time (b)(6) had had a falling out, and (b)(6) had hooked up with ASA to provide language support, while(b)(6) remained with (b)(6) and the Air Force. With the appearance of a full-fledged USAFSS direct support unit, (b)(6) seems to have disappeared from the cryptologic scene.

Although the service cryptologic agencies were not yet on duty in Korea, AFSA was already hard at work on the problem. Within a few days of the North Korean invasion, AFSA analysts were working 24 hours a day. As many collection positions as could be spared from Soviet and Chinese intercept duty were diverted to Korean coverage--initially twelve positions, all located in Japan.

In those early days, North Korean communications were rudimentary and exploitable, and AFSA set about to attack them. After three weeks of work, AFSA had its first breakthrough against North Korean communications on 14 July, followed by a string of additional successes. The 16-31 July issue of the AFSA Semi-Monthly Report noted that North Korean communications matters were much improved.

The SIGINT improvements came just in time for Gen. Walker's defense of the Pusan perimeter. Walker established his defensive perimeter on 31 July, as the last US troops fled across the Naktong river near Taegu, north of Pusan. With interior lines but inferior forces, Walker frantically shuttled his troops to points of North Korean attack. He was able to hold the line largely due to knowing where the North Koreans were going to attack, information coming primarily from SIGINT reports. From 31 July until the Inchon invasion in September relieved the pressure by North Korean forces, Walker continued to juggle his forces using information from North Korean messages. It was a classic illustration of the adage that intelligence is appreciated primarily by the defensive side.

The highlight of this early phase of the struggle was an offensive near (b)(6) headquarters at Taegu on 31 August. An AFSA report based on exploited North Korean messages contained much of the North Korean battle plan. We know little about how (b)(6) got this support. ASA's units had not yet arrived and there appears to have been no mechanism for (b)(6) to receive AFSA reports; the general may have been relying on ROK intelligence from the (b)(6) unit. In any event, the information reached(b)(6) two days before the attack, permitting him to shift his forces in time.

Predicting China's Intervention

The 8th Army rolled north after the 15 September landing of US forces at Inchon. By the end of the month, American and ROK troops stood poised at the 38th parallel. Syngman Rhee, the committed anti-Communist who headed South Korea's government, scarcely hesitated before ordering his troops across the postwar divide into North Korea. MacArthur, too, gave a green light, and the US Army steamed into the north.

The US objective was the Yalu river, which marked the Korean border with Manchuria. The JCS considered this risky in view of possible Chinese intervention in the war and questioned MacArthur closely. President Truman was so concerned that he flew to Wake Island to discuss the military situation with MacArthur in mid-October. The general contended that there was nothing to worry about from the Chinese.

All the time, however, AFSA had been publishing reports pointing to probable Chinese intervention. The great bulk of the information came from Chinese civil communications, which carried large volumes of routine logistics and movement orders for Chinese military units. As early as July, AFSA had began noting references to army units moving north. Rail hubs in central China were jammed with soldiers on their way to Manchuria. By September, AFSA had identified six of the nine field armies that were later involved in the fighting in North Korea and had located them in Manchuria, near the Korean border. Ferries at Anshan (on the Yalu river) were being

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reserved for military use. Maps of Korea were being ordered in quantities large enough to equip 30 divisions. On 7 November, in a radiotelephone conversation intercepted and published by AFSA, an East European ambassador in Beijing stated, "We are already at war here."

This was not news to the ROK Army. On 25 October, a ROK division had been badly mauled by elements of the Chinese 40th Army, earlier reported by AFSA to be close to Korea. Five days later, MacArthur's chief of staff, (b)(6) reported that he had seen Chinese prisoners being held by a ROK unit. On 1 November, a Chinese force attacked a US unit for the first time. But (b)(6), MacArthur's G2, preferred to believe that these encounters represented isolated Chinese volunteers rather than division-strength regular Chinese Army units.

Throughout the fall of the year, there was great uneasiness in Washington about what the Chinese would do. Intelligence agencies started to pay closer attention. The Watch Committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which began noting Chinese troop movements as early as June, concluded by September (partly on the basis of AFSA reporting) that these troops were moving north rather than to the coastal provinces near Taiwan. By mid-October, however, the Watch Committee had changed its opinion, saying that, although there was convincing evidence that startling numbers of Chinese forces were in Manchuria, the time for intervention had passed. They concluded that the Chinese would not intervene. This judgment was not supported by COMINT. Encounters with Chinese ground and air forces in late October and early November eventually caused the Watch Committee to take another look.

Ignoring the SIGINT reports on Chinese troop movements was one of the most famous miscalculations in modern American military history. MacArthur was determined to press ahead with offensive operations to reach the Yalu and get the boys home by Christmas. On the snapping cold night of 25 November, thousands of Chinese soldiers fell on unsuspecting units of the 8th Army. The American offensive quickly turned into a defensive, and the defensive into a rout, with high casualties. Both Army and Air Force SIGINT units tarried too long and were nearly overrun before escaping to the south.

The Marines apparently had no SIGINT support throughout the war, at least at the tactical level. The most infamous incident was the retreat of the 1st Marine Division, which had been trapped at the Chosen reservoir in northeast Korea. A Marine radio company, trained for COMINT support, was at Camp Pendleton in California, but did not deploy to Korea because it lacked the necessary equipment and was not considered combat ready. The system of tactical intercept support to Marine units that had been established so laboriously in World War II had almost disappeared. It took the entire Korean war to reestablish a semblance of what had been available earlier.

SIGINT Challenges


As the situation settled into grim trench warfare in central Korea, the SIGINT organizations tried to shore up their capabilities. The most pressing problem was to find enough linguists. The requirement to translate three different languages severely stretched cryptologic resources throughout the war.

- ASA had only two Korean linguists-(b)(6)-and both were assigned to the language school in Monterrey. The choice was to leave them in California to train future Korean linguists or transfer them to the front. Both found themselves with tickets to Korea. Two linguists would hardly suffice, however. ASA acquired a translating service of its own, the so-call(b)(6) unit, named after th(b)(6) of the earlie(b)(6) uni(b)(6) and his unit hooked up with USAFSS and provided stellar translating service throughout the war.

- Another critical need was for Chinese linguists. The SIGINT services partially solved the problem by hiring Nationalist Chinese officers from Taiwan. This process was slow, however.

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- Finally, there was the Russian problem. Russian air forces had established a communications net in China to serve military and civilian aircraft at airfields in Korea and Manchuria by July 1950. Early the following year, COMINT intercepts showed Soviet control of fighter activity in the northernmost regions of Korea, and Soviet pilots were noted frequently in air-to-air and air-to-ground conversations.



Army Security Agency Direction Finding Unit in the Mountains of Korea. (NSA photo)

Before the Chinese intervention, the Air Force had dreamed of setting up a cryptologic outpost in Sinanju, far to the north, for North Korean communications, with a rear detachment in Pyongyang to intercept Soviet and Chinese messages related to the war. As UN troops fled south in December 1950, even Pyongyang was out of the question, and the Air Force eventually set up its operations in Pyongtaek, well south of the 38th parallel. Here the Air Force attempted, with limited success, to support American ground controllers with SIGINT.

Once the UN forces had regained the initiative, Seoul was safe, and both Air Force and Army cryptologists moved their headquarters to the western suburbs of Seoul--the Air Force to Chosen Christian College and the Army to the campus of Ewha College. ASA units were flung along the wavering front north of Seoul. They were organized into small tactical support units, mostly with manual Morse positions. Morse communications proved difficult to exploit and were of little value in the tactical environment. ASA analysts did apply traffic analysis, however, to establish an order of battle for the North Korean army.

Most of ASA's value in Korea stemmed from its intercept of Chinese and Korean voice communications. Much of that came from the detection of Chinese telephone conversations being carried through the ground and picked up by sensors originally designed to detect the tramp of advancing enemy troops. (Such ground-wave intercept techniques had been pioneered during World War I.) This serendipitous discovery resulted in the formation of low-level voice intercept (LLVI) units. Later, ASA units also intercepted Korean voice communications, and many of the LLVI teams wound up having to provide translations in two languages. The program was limited only by the availability of good linguists. By war's end, there were 22 LLVI teams in Korea, a testament to success.

Success Stories

The dull trench warfare was occasionally punctuated by fierce battles where SIGINT played a crucial role. One such encounter, an attempt by the Chinese Communist troops to take Hill 395 in central Korea in 1952, came to be known as the "Battle of White Horse Mountain." Intercepted Chinese communications gave the Americans warning of the attack. ASA rushed an intercept unit to the spot, and it fed American commanders with hard intelligence as the battle progressed. The Chinese lost 10,000 troops out of the 23,000 they had committed. In March 1953, COMINT also tipped off Chinese planning for offensives at Old Baldy and Pork Chop Hill.

Air Force SIGINT operations benefited from Soviet air warfare doctrine, which called for fighter aircraft to be closely managed by ground controllers who were watching the battle on radar. USAFSS discovered Russian voice communications in the early spring of 1951, and set up a mobile intercept hut at Pyongtaek in central Korea. As they listened to the Soviet pilots talking to the ground controllers in North Korea, their biggest concern was security. No one on the operations side was cleared for the information, so they had to disguise it as American radar plots.

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They would call the information over a landline connected to the operations building. The American Air Force controller could then pass the information on to the pilots, mixing it with radar plots. On no occasion was anyone in USAFSS ever permitted to take the next obvious step and talk directly to the pilots in the air.

The SIGINT warning operation significantly expanded the range of coverage beyond American radars, and many believe that it was partly responsible for the enormous American kill ratio in the air war. As the front lines moved farther north, the USAFSS operation was transferred to Kimpo airport to remain collocated with the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), which controlled the air war. In August 1951, the TACC and its Security Service unit moved again, to Pyong-Yong-Do (referred to by the GIs as P-Y-Do), a small island in the East China Sea north of the 38th parallel. Here they continued the warning operation, called Yoke, in tandem with the TACC. The P-Y-Do operation was closed down a month later and USAFSS returned to Seoul. All Air Force SIGINT warning was collocated at Chosen Christian College, where analysts had available, for the first time in one geographic location, intercepts of North Korean, Chinese, and Soviet communications, both Morse and voice.

The VHF Complication

This idyllic situation began to change almost as soon as it began--the target refused to remain static. Intercepts of tactical air voice communications began drying up. Air Force analysts suspected that the enemy was starting to use very high frequency (VHF) ranges for transmission. VHF can only be intercepted at locations within the line of sight of the transmitter. Suburban Seoul was just too far away.

VHF usage had first appeared during World War II, but had been in its infancy. In the five years following the end of the war, the world's military organizations had continued to use high frequency (HF) for communications. Use of frequencies above HF was still experimental. When USAFSS operators in Korea could no longer hear enemy pilots, however, they concluded that the reason had to be a change in transmission frequency.

(b)(6)

This adverse development coincided with the arrival of (b)(6) with the first batch of school-trained American Chinese linguists in mid-1952. (b)(6) took stock of the situation. The voice communications that he and his people were trained to intercept were no longer hearable. Meanwhile, the TACC had moved from Kimpo to Cho-Do Island, off the east coast of Korea near the North Korean port of Wonson. Tactical SIGINT support now involved the laborious process of intercepting at Chosen and relaying to Kimpo, with a further relay to the TACC at Cho-Do. The answer? Move the USAFSS intercept operation to Cho-Do.

Tests on Cho-Do in August confirmed that enemy pilots were now using VHF for communications and that those communications were hearable from the island. (b)(6) and the USAFSS contingent headed for Cho-Do. They set up intercept operations about three-quarters of a mile from the TACC, and (b)(6) placed a linguist in the TACC next to the tactical air controller. He had a field phone sitting on his desk, with the other end at the USAFSS intercept unit. Combined with the improved ability to hear, the new lash-up at Cho-Do Island provided the best support that USAFSS mustered during the entire war. In one day, which (b)(6) described as the "great Korean turkey shoot," American F-86s downed fifteen MiGs without a loss, even though none of the MiGs was ever seen on American radar. The information came, of course, from the COMINT operation on Cho-Do. A visiting ASA colonel commented that "it was just like shooting ducks in a rain barrel."

Back in Washington

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Meanwhile, AFSA was having a hard time of it. North Korean communications, so exploitable earlier in the war, dried up in the summer of 1951. The North Koreans adopted Soviet communications procedures, and the communications nets that AFSA had been exploiting earlier no longer yielded useful intelligence. This development made Korean war SIGINT mostly a tactical problem--there was little strategic information available from AFSA in Washington.

At the same time, AFSA was losing the bureaucratic struggle to centralize American cryptology. The three service cryptologic organizations went their own way, ignoring or defying AFSA orders. AFSA, for example, had established a rule that it would control all resources that resided at "fixed" field sites, while the services would control those that were "mobile." At the time, virtually all sites (except those with tactical Army units in Korea) were regarded as "fixed." USAFSS simply reversed "fixed" and "mobile." An Air Force general commented wryly that the sites were "about as mobile as the Eiffel Tower." With the stroke of a pen, however, the Air Force had removed its collection resources from AFSA control.

With AFSA powerless to intervene in jurisdictional fights, a nasty row broke out between ASA and USAFSS about which one would target air-related communications. The result was that both of them targeted the same communications, while leaving other targets unattended. This approach not only wasted resources, but also violated the sense of decorum that should have prevailed within the Intelligence Community. It had become an all-out food fight.

The Korean war spelled the demise of AFSA. American officers who had considered readable high-level enemy communications almost a birthright during World War II voiced their unhappiness at the turn of events. Two important customers, the CIA and the State Department, viewed AFSA's organizational problems with alarm. Fragmented control and duplicated resources, they believed, were resulting in the JCS squeezing CIA and State SIGINT requirements out of the picture in favor of straight-out military targets. To them, it was all part of a palpable decline in the effectiveness of American SIGINT.

In December 1951, Walter Bedell Smith, the crusty Director of Central Intelligence, wrote a memorandum to the National Security Council, recommending that a committee be established to "survey" American COMINT. The NSC forwarded the letter to President Truman. The events that ended the life of AFSA and led to the establishment of the National Security Agency began to unfold.

In Conclusion

From what we can now glimpse, the bottom line on SIGINT in the Korean war paralleled the overall American experience during that war. There were successes and there were failures, but the failures tended to overshadow the successes. The war ended in a draw, a highly discomfiting outcome for the American public, the generals and admirals who led the fight, and the men and women who fought it.

SIGINT, too, ended in a draw. What tactical successes there were, were gained only after long delay and prodigious effort. Unready for Korea, American cryptologists rose unsteadily to the challenge and were knocked down several times by enemy haymakers. Resources were inadequate, organization was sometimes chaotic, and expertise had to be acquired laboriously. Still, SIGINT did make a difference on a number of occasions. It was not quite what had been achieved in World War II, but it did establish the outlines of a successful tactical SIGINT support system.

The real tragedy of Korea was that the lessons learned "the hard way," through battlefield experience, were promptly forgotten. They had to be re-learned in Vietnam a decade later. The Army was no more ready for tactical SIGINT support in Vietnam than it had been in Korea. (b)(6) had to be sent to Saigon to show the Air Force how to do tactical warning. But that is a story for a future article.

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Footnotes:

1 Frederick W. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).

2 As of July 2001, NSA's website (www.nsa.gov) listed five papers related to Korea: Jill Frahm, "So Power Can be Brought into Play: SIGINT and the Pusan Perimeter;" David A. Hatch and Robert L. Benson, "The Korean War: The SIGINT Background;" Thomas R. Johnson, "General Essay on the Korean War," originally published in *American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989, Book I: The Struggle for Centralization, 1945-1960* (Fort Meade: NSA, 1995), pp. 36-56; Patrick D. Weadon, "SIGINT and COMSEC Help Save the Day at Pusan;" and "Cryptologic Background to the Chinese Intervention," by an anonymous retired NSA officer.

3 Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: New York Times Books, 1987).

4 Matthew M. Aid, "U.S. Humint and Comint in the Korean War: From the Approach of War to the Chinese Intervention," *Intelligence and National Security,* Vol. 14, No. 4, Winter 1999.

5 Walter Laqueur, *A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

Dr. Thomas R. Johnson is a 35-year veteran of cryptology operations. Currently associated with CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, he is the author of a classified four-volume history of American cryptology during the Cold War.

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UNCLASSIFIED

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Are We Our Own Worst Enemy?

Safeguarding Information Operations

Stephen W. Magnan

> **"Most articles about the US information superhighway have concentrated on the need for better physical security, while at the same time identifying many of its cyber-related vulnerabilities."**

Stephen W. Magnan is a captain in the US Air Force.

> *The reality is that the vulnerability of the Department of Defense—and of the nation—to offensive information warfare attack is largely a self-created problem. Program by program, economic sector by economic sector, we have based critical functions on inadequately protected telecomputing services. In the aggregate, we have created a target-rich environment, and US industry has sold globally much of the generic technology that can be used to strike these targets.*
>
> Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare-Defense (IW-D), November 1996

Most articles about the US information superhighway have concentrated on the need for better physical security, while at the same time identifying many of its cyber-related vulnerabilities. Few address what possibly is the most vulnerable element—the human operators—and the inability of those operators from the policy level down to practice good operations security (OPSEC).

In a 4 June 1998 *Guardian Online* article by Duncan Campbell entitled "Hiding from the Spies in the Skies," Campbell states, "The Internet has made tracking and evading spy satellites child's play.... Data and programs downloaded from the Net enable anyone to track the satellites and work out when the spies in the sky are overhead." Campbell also provides instructions on how to visually acquire satellites with the naked eye and even lists six Internet Uniform Resource Locator addresses where one can find programs and information on the location of the "spies in the skies." He refers to several Internet sites in his article that offer the capabilities to track the locations, routes, and times certain satellites will pass over specific locations.

India's Nuclear Tests

In May 1998, India conducted a series of underground nuclear tests that, according to the press, the Clinton administration learned about when India publicly announced the tests. This prompted widespread speculation about how the US multi-billion-dollar surveillance and reconnaissance assets could have missed the critical clues that revealed the impending tests. India readily admitted that it knew how to deceive the United States. It referenced information the United States had shown it in the past and also downloaded tools freely available from the Internet. In an Associated Press article of 15 May 1998, Indian nuclear researcher G. Balachandran stated, "It's not a failure of the CIA. It's a matter of their intelligence being good, our deception being better."

An action that further assisted the Indians in their deception campaign was the "sharing" of intelligence and overhead imagery by the United States. In an effort to thwart a nuclear test in December 1995 and January 1996, the United States had shared this information with the Indians to convey the message that "We know what you are doing and do not approve." By demonstrating the US capability to track India's actions *and*

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the fact that the United States *was* tracking their actions directly informed the Indians that they needed to develop a superb OPSEC and deception campaign.

The commission that was formed to evaluate why the Intelligence Community (IC) failed to predict the Indian nuclear tests concluded that the IC needs a good overhaul. It directed little attention, however, to India's successful deception, and, ultimately, to an information operation (IO) perception management campaign. Instead, it recommended reviews of policies, changes in leadership and management philosophies, and organizational structures. The commission's recommendations address, in a generic manner, the symptoms of the problems, not the causes:

> *The organization needs to be scrubbed, and I am talking about the IC organization, not necessarily the CIA, to improve the clarity of the structure, to fix responsibilities, to resource the staff with appropriate tools, and to inform the organization once that review has taken place.*

No mention was made of improving education or training, increasing manpower, or dedicating more assets to those who need it most—the workers. Therefore, the imagery analysts will continue to work under a new and improved management and supervisory staff, who will tell or show the analysts how to do a better job with the available resources.

OPSEC requires the same elements as the imagery analysts do: improved education and training and increased billet authorizations. OPSEC requires as much senior-level support as do the other elements. Furthermore, all elements of IO can no longer be common-sense based—they are not integrally linked to each other.

"The commission that was formed to evaluate why the Intelligence Community failed to predict the Indian nuclear tests concluded that the IC needs a good overhaul."

Beating the System

Katie Hafner and John Markoff, in their book *Cyperpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier*, give an instructive example of how easy it can be to access a computer system:

> *While in Washington, Susan got the chance to demonstrate her "social engineering skills." As Susan later told the story, a team of...colonels and generals from three service branches sat at a long conference table with a computer terminal, a modem, and a telephone. When Susan entered the room, they handed her a sealed envelope containing the name of a computer system and told her to use any abilities or resources that she had to get into that system. Without missing a beat, she logged on to an easily accessible military computer directory to find out where the computer system was. Once she found the system in the directory, she could see what operating system it ran and the name of the officer in charge of that machine. Next, she called the base and put her knowledge of military terminology to work to find out who the commanding officer was at the SCIF, a secret compartmentalized information facility. "Oh, yes, Major Hastings." Casually, she told the person she was talking to that she couldn't think of Major Hastings's secretary's name. "Oh," came the reply. "You mean Specialist Buchanan." With that, she called the data center and, switching from nonchalant to authoritative, said, "This is Specialist Buchanan calling on behalf of Major Hastings. He's been trying to access his account on this system and hasn't been able to get through, and he'd like to know why." When the data center operator balked and started reciting from the procedures manual, her temper flared and her voice dropped in pitch. "Okay, look, I'm not going to screw around here. What is your name, rank, and serial number?" Within 20 minutes, she had what she later claimed was classified data on the screen of the computer on the table. A colonel rose from his seat, said, "That will be enough, thank you very much," and pulled the plug.*

This story may or may not be based on a true incident, but similar such incidents occur on a daily basis around the world. In 1997, the JCS mandated the conduct of the first-ever No-Notice Interagency Exercise (NIEX) based on an IO scenario as part of the ELIGIBLE RECEIVER exercise series. Several other Unified Command Commanders have also ordered that similar IO-based exercises be conducted within the confines of their command.

These IO-based scenarios are designed to test the Blue Team's ability to overcome an unknown adversary who will be attacking from an unknown location and time

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Trying to counter Castro

Working the Cuban Beat

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The few of us who were present at the birth of the Castro regime and who worked against it sporadically for three decades are still around as observers in its declining years. I have been particularly lucky in this regard. By far the most interesting and productive period of this era was at the Havana station from the last year of the Batista regime in 1958 to our break in relations with Castro in January 1961.

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After the break, I was assigned to Miami for most of the 1960s and the early 1970s,

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I returned to Miami to handle Radio Americas, CIA's propaganda operation against Cuba. (b)(3)(n) I returned to Miami as case officer-director of a Cuban intelligence service in exile known as the AMOTS. I retired in 1972, but I was recalled to service as an independent contractor to screen and interview arrivals during the Mariel boat lift. I continued to interview Cuban arrivals until 1991.

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When I arrived in Havana in 1958, my main assignment

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There were walk-ins in fairly large numbers. But almost all these people were revolutionary advocates running a propaganda campaign against the US Embassy in general, and CIA in particular. Thus, Castro was painted as a democratic reformer. Batista's "atrocities" were exaggerated and those of the 26th of July and the DR dismissed as acts of overzealous underlings. Batista's fall was touted as inevitable, and the number of guerrillas fighting the regime inflated exponentially. As of January 1959, our efforts had failed.

Castro was an attractive and popular figure, and the United States had no real alternative but to support him initially when he came to power. The CIA station officers, many of whose casual contacts saw through the Castro democratic facade, were virtually unanimous in their opposition to Castro from the day he took power. The facade was convincing to many, however, because the first revolutionary government was made up of some people with ostensibly impeccable liberal credentials.

Castro did not take long before showing his true colors by reversing court decisions, ridding himself of his democratic prime minister and most of his democratically oriented entourage, and by placing "Che" Guevara, an Argentine physician and a Marxist, in charge of the

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economy, as well as his brother, Raul, in charge of the Defense Ministry, and himself in dictatorial control of the nation. In the light of these developments, the intelligence business picked up. Walk-ins, defectors (15 members of the Supreme Court seeking visas one Saturday morning), and counterrevolutionary groups began to multiply, and the intelligence drought became a deluge. The problem was handling the mass of the discontented during late 1959 and in 1960. It was difficult to evaluate the potential of a variety of counterrevolutionary groups and their usually extravagant claims. Some of the more promising counterrevolutionaries became known

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Exporting the Revolution

From the beginning, one principal aim of Castro and Guevara was to export the revolution. Caribbean revolutionaries of varied political stripes swarmed to Havana looking for help as soon as Castro took over.

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most cases, decided to use his own people for the many "invasions" that he launched during my stay in Havana against Mexico, Haiti, Honduras, and several other countries. Castro did not fail completely in his attempts to export his doctrine. He helped the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and numerous other rebel groups throughout the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere, including those in Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic. As of 1993, some Castro-inspired destabilization remained in some Latin American countries. This messianic facet of the Cuban Revolution may have been one of its most destructive aspects. It was costly to several Latin American countries and to the United States, which tried to contain it.

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For a time things went smoothly, but the agent had three female neighbors who were apartment "mates." He had affairs with all three, and this created a real ruckus. I had to find him another rent-free safehouse. I found one, and once again banked on government inefficiency in administering the urban reform law. We broke relations with Cuba a few months later, and my problem of keeping him in a new safehouse disappeared when he departed.

Staybehind Program

The station received no guidance from Headquarters on establishing a staybehind operation, and we did not have much time to create a mechanism. There were many distractions, and there were no replacements for departing officers. TDYers were often more of a hindrance than a help. We would have to reach some compromise between a local chain of command and independent

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operations. Funding would be a problem both for the independents and for any net established. At this time, I have scant recollection of which agent was which. While we were planning, each agent was handled by the case officer who had either recruited him or to whom he had been assigned. As planning progressed, the operation's organization, if such it could be termed, took a shape of sorts.

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Agents abounded because opposition to the regime had become substantial, and some who would have been unwilling to cooperate a year earlier now began to come around. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

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Headquarters sent agent radios to Havana for caching or stashing around the island. By modern standards, these were dinosaurs. They came packed in a large waterproof "coffin" which would have permitted caching in a lake or stream, as well as in the ground. All station officers were expected to help in placing the cumbersome radios. A ground cache was, in effect, a real burial, and precise details on the location were required for ultimate recovery and use. Case officers transported the radios to different parts of the island; some were buried, some were stashed, and at least one was placed in a well with unhappy results.

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Another radio-stashing operation also returned to haunt me. One afternoon a colleague told me that he could stash two radios with contacts in Cienfuegos in south-central Cuba, and he suggested that I accompany him. We were stopped en route by the Cuban police, who ignored our claim of diplomatic immunity and opened our car's trunk. Fortunately, the radios were in cardboard boxes which the police did not bother to open. In Cienfuegos my colleague and I went to his contact's house, and my friend took him aside while I chatted with his son. Years later, when I was at Miami International Airport on my way to a TDY, the airline agent cursed me when I gave him my ticket. The ticket agent was the son with whom I had talked in Cienfuegos. My associate had failed to tell his father what was being stashed, and the father and son got rid of the radios when they discovered what they were.

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While a good deal of work had been done in developing our staybehind mechanism, much more was still needed when relations were broken. After the announcement was made, I gave my servant some money, packed my scant belongings, drew a substantial amount of money from the station, phoned all principal agents and the chief radio operator, and met them all in my official vehicle on a boulevard a few blocks from the Embassy. I turned over the funds to the agent I considered the most astute, (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) I gave them

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all last-minute instructions and returned to the Embassy to await transport to the ship that would take us from Havana to West Palm Beach.

I realize that I violated several security practices at the last meeting. Given the time available, however, I decided to take the risk. The net survived for some time, and to my knowledge no one was arrested as a result of the emergency meeting. The principal agent with whom I left the funds survived, but he ultimately had to brave the Florida Straits on a raft.

The departure from the Embassy was an emotional experience, both for the Cubans and for US personnel. There were Cubans, still unwilling to believe that there would be no more visas, seeking our last-minute help in vain. Cuba had been an interesting experience for most of us, and many could not help recalling the contagious gaiety we had found upon our arrival and before Castro took over. That was gone now. In addition to the visa seekers, the Embassy parking lot was filled with angry Cubans, civilian and militia, who jeered at the "Yankee imperialists."

A Denied Operations Area

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There also was the burgeoning intelligence service in exile that we were developing and which, at first, I considered an administrative nuisance, in part because there were so many other fish to fry. I was wrong, and little did I suspect at the time that one day I would be case officer-director of this group. Ultimately, it

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The pursuit of operational leads is a tiring and generally unrewarding job because dry holes are the norm. Sometimes even what at first appears to be a home run turns out to be a waste of time and money. One particular case sticks in my mind.

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The operation worked for a short time, and I was transferred elsewhere. When I returned to Miami for another tour a few years later and inquired about the operation, I learned that the agent had been jailed for embezzlement, that he had produced precious little before his arrest.

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During the Bay of Pigs invasion, Miami station was largely a support mechanism for an operation run out of Washington. The Cuban shadow government in exile was in the area, but the officer dealing with that group was not an officer permanently assigned to the station. *Brigadistas* who participated in the invasion were picked up in Miami.

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If the option of a military invasion had been selected during the missile crisis in 1962, I was one of five officers who would have been sent to the island to establish a new station. All of us were military reserve officers.

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(b)(1)
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Radio Americas

(b)(3)(n) I returned to Miami and again became a covert action officer. My principal case was our major radio operation targeted at Cuba, at that time called Radio Americas, but originally known as Radio Swan, because the transmitter was located on Great Swan Island off the Honduran coast.

This operation, which had been in being from the early days of the Castro regime, was probably as effective as such an operation can be, especially considering the limited funding it received. Although it was supposed to be a clandestine operation, that is, privately sponsored, from the outset Castro was complaining about "a steamship company without ships" named the Gilbarlter Steamship Company, the original notional company that was supposed to own the station. Along with the transmitter, technicians and news readers were stationed on Swan Island, which was about a mile or so long. With Little Swan it was the subject of a low-key territorial dispute between the United States and Honduras. (In recent years the United States has given up its claim to the islands.)

Along with Radio Americas, the United States had a weather and FAA facility on Great Swan. The other occupants of the island were Caymanese who would come and go. Regular R and R was necessary for Radio Americas personnel who received logistic support and program tapes from south Florida by occasional DC-3 flights and regular weekly flights by smaller aircraft. As case officer, my visits to the island were not frequent, but those of the station manager were, and he usually had to resolve personnel conflicts and logistic flaps.

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A new chief of station, (b)(1) w(b)(3)(n) ly satisfied with Radio Americas, even though the letter response from both Cuba and Latin America was outstanding. He felt that some of the programs were too propagandistic and hard hitting. My efforts to tone down the programs to the point of little more than straight news and music never quite satisfied him, and perhaps it was fortunate for me that the operation was canceled as my tour was about to end. The reasons for the cancellation are especially nebulous, considering that a few months before termination we had been instructed to lease new quarters and buy the equipment to produce our own programs in our own studio instead of farming them out.

While RFE and Radio Liberty may have been very marginally helpful in hastening the crumbling of the Soviet Bloc, Radio Americas may have had a deleterious effect, though one consonant with US policy. It may have slightly aggravated discontent on the island and thus contributed to the exodus of some of the very people who might have helped to overthrow Castro. If such is the case, it also contributed to the costly immigration problems which have plagued Miami and other cities.

Cuban Intelligence Service in Exile

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and the nucleus of an exile intelligence group began to take

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shape. (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) tion and the Cuban intelligence group, by now known as the AMOTS, had begun to grow. I turned over the operation to a contract employee whom I had handled in Havana, and he ran it for several years. This was the same man that I had left in Havana as chief of the staybehind mechanism. He did a commendable job during his long tenure, and he was well rewarded by the Agency.

I became responsible for the operation in 1970, (b)(3)(n) During this time, the operation's boats were being phased out because AMOTS-sponsored infiltration missions had ceased and personnel had been cut (b)(3)(c) I had the task of cutting this number in half immediately before I retired. During most of my tenure, however, the operation was a principal source of intelligence for the Miami station and had assumed many of the Cuban exile interviewing functions of CIA's overt office in Miami.

The principal sources of information derived from interviews of new arrivals from Cuba and the impressive files that the organization had developed. We had two screeners at the airport who talked to adult arrivals to see if they might have information to service our requirements. Basic personal data, including Miami addresses and telephone numbers, were taken down and the person was told that he or she would be contacted for questioning in depth. Because the screening was done under what appeared to be official auspices, protests were few, and the "go to hell" attitude assumed by some Cubans in later years were rare. These were the days of the "freedom flights" agreed to by the United States when Castro launched the Camarioca boat lift, a small precursor to Mariel a decade and a half later. The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 was passed, and any Cuban who could make it to the United States legally could claim permanent residence after a year and a day. The Cubans could come with an immigrant's visa, or, as was to happen so often later, on rafts and inner tubes.

The screening results were passed to the Chief of the interviews section in a large safehouse near the AMOTS headquarters. There were about a dozen interviewers assigned to that unit; they specialized to some extent on various subjects so that a particular interviewer would have at least some basic knowledge of the field on which the source had information.

The raw interview results were delivered to AMOTS headquarters by courier from the safehouse, where most of the in-depth interviews were conducted. These were then scanned and sent to one of the sections, usually positive intelligence, to be put into report format. Sometimes collateral information was added from file research or from the knowledgeability of the person preparing the report. Copies would be sent to the files and to the studies section, which from time to time was requested to prepare biographical, political, and economic studies.

All raw reports were written in Spanish, and those forwarded to the station as disseminable positive intelligence or counterintelligence reports were translated by one expert translator and by another who required a good bit of supervision. I edited all the reports and checked them for correct translation, when necessary.

In the AMOTS headquarters, , there was a small stable of employees available for immediate travel to interview Cubans . Their reports were then processed through AMOTS headquarters. Each day I would meet with a station courier to pass on all of our processed materials and to receive any station requirements. Telephone contact with the station was frequent, but my visits to the station were rare. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

I believe that this operation was the principal source of station intelligence during the operation of the freedom flights. When Castro suddenly suspended the flights, there was no longer a need for such an operation. It became my last and unpleasant task to reduce the operation by 50 percent. Mass terminations are not easy, and no training course could satisfactorily address the problem. Commo (b)(1) and a touch of empathy, feigned or real, helps (b)(3)(n) me that he also had termination problems. AMOTS personnel who had served loyally for over a decade were offered a financial separation package.

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Mariel Boat Lift

In 1980, triggered by a mass invasion of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana by Cuban freedom seekers, Castro again resorted to the escape valve to rid himself of the discontented by facilitating mass flight to the United States. He invited Cubans already in the United States to come to the port of Mariel several miles to the west of Havana by boat and pick up loved ones. Castro decided who would leave. He termed them all *gusanos* (worms), and, though most wanted to leave to join relatives in the United States and live better, Castro managed to send us a good measure of antisocial types, including seasoned criminals as well as residents of the Havana Mental Hospital.

Although I had been offered a contract with the Agency when I retired, I refused because I wanted to teach, travel, and write. By 1980, I had taught for eight years and had done a good deal of traveling. The urge to write, at that time, was unfulfilled. I had turned down other Agency work offers.

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(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

The flow continued by boat, by raft, through the Mexican border, and by sponsorship of Cuban exiles in other countries by the Cuban-American National Foundation. Panama, where Cubans obtained entry visas, was used by hundreds as the departure point for the trek to the Mexican border. This "underground railroad" had a big disadvantage. Such arrivals were deemed illegal, so they could not avail themselves of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 which permits any Cuban arriving legally to legal residence after one year in the United States.

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An Assessment

This story of my experiences is merely a suggestion of CIA's extensive operational activity against the Cuban target. The effort has had its successes and its failures, including the Bay of Pigs and the revelation by a defector in the late 1980s that most Cuban agents "recruited" in the previous decade or so were "dangles" who remained loyal to Castro.

Nonetheless, policymakers have been kept informed of internal Cuban developments, and the Agency has kept Castro off balance by reporting on and frustrating his persistent efforts to export his revolution militarily and by subversion. The price has been phenomenal, and we may have prolonged his existence by encouraging and facilitating the mass exodus of those who might have developed a viable resistance movement. This, of course, was a policy decision.

This article is SECRET.

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Overcoming Old Barriers

Operations Analysis: A New DI Tradecraft for Partnership

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"Partnership" and "collocation" are the hottest buzzwords today in CIA's lexicon. Former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Woolsey stated in November 1994 before the DCI Seminar that partnership signals a "change in the way we approach our mission to be the intelligence organization of choice in the United States Government." As a Directorate of Intelligence (DI) officer who spent four years working in a Directorate of Operations (DO) operations branch in the Counterterrorist Center (CTC), I believe that the CTC provides a prototype for partnership. The distinguishing feature of the CTC which makes it useful for developing a broader program of DO-DI partnership is what I call "operations analysis." This analytical methodology is the vital ingredient for making partnership and collocation work for the two directorates. Operations analysis offers the DI a new mission that will benefit the directorate, the DO, and the Agency.

A Laboratory for Partnership

The assumption underlying partnership and collocation is that, despite the challenges, the DO-DI partnership will result in better intelligence operations and reports and, ultimately, better analysis. Many, if not most, officers probably sense that there are advantages to be gained through partnership. Thus far, however, much of the dialogue on the benefits seems to revolve around anecdotal comments and speculative observations. Much remains to be done to define exactly how better operations and better finished intelligence will come about through partnership. Cooperation between the DO and DI is as old as the Agency, but the nature and modalities of formal interaction between the two directorates have yet to be spelled out.

The CTC offers a current example of partnership and collocation in action. DO and DI officers have been working together in close quarters in CTC since the Center's creation in 1986. Although the CTC essentially operates as an office of the DO in terms of its core mission of penetrating terrorist groups, collecting threat information, and preventing terrorist acts, (b)(3)(c) officers working in the Center as of May 1995 were from the DI. CTC has been at the forefront of hosting experts from different directorates and from other US Government agencies for the purpose of tackling international terrorism. It would be fair to say that most officers who have worked in the CTC view DO-DI cooperation in the Center as a successful experiment.

The establishment of effective, cross-directorate working relations within the CTC has not been without difficulty. Working in CTC at Headquarters can be the first occasion where DO and DI officers share workspace and professional responsibilities. DO and DI officers will come to the Center expecting to witness the worst stereotypes of officers from the other directorate and act accordingly. More often than not, however, DI officers discover that DO officers can write cogently, and DO officers realize that DI officers can fathom the mysteries of agent operations. In a sense, partnership between the DO and the DI in the CTC must be re-established continually as new officers from both

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services rotate in and out. In my view, time and the clear mission of the CTC have slowly reduced the qualms that DO and DI officers hold about the Center and its institutional strength within the Agency.

The CTC experience also demonstrates that partnership does not automatically follow from collocation. Indeed, there are different degrees of collocation and partnership even within the Center.

(b)(3)(c)

The expectation in CTC, however, is that the DI officers in operations branches will provide a substantive skill and perspective on a region, state, group, or intelligence issue that may not otherwise be available in the branch. They are to bring to the operational milieu their ability to organize and analyze data and to package this analysis for briefings or other operations-related, or finished-intelligence-related, purposes. If this type of DI officer in CTC is the model for future DO-DI partnership, then the likely result would be full collaboration, but with the attendant risk of possible absorption of the DI into the DO. The CTC experience suggests that the right mix is a DO-DI relationship that is a compromise between the two models cited above.

Operations Analysis

What, exactly, is the "value added" work of the DI officer serving in the CTC, either as an analyst in AIG or as an officer integrated in an operations branch? Can this service be replicated throughout the DO and DI in the new partnership scheme? The answers are that the DI officer in CTC provides what can be termed operations analysis, and that this type of analysis is precisely the kind of assistance that the DI can provide to the DO across the board.

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Partnership and Compartmentation

The more intimate professional interaction between the DI and the DO, and the pursuit of operations analysis by the DI, inevitably runs up against the competing demand for greater compartmentation of Agency operations in the aftermath of the Aldrich Ames case. No other issue in the move to partnership evokes such strong reactions on the part of DO and DI officers. Some DO officers fear access of DI officers to sensitive sources and information will lead to the compromise of assets and operations. Some DI officers are concerned that their entry into the world of clandestine operations will turn into a "Faustian pact" that will somehow compromise the DI's integrity and independence.

Neither concern should be played down or dismissed, but neither should be exaggerated. The short but honest answer to the question of whether partnership and compartmentation can be reconciled is that they cannot. I do not believe that the introduction of one or two--or even a handful--of DI officers to a DO operational case poses appreciable new risks, especially when the identity of that asset is already known by dozens of DO officers.

(b)(3)(c)

The advantages of collocation and partnership, in which the DI provides operations analysis to the DO, are too many to let compartmentation stand in the way. The DO could use the help of DI officers, while the DI would benefit from new information and an important new mission. The status quo and the traditional separation of services is a luxury that neither office can afford in this era of downsizing.

For the DO, the end result should be a quantitative and qualitative improvement in intelligence reports. For the DI, partnership should result in better finished intelligence products that are more suited to the needs of the Agency's consumers, a greater understanding of the subject matter, and a better appreciation of what it takes to run successful clandestine operations.

Operations Analysis and "Opportunity Analysis"

There is a complementary relationship between operations analysis and "opportunity analysis," which is the focus of the new "Tradecraft 2000" training program for DI officers. If opportunity analysis is supplying US policy officials with explicitly actionable intelligence support, then operations analysis is providing the same service to the DO.

And the DO is no less a US foreign policy actor than other depart- ments and agencies of the Federal Government. To be sure, the DO fundamentally is a collector of intelligence, and the DI's support of

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the DO through operations analysis is different from DI opportunity analysis for US policymakers. The difference, however, is all too easy to overstate. In the discussion of opportunity analysis, the fact that the DO, in much of its activities, has a tremendous effect on the foreign policy of the US Government is often overlooked. (b)(1) engages in an exchange of information and analysis with another intelligence service on a topic of interest to both parties, it has the opportunity to influence the attitudes of key foreign officials in a manner that may not be available to US diplomats or military officers. Through partnership with the DO and operations analysis, the DI can better serve the overall interests of both the Agency and US foreign policy.

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Audacity and Courage

The Youngest Intelligence Star

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The Congo in May 1966 was a country in turmoil. A civil war was being fought, and the various factions were supported by foreign forces. In the capital, Kinshasa, the government had more control, but armed men were a common sight, and there was general lawlessness after dark. Embassy families lived in locked, barred, and "guarded" houses because crime and break-ins were routine.

One night, the 14-year-old daughter of the CIA station chief was awakened by the noise of people ransacking her dressing room, which was the only means of escape from her bedroom. She pretended to be asleep as three masked burglars entered her bedroom and began searching for valuables. One took a ring and bracelet from her hand and wrist while she pretended to sleep.

The girl heard the burglars discussing the possibility of harming her. She understood their local language, Lingala, but she did not understand the word rape, only that it was a physical threat. They turned on the lights, and one used a butcher knife to cut her nightgown. She managed to roll over and cover herself with the sheet, still feigning sleep. Her greatest fear at that time was that perhaps the men had already killed her mother and father.

When one robber pricked her neck with the knife, she could no longer pretend she was asleep. She started to speak, but the robber made a sign and said in French that he would kill her if she did. He grabbed her arm and tried to pull her from the bed. She wrenched free, jumped out of the other side of the bed, and declared in Lingala that he should keep his hands off her. Pulling on her dressing gown, she faced the armed robbers and warned them not to harm anyone in the house.

Quick Thinking

Surprised by her self-assurance and her ability to speak Lingala, the robbers said they wanted money and did not want to hurt anyone. She agreed to help them find money, and she led them out of her bedroom and dressing room. As they walked through the house, she boldly warned them in Lingala that the American Embassy had "secret and magic" ways of identifying people who harmed Americans. She told them that Americans always kill such people.

She led them into two spare rooms which they searched for valuables. Then they ordered her to take them to her parents' bedroom. They held her in front of them--one robber held a knife at her throat, another had a gun at her back. She opened the door, turned on the overhead light, and in a loud voice she told her parents to wake up and warned them that three armed men were behind her.

Her parents had been sleeping soundly. Her father jumped out of bed when he heard her voice, but her words did not register immediately. When he realized a robber was holding a knife at his daughter's throat, his first instinct was to get his gun from under his pillow. He was too far away from his gun, however, and she warned him again that there was another robber with a gun at her back.

Nonstop Escape

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Narrow Escape

The robbers forced the father, mother, and daughter into a corner of the bedroom. Two robbers armed with a knife and gun covered them. The third searched for valuables, and for 15 to 20 minutes he took jewelry, cameras, and other items. All the while, the mother harangued the robbers in French. The robbers demanded money. The father denied there was any, and the mother ordered them out of the house. As the robbers menaced them, the daughter intervened to tell her parents that the robbers meant business. She took her father's money and threw it at the feet of the robber with the gun, and he ordered the third robber to pick it up.

The daughter repeated her warning in Lingala regarding the American Embassy, and the mother continued to "chew out" the robbers in French and demand they leave her house. Finally, as if to rid themselves of the troublesome women, the robbers ordered the family into the bathroom. The daughter entered first, followed by the mother and father. They slammed the door behind them, threw their bodies against the door and locked it before the robbers could enter. The daughter grabbed two large water bottles to use as weapons and gave one to her father. The family called through the window for help. After a few minutes, their cook's voice could be heard. The robbers had fled. The family unlocked the bathroom door, and the father and daughter armed themselves with handguns and rushed out to hunt for the robbers.

Justice is Done

After some false starts, the local police managed to capture the robbers, who were eventually tried and executed. In retrospect, the daughter believes the robbers were people who learned the layout of the house when they were employed to install grills on the windows--ironically, the reaction to an earlier attempted break-in.

The family learned later that the robbers knew where the daughter slept and planned to use her as a hostage. They also learned these robbers had killed other families, gunning them down in their bathrooms. Only one Belgian family had survived a similar attack by fighting off the burglars.

Well-Deserved Recognition

The daughter believes her mother should have had an award because it was probably her diatribe which disrupted the robbers' efforts to intimidate her and her family. When the daughter recalls the incident now, it resembles a movie. She does not see herself as a hero. She believes people who have shown real courage are those who were hostages or in hostage situations for long periods of time.

Nevertheless, the daughter received the Intelligence Star--the youngest person ever to be so honored--in recognition of her courageous conduct which helped save herself and her father and mother. Her quick appraisal of the situation, calm deportment, knowledge and use of the local language, exploitation of local lore, and resolute action served her well as a teenager, and they continue to do so now in her career as a case officer in the Directorate of Operations.

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Intelligence for the Highest Levels

Serving Our Senior Consumers

Charles A. Peters

It was a pleasant Saturday morning in the summer of 1988, shortly before the Republican convention in New Orleans. As was the custom on weekends, the briefing of Vice President Bush was at his residence on Observatory Hill, and the warm temperature encouraged us to meet over coffee and cinnamon toast on the large porch that runs along two sides of the hous(b)(3)(c)

When he had finished the briefing, the Vice President said, "Pete, assuming all goes well at the convention and if I win in November, I want to change President Reagan's practice of receiving *The President's Daily Brief* (PDB) from his National Security Adviser. I want to continue these daily briefings by you and the staff." I was frankly flattered, but I reminded him that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who was by statute his intelligence adviser, might have something to say about the arrangeme(b)(3)(c)

"The DCI is welcome to attend whenever he wishes," the Vice President said, "but the PDB session should be handled on a regular basis by the usual working-level group.(b)(3)(c)

Of course, the convention came off without a hitch, and the Vice President won the election convincingly. On 21 January, the day after the inauguration, therefore, we gathered for the first time in the Oval Office. Present, as was the custom in the Bush presidency, were Chief of Staff John Sununu, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and Deputy National Security Adviser Bob Gates. DCI Webster also was there, and that led to the first of a long series of informal bits of byplay that were to mark our daily sessior(b)(3)(c)

When the President had finished reading, he turned to me and said with deadly seriousness, "I'm quite satisfied with the intelligence support, but there is one area in which you'll just have to do better." The DCI visibly stiffened. "The Office of Comic Relief," the new President went on, "will have to step up its output." With an equally straight face I promised the President we would give it our best shot. As we were leaving the Oval Office, I wasted no time in reassuring the Director that this was a lighthearted exchange typical of President Bush, and that the DCI did not have to search out an Office of Comic Relief and authorize a major shakeu(b)(3)(c)

The New Administration

Four years later, in 1993, we met with the new President, and his team for the first time. Deputy Director for Intelligence John Helgerson, who had played a major role in the PDB service to the President-elect in Little Rock, accompanied and made the introductions. In addition to the President's Chief of Staff "Mack" McClarty, National Security Adviser Tony Lake and his deputy Sandy Berger and Vice President Gore and his National Security Adviser were present in the Oval Office. Perhaps because of the larger group, President Clinton moved from behind his desk to one of the two chairs in front of the fireplace. The Vice President took the other chair and the rest of us arrayed ourselves on the two facing sofas perpendicular to the fireplac(b)(3)(c)

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the two facing sofas perpendicular to the fireplaces.(b)(3)(c)

Not surprisingly, there was a fair amount of chaos in the West Wing, and the start of the session was delayed. Some people were not certain where their desks were. Few had computers and telephones hooked up and operating. This was understandable for a group new not only to the White House but also, for the most part, to the national government. It was, however, similar to the scheduling problems that Helgerson had experienced in Little Rock, and it foreshadowed an irregularity that was to continue to mark the briefing relationsh(b)(3)(c)

The atmosphere was stiffer than in the Bush administration, although the President seemed warm enough and interested. Our records show that on his first day in office he asked for a "short paper" on human rights abuses in Haiti. A piece in the PDB that day dealt with the (b)(1)chemical weapons program. The President noted that one of the differences between being in Washington and being Governor of Arkansas was that in Little Rock CW refers to country and western music. (b)(3)(c)

Relationships, meanwhile, were still being sorted out. For most of the participants, their only experience with the use of intelligence was that garnered in Little Rock during the preinaugural period, when it was interesting but not vital to see what CIA was saying about the world's trouble spots. Now, there was a responsibility to act on behalf of the United States. How much confidence should they put in the words being placed before them? And how much help could they expect from those word(b)(3)(c)

The other PDB recipients began a pattern of regular briefings that has continued. The day before the inauguration, the Vice President-elect had asked for two papers on aspects of (b)(1) (b)(1) and on inauguration day we saw him twice--once briefly before he was sworn in and then later that evening between inaugural events at the Mayflower Hotel. Secretaries-designate Christopher (State) and Aspin (Defense), who had been receiving briefings when they were in town before the inauguration, continued the practice through their confirmation periods(b)(3)(c)

Importance of Personal Contact

The three vignettes--one on the Vice President's porch and two in the Oval Office--illustrate, I believe, the importance of personal and continuing contact in serving the President and his top advisers effectively. The concept is hardly a new one. Fifteen years ago, Bob Gates wrote, "Above all, we in intelligence should appreciate the primacy of personal relationships in making government work.... Personal contacts...are essential to ensuring that the best possible intelligence product in fact reaches our most important customer in time to make a difference."(1(b)(3)(c)

Thirteen years before that, Directorate of Intelligence officer (b)(3)(c) wrote, "Communication--free and easy contact in an atmosphere of confidence--is essential to the smooth working of the intelligence-policy relationship. Mechanisms can be established to speed the flow of intelligence up and requirements down, and these mechanisms are essential. But nothing is so valuable as an effective person-to-person relationship."(;(b)(3)(c)

It was my experience over 14 years of working with senior policymakers that both sides benefit from such a relationship. For those in policy positions, there is an opportunity to ask questions on the spot and to explore areas of interest. Over a period of time, the way is opened for easy dialogue. The written product itself takes on more meaning when it does not just appear unannounced in the in-box. (b)(3)(c)

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For the intelligence side, there is an unparalleled opportunity to provide relevant material for important customers. Much guesswork about what is desired is removed, and we learn at first hand a good deal about the level of knowledgability of our principal customers that enables us to avoid either repeating the obvious or dazzling with the obscure. Even if there is no verbalization, it becomes apparent that intelligence has not been helpful when a customer reads the headline and then turns the pag(b)(3)(c)

Both sides also benefit from personalizing the product. All the readers, of course, got the same PDB, but the real growth industry of the last decade has been the response to individual interests. There also have been a substantial number of oral briefings by teams of experts--particularly before foreign travel by one of our customers. Quite often, we anticipated a need and offered a collection of papers or other intelligence products that we thought would be of interest in connection with a speech, Congressional testimony, or a foreign visito(b)(3)(c)

Even George Shultz was a more avid consumer than he recalls. In his book, he charged the Agency with using its analytic product to push a policy line and said that he told acting DCI Gates in January 1987--at the height of the Iran-Contra controversy--that he "wouldn't trust anything you guys said about Iran, no matter what." At the same time, he told new National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci that he continued to read the PDB "in part to know what was being put before him.(b)(3)(c)

In fact, the daily record of briefings during Shultz's six-and-a-half years as Secretary of State shows that he seldom missed a session when he was in town, that he welcomed having a member of the PDB staff travel with him on vacations in California, western Massachusetts, and elsewhere, and that he frequently requested the additional Directorate of Intelligence products that are listed weekly. On several occasions, he responded with enthusiasm to analytic reports and urged that they be brought to the attention of his subordinates or other PDB recipients(b)(3)(c)

On 14 January 1989, two years after the Secretary's critical comments to Gates and Carlucci, I had my last meeting with him. I thanked him for the interesting discussions we had had on the role and the shortcomings of intelligence and wished him well in California. My notes from that meeting quote the Secretary as saying that we had provided a "useful service" and describing the PDB as a good publication--"succinct, with excellent graphics." The Secretary went on, according to my notes, by acknowledging that he didn't always agree, but that was to be expected. He said he only wished he had "tasked the intelligence folks more." We were always responsive, he said, and the reports were good. He indicated that he would raise this point with Secretary-designate Bake(b)(3)(c)

The DCI's Role

All Directors know that regular access to the President is a major factor in the success of their tenure at the CIA. It is good for morale at Langley and for their ability to get things done. It strengthens their hand with cabinet-level colleagues, gives them more muscle on the Hill, and enables them to withstand public criticism when, inevitably, it come(b)(3)(c)

Some Directors have started out with the advantage of knowing the President well and of having served him before. Bill Casey had run President Reagan's election campaign, and Bob Gates was well known to President Bush because of his service as Deputy National Security Adviser. Others knew much less about their new bo(b)(3)(c)

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After he was nominated for the DCI job but before he was confirmed by the Senate, we added Jim Woolsey to our regular briefees. Until he was officially on the job, propriety required that we meet with him in his law office in downtown Washington. On substantive issues, the sessions were much like those with other members of the incoming administration. Woolsey, however, was at least equally interested in the daily reports from the Helgerson team in Little Rock and what they said about the President-elect's interests and approach. He had had, Woolsey told me one day, only a single, brief meeting with Mr. Clinton in Little Rock after the election and little significant association with him before Novemb(b)(3)(c)

The ground rules at the Clinton White House were similar to those of the Bush administration: the DCI was more than welcome to attend whenever he chose, but the PDB Staff would deliver the book. In practice, Woolsey adopted the pattern set by his two predecessors and sought to go to the Oval Office once or twice a week. When he managed to connect with the Presidential session, things went well. The President was always gracious, and the two men appeared to have respect for each other. The problem was that the President's schedule was frequently in flux. He often fell behind, and the briefing would be delayed, shortened, or abandoned altogether. Frequently, the President's scheduler would warn us that Mr. Clinton was running behind and beg us to "keep it short." If Tony Lake or Sandy Berger had important policy matters to discuss, the problem was compounded, and we would give up our time. It was not difficult for us to wait and then often to be disappointed, but it was different for the DCI, who usually had other appointments and could not postpone them when there was no assurance we would see the Presiden(b)(3)(c)

Coping With Crises

While there were many foreign crises for US policymakers during my years on the PDB, none focused the attention of senior officials more sharply and over a period of several months than the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. All of the elements were present: major US forces were directly engaged in a shooting war, and a disparate alliance had to be held together. There were many questions about military capabilities and the effectiveness of weapon systems--some of which were being used for the first time in combat. At least until US forces were engaged, public attitudes were ambiguous and, with live television a fact of life, putting a spin on developments became a considerable undertaking for policymake(b)(3)(c)

The Intelligence Community responded by going into a task force mode and publishing spot commentaries several times a day to keep up with breaking news. (b)(1) reporting related to Iraq was given highest priority. Policymakers, of course, a(b)(3)(n)cess to extensive media coverage and to reporting from US commands that were directly involved. Telephone calls to foreign leaders became more frequent, and senior Defense Department officials regularly briefed the President on operational developments. On one occasion, Secretary Cheney went into the Oval Office with us to tell the President the latest from the battlefiel(b)(3)(c)

PDB briefing session, Clockwise: President Bush, Charles Peters, DCI Webster, Chief of Staff Sununu, Deputy National Security Advisor Gates, and National Security Adviser Scowcroft

The appetite for information, including tactical details not ordinarily covered in the PDB, grew in proportion to the directness of US involvement. The daily reports on the briefings in January and February 1991 reflect (b)(1) as we strove to bring something useful to the policymakers. In the pr(b)(3)(n) got into some pretty fine detail. Questions were raised in the Oval Office, (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n) President Bush became very familiar (b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)
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Some of our best work was done on issues that might be regarded as peripheral to the daily accounts from the battlefield. There was great interest in the progress of an oil slick from an offshore Iraqi pumping station as it made its way down the Gulf toward Saudi desalinization plant intakes.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n) Even more important and more difficult to address with confidence was the question of
(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

Our records show that a paper on the military structure of Iraq was
(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n) A more theoretical study of drew rave reviews at the Pentag(b)(3)(c)

There were issues that were clearly controversial--some of short duration and some of longer. Early in January, (b)(1)
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Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, (b)(1) never believed the story. For a week or so after the event, he ribbed us good naturedly about the missing helicopter(b)(3)(c)

More significant was the issue of whether Iraq had chemical warheads for its Scud missiles. With these missiles being fired against Allied installations in Saudi Arabia and against population centers in Israel, this was a high-stakes question. The Intelligence Community knew of Iraq's extensive CW program and credited it with the capability to develop a CW warhead for the Scud. Baghdad had demonstrated frequently a willingness to use chemicals delivered by aircraft or artillery shells in its war with Iran and against its own people. General Powell and others in the military were skeptical, and, in the end, no Scuds with CW warheads were fired. Were the Iraqis deterred by openly stated threats of massive retaliation if chemical weapons were used? Or had they simply failed to build an operational CW warhead for the Scud(b)(3)(c)

That question was never finally resolved. By raising the issue, however, Allied forces could take precautions, and the warnings of retaliation could have left little doubt in Iraqi minds that US and Israeli responses would make the use of CW warheads a bad idea. The cost in terms of wearing gas masks and protective clothing and evacuating threatened civilian areas seems small in comparison.
(b)(3)(c)

Even at the height of the fighting, when Secretary Cheney and General Powell were spending all or part of the night in their offices, our records show a surprising attention to other events going on in the world. This was also period when there were serious problems in relations between the Soviet Government and the Baltic states, and there was much interest in the military threat to Lithuania. There also were political changes in Moscow, and the issue of NATO security guarantees for the East European countries was prominent. Secretary Cheney continued to be a regular customer for the wide

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variety of intelligence publications listed in the PDB every Saturda(b)(3)(c)

On Bringing Bad News

On 19 February 1982, I was scheduled to meet with Secretary of State Haig at his home in northwest Washington. As I went to the front door early that morning, I saw *The Washington Post* on his steps, and I picked it up to bring it in to him. I had read the *Post* on the way over to his house, and I knew that it featured a lengthy front-page story by Bob Woodward on the "unvarnished Haig" that quoted extensively from notes taken by a person "present at nearly two dozen regular senior staff meetings over the last year." The quotes covered a wide range of foreign policy issues and included often candid comments by the Secretary on many of his colleagues in Washington and on his opposite numbers in other government(b)(3)(c)

Haig had complained frequently and bitterly about leaks damaging to US policy and to him personally. Most complaints were directed at the White House, where he later complained that senior staffers were concerned that his aggressive approach to policymaking diminished the role of the President and perhaps even foreshadowed Haig's own presidential ambitions. This latest *Post* article, however, appeared to involve an internal leak at State, and I admit I was more than a little curious to see the famous Haig temper in actio(b)(3)(c)

When the Secretary let me in, I handed him the *Post* and told him he probably would want to read it first. He glanced through the story and jumped for the telephone, finally tracking down his public affairs officer at home. Haig was furious--and rightfully so--and I made no effort to record his languag(b)(3)(c)

I mention this story for two reasons. There do appear to be times when we in the intelligence business go out of our way to bring our own bad news to policymakers. There is a sadistic element, I fear, in all of us. Second, it provides an opportunity to get into an important subject: how can we strike the proper balance between candor and pandering in our intelligence writing, or at least come to a better understanding of the senior policymaker's view of where that balance should be struck?

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There are, I believe, two bad-news issues at work. One can be disposed of easily. We do write about a lot of dreary topics--coups, wars and rebellions, terrorist threats, failing economies, and foreigners out to do in the United States. Good-news pieces are rare and almost always are remarked on. Both as Vice President and as President, Bush often took it upon himself to try to lighten the atmosphere, and he regularly called on the "Office of Comic Relief" to increase its output. We tried--more often than I care to remember--to get some humorous items into the book, but satisfying several levels of bureaucracy that a story is funny, in good taste, and not demeaning to the overall product is no easy tas(b)(3)(c)

As a result, much of our effort at easing the atmosphere was never part of the official written record. I took a hot fudge sundae into the Oval Office one morning to pay an election bet with Governor Sununu. Another day, the governor called back the White House photographer to get a shot of Scowcroft, Gates, Sununu, and me shaking our fingers at an empty chair behind the presidential desk. Sununu later had the four of us sign the picture, which was intended as a takeoff on G.B. Trudeau's cartoon about the President's evil and invisible twin. The inscription read, "To President Skippy, from the gang who sees through you." The President later took the autographed picture to the White House press room, where he told reporters that he did not mind the levity; it just should have been signed "from the gang who used to work here.(b)(3)(c)

The real bad-news issue, however, is telling a policymaker that his policy is not working and describing all the reasons why it will not. Intelligence writing tends to focus on the trouble ahead. We seldom have a vested interest in the success of a particular policy--at least not to the extent that the architect of the policy is anxious to see it succeed. We tend to see what has gone wrong over the years or the decades, and we have learned--often painfully--that if we predict disaster and it does not happen, there is seldom a penalty. If, on the other hand, we fail to warn of disaster and it happens, there are all kinds of career and personal penalties.(b)(3)(c)

It is well documented that policymakers--especially senior ones--have a different view. They are used to seeing their policies succeed, and they have major political and often personal stakes in the policies doing well(b)(3)(c)

I have no new answers on how to bridge this gap, except to recognize that it exists and to remind ourselves constantly that gratuitous fingers in the eye of the policymakers do little good and risk turning off the recipient of the bad news to the whole intelligence produ(b)(3)(c)

It also is well to keep in mind that policymakers have interests that go beyond our "objective," sometimes ivory-tower view of a situation. Politics and relations with Congress are almost always a factor for the President and his principal aides. We may feel that Gorbachev's approach to reform will not work and that he may not last, but a President has little choice but to deal with the man in power, and he may be especially inclined to do so if he knows him personally. For a President to speculate publicly about another leader's weakness or to act in a way that suggests he is a diminished actor on

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the world scene will, in many cases, become a self-fulfilling prophec(b)(3)(c)

We may say over and over again that there can be no settlement in Bosnia that does not recognize Serb gains on the battlefield. For both foreign and domestic policy reasons, however, no President can appear to be accepting ethnic cleansi(b)(3)(c)

Bad news can cause real problems for policymakers. One of the most dramatic examples was the conflicting estimates of bomb damage to Iraqi armor in the weeks immediately preceding the ground offensive into Kuwait and Iraq in 1991. I have no intention of going back over the conflicting assessments, the reasons for them, or who was right. One week before the ground attack, however, then Deputy National Security Adviser Bob Gates told me in no uncertain terms--a message I am sure he wanted me to carry back to Langley--that the President needed a "solid statement" from the Intelligence Community on which to base policy. Present efforts, he said, do not "fix" the problem or even "ameliorate" it. In addition, he noted that the low damage estimates coming out of the Community compared with the higher figures from CINCENT would be used on the Hill to argue for a delay in the ground attack. General Scowcroft, who was present throughout Gates's comments, said he agreed with Gates but would refrain from "piling on." My notes show that the issue also came up in the Oval Office, with the President, himself a former fighter pilot, raising the possibility of "pilot euphoria" to explain the higher field estimate(b)(3)(c)

Gates's remarks make two important points. First, this was an important issue on which the President needed a firm judgment from the Intelligence Community. Other factors would play a part in determining when the ground attack would be launched--the readiness of Allied forces, the ability to sustain that readiness if more time were needed to destroy Iraqi armor, the chance that Iraq would anticipate the timing and directions of the Allied attack if the delay was prolonged--but intelligence on Iraqi capabilities was important. Discussions of methodologies for assessing bomb damage to explain differing conclusions were not what the President and his advisers neede(b)(3)(c)

Further, there was the issue of how the intelligence would be used by those who opposed the ground attack. If the information went only to senior policymakers, it could be considered and acted upon or discounted. The prospect of it leaking or being used by opponents of the ground attack on the Hill, however, was real and definitely a factor in White House unhappines(b)(3)(c)

This case illustrates two quite different views of the Intelligence Community's role. We saw ourselves as purveyors of the truth and tended to disregard the impact of our views on the execution of policy. The White House, however, needed to bring the Congress and the country along in support of a controversial policy. Senior officials looked to intelligence not just to be a team player but to provide information useful in the context in which they were operatin(b)(3)(c)

The last phrase is crucial. Our mission is not only to collect, analyze, and present intelligence we find important. We also have to understand better the needs of the policymakers and, without sacrificing objectivity, do what we can to meet those nee(b)(3)(c)

NOTES

(1) *Studies in Intelligence*, winter 1980, p. 26.

(2) *Studies in Intelligence*, winter 1967, p. 6.

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Tough, Unconventional, and Effective

An Interview With Former DDCI John N. McMahon (S)

(b)(3)(c)

Photo Of John N. McMahon

In 1951, John McMahon joined the CIA as a GS-5 cable distribution clerk. When he retired 35 years later, he was Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI). Along the way, he walked out of the Junior Officer Training Course because he thought its exercises were silly; he crossed swords with Counterintelligence Staff chief James Angleton over the Francis Gary Powers incident; he fought the Air Force tooth and nail to retain a role for the Agency in the building and management of overhead systems; he had more than one tiff with DCI John McCone; and he held nearly every major managerial position in the Agency. (U)

A brief summary of McMahon's career shows just how extraordinary it was. He was sent overseas in 1952 to work in the German Station's cable secretariat and then spent a second tour there as special assistant to the Chief of Station (COS) Gen. Lucian Truscott, and, later, to his replacement, Tracy Barnes. In 1959, he was assigned to the U-2 program, where he handled administrative matters for the pilots and the contractors that worked on the project. The next year, he was made Executive Officer of the Development Projects Division in the Directorate for Plans (DDP), which handled the U-2 and several other projects. (During McMahon's tenure there, the office was moved to the Directorate for Research, the forerunner of the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T), and renamed the Office of Special Activities.) In 1965, he was appointed Deputy Director of the Office of Special Projects, the predecessor to the current Office of Development and Engineering. In 1970, he was made Deputy Director of the Office of ELINT (later the Office of SIGINT Operations) and Director of the same office the following year. In 1973, DCI James Schlesinger picked McMahon to be chief of the Office of Technical Services. The next year, he was named Associate Deputy Director for Administration. In 1976, he was reassigned to become the Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community. Two years later, DCI Turner named him Deputy Director for Operations (DDO), and in 1981, DCI Casey tapped him to become Deputy Director for Intelligence. The following year, he became Executive Director, serving only a few months in that job before being named DDCI. (C)

In the interview excerpts that follow, John McMahon shares some of his exploits and gives his views on a host of topics, from managing in the Agency, through relations with the Congress, to covert action. The interview was conducted on 4 December 1997 and 4 February 1998. (U)

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To Germany and the JOT Program

The knowledge of the Agency which I had in the 1940s came from my sister, who worked in OSS. She was a cryptanalyst and also instructed OSS agents, officers really, in their communications program for dropping behind the lines in Europe. When I was getting ready to graduate from Holy Cross, the Agency had a recruiter up there who talked to a number of people, some formally and some informally. That reacquainted me with the Agency, but I decided to go to law school. I came down to Georgetown Law and started school during the day, full time. It didn't take too long for me to realize that one must eat if one wanted to go to school, so I needed a job, and my sister, again, introduced me to Agency people in communications, since they worked nights, in fact worked 24 hours. So it was possible for me to go to school during the day and work in communications at night. My assignment was in cable distribution, where one would read the cable and route it to the different elements of the Agency that ought to have it. It was rather a routine job, but it did expose me to the side of the Agency that was far greater than just communications. (U)

Just as I was in the midst of my final exams for the semester, the Agency asked me if I would go to Germany [in 1952]. So I did not go back to school for the second semester but instead went into communications training and then over to Germany. The intent was that I would set up a--help set up--a cable dissemination function in the Eastern Europe (EE) Registry. The Agency, at that time, was in the process of pulling together the Office of Policy Coordination [responsible for covert action operations] and the Office of Special Operations [responsible for clandestine intelligence collection], and in Germany that manifested itself by pulling the headquarters of OSO into [redacted] and the headquarters of OPC from [redacted] into [redacted] and placing both those functions under Gen. Lucian Truscott. (b)(3)(c) [redacted] headed up the OPC activities and (b)(3)(c) [redacted] headed up the OSO (b)(1) activities. Instead of going into the cable dissemination function, I ended up in the signal center (b)(3)(n) working with one-time pads in both encrypting and decrypting messages and working swing shifts. That was not my intention in life, nor was it the reason why I went to [redacted] So I announced that I was resigning from the Agency and going home. Whereby a number of people verified that I was supposed to be in EE Division, and I was summarily transferred into EE Division, [Registry Branch, cable desk] from Commo. (C)

In EE, I went to work with (b)(3)(c) [redacted] a case officer who was setting up the cable dissem function. At that time, [redacted] and Tom Polgar were special assistants down in the front office to General Truscott, and the others, [redacted], were down there. Toward the end of my first year, I was asked to come back to [redacted] and work for [redacted] in Administration. When I returned to Germany, I briefly joined [redacted] in Admin, but it turned out that Polgar and [redacted] were returning home, so I was asked to go help General Truscott as his "gopher," so to speak. That I did, and within a year or so, Tracy Barnes replaced the General as COS Germany. I stayed on as Tracy's assistant. The integration of OPC and OSO, at that point, had been fairly well cemented and executed, and two Assistant COSs showed up, all working for Tracy Barnes. [redacted] (b)(3)(c) [redacted] (C)

It was planned that I would go into the Junior Officer Training (JOT) program, as we called it in those days, later known as the Career Trainee program. There, I encountered a number of stumblingblocks. The first one started with a test that we were all given. We were told that, after we completed the test, we should set our papers on the front desk, and we could leave. I went through the test, went up and put my paper on the desk. The monitor told me to take my seat, and I said, "No, I've finished the test."

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He said, "I still want you to take your seat," whereupon I just laughed and walked out. The next one was more formal, when I was assigned to a room with a number of psychologists in it, with three or four other JOT candidates. There was a pile of blocks of different sizes and shapes in the middle of a table. No one gave any instructions, and I guess the purpose of the routine was to see who was going to take charge and be the leader and decide how the blocks and shapes ought to be organized. It was amusing to watch people elbow each other out of the "leadership position." When the exercise was finished, we were then sent to different rooms and asked to write an evaluation of the other students taking the test. I allowed that I was not going to do that. I was told that I had to do it. So I wrote across the paper "I refuse to write an evaluation of people I meet under such absurd circumstances." I handed it in and walked out. That was the end of my JOT qualification program. There was a furor because a lot of people had sponsored me, like Tracy Barnes, and even [Deputy Director for Support] Red White was very tolerant of me. But the Office of Training decided that I was not worthy of the position of JOT candidate. (U)

I asked to see Matt Baird, who was the Director of Training, and I said that I had just one question for him. I said, "You know my background, you know what I've done thus far. If I came to you for a job, what would you do?" He said, "I would hire you." I wasn't sure what I was going to do, but Colonel White was then running the DDS [Deputy Directorate for Support], as we called it at that time. He said that he would give me a personal JOT course depending on where I wanted to end up in the Agency. I knew the relative size of the different organizations in the Agency. The DDS service, which soon afterwards was known as the MG service, for Admin people as opposed to Logistics or Security, had [redacted] people in it. The DDO had more than [redacted] and I decided that I would rather be one of [redacted] than one of [redacted]. I told Colonel White that I would like to have his personalized JOT program, and he assigned me down to the Central Processing Branch, where we prepared our people for overseas travel. The interesting part of CPB, as it was known, was that it had all the elements of the administrative offices. It had logistics, security, personnel, obviously travel, and finance. So I would be exposed to all those functional elements of the administrative service. I went down there and became the deputy to a gentleman by the name of [redacted] (S)

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The U-2 Program

I held that job for a little less than a year, when Jim Cunningham and [redacted], who were working the U-2 program, asked me if I would come up to H Street and be the "case officer" to the U-2 pilots. This was a euphemism for handling all their administrative chores as well as babysitting the problems that their wives or families might have, since the U-2 program for the pilots at that time was a bachelor assignment. In addition to that function, I should handle the contracts for the technical representatives of the different companies which had hardware on the U-2. So, in January 1959, I joined the U-2 program, and I was in that job just about a year when I was asked to become the executive officer for the entire office. At that time, the office was responsible for not only the U-2 program but also the beginning of the CORONA program, the beginning of the OXCART program, and our conventional air operations, which were heavily committed in Southeast Asia and, to a lesser degree, in Africa. [redacted] That was right after we had moved from the DDP, under Dick Bissell, to the DDS&T as the Office of Special Activities. So I kind of backed into the S&T from the U-2 program. (U)

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You may recall that when the U-2 was established, we anticipated that we would have about a year and a half to two years before the Soviets came up with a countermeasure, namely a surface-to-air

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missile. We initially felt that their radars weren't very good and that, until they got the radars working well, the U-2 was safe. That position, while not loudly touted, was put to the test on the very first mission when the Soviets tracked us and, lo and behold, we realized that the Soviets really knew how to make radars. We were able to go from the first flight in July 1956 to May 1960, when Powers was shot down. When he was shot down, there was a considerable amount of confusion,

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We had a cover story where we would say nothing, and the pilots were told we would say nothing. We provided the pilots with the option of killing themselves. We told the pilot if he were captured he was to tell the Soviets that he worked for CIA. And then we said we want this to be a CIA mission, not a military mission, and further that he was to underestimate the altitude of the airplane. Well, true to form, as soon as something happened, the State Department said, "We have to come out with a story." We reminded them that we all agreed there would be no story; that we would remain silent. They instructed us to say that he was on a weather mission, which was the cover for a mission from Ada Turkey. We pointed out that they tracked him by radar coming out of but the State Department maintained that they had to save The fact that State Department came out with this cover story gave President Eisenhower a huge lie, and Khrushchev finally came out and said, "Ah ha! You lie! I have Gary Powers from the CIA." The whole world said, "So what?" and scoffed at it. The Soviets then realized they made a mistake and started calling him Captain Powers from the Pentagon to try and put the military spin on it. (U)

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When the trial came out, there were two things that were not said that should have been said had Powers just revealed everything he knew, as Jim Angleton [chief of the Counterintelligence Staff] professed. They never mentioned the altitude of the airplane, and they never mentioned that British pilots were also involved in the program. We know that the Soviets would have jumped on that readily. So that convinced me that Powers followed our directions to the letter. (S)

That started a fight between myself and Angleton on what would happen with Powers. I urged an exchange, and I wrote a paper that [DDCI] General Cabell approved. Then I attended meetings where we tried to figure out, as a community, where to go next. Those meetings were usually at State. President Kennedy approved that we try and get Powers out. Our friends in the CI Staff did everything they could to torpedo that exchange. I can remember several officers in State speaking against the exchange. I pointed out that President Kennedy authorized the exchange, and I wanted the names of those that were against it. The objections disappeared. John McCone, who was the head of AEC when Powers was shot down, proclaimed then that he defected. So, as Director, he wasn't too happy eating those words. We finally effected the exchange, and the individual who met Powers at the bridge and brought him home was (b)(3)(c) [of the Office of Security]. (U)

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What I did here was handle all the correspondence, much of it to the chagrin of Dave Murphy and Dick Helms. We had our own commo system, and I would send cables to (b)(3)(c) who was handled our end in and had a lot of contact with [Wolfgang] Vogel, the lawyer for the Russians on the exchange. After we managed to get Powers back, and after all the debriefing of Powers, it proved that he did exactly what he was told, and sure enough he was shot down. McCone didn't want to accept that. We had Kelly Johnson, a number of technicians, and Air Force experts agree he was shot down. But, at McCone's insistence, the Powers incident was brought

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before a three-judge panel of Federal judges. They concluded that Powers was indeed a hero. Then McCone planned to have the general in charge of Air Force OSI [Office of Special Investigations] conduct a separate investigation. He just had that bit in his mouth, and he wouldn't let go. President Kennedy called McCone and told him to forget it. (C)

McCone got excited one day because two authors, [David] Wise was one and I forget the other name [Thomas Ross], but these two journalists had written a couple of books on intelligence. They just completed a book on the U-2 program. The book was coming out just about the time that word got out that Powers was going to write his own book. He had vetted this through the Agency, and everybody thought it was an OK idea, and we could censor it for classified information or whatever. I can remember McCone called me upstairs, and [Acting Director, Office of Special Activities] Jim Cunningham was with me. The authors had complained to Bobby Kennedy, who in turn called McCone, saying he thought that it was inappropriate for Powers to write a book. What they were really doing was making sure there was no competitor to Wise's book. McCone said he understood that Powers was writing a book, and he said, "Can't you convince him that that's not the thing to do?" or "Can't you handle it?" I said, "No, sir, my biggest problem is trying to convince him that your decision isn't political." Jim Cunningham said, "Jesus Christ, John, what are you doing?" McCone gave a wave, and I walked out. Powers wrote his book. It was too bad that Powers was not heralded as the hero that he was. He was a unique pilot; he was one of our best pilots. (U)

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This is a flashback to when I had thought I had spent enough time as executive officer in the aircraft and reconnaissance business. I went to the ADDA, (b)(3)(c) who was technically the father of the career service that I never had. I asked him what the service might have in mind for me over the next year or so, and he said he wanted me to go to [redacted] as the deputy admin officer there. Having tasted the rarefied atmosphere of Executive Officer in the Development Projects Division and Office of Special Activities, I felt that that was quite a step down. That is, from a GS-17 position to a GS-13 position. When I complained (b)(3)(c) about the wisdom of that selection, he said, "Look, John, frankly we don't know what you've been doing the last few years. You've been in all these special projects." My response was that that was not a problem for me, that was a problem for the Agency, and I thought the best thing I could do was to have no career service at all, since the one that I had didn't keep very good track of me. He allowed that I had to have some career service, but I countered that, since I did OK without it so far, I guess I could do OK without it in the future. Not having the career service had its drawbacks though, since there was no one looking out for my future. In fact, when it was suggested that I be promoted to a GS-16 by [DDS&T] Bud Wheelon, (b)(3)(c) who was the head of the DS&T career service, didn't want to do it because I really had no technical qualifications. Wheelon prevailed, however, and the DDS&T assumed career responsibility for me. (C)

Fighting for the Overhead Systems

As you may recall, Dick Bissell ran the reconnaissance programs as special assistant to the DCI, who was then Allen Dulles. Bissell, from that assignment, was appointed DDP, which is now DDO, but he took those "recon" programs with him. It was only after the Bay of Pigs, as well as the shootdown of Powers, that the reconnaissance activities were migrated over to the DDR, Deputy Director for Research, under Pete Scoville. John McCone came in to replace Allen Dulles, and he placed the reconnaissance activities under Scoville. McCone was surprised that the Agency was in the reconnaissance business at all, so he gave our budget away to the Air Force, and that act created a large hassle between those of us who were trying to save the satellite programs for the Agency, and

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the Air Force, which wanted to take them over. (U)

As part of the quid pro quo for McCone giving our budget to the Air Force, Brockway McMillan, the Air Force Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, was designated to run the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), but Scoville was to be named a co-equal. Brockway procrastinated on implementing such an arrangement, and Scoville was too meek to fight for it. Instead, he suggested that I be assigned to the NRO staff working under McMillan and the Air Force folks that were with him. But a general named Leo Geary convinced McMillan that if I went in to the NRO staff, I would be running it in a short time. So that assignment never came to fruition. Instead, I continued to fight the battle to maintain our reconnaissance role in spite of Scoville's willingness to let McMillan take the lead. (U)

Bud Wheelon then entered the scene and DDR became DS&T. Bud was to consolidate all science activities, including the scientific analysis activities, and he set up an office called FMSAC [Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center] to analyze foreign missiles, principally through the telemetry that we collected. Bud was indeed a leader and immediately took up the challenge of stopping the erosion of the Agency's reconnaissance position. He not only fought to preserve our role in CORONA but also to branch out and establish follow-on satellite programs. With Bud's arrival, we were able to challenge the Air Force, and a rather dramatic series of actions unfolded which resulted in a great bitterness between the Air Force and the Agency. But the end result was a clear recognition and definition of the Agency's role in the current and future reconnaissance program. (S)

That settled that part, but things in Washington were still pretty heated. McMillan, since he controlled our funds, had literally starved us in doing much research, and at a meeting with McCone--he was still uneasy with the Agency's reconnaissance role, but we now had Bud Wheelon, who was very much a champion for it, breathing down his neck--at the meeting, McCone got rather upset with our activit(b)(1)
I sounded off that McMillan had lied to him repeatedly and had gone out and spent [redacted]n (b)(3)(c)
improved version of [an overhead system] and he, even as DCI, didn't know it. (C) (b)(3)(n)

McCone left the room in a huff. Gen. Pat Carter, who was the DDCI, said that he hoped that I was right. And I told him that I could prove it, and he said, "Please do." I went downstairs and typed up seven different incidents where McMillan had lied to McCone, or did things with McCone not knowing it. I gave them to Carter that night. Carter gave those seven items to McCone, and within two or three weeks McMillan was fired from the Air Force. I submit that there was a cause and effect. (U)

At any rate, that caused the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense to address the entire reconnaissance program for the nation. Two panels were set up to determine what role the Agency would have in reconnaissance. I represented the Agency, and a general and colonel represented the Air Force. The second panel addressed technical issues associated with any division of labor. The end result was that the Agency was given the responsibility to develop an entire SIGINT system and, further, was given the responsibility to develop the camera system for the next-generation imaging satellite, and also responsibility for the film path and film spools that would be integrated into an Air Force reentry vehicle. (S)

At about that time, Bud Wheelon left the DDS&T for industry. Huntington Sheldon was appointed to carry the workload associated with the NRO, in lieu of the DDS&T, until a new DNRO could be appointed. Shortly, that happened in the name of Dr. Al Flax, who in addition to becoming the director of the NRO was the Air Force Assistant Secretary for R&D. Jim Reber, who was running the requirements committee for reconnaissance activities for the DCI, was appointed DDNRO. The

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DDS&T set up an office known as the Office of Special Projects with John Crowley as Director and myself as Deputy Director. (U)

In looking back over the wrestling that had transpired with the Air Force, I'm reminded that, when Gen. Jack Ledford came in to take over the U-2 and OXCART programs, Crowley and I were thrashing around on the satellite side of the house. Ledford tried to establish an arrangement with the Air Force where the Air Force could take the Agency's satellite stuff, and he would keep the Agency's aircraft programs. That obviously led to a fair amount of discussion on our part with him, but I felt that I was given the ultimate tribute: when he retired, at his party at the Madison Hotel, he said the only reason why the Agency retained the satellite effort was because of John McMahon. I don't think his statement is all that true, but I was more than happy to take credit for it that night. (U)

Three New Directors, Three New Jobs

Then our friend DCI Schlesinger came on the scene. He came in after Richard Helms left and, if you recall, we had a lot of rattling around in 1973. He called me one day and said that I should come over to his office at 9:30 a.m. I called [DDS&T] Carl Duckett to tell him and proceeded to the ADCIA's office. Schlesinger wanted to know if I had gotten my 18. I said, "Yes," and thanked him. He said "I've got a job for you." I said, "What's that?" He said, "I want you to go down and run OTS" [Office of Technical Services]. I said, "I don't know anything about OTS." I said, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) He said, "I want you to go down there and run it anyway." And he said, "Make sure you know what's going on." He asked Duckett, "When would be a good time?" Carl said, "How about the first of the month?" Schlesinger said, "How about 10 a.m.?" I literally went out the door, got in Carl's car. We drove down to OTS and I walked in and said, "Hi, I'm your new leader." It was a very awkward occasion. (C)

I never cease to be amazed at the ingenuity of OTS people and how they can cause things to happen. There was no reason for me to have a night's sleep the two or so years that I was there, because we always had operations going on worldwide [redacted] It was just fabulous, and they were dedicated employees. I can't speak highly enough for OTS, which does a vital job. (S) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

Then from OTS, Bill Colby asked if I would become the Associate Deputy Director for Administration (ADDA) to Jack Blake. I thought it was rather amusing that after all these years I ended up as Chairman of the MG career service, which I had never really spent any time in. The job as ADDA was fascinating. Of course, Jack Blake was a sharp, fast-moving individual, and the DDA had a number of growing pains, particularly since the Agency was beginning to enter the world of technology through the Office of Communications and the Office of Information Services, that is, computers. The latter was eventually to be assigned to DS&T because of the technology rush in computers. In retrospect, I'm not so sure that it was a bright idea since computers and communications have really folded one into another in more recent years. (U)

It was not too long that the role as ADDA was engulfed in the Church/Pike [Congressional] investigations, and the Associate Deputy Directors in all Directorates formed a panel under the DDCI to address the questions, as well as the call for documentation, from the committees. It was always a hassle, and our meetings were filled with tension prompted more out of frustration with the

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committees than with each other. I am confident, however, that without the ADD panel, the Agency would have been savaged by the Congressional committees. (U)

In a couple of years, George Bush entered the scene as DCI, and he was anxious to breath life into the Intelligence Community (IC) Staff and have the DCI play the role as the head of the IC and not just the head of CIA. He had selected Adm. Dan Murphy to be the Deputy DCI for the IC Staff, and he asked me to be Dan's deputy to represent the Agency's interests. Dan and I played a harmonious role in trying to help the DCI carry out his Community function. In spite of all the Executive Orders previously issued, we put together the first consolidated IC budget in the history of the nation. We really had to do some arm twisting with the members of the Community, the member agencies of the Community, not only to tell us about their programs, but also how much they were spending to perform them. It was only later, under Stan Turner's tenure, that the DCI really got ahold of the Community, thanks principally to the will and intervention of President Carter. (U)

A small, maybe meaningless anecdote, but one which convinced me of the beauty of having a DCI with close relationship to the President, occurred with the appointment of George Bush as DCI. I felt that the Agency would run the risk that usually attends a Presidential appointee assignment. However, I soon became a believer in the effectiveness of a close DCI/President tie. It occurred once when Dan Murphy was on a trip, and the Department of Defense and the State Department had been active in trying to chew up DCI prerogatives in the aftermath of the Church/Pike investigations. Those entities realized that the Agency was weakened considerably, and they were looking for any piece of the Agency's action that they might assume. The Pentagon had been active on this score, and I went into George Bush's office and complained to him about what the Pentagon was trying to do. He said, "Tell me one more time." And when I did, he picked up the phone and got ahold of Don Rumsfeld, who was then Secretary of Defense. When Rumsfeld came on, Bush had a few smalltalk words but then acknowledged that some of his people were trying to grab DCI responsibilities, and he asked if Rumsfeld could take care of it, or should both of them go see Jerry? Meaning President Ford. Rumsfeld allowed that he'd take care of it, and, indeed, the door slammed shut on the Pentagon's ventures shortly thereafter. It was then that I realized that having a DCI who can call the President by his first name was well worthy of the assignment. (U)

DDO and DDI

Getting back to the subject of manpower, DCI Stan Turner has taken a bum wrap for the "reductions" within the Directorate of Operations (DO). I think it's important to set that record straight. You may recall when George Bush came into the Agency as DCI, he wanted his own Deputy Director for Operations (DDO). He moved Bill Nelson on, and Bill chose to leave, but as a departing gesture Bill left a memo for Bush telling him that the DO v(b)(3)(c) people fat, and that it should be cut. Bush never acted on that, but it was in the in-box when Stan Turner came onboard. Bill Wells, Nelson's replacement, was asked to follow up on that recommendation by Turner. Wells went through a variety of options, all looking at reduction. The question was how soon and how many. He came up with a formula that had a reduction of ab(b)(3)(c) people in a three-year time frame. Turner took that recommendation and told Wells that he wanted th(b)(3)(c) eduction but that he wanted it in a two-year time frame. It was just about then that Wells left and I came onboard as DDO. It may be worthy to note that I was running the IC Staff in the summer of 1977, when Stan Turner asked me to take over the DO. I demurred, saying that he ought to go to a career DO officer to do that. He said, "Name some." I named Dick Stoltz and John Stein. Turner interviewed both of them and, for some reason, he came back to me and said, "I want you to take this job." I had put him off a number of

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times, and he finally said to me in December, "If you don't take the DDO job, then I will go outside." That forced me to acquiesce, because I felt that regardless of how poorly I might handle it, it would be a hell of a lot better than an outsider. (C)

I took the job and started the first part of January 1978 as the DDO. I was faced with this reduction going on in-place. I'll admit that the DO found ingenious ways to hire people who were on contract in various capacities, so that I don't think that we lost that much talent. I was content that the DO was on its way back and seemed to have the support of Congress. As things happened, a change of administrations, Reagan came in and so did Bill Casey as the DCI. Bill Casey and I wrestled a bit with some of his activism and role that he wanted the DO to play in a number of things. I usually had to argue, but I think always successfully, that we had certain ground rules to abide by. It wasn't a question really of Bill trying to skirt any law or procedure, it just wasn't something that he was familiar with. It took constant care to not let things get loose. I don't think that I was as aggressive on covert action as Casey would have liked me to be, because if it didn't make sense, or if it was beyond our means at least by my standpoint, I argued against it. I think Bill decided that it was time for him to get a more inspired activist in the DO, and that's when he asked me to take over the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). I chose to retire. He asked me not to do that. He said give the DI a shot for a year or so. He said that he was not happy with the DI and asked me to take a look at it and see what's wrong and fix it. I agreed to do that, and he immediately put Max Hugel in to replace me. Max fell quickly on his own sword and was replaced by John Stein. (U)

I went over to the DI and was puzzled by what made an analyst analyze what he was doing. I appreciated that we needed to have a reasonable balance between answering the mail on a daily basis and reacting to a crisis worldwide. I also realized there had to be a proper balance between answering the mail and yet permitting the analyst to do research so we could build up a database of understanding, so that when a crisis did occur, we had the basis of our research to fall back on to give us a point of reference. I also didn't appreciate what countries received what analysis. I decided to take a brute force approach to finding out what the DI was doing. Only then could I figure out what needed to be fixed. I got together with (b)(3)(c) and we set up basically a time card, a computer time card, where the analysts could and would fill out their card everyday as to what they were analyzing and how much time they spent on it. Then, when I overcame all the grumbling over that, I could run the cards through a computer and get a printout of what kind of analysis, whether it was economic or political or military, was being done on each country and for how much time. I was stunned to learn that here we were in 1981, and we had one man-year devoted to [redacted] At that point, I became convinced that we had to have a great deal of revamping. (C) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

I also realized that if I ever asked the question about what was going on in any particular country, I would have to ask at least three different offices to get the input on economics, military, and political, and then I would have to do the integration, which didn't make any sense whatsoever. I decided that we had to reorganize and get away from the functional structure and go regionally so that we would have all of the players in one section working on a certain region and a certain country. That way we could put a military analyst and an economic analyst and a political analyst in the same room and focus on a particular country. That way, they could interchange ideas and hopefully that kind of synergism could produce fuller and better intelligence. (U)

When I arrived at this conclusion, I sounded out several former Deputy Directors for Intelligence (DDI) like Ray Cline, Bruce Clarke, and Jack Smith. I may be doing them a little bit of injustice, but in essence the response was that they felt that it was the way to go, but they weren't courageous enough to attempt it. It so happened that when I decided to do it, I talked to [DDCI] Bobby Inman and

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Casey, and explained to them how I would go about it, and they endorsed it and said go with it. So it turned out that we were having an offsite at [redacted] to discuss the budget needs for the different DI offices. I think we were still known as NFAC [National Foreign Assessment Center], but maybe we had changed to DI. The office chiefs were planning to tell me all their requirements and what they felt they needed, and we were going to argue in an open forum about what was required. I decided it would be an excellent forum to have the office directors tell me how they were going to organize to satisfy my desire to put them all together in a regional approach. So I went to the meeting, took the floor, and said that there are two ways to do this: I will tell you what I want done, and I can either tell you how I am going to do it, or be smart and ask you to tell me how to go about accomplishing it. I told them what it was I wanted, and I walked out the door. There was a lot of hooting and hollering. Some crashing of rice bowls, but sure enough the majority came through and told me how we ought to do it. That's how the reorganization took place. (C)

The Office of Economic Research, under [Maurice] Ernst, raised all kinds of hell. He went running down to the Department of Commerce. He went running to the NSC. He told them the sky was falling, and I got calls from various people. I only assured them that their intelligence would get better, not worse. And so we went forward with the reorganization, and I found it best if Ernst found a job as an NIO [National Intelligence Officer] for Economics, and I put him in it, and he seemed to be happy. Anyway, we went through with our reorganization, and I am confident that the intelligence did improve. We did ensure that there was proper research done and, further, that we had an integrated product whenever a paper was written, because it was written from a context of military, political, and economics, and not just one of those functions on their own. And to this day, as I found out quite recently, the DI still professed that it was something that was needed for a long time, and they were grateful that it was accomplished. (U)

After I reorganized the DI, Casey said he wanted someone to manage the Agency, and he would have Adm. Bobby Inman worry about the IC for him. In January 1982, I became the Executive Director, a job that had not been filled in a number of years. The role in managing the "day-to-day" activities of the Agency was fairly easy, since I had spent a considerable amount of time in all the Directorates, and I was fairly current on all the activities. It also was of great help to have the Community experience permitting the interface of the Agency to the Community, a rather familiar and knowledgeable chore for me. Bobby Inman was very helpful in letting me run the Agency as I saw fit. I was religious in keeping him informed of what I was doing but experienced no friction between him and myself relative to my new role. That job lasted six months, and, in June 1982, Inman retired, and I was appointed by President Reagan as DDCI, and Chuck Briggs took over the role of Executive Director. Chuck was a natural for the job, since he in turn had assignments and experience with a number of the Directorates. (U)

DDCI

The transition to DDCI seemed natural from the Agency standpoint, but I soon realized that Casey had major problems with the Hill. As a result, I spent a good deal of time putting out fires that Casey lit on the Hill, or trying to smooth feathers which he didn't necessarily worry about ruffling. I was also able to pick up a good deal of the workload with the Community, but we had placed Admiral Burkhalter as head of the IC Staff, and he had great rapport with the directors of the various agencies within the Community. So he took a good load off our shoulders. Casey and I seemed to develop a work relationship that spanned the entire DCI's responsibilities, and we did not necessarily parcel out our work but took it as it came. He, of course, did a lot of traveling, which caused me to mind the store

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quite a bit. And with his relations with Congress being so poor, I took a great deal of the Congressional hearings. When there were substantive representations to Congress, he and I both would prepare for the hearing and then if, for whatever reason, he decided not to take it, I was prepared for it. When we had NSPG [National Security Planning Group] meetings, normally both of us went. And on Cabinet meetings involving intelligence, or requiring intelligence input, either he or I would go and give an intelligence introduction before the meeting got underway. Of course, both of us went to the luncheons or meetings with Shultz [Secretary of State], Weinberger [Secretary of Defense], Clark, McFarlane, and Poindexter [National Security Advisers]. (U)

On Congress

The Church and Pike Committees set a bad tone for Congressional oversight. Of course, they came into the Agency seeking resolution of the so-called abuses, and unfortunately Senator Church used the forum to enhance his presidential aspirations. And he made no secret about that. As a result, really the first baptism that the Agency had with Congressional oversight was one of an adversary on the loose within the Agency. The Agency had to take great measures to contain the security of Agency operations and its agents. Wisely, the Agency set up a panel of the Associate Deputy Directors to look at the requests from Congress, to see how the Church and Pike Committee staffers were handling themselves and try to modulate reasonableness in the approach. We weren't always successful, but I think that we did come forward to expose where the Agency went wrong, but we were judicious in assuring that we would protect our sensitive operations and personnel in the Agency, and in our agent corps. The whole process, and the publicity which the Church and Pike Committees used to denigrate the Agency, left an uneasy feeling relative to Congressional oversight. (U)

At any rate, when the Congress decided to establish the select committees on intelligence, both in the House with the HPSCI [House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence] and in the Senate, the House panel was formed under Representative Eddie Boland from Massachusetts, and I know he called for a hearing on the DO in January 1978. It so happened that I took over the DO three weeks before that hearing was to take place. The natural reaction within the DO was to stiff them, principally because Congress didn't show any thought of being a reasonable oversight agent. I concluded that we had to develop a good relationship with Congress wherein they would trust us. Much to the chagrin of most, if not all, of the people in the DO, I decided that I would take that hearing even though I had been the DDO for only three weeks. (U)

I was blessed with a pretty good feel for the DO through my tenure in OTS. I decided to use OTS as a vehicle to translate DO operations to Congress. I selected a number of the spy gadgets out of OTS, and I went down to Congress and described to them what it was like to be a case officer. Of course, this was a presumption that took a lot of guts, if not stupidity, to try to do it. I passed around the devices that are used in operations--miniature cameras, audio devices, small video cameras, even secret writing, and the famous rollover camera--and those gadgets mesmerized the Congressional members. They passed them one to another all around the room, and then they began to ask questions that went to the heart of what the DO was trying to do, and the complexity of running agent operations. In other words, they became novices in what the DO was all about. The whole tone of the hearing went from, "We're from Missouri," to the point where they appreciated the DO and realized that we had one hell of a chore before us. Eddie Boland was a fantastic leader in exploring with me at that hearing how we ran operations, and what was needed to do that, and what support could Congress give us. I think that hearing went a tremendous distance in setting a tone so when we went back to Congress they listened to us as a person who was telling them the truth. (U)

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My ground rules were, wherever I could, I would tell the truth. When I couldn't answer a question in order to protect a source, I told them that, and they respected that. To prove my point that Congress did a complete flipflop on questioning the DO to supporting the DO: it was manifested in the next budget cycle, when we were going through reductions and Admiral Turner, who was then DCI, was holding the DO to the reductions of personnel and positions that the DO had signed up to years before. Congress didn't like the thought that the DO was being cut. So I was called down and I was asked how many more positions did I need in the DO. I responded by telling the Boland Committee that the President's budget has asked for so many people. Boland said, "I don't care what the President asked for, I want to know what you need to get this country a reasonable Directorate of Operations." I told him I ne(b)(3)(c)ore slots or something like that. Sure enough, the Boland Committee gave us those slots and fenced them so that the Director could not put them in any other Directorate. That to me was a great indicator that we had Congress on our side and that they were intent on making sure we had a viable operations entity. This was in 1978, when we were going through the budget cycle, which I guess commenced in about April, leading to the October budget process. Whether or not the Congress acted by October I don't know, but it was for that 1979 budget. (C)

As a corollary to Eddie Boland, the Senate was supportive in the same vein, even though it was Boland's HPSCI that took the point on this. The Senate followed suit. One of the key players was Pat Moynihan from New York. Pat's changed a few horses since then, but he was very supportive in helping the DO at that time. As years went by, from 1978 onward, I realized that Congress was a many splendored thing, but the key was not to sandbag them or surprise them with a major operation that went sour when they weren't given a hint that it was going on. Under the ground rules, we were obliged to brief Congress on any significant operation. Let me hasten at this point to say that I never found Congress to violate our confidence, except when we got to the Nicaragua program. Some members would get briefed on what we were doing, what we were up to, and run downstairs and have a press conference and indicate what was happening in Nicaragua. That's because they were dead set against the program. (U)

On the whole, I found Congress to be supportive of the Agency and the IC. The questions and concerns they did have were not outlandish, and often, when they would get mad at us, it would be because we missed telling them something which to us wasn't a big deal, but when it hit the fan we had not had that on their scope. (U)

I think that is essential. I'll give you one item that really ripped it with them, and I was surprised at first but in later years realized it was well justified. (b)(3)(n)

That opens the door to Bill Casey's role with Congress. Bill Casey had contempt for Congress. He always felt that they had slighted him in claiming that he was politicizing intelligence. They always questioned his motives, and, to an appreciable degree, I handled a lot of hearings in Congress that maybe the Director should have taken--except for his relationship that existed there. (U)

It proceeded to get worse, not better. I can remember when there was an issue over Casey's stock

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holdings because he didn't have them in a trust. Congress started beating on him, proclaiming that he was exposed to sensitive intelligence, and he could use this intelligence for his own benefit, financially. It ticked Casey off that they would question his integrity. He took the position that he was not going to put his stocks in trust. This was aired over the public media, and it really exacerbated the ill will that was rapidly growing. I went to Casey and said, "Bill, does it make any difference to you?" He said, "Hell no, I have a guy up in New York that buys and sells, and I don't even know what he's doing. But those bastards are exposed to the same intelligence I get, and when they put their stocks in trust, I'll put mine!" Barry Goldwater wrote Casey a letter, and Casey's response was to tell him that: "You put your stocks in trust, I'll put mine." Goldwater went through the overhead and gave me a call. He just said, "You've got to solve this, because this thing is unraveling quickly. You've got to fix it." I talked to Rob Simmons, who was then the Staff Director, and told him that, if he could cool the Senators for a while, I'd work on Casey. I went to Bill and again said, "Bill, does it make any difference?" He said, "No." I said, "Then put it in trust." And he did. (U)

If you remember during my confirmation hearing, the Senators urged me to use the technique that Bobby Inman used, and that was when Casey was not telling Congress the full story, he would bend down and pull up his socks. I don't think such a signal existed, but that's what they professed. The heat that they showed me during those confirmation hearings against Casey made me tell Bill that he was losing it in Congress, and he had to go down and placate them. It was essential, not for his ego, but for the well being of the Agency that we maintain a decent relationship. While he acquiesced to the wisdom of that, I don't think he ever went out of his way to stroke Congress at all. (U)

Today, I think the Congress and the Agency have a good dialogue. They seem to be issue-oriented, as opposed to a frontal assault. It's OK to have problems over certain issues and have them talked out. With George Tenet's background in the Congress, I think that will aid the Agency and IC considerably in maintaining the right kind of dialogue and relationship. (U)

The major sore point in the Agency's relations with Congress can quickly fester, and that's over Findings [a formal presidential intelligence directive, including contingency funding, for a specific covert action]. Usually Findings, I like to think, are a subtle articulation of our policy. That's not necessarily always the case. They often are a substitute for lack of policy or failed policy. Let me editorialize right here and say, to me, the Findings are the weakest link in the Agency's relationship, not only with the Congress, but also with how Congress portrays the Agency to the American people. I was always a great believer in making sure that Congress was involved in our Findings from the very start. If there was a crash, I wanted the oversight committees to be with us when that happened. It seemed that whenever the President would take advantage of the law, written by Congress, which permits him to direct the Agency to undertake a covert action and not tell Congress, we would always get in trouble. When the President invokes that law, and untoward things happen, Congress does not rise up and criticize the President, they rise up and fault the Agency. Even though what was done was totally legal by their own legislation. I have urged Congress in hearings a number of times to revoke that permissibility of not informing Congress, and insist that Congress be informed on all covert actions within 48 hours of the President's signature. I would do that to protect the Agency, because I feel there are only so many blows that the Agency can take on behalf of the Finding before bad things happen, whether it happens by reduction of personnel, or a reduction of funds going to the Agency. (U)

I can't think of one Finding in my knowledgeable lifetime that we could not have told Congress about when it was signed. That goes to the hostage rescue at Desert One. No Congressman would publicly reveal that before it happened. We saw what happened on the Iran-Contra when we didn't advise

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Congress, and not telling them permitted the NSC Staff to do the stupid things they did that led up to that debacle. It's also interesting to note that Findings do not necessarily demand partisan support. A great deal of them are bipartisan in nature, and I think that we had more Findings on the book under Jimmy Carter than we did under Ronald Reagan. Toward the end of my tenure as DDCI, the Senate began to hold joint hearings with the Secretary of State and the DCI, so that they could appreciate what was happening from a policy standpoint and what would be expected from a Finding in support of that policy the Agency would undertake. I don't find that at all bad. I think it does show that we work hand in glove with the Department, and we don't get "track two" started by using a Finding that runs contrary to what we're trying to do with our foreign policy. (U)

Where that came to fruition a number of times was centered around Nicaragua. In fact, you recall the famous mining of the harbors. When we went forward with mining, we tried to get to the HPSCI and to the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence (SSCI). HPSCI held a hearing the end of January, and we advised them that we were mining three harbors. We tried to get to the SSCI, and they kept putting it off and putting it off, and finally, around 16 or 17 February, I told Senator Wallop that we had a Finding under way that we should advise the Senate about, and he said, "OK, we'll try and set that up." It was set up for the end of February. They were going to have a joint meeting with Casey and George Shultz. Shultz couldn't make it at the last minute, so they postponed it to, I believe, 8 March. We went in, and Casey and George Shultz talked about the Finding and how that complemented the actions we were trying to force in Nicaragua. Casey went back on 12 March and reiterated the mining of the harbors to the SSCI. (U)

We received a letter shortly thereafter from Senator Pell, of Foreign Relations, saying we understand you are doing certain things, would you come tell us? And we did. In fact, I think that came by letter, and we answered it by letter. We also told the Appropriations Committee chairmen in both houses. No one said a word, except Senator Pat Leahy, who was against doing it. In the caucus with the SSCI, he objected to it, but they voted him down. I think the vote was 14-1. Then, in April, a foreign newspaper carried the story that CIA was mining the harbors in Nicaragua. That should have been no surprise because the Contras put out a NOTAM [notice to shipping and to aircraft] that they were mining the harbors. So it was out on the street. *The New York Times* wrote an editorial castigating Senator Moynihan, who had claimed he did not know anything about it. Barry Goldwater, who was chairman, wrote the Director a letter that said, literally, "I'm pissed off that you didn't tell us about this." So I went in to Casey and said, "What's going on?" It was a Friday, and he and I went down to see Senator Moynihan. We had an appointment at 6 p.m. We arrived there, and there was a team of TV photographers in Moynihan's office, so we cooled our heels, and they went out one door, and we were invited in the other. We said, "Senator," he was then Vice Chairman, "We don't understand your reaction or Barry's letter." Goldwater had gone off to a visit in Taiwan or someplace, and Moynihan said, "Well, you know how it is." (U)

We never really got a crisp dialogue going on that; he seemed to pass it off. We found out that what he had just done was taped a show, which was aired the following Sunday, saying that he resigned as Vice Chairman of the SSCI because he could not trust CIA. Our employees were astounded that Casey and I allowed this to happen and didn't tell our good Senators. So I wrote a notice to all employees and sent it out to everyone hoping that it would leak. I never saw a copy of it anywhere in any of the tabloids that Washington calls newspapers. There was a great furor, and collective amnesia struck the SSCI, except for Pat Leahy, who said, "Yeah, we all knew about it, and I was against it, but I was the only one." Not one paper carried his denial. (U)

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Iran and Afghanistan

When we got going on the Iran weapons sale, if that had been dumped on the Congressional platter, we would have never had the mess that we had afterwards with the diversion of funds. I think the best thing that happened on the Iran issue was when I insisted that the President sign a Finding retroactively. Stan Sporkin [General Counsel] wrote up the Finding, and the best I know it was signed. Poindexter [National Security Adviser] said it was signed, and he later destroyed it. Ollie North told our lawyers that it was signed and in his safe. The reason why our lawyers were involved is I asked them to get that copy from North, and he assured them that it was signed but it was in his safe. That, I think, saved President Reagan in the long run. The Agency was duped into supporting that which they never should have. (U)

I had retired before the Contra aspects came to the fore, although the movement and sale of TOWs was just getting started under the 22 January Finding in 1986. I think it's worthy of note how Iran got started and how the Agency was drawn in. There obviously had been some chatter with some Agency officials in Latin America Division and the Europe Division. On a Saturday morning in November, I went down to the DDO's office, as I usually did on a Saturday morning, in fact every morning, and I would get briefed on the "Blue Border" traffic that came in over night. Clair George [DDO] was away, so (b)(3)(c) [ADDO] was there, (b)(3)(c) sked me if I had seen a certain cable. Of course, I hadn't. I looked at it. It was a cable from either Poindexter or McFarlane (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) g. It was out of context as far as I was concerned, but I said to "Look, it's permitted for the Agency to send correspondence or cables on behalf of other government entities when a security issue is involved, but you make sure that the Agency doesn't get involved in any of this." Monday morning, when I went back down to the D(b)(3)(c) id to me, "Do you know what those guys did?" And I said, "What guys?" And he said, "Poindexter and North." And I said, "What?" And he said, "They used our proprietary aircraft to ship oil supplies to Iran." I got somewhat heated and said, "I told you not to get involved with what those guys were doing!" He said, "We're not involved. They used our proprietary. They came to us, and I said we can't help but here's the number of a commercial airline." That's when I called up Stan Sporkin and told him I wanted a Finding to cover this flight, and I wanted it retroactive and everything else. It was a misstep that was rationalized that it's a proprietary therefore it's not the Agency. Of course, we were guilty on that, and that drew us into this mess created by the NSC Staff acting as an action agent instead of a staff. The rest is history, ad nauseam. (S)

With Iran behind us, I think it's appropriate to talk about the Afghanistan program. It was the kind of program that the Agency is best at, particularly when compared to Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, we, in essence, were trying to run a war. We, as an Agency, were no longer equipped, either with experience or resources, to run the kind of war that we ran in Laos and Southeast Asia. In Nicaragua, it got too much for us, and we had to recruit talent from outside--people who had no allegiance to the Agency and no sense of the Agency's mores, culture, and way of life. To these recruits, war was war and not necessarily by our kind of ground rules. That is why we ended up with this stupid comic book that some major took out of his trunk from the days when he was in Special Forces. The comic book instructed the Contras in how to go in and take over a village and dispense with the chief of police and the mayor and anyone else in authority in the community so that the people would be beholden to the Contras. Of course, that again was done without any review on the part of the Agency. It was done locally (b)(3)(c) without anybody in command knowing it, and shipped back. That was a major breakdown in discipline on the part of the Station and the people

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down there who knew about it. (C)

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The beauty of the Afghan program was that everybody was for it. That's because we were tying up Russians directly. We were no longer dealing with their surrogates, but we were taking the Russians on head to head through the Afghan rebels, or Freedom Fighters. Everybody liked that. What I became concerned about, and had expressed my concerns to McFarlane and some of the folks at the NSC, was that it became an end to itself, and we had no policy moving forward to try and seek a diplomatic resolution to the Afghan issue. It seemed like we were quite content to fight the Russians to the last drop of the Afghan rebels' blood. My pronouncements in this vein, and in this milieu, were not received gracefully. It seemed that no one was looking beyond getting the next shipment of weapons over there. Eventually, that did sort out, and all along we knew that, when the rebels would stop fighting the Russians, they would fight each other. That seems to be the case to this day in Afghanistan. It was a clean operation. The Agency held itself in check and handled it quite appropriately. (U)

Our whole intent, at least early on, was to give the rebels Soviet weapons so that it would cut down on the logistic tail. If they needed more bullets or more rifles or whatever, they could acquire them simply by overrunning an Afghan Army garrison, and they could replenish themselves as they moved all around Afghanistan, and we would not have the logistic worry about resupply. You had to remember that everything that went into Afghanistan went in on a mule, horse, or on the backs of the rebels themselves. (U)

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Human Resources

The DO also had vital training programs to handle the new employees. We had a fairly aggressive Career Trainee (CT) program to get the sort of employee that we wanted. You must appreciate the

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backdrop of this--this was the "me generation" coming into its own, and patriotism was no longer the focus of our approach in acquiring people. We had to have a rationale and a sales pitch for having people move in our direction. We were quite content that, once on board, they would come to the realization of the value and the need for the Agency, but to catch them cold off the campus was not an easy thing to do. I found that the new CTs were preoccupied with retirement benefits, which left me somewhat nonplused as to how we could stimulate them for different needs that we had in the Agency. We also found that more males were married, and that meant that we had to get smart on how to provide for a career for females. This prompted the Agency to begin to look closer at the value of female officers. (U)

It's strange that the DO for years had made full use of wives in operational activities in some of our more hazardous Stations, because they were less prone to surveillance and had an ease of movement that the male case officer didn't have. But now we were reaching a stage where there were a number of professional women that we felt we could call upon to have a greater value in contributing to DO needs and objectives. This recognition of the value of the professional female officer made us look inward to those that we had on board and realize that they could play a vital role in our operational activities. This caused me to think of placing females in Chiefs of Base positions and also in COS positions, and we did that. It had a twofold effect: it worked as far as the Station was concerned, though maybe some of the liaison folks gulped a little over it; it also sent a signal to women, both inside and would-be recruits, that women could have a career path in operations that can result in the highest assignments that we have to offer. My (b)(1) ience in placing women overseas was gratifying because it worked well. That's from Eloise Pa (b)(3)(n) Carol Roehl [redacted] It opened the door for women to aspire to higher positions across the board in the DO, and I think that was not only fair but also healthy for the DO. (C)

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As I found the women to be extremely successful and helpful in the DO in operational jobs as opposed to just staff jobs, I found the same was true in DI. There were brilliant women in the DI who just cried out to be made office chiefs. So I made two of them office chiefs and one of them a deputy office chief. I never regretted it, and I can safely say neither has the DI. They knew their countries. They knew their regions. They knew how things worked in Washington and how analysis was fashioned, and I think they have done a great service to the Agency during their tenures. (U)

One thing that I didn't mention was training. One would like to see a rule of thumb where 10 percent of your people are in training at any given time. I don't know who cited 10 percent as good, bad, or indifferent, but it is now folklore among a lot of management schools. There are some companies that will have as much as 20 percent of its people either in training or taking advanced courses so that they stay on the cutting edge of technology. I must say that, if you look at my file, you'll probably see that, compared to most employees, I didn't spend that much time in training. That was because I was "so important" I couldn't be freed up to have the benefit of training. But I remember going to the management course, career management course for middle managers, and the centerpiece of the course was the grid system for measuring how a person gauges the welfare of his people versus the need to get the mission accomplished. The perfect person is a 9, this is on a scale of 1 to 9; a person who's a 9 and worried about his people and 9 in accomplishing his mission. He is a great manager. So everyone tried his best to be a 9/9 as opposed to being a 9/1, where you get the job done and don't care about the people. (U)

We had an exercise where the purpose was trying to prove that a group solution is always better than a single solution. In other words, if you get a group of people together they will come up with a better answer than one person by himself. We broke up into teams, and then we individually took a test.

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After the test, it was set aside and the teams were pulled together and were given the same test. You would think that with such give and take that everybody would finally agree on the right solution to every question, and you'd come up with a far better score than what you d(b)(3)(c)ually. That was true for all groups, except mine. In my group, there was one individual who had all the answers right individually, but our group didn't have all the answers right. I said to myself, how can one person have the answer and the group walk away from the test without the right answer. This is where it became very personal. (U)

I went back and looked at our discussions and found that the people who were the noisiest and would elbow their way in saying here's the right solution, and would pound the table, would convince the others to agree to it. This one individual was a mathematician who was an analyst from FMSAC. A brilliant person who could analyze the trajectories just out of certain data points and could determine exactly what the missile was doing. He had a mind that was so abstract it was unbelievable. He had all the right answers, but he was shy. He sat there, and he didn't say "boo." He never offered an answer. He never even said, "No, you're wrong because of this." He just sat there and let us come up with the wrong answer. That taught me that to be a good boss, you can't let people who have the right answer sit quietly. You've got to draw out from them everything they have to offer to the group. (U)

That convinced me to be an advocate for diversity. If you look at our Asian population, and this is particularly true in industry, on a whole you can't generalize or stereotype people, but on a whole Asians are reticent. They are quiet, they don't intrude, they are polite, and they don't like to argue with people. I found out in meetings where I had Asians I would draw them out. I would make them feel like their word was important because I wanted to milk our employees of everything they had to offer, and that's true of Hispanics, or blacks, or anybody else. If you have a group of people, make sure you listen to them. The Agency taught me that, which I have employed in my entire life, and that's why you saw women come into the DO and the DI. (U)

In my 34-year career with the Agency, I never pushed for a job. It seemed that I was always drafted for my jobs. And my goals centered simply on a career in the Agency, but not one earmarked in one Directorate or the other. Once I got with the U-2 program, which, again, was back in 1959, things just seemed to flow and did prove that hard work and a lot of luck can permit an engaging career, with luck being the predominant factor. I never had an attribute that centered on expertise. I guess my greatest attribute was a willingness to take any job, whether I thought I was prepared for it or not. I know I was never afraid to take a risk. I felt that knowing what you were doing was a major portion of any activity. My managerial style was not to have any style at all, but rather to adapt my handling of people based on the needs of the individual. Some people need to be led all the way, all the time. Even talented people. And, if you're anxious to get the best of their talent, then give them what they need, namely leadership. On the other hand, some people simply like to be told the dimension of what is required of them, then let them go do it and be clever enough to have enough visibility into their efforts so you're not blindsided. Finally, others not only want to be led, but also to be pushed. Given the immense reservoir of talent available within the Agency, the demands of management are rather easy. I was always anxious to surround myself with smart, knowledgeable, talented people. In fact, I was always quite content to be the dumbest person in my office and not necessarily embarrassed or threatened by that. (U)

(b)(3)(c) works on the CIA History Staff's Oral History Program, which is directed by

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Bridging the Great Divide

A Cryptologist Encounters the Human Side of Intelligence

Thomas R. Johnson

As an ex-cryptologist, I look at HUMINT from my own blinkered past. What you are about to read is how HUMINTers are viewed by a refugee from the American cryptologic empire. Despite our vastly different worlds, the stepped-up challenges of intelligence collection in today's complex, technologically sophisticated, and fast-paced world require unprecedented collaboration between the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. (U)

The Empire that I Once Served (U)

To begin with, it helps to understand where I stood (or sat) for most of my career. For those who have not worked their entire lives in the cryptologic community, the world of signals intelligence takes a certain amount of getting used to. (U)

Back in NSA's heyday, it ran the largest American intelligence system. NSA (b)(1) NSA (b)(3)- 50 USC 3024 (i) NSA (b)(3)- P.L. 86-36

The SIGINT world was huge. At the empire's peak, almost 100,000 American cryptologists worked at locations. When they needed sites from which to operate, they got them. (S)

NSA (b)(1)
NSA (b)(3)- 50 USC 3024 (i)
NSA (b)(3)- P.L. 86-36

When I worked for NSA, I thought cryptology was the enter of the universe. The cryptologic record in World War II had become a thing of envy to intelligence professionals. Since 1945, SIGINT had acquired increasing prominence and authenticity in presidential administrations. It was clear to me when I studied trends during the 1970s and 1980s that the cryptologic world—the

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world of "technical intelligence"—had replaced the world of spies. (U)

Through the post-World War II decades, the influence of the cryptologists on American policymakers rose steadily, hitting its apparent peak in the late 1970s. President Carter, reluctant at first, came to rely on SIGINT to a greater degree than any American president ever had. During his presidency [redacted] was the most important intelligence objective, and "national technical means of verification" chiefly meant SIGINT and overhead imagery. Later in the decade, when the President's attention turned to [redacted] Afghanistan, SIGINT again fed his appetite. [1] (S)

NSA (b)(1): (b)(3)- 50 USC 3024 (i): (b)(3)- P.L. 86-36

Carter probably liked SIGINT because it was clean. It did not involve "messy" human assets, the covert exchange of money, or clandestine meetings on foreign soil. We did not have to pay foreigners to betray their countries —their own communications did the job for us. SIGINT involved no problems of verification—it collected the sources' own thoughts, in their own words. Even Stansfield Turner, Carter's Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who was at war with NSA director Bobby Inman for his entire four years at CIA, admitted that he relied on technical intelligence. Turner's dictum was: "Never send a spy when you can get the information you want by technical means." [2] He might not have liked Inman, but it was Inman to whom he turned for his best information. For the cryptologists, it was their finest hour since 1945. (U)

My Journey to the Antipodes (U)

Those days were long gone when, in late career, I decided to make a switch. Twenty years had passed since 1979, the height of American cryptologic Cold War success. Perhaps it was time to move on, to find out what the other INTs were doing. (U)

My trip from the world of SIGINT to the world of covert human intelligence (HUMINT) took me only 35 miles—from Fort Meade, Maryland, to Langley, Virginia. I could make the trip in under an hour, even through legendary Beltway traffic. But the SIGINT world that vanished from my rearview mirror was replaced by one so different that I have not yet fully comprehended the changes. (U)

I knew some of what to expect, because I had had a brief tour with CIA several years earlier. At that time, my first 24 hours stuck in my mind because they had not gone well. That first day, I checked in, got my desk, and began work. At quitting time, I quit. I locked up my classified material and left the office, with yellow post-it notes strewn around the desk. (U)

The first thing I noticed the next morning was the absence of those post-it notes. I made a closer check of my desk and found that it had been swept clean—only the telephone remained. Left behind was a curt note from the security officer saying that she had taken possession of everything. I was to report to her office. (U)

"Well!" I said, "What right do you have to go swiping my calendar pad and telephone list finder?" She stormed back with questions about the names in the list finder. Who were those people, and why were their names in there? Didn't I know that I could be compromising sources? And what were all those appointments on my calendar? All that material was sensitive, and should have been locked up. This was a security violation. (U)

That was my first lesson about HUMINT. The most sensitive information was about human

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assets. Compromise those, and we would lose not only the information they gave us, but the assets themselves. I had never thought of it that way. Fact was, I didn't have any assets, didn't know any foreigners, and wasn't in touch with any clandestine sources. The phone numbers in my list finder were for the bank, the barbershop, and the laundry. But there was no point explaining that to her. I began locking up my calendar and telephone list finder at night. (U)

Eight years later, when I once again made the trek to Langley, it was under very different circumstances. I had reverted to a former life as an historian, and my job was to compile the history of certain clandestine operations. Although each had a cryptologic component, they were basically Directorate of Operations (DO) projects. So, for the first time, I began to learn what the DO was all about. (U)

The Nature of the HUMINT Business (U)

One of the first differences I noticed was the lack of "cleanliness." DO collection was dirty. Case officers had one mission—to recruit spies. They were to go out and find the Aldrich Ameses and Rick Hanssens of foreign countries.[3] Reading DO case files, I could see some common threads that struck home. They all reinforced the messy nature of HUMINT. (U)

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Moral ambiguity. The demands of clandestine work are pretty hard to reconcile with our own values. This is one of the few occupations in which criminality is not only legal, it is rewarded. It must be difficult sometimes to keep one's moral compass pointed north. The shift from job to family and local community life is probably jarring. Occupations like this induce a certain schizophrenia. One CIA officer turned the golden rule on its ear when he wrote his own credo: "Admit nothing, deny everything, and make counter-charges." This is probably **not** what he learned in Sunday school. (U)

Concepts of right and wrong bear only a tenuous relationship to the idea of "legality." CIA officers operate "legally" in foreign countries according to American law, but not according to foreign law. Do it, but don't get caught, is the guiding principle. And what is "legal" and "illegal" shifts when one travels back and forth between the United States and foreign soil. Most Americans don't have to deal with this. (U)

There is a certain extraterritoriality involved. In recent years, the Justice Department has extended American law beyond its borders—now it is okay to capture and bring back foreign malefactors to American soil for trial in American courts. They are often tried for activities that their own countries pay them to do. (U)

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Operating in a sub-world. If you want to become a case officer, you must be prepared to become a bottom-feeder. Officers in the Clandestine Service make a living off countries in chaos. They constantly fish in troubled waters.

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The SIGINT World in Perspective (U)

Cryptology, by comparison, is as clean as a freshly laundered shirt. Sitting in a sterile, windowless blockhouse bristling with antennas, the SIGINTer never sees the adversaries. It is a technological business. Signals are picked out of the ether, strained through digital sieves, sifted at the other end to determine what is useable, and sent to the people who translate, analyze, and report. The intercept floor resembles a laboratory or a high-tech "clean room" with lots of gizmos and people in clean military uniforms listening intently to radios. It is far from a back alley in a dirty foreign capital that reeks of discarded vegetable peelings. You may as well be in Silicon Valley. (U)

In that SIGINT blockhouse, there is very little moral ambiguity— there is barely a recognition that what you are doing is part of foreign intelligence collection. Little connects one mentally with what we traditionally regard as espionage. On occasions when I have questioned NSA audiences, most refuse to believe that they are engaged in spying. That, they feel, is the province of those people south of the Potomac. *They are the spies.* (U)

"Techniques" is the term that NSA uses to describes how it goes about its work, while "Tradecraft" is always associated with CIA.

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Why We Need Each Other (U)

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The days of splendid isolation are gone. The demands of modern intelligence require increasing integration. Readers of an intelligence product are generally unaware of how much cooperation went on behind the scenes to make the report possible. (U)

I've heard it said that NSA and CIA are the dogs and cats of the Intelligence Community—always fighting. How could they ever get together? The fact is that they have been getting together in fits and starts for many years. The need for intelligence integration has never been starker. The fact is that if we want to keep a viable intelligence system, we will have to continue to strengthen collaboration. (U)

Moral Ambiguity, meet Mr. Clean. Mr. Clean, meet your savior. (U)

Footnotes:

[1] Stansfield Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), pp. 90-98. (U)

[2] Turner, p. 639. (U)

[3] Aldrich Ames, the CIA mole arrested in 1994, and Robert Hanssen, the FBI spy arrested in 2001, both drew life sentences in federal custody. (U)

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[5] Apocryphal words attributed to Jim Farley, Franklin Roosevelt's campaign manager, seem to apply here: "He may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch." (U)

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Dr. Thomas R. Johnson is a 35-year veteran of cryptologic operations. He is the author of a four-volume classified history of American cryptology during the Cold War. (U)

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Science and Tradecraft

Origins and Applications of Nuclear Intelligence (U)

Henry S. Lowenhaupt

Looking back, it is amazing how close the US government's continuous search for technical information on the Soviet nuclear program was to the cutting edge of technology. By that I mean that in designing the technical collection tools and analyzing the results of collection operations, the latest ideas in both science and technology were used. Moreover, the sophisticated tools and techniques brought to bear on nuclear intelligence problems often provided breakthrough solutions to civilian problems as well. (U)

Of course we all knew we were in a gut match with the Soviet Union. Their focus on national security was beyond anything previously known for a big country. We were aware that "obtaining the bomb" was a top priority for Joseph Stalin: the construction and research activities of the First Chief Directorate of the Council of Ministers (their atomic project) had a priority exceeded only by actual troop movements. (U)

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Nuclear Collection in World War II (U)

The first attempt to use cutting edge technology in nuclear intelligence came near the end of World War II. It involved the development of a new approach to estimating the production rate of mines using aerial photography when the mines were sequestered in enemy territory. Mining engineers steeped in the technical literature on the Joachimstahl uranium mines in Czechoslovakia analyzed aerial photographs of the enterprise taken a year apart. The postwar surprise was how accurate their estimates were: the Germans had not had access to multi-tonnage amounts of uranium after all. This was the start of the use of professional technical experts for understanding aerial imagery of complex technical, especially nuclear, targets. (U)

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The Chicago scientists soon developed a means for measuring the radiation of highly radioactive xenon with its 5-day half-life. To use this tool successfully, however, we would need to deploy the instrumentation in safe locations within a hundred miles or so of suspect nuclear sites. Accomplishing this as our troops fought their way across Germany, needless to say, was not a very realistic possibility. (U)

In contrast, radio-krypton with its 10.4-year half-life could be collected at much greater distances from potential targets. At the time, however, there was no known way to analyze it in any sort of quantitative and duplicable manner. Dr. Willard Libby, then at the University of Chicago, took on the task. He found a way to analyze krypton-85 as a gas in a kind of Geiger tube, using an array of Geiger tubes surrounding the specimen to detect and subtract the cosmic ray background. This gave us a useful tool. (U)

Building on his national security work, Dr. Libby, full of ideas as usual, continued his experiments using carbon dioxide gas. His purpose became to learn how to measure the naturally occurring carbon-14 in carbon dioxide. He succeeded. Carbon-14 measurement is now a standard means of dating prehistoric remains and has revolutionized the prehistory of Europe and the Middle East. Dr. Libby received the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1960 for his work on carbon-14 dating. (U)

Detection of Nuclear Detonations (U)

Soon after the war was over, it became clear that the USSR was doing everything possible to develop a nuclear weapon, including committing espionage against the United States and ransacking East Germany for scientists and technicians with skills applicable to nuclear research. Moscow established an enormous uranium mining effort in East Germany labeled Wismut A. G. (Bismuth Incorporated). Likewise, it commenced large uranium mining operations in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Estonia, and Soviet Central Asia. Given the tight security practiced by the USSR, finding some means of determining when the first Soviet nuclear test would occur became of crucial importance. (U)

In 1947, Washington brought together an interagency scientific task force whose objective was to determine how to detect foreign nuclear weapon detonations using exceptionally long-range technical techniques. Col. Frank Valente—a former professor of physics at Columbia University and the Army's
scientific expert during the construction of Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee and the Hanford Reactor Site in Washington state—represented the Manhattan Engineering District (the US Atomic Project), and, later, CIA. Dr. Lester Machta, a young genius in the weather forecasting field, assisted the Air Force team. Several outstanding people represented the nuclear laboratories, including "Spof" English, an eminent radiochemist with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

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The task force's priority recommendation was to develop high volume filters that could be deployed on (b)(1) designated aircraft. Aircraft equiped to collect large volumes of aircraft and analyze its radioactivity was to follow, as soon as it could be devised. (U)

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Tracking Airborne Radioactivity (U)

Tracking multiple fission products back to their point of origin to determine when and where the first Soviet nuclear detonation had occurred gave us only a general location in Central Asia—an area the size of my hand on a National Geographic map of the Soviet Union. Clearly, we had serious problems to overcome. (U)

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The use of the technical knowledge developed to track nuclear plumes, combined with the advent of high-speed computers and an increase in the number of weather recording stations, changed weather forecasting for civilian as well as military purposes. The result was the extension of forecasts from a 2-day window in 1950 to weather predictions of a week or more today. (U)

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Seismic Technology (U)

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Again, civilians have benefited from work stimulated by national security needs. Currently, the USGS also hosts an international civilian seismic detection coalition whose primary purpose is to locate and measure nuclear blasts, earthquakes, and volcanic explosions anywhere in the world. This information can also be used to forecast the paths of tidal waves caused by earthquakes. The USGS data is available to help planners organize emergency relief efforts following seismic or volcanic events, especially in isolated places without easy access and communications. (U)

Acoustic and EMP Measurement (U)

(b)(1)

Once the dangers of EMP were recognized, the US military had to "harden" all of its electronic equipment, a task that took adecade. The techniques that were developed were passed into the civilian economy in various forms. As a result, civilian TVs and radios are now more resistant to damage from pulses from electric transmission lines and lightning flashes. (U)

Nuclear Detection Satellites (U)

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Measuring Plutonium Production (U)

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
Experience with krypton-85 had a surprising and important civilian spin-off related to global warming. Working with the National Weather Service (NOAA) and with international cooperation, Machta applied these techniques to measuring the carbon dioxide content of the total atmosphere. This gas is the major contributor to the "greenhouse effect" and may be linked to the current general warming of the earth. At the moment, how much it contributes to the global warming, and what to do about it, are topics of heated international debate. (U)

Environmental Collection (U)


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This intelligence effort has helped to make the operation of civilian nuclear power plants safer. Since the late 1950s, some 30 nuclear power plants have operated in the United States without any *serious* medical problems—and that includes the partial core meltdown at the Three Mile Island reactor in Pennsylvania in 1979. (U)



The creation of these tools for nuclear intelligence purposes influenced the development of ever-more-sensitive forensic techniques for a host of civilian uses. Police departments and the FBI use them quite effectively. They are now regularly employed, for example, to detect art forgeries. A few years ago, the famous Shroud of Turin was determined to be from the14th century, rather than the 1st century—microprobes showed that the paint was of a type used in the 14th century, and radiocarbon dating on a speck of the cloth confirmed the age. (U)

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The U-2 Reconnaissance Aircraft (U)


Lockheed Aircraft Company's design and construction, under CIA contract, of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft in the early 1950s made possible high-quality imagery of nuclear facilities in the USSR that had been kept hidden for over a decade. In addition to monitoring nuclear activities, the U-2 photographed ballistic- and anti-ballistic-missile R&D facilities. It exposed military plants producing aircraft, armor, and naval vessels in the USSR, China, and the Near East. Its use during the Cuban Missile Crisis was crucial to slowing down the Soviet advance throughout the world. (U)

The U-2 produced quite unexpected civilian and military spin-offs. Foremost was the boost given to development of the first real space suit. The U-2 pilots had to be able to endure conditions at over 70 thousand feet during missions of up to 20 hours in length. The lessons-learned are used by NASA today in space flights and moon walks. (U)

The reconnaissance aircraft required a capability for high-resolution photography from great heights. New cameras and lenses had to be devised, along with finer-grain and faster-acting film. Upgraded versions of the photographic equipment fly today in our civilian and military satellites. The R&D for color imagery from space required a major increase in the acuity of color film. These advances are now incorporated into the film you buy for your camera at the store. (U)

The designers of the B-2 stealth bomber and F-117 stealth fighter were amazed to discover that many of the anti-radar solutions they wished to design into their aircraft had already been worked out for the U-2 and, later, the SR-71 (Blackbird)—hardly civilian applications, but nevertheless showing that CIA's technical intelligence was first again. (U)

Infrared Imagery (U)



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The application of IR imaging to civilian and military weather forecasting is a major spin-off from intelligence programs. All our current weather satellites use a combination of infrared and visible-light imaging. The infrared capability highlights clouds in the upper atmosphere and snowfields on the ground, while clouds in the lower atmosphere are recorded using visible light. Ground-based radar and weather stations provide important supplemental data. In another application, the National Institute for Standards and Technology promotes the use of IR imagery to determine if houses and larger installations have unwanted heat leaks. (U)

Reflection (U)

The Nuclear Intelligence Community is to be commended for sponsoring these highly technical and ultimately successful projects. For me, it has been fun and an honor to be associated with them and the wider nuclear community for more than half a century. (U)

Footnotes:

[1] Gen. Vannikov had been chosen to lead their atomic program because of his outstanding job overseeing the production of Soviet military equipment during World War II. (U)

Dr. Henry S. Lowenhaupt has been a distinguished senior scientist with CIA for more than 50 years. In addition to his CIA duties, he was a Deputy for Collection on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee from 1948 until his retirement in 1990. He was honored as a Trail Blazer at the Agency's 50th Anniversary celebrations. (U)

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Breaking New Ground

CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 Investigation and Trial (U)

(b)(3)(c) *Oral History Program Interviewer*

On 21 December 1988, Pan American flight 103, a Boeing 747, took off from London, bound for New York City. As it was climbing on its northerly flight path, it exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. All 259 passengers and crewmembers and 11 people on the ground were killed. One CIA employee, Matt Gannon, (b)(3)(c) *was on board. After more than 11 years of determi*(b)(6)*estigation by many officials in many countries, two Libyans were tried for the crime before a Scottish court convened in the Netherlands. One was convicted. This article focuses on the CIA's contribution to the investigation and trial, as it is remembered by Agency officers involved. The officers recount the CIA's engagement in the hunt for those responsible, the discovery and assessment of key pieces of evidence, and the successful prosecution. This is the story of a jigsaw puzzle's assembly by cooperating law enforcement, intelligence, and legal personnel. The officers conclude by offering the lessons they believe the CIA learned from the experience. (U)*

Below are excerpts from interviews of seven Agency officers. Working for the CIA's Oral History Program, (b)(3)(c) *conducted the interviews in 2002, shortly after the trial. The interview transcripts are held in the CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence. (U)*

The Crime (U)

(b)(3)(c) *the senior Directorate of Operations (DO) officer responsible for the case during its prosecution phase describes the attack and the apparent motive:* (b)(3)(c) Chief of the [CIA] Counterterrorist Center (CTC), always speculated that Pan Am 103 was brought down as payback for the US air raids against Tripoli (b)(1) and that might well be the truth.1 ~~(S)~~

What emerged during the trial, in the testimony, and what was previously indicated in the indictment was that apparently a deliberate effort had been made to search for a way to bring down an American plane. Somewhere along the line, it's not clear just when the light went on, . . . the Libyans got the bright idea that they could insinuate a piece of luggage into the system at Malta Airport--unaccompanied baggage--send it as checked luggage through the connector flight from Malta to Frankfurt, have it automatically transferred to a Pan Am feeder flight from Frankfurt to

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
London, and finally have it automatically transferred to Pan Am 103, which originated in London. (U)

The bomb was probably supposed to explode when the plane was over the ocean. It did not because of the weather that night. On that night, the jet stream was particularly strong from west to east, at about 150 miles an hour. The plane could not take off over Land's End, as it normally would, and fly straight out, from Heathrow straight out over the Atlantic. Instead, it headed overland, due north, and it reached cruising altitude [30,000 feet] just over Lockerbie, Scotland, and was just beginning to turn left. Lockerbie is within sight of the Irish Sea. (U)

They probably had just taken off the seatbelt sign and were just bringing out the drink carts. In another 90 seconds, that plane would have been over water. Had it followed the original flight path, it would have been miles out over water. We would never have found any evidence. (U)

There wasn't a lot of explosive in that bomb. There was only a couple of pounds, because it was put in a fairly small Toshiba Boombeat, I think it's called, portable radio. And it's probably just pure serendipity that that plane was brought down as it was, because a 747 is a very robust aircraft. It normally would take a lot to bring down that aircraft with all of its backup systems. (U)

From computer models and forensic evidence, the British and the FBI reconstructed just what happened when that bomb went off. They know precisely where the bomb was. They were able to pinpoint the exact luggage container, which they found. Obviously there had been an explosion in it, as it was shattered outward. They knew where in that luggage container the bag with the bomb was placed, because they had records, actually, of which bags went into what container, and they could tell, again, from the forensic evidence where it was. It was about two up from the bottom, and they knew where in the aircraft that luggage container was placed. And then they actually blew up some planes on the ground here to prove that theory. (U)



An engineer from the Air Crash Investigation Unit peers out from the reconstructed remains of the Pan am Boeing 747 that crashed in Lockerbie, Scotland. (U) ©Reuters 1998

They demonstrated that, because the luggage container was next to the wall of the aircraft, just under the business class section, about row 14, the force of the explosion and the explosive plasma, which came out from the bomb, had nowhere to go. It did not break the skin, the outer skin. It broke the inner skin, and then it spread up through the fuselage in a circular pattern between the outer skin and the inner skin. And essentially it went all the way around the aircraft. And then burst out. And it just cut the aircraft. It was like taking a huge cleaver and chopping off the nose of the aircraft. Which is why you had the cockpit section lying in the field, the famous picture where the Pan Am logo was visible. (U)

Initial Approach (U)

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(b)(3)(n)
(b)(6)

Where to Look? (U)

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(b)(3)(n)

The Break (U)

(b)(3)(c) The sequence of events that really changed the focus to the Libyans [occurred] in the fall of 1989. Months after the plane went down, the Scots discovered a piece of [circuit board from] the timer that came from the bomb that destroyed Pan Am 103. A shredded shirt [containing the fragment] was found by a Scotsman walking his dog after the formal recovery effort had ended. (S)

(b)(3)(c) *Chief of the Litigation Division of the Office of General Counsel (OGC) and the*

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supervising Agency attorney on the case during the prosecution, describes the moment in 1989 that the key piece of evidence turned up in a field near Lockerbie: The shredded shirt . . . was some distance off from the main crash site. This [farmer] saw this fabric, looked at it, knew, of course, the plane had crashed . . . and brought it to the attention of the Scottish police. The shirt had been destroyed. However, . . . the label in the back of the collar had a tag that linked it to Mary's House, a clothing store in Malta. That's how [the Scottish investigators] were able to tie it to that store. The shirt was made of polyester fabric so the heat of the explosion had actually fused the timing device chip into the shirt so it didn't fall off when the man picked up the shirt. If he hadn't thought it was a piece of debris, or thought it was only a piece of litter and just left it there, we still might be searching to figure out what happened. (U)

The Lockerbie police sent the shirt fragment to the Royal Armaments Research and Development Establishment military laboratories, where, as they were pulling the scorched fabric apart, they found the piece of circuit board from the timer. (U)

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The Libyans who ultimately went on trial for the Pan Am 103 bombing: Abd'al Basset. Ali Al-Megrahi (left) and Al-Amin Khalifa Fahima. (U)

(b)(3)(c) *the Scots had linked the shirt fragment to Malta and the Libyans:*

. . . [By September 1989,] the Scots had begun their own investigations in Malta. They had come across Tony Gauci, the shop owner who ran the Mary's House clothing store [in Valletta]. And he's the one who recalled that he had sold such-and-such articles of clothing, similar to what was found at the crash site, to somebody that he said he could identify as Libyan. He didn't know the name.

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He did not know whether they were connected to the Libyan Airlines office, or the Embassy, or what. But he said that just by appearance, by language, he recognized them as Libyan. He identified them when he was a witness at the trial. (U)

Tom McCullough, the Detective Chief Superintendent from Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary, has been with this case since the night the plane went down. He was recovering bodies and was in charge of the temporary mortuary. Later, he emerged as the Chief Investigator and, in the last few years, has traveled to Libya, Jordan, Turkey, and all over Europe. McCullough has nominated Gauci for the [US] Department of Justice (DOJ) reward money in this case. McCullough says that the Scottish prosecutors viewed Gauci as probably the single most crucial witness in that whole process. He was able to make the connection to the Libyans. While the forensic evidence might have pointed to a Libyan connection, Gauci was the one who was able to put a face on the plot. (U)

CIA's Libyan Asset (U)

Abdul Majid Gaika, a Libyan intelligence officer,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

Majid had no connection with the Pan Am bombing, but he held another of the keys to the solution of the puzzle. No one realized what he could offer, however, until the investigation of the Libyan connection had deepened as a result of the discovery of the circuit board piece and the account of the Maltese shopkeeper. (S)

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Majid Connects the Puzzle Pieces (U)

Understanding of Majid's utility to the Pan Am case and Al-Megrahi's role in the bombing unfolded over two years.

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(b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c) *describes Majid's role:* We had at that time no indication [Majid] knew anything about Pan Am 103, but we knew he had been a Libyan intelligence officer

(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c) The more they [FBI] started investigating there in Malta, the more the leads were tugging them away from the Palestinians and towards the Libyans. And Phil [Reid, of the FBI] said that it wasn't really unti(b)(3)(n)ame out--and he was the first one to interview him -that it became pretty apparent to him that this was a Libyan job and wasn't a Palestinian job. (S)

Basically Majid's part in this was that he was connecting a lot of the pieces they had discovered, and that's why they called him "Puzzle Piece;" that was what the FBI's codeword for him was. (b)(3)(n) Then, when the FBI started interviewing him, and he started providing specific data and filling in some gaps, he put a number of things into perspective for them. This is when it become apparent that, yes, this was a Libyan operation. (S)

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(b)(3)(c)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Supporting the Prosecution (U)

(b)(3)(c) *describes the evolution of the Agency's role in the prosecution and trial of the Libyans Al-Megrahi and Fahima at the Scottish Court in the Netherlands* : We [the Office of General Counsel] gave our first briefing to the DCI in early 1999, and, at that point, he looked directly at all of us and said: "This is very important to me. I want you to be forward-leaning, do all that you can to help." And it was understood that there were things in this case [we were going to have to do] that were counterintuitive to us in the intelligence business. We're used to protecting our secrets. And it was going to be a push, but he instructed us to go forth and cooperate as much as we could. (S)



(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

Artist's rendition of Libyan defendants Al-Megrahi and Fahima as a witness testifies during the Pan Am 103 trial in the Netherlands. (U)

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(b)(3)(c)
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When we were first told that Qadhafi had produced the defendants and we were actually going to have a trial, the two Department of Justice attorneys, Dana Biehl and Brian Murtagh, sent a request to us saying that, "We're going to need to see all of your files relating to Pan Am 103. The prosecution is going forward. The United States government is going to be directly prosecuting the defendants." (S)

We weren't happy about that. Then Justice became unhappy when they learned that they weren't actually undertaking the prosecution, but there was an agreement made by the State Department and Justice to assist the Scots, who were conducting the prosecution, and we were to help in any way we could. So the Justice attorneys came to [CIA] Headquarters.

(b)(3)(n)

So they spent a lot of time going through that with a fine-tooth comb. They found the documents that they determined to be relevant to the case and helpful to the Scottish prosecutors. At that point, we began the redaction process to declassify the documents that they asked for, which took awhile. DOJ came over, and we went back and forth with the DO Information Review Officer to discuss the scope of the redactions. (S)

The Trial (U)

(b)(3)(c) We had two issues that had to be dealt with. One was our dealings with Majid, and how that was going to come before the trial. The second involved the timers, and how we were going to prove that this little chip had something to do with or was connected to Libya. We couldn't obviously connect the chip to these defendants. But we could connect it to Libya and that was going to suggest it came from somewhere in the Libyan intelligence organization. (S)

The Scottish legal system is much different from the US legal system. It requires much more supported background information for [something] to get in [as evidence]. So, for example, the CIA's cables about its meetings with Majid . . . were going to be needed in this trial, because Majid's memory was sketchy, and he was not the world's best witness, by any stretch of the imagination. He was high-strung, and not overly bright, and there were some other issues, as well. And his testimony would not have been credible if the Court actually came to these conclusions. (S)

Majid's testimony and evidence were supported by these cables that would indicate that he said

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what he said at a time when he had no reason to say anything else, unless you really believe in a huge conspiracy theory. The cables would support what he said in 1988. There was a question of whether the Court was going to let those cables be used [especially if they were redacted to protect security information]. We don't let our cables be seen by just anybody, and certainly don't want them being seen by foreigners, especially Libyans, who might learn about our sources and methods and tradecraft. (S)

At the time, we weren't going to acknowledge our presence [in Malta] and it wasn't [widely] known that Majid existed. I mean, we knew. DOJ knew. The Scots knew. But the rest of the world didn't know that Majid was a CIA agent, or that we had this particular specific information. So there was first the question of how was the CIA going to get involved in this at all. Next we were not sure what it would take to get these cables introduced into evidence. (S)

(b)(3)(c) The [Scots] are even more particular about authentication than we are. Under Scottish law, we would have to acknowledge that they were CIA documents. We would have to have the cables revealed, and we'd have to have someone testify that they, in fact, had received the information from Majid, that they had then gone ahead and written down the information in these cables. (S)

(b)(3)(n)

It took a seemingly unusual act of faith by the court to accept that potentially exculpatory information had not been redacted from the CIA cables that were introduced. (b)(3)(c) *describes how it happened:* In this case, the Lord Advocate had never seen the minimally redacted cables, and he said [to the Court], "Well, these are the cables. This is all I've seen." The Court says, "We think there's more out there . . . can you go find out?" The Lord Advocate then came back to the Court after reading the minimally redacted cables and said, "This is what we can have. I've now gone through it. I sat down with the CIA and we went through them one-by-one. I am satisfied that the only thing that is left out is something that's actually national security." And the Court said, "Okay. We believe you." The defense whined about it, and the Court said, "Well, I'm sorry. This is the way it is." (S)

Weighing Majid's Testimony (U)

(b)(3)(c) *testimony of the CIA asset, who took a pretty severe beating during cross-examination* : Because of the fact that [Majid] had never told us about the luggage [until long after the bombing], he was crucified during cross-examination. But the FBI took him, put him in the witness protection program. (S)

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(b)(3)(n)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

CIA Officers as Witnesses (U)

Arranging the appearance of undercover CIA officers required extraordinary measures . (b)(3)(c) . Our witnesses were in disguise, in aliases, their voices were altered, and, although the Court was open to the public, there was a closed-circuit TV that was broadcast to other parts of the Court, back to New York, DC, and London, where there were offices set up solely for the family members of the crash victims. You had to have a special pass to get in. There was also a media center, where the media could watch, but they couldn't videotape it. The media were only allowed to sketch and take notes. (S)

The judges, the defendants, the defense counsel, and the prosecution could see the witnesses. There was a screen put up when our witnesses testified to block them from the gallery and the public. And the closed-circuit TV cameras were degraded so you couldn't see the person. You could barely tell it was a person, and their voices were degraded . . . they sounded like Darth Vader. It was very unusual. (S)

Agency officers helped establish that the timer used in the bombing was of Libyan origin. This involved testimony not only from (b)(3)(n) *officer who had made the connection,* (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

STAT *timer into the country.* (b)(3)(c) The first [witness] was (b)(3)(c) in Senegal when the Libyans were arrested, which didn't come out during the trial, so I think it's probably still classified,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

When the Libyans got off the plane, the police were there and arrested them as they were entering Senegal. The Agency was involved in that (b)(3)(n) saw them being arrested and taken into the VIP Lounge at the Senegal Airport. Subsequently, he saw them in prison a couple of days later. Then he was involved in making arrangements (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) to examine the device and the

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explosives (b)(1) That was the substance of his testimony during the trial. (S)

The second Agency witness was the Agency officer (b)(1) He testified about and showed pictures of all the things that were taken out of the Libyan's briefcase--a pistol, Semtex explosive, and the timer. Fortunately, he had gotten some pretty good pictures. At one point, he had tried to take the timer casing apart, but the Senegalese wouldn't let him. He testified to all of that, which went pretty well. The pictures were very important to show that these were the same type of chip, same type of timer used to destroy Pan Am 103, and how it related to the way the Libyans operate. So the Agency testimony was a big part of establishing that. (S)

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

It didn't take a lot of work for the prosecution to link the timer in Senegal to be exclusive with the Libyans once Messier and Bollier, the timer's manufacturers, testified. They admitted to the fact that these were [MEBO] timers, which were sold to the Libyans, but not exclusively. The owners said they had sold a small number to the Stasi, the East Germans. It's hard to prove a negative, that nobody else had them, but Bollier testified that he had sold 25 of these timers to the Libyans. He had taken them there, and the Libyans had taken him out to the desert, and he had done tests for them, and helped them configure the timers, and showed them how to use them. There's always the possibility the Libyans could have sold them to somebody themselves, or something crazy like that could have happened, but there was no evidence supporting that theory throughout the trial. (S)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

The trial got delayed or adjourned for three weeks, while they went chasing leads and trying to resolve some issues. I went back in late October, and, again, the night before, I sat down with the prosecuting attorneys. And this time, God bless them, they had a nice script all put together. One of the prosecutors said, "I'm going to talk about your background. What your technical qualifications are, then I want you to describe for me (b)(1) timer." He was using me as just a technical witness. "Forget about (b)(3)(c) coming to see you. We don't need that." What they were trying to do was to essentially refute the defense's case before the defense had a chance to present it. And so he says "I want you to talk about the technology here, the technology there, then compare the two." So I testified for about 40 minutes on the stand. (S)

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There were two defense attorneys, of course, one for Fahima, one for Megrahi. I had been warned that they were like a good cop, bad cop routine. Fahimah's was the nice guy, and he would ask these very nice questions, and then the other attorney would jump up and call you a liar and question your parentage and everything else, trying to get you upset, saying something like, "We obviously can't accept any of that testimony." And he was very successful doing that with a few of the witnesses. (S)

So the prosecution went through their routine, following the script, which was great, as I knew where they were going. [A prosecutor] had told me, "Don't give me more than what I ask you. Just answer the question but don't elaborate. And if I want more, I know what you know, I'll ask you and I'll draw it out of you. Let me pull it out." So I knew where he was going and this was good, so we went through the 40 minutes of testimony and Fahimah's attorney got up and said, "No questions, my Lord." (S)

And then Megrahi's attorney gets up and asks, "Is it true today, and in fact in the 1980s, that any electronic equipment would contain electronic components?" My first question was what did they mean by that? And then I thought, that's not what he's trying to ask me. What is it he's trying to ask me? But then I thought, no don't figure it out for him. I'm not here to help the defense, so my answer was--and I thought I can't give him a smart ass answer either--so I said, "By definition, sir." That was my answer, "By definition." Electronic components, that's what makes it a piece of electronic equipment. And he says, "And therefore it would also contain circuit boards?" And I said, "Not always." And he says, "But in the majority of the cases," or "by far and away," or something like that. And I said, "Yes, normally it would." "No more questions." (S)

(b)(3)(c) brought to the trial was to differentiate between the PFLP-GC's altimeter timers and the MST-13. And that was very important, because their whole defense was basically premised on the fact that the PFLP-GC bombed Pan Am 103 and not the Libyan(b)(3)(c) rave reviews from the Scottish prosecutors and the Department of Justice attorneys for his testimony. The Department of Justice attorneys stayed there the whole time, throughout the trial. They actually were allowed to sit in the benches with the Scottish prosecution, which is very unusual.(b)(3)(c) estified, they came over, and one of the DOJ prosecutors said that he thought that was the best witness that he had seen. And I don't think he was just making us feel goo(b)(3)(c) was very convincing, and very authoritative. He was our expert witness. And he, unequivocally, demonstrated that the timers the PFLP-GC used, which are called (b)(1) that the Libyans used. That was extraordinarily important to achieving the conviction. (S)

Logistics (U)

(b)(3)(c) We didn't know what to expect, we didn't know if there'd be a lot of media coverage. By the time our witnesses had to testify, everyone was bored with the trial and there wasn't much media coverage at all. There was one reporter around, and no one was taking pictures. We ended up using all those support people, but I think there was a thought that maybe we don't need to do this as extremely as it started. (S)

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(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

We went to Scotland and we got a tour of the crash site. We spoke to the police officers who were there that night, who told us what they had seen. They took us to the evidence room and showed us all the suitcases and pictures. We met with the Chief Constable of Dumfries and Gal(b)(3)(c)ho was responsible for the whole case.
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c) *preparations made to bring the agent's handlers to the trial and the p*(b)(3)(n)*n's decision not to use them* : . . . the decision was made by the Crown Office not to put [Maji(b)(3)(n)handlers on [the stand] . . . Those officers each traveled to the trial two or three times. So each of them really went out of his way a number of times to come and stand by, go through the whole security rigmarole, in disguise (b)(3)(n) waiting, ready to go. And . . . the lead solicitor decided . . . that the prosecution had made their case adequately, they'd established the facts they wanted to establish, and if they put these fellows on the stand, the defense would keep questioning them until they got into areas that these officers could not talk about ~~(S)~~

We all felt that it was unfortunate that they did not testify. They felt frustrated that they did not appear, because, had they appeared, they probably would have been able to bolster Majid's credibility. They would have been able to corroborate and expand on a number of things that Majid had testified about but on which he had been badgered and belabored and picked apart by the defense. ~~(S)~~

(b)(3)(c) *observation about the unique circumstances in a foreign court* : The other complicated thing about this case was the foreign soil facet . . . Actually the Scottish Court was a country within another country.

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

Protecting Intelligence Secrets (U)

(b)(3)(c) *several of the accommodations that the Agency had to make at the trial:* One was [acknowledgment] that the Agency had a station in Senegal, at least during "X" period of time, and a particular Agency officer was responsible there. One of the really big ones was that we were running unilateral operations in Malta.

(b)(3)(n)

We had to admit everything involving our asset, Majid, and that, in Malta, we

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recruited somebody out of the Libyan External Intelligence Service. (S)

(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c) Two things [of special note]: One, the provision of highly sensitive and critical documents, that is DO operational cables, although redacted, but, in the end, redacted minimally--very minimally--in an international criminal trial--not a US trial--for the first time. And, second, passing them, essentially, to the Libyans, because they were given to the defense. It was the same as telling the Libyans what we were doing, how we were "reading their mail" through Majid. There were no questions about what the extent and nature was of our relationship with Majid. They knew previously that Majid had defected to this country, that Majid was going to be a witness. But they certainly didn't know the details of his relationship with CIA that came out subsequently. That was a real departure. (S)

Another unique thing is, similarly, providing the witnesses. We were prepared to put on the stand half a dozen serving officers--(b)(3)(n)--which had never been done before. Then the whole facilitative,(b)(3)(n) piece had to be pulled together, which was probably the bulk of my effort and my contribution in this project. Beyond that, it was clear to everybody, it was clear to the judges, it was certainly clear to the defense, clear to the public, that CIA was heavily invested in this trial. That meant something. That meant CIA had something. We weren't just concocting this stuff. I think the judges, realizing as they did that we had taken extraordinary steps in providing witnesses and documents, probably tended to give a little more weight to some of the witnesses and some of the argumentation by the prosecution. (S)

Lessons (U)

The Scottish Court presiding over the trial of the two Libyans announced its verdict on 31 January 2001. Megrahi was found guilty of murder and was sentenced to no less than 27-years' imprisonment under Scottish law. His co-defendant, Al-Amin Khalifa Fahima, was acquitted; the Court concluded that the evidence in his case was insufficient to satisfy the high standard of "proof beyond reasonable doubt." An appeal by Megrahi was rejected, and he remains in a Scottish prison. The verdict also led the Libyans to openly acknowledge their culpability and to offer compensation to the families of the victims. (U)

Reflecting back on the long process, (b)(3)(c) *was proud of everyone who pitched in to support the Pan Am 103 trial. Asked to reflect on lessons learned from the experience, he suggested that CIA should remember its proper role:* I think we have to recognize that we are an intelligence organization, not a law enforcement organization. We shouldn't be collecting evidence, except in those very narrow situations, counterintelligence situations, where we have a charter to do that. I think we have to be very careful about how we provide our intelligence and our operational information in support of law enforcement, if for no other reason than to protect it and our clandestine sources from the scrutiny that it's going to come under in a judicial setting, where it should come under scrutiny. I think that intelligence is a marvelous mechanism to enable law enforcement people to go after evidence and get evidence that can stand up in a court of law. But I

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don't think intelligence is a substitute for that. (S)

This was one of those extraordinary cases where, after sitting down and looking at it, and talking to our lawyers, and talking to the Scottish investigators, talking to the prosecution, and getting a good perspective on this (b)(3)(c) who saw the strategic dynamic, that we had to give that information up, and it had to go out as evidence, because there was no other way that it was going to be . . . that there was no substitute available. And without that, the verdict would not have come out the way it did. (S)

(b)(3)(c) We got a guilty verdict [for Al-Megrahi] and were able to provide a definitive answer to the family members of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103 that the Libyans definitely were behind this. That was the lingering question that we wanted answered by a court of law. And that's what we got. We accomplished it within the framework of Scottish Law. Indeed, it was a rather significant feat." (S)

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n) We were determined to find solutions and to take that extra risk so that this trial could take place. (b)(3)(n) to the lawyers, all of us worked long hours and weekends to solve problems. "We can't do it" was never muttered. I can say that from the professionalism of the officers I got to work with during this entire episode, I have no doubts that CIA is the best intelligence service in the world. (b)(3)(n)

Footnotes:

1 An exchange of tactical missiles between Libya and the United States during US naval maneuvers in the Mediterannean in March 1986, and the subsequent bombing by Libyan operatives of a discotheque frequented by US soldiers in Germany, led Washington to launch air raids against Libyan targets linked to terrorism on the night of 15 April 1986. (U)

2 Trial testimony underlined the time it took Scottish authorities to process and evaluate the huge volume of debris. The shirt fragment--a piece of collar--bearing the timer fragment was logged in as evidence in January 1989. The finger-nail sized piece of the circuit board was discovered in May, among other pieces of plastic, metal, wire, and paper imbedded in the shirt fragment. In September, the Scottish investigators asked for help from London in identifying it. (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

4 A CIA 201 file is the official file containing all biographic reporting on and references to an individual of specific interest to the Directorate of Operations, including personal history and operational assessments. (b)(3)(c)

5 (b)(3)(c) the Court didn't believe Majid on a lot of his points because the justices never saw a second, more extensive, batch of redacted cables, which would have confirmed much of what he said in court. (U)

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(b)(3)(c) served in the CIA's Office of General Counsel. (U)

(b)(3)(c)

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(b)(3)(n)

~~SECRET~~

Why Spy?

The Psychology of Espionage (U)

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

I said once that the men that I betrayed had taken or made similar choices and taken similar chances. Any reasonable person hearing me say that is going to say "what arrogance." But that was not an arrogant statement. What I did to those men—the situation of their families and others—and the kind of shame and the kind of remorse I feel—this is, and I think will always be, intensely personal.

— CIA mole Aldrich "Rick" Ames[2] (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

People who commit espionage sustain a double life. When a person passes classified information to an enemy, he or she initiates a clandestine second identity. From that time on, a separation must be maintained between the person's secret "spy" identity, with its clandestine activities and the "non-spy" public self. The covert activities inescapably exert a powerful influence on the person's overt life. They necessitate ongoing efforts at concealment, compartmentation, and deception of those not witting of the espionage, which includes almost everyone in the spy's life. For some people, sustaining such a double identity is exciting and desirable; for others, it is draining and stressful. For a few heroic people, spying is a moral imperative that they would prefer to avoid but feel compelled to act on. (b)(3)(n)

This article focuses on spies whose espionage appears to be primarily self-interested, rather than altruistic or self-sacrificing. Within this criminal or treasonous type, specific psychological factors

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commonly occur, providing a guide to understanding the motives, behavior, and experiences of this type of spy. The risk of espionage can be reduced through understanding these psychological patterns and tailoring countermeasures. (U)

Elements of Espionage (U)

Three essential elements set the conditions for espionage: dysfunctions in the personality, a state of crisis, and ease of opportunity. The converse is true as well: Safeguards or strengths in these areas mitigate the risk of espionage. (U)

Any consideration of motivation in espionage must closely examine personality pathology. Personality is the mix of traits, attitudes, and values that characterizes a person. Spies frequently have pathological personality features that pave the way to espionage, such as thrill seeking, a sense of entitlement, or a desire for power and control. In addition, healthy countervailing traits—such as a calm temperament or strong sense of responsibility—may be either weak or entirely absent.4 (b)(3)(n)

A second essential motivator is the spy's experience of an acute personal crisis resulting in intense distress. Though the spy may have regrets in hindsight, at the time he or she initiates the espionage, it appears a logical decision to solve a problem or the only option available to escape a desperate or painful situation(b)(3)(n)

Finally, ease of opportunity is a prerequisite for espionage. The potential spy must have access not only to classified information but also to an interested "customer." The manipulations by such "customers," who are often professionally trained to present themselves to potential spies as rewarding and safe patrons, can be a major determinant in motivating a vulnerable person to take the step into committing espionage. (b)(3)(n)

The factors of "personality," "crisis," and "opportunity" do not operate independently. Vulnerabilities in one area generate vulnerabilities in the others. A person with a problematic mix of personality features will tend to have more than the average number of life crises, including job terminations, relationship or family problems, and financial troubles. Such personal crises will, in turn, further stress and magnify problematic traits and behaviors just when the person needs most to function with stability and maturity. Unscrupulous agents "spotting" a vulnerable person may insinuate themselves into the situation and find ways to exacerbate the personal crisis, "ripening" the targeted person's vulnerability to recruitment. Handlers will then continue to manipulate a recruited asset's vulnerabilities to maintain the person's long-term commitment to espionage. (b)(3)(n)

The descriptive categories that follow are useful as a map of what to expect on the psychological terrain of espionage. As with all maps, however, they oversimplify. No typology can encompass the full complexity of the psyche of any individual spy. Moreover, a proportion of people caught in criminally oriented or self-serving espionage will not fit the predicted patterns. Therefore, the typology must be applied with caution. Trained professionals can apply these concepts to mitigate risk in contexts such as applicant screenings and evaluations for clearances. Managers and other members of the Intelligence Community may use this information to sharpen their awareness of potentially risky behavior patterns. They should bear in mind, however, that these psychological patterns do not always lead to trouble . . . and that many troubled people do not exhibit these patterns. (U)

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Psychopathy (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

My initial intention had been to stop. Having done the scam, having gotten the $50,000, then I would stop. My intent had been to stop, and leave it at that. What brought me to do it . . . to pass all that information, was partly a matter of self- preservation. Two of the names I gave were KGB officers serving in the Washington Residency.

—CIA mole Rick Ames[8] (U)

Psychopaths are predators, approaching life with remorselessness, manipulation, pursuit of risk and excitement, and sharp, short-term tactical abilities alongside poor long-term/strategic planning. They frequently leave people with a positive first impression. Over time and with extended exposure, the initial impression wears away as people become aware of, or are directly victimized by, the psychopath. Before they are unmasked, psychopaths can cause severe damage to individuals and institutions. (U)

Psychopaths cannot consistently follow laws, rules, and customs, and do not understand the social necessity of doing so. They have limited capacity to experience the feelings of guilt, shame, and remorse that are the building blocks of mature conscience and moral functioning. They are facile liars. In fact, many psychopaths take inordinate pleasure in lying because perpetrating an effective "con" gives them a sense of power and control over the person lied to, an emotional charge sometimes termed "duping delight."[9] Their glee in manipulating others may be so acute that it overrides their judgment and good sense, causing them to take foolish risks simply for the pleasure of temporarily "conning" others. (U)

Psychopaths are interpersonally exploitative. The condition is not infrequently associated with acute cruelty and the enjoyment of inflicting pain on others. Harming or alarming others is, to psychopaths, its own reward. They pursue these pleasures with relish irrespective of the risks involved or the limited potential for gain. (U)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Finally, psychopaths rarely learn from mistakes and have difficulty seeing beyond the present. Consequently, they have deficient long-term planning and their judgment is weak. In contrast to their problems in strategic planning, however, psychopaths can be supremely skilled tacticians and exceptionally quick on their feet. Absent the usual prohibition against violating rules or social customs, psychopaths are tactically unbound and remarkably uninhibited. (U)

(b)(3)(n)

Snakes in Suits (U)

In the workplace, psychopaths are noteworthy for their central role in frequent, enduring, and bitter conflicts. Psychopaths exert themselves to charm select superiors, whereas their immediate workplace peers experience their abuse and quickly come to view them with mistrust. Peers see them as possessing a guilt-free lack of integrity, as remorseless in pursuit of their own agendas, and as ruthlessly eliminating critics or obstacles—even legitimate competitors—who present a threat. Subordinates of psychopaths most often fear them. A great deal of resolve and courage is required to publicly take on psychopaths, because of their ruthlessness, manipulative acumen, and the thrill and excitement they experience at generating stress and conflict. (U)

Those in the bureaucracy responsible for oversight or disciplinary functions—such as security or finance officers—will frequently be the first targets of psychopathic manipulations. These institutional disciplinarians are often in a position to collect hard data against the psychopath, such as fraudulent accountings or inaccurate time-and-attendance records; therefore, they present an especially acute threat to a psychopath's freedom to maneuver undetected within a bureaucracy. They often are subjected to vicious attacks instigated by the psychopath, which may take personal rather than professional form. These pre-emptive strikes serve to obstruct or obscure legitimate efforts to bring to light concerns about the psychopath's integrity and behavior. In addition, if a psychopath's immediate supervisor, peers, or subordinates try to feed some of their concerns upward to management, they often find that the psychopath has been there before them and preventatively "groomed" key managers to expect such criticism. The warnings, therefore, fall on deaf ears or result in
blowback to the messengers. (U)

Because psychopaths thrive in an atmosphere of turbulence and instability, corporate cultures that tolerate risk-taking and controversial or even abusive behaviors will provide congenial ground for them. Organizations where the usual institutional systems of control or supervision are weak—such as those with inadequate personnel measurement and tracking systems or with vulnerable information systems—will be particularly unprotected against psychopathic manipulations. (U)

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The Intelligence Community has both more protection from and also more vulnerability to deliberate manipulation by insiders. The institutional safeguards are greater than in most workplaces because of rigorous medical and security screenings of applicants, regular security reviews of the workforce, and programs for medical and lifestyle support for troubled employees. These unique institutional controls are essential because the Intelligence Community's compartmentation of information, secrecy regarding programs and activities, and constant mobility of personnel make it relatively easy for unscrupulous employees to maneuver undetected and to manipulate the system. In the national security environment, such behaviors have the potential to do especially grave harm. (b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(n)

Narcissism (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Yes, and there were Kapos, too, during the concentration camps.

—Navy civilian analyst
Jay Pollard 11(U)

Narcissistic personalities are characterized by exaggerated self-love and self-centeredness. Alongside an all-encompassing grandiosity runs a subtle but equally pervasive insecurity, into which narcissists have limited insight. Their internal world typically is built around fantasies about their remarkable personal abilities, charisma, beauty, and prospects. They are compelled to exhibit their presumed stellar attributes and constantly seek affirmation from others. Though their imaginings distort common sense or everyday reality, narcissists nevertheless believe in the accuracy of their daydreams and act accordingly. Others, therefore, often experience them as lacking common sense and twisting reality. When facts or other people contradict or interfere with their fantasies, narcissists become combative and vengeful. Their defensive hostility to criticism—even mild feedback—is often well out of proportion to whatever provocation sparked it. (b)(3)(n)

Narcissists possess a careless disregard for personal integrity and can be very unscrupulous and manipulative in pursuing their own ends. They are, on the whole, indifferent to the needs of others and are frequently experienced by others as having flawed social consciences. They feel entitled to special—even extraordinary—favors and status that they do not believe they have to reciprocate. They heedlessly exploit others emotionally and financially, or in other ways that suit their ends. They are deeply antagonistic to sharing decisionmaking with others, irrespective of the legitimacy of the claims of others for some degree of control. Convinced of their own inherent superiority, they blame others for their problems or for negative events that happen to them, including social

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rejection. Because they do not consider themselves at fault for any troubles or setbacks, narcissists feel at liberty to take whatever steps they deem necessary to redress wrongs or regain a sense of mastery and superiority. (U)

Narcissistic self-absorption should not be confused with an inability to grasp the perspective of others. Their hunger for affirmation produces acute awareness of the reactions they are provoking from the people around them. This deep hunger for affirmation also makes them vulnerable to manipulation, particularly by people whose admiration or approval they desire. Narcissists are particularly sensitive to authorities or to otherwise socially prominent or powerful people. Conversely, they can be inordinately indifferent to or contemptuous of the feelings or needs of people whom they believe to be insignificant or social inferiors. (U)

Narcissists in the Workplace (U)

Narcissists are often magnetic because their supreme self-confidence wedded to their urgent drive to impress enables them to project the appearance of talent and charm effectively. Over time, the charisma wears thin as it becomes evident that this appearance is not built on substance, but rather on fantasies and fabrications. Furthermore, narcissists' pervasive tendency to see others as inferior causes them to be needlessly sarcastic, belittling, or supercilious. People around them may note a stark contrast in the narcissist's conduct towards different classes of people depending on their social rank and usefulness. Furthermore, the hostile and vindictive attacks meted out by narcissists when others challenge their grandiosity tend to provoke angry responses in return. The result is that narcissists frequently find themselves the recipients of antagonistic feelings at distinct odds with their view of themselves as infinitely superior and admirable. They have limited insight into their role in these dynamics and tend to blame others for their own lack of social success, in the workplace as elsewhere. Their managers will frequently have to intervene in the interpersonal conflicts they habitually generate. (U)


In addition, narcissists often show a pattern of organizational rule violations and disregard for institutional or managerial authority. They trivialize inconvenient regulations or hold themselves superior and exempt from policies, directives, and laws. They feel entitled to favorable workplace treatment—whether this comes in the form of forgiveness for transgressions, early or frequent promotions, attractive work assignments, or other advantages such as having their requests expedited by support staff. They are acutely sensitive to the advancement of others and become suspicious and angry if they experience themselves as being left behind. They perceive workplace competitors who get ahead of them as "stealing" advantages or rewards that are rightfully their own. Finally, narcissists will lie, fabricate information or events, willfully exaggerate accomplishments, and often believe their own fabrications, all in the interest of appearing successful or important. (U)

Many of these characteristics, properly contained, can be very useful in certain types of work requiring flexibility, charisma, and persuasion—for example, in sales, politics, and operations officer work. It can be very difficult for managers to know where to draw the line between a tolerable or useful level of narcissism and more dangerous self-absorption and self-aggrandizement. One way to make this determination is to look for positive counterbalancing features in the personality that control the narcissism. (U)

Immaturity (U)

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Observers frequently compare immature adults to adolescents. Attitudes and behaviors that are expected and even endearing in normal adolescents or children, however, are unsettling, disruptive, and potentially hazardous in adults. (U)

The most salient characteristic of immaturity is the ascendancy of fantasy over reality.14 Immature adults spend an inordinate amount of time daydreaming, deliberately calling to mind ideas that stimulate pleasant or exciting emotions. In contrast to mature adults, immature adults do not readily distinguish their private world from objective external reality and, in fact, may expect reality to conform to their self-serving and stimulating fantasies. Their fantasies about their special powers, talents, status, prospects, and future actions can be so seductive that they become resentful of conflicting real-world truth. (U)

Immature persons generally expect others to embrace what to them is the self-evident legitimacy of their personal ideas and longings. They often cannot understand why others do not share their perspective and fail to see that reality itself works against the validity of their fantasies. They frequently will act on their fantasies with little anticipation of consequences that to most people would be completely predictable. They are often genuinely shocked when reality intrudes on their plans and interferes with anticipated outcomes. Because they are persistently egocentric, immature people see themselves as the epicenter of any crowd or event. They believe others are paying close attention to them personally in most contexts, and as a result they are acutely self-aware. When it becomes clear that they are not the center of attention, and that others might, in fact, be indifferent to them, they often react negatively and take steps to bring attention to themselves. (U)

Immature people have difficulty moderating their feelings. Rather than appropriately disciplining and channeling feelings, they are subject to them. As a result, they are given to dramatic displays of emotion when stressed or excited, and while these displays may be congruent to whatever stimulated the feelings—for example, they will become very angry at perceived injustices or delighted at successes—observers will sense that the emotions lack proper proportion and moderation. (U)

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A significant consequence of poor emotional control is impulsivity. Immature people have difficulty restraining their immediate wishes in the interest of anticipating long-term consequences. When prompted by sudden feelings or urgent desires, they take precipitous action. They tend to have limited attention spans and need to be emotionally engaged with a task or a person to retain focus. They are easily bored with routine and can be quite fickle and distractible. (U)

Finally, like psychopaths and narcissists, immature persons have defective consciences, but they are capable of feeling real guilt and often have well-developed moral codes. Their egocentricism and impulsivity limit their capacity for foresight, but in hindsight they often deeply regret their impetuous actions. Though they may want to behave in an ethical manner and feel guilt and shame when they behave badly or hurt other people, their capacity to apply their moral understanding and desires consistently is compromised. (U)

An occasional feature of immaturity is dependency, which is highly relevant to espionage because dependency makes a person particularly susceptible to manipulation and control. Dependent persons experience relationships to be so crucial to their well-being that they will do almost anything to sustain them. Dependent people may function quite adequately and seem well adjusted as long as they are not required to be on their own and are able to rely on a relationship as a psychological crutch. If the relationship is threatened, or there is even the possibility of separation, they become anxious and less able to cope. Their hunger to both please and cling to the person or people on whom they are dependent necessarily affects their judgment, and they will willingly compromise their own and others' well being—including their personal ethics—to sustain the relationship on which they depend. (U)

(b)(3)(n)

Children at Play (U)

In the workplace, immature people are often spontaneous and imaginative and can be quite appealing. In optimal conditions, they can be productive and inventive people who are eager to form attachments with others and to please and impress them. (U)

When such employees are stressed, however, these characteristics can take distinctly negative turns. Spontaneity can translate into erratic and impulsive behavior, and active imaginations can cause problems with decisionmaking and judgment. If stress is not reduced, immature workers rapidly lose their ability to cope and can become inordinately needy and demanding. Co-workers who discern these patterns become alarmed, and immature persons are often considered by others to be somewhat unbalanced and a risk for hazardous behavior and bad judgment. (U)

In general, immature persons are naïve about normal expectations regarding adult workplace attitudes and conduct. They are too susceptible to environmental distractions and internal pressures to be consistent performers. They do not readily distinguish between personal and professional spheres. They are easily bored with routine and heedlessly seek stimulation from people and things around them. They can be either too dependent on, or reactive against, control mechanisms. They tend to be very demanding of positive attention from authorities, while at the same time overly hostile or sensitive to negative feedback. Their seeking after attention or

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stimulation often becomes a drain on supervisors, who must engage in constant oversight, and can deplete peers, who get pressed into fixing problems caused by their immature colleague's inattention and poor judgment. (U)

Mixed Personality Disorder (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

While the traits and behaviors of many spies match the features specific to psychopathy, narcissism, or immaturity and dependency, in some cases the personalities do not readily fit any one of these types. What may be most notable in such cases is a lack of positive personality features to counterbalance negative ones. In addition, some spies show a mix of characteristics from all three dominant types. Some may also show other psychopathologies such as paranoid or compulsive symptoms.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(n)

Healthy Personalities (U)

In healthy personalities, positive characteristics counterbalance negative ones. Positive features might include the ability to accept criticism; feel remorse and make reparations for mistakes; show genuine empathy for at least some people; exhibit reasonable stability of mood over time and in different contexts; experience, express, and also contain, a wide range of emotions; show tactical adaptability alongside good long-range planning and self-discipline; and demonstrate ethical behavior across various situations. (U)

In contrast to exhibiting a mix of positive features to temper problem characteristics, pathological personalities tend to be structured around a few dominant, relatively uninhibited characteristics. The complexity of healthy personalities enables them to deploy an array of coping strategies depending on the nature of the challenges they have to address. In contrast, pathological personalities posses a limited range of coping techniques. People with personality pathology tend to adhere stubbornly to a few approaches to problem-solving and have difficulty adjusting, changing, and growing despite repeated evidence that their strategies for dealing with life are not working adequately. (U)

Precipitating Crises (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

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My own decision in June [1986] to give them—to basically to volunteer to them the mass of genuine information that I had—is one that I still have trouble reconstructing. What I was thinking? How I was thinking? It was a very busy and stressful period both professionally and personally and it was like a leap in the dark.

—CIA mole Rick Ames 17 (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

While problematic personality features are essential, they are not sufficient to provoke espionage. The majority of people who have some, or even many, of the personality features described above will never engage in criminal conduct. Espionage must be triggered by a crisis and the person's assessment that illicit criminal conduct offers the solution to or an escape from the crisis. The precipitating crisis may be self-evident to observers—for example, the breakup of a marriage, the loss of a job, or bankruptcy. But it can also be private and invisible. Such psychological crises as feeling intensely frustrated and humiliated at being consistently outperformed at work by peers can be just as acute and painful as externally evident problems. (b)(3)(n)

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States of crisis often result in patterns of thinking that degrade judgment and behavior. A person in crisis typically experiences a sense of threat alongside a severe loss of control. The combined result frequently is a feeling of paralysis or helplessness, a desire to either fight the situation or to find a way to escape it at all costs. Most significant in regards to motivation for espionage, a person in this state of mind can acquire "tunnel vision," in which the person's attention becomes riveted on the current crisis. This fixation on the present can degrade long-term planning and the capacity to anticipate lasting consequences. Such mental conditions make a person vulnerable to taking badly judged actions. (b)(3)(n)

While life crises are ubiquitous, criminal responses remain rare. Personality flaws that weaken moral reasoning, judgment, and control over impulsive behavior are aggravated by the sense of immediate threat, urgent need to escape, and tunnel vision common to crises. A person with personality problems is therefore doubly vulnerable to misjudgments and misconduct in a crisis. Conversely, people who as a rule have strong judgment, good self-control, and healthy consciences have more insulation against tendencies to impulsive action or misconduct when under the pressures of crisis. (U)

(b)(3)(n)

Special Handling (U)

I have a lot of respect for [my handlers] and gratitude. Gratitude because they worked real hard and they did everything they could from their point of view to take good care of me.

—CIA mole Rick Ames 21 (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

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(b)(1)
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A well-trained espionage recruiter will search for vulnerable targets. Professional intelligence officers are trained to "spot" outward signs of trouble in a person's history or behavior—such as tumultuous relationships or frequent job changes—and to evaluate the deeper, more enduring psychological dysfunctions that may be at the root of the problems. These professional recruiters are trained to deploy sophisticated psychological control techniques matched to the vulnerabilities they have detected in order to manipulate, apply pressure, or induce a person to commit espionage. (b)(3)(n)

Some intelligence services do not limit themselves to exploiting pre-existing problems, but may actively foster crises to enhance the target's susceptibility to recruitment. Common forms of such aggressive pursuit and manipulation of targets include emotional or sexual entrapment and financial manipulation through increasing the target's level of debt. A psychologically vulnerable target's grandiosity, sense of being above the rules, or vengeful impulses can all be manipulated in the service of recruitment. (b)(3)(n)

The role of such manipulations by a potential customer and the prospective spy's own sense of the ease and safety of espionage are often underestimated as key factors in increasing or decreasing motivation. Adept professional handlers depict themselves not only as willing to reward espionage but also as capable of safeguarding their agent. Good professional "handling" is designed not only to collect classified information but also to stabilize and reassure the spy in the interest of sustaining his or her capacity to commit espionage for as long as possible. As a result, the relationship between an agent and a handler is frequently highly personal, intense, and emotional, at least from the perspective of the spy, and the nature of this relationship is often a powerful force behind an individual's choice to spy. (b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(n)

Remedies and Risk Management (U)

How people who have the potential to spy gain clearances and secure entry into the Intelligence Community; how they progress and function once inside; and how the risk they pose might be mitigated are questions of critical interest to security and counterintelligence personnel as well as to medical and management professionals. The risk of spying can be mitigated through programs designed to spot and address warning signs at each stage of an employee's career, and by providing support services to troubled employees once they have been identified or by disciplining them appropriately. (b)(3)(n)

The entry points into an organization can be safeguarded through rigorous security and psychological evaluations of applicants designed to spot and weed out chronically dysfunctional people unsuitable for clearances. Patterns of personality deficiencies that can result in trouble at both work and in personal lives not only attract the attention of trained observers of human behavior—such as psychologists and case officers—but also can be registered by more incidental observers, such as co-workers and neighbors. For this reason, background checks in the security clearances process are designed to tap into this informal reservoir of observations to identify maladaptive patterns that would put an intelligence organization at risk. (b)(3)(n)

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While such medical and security screenings of applicants are the first line of defense, ongoing security reviews of the employee population are the second line, with the intent of detecting personnel who demonstrate patterns of troubling attitudes or behaviors and intervening before serious misconduct occurs. The typology of psychological factors in espionage presented here has been helpful in organizing observations regarding the personalities, behavior, and life circumstances of captured spies, with an eye to developing countermeasures and risk mitigation strategies applicable to the workplace. (b)(3)(n)

Routine security and CI reviews of applicants and staff should not be the only lines of defense, however, because while such reviews can pinpoint problems they do not necessarily ameliorate or fix them. Programs of education and support for the cleared workforce must supplement the safeguards provided by regular reviews. Educational programs regarding danger signs can assist employees and managers in spotting emotional or behavioral problems in colleagues or subordinates, or even occasionally in themselves, before they evolve into serious CI or security problems. Effective follow-through once problems have been spotted is imperative in the form of active and well-staffed medical support for troubled employees. It is especially important to make such services available to employees who identify their own problems and come forward to seek support voluntarily. (b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(n)

The Intelligence Community recoils every time a spy is caught. Laws have been broken, national security has been breached, and the bond among patriotic professionals has been violated. It would be consoling if the capture of major spies in recent years and the end of the Cold War signaled a downward trend in espionage. But the impetus to spy grows out of the human psyche, and personality dysfunctions, personal crises, and opportunities to serve other masters will never vanish. Under-standing the elements of espionage is critical to remaining vigilant and safeguarding the vital mission of US intelligence. (U)

Understanding Case Studies: *Every person is complex, and most personalities include contradictory features. A good psychological case summary is based on information and careful judgments regarding what constitutes the dominant, rather than incidental, features of the personality under study. Hitler, for example, was known to be very kind to children and animals, but his lack of remorse---even pride—in murdering countless millions of people dramatically overshadowed other aspects of his personality. The case studies presented in this article focus on the patterns of behavior that illustrate the essence of the personalities of the various spies. Such synopses do not imply that there were no other interesting or even redeeming features in their personalities or conduct, merely that the latter were secondary to the primary patterns that drove them. (U)*

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Footnotes

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2 "Ames on the Inside," CNN Interview, with Wolf Blitzer and Bob Franken, 27 December 1994. In this interview from prison, Ames talked about the 11 Russian agents he identified to the KGB, 10 of whom were executed. A career CIA case officer, Ames was arrested in 1994 for spying for both the KGB and its successor, the Ministry of Security for the Russian Federation, over a nine-year period. He received over $2 million from his handlers. Ames is serving a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. (U)

(b)(1)
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4 "Why People Spy," Project Slammer Report, December 1992; "Personality Characteristics of Convicted Espionage Offenders," Slammer Psychology Team Technical Report, May 1992; and "Managing At Risk Employees," Project Slammer Report, February 1993. Project Slammer is an Intelligence Community research effort, initiated in 1983, to understand espionage through conducting in-depth interviews and psychological evaluations of incarcerated spies. To date, over 40 spies have been interviewed. (U)

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8 Ames explaining his calculated decision to volunteer to the Russians the names of American penetrations who were in a position to alert their American handlers—and therefore the FBI—that there was a mole [Ames himself] in the CIA. All but one were executed. "Ames on the Inside," CNN Interview, with Wolf Blitzer and Bob Franken, 27 December 1994. (U)

9 Robert Hare, Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 1993); Carl B. Gacono, The Clinical and Forensic Assessment of Psychopathy (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000). (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

11 Comment reflects Pollard's indictment of Jewish-American officials, including a Federal judge, involved in his prosecution, trial, and life sentence for spying for Israel, after his arrest in 1985. "60 Minutes: The Pollards," interview with Mike Wallace, CBS, 20 November 1988. (U)

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14 All three types of personalities described in this article are distinguished by active fantasy lives, but the fantasies tend to differ in both content and degree. Psychopaths tend to fantasize mostly about power, pain, and control, while narcissists focus on their personal superiority and the hostility provoked by those who do not notice it. The fantasy life of immature persons is frequently much less well defined. Because their reasoning, judgment, and self-control are underdeveloped, they are less tied to factual reality and more dependent on fantasy to cope with events and maintain stability than are mature adults. (U)

(b)(1)
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17 "Ames on the Inside," CNN Interview, with Wolf Blitzer and Bob Franken, 27 December 1994. (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

21 "Ames on the Inside," CNN Interview, with Wolf Blitzer and Bob Franken, 27 December 1994. (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c) is a clinical psychologist in the CIA Counterintelligence Center. (U)

(b)(3)(c)

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11 September 2001: With the President (C)

Michael J. Morell

"As I waited, two young men checked out of the Comfort Inn in Portland, Maine."

I slept fitfully, tossing and turning, setting and resetting the pillows and blankets. As the time on the hotel alarm clock ticked toward 3:30 a.m., the time I needed to get up, I became even more restless. This was not unusual. I had slept poorly during the previous eight months of this assignment because one of the many things I did not want to do was to sleep through an alarm and rush, unprepared, into my 8:00 a.m. briefing of the president of the United States. (C)

After pulling myself out of bed a few minutes before the alarm was to go off, I quickly showered, dressed, made coffee, and waited (b)(1) to bring me the classified materials from which I would fashion the briefing for the president. These materials were to arrive (b)(1) from CIA Headquarters, through the Situation Room at the White House and on to the WHCA command post at the Colony Beach and Tennis Resort near Sarasota, Florida, where the president was spending the night. (C)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

On this day, (b)(1) waited and waited; 4:00 a.m. came and went; then 4:30. I'm not patient by nature, and my impatience was getting the better of me. I paced the room, looked at the clock, paced some more, and checked the clock again. I called CIA Headquarters to ask if there was a problem there. "Nope," I was told, the material had been sent (b)(1) as we had agreed, at 3:30 a.m. I phoned the command post at the resort. "Yes," I was reassured, the briefing was just coming over and they would bring it over soon.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)(c)

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Twenty-one years into my career, I was a doing a job that fe(b)(1) would ever have. And I was having the time of my life.

I didn't know it then, but as I waited, two young men checked out of the Comfort Inn in Portland, Maine, a hotel I had stayed in two months earlier, when the president spent a long weekend at his father's oceanside summer home in Kennebunkport. Now, as I was sitting in Sarasota, 1,500 miles from Portland, these men took a short drive to the Portland International Jetport, where they boarded a 6:00 a.m. flight to Boston. In Boston, they would board American Airlines Flight 11, bound for Los Angeles. Their names were Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari. (C)

Air Force One had left Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, DC, the previous morning. The president's schedule called for him to fly to Jacksonville, Florida, to participate in a variety of political events to promote his recently announced education bill. After the events in Jacksonville, he was to fly to Sarasota, arriving early in the evening. On the morning of the 11th, the president would join children in a classroom at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota. From there, he was to fly back to Washington and be back in the Oval Office by early afternoon. As the president's intelligence briefer, I was on board Air Force One as it went "wheels-up" on 10 September. (C)

At this point, I was eight months into what I was told would be a one-year assignment. Next to serving as the deputy director for intelligence, responsible for all of the Agency's intelligence analysis, I considered this the best assignment a CIA analyst could have. Carrying the Agency's best information and analysis to a president and helping to shape his view of the world is a deep honor and an even deeper responsibility. Twenty-one years into my career as an analyst, I was a doing a job that few would ever have. And I was having the time of my life. (C)

I saw the president every morning, Monday through Saturday. I briefed him whether he was working in the Oval Office or whether he was spending the weekend at Camp David. I traveled with him on domestic as well as international trips, including on family vacations. Indeed, on 10 September, I was just two weeks removed from having spent most of the month of August briefing the president at his ranch in Crawford, Texas. I had logged over 100,000 miles in the air during my year with the president. Many of those miles came on Air Force One, but many more were logged on American Airlines flights between Washington and Dallas. (C)

A briefing would generally include seven or eight items, each of them placed in a three-ring blue leather binder, with the words "President's Daily Briefing" embossed on the cover.(b)(1)

It was my job to decide both what to show the president and how to brief it so that he took away the key points. I would usually "tee-up" each item in the briefing book with a few words—for example, the last thing we had told him about the topic, how this new piece advanced the story, and a preview of the key points. The president would read the piece, often quite carefully. He would then either ask me questions about the item's substance or, more frequently, ask the senior officials in the room with us questions about the policy implications. When that discussion ended, we would move to the next item in the binder. Fifteen minutes were usually allotted for the briefing, but it would frequently run much longer. (C)

Other officials in the room usually included Vice President Cheney, Chief of Staff Andrew Card, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Director of Central of Intelligence George Tenet. The presence of these people made my job even more challenging because they were—as they should have been—intensely focused on what I was presenting to their boss. Occasionally, one of them would disagree with points in a piece and would say so in plain, direct language. (C)


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On arguably the most important day of President Bush's tenure, his intelligence briefing was uneventful.

Because the president was traveling, the briefing on 11 September would include only one of the other usual participants, Chief of Staff Card. The national security advisor or deputy national security advisor often traveled with the president, but this time the senior National Security Council official present was Captain Deborah Loewer, USN, the director of the White House Situation Room. (C)

As the NSC representative, Loewer would join the briefing. Her job was to obtain answers to policy-related questions the president might raise and, more importantly, to communicate things of interest back to Rice and her deputy, Stephen Hadley. On the flight from Jacksonville to Sarasota, I had told Loewer that I would meet her at 7:30 a.m., 30 minutes before the scheduled meeting with the president, to show her what I would be briefing. Loewer wanted to be prepared, and I wanted to accommodate her. She had been in Kennebunkport, and I found her both friendly and helpful. (C)


THE VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT
TO
FLORIDA

The book containing the itinerary for President Bush's trip to Florida on 10 and 11 September. Each person on the flight received one. (U) (Courtesy of Michael Morell and CIA Museum.)

At 7:55 a.m., Loewer and I went up the stairs to the president's suite, passing through Secret Service checkpoints on the way. We waited in the hallway outside the president's room. The president had just returned from a four and a half mile run around the golf course at the Colony Resort, and he was showering and dressing. While we waited and chatted with the president's personal aide, American Airlines Flight 11—a Boeing 767 with 92 passengers and crew members aboard—took off from Boston's Logan Airport. Flight 11 was the first of the four hijacked flights to take to the air. (C)

A little after 8:00 a.m., Chief of Staff Card opened the door, said "good morning," and motioned us in. We found the president seated at a table with a cup of coffee and a newspaper. He seemed surrounded by plates of fruit and pastries. When he saw us, he asked if we had enjoyed our night on the beach. I reminded him that my schedule did not allow for late evenings out, adding that I heard some waves but had not actually seen any. He said "Michael, you need to get a new job." He put down the newspaper and said, "Anything of interest this morning?" (C)

On arguably the most important day in President Bush's tenure, his intelligence briefing was uneventful. (b)(1)

One issue in the briefing did catch the president's attention and caused him to pick up the phone to call Dr. Rice in Washington. The briefing was over by 8:25 a.m. Only four minutes earlier, the transponder on American Flight 11 stopped transmitting its Identification Friend or Foe beacon. (C)

Captain Loewer and I left the president's suite and quickly took the elevator down to take our places in the motorcade that would take the president to Booker Elementary. (b)(1)

Soon joining me in the van were several senior White House officials, including political advisor Karl Rove, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, and Director of White House Communications Dan Bartlett. I had become friendly with both Rove and Fleischer during the previous eight months. Fleischer and I would often talk sports, and Rove and I would often

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"Ari, I sure hope this is an accident and not terrorism." He paused for a second or two—the word "terrorism" hanging in the air—and said, "I sure hope so too."

banter about the PDB. Rove would say, "You don't have anything in that briefcase that CNN doesn't have." I would respond, "Karl, if you only knew what I know." (C)

Fleischer joined me in the back of the van, sitting in the row in front of me. We exchanged greetings and dove into newspapers. The president's photographer, Eric Draper, jumped in just as the motorcade began to pull out of the Colony Resort. It was a few minutes after 8:30 a.m. Booker Elementary was 20 minutes away in a working-class neighborhood of Sarasota. During the drive, at just after 8:45 a.m., American Flight 11 slammed into the north side of the North Tower of the World Trade Center, between the 94th and 98th floors. It was traveling at 490 miles per hour. (C)

Within minutes of the Flight 11's impact, just as we were pulling up to the school, Fleischer's cell phone rang. He listened for a few seconds and flipped his phone off. He turned to me and asked, "Michael, do you know anything about a plane hitting the World Trade Center?" I said "no," but I told him I would make some calls. As the motorcade came to a stop, I said "Ari, I sure hope this is an accident and not terrorism." He paused for a second or two—the word "terrorism" hanging in the air—and said, "I sure hope so too." (C)

My assumption at that point, one the president later told reporters he shared, was that the crash was an accident. The image in my mind, as I was heading for a classroom that had been set aside for the senior staff while the president sat with a group of second-grade students in an adjoining classroom, was of a small plane losing its way in a storm or fog and hitting the World Trade Center. I figured the death toll would include only two or three people on the plane and perhaps a few more in offices at the point of impact. Still, I planned to make a call to follow up on Fleischer's question. (C)

From just outside the staff classroom, I called CIA's Operations Center. I intended to find out if anyone there knew any more than what Fleischer had just told me. It was a good bet they would. During my time as the president's briefer, I had come to rely on the group of hard-working officers in the center both to set aside for me key pieces of overnight reporting and to answer my many questions. I was a frequent caller. (C)

The phone, as usual, was answered by one of the operators on duty. (b)(3)(c) I was told she was on another line and had several additional calls on hold. I then asked for (b)(3)(c) and a few seconds later he was on the line. He told me essentially what Fleischer had told me, with one significant amplification. He said the initial reports indicated that the plane was a large commercial jet. My mental image of what happened started to unravel. (C)

As I flipped my phone shut and walked into the senior staff room, I looked at my watch. It was 9:00 a.m. In just three minutes, United Airlines Flight 175, a Boeing 767 with 65 passengers and crew members on board, would slam into the south side of the South Tower of the World Trade Center between the 77th and 85th floor. At impact, United Flight 175 was traveling at more 500 miles per hour. (U)

All of us in the senior staff area were stunned when we heard the news a few minutes later that a second plane had hit the World Trade Center. There was now no question: this was not an accident but a deliberate act of terrorism. In the classroom next door, the White House chief of staff made his way to the president, who was listening, along with 16 second graders and a large number of reporters and others, to a story about a girl and her pet goat. Card whispered in the president's ear: "A second plane has hit the World Trade Center. America is under attack." (U)

The president finished the session with the students and joined the senior staff. He made a number of calls on the secure phone that was always with the president just for such a contingency. He spoke with, among others,

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
At 9:30 a.m., President Bush went back to a classroom to speak to the nation.

Vice President Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice. During one of these conversations, with the president sitting at a school-lunch table, the networks showed a tape of the second plane crashing into the South Tower. A staff member called the president's attention to the footage, a moment the president's photographer caught in a photo that can still be found on the White House Web site. (C)

I could only stand and watch as the president spoke on the phone. Still holding my briefcase, I was growing increasingly concerned about his safety as well as the safety of others at the school. After all, I said to myself, it had been public information for days that the president would be at Booker Elementary on 11 September. I wondered if a plane might come crashing into the school. I considered saying something to the agent in charge of the Secret Service detail just across the room from me, but I demurred. I figured he did not need someone telling him how to do his job. In any event, he already had quite a worried look on his face. (C)

At 9:30 a.m., President Bush went back to a classroom to speak to the nation. Surrounded by students, teachers, and news reporters, the president said the country had suffered an apparent terrorist attack. He promised to hunt down those who committed the crime, adding that "terrorism against our country will not stand." While the president was speaking, I wondered what the students were thinking. I was also thinking that the story about the pet goat suddenly seemed so long ago. (C)

A few minutes after the president concluded his remarks, American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757 with 64 passengers and crew members on board, crashed into the western side of the Pentagon. A close friend, a teacher in Arlington County, Virginia, later told me that he saw the plane fly over his school, just seconds from impact. One of the Agency's drivers, a gentleman with whom I had become well acquainted during my briefing assignment, was waiting at the Pentagon's River Entrance. The driver said the impact of the crash lifted his vehicle off the ground. At the time, a colleague on the briefing team was briefing Secretary Rumsfeld. (C)



The president on the telephone from Booker Elementary School. Standing to the left, with his brief case, is the author. (U) (Photo: White House Web site)

When the president began speaking to the country, the Secret Service told those of us in the staff area to take our places in the motorcade "as quickly as possible." The president, they said, would be leaving for Air Force One immediately upon concluding his remarks. They added with some emphasis that once the door to President Bush's limousine closed, the "motorcade would wait for no one." I climbed back into the senior staff van and in a few minutes we were on our way to the Sarasota Bradenton International Airport. The airport was just three-and-a-half miles away. (C)

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For seconds no one said a word. Then someone broke the silence by whispering "my God."

News of the attack on the Pentagon greeted us at the airport. I began to wonder how many more planes had been hijacked, how many more targets there might be. I also thought of my family. My wife (b)(6) was probably at home. I wondered if she even knew yet what had happened. My children (b)(6) were at school in Fairfax County, Virginia. I prayed they would not be too frightened by what was occurring nor overly concerned about my safety. After all, I was about ready to board the most secure aircraft in the world. (C)

In fact, when the motorcade pulled up to Air Force One, I quickly noticed that security had been enhanced around the aircraft. A number of Secret Service agents, brandishing assault rifles, ringed Air Force One. Other agents, along with bomb-sniffing dogs, were checking every bag brought onto the aircraft. A long line snaked from the back door of the plane, where most of its passengers embarked and disembarked. Standing in that line, I saw the White House Chief of Staff's briefcase being inspected. My briefcase, with top secret material, and my overnight bag were inspected as well. (C)

Once everyone was aboard, Air Force One's engines roared to life. Normally, the Boeing 747's roll down the runway and its angle of assent at takeoff was leisurely, like that of a commercial passenger jet. Not on 11 September, not leaving Sarasota. The aircraft accelerated rapidly down the runway and began a steep ascent. It was 10 a.m. (C)

Once we were airborne, I asked the president's military aide, who was sitting nearby, if we were returning to Washington. (b)(1)

The plane was eerily quiet in those first few moments after the takeoff. Most of the people on board were still in shock and were anxious about what still might happen. The president was in his office with a small number of close aides. From there, he ordered the nation's military to a high state of alert. (C)

I was huddled with several others in Air Force One's senior staff compartment, a small room with four seats not far from the president's office. Five or six of us, including the president's doctor and nurse, were watching televised news reports. There we watched people jump to their deaths from the top floors of the World Trade Center. We also watched the South Tower collapse and disappear into a plume of smoke and dust. For seconds, no one said a word. Then someone broke the silence by whispering "my God." (C)

A few minutes later, but unknown to us at the time, United Airlines Flight 93, a Boeing 757 with 44 passengers and crew members aboard, crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Days later, we would learn that the Flight 93 passengers, aware of the hijackers' general intentions from speaking with loved ones on cell phones, had revolted and had attacked the hijackers, their actions possibly saving the lives of thousands of others. Months later, we would learn from a senior al-Qa'ida member in US detention that the US Capitol Building was the intended target of the Flight 93 hijackers. The Capitol was just 15 minutes flight time from Shanksville. (S)

(b)(1)

Some time later a senior member of the DFLP denied the initial claim. (S)

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The White House, he said, had received a call indicating that Air Force One was a target of the terrorists.

As I turned to leave, the president said: "Michael, one more thing." He asked me to call the DCI. The president had become quite close to Director Tenet over the previous eight months. He trusted Tenet's judgment, and the director had developed a deep respect and fondness for the president. The president asked me to

(b)(1)

I said I understood and would make the call immediately. (S)

I returned to my assigned seat in the staff section of the plane and picked up one of the phones that sit beside almost every seat on the aircraft. The phone rang twice, and one of the Air Force officers working on the upper deck of the 747 said "Yes, sir. What can I do for you?" I asked to be connected to the DCI's office in Washington, and I gave him the number. The officer said, "Sir, we have been ordered to keep all the phone lines open for the president and the military aide." I told him the president personally had asked me to make the call. The officer said, "I'll put you right through." Within seconds, the phone in the director's office was ringing. (S)

The DCI's suite was in a crisis mode. Tenet had just made the decision to evacuate all personnel from the CIA Headquarters compound, and he and his staff were in the process of leaving his office suite when I called. (b)(3)(c) one of the director's secretaries with whom I had worked closely when I was the director's executive assistant, told me the DCI was not available. She handed the phone to the nearest official, and I found myself talking to Cofer Black, the head of the Counterterrorist Center and my boss when I had worked in the Center for a short time. (C)

Black was calm and collected. This did not surprise me. He (b)(1) and was used to finding himself in difficult situations. He told me what the Agency knew at that point, which was little beyond what the rest of the world knew. I passed on the president's message and asked that he share it with the director. As I hung up, I was not confident the DCI would get the word, given the evacuation and given everything that would be asked of Black over the next few hours. (S)

After signing off, I walked toward the president's office, without a clue about what my role should be at that point, but I wanted to see if I could be helpful in any other way. When Chief of Staff Card saw me, he took me into the president's private quarters. There, next to his office, the president would entertain senior guests or relax and sleep. I had looked into the room several times before on earlier flights, but I had never been in the private quarters before. (C)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

I thanked Card for sharing the information, but I was not concerned.

(b)(1)

The military aide had told me a few minutes earlier that Air Force One was flying with fighter protection and with an AWACs plane overhead. I felt quite safe. (C)

The military aide also told me that a decision had been made to land for a short time at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. He said that this would allow the president to make another public statement and would allow additional food and water to be brought aboard, since we did not know how long we would be flying. He added that landing would also mean that a number of passengers—those not critical to national security—would be asked to deplane at Barksdale. He said this included the large number of White House domestic policy staff and two congressmen from Florida, Adam Putnam and Dan Miller, who had accompanied the president on his visit to Booker Elementary. I wondered what was in store for me. (C)

As we approached Barksdale, a local news channel playing on Air Force One's many video screens

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President with the commander of Barksdale Air Force Base. (U)
(Photo: ©Reuters/CORBIS)

was reporting a possible terrorist incident at the base. Reporters in the area had noticed a significant enhancement in security at the base and had assumed the worst. They were unaware that the enhanced security was due to the imminent arrival of the president. On our final approach to the airfield, I glanced over at the military aide and saw that he had the list of passengers who would be staying with the president and of those who would remain in Shreveport. I asked him what the plan was for me. He said "Andy Card says you are to stay with us." It was 11:40 a.m. (C)

A few minutes after we came to a standstill on the Barksdale tarmac, the president walked down the steps of the jet ramp. Typically, presidential visits to military bases are full of pomp and ceremony—a large group of soldiers and family members cheering and waving flags, welcoming remarks by the base commander, and a morale-boosting speech by the commander-in-chief. That was not the scene on 11 September. On that day, only a few officers met the president, and soldiers in full battle gear ringed his plane. The president shook hands with the officers, climbed into a vehicle and sped off. (U)

As I watched the president's arrival from one of the windows along the main hallway of Air Force One, two of the military stewards came through the plane to announce in a very pleasant way that for "security reasons" no one would be permitted to make cell phone calls or to give out the president's location. My heart sank. I had planned to call (b)(6) I wanted to let her know I was okay and that I did not have any idea when I would be getting home. I hoped she was not worried. (U)

I was accustomed to remaining on Air Force One while the president was off the plane at an event. I preferred staying on the plane if the stop was to last only a few hours. I felt it was better than tagging along with the president and his party, when, with everyone working but me, I felt like a fifth wheel. Instead, I would read on the plane or relax with a movie. The only downside of that was the need to regularly shake hands with, or at least smile at, the many local dignitaries who were given tours of Air Force One. Apart from the tourists, however, I was usually alone. (C)

Not on 11 September 2001. Sitting with me in the conference room, watching news reports, were the two US congressmen. While we were watching the day's latest updates on television, one of the congressmen, aware that I worked for CIA and provided the president with his daily intelligence briefing, asked me who I thought was behind the attacks. I told him I would bet every dollar I had that Usama Bin Laden's al-Qa'ida organization was responsible. (C)

The next day, after returning to CIA Headquarters, I found on my desk a press report quoting the Florida congressman telling reporters that a "senior national security official traveling with the president" had told him just hours after the attack that Bin Ladin was the culprit. A handwritten note on the piece, from one of my briefer colleagues, asked, "Are you the senior official?" I wondered as well. (C)

At 1:45 p.m., the president returned to Air Force One, and we left Barksdale. On the ground, the president had made a series of phone calls and had spoken to the nation—this time with a short delay as the media pool that travels with the president fed the tape to the networks. In his statement, the president said,

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"The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts." He added, "The resolve of our great nation is being tested. But make no mistake, we will show the world that we will pass this test." (U)

When Air Force One left Barksdale, it had considerably fewer passengers than when it arrived, but large pallets of water and food had been brought on board. The military aide explained to me that the Secret Service had decided that it was still not safe for the president to return to Washington and that we would fly to Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska, where the president would conduct a meeting of his National Security Council over the secure video link at the Strategic Air Command bunker. (C)

About 15 minutes from Barksdale, Andy Card walked into the staff section of the plane, where I was seated, and said "Michael, the president wants to see you." As I rose from my seat, I asked Card what the president needed, and he said, "He just wants to talk a bit." When I reached the president's office, he was on the phone with New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani. I heard the president say (b)(1) The president was focused and determined, a perception of him that I would have a number times over the ensuing months. (C)

The president asked me who was responsible for the attacks. I said "Sir, I haven't seen any intelligence that would point to

The president asked me "when will we know [who was responsible for the attacks]?"

responsibility, so what I'm going to say is simply my personal view." The president told me he understood. I said two terrorist states were capable of conducting such a complex operation (b)(1) I pointed ou (b)(3)(n); that neither had much to gain and both had plenty to lose from attacking the United States. Rather, I said the culprit was almost certainly a nonstate actor, adding that I had no doubt that the trail would lead to the doorstep of Bin Laden and al-Qa'ida. (S)

The president asked me, "When will we know?" I said "I can't say for sure" and went on to review for him, with some specificity, how long it took CIA to have any certainty of responsibility for past attacks—the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the near-simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen. I told the president that we may know soon and then again it may take quite some time. When I was done, I was surprised that I had committed to memory the history of the aftermath of the previous attacks. (S)

At this point, Ari Fleischer interrupted our discussion. Escorting a news photographer, Fleischer wanted to give him the opportunity to take photographs of the president in a crisis, the commander-in-chief at war. While the president and Fleischer chatted, the photographer, moving about the small room, snapped dozens of pictures. (C)



Air Force One lifting off from Barksdale AFB. (U) (Photo: ©Reuters/CORBIS)

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
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During my discussion with the president and Andy Card, I had no way of knowing that analysts at CIA Headquarters had already tied al-Qa'ida to the attacks.

After the photographer left, President Bush said nothing. He, Andy Card, and I just sat. One minute elapsed, then two, then three. I was beginning to feel uncomfortable. After five minutes, I asked the president if he needed anything else. The president said "No, Michael, thanks very much." I rose, left the room, and returned to my seat in an empty staff section of the aircraft. For the first time that day, I felt very tired. I closed my eyes, hoping I could sleep for a few minutes. But sleep never came. (C)

During my discussion with the president and Andy Card, I had no way of knowing that analysts at CIA Headquarters had already tied al-Qa'ida to the attacks. Agency analysts had acquired the passenger manifests of the four flights from the Federal Aviation Administration and run the names against CIA databases of known terrorists. Hits came up on American Airlines Flight 77. Three passengers had known, and definite, links to al-Qa'ida. I would soon discover that I would fail to ensure that the president would be the first to learn that. (C)

News reports, which were still being shown continuously on Air Force One's video screens, were now reporting the president's imminent arrival at Offutt Air Force Base. I did not know it at the time but a close friend of my wife's, who lives with her husband and three children in Omaha, was in her car on her way to pick up her children at school. While stopped at a traffic light, she watched Air Force One, on final approach to Offutt, pass overhead. She later told (b)(6) that she wondered if I was on board. It was a little after 3:00 p.m. eastern time. (C)



The president on a phone in Air Force One. (U) (Photo: ©CORBIS SYGMA)

I did not know how long we would be at Offutt, but rumors were circulating that we might spend the night there, so I decided to deplane with the president and his staff. The president was whisked away in what looked like the base commander's official car. The staff, including me, boarded buses that took us to the entrance of the underground bunker of the Strategic Air Command. (C)

(b)(1)

As we approached the bunker's command center, it was clear from the deployment of Secret Service agents that the president was already there, about to begin a video teleconference with his National Security Council. As I stood outside the door with other White House aides, Captain Loewer, who was with the president in the meeting, poked her head outside and motioned me in, saying "I think you ought to hear this." (S)

As I entered, I saw President Bush, Andy Card, and the SAC commander at a table in front of a large screen. On the screen, transmitting from three or four different locations, were senior officials from Washington. George Tenet was speaking. He was walking the president and everyone present through the information that tied three of the hijackers to al-Qa'ida. When

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"Embargoed from the president?" I asked. After a period of silence at the other end of the line, I said "Just send it."

he finished, the president turned and looked me straight in the eye. He didn't say a word, but his look told me he had been let down. I hoped my expression would tell him I had no idea what happened. (S)

I rose from my seat in the back of the command center and headed for the door. As I was walking out, the National Security Council was discussing whether the president should return to the White House or whether he should spend the night in Omaha. The director of the Secret Service, speaking from Washington, recommended against returning. He said there were too many unknowns to be able to guarantee the president's safety. The president responded firmly, simply saying "I'm coming back

(b)(1)

I went into a nearby office and phoned the CIA Operations Center and asked to speak with the DCI's Executive Assistant, a job filled that day by an officer filling in for the actual EA, who was on leave. After expressing my frustration over not having been able to meet the president's expectations, I asked that the information the DCI had briefed to the president be sent immediately to Air Force One.

(b)(1)

A few minutes after takeoff, with Air Force One on the way to Washington, a steward brought me a six-page fax from the EA. Written on the cover sheet was a short note. It said, "Michael, sorry. Here's everything we have."

(b)(1)

As I began to read the documents, Andy Card walked up to me. I told him I had the key pieces of intelligence. He said, "Good, I think the president will want to go through it in a little bit." Card left, and I quickly set myself to study the package. I read through it several times, making sure that I understood the key points. I highlighted several passages in the talking points and a handful of sentences in the two reports. I set the material aside and waited. About 30 minutes later, Card again entered the staff cabin and told me the president was ready. (C)

I walked with Card toward the president's cabin, but we stopped short, instead entering the conference room. The president was sitting at the head of the conference table. I walked him through the documents, letting him read as much as he wanted.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

The president thanked me, and I returned to my seat after a quick detour to the upper deck to shred the documents. (S)

I was not aware of it at the time, but as I briefed the president, Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex collapsed. The occupants of the 47-story building (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) had been (b)(3)(n) evacuated earlier that day. Just across the street from the twin towers, WTC 7 was fatally weakened by their collapse that morning. It was the last of the destruction resulting from the attacks nine hours earlier. (S)

It was early evening as we approached Andrews Air Force Base. Everyone on board was tired. It has been a very long day. The lights inside Air Force One had been turned off. Some of those in the staff section had their eyes closed; others were flipping, seemingly mindlessly, through newspapers or magazines. The president's military aide was standing in the aisle, looking out the window. He saw me looking at him, and he motioned me over. He pointed out the window and told me to look. (C)

The view from the window was surreal. One hundred yards off the tip of Air Force One's wing was an F-15. The military aide whispered, "There is one off the other wing as well; they're from the DC Air National Guard." The fighter was so close we could see

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I thought of the thousands of children who would never see their parents again.

the pilot's facial features. He seemed to be looking at us as well. In the distance below we could see the Pentagon, smoke rising from the northeastern section of the building and lights of emergency vehicles flashing. The scene refreshed memories of everything that had happened that day. It now seemed so long ago. Tears welled up in my eyes. (C)

The arrival at Andrews—at just after 6:30 p.m.—was as uneventful as our departure 36 hours before. Little was said as we deplaned. The president, his closest aides, and several Secret Service agents boarded Marine One and took off for the White House. The vast majority of the staff boarded vans that would take them to the White House as well. As for me, I walked alone across the tarmac, through the VIP departure lounge, and out to the parking area. I was expecting the Agency vehicle and driver I had earlier requested from the Operations Center. I found no car and no driver. (C)

I called the CIA Operations Center again and was told that the driver was on the way. I went back to the VIP lounge and watched the news for several minutes, but I could not concentrate. Instead, for the first time that day, I called Mary Beth. Her voice was reassuring. I told her we had landed at Andrews and that I was waiting for a car to take me back to the Agency, where I would get my car and drive home. I told her I'd be home in an hour. She seemed relieved. (C)

The drive to McLean took us through Southeast Washington and past the Pentagon. I eventually saw the smoke and emergency lights from another perspective. I didn't get a good view, but the destruction I saw was sobering. Neither the driver nor I said anything during the rest of the trip. At Headquarters, the driver took me to my car. I thanked him, and he drove off. I got in my car and slowly pulled out. As I passed the main gate and left the grounds, I began to cry. (C)

I pulled into our driveway in northern Virginia, with the radio on and the president about to speak. I sat and listened for a few minutes before going into the house. I found (b)(6) on the sofa in our family room watching the president. We sat together and listened to the president talk to his grieving nation. He asked for prayers for the families of the victims, said America would overcome the terrible tragedy, and promised that it would emerge even stronger. And, in a major change in policy that would come to be known as the Bush Doctrine, the president said the US "would make no distinction between terrorists and the nations that harbor them." (U)

After the president finished, (b)(6) and I talked about the events of the day. I told her there was too much to talk about in only one night and that I needed to sleep. On the way to our bedroom, I went into each of my three children's rooms. They were asleep, surrounded by stuffed animals. They looked as they did any other night, peaceful and content. I thought of the thousands of children who would never see their parents again. I kissed my three on their foreheads and said I loved them. (U)

Afterword

In the weeks following 9/11, the

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

The work load for the PDB briefing staff would increase enormously as the growth in the amount of material each briefer was required to sift through each morning forced even earlier waking hours on each member of the staff. For me that meant arriving at work three hours earlier than I usually did before 9/11. That increased workload was a reflection of the intensity of everyone's effort, at home and abroad, after 9/11. My sacrifices and those of the other briefers would pale in comparison to those of our intelligence officers and military personnel in Afghanistan and other places overseas in the weeks and months after 9/11. (C)

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The impact of Soviet post-Stalin policies on economic and estimative intelligence.

COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE [1]

(b)(3)(c)

It is the object of this paper to examine the impact upon our work in economic intelligence of those changes in the world situation and in Soviet policy which are suggested by the Soviet term "coexistence." There is, of course, room for a good deal of argument as to the nature of these changes and there will accordingly be some temptation to discuss Soviet policy rather than the ways in which it has affected our work. In order to keep our attention focussed as much as possible on the latter I shall ask you to accept as a point of departure a broad and somewhat oversimplified characterisation of the post-Stalin period. For the purposes of this paper we are using the term coexistence to mean the Soviet pursuit of their national interests by means short of nuclear war; and of these means we are concerned here with the study of the external economic activities and relationships of the Communist countries with the West, with the underdeveloped countries, and with one another.

Features of the New Era

The Khrushchovian concept of coexistence was to some extent a reaction to changing world conditions as well as against the bankruptcy of Stalinism. During this period we have witnessed a diffusion of power, and this has perhaps been the most important single development since the death of Stalin. Within the Bloc it has been apparent in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the defection of Albania, and the increasing consideration shown by the Soviet Union to the European Satellites, particularly in economic matters. In the non-Communist world it has been apparent in the rapid economic development of Western Europe and the emergence

[1] Adapted from a paper presented in October 1962 in Washington. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

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of a group of politically influential states in Africa and Asia. These developments have carried important implications for economic intelligence, but for the moment it is sufficient to note that the general pattern has moved from centers of power in the direction of more complex systems of power.

The second main feature of this period is suggested by the United Nations slogan for the sixties—"decade of development." The idea that the outcome of the struggle between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds is ultimately dependent on comparative rates of economic development, both in the industrial and in the underdeveloped countries, has been widely accepted. The decision of the Soviet Union not only to engage in a development race with the United States and the industrial West but also to seek an important role in the economic development of the ex-colonial world has thus become a major preoccupation of economic intelligence specialists.

Thirdly, there has in these years been a new Communist emphasis on trade, in keeping with Khrushchev's "We declare war on you in the peaceful field of trade." In spite of large percentage increases, however, the trade of the Sino-Soviet Bloc with the non-Communist world has remained marginal. None of the non-Communist industrial countries conducts a significant portion of its trade with the Bloc, and only a few of the underdeveloped countries have more than 10 percent of their trade with it. Nevertheless, the Bloc's foreign economic activities have drawn increasing attention because of their concentration in particular commodities and areas and because of the importance of discerning Communist objectives and capabilities in this field.

New Burdens

With this, as I warned you, rather oversimplified picture of the period, let us now turn to the consideration of its general impact on intelligence. First, there has been a multiplication of commitments, along with changes in their relative importance. This has resulted in increased difficulty in assigning priorities and resources. There has been no decrease in the demand for intelligence on the Soviet defence establishment of the kind needed when Stalin was at his most aggres-

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sive; on the contrary, the creation of new weapons systems and the increasing attention which has had to be given to the military power of China and various countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia have made the task of all those concerned with military strategic intelligence increasingly difficult. Furthermore, there has been little or no decrease in the demand for economic intelligence related to strategic commodity and financial questions.

The Bloc's adoption of new non-military means of extending its influence and power have now added to these tasks. The resources devoted to these requirements have had to be commensurate with Khrushchev's repeated insistence on the importance of economic competition and with Western intelligence estimates that the Soviet Union will seek to attain its ends by means short of war. The extent to which intelligence resources should be concentrated on global nuclear war, the most devastating but least likely of possibilities, to the relative exclusion of more palatable and also more likely terms of struggle is a major question for intelligence administration. Since this is a question of balance and judgement it is unlikely to be solved except by a continuous process of adjustment.

The increasing complexity of the Communist Bloc and of its actions in the world at large have added to this problem of scale a problem of coordination. While we must divide up the study of complex situations for detailed analysis by specialists, their analyses must in turn be related to one another and added up before we can understand Soviet designs. Thus, in order to assess the progress of Communist foreign economic efforts correctly we have been obliged to adopt a broader interpretation of what economic intelligence means: Ambassador Galbraith has pointed out that economic affairs are after all largely non-economic. Although economic intelligence still has value as an administrative category and still has a role in analysis, a too isolated pursuit of the narrow category can have and has had an adverse effect on the soundness of some of our judgements.

Another and related general consequence of the increasing attention which has to be given to the impact of Communist non-military policies, particularly in the underdeveloped areas,

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has been the need for a much greater variety of area specialists who understand Latin Americans, Africans, and Asians as people. The Soviet government, which until the death of Stalin was largely confined to a Slavic empire, has not been free from this problem. One of the great shocks, not only to the government but to specialists like Professor Potekhin, has been the discovery that African attitudes do not fit neatly into the Soviet concept of the world, that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in Marxist philosophy. We too sometimes have difficulty in looking at the world as from Accra, or Cairo, or Bangkok.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)


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Problems of Evaluation

To turn to the evaluation process, we find a parallel record of solid achievement in evaluating in terms of hardware, roubles, and trade returns the progress of Sino-Soviet activities. The skill with which the larger agencies collate all the available detail and present it in convenient form is of great assistance to us all. I would, however, like to refer briefly to one or two problems of evaluation which seem to me important for the future.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

The first is a problem of semantics. The new terms which have been invented to describe Soviet attempts to develop economic ties with the underdeveloped countries have tended to make the process of intelligence evaluation more difficult because the language itself has contained implied judgements. The most obvious example is the term "economic penetration." It was no doubt chosen to express a reasonable assumption about Soviet intentions, but unfortunately it has come to imply an inevitable effect of Soviet actions. As a result, the dollar values computed for Soviet economic aid in particular countries have often been taken as a direct measure of Soviet political influence there. The usage has had much to do with erroneous judgements about the extent to which particular

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recipients of Soviet aid are under the political thumb of Moscow. A more neutral terminology would be one step toward a more objective evaluation of the effect of Soviet actions. One intelligence paper went so far as to define "penetration activities" as those activities which would be acceptable if undertaken by a non-Communist state but harmful when undertaken by the Communists. Such a focus prejudges estimates as to the effect of Soviet actions, particularly the possibility that these effects might sometimes be beneficial to the West.

A second unfortunate tendency has been toward the use of Communist terminology and categories in the description of Soviet economic activities. For example, the Soviet aid program is generally measured by the total of Soviet promises, rather than actual expenditures. This is, of course, a Communist technique, and it is well understood among intelligence officers that Soviet aid actually reaching the underdeveloped countries has not been very great. Many intelligence officers also feel confident that this is generally understood by consumers of intelligence at the policy level. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it would be better to discard the Communist categories and devise new ones which would give the estimator and the policy maker an objective view of the Soviet program in Western terms.

Estimative Difficulties

At the output end of the intelligence process lies the estimate, which examines evaluated intelligence to produce the answers to the big questions. The less effective the collection and evaluation processes, the more difficult the task of estimating; but I think we can safely assume that no matter how efficient the rest of the process the estimate will always represent a substantial leap from the known facts to the required answers. In particular, the coexistence policies of the Soviet government have raised special problems for the estimating phase of our work.

First, there is no generally accepted theory of the relationship between economic action and political power. We are therefore more than usually on our own in assessing the impact of Soviet foreign economic efforts. For example, three divergent estimates of the Soviet impact in the UAR presum-

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ably exist, a hopeful Khrushchovian estimate, a confident one by Nasser, and a somewhat apprehensive Western one. None of these estimates has been made without benefit of facts and power of reason, but at least one of them must be wrong, and all of them may be partially right. We have gone a long way when we have realized that there are no automatic results from Soviet economic actions, and that the Soviet government's entry into a field of competition where it has limited capabilities and little experience may in the long run prove to have been a foolish decision.

When Khrushchev first began his programs of trade and aid we made what were at the time reasonable estimates of his intentions and of the considerations which had led him to adopt them. As a broad and perhaps unfair generalization I would say that we overestimated his capabilities in this field. The evidence suggests that Khrushchev himself had an unrealistic view of the extent to which the newly independent nations would rally behind him and that the Soviet government may now be placing less emphasis on these programs. In short, the major problem in estimating the impact of Soviet economic actions abroad lies less in outlining their scale and direction than in assessing their net long-term effect.

At least as important as an objective analysis of the external impact of Soviet activities is the task of gaining some insight into the Soviet government's view of its own objectives and success. This is important in many ways, not the least of which is the possibility that complete disillusionment with its foreign economic efforts might lead to policies even less to our liking. I have already referred to evidence that a reduced level of Soviet economic aid commitments is paralleled by an increased level of military assistance. The important question is what led to these changes—inability to provide aid, or dissatisfaction with the results.

The Soviet government's view of its progress in the underdeveloped countries is, however, only part and in some respects not the most important part of the total scene. There is reason to believe that the Soviet authorities are only now beginning to take the full measure of Western economic power. They appear to view with increasing dismay the growing economic solidarity of the Western world and the evolu-

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tion of more prosperous and larger non-Communist economic groupings. Certainly the recent Soviet attacks on the association of underdeveloped and neutral countries with the European Economic Community and the apparent dilemma of Soviet writers in attempting to fit EEC into the "continuing crisis of capitalism" seem to reflect Communist worries and confusion in this respect.

The recent attempts at the June meetings in Moscow to generate some energy in CEMA were in part clearly a response to developments in Western Europe. The success of Soviet efforts to coordinate Communist economic affairs in the face of strong centrifugal forces will be one of the basic factors defining the limits of Communist strength over the next few years. These two aspects of the problem—the relative economic strength of the industrial East and the industrial West, and the relative economic cohesion of the two blocs—are likely to prove as decisive as any actions in the underdeveloped world and will require the particular attention of intelligence.

The Soviet leaders have made clear that to them coexistence is a means of "burying" our system through peaceful competition. It follows, therefore, that our most important task is to determine the Soviet government's own assessment of its progress by its chosen means. It seems unlikely that they could be satisfied with their competitive position economically in the underdeveloped world and vis-à-vis the developed West. Agricultural failures in Communist countries contrast with Western surpluses; the difficulties encountered in CEMA contrast with the progress of the Common Market; and the aid programs of the Bloc are lagging behind those of the West. These shortcomings from their point of view must invite reappraisals within the Soviet hierarchy of the extent to which they should continue to depend upon their present methods of competitive coexistence. Such reappraisals could lead either to more aggressive or to more conciliatory forms of action. Our task in economic intelligence, therefore, is to play our part in ascertaining whether the Soviet will hold steady the course of coexistence, veer into more dangerous waters, or move towards less hostile ends and means.

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Despite widespread media publicity in 1975, almost all aspects of the Hughes Glomar Explorer *project are still classified, and it is important that they remain so. The widespread publicity has contained much fact and extensive error. It remains important* (b)(1) *to protect sources and methods which may have future application.*

In the course of continuing litigation related to the project—principally concerning California State tax liability, Freedom of Information Act matters, and a patent infringement claim—several facts about the Glomar Explorer *project have been acknowledged in court by the U.S. Government. These include the fact of CIA sponsorship of the project for "intelligence collection purposes;" the participation of Hughes Tool Company, the Summa Corporation, and Global Marine, Inc.; and the actions of senior CIA officials in 1975 to attempt to persuade members of the media not to broadcast or publish reports concerning the project. Beyond these few details, however, it is still firm U.S. Government policy that nothing further about the project is to be said or acknowledged. This prohibition was recently reaffirmed by the President's Advisor for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the DCI. It applies particularly to the specific purpose of the AZORIAN mission; the degree of success; operational details; participation of other contractors, government organizations, and individuals; classified technology; and project funding matters.*

The following article is being published because it now is possible to discuss most of the foregoing matters and other classified project details at the SECRET NOFORN level rather than in the TOP SECRET compartmentation which previously applied to all aspects of the AZORIAN project. Nevertheless, there has been no *relaxation of the necessity to keep most of the details of the AZORIAN project classified for the foreseeable future.*

PROJECT AZORIAN:

THE STORY OF THE *HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER*

(b)(3)(c)

In March 1968 a Soviet submarine of the G-II class was lost with all hands, 16,500 feet below the surface of the Pacific Ocean.

On 8 August 1974 (b)(1) that submarine was brought to the surface in (b)(1) a recovery system designed and developed specifically for that mission.

The story of the more than six years intervening is the story of Project AZORIAN, that is, the story of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer.**

AZORIAN ranks in the forefront of imaginative and bold operations undertaken in the long history of intelligence collection. It combined immense size and scope, advanced technological development, complex systems engineering and testing, unusually severe cover and security requirements, a demanding mission scenario in an unforgiving marine environment, the potential for a serious confrontation with the Soviet Union, a difficult and technically unusual exploitation phase, and high cost.

The project became widely known to the media in early 1975. At a time when the Central Intelligence Agency was under investigation by two committees of Congress and many members of the press, the CIA was credited in some newspaper editorials

* The full name of the ship is the *MV Hughes Glomar Explorer,* as shown in Figure 5. Global Marine, Inc., operates a number of ships with the word *Glomar* in their names.

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with pursuing its tradecraft in a most imaginative manner and doing what intelligence organizations are supposed to do—collect intelligence. Other articles were critical of the project, its cost, and method of operation.

Many senior U.S. Government officials, including three Directors of Central Intelligence, two Secretaries of Defense, two Secretaries of State, and two Presidents, were personally knowledgeable of the program and recognized it as an innovative undertaking of great magnitude and complexity. Key members of four Congressional committees were also kept informed of project progress and reviewed budget requests for the project.

Because the AZORIAN Project was of such huge dimensions in cost, risk, and intelligence value, it sometimes caused difficult problems for the officials who had to make the major decisions affecting it. Some of the questions did not lend themselves to clear-cut unequivocal answers: the intelligence value of the target after six years on the ocean floor, for example, or the political or physical response of the Russians if they should learn of the recovery effort. Because of these difficult questions, there could not be and was not unanimity of opinion among senior officials in CIA, Defense, State, the White House, and other agencies collectively responsible for AZORIAN and the decision on whether or not to proceed. Differences of opinion were expressed and debated in appropriate forums, both before the project was initiated and during its lifetime. These differences are expressed candidly in this article in several places.

In March 1975, columnist Jack Anderson disclosed the existence of the Hughes *Glomar Explorer* (HGE) project on national television and radio. The original press leak had occurred in the *Los Angeles Times* in February 1975. The *Times* story was unspecific, and wrong in important facts, but it gradually developed into a widespread security problem for the program before the Anderson disclosure.

The original leak resulted from an improbable series of events following a break-in and robbery in June 1974 at Summa Corporation headquarters in Los Angeles. It was thought that among the stolen documents there might be a memorandum from a senior Hughes official to Howard Hughes describing a proposed CIA attempt to recover a sunken Soviet submarine and requesting Hughes' approval for Hughes Company participation. Thus it became necessary to brief several persons involved in the investigation in order to protect the document from disclosure if it were recovered. While the source of the leak was never identified, the circumstances became known to reporters who were covering the story and were disclosed in the *Los Angeles Times* story. Extraordinary efforts by DCI Colby and others were able to contain the spread of the story for a time, but it eventually became widely known in press circles, and Anderson decided to break it.

(b)(3)(c)

This article describes how the *Glomar* project—code-named AZORIAN, not "JENNIFER" as stated in the press—came about, how it was managed and conducted, and to what extent it met its goal. Subsequent articles will describe how the (b)(1) cover aspects of the AZORIAN/MATADOR program, and other related issues.

Project Origin

The diesel-powered Soviet G-II-class ballistic missile submarine pendant 72 (b)(1) (b)(1) sailed from Petropavlovsk on about 1 March 1968 to take a patrol station

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northeast of Hawaii, off the west coast of the United States, where it would be available for nuclear attack on U.S. targets in event of war. The submarine suffered an accident—cause unknown—and sank 1,560 miles northwest of Hawaii. With the 722 out of contact and overdue, the Soviets undertook a massive two-month search effort covering a broad area from Petropavlovsk to the patrol area northeast of Hawaii. The Soviet search was fruitless, (b)(1) Senior officials in the Department of Defense and CIA recognized that if it were feasible to devise a plan to recover important components of the submarine, extremely valuable information on Soviet strategic capabilities would be obtained.

Organizing for Recovery

Discussions regarding the feasibility of recovering components of the G-722 took place between technical representatives of CIA and the Department of Defense during the latter months of 1968 and in early 1969. These talks resulted in a letter to the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, on 1 April 1969. Packard, referring to the sunken submarine, asked for a study of what could be done in the next few years to recover significant components. He asked CIA to take the lead, (b)(1) and designated Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DD/R&E) as the point for coordination. Mr. Helms designated Carl Duckett, Deputy Director for Science and Technology (DD/S&T) as the CIA focal point.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

During early July 1969 CIA representatives, including John Parangosky and worked to develop a plan for a to recover the submarine. This plan was coordinated and approved by mid-July 1969 (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

On 17 July 1969, Helms advised Packard that considerable work had been accomplished to undertake submarine recovery; that Duckett had met with and work was in progress to develop a charter for it, that an Agency task force was studying the retrieval problems associated with the sunken G-II submarine, (b)(1)

(b)(1)
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On 8 August 1969, outlined to a high-level Executive Committee (consisting of Packard as Chairman; Helms; and the Science Advisor to the President, Dr. Lee DuBridge) the proposed organization for the submarine recovery effort, including structure, management, assets, personnel assignments, and intelligence objectives.

ExCom approved the establishment of the new organization and the allocation of resources and personnel, and agreed that the President should be advised of its establishment. This was done in a memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to President Nixon, which the President approved. Ernest "Zeke" Zellmer, a senior CIA official from the DDS&T, who was a Naval Academy graduate and a submarine officer during World War II, (b)(1) Deputy Director, (b)(1)

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(b)(1) (b)(3)(c) agreement describing the organization's detailed responsibilities, management structure, and working relationships was signed by Packard and Helms on 19 August 1969. Among other features, it specified that the staffing of the new organization should reflect the best talent available from the CIA (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) Security policy and procedures were in accordance with the basic agreement, which placed security management responsibility for the new security system, code-named JENNIFER, with the Director of Security, CIA, acting for the DCI. The Director of Security, in turn, delegated everyday security responsibility to the Chief of the Special Security Center (SSC) at CIA and directed him to establish compartmentation procedures to insulate JENNIFER data from data relating to other programs.

From the beginning, extraordinary security was imposed and clearances severely limited to those with an absolute need-to-know. It was clear at all stages of the AZORIAN Project that it had to be leak-proof to enable the mission to be conducted without diplomatic or physical interference from the Soviets. Therefore, air-tight security and effective cover were of the utmost importance, and project continuation depended upon them completely.

The original CIA task force for Project AZORIAN, established on 1 July 1969 in the (b)(3)(c) became the program headquarters complement, carried in Agency records as the Special Projects Staff, DDS&T. John Parangosky, who had previously held key assignments in the Agency IDEALIST (U-2) and OXCART (A-12) aircraft reconnaissance programs, was named to head this staff. (b)(3)(c) a senior CIA officer and Naval Academy graduate, was appointed as his Deputy.

Development of Engineering Concept

Parangosky initially assembled a small task force of engineers and technicians, who were closeted each day in a large room dubbed the "think tank," to develop an engineering concept to recover the Soviet submarine (b)(1)

Because of the great difficulty and complexity of the recovery problem, the task force called on three security-cleared contractors for early help: (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) for structures and mechanisms; for naval architecture; and (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) for sensors. Principal criteria for the recovery concept were technical and operational feasibility, timeliness of implementation (get the system into the field as soon as possible for an early recovery mission), and reasonableness of costs. The group quickly immersed itself in the problem, fully aware of the challenge of a uniquely difficult task. No country in the world had ever succeeded in raising an object of this size and weight from such a depth.

1. *Early Concepts*

Three basic categories of lift concepts were considered for use in the early studies: total "brute force" or direct lift; trade ballast/buoyancy; and at-depth generation of buoyancy. Each is reviewed below:

a. *Total "Brute Force" (Direct) Lift,* referrred to as the Rosenberg Winch, involved massive floating winches with wire ropes of the necessary strength to manage

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the total weight of the target object (believed, at that time, to be about 2,000 to 2,200 long tons).

Use of a "drill string" (i.e., a "string" of connecting pipe) was discarded by the task force in the early discussions because it was difficult to envisage how the massive pipe required could be successfully deployed. It was believed at that time that the weight of the pipe alone could not be supported from the surface and still allow enough strength and lifting capacity for the submarine hull section.

b. In the *Trade Ballast/Buoyancy* concept, buoyant material would be carried to the bottom using excess ballast. On the bottom the ballast would be dropped, generating sufficient positive buoyancy to extricate the target from the bottom and help lift it to the surface.

c. *At-Depth Generation of Buoyancy* envisaged the generation of gas at depth to create buoyancy to lift the target. Methods reviewed were electrolysis of sea water, cryogenic gases (hydrogen, nitrogen), catalytic decomposition of hydrazine, and chemical generation of hydrogen through the reaction of active metals (e.g., sodium, lithium) or metal hydrides (e.g., lithium hydride).

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4. *Engineering Concept Selected*

By late July 1970, the heavy-lift concept was clearly the favored system to develop for the recovery mission. From that time on, it was given full attention by all appropriate parties, [redacted] gained the formal authorization to concentrate studies on the heavy-lift method on September 1970 during a briefing at the Pentagon. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

As the engineering concept was being formalized, a deep-ocean mining cover story was beginning to take form to explain all the project activities, particularly those planned for at-sea operations.

Executive Committee Approval

At the 30 October 1970 Executive Committee meeting, [redacted] addressed the matter of conceptual development for target recovery. He described the dead-lift (or brute force) concept which would be designed to lift the estimated 1,750-ton target object from the 16,500-foot depth by means of heavy-lifting equipment mounted on a large (565′ by 106′) surface ship [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

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As mentioned previously, a deep-sea mining venture was to be used as the cover story for this operation. To support this theory, a mining device would be constructed which could be handled by the surface ship and mated into its center well. A submersible dry dock was also planned to complete the system.

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As with all engineering concepts, technical risk areas were involved, and (b)(1) identified the major ones. (b)(3)(c) They were characterized as being within the state-of-the-art but requiring a major beef-up to handle the weights and pressures involved. The control system was also considered a risk area, but its feasibility had already been demonstrated by another Global Marine ship, the *Glomar Challenger*, which drilled a hole in the sea floor, withdrew the drill bit, and th(b)(1) placed a new bit into the same drill hole in deep water earlier in 1970. furth(b)(3)(c) pointed out that an extensive simulation program would be conducted to define the dynamic characteristics and stresses of the system. Initial analyses had not uncovered any unexpected or insurmountable problems.

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All in all, at that time estimated the probability of success at about 10 percent, a not very assuring number. (This estimate continued to rise, however, as

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design, development, and testing proceeded. Just prior to the mission, [redacted] believ(b)(1) (b)(3)(c) the probability of success to be about 90 percent.) Helms stated that the *ad hoc* committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) had completed a detailed review of the value of the AZORIAN target on which they had placed the highest priority, and he concurred in their assessment. [redacted] (b)(3)(c) [redacted] Dr. Edward David, the President's Science Advisor, asked what assurance there was that the desired material [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] he also questioned whether it would be in an exploitable condition when recovered [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) [redacted]

(b)(1) (b)(3)(c) [redacted] pointed out that there were two basic questions to be answered: should the organization proceed all-out with AZORIAN? If so, where would funding be obtained? Packard answered that not all data on fund availability were known, but that (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) [redacted] nevertheless should go ahead with the AZORIAN project.

Some concluding remarks were made by others at the meeting. Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research & Engineering, observed that there appeared to be an underestimation by those present of the value of the target and of the impact AZORIAN would have [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) [redacted] Helms commented that he was more confident in regard to this project than to some others because of the thorough work that had been done up to that point.

Packard summed up the proceedings of this meeting and said the consensus was to proceed with AZORIAN. He felt that planning should be done on a [redacted] (b)(3)(c) [redacted] level but said it would be necessary to identify possible sources of funding.

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) [redacted]

Recovery Systems Modification

(b)(1) (b)(3)(c) [redacted] reported back to ExCom on 24 March 1971 on technical and design progress of AZORIAN. Total cost now was projected to [redacted] (b)(3)(c) [redacted] with the

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principal cost increases attributable to two factors: (1) extended operations to permit more adequate systems testing, and (2) cover enhancement and recomputation of general and administrative expenses. Increases in hardware costs were relatively small.

The Crucial 4 August ExCom Meeting

The next ExCom meeting, on 4 August 1971, proved to be crucial to the life of the project.

Packard opened by stating he considered it necessary to terminate AZORIAN because of the risks involved, escalating costs, and the general budget situation. Nevertheless, he asked [redacted] to brief ExCom on program status.

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[redacted]

The "other increases" included, for example, modifications of the well area for safety reasons; design and manufacture of a small mining machine for cover purposes; and other contractor cost increases.

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There was an extended ExCom discussion of the cost growth problem along with the strained budget status, the anticipated very high intelligence value of the target, and the operational risks. Packard concluded that the project should be continued for a few months, but that [redacted] should consider alternatives in case it were subsequently terminated. This guidance was later expanded to direct a thorough cost review while permitting procurement of long-lead items. However, the keel of the surface ship should not be laid until further approval.

Budgetary Shoals

The 4 August 1971 ExCom meeting was but the first of a number of recurring occasions on which AZORIAN nearly foundered over cost increases and operational risks. Some of the original recovery concepts such as buoyancy lift had been price-tagged as low as [redacted] (b)(3)(c) the chosen concept was first costed (b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(c) in 1970. In less than a year it had jumped more than 50 percent to some [redacted]

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(b)(3)(c) and another year brought the figure to (b)(3)(c) Each time, however, consideration of the intelligence potential carried the day.

Design and Development of AZORIAN System

By the November 1971 ExCom meeting, substantial strides had been made in design and engineering development of major ship systems, such as the heavy-lift and heave-compensation systems. All details of the pipe-string design also had been completed, and a pipe-string specimen had been fabricated to develop confidence in pipe section fabrication. Design of the large test fixture which would prooftest each 30-foot section of the pipe was nearly complete.

(b)(1)

By the early fall of 1971 Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., Chester, Pa., which had been selected to build the surface ship, was proceeding with fabrication of the docking well gate guides and the temporary bottom structure for the docking well, and preparing to lay the keel.

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On 4 October, Packard authorized to proceed with AZORIAN b directed that every effort be made to contain costs within the then-refined total program cost of (b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

In April 1972, reported to ExCom that the keel for the surface ship had been laid by Sun Shipbuilders on 16 November 1971 and that the schedule now called for a launch by 5 October 1972 and delivery to the program by 20 April 1973. Further, all long-lead equipment was under procurement and on schedule.

The construction barge was launched in San Diego in January 1972, and reached Redwood City early in Ma

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equipment—control center, sensors, and control, power, and data-transmission subsystems—had been completed during FY 1971.

(b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

(b)(1) By April 1972, 55 pieces of the pipe string had been poured— (b)(3)(c) —and final delivery of all 590 pieces at dockside was scheduled for 7 June 1973.

All data-processing functional requirements were defined and document(b)(1) during December 1971, and the configuration computers a(b)(3)(c) associated peripheral equipment was put in final form in January 1972.

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(b)(3)(c)

Managerial Views of Program in 1972

At the ExCom meeting on 28 July 1972, pointed out that AZORIAN had been developed as a one-of-a-kind system intended for a specific job and that because of this uniqueness and the need to accomplish the mission at the earliest possible time, work on the system was proceeding concurrent with design and production. The consequence had been that the amassing of a considerable body of knowledge enhanced the chances of success, but it had also necessitated some costly changes along the way. said he expected delivery of the ship in the spring of 1973, and operational deployment in the summer of 1974. He pointed out that recent major changes had driven the total system cost to more than (b)(3)(c) These changes included ship hull strengthening, modification of propulsion shafting, increased electrical capacity, the incorporation of a sewage system to meet new ecological standards, and an improved pipe-string handling process. In addition, a second and more expensive subcontractor had been brought into pipe-string production to meet the tight delivery schedule. aid construction of the whole AZORIAN system was expected to be largely completed by the end of FY 1973.

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Early Political Feasibility Evaluation by 40 Committe

At this 28 July 1972 ExCom meeting, it was agreed that the 40 Committee should be asked for an early evaluation of the political feasibility of conducting the mission in mid-1974, in the light of increasing concern that by that time the developing political climate might prohibit mission approval. On 14 August 1972 Kenneth Rush, who had succeeded David Packard as Deputy Secretary of Defense and thereby as chairman of ExCom, forwarded two documents to the 40 Committee, one an intelligence reevaluation of the submarine target object by the *ad hoc* Committee of USIB, the other a summary of the program's technical, operational, cover, and security factors. He reported to the 40 Committee in his covering memorandum that AZORIAN was proceeding on schedule (b)(1) It would reach an accrued cost o(b)(3)(c) by 31 August 1972, and was expected to cost (b)(3)(c) for completion. In the light of the developing political climate and uncertain budget problems, he said, ExCom was requesting a preliminary political assessment.

On 15 August 1972, Rush forwarded to Helms and David copies of three memoranda relative to the AZORIAN assessment which he had received from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), Dr. Hall; and DIA Director Vice Admiral de Poix. All three to varying degrees judged that the value of the anticipated intelligence gain from the mission was less than that estimated by the *ad hoc* Committee, pointed to the escalating costs and political risks of AZORIAN, and generally felt that the program should be terminated. Zumwalt, while not recommending immediate termination,

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stated his strong reservations about continuing AZORIAN and recommended that the cost-benefits be studied further with relation to the total DoD intelligence program.

(b)(1) (b)(3)(c) forwarded a detailed report to Hall which discussed in detail expected benefits potentially derivable from recovery of the G-722 target object. It was clear that (b)(3)(c) was still favorable as far as expected mission intelligence value was concerned.

In any event, all these papers and the assessment of the *ad hoc* Committee of USIB which reaffirmed the expected important intelligence gains including those in cryptographic areas were forwarded to 40 Committee by Deputy Secretary Rush on 21 August 1972 along with CIA comments which took issue with Zumwalt's and Hall's memoranda.

At this crucial juncture Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent a memo to the 40 Committee on 28 August stating that he could not support the proposed AZORIAN mission, primarily because of decreased intelligence value of the target with the passage of time since the G-722 sank in March 1968, the escalating costs which he believed would continue, and the possibility of strong reaction from the Soviets if they suspected the nature of the activity.

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Helms countered on 14 September with a memo to Chairman, 40 Committee, which argued for a continuation of AZORIAN. While agreeing that the differing judgments around the community concerning the intelligence value of items and systems believed to be aboard the G-722 were understandable in such a difficult program, Helms urged a decision to proceed based on the documentation prepared by the joint program organization and the USIB *ad hoc* Committee assessment, which he considered an accurate national evaluation of intelligence potential. He further believed the technical risks were acceptable in view of the expected intelligence value, and that a political judgment as to whether to conduct the mission could be made satisfactorily only at mission time. He also believed the risk of further significant cost increase was low, and that in any case the costs recoverable if the program were terminated would be small.

Then, on 18 September 1972, Rush weighed in with his judgment. Because of current and continuing political relationships and negotiations with the Soviet Union, he believed it undesirable to execute AZORIAN as then planned. He predicted the Soviets would react strongly with physical force if they learned of the nature of the mission beforehand, and even if they discovered its nature only at a later date, U.S.-Soviet relationships and negotiations would be seriously damaged. He also believed there was a high risk of technical failure, and estimated the chances of technical success at 20 to 30 percent based on the existing program schedule and budget. Rush did not take issue with Helms' evaluation of the intelligence benefits but believed that, overall, the program should be terminated in view of high political and technical risks. He shared Helms' concern about the effects of termination on contractor relationships, because the major contractors had publicly committed themselves to a large ocean mining endeavor. Helms felt that a termination now would appear capricious to contractors and jeopardize future cooperative efforts with the intelligence community when contractor support would be needed.

The AZORIAN Review Panel

Rush made the next major move by establishing a panel under Hall to review and refine AZORIAN cost data, to examine projected savings if the program were

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cancelled, and, alternatively, to look at technical risk areas that he believed might lead to greater costs; he invited Helms to provide a panel member. The AZORIAN Review Panel consisted of representatives of the DCI, Office of the Science Advisor to the Presider(b)(3)(c) Defense Contract Audit Agency, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and was convened by Helms and Rush.

The panel reported back to Rush on 11 December 1972. By way of background, the report stated that the program had been organized around four major developmental tasks: surface ship, capture vehicle, pipe string, and data-processing systems, and that program management had been highly effective with the result that all key phases of the program were on schedule. The key phases included developments on the boundary of the state-of-the-art, such as some of the largest forgings ever made, entirely new pipe metallurgy, and a lifting apparatus that could not be fully tested prior to the actual mission operation. The new and dramatic individual developments led to some legitimate concern about the future technological risks. The panel could not in the time available examine the program's technical uncertainties, but stated that such a bold engineering undertaking must be considered a high-risk venture. The panel concluded:

1. The saving to the government, if AZORIAN were terminated, would range between (b)(3)(c) depending upon the effectiveness of the cover operation and availability of a competitive market.

2. Should the program be continued, the estimated cost growth could range from (b)(3)(c) assuming that the mission was accomplished on the planned date.

3. Current schedule and program office planning should allow the mission to be performed on the target date.

4. There was no way to test the full system in advance of the actual lift operation, and engineering unknowns at the time provided the greatest uncertainty in the program.

In a separate report on 21 November 1972, (b)(3)(c) and member of the AZORIAN Review Panel, concluded as a result of his overview of the project that the technical prognosis was good, project management was excellent, and schedule and cost aspects had been tracking reasonably well. He noted that the project was then entering a critical testing phase wherein difficulties had to be expected despite anticipatory efforts that had been exerted to date. He believed that further cost growth would probably develop during the testing phase, but that substantial offsets could be generated as well.

Regarding costs, (b)(3)(c) noted that total project cost had grown by 66 percent to estimated in October 1970 based on contractor proposals, and by six percent from the (b)(3)(c) at which the contracts were calculated in December 1971. Considering the highly developmental nature of the undertaking, he regarded this as a creditable performance. AZORIAN, he said, was clearly a bold engineering undertaking which staggered the imagination. It reflected a massive degree of concurrency in design, development, and production, and—being without precedent in its totality—must be considered a high-risk venture. Each element of the total system, however, had highly professional scientific and engineering attention, and thorough testing routines were planned short of the final operation.

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The 40 Committee Decision to Proceed

The 28 July 1972 ExCom decision to seek a 40 Committee review culminated on 11 December 1972. After the most intensive, detailed, and broad-based examination to date of all facets of the program, the final decision, made by the President, was to continue the AZORIAN project, with 40 Committee exercising appropriate policy supervision. In his memo on that date to 40 Committee principals, Dr. Kissinger said the President was impressed by the project's creative and innovative approach to a complicated task and that he praised the cooperation among elements of the intelligence community to serve a national objective.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

So, almost four years after the initial discussions between Agency and DoD representatives about the feasibility of recovering the G-722 (b)(1) a very crucial milestone had been passed, the most important in a long series of high-level program reviews which, at times, had threatened the continued existence of the AZORIAN program. Now, with the Presidential green light, the program office redoubled its efforts to keep all work and planning on schedule to maximize the chances of success in 1974.

Construction and Delivery of HGE

In April 1971, Robert F. Bauer, chairman of the board of Global Marine, Inc., had issued a press release announcing that GMI would build a 600-foot mining ship for the Hughes Tool Company (HTC). The following month, the GMI Quarterly Financial Report to the stockholders mentioned that a preliminary agreement had been reached with Sun Shipbuilding Company for construction of the ship. On 4 November 1972, the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* was launched with the usual champagne christening ceremony and speeches by Bauer and by Paul Reeve, general manager of the Ocean Mining Division of the HTC. At the same time, a press release was made available to the news media providing general information about the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* and some of the principal contractors.

Between 25 November and 23 December 1972, the ship's well-gate guides were installed. The next few months at Sun Shipyard were somewhat hectic as the HGE was readied for builders' trials, scheduled for mid-April 1973 to verify to Global Marine the satisfactory basic operation of the ship and its operating equipment and machinery. Additionally, certain tests were scheduled to obtain certification by the U.S. Coast Guard and the American Bureau of Shipping. Sea trials were conducted under normal operating and weather conditions, in open sea and deep water, and, where applicable, in the presence of Global Marine, Sun Shipbuilding, the U.S. Coast Guard, the American Bureau of Shipping, and various vendors or subcontractors.

Trials and tests were divided into three categories: general items including trim and ballast, dual pilot houses, lifeboat drill, and vibration; standard ship tests which involved main propulsion, speed trials, turning radius, astern and emergency steering, stabilizing system, calibration of propulsion and thruster motors; and unconventional ship tests such as checking docking legs, gimbal bearings, and the dynamic positioning system.

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Summary of Trials and Trial Data—Builder's Trials

The HGE (see Figure 5), left Sun Shipyard, Chester, Pa., on 12 April, down the Delaware River and through Delaware Bay into the Atlantic Ocean where all tests were conducted in an area approximately 75 nautical miles southeast of Delaware Bay. There were 203 people on board, either participating in or observing the trials. Sun Shipyard had four key operating personnel, four who were supervising, and also a large number of engineers, electricians, pipe fitters, and operating crew; Global Marine had 58 representatives with an engineering group; and the Special Project Staff had several representatives under cover. The American Bureau of Shipping and the U.S. Coast Guard also had several representatives on board.

The ship and its equipment and machinery were operated by Sun Ship personnel only, and tests and trials were carried out under normal operating conditions, in good weather and calm seas. All scheduled tests were accomplished successfully in all areas. The ship's handling during the tests was reported as follows: "HGE overall seaworthiness, mobility, and response is excellent." A few major and a number of minor discrepancies were noted which Sun Ship and Global Marine were responsible for correcting before the ship was delivered.

Builder's trials were concluded late in the evening of 14 April with completion of thruster tests. The HGE then proceeded to Delaware Bay and retraced its route up the Delaware River, arriving at Sun Shipbuilding, Chester, Pa., on 15 April. Upon return to Sun Shipyard, the HGE underwent a major effort to correct deficiencies and ready it for delivery to Global Marine as operator for the U.S. Government, with completion of East Coast trials scheduled for early July 1973.

East Coast Trials, July–August 1973

Even though all marine systems were given their first sea test during builder's trials, it was the intent during East Coast trials to test most basic marine systems again and to record test data. Further, a great many systems had not been tested at sea during builder's trials and could not be adequately tested at the dock, such as heavy lift, docking legs, heave compensator, gimbal platform, and the pipe-handling system, and test personnel were to give maximum effort to these. Dockside work at Sun Shipbuilding was completed early in July, and the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* set out for East Coast trials (originally scheduled for 7 July) on 24 July 1973. Curtis Crooke of GMI was designated overall test director, and each test was assigned a principal reviewer from the Global Marine review team. As discrepancies were encountered and recorded, reviewers were responsible for signing off formal acceptance or rejection of each test. Discrepancies which could not be corrected immediately were recorded and scheduled for correction either during transit from the East to West Coast or during West Coast mobilization after the HGE's arrival at Long Beach.

Ship's activities were scheduled from departure from Sun Shipyard dock until it arrived at Hamilton, Bermuda, the first port of call, including some 47 different tests or activities which were conducted in six main areas.

As the HGE headed south down the Delaware River at low tide, it passed under two bridges and one power line. One bridge was the Delaware Memorial Bridge at Wilmington. To get the ship under the 225-foot-high span, the top 28 feet of the derrick had to be removed and stored on main deck. Once below the bridge, the *Sun 200*, a huge floating crane, picked up the 28-foot section and placed it back atop the 200-foot derrick where it was secured.

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


Figure 5. Schematic Drawing

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After shallow-water tests off Delaware Bay, the ship proceeded to the deep-water test location 80 miles northwest of Bermuda, where the Automatic Station Keeping (ASK) system had its first test in deep water; about ten double sections (600 feet) of heavy pipe were run in the pipe-handling system; and the gimbal platform was put through its first fully operational test. At the conclusion of test activity the ship proceeded to Bermuda for crew change and final preparation and loading for the East-West transit to Long Beach, Calif., around South America via the Strait of Magellan.

Results of East Coast Trials

It was concluded that—except for a few deficiencies—basic ship's systems had performed very well, and the HGE was capable of performing its intended job. The hull was determined to be sound, with no apparent flaws or weaknesses. Major structural assemblies such as the well gates, A-frame, gimbal platform, derrick, and docking legs all appeared to be structurally sound with satisfactory alignment and fit, so that no major structural rework or change in concept of the basic ship's systems was required. For the most part, all mining equipment items operated as designed, although there were several serious deficiencies and many minor ones. Corrective work was scheduled to begin during the transit to Long Beach and early in West Coast mobilization for the mission. To illustrate the complexity and magnitude of readying the ship for West Coast testing, it was determined immediately after East Coast trials that 40 corrective tasks could be performed prior to departure from Bermuda; 136 tasks could be performed during transit to Long Beach; and 245 tasks would have to be performed as soon as possible during West Coast mobilization.

East-West Transit, 11 August-30 September 1973

After completion of East Coast trials, the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* remained at anchor off Bermuda 9 through 11 August 1973 while a crew change was accomplished and all preparations completed for the 12,700-mile voyage. This was planned to take just over 50 days at an average speed of advance of 10.5 knots. The long way around was necessary because the HGE's 116-foot beam was too wide to permit passage through the Panama Canal. A transit crew of 96 persons was decided upon, of whom 47 were regular ship's crew members and the remaining 49 were Global Marine engineers and technicians who used the time in transit to complete a number of fitting-out tasks.

Arrangements were made through the Global Marine agent in Valparaiso, Chile, to carry two Chilean pilots for the transit through the Strait of Magellan. They were to board the HGE in Possession Bay on the Atlantic side, provide the ship safe passage for the 320-mile journey through the Strait to the Pacific Ocean, and ride the ship to Valparaiso for disembarkation.

The replacement crew for the East-West transit was flown to Bermuda from Los Angeles on 10 August 1973. By midday on the 11th, engine modifications had been completed, stores and provisions loaded, and final preparations completed, so that the HGE was under way from the Bermuda anchorage at 1630. Because the ship was government property, there was a senior U.S. Government representative on board as commander—as differentiated from the ship's captain. The commander's responsibility was to ensure that the government's best interests were served even though the ship was in a "white"—i.e., commercial—configuration and the majority of the crew were not witting of the AZORIAN Program. U.S. Government representatives used aliases as they were under tight security cover for the voyage. The HGE's Captain and a few

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others were briefed and aware of proper actions to take in event of a political incident en route to Long Beach.

Bermuda to Entrance, Magellan Strait, 11 August–5 September 1973

Weather was consistently excellent throughout this leg, although 50 to 60-knot winds and 15 to 20-foot seas were experienced for a brief period while passing through a storm front.

The HGE handled and rode well; a work routine was established, and good progress made on all transit tasks; morale was good, and the marine crew competent and well-organized. Morale was helped by a well-staffed galley (three cooks and two bakers) which produced superb food.

During the latter part of August, news reports from Chile verified that the Allende government was experiencing problems, with the possibility of widespread labor strikes. Although it was considered unlikely, project headquarters developed plans for the possibility that Chilean pilots might not be available for passage through the Strait of Magellan. Additionally, contingency plans were prepared in the event Chilean or Argentine ships showed intentions of interfering with the HGE. Alternative options were prepared for Director, Special Projects, in case passage through the Strait was denied or it was deemed politically inadvisable to go through. These options were: (1) standing off the coast of South America until things settled down, (2) going around Cape Horn into the Pacific, or (3) going east around South Africa, through the Indian Ocean, then through the Pacific. As events turned out, an alternative was not required.

Transit of Magellan Strait, 5–6 September 1973

The HGE arrived at the entrance to the Strait on 5 September, anchored in Possession Bay, and the two Chilean pilots were embarked at 1100 local time. The transit was made without incident, although during the last half of the passage the ship went through a cold front with accompanying 45 to 50-knot winds. This slowed progress somewhat, but the HGE cleared the Strait and entered the Pacific Ocean at approximately 1500 6 September.

Strait of Magellan to Valparaiso, Chile, 6–13 September 1973

Immediately after entering the Pacific Ocean, the HGE ran into extremely heavy weather which slowed its progress again and actually forced the ship to heave to for a short period in 60-knot winds and 25-foot seas. Throughout these conditions, however, the ship handled beautifully, rode well, and its performance was never of concern to the crew. The remainder of the leg into Valparaiso was uneventful, and the ship's crew used this time to complete for Global Marine a list of parts and supplies to be loaded at Valparaiso when the pilots were disembarked. During the few days preceding the 11 September military coup, the ship's commander monitored commercial radio broadcasts as the HGE approached Valparaiso, and he was aware of the increasing tension developing in Santiago and Valparaiso. Nevertheless, he and the HGE's captain, Louis Kingma, did not allow any concern over these events to show in their daily messages to headquarters.

The HGE anchored in the outer harbor of Valparaiso at 2100 local time on 12 September. Shortly after its arrival, a small Chilean naval launch came alongside, and a naval officer and seaman came aboard for discussions with Captain Kingma, at which time the ship was formally entered into the port and Kingma was apprised of the military coup in Chile. Because a curfew was in effect, no further personnel

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movements to the ship could be accomplished that night, but the two Chilean pilots left the HGE with the Chilean naval personnel.

On 7 September, prior to these events, Global Marine's enterprising personnel representative had left Los Angeles for Santiago accompanied by one other Global employee. They brought some 28 boxes of materials and supplies for the HGE, as well as a bag of personal mail. Their principal task was to arrange for the transfer of the supplies and, more importantly, the entry into Chile and transfer to the HGE of seven technicians, all this having been programmed in early August. They arrived in Santiago on 8 September and with the assistance of other representatives, processed the supplies through customs and proceeded to Valparaiso. On Monday, 10 September, Global's representatives traveled to Santiago again to meet six arriving (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) and Lockheed personnel who, along with their tools, luggage, and supplies, were all processed and cleared by Customs. The entire party then returned to Valparaiso and settled in the Hotel O'Higgins to await the arrival of the HGE on 12 September.

At approximately 0600 on 11 September, the Americans were awakened by noise outside the hotel. It was evident the revolution had started, as there were soldiers, tanks, armored cars, and other military vehicles all over the city. The hotel was surrounded, communications cut off, and guests confined to the hotel for the next two or three days. As attested to in his trip report—which reads like a Hollywood script—Tom Williams, the GMI personnel representative, encountered much intrigue and suspense in getting the seven technicians, supplies, and parts loaded on the HGE in the midst of the revolution. Nevertheless, in spite of a curfew, lack of communications, and the general confusion, Williams did a magnificent job of getting to the right people in the new government so that at approximately noon on 13 September, all persons and supplies were allowed aboard the HGE, and the ship was cleared to leave Valparaiso. The HGE weighed anchor at about 1500 and sailed for Long Beach. The presence of a covert U.S. intelligence ship in a Chilean port during the military coup was a bizarre coincidence quite unrelated to the rumors that "the CIA had 200 agents in Chile for the sole purpose of ousting Allende." There were no unfavorable incidents involving the ship, crew members, or the Global Marine representative.

Valparaiso, Chile, to Long Beach, California, 13–30 September 1973

This leg of the voyage was completed without incident. The weather was excellent with the exception of two tropical storms that the ship easily avoided; work progressed well, and the HGE made a final report on transit task completions. Only 21 scheduled jobs were not completed due to lack of time. The heavy-lift team which boarded at Valparaiso made excellent progress, following a preplanned work schedule. The HGE arrived Long Beach at 1700 PST, 30 September, and tied up at Pier E without incident. As it was a Sunday evening, the ship's arrival did not attract undue attention; stores were loaded and the relief crew came on board early Monday to conclude the east–west transit phase of the AZORIAN program.

In its transit from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the HGE travelled 12,745 nm in 50 days, 7 hours and 30 minutes, for an average speed of 10.8 knots. A total of 20,643 barrels of fuel were consumed, which equates to 68 gallons per mile.

Mobilization for Mission, October 1973–January 1974

After the East–West transit and arrival at Long Beach on 30 September, the HGE began a period of mobilization for the mission that would end with further systems testing (b)(1)

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(b)(1) This final "fitting out" period was originally allocated approximately 51 days. It was to take about twice that long. The primary purpose of in-port mobilization was to convert the ship from an overt to a covert configuration (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) During this same time, operations personnel activated the mission team and began an intensive mission team training program which was accomplished aboard ship as vans and equipment were installed, checked out, and made available to users.

After considerable discussion and analysis of the number of crew members required for the mission, a total of 178 was decided upon, the maximum size limited by lifeboat capacity. Despite distractions such as the busy pierside maintenance activity, crew members, ship workers, and technicians turned to their specialized assignments with a high degree of technical competence, motivation, and morale. The mobilization period produced a cohesive team effort for the mission and presented the first opportunity to assemble a mission team in accordance with key functions and positions established earlier in the program. Key mission personnel were: Mission Director, Deputy Mission Director, Deputy for Recovery, Deputy for Handling, Deputy for Exploitation, Deputy for Operations; Director, Technical Staff, and Ship's Captain. Although the ship's captain normally is in command of a vessel, the Mission Director was the senior command authority on the *Glomar Explorer,* because of its unique mission and responsibility for the operation of the complete AZORIAN recovery system. At sea, he alone was responsible for implementation of contingency or emergency plans if required, while maintaining mission security and cover. As an indication of the thoroughness of pre-mission planning, when the HGE sailed on the recovery mission in June 1974, the shipboard mission team and organization were very similar to that originally set down on paper in 1971 and 1972.

Conversion of the HGE From "White" to "Black"

From July 1973, when the HGE left Sun Shipyard in Chester, Pa., through east coast trials and the transit from the east coast around South America to the west coast, the ship was in a completely "white" configuration. That is, there was no equipment or activity aboard which would indicate its intelligence nature or the projected recovery operation. Although the HGE had some unique features such as the massive "A" frame, the unusually large well area, and the towering derrick (236 feet above the waterline), all could be attributed to a prototype mining vessel which required these for the heretofore unexplored mission of deep-ocean mining.

During mobilization, the primary effort was to install equipment and facilities for the recovery mission and for exploitation of valuable intelligence items expected to be acquired. Twenty-four mission vans were loaded and installed aboard ship for these purposes. They had been prefabricated to a standard 8′ x 8′ x 20′ size and delivered to contractors for outfitting with specialized mission gear. For example, 20 such vans were equipped (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) and then trucked to Long Beach for loading aboard ship under tight security.

(b)(1)

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(b)(1)

All ship-to-shore communications were open and transmittted via commercial radio circuits using radio teletype or manual morse. Commercial messages were addressed to Global Marine, Inc., Los Angeles, and were normally handled by RCA radio station KPH in San Francisco. Weather observations were transmitted to Coast Guard stations for further relay to Fleet Numerical Weather Central.

(b)(1)

Global Marine responded to the ship's requirements and questions as required by answering messages in a normal commercial manner via normal commercial radio circuits. These messages to the ship helped to maintain the appearance that Global Marine was controlling operations of the HGE.

(b)(1)

two control vans served as the nerve center of operations. Other vans were installed in appropriate positions on the HGE for such purposes as:

Cleaning: fitted out for ultrasonic cleaning and the preservation of items recovered from the submarine.

Decontamination: separate rooms for decontaminating exploitation personnel and target materials containing nuclear contaminants.

Paper processing: facility for processing and restoring the great volume of manuals, documents, and other papers expected from the target.

Drying: special facility for proper drying of documents and other items.

Darkroom: to process the large number of photographs taken to record intelligence material.


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Waste handling: to safeguard and handle any nuclear-contaminated materials.

Dress out and change rooms: facilities for personnel working in the well to change and clean up after exposure to possible nuclear contamination.

Packing: facility for wrapping and crating recovered items for shipment to exploitation facilities in the United States.



Weather Facilities

The weather forecasting capability established aboard the HGE (b)(1) meteorologists were assigned to provide onboard meteorological and oceanographic expertise which was imperative for the mission. The aft chart room, adjacent to the aft bridge and pilot house, housed the meteorology office, display center, and main weather equipment space. Shipboard capability for reception of weather data included all required advanced equipment.

Manning

As in-port mobilization continued, labor-management problems were developing between the Marine Engineers Benevolent Association (MEBA) and Global Marine. As a result, MEBA set up picket lines in an attempt to boycott the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* at Pier E. This unfortunate situation took a serious turn on 12 November when MEBA escalated its picket activity from a small group to mass picketing by about 100 persons including strong-arm types. The resulting tense situation continued for the next week to ten days. During this time, the ship's crew and shipboard workers were harassed, delivery trucks stopped, and special security measures had to be put into effect. The union problem, added to certain engineering problems, worked havoc with the mobilization schedule, and with the Christmas–New Year holiday approaching, departure for sea trials was set back until mid-January 1974.

One of the prerequisites for beginning sea trials was a valid pipe-handling system (PHS) demonstration at dockside. However, on 9 January there were still several engineering tasks to be accomplished before the heavy-lift pipe could be moved through the system. It was decided to move the ship from the dock to the Long Beach outer anchorage and conduct the PHS demonstration there, and then move out on sea trials. The main reasons were the sagging morale of the sea trials crew and the fear that the repeated delays would begin to affect mission crew performance adversely.

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Rather than risk this, it was decided to give everyone a "shot-in-the-arm" with the move to the outer anchorage.

Because of the delays in getting ready for sea trials, time now was very precious. It was essential that all the tests be completed, the ship be readied for the mission, and depart in time to be on station at the target in early July. The mission could only be accomplished during the July to mid-September weather window. Only during this period could one expect moderately good weather to last long enough for the operation to be completed. For planning purposes, 14 to 21 days were expected to be required for the recovery sequence. If the HGE could not be ready to leave on its mission by mid- to late June, the recovery attempt would have to be delayed a full year.

(b)(1)

During the period the HGE was being mobilized at Pier E (and where it was berthed after the mission as well), Soviet merchant ships made routine port calls to Long Beach of two or three days' duration. In almost all cases the Soviet ships were docked at Berth 10, located some 400 yards across the channel off the HGE's starboard quarter. Even though the Soviet ships were close to the HGE and had the opportunity for close inspection, there has been no evidence that the Soviets gained prior knowledge of its true mission, a tribute to the security precautions and mining cover lived by the ship's crew during West Coast mobilization.

First West Coast Trials, 11 January–23 January 1974

West Coast trials began 11 January when the *Glomar Explorer* left Pier E at 1230 Pacific time. The MEBA union problem was still plaguing Global Marine, and two union picket boats were present, but neither tried to interfere with the ship. The site for trials was approximately 160 miles west-southwest of Long Beach, where water depth was expected to be about 12,500 feet. The primary purpose of the test was to verify readiness of the pipe-handling system (PHS) and heavy-lift system (HLS) as well as the readiness of operating personnel (b)(1) The trials also would include checks of engine propulsion, navigation systems, and other ship's systems while under way to and from the test site. Upon completion of tests, the well gates would be closed and the ship would proceed on approximately 1 February to Isthmus Cove at Catalina where the HMB-1 would be anchored (b)(1)

Trials Chronology

After the HGE moved to the outer harbor anchorage, the mining crew ran a practice double of pipe—60 feet—through the system two or three times; the well was flooded and the PHS and docking legs checked for reliability. After five days at the anchorage, during which a myriad of problems occurred in the PHS, it was concluded that the system had limited reliability in its configuration at that time. If time had not been so critical, the obvious course of action would have been to return to Pier E for needed modifications, but all believed the penalty in time would be unacceptable because the 1974 weather window would be missed. Even though it became clear that the PHS could not be qualified during the trials, it was considered that many priority tests could be completed.

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(b)(1)

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The ship arrived on site at approximately 2400 hours on 19 January and deployed long and short baseline transponders as well as the wave-rider buoy, the latter a device which measured, recorded, and continuously transmitted sea-state data to the ship for its use (b)(1)

On 21 and 22 January, the unfavorable sea state and winds on site delayed the tests, including the important initial step of flooding the well and opening the well gates. Weather improved temporarily on the 22nd sufficiently, however, so that (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) was able to make a quick visit to the ship by helicopter for a first-hand review of test operations.

On 23 January, the well had been flooded and well-gate opening was in progress when the ship suffered damage in the aft gate-operating machinery. The casualty occurred during heavy surges of the sea in the well. An inspection revealed damage to the aft gate seal, distortion to aft gage drive gear teeth, and damage to the pedestal supporting the aft gear driveshaft. The after well gate had to be hauled to a closed position by rigging cables and using winches. Because of these problems, it was not possible to continue the sea trials. Headquarters was advised that the HGE would return to Long Beach anchorage for further inspection and repairs. The trip back was uneventful, and time was spent in communications between the ship and Global Marine to order parts and technical help for repairs. The HGE arrived at Long Beach harbor on 24 January.

Examination of the well-gate damage caused (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) to conclude that although the sea state may have been within the upper limits of the stated specifications for opening the gates, it nevertheless stressed the system too greatly and caused the failure. After a thorough evaluation, engineers estimated 13 to 15 days would be needed to accomplish repairs. With this added to several other major component tasks, it was estimated the ship would be ready for sea again about 14 February to complete West Coast trials (b)(1) The repairs had to be accomplished under difficult conditions because there was not time to move the ship to a drydock large enough to handle her—even if one would have been immediately available. Thus inspection and some seal repairs had to be done by divers. One small but persistent seal leak was never corrected, and the seepage of a few gallons per hour was accepted. Thus the *Glomar Explorer* lived with a small puddle in the starboard wing well.

(b)(1)

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Interestingly, the press took note of the HMB-1 departure from Redwood City in an Associated Press article datelined Redwood City which appeared in the Long Beach *Independent Press Telegram*. Basically, the article enhanced program cover in that it discussed the barge's connection with the HGE and its role in the Hughes ocean mining venture.

After the safe arrival and mooring of both barges at Catalina, they went into a "sit and wait" mode because HGE sea trials were short-lived due to the well-gate casualty on 23 January.

Second West Coast Trials
15 February–2 March 1974

(b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) was selected to be the Mission Director for the operation. He was an excellent choice, as future events would verify. Not only did he provide the leadership required for this complex and dangerous mission, but his earlier role in preparing to handle the nuclear materials and contaminated items gave the mission crew confidence in an area of little-understood danger.

Excellent progress was made during the in-port work period after the well-gate casualty on 23 January, and it was possible this time to conduct tests immediately upon completion of repairs and modifications. These included flooding the well and opening the well gates to check the previously damaged gate drive system. Also, because the well gates were open, pipe was run through the entire system. All operations were performed satisfactorily to the degree that senior officials considered the ship ready to go back to sea to complete trials (b)(1)

GMI Vice President Curtis Crooke was on board for the new trials as the senior Global Marine official. This position conformed to what the ocean mining world would expect (b)(1) was necessary because completing trials was a Global Marine contractual responsibility to the U.S. Government (b)(1)

(b)(1)
Performance Criteria and Agenda for West Coast Trial (b)(3)(c)

In view of the poor performance and problems with the pipe-handling system during East Coast and West Coast trials, established specific performance criteria for the PHS and the heavy-lift system for the new trials. These included reliability demonstration by lowering and raising 60 to 70 doubles of pipe (3,600 to 4,200 feet), with the exact number based on available water depth near Catalina Island (b)(1) but in the event that bad weather or time available precluded selection of a site to complete the 60 to 70 doubles requirement, the Mission Director was authorized to allow a moderate backoff from that specific range of pipe lengths. The basic criterion was a "reasonably reliable demonstration," with the sole judge of acceptability and suitability in meeting the test objective.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

For the next ten days on test location, everything and everybody were devoted to solving test problems, and virtually all tests were successfully completed within the scheduled time frame. Of the problems surfaced, perhaps the most serious were malfunctions in the heavy-lift system sensors and controls, which were repaired. Most importantly, the pipe-handling system operated satisfactorily with only a few minor

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delays. A total of 40 doubles of pipe were deployed and recovered (equivalent to 2,400 feet), with the only problem being untorquing of some joints. All agenda events for trials were satisfactorily completed by the evening of 25 February. With an excellent weather outlook projected for Catalina for the next few days, the HGE estimated arrival at Isthmus Cove at 0700 on 26 February.

(b)(1)

From Isthmus Cove the *Glomar Explorer* proceeded to a point 65 nm miles southwest of Catalina Island to coordinates 32-44N; 119-14W. The technical purpose was to complete roll stabilization tests, but a more compelling reason for leaving California coastal waters was that commercial vessels in California waters on 1 March were subject to a special California inventory tax. Rather than face possible scrutiny over the tax, and possibly uncover true ownership of the ship by the U.S. Government, it was decided to be in international waters at that time. After completing tests in the vicinity, the HGE sent a message to that effect and then returned to Long Beach, where it arrived at Pier E at 1645 local time on 2 March. The HGE was scheduled to remain in port for a 25- to 30-day period completing rigging and (b)(1) together with other mobilization tasks still required.

(b)(1)

Integrated Systems Tests (IST), 28 March–13 May 1974)

After (b)(1) and the ship's return to Pier E, Long Beach on 2 March, the next 25 days were devoted to final preparation of the complete AZORIAN recovery system for the Integrated Systems tests (IST) scheduled to begin 28 March.

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Concurrently, work on ship's systems also was being accomplished at a feverish pace with particular attention to the pipe string, thread compound, gimbal platform, A-frame, yokes, hydraulic pumps and controls, and docking legs, all considered essential to pipe-handling and heavy-lift systems. Excellent progress was made in all areas. In many cases round-the-clock activity was required to complete tasks on schedule.

The time pressure of meeting the July–August weather window forced a drastic change in the IST. An intermediate water depth (about 2,600 feet) site was chosen off Catalina Island where the water was deep enough (b)(1) and to exercise the pipe-handling system thoroughly. The HGE left Pier E on schedule at 0045 on 28 March and, after mooring at the initial test site eight miles east on the lee side of Catalina Island on 29 March, immediately began its test schedule.

A torquer casualty was followed by a series of bridle, heavy-lift, and pipe-handling problems which required in-port (b)(1) tines and davits. Valuable training was accomplished by the Control Center crew; personnel performance was outstanding and represented a shot-in-the-arm for crew morale. In view of the many setbacks and delays in the program thus far, it was indeed heartening to know that (b)(1) system was operational and had demonstrated satisfactory reliability. The problems and delays encountered previously, however, now required major revisions of the remaining test schedule and scenario. If the recovery mission were to be accomplished in the summer of 1974, a major decision was required now as to the need for further testing versus declaring the system to be ready for recovery operations.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

in conjunction with senior CIA officials, decided that completion of system testing at the 2,400-foot depth location would satisfy the requirement for a satisfactory demonstration of system reliability and that planning would continue for a June departure on the recovery mission. This decision waived the need for a deep test to 12,000 feet. A major factor in this decision was confidence in the capture vehicle and recovery crew performance. Additionally, what had been an earlier recognition of two factors was coming into renewed and clearer focus. The first was that this unique recovery system was unparalleled in size and complexity and the first ever to operate at these depths and loads. The second was that the system design was based upon a one-time operation, not a series of repetitive test and development operations such as with a new airplane. Further tests would create additional confidence but would also place some wear and tear on the system. AZORIAN was the world's largest salvage operation, and its success, after a reasonable preliminary test demonstration, would depend to a large extent upon people and their ability to devise "work-arounds" for the many problems which would never go away completely no matter how many tests were conducted.* Risks were inherent and some would remain, no matter what.

(b)(1)

*Further, no test (short of the mission itself) could ever duplicate the target with its unknowns of structural integrity, stability, and breakout characteristics.

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As planned, elements of the underwater teams directed by the Deputy for Handling and Deputy for Exploitation were put aboard the HGE just before completion of the Integrated Systems tests to familiarize them with their work areas, equipment, and procedures in the at-sea atmosphere.

On 12 May 1974, the ship advised project headquarters that all scheduled tests were completed. The gates were closed, the well pumped down, and the HGE returned to Long Beach. It moored alongside Pier E in the early morning hours of 13 May where it was scheduled to remain for a 28- to 30-day refitting period in preparation for departure on the recovery mission in mid-June.

Final Approval in Washington

In Washington, meanwhile, USIB's *ad hoc* committee in April and May 1974 had made one more evaluation of the expected intelligence benefits of AZORIAN at the request of Dr. Kissinger to support the 40 committee's discussions regarding approval for the mission to begin in June. This study, approved by USIB in executive session on 7 May, was forwarded to Kissinger with a covering memorandum which stated:

> The United States Intelligence Board has reviewed and updated its intelligence assessment of Project AZORIAN. On the basis of this review, the Board concludes that there have been no significant developments since the last Board assessment which would detract from the unique intelligence value of this target.
>
> Successful recovery and exploitation (b)(1) expected to be on board (b)(1) . . . Acquisition of the nuclear warheads and the SS-N-5 missile system, together with related documents, would provide a much-improved baseline for estimates of the current and future Soviet strategic threat. The Board also expects that recovered documents would provide important insights into Soviet command and control and certain aspects of their strategic attack doctrine.
>
> In its evaluation the Board assumed a successful mission. On this basis the Board continues to believe that recovery of the AZORIAN submarine would provide information which can be obtained from no other source, on subjects of great importance to the national defense.

With the planned mission departure date barely a fortnight away, the 40 Committee met to consider AZORIAN on 5 June, and Dr. Kissinger prepared a memorandum for the President covering the essential points of the discussion. President Nixon approved the mission on 7 June, with the proviso that actual recovery must not be undertaken before his return from an impending 27 June–3 July visit to the Soviet Union.

AZORIAN Mission Recovery, 20 June–16 August 1974

On 20 June 1974 the *Glomar Explorer* moved from its anchorage off Long Beach to a pre-arranged point outside the three-mile limit for the ceremony marking Summa's acceptance of the ship, and the next day representatives of Summa, Lockheed, Global Marine, and Honeywell arrived by helicopter for the ceremony. They were given a tour of the HGE and demonstrations in the control center using the (b)(1) other features of the ship. The acceptance ceremony was duly recorded and photographed for cover purposes, after which the representatives returned to Long Beach by helicopter.

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That same day, the HGE set its course for the recovery mission in the northwest Pacific. As the message that day from the HGE to project headquarters indicated, morale was high and preparations for departure had proceeded smoothly.

On 27 and 28 June, several ships passed the HGE on an easterly course but got no closer than 2½ miles. On 29 June, the HGE had covered a distance of 1,888 miles without incident and still had 1,120 miles to go; a container ship, *Oriental Charge*, passed the HGE that day on the port side at a distance of about two miles. On 30 June, various drills were held aboard ship. The Deputy for Exploitation conducted a drill for the control and flow of personnel in and out of the well in event of nuclear contamination; the Deputy for Recovery conducted target acquisition dry-runs using (b)(1) and there was an emergency drill for destruction of classified documents and equipment.

Transit to the recovery site in the Pacific Ocean proceeded without incident, and on 4 July, Independence Day, the HGE arrived at the recovery site at 1301 local time. (President Nixon had left Moscow the preceding day.) Transponder deployment went relatively smoothly, but several unsatisfactory units had to be rejected before the ship eventually got its six-transponder grid deployed. These were necessary for precise location of the ship and automatic station-keeping at the recovery site.

On 5 July, a final and complete (b)(1) was carried out. Two wave-rider buoys were also deployed, and the automatic station-keeping system was calibrated. On 8 July, the well gates were opened (b)(1) was started immediately

On 10 July, heavy fog, which had been present, continued in the area. After conducting (b)(1) a thorough workout of the pipe-handling system (30 doubles or 1,800 feet of pipe, up and down) (b)(1) only 8 hours (b)(1) was delayed, however, because of concern for the weather. Typhoon "Gilda" was expected to affect the recovery site, and it was decided to sit out the expected high waves (b)(1)

On 11 July, with waves about 7 feet, there was significant vertical surge of water in the well with peaks of about 8 feet, making diver operations, including camera rigging, very difficult, (b)(1)

The sky was leaden, yet the crew had spirits that were as bright as polished silver. Under way at last! Finally, we were really going to do it. The course was set West-Northwest—a direct line to the target. If we could only be there tomorrow—but an eight-knot rate of advance meant a 13-day voyage. We would not arrive until the Fourth of July. Surely that would void any evil spirits lurking in a 13-day voyage.

But thoughts of jinxes were in few people's minds. We could do anything. Let Headquarters give us a last-minute change of targets—with this crew and this beautiful ship, no task was too difficult. Mission impossible? Nonsense! "Impossible" was not in our vocabulary. Moments like this must contain the true meaning of team spirit, that extra ingredient that hardware will never possess. To experience it once is enough for a career.

(b)(3)(c)

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The HGE encountered its worst effect from "Gilda" on 12 July when a series of long swells (15 to 16 seconds) came through the area about noon with a combined significant height of 9 to 10 feet (b)(1) and surge in the well went as high as 22 feet. The crisis (b)(1) seemed to be over on the 13th of July, as the waves were down to 8 to 9 feet (b)(1)

That same day, a British merchant ship, *Bel Hudson*, which earlier had requested medical assistance by radio for a stricken crew member, arrived on the scene. Headquarters contingency planning for AZORIAN had anticipated such an event, and a pre-mission decision had been made—based on humanitarian and cover reasons (b)(1) that the HGE would respond to medical emergencies if possible. Nevertheless, (b)(3)(c) had to ponder the situation carefully to consider whether this might be some sort of ploy based on an awareness of the mission, and make certain there would not be an unwitting disclosure of the HGE's activities. The HGE's surgeon, accompanied by a medical technician and security officer, and a British boatswain, made the precarious trip to the *Bel Hudson* to examine the patient. After diagnosing the patient and determining he had not had a heart attack (as the *Bel Hudson* had earlier described the ailment) the doctor brought the patient back to the HGE for X-rays and treatment. He relieved the patient's severe internal discomfort and returned him to the *Bel Hudson* in one of her lifeboats. Throughout the incident, careful security precautions were taken and mission activities not exposed. The captain of the *Bel Hudson* was very grateful to the HGE and to the doctor in particular, for his assistance and skillful diagnosis and treatment which quickly improved the seaman's condition. The incident ultimately worked to the advantage of the HGE as far as cover was concerned. As the *Bel Hudson* and the HGE were arranging the rendezvous position, the British ship asked, via the open radio circuit, what activity the HGE was engaged in. The HGE responded that it was engaged in deep-ocean mining testing using a prototype mining machine. It was hoped the Soviets were monitoring this exchange.

By 14 July, the weather had subsided enough for (b)(1) to consider undock (b)(3)(c) although higher seas were predicted for the 15th. On the evening of 14 July, unfortunately, cracks were discovered in both the forward port and after starboard docking leg guide structures and were considered a serious problem and difficult to repair. With the uncertain weather, there was concern whether the cracks could be repaired properly before further damage might result which could cause aborting the mission. The ship's heading was adjusted and canvas screens rigged to provide as much protection as possible for the critical welding repair job, which took the next 72 hours to complete. But the weather took a turn for the worse; tropical storm "Harriet" was causing high seas, and the Mission Team was reluctant (b)(1)

(b)(1) For safety reasons, a decision was made , close the well gates, and be prepared to leave the recovery site if wave conditions became too extreme. The well gates were closed on 16 July amid 6-foot waves; no big problems were encountered, but closing the huge well gates was never a dull exercise on the HGE.

The weather hold continued on 17 July when the HGE was advised that a Soviet naval ship, the Missile Range Instrumentation Ship *Chazhma*, was under way on a course towards the recovery site and expected in the immediate vicinity of the HGE at 0400 hours on 18 July. *Chazhma*, 459 feet long, carried a helicopter and was based in Petropavlovsk. As a precaution, the Mission Director ordered that piles of canvas-covered crates be placed on the HGE's helicopter deck to preclude the possibility that the Soviet helicopter might land on the HGE for any reason. *Chazhma* had sailed

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from Petropavlovsk about 15 June to support a SOYUZ/SALYUT space event, and during 10–13 July began her return to Petropavlovsk from near Johnston Island. During the early morning hours, the bridge was reporting fog conditions as patchy and visibility as less than five miles. Between 0600 and 0800 *Chazhma* closed its position with the HGE to approximately two miles. (b)(1)

At 1430, *Chazhma* closed to within one mile of the HGE. At 1540 Soviet personnel on the boat deck began taking pictures with a binocular camera, and then the helicopter was launched and made many approaches to the HGE for approximately the next hour taking photographs from all angles. The Mission Director, with crates already stacked on the helicopter deck, sent a number of crew members to the bow of the HGE to preclude any attempt by the Soviet helicopter to hover and lower personnel onto the bow. At 1619, to the relief of the HGE, the helicopter landed back aboard *Chazhma*. Although and his team found it difficult to assess Soviet intentions with the many close passes and detailed scrutiny given the HGE by the helicopter, the consensus was that it ranged from being a thorough photographic assignment to a downright aggressive and provocative act.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

These actions by *Chazhma* caused a measure of concern that the Soviets had become knowledgeable from other sources of the true mission of the HGE. The HGE was vulnerable sitting alone in the vast Pacific Ocean, miles from any friendly supporting forces and very much aware of other unidentified contacts in the vicinity which its communications unit had picked up the preceding few days. Accordingly, advised the officer in charge (b)(1) to be prepared to order emergency destruction of sensitive material which could compromise the mission if the Soviets attempted to board the ship. The team designated to defend the control room long enough to destroy the material (b)(1) was alerted, but guns were not issued.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

At 1630, *Chazhma* started blinking a light signal to the HGE which was difficult to read because of the lighting conditions. The Soviet ship then passed 500 yards astern the HGE and signaled it would communicate using the local code. The HGE responded with its own signal flag signifying "I am going to communicate with your station by means of international code signals." The HGE's communication unit then received an indication that another Soviet helicopter launch was impending. A few minutes later, *Chazhma* put up a flag hoist signifying "Understand your signal," then crossed the bow of the HGE at a distance of 1,000 yards. During all the surveillance the HGE was stationary in the water. At 1711 hours, *Chazhma* transmitted by radio in Russian requesting acknowledgement if its transmission was heard; the HGE did not answer. At approximately 1730, *Chazhma's* helicopter took off and again made many low passes over the *Glomar Explorer* taking pictures of the ship. About one-half hour later, the helicopter completed its work and landed back aboard *Chazhma*.

After several hours of HGE attempts to respond to communications from the Soviet ship, *Chazhma* transmitted at 1847 "WCHG (HGE) this is UMGT" and indicated it now was ready for the HGE's message. The HGE answered "We have no message. Understand you have a message for us." The Soviet ship replied "Stand by five minutes" and then shortly afterwards transmitted "We are on our way home and heard your fog horn. What are you doing here?" This statement appeared questionable because *Chazhma* was not in hearing range during the fog. In any case, the HGE answered "We are conducting ocean mining tests—deep-ocean mining tests." *Chazhma* asked "What kind of vessel are you?" to which the HGE replied "A

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deep-ocean mining vessel." The Soviets then wanted to know what kind of equipment was aboard the HGE, to which the answer was "We have experimental deep-ocean mining equipment onboard." The Soviets asked "How much time will you be here?" and the HGE answered "We expect to finish testing in two to three weeks." The Soviet ship signed off with "I wish you all the best." *Chazhma* left the recovery area at about 2100 hours on 18 July and sailed off to Petropavlovsk.

The weather cleared sufficiently on 19 July for to order the well flooded and the gates opened, after which (b)(1) system checks began. On 20 July, the (b)(3)(c) and all systems were brought up to operating condition. The undocking evolution was of particular concern due to a substantial (five-foot) heave of the HGE. (b)(1)

On the morning of 22 July a 155-foot Soviet seagoing salvage tug, the SB-10, arrived and maintained a distance from the HGE of about 3 to 4 miles. Work continued, however, (b)(1)

Meanwhile, the Soviet SB-10 conducted closer surveillance, passing within 200 feet and conducting runs up and down both sides of the *Glomar Explorer*. HGE personnel observed (over time) 43 crew members (including one woman) on the deck of the SB-10. They were dressed in fatigue-type outfits, swim trunks, shorts, and other such apparel. About a half-dozen Soviet sailors with cameras took photographs of the *Glomar Explorer*. By 2300 hours, the SB-10 had moved off to a distance of several miles.

The HGE continued lowering pipe on 24 July and, despite more problems, the (b)(1) A Greek ship, *Pelleas*, passed within two miles of the HGE without incident. The SB-10 continued its close surveillance of the HGE, frequently at short distance.

The HGE kept headquarters informed of engineering problems it was encountering. For example, (b)(1) reported on 25 July, (b)(1) that malfunctions (b)(3)(c) every system continued to make the situation difficult but not discouraging. He indicated that frequent shutdowns were experienced, mostly associated with the heavy-lift sensors and controls.

On 26 July, the Command-Control Van reported sonar contact with the ocean bottom. By this time, the series of equipment breakdowns which had occurred was beginning to wear on the nerves of the recovery team. A bright side to all these problems, however, was the confidence the crew began to have in the pipe, which seemed able to bounce back from nearly all kinds of abuses and remain unscarred. On this date, the Mission Director reported that 230 doubles, or 13,800 feet of pipe, had been deployed. Also, information had been regained (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) Meanwhile, the SB-10 continued surveillance.

On 28 July (b)(1) failed, causing a display of noise, fire (sparks and smoke primarily) and spastic shaking of the derrick. These effects were startling, to say the least, but no

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insurmountable damage was suffered. [redacted] reported that many among the crew were very nervous about the safety of the heavy-lift system and, as a precaution, unneeded personnel were kept away from the area around the A-frame.

While this situation was being corrected, high resolution sonars were used to pinpoint the target submarine. The SB-10 was back within radar range at approximately 5 miles, but heavy fog prevailed, limiting visibility to less than one mile.

(b)(1)

Everyone on board was caught up in the anticipation of seeing the target object for the first time. The main source of action was the control center. All eyes were watching the display from the scanning sonars (our long-range detectors) for any sign of a return. The yellow dots marched across the cathode ray tube in unending regularity. Then, on one pass, an irregular hemispherical hump displaced the flat line on the screen. One, two, three, . . . and more times it was the same. It was the submarine hulk for sure. Word spread rapidly throughout the ship. We were on target.

Within hours we were close enough to the target for the TV cameras to pick up a clear picture of the remains of the submarine. All hands wanted to see the picture, and the Mission Director allowed the crew, in small groups, to file through the control center to see for themselves. The most common comment was (b)(1)

The Mission Director and his deputies recognized that during actual recovery operations the ship's crew could not be allowed in the control center. The concentration and tension would be too great to risk any distractions. The crew had contributed greatly to the project's success and denying them a chance to observe the recovery operation weighed heavily on the Mission Director's mind. He directed that several TV monitors to display the video (b)(1) *be placed around the ship for the crew's benefit. These were intently watched by sailors, cooks, divers, drill crew—all hands—during the crucial moments of the recovery.*

(b)(1)

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There was one last hiccup from the pipe-handling system that night. As a 15-ton pipe double was being placed in the cart, it slipped over the center joint stop used to restrain the pipe and became loose in the cart. The galley and port-deck sleeping areas near the transfer boom were evacuated until the pipe was back under control. Once again, fortunately, no personnel injury or damage to the system resulted from the accident. Meanwhile, the SB-10 maintained its usual surveillance activity of closing in toward the HGE and then drifting off a couple of miles. Generally, the visibility remained poor, less than two miles, and the HGE sounded its fog signal during these poor conditions. Pipe No. 268 was put into the upper yoke, but at this stage the pipe was moving very slowly (b)(1) The Deputy for Recovery reported the following information to Headquarters:

> The heavy lift system is operating marginally; two additional heave compensator position transmitters failed; (b)(1) the target was easily located . . . high resolution sonar and video are excellent; the salt water (seawater) hydraulic flow to test the hydraulic system was checked out (b)(1) preparations are continuing (b)(1) one heave compensator position transmitter was repaired: (b)(1)

The SB-10 tug remained within close range during the night, and was illuminated with a searchlight from the HGE whenever it maneuvered uncomfortably close. This tactic was always successful in making the SB-10 move off. It continued its close-in surveillance of the HGE in the morning, circled the ship once, and was observed taking height and distance measurements of the HGE substructure using a sextant and an alidade.

(b)(1)

On 31 July, Headquarters was informed that some (b)(1) problems had been experienced Also, the heave compensator position indicators were working well. (b)(1) all systems were normal. Optics remained good until touchdown, when mud obscured visibility for about one-half hour (b)(1)

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(b)(1)

Lift-off

On 1 August, and lifted from the bottom. (b)(1) 2200 that night, recovery was under way (b)(1) During all this time, the SB-10 appeared to be running in circles, moving in at close distances to all points of the ship. In addition, unidentified radar contacts were reported within short range of the ship.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

Pipe lifting went well on 2 August and the weather cooperated. instructe (b)(3)(c) his team to start preparing for entrance into Midway in accordance with the AZORIAN operations and cover Plans. (b)(1) Two hundred and seventy-four doubles or 16,440 feet of pipe had been deployed and were coming up.

In accordance with the cover plan, a message went out in the open commercial channel on 3 August to explain an entry into Midway. The *Glomar Explorer* duly reported that it believed the "nodule collector vehicle" might have collided with a hard silt-covered outcrop. It was this fictional "casualty," reported in the clear, which would have been used as an excuse for the HGE to request permission from U.S. Naval authorities to enter Midway for repairs to the vehicle. The scenario would follow that the damage to the "nodule collector" was more serious than at first diagnosed and a new part would be required from the U.S. mainland. (b)(1)

(b)(1) that same day pointing out that the operation was still plagued with serious heavy-lift system problems, even with the load on the pipe decreasing. At high pressures, the heavy-lift hydraulic pumps required much attention, and a great deal of trouble was experienced in keeping a sufficient number operable. Because of these conditions, it was necessary to bypass some fail-safe circuitry and depend instead on operating personnel. The operators and hydraulic mechanics were complimented for doing what the Mission Director judged an outstanding job, and he expressed pleasure that the ship had overcome some major hurdles while facing up to all the problems associated with recovery operations. All hands were very busy and concerned, knowing the many times they came close to

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aborting the mission because of equipment problems. The mission team was not discouraged, however, and had every intention of accomplishing the objective of raising the submarine (b)(1) (b)(1) on 3 August The SB-10 continued close surveillance. During the preceding night, the tanker *Bangkok* (Thailand registry) had passed within five miles of the *Glomar Explorer*. A short series of flashing light exchanges passed between the *Bangkok* and the HGE, and there was also an exchange via radio. The *Bangkok* asked questions as to HGE operations, and HGE replied briefly that she was conducting experimental deep-ocean mining operations. The query from the *Bangkok* appeared to stem from curiosity and was judged social in nature.

(b)(1)

the SB-10 presence near the recovery site was related to Soviet Pacific Fleet submarine operations and transit.

(b)(1)

the HGE team maintained its composure and adhered to the AZORIAN cover plan by sending a commercial message via station KPH in San Francisco advising that the "nodule collector vehicle" might be more damaged than originally thought.

(b)(1)

On 6 August, the HGE received a message from Paul Reeve, Summa Ocean Mining Division General Manager, addressed to "the Senior Summa Representative" aboard the ship. This overt commercial message instructed that as soon as the Summa representative was in a position to assess the damage to the "nodule collector vehicle," he was to start reporting at least twice daily on progress towards effective repairs.

Meanwhile, the SB-10 continued to operate at close range (b)(1) raised closer to the well of the HGE, On the afternoon of 5 August, the HGE executed a plan to lower the docking legs to 90 feet, tilt them in and out and then move them

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slowly back to their previous position. This drill attempted to elicit any possible reaction the SB-10 might be planning to take (b)(1) Although the SB-10 started to close its distance with the HGE when it saw the docking legs were being lowered, its maneuvers generally were no different from any previously conducted.

On 6 August, (b)(1) the SB-10 again maneuvered completely around the HGE, closing to a distance of 75 yards. The *Glomar Explorer* gave a flashing light signal to warn the SB-10 to keep clear because it was "maneuvering with difficulty."

(b)(1) the SB-10 was considered to have a limited shallow-water diver capability normally used to support submarine contingency situations and minor salvage roles. The capability indicated that both hard-hat and Scuba divers were trained to perform hull inspection and repairs under controlled conditions at depths of less than 30 feet. However, headquarters did not believe Soviet tug personnel would have the training or experience to accomplish the extremely dangerous task of underwater reconnaissance of the HGE. The divers could easily be observed, and the risk of injury or death in open ocean near an unknown objective would be so great as to be unacceptable. The Mission Director and his advisors had in any case devised a few simple ship maneuvers to counter possible Soviet divers without endangering (b)(1)

AT 2135, the SB-10 approached the HGE within 75 yards on the starboard beam. The HGE sent a signal to the SB-10 to keep clear. The Soviet ship backed off, sounded three long blasts of her whistle and went around the stern of the HGE still at a distance

(b)(1)

The lifting operation had become more comfortable. Pressure in the hydraulic power units was dropping and had fallen to almost a routine level. Each double of pipe removed meant about 15 tons less load on the system. No one was relaxing, but there was a sense arising that we were, indeed, going to make it. (b)(1)

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of about 75 yards. The SB-10 crew members were observed waving. The ship appeared to be headed for Petropavlovsk, and by 2238 hours was fading from the HGE's radar screen. Its departure marked the end of a close surveillance of the HGE which had lasted 13 days and 16 hours.

A touch of irony was that as the SB-10 broke off its last close-in surveillance, the recovered G-722 submarine (b)(1) below the HGE. One can only conjecture the reaction and chagrin of Soviet authorities when they later realized that two Soviet Navy ships were on the scene and, in effect, witnessed the recovery operation against their lost submarine.

(b)(1) sent on 6 August reported problems that the recovery team were then encountering. For example, the heavy-lift system had a leaking seal on the upper yoke, and sticking isolation valves were making the system dangerous; three hydraulic pumps had blown manifolds, and difficulty was being experienced keeping them running at the proper pressure. Other problems occurred and were corrected as quickly as possible so that recovery could proceed. All this was transmitted virtually as a matter of routine in a status report on engineering matters rather than an emotional litany of calamities, as might have occurred in such a stressful situation.

(b)(1)

No radioactive contamination had been detected as yet.

(b)(1)

While the water was being pumped out and before shoring began, an inspection team checked (b)(1) its target for nuclear contamination. Evidence of plutonium was found. Later as the inspection and exploitation continued, the contamination was found (b)(1) apparently primarily from one or more of the nuclear torpedoes whose high explosive had detonated without creating a nuclear explosion—the war heads were "one point safe." Fortunately, the plutonium was in a hydroxide form and thus there was little danger of airborne particulate.

(b)(1)

The recovery phase of the AZORIAN mission was finished on 9 August. In an overt commercial message to "Summa headquarters" sent via Station KPH, San Francisco, the HGE advised it had completed "Event 36-A," a prearranged code for

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the recovery phase. Previously, other major events had been coded sequentially to keep headquarters informed on mission progress. In accord with the AZORIAN cover plan, mention also was made that damage analysis of the "nodule collector vehicle" was still progressing.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

Despite a certain amount of apprehension because of the past and potential future presence of Soviet ships at the recovery site and a desire to move away from the area as soon as possible, decided that all residual actions, such as recovery of the wave rider buoys, should be completed. After all, the buoys cost about $25,000, and he also pointed out that their situation would not be improved appreciably by limping away from the site before completing all that had to be done. If the Soviet Navy were inclined to challenge the HGE, the ship could not outrun them. Thus,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

carried out the HGE cover role as a commercial mining research ship according to plan.

The HGE sent an overt commercial message on 10 August, ostensibly to Summa, stating that every effort was being made to determine whether repair of the nodule collector vehicle could be made at sea. At that time, the ship was continuing its course toward a prearranged site in the direction of Midway where, under the cover plan, a decision would be made as to whether it was necessary to enter Midway

(b)(1)

On 11 August, the HGE sent another overt commercial message indicating it was changing its destination to a new site and that repairs to the "nodule collector vehicle" would take at least 30 days.

(b)(1)

The Soviet tug left. We were going to be able to do the telltale pumpdown operation without surveillance. Our cover story had held: the Soviets had been fooled. Now we could anticipate seeing our prize without being concerned about sharing it with the owner.

Everyone wanted to get the first glimpse of the target.

(b)(1)

Those of us waiting anxiously on deck received a reward of a different type. Bobbing up to the surface (luckily in the well) was a brimming full Jerry-can of torpedo juice. It had travelled over three miles to the bottom and back and been subjected to pressures of over 7000 pounds per square inch without spilling a drop.

(b)(1)

The Mission Director and his team viewed the scene from a balcony-like portion of the ladder which led down to the well gates. Radiation monitors had reported readings 5 times background even at this distance. We knew that we were in for a nasty time. Some of the earlier excitement of the mission was returning to the exploitation party. There was going to be (b)(1) *It was going to be difficult—the jumbled hulk was not going to reveal its secrets easily.*

(b)(3)(c)

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necessary to go to Midway. A decision was made by headquarters that the ship would proceed instead to Lahaina Roads off the Island of Maui, Hawaiian Islands, where a crew change could be made. A special exploitation team to recover, process, and package the intelligence items (b)(1) also would board in Hawaii.

The HGE sent a commercial message on 12 August for cover reasons stating that the "nodule collector vehicle" would be ready for inspection and commencement of repair work upon arrival at Site 130-1, which was Lahaina Roads. Arrangements were made (b)(1) for an inspection team from Washington to examine For cover purposes, Paul Reeve, General Manager, Summa Ocean Mining Division, would lead this team aboard ship. Meanwhile, a series of personal messages were sent from crew members not under cover to make arrangements for relatives and friends to meet them either in Honolulu or on the West Coast.

The HGE arrived and anchored at Lahaina Roads at 1430 local time, 16 August. The mission crew was relieved by the exploitation crew in the evening, and Paul Reeve and the engineering inspection group also boarded the HGE at that time. In Hawaii, the *Honolulu Advertiser* newspaper featured a front page article on the HGE and the Summa mining venture.

On the 17th of August, the Summa office at Honolulu maintained its cover image by sending a message via RCA, San Francisco to its home office advising that the crew change went smoothly.

The HGE was initially anchored approximately one mile south of the Lahaina Roads sea buoy, but that morning it shifted anchorage to a point eight miles south of Lahaina Roads buoy, approximately five miles off shore.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

Looking back on the AZORIAN operation, remarked that he w extremely grateful for the advice and confidence he received from William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, immediately prior to the HGE departure on the AZORIAN mission in June. Colby told he was fully aware of what it meant to operate in the field and that the officer-in-charge at the scene of action is usually much more aware of a given situtation than someone back at headquarters. Therefore, Colby said, he wanted to assure the Mission Director that he was to use his own good judgment in critical situations as long as he was adhering to the basic guidelines of the directives and plans which governed the operation. In looking back to that challenging, demanding, and very difficult experience, recounted that he took this advice gratefully and literally.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

Thus, the long saga of AZORIAN came to a conclusion as the HGE rested at anchor in the Hawaiian Islands, more than six years since the Soviet G-II-class submarine 722 sank in the Northwest Pacific Ocean. The efforts to locate the site of the sinking and to conceive, develop, build, and deploy the HGE system (b)(1) stretched almost as long in time, beginning in mid-1968. And the success that was achieved depended, in the end, on the combined skills of a multitude of people in government and industry who together forged the capability that made it possible to proceed with such an incredible project.

As the operational phase of AZORIAN ended, the important task of exploiting the intelligence information began. After preliminary examination aboard the HGE (b)(1)

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(b)(1)

The news media leak in the *Los Angeles Times* in February 1975, however, culminating in Jack Anderson's decision to expose the project on national TV and radio in March 1975, (b)(1) As proof that the USSR had gotten the message—and no doubt intended as a message to us—the Soviets reacted immediately to the disclosure and assigned one of their ships to sit and monitor the site of their lost submarine, which had then become known to them.

One of the most difficult exercises is to apply the cost-benefit principle to a specific intelligence operation. This is particularly true of Project AZORIAN. During its early stages of planning, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and his fellow ExCom members and other senior officials were wrestling with projected costs of the program and evaluating the technical risks involved. Lifting a submarine weighing approximately 1,750 tons from a depth of 16,500 feet had never been attempted or accomplished anywhere before. Packard contended if they were to wait until all the risks were eliminated, the project would never get under way. The resulting decision to move ahead with the plan to recover the Soviet submarine was courageous, carefully considered, and intangibly beneficial: a government or organization too timid to undertake calculable risks in pursuit of a proper objective would not be true to itself or to the people it serves.

To attempt to evaluate Project AZORIAN in terms of cost benefits, one must consider not only the immediate intelligence gained (b)(1) but the broader aspects and achievements as well.

For example, the state-of-the-art in deep-ocean mining and heavy-lift technology was advanced in a major way. AZORIAN produced an advanced deep-ocean system with important future economic, political, and strategic potential for the United States. The need for such a capability is well-documented in the United Nations Law-of-the-Sea Negotiations. As this article is published, a private consortium of companies, including Lockheed, Global Marine, Standard Oil of Indiana, and Royal Dutch Shell, are readying the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* for use in deep-ocean mining operations to begin late in the fall of 1978. Also, a number of government agencies

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have been planning future use of the *Glomar Explorer* for other deep-ocean projects compatible with her unique characteristics.

As a final note, we can find tangible proof in such projects as AZORIAN that the intelligence profession is dynamic and alive—keeping pace with the rapid advances of science and technology, and applying the proper mixture of tradecraft to these advances to make them serve our purposes and yield the information this country needs.

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Some legal aspects of the AZORIAN program

AT SEA WITH THE LAW

(b)(3)(c)

In today's world of oversight, managers of technical collection programs must be closely attuned to the legal implications of their actions. Nothing may be more certain than death and taxes, and taxes did, indeed, become a part of the AZORIAN program (the project designed to retrieve the wreckage of the Soviet Golf-II submarine #772.)* But other legalities are almost as certain to arise in any major technical collection effort. This is doubly true if the effort is wrapped in a commercial disguise. Even if AZORIAN were to become an example of a type of activity never again to be carried out by CIA, there are legal lessons to be learned from it. These lessons may be only dimly visible to present-day managers. This article attempts to illuminate some of the problems faced in the AZORIAN program in the hope that new and elegant approaches can be made to working within the ever-present legal boundaries. Examples to be described (from a non-lawyer's perspective) are from the realm of international law, taxes, patents and the Freedom of Information Act.

Forebodings

The contracting officer assigned to [redacted] the group responsible for AZORIAN, was the first to warn those of us working the technical problems that we were heading into a confused legal sea. The Director of Central Intelligence had delegated his contracting authority for AZORIAN directly to [redacted] (b)(3)(c) [redacted] experience had included duty as a naval officer, a Foreign Service Officer and contracting officer for both covert and national programs. In examining the contracting job facing him, [redacted] soon became aware that CIA had essentially zero experience in the covert procurement and operation of a commercial sea-going vessel. He suggested that [redacted] could find itself setting precedents in admiralty law by conducting intelligence operations with an ostensibly commercial ship. For the massive facade being established there were no clear-cut rules to follow with regard to such matters as the International Law of the Sea, taxes, insurance, and the special rights given by the Jones Act to American merchant seamen sailing on U.S. flag vessels. The message [redacted] brought to [redacted] was that these issues had to be addressed along with the technical problems to assure the project's success. He was dead right.

Salvage Rights

The basic legal issue that required study was the salvage of sunken foreign warships within international law. There was high political impact in the recovery of a

* For earlier articles on the AZORIAN program, see *Studies in Intelligence* Volume XXII No. 3, Fall 1978, and Volume XXIII No. 2, Summer 1979.

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foreign warship, in this case, the Golf-II submarine that had not been officially abandoned by the Soviet Union. Initially, CIA's Office of General Counsel was asked for an advisory opinion; it was their belief that a recovery attempt would not be an illegal act in terms of international law. The Agency then turned to the Office of the Judge Advocate General in the Department of the Navy for a second opinion. The Navy, logically, had more direct experience in a matter of this kind.

In the world of commerce, the Navy pointed out, salvage is an act done voluntarily—there is no legal obligation—to remove property from an impending peril at sea. After performing the service a claim can be made only if the following three elements were present: 1) a marine peril; 2) service voluntarily rendered when not required as an existing duty or from a special contract; and 3) success in whole or in part, or that the service rendered contributed to such success. The 1910 Brussels Convention on Assistance and Salvage at Sea excludes warships and public vessels in public service from making claims. Since the United States was a signatory to this convention, a U.S. Government-owned vessel would be excluded from making a claim against another signatory. It was clear to the AZORIAN team that the general law of salvage would not furnish any legal guidance since none of its provisions pertained to the retrieval of the Golf-II submarine. There was, however, a very compelling precedent that bounded the operation.

Ships of war are recognized as possessing the rights of sovereignty of the parent country. The tenets of international law, which are recognized by the United States, have maintained the position that the title to sunken warships remains with the flag government unless a specific notification of the intent to abandon has been made. As the report of the Navy Judge Advocate General noted:*

> Abandonment cannot be implied from the absence of any interest overtly shown by the flag nation in locating the wreck. It makes no difference whether the sunken warship is located in the high seas or in the territorial waters of a foreign country. If the wreck constitutes a hazard to navigation, the flag nation must be consulted as to salvage. The flag nation has a right to determine what documents, classified material, etc., should be handed over in the event the vessel is salvaged or removed because it constitutes a hazard.

It should be mentioned that the study done by the Navy Judge Advocate General was an unclassified one. Removal of a hazard was the only logical reason that the Judge Advocate General could overtly assume as the basis for the requested study. The fact that the Golf-II wreckage was not a navigational hazard does not alter the arguments about abandonment or rights of sovereignty.

The United States had made its position very clear on these issues. It had denied the rights of salvage of the USS *Peary* to the Australian Government. The *Peary* had sunk in Darwin Harbor in World War II. The Navy had removed its name from the naval vessel register and stated it no longer had interest in it. Still it was determined that the United States had title to the vessel and had made no expressed abandonment of it. The United States denied salvage on the ground that the U.S. Navy preferred that the wreck remain undisturbed as a place of rest for the gallant men who went down with it.

In a converse case, the United States has recognized the rights of the German Government to the title of German submarines that were sunk in our territorial waters. We have not claimed them as war booty. Furthermore, unless the German

* Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General; Memorandum for the File JAG: 10: JRB: lgc 21 August 1970.

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Government expressedly abandons title to its sunken submarines, the U.S. Government insists there is no authority to salvage them without permission of that government.

The conclusion of the Judge Advocate General study was that the title to the sunken Golf-II submarine and its contents remained with the Soviet Union. Thus, the wreckage was not legally salvageable according to international law. This point, however, was moot because of something the Soviets themselves had done. In 1928 the Soviet Union had raised a British L-class submarine which had gone down in the Baltic Sea in 1919. The Russians rehabilitated the British submarine and put it into service as their *Leninetz* class. Through this act, the Soviet Union left themselves no maneuvering room in which they could claim the United States was violating international law by salvaging their submarine.

There is an interesting story connected to this British L-55 submarine. After the Russians put her into service on 9 October 1931, she was sunk again the very same month in a collision with a merchant ship. Once more she was raised and put into service by the persistent Soviets, who thereafter restricted her to training exercises only.

The January 1979 issue of the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* contained an article entitled "The Recovered Sunken Warship: Raising a Legal Question," written by a member of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy. The author, Lt. R. D. Wiegley, examined the general Soviet-American problem of the recovery of each other's sunken warships using AZORIAN (the author, who was not involved with the project, referred to it as Project JENNIFER because his information was based on open sources) as a specific example. He concluded that the legality issue was arguable, and he presented arguments on both sides. His preference was a third option which would brand covert intelligence operations neither legal nor illegal. Instead they would be considered to be in a "gray area." The United States and the Soviet Union would enter into a formal agreement on the recovery of sunken military ships. In this way the two superpowers would avoid causing a serious international incident over the recovery of the other's lost vessels. Certainly for the forseeable future the recovery of sunken warships will remain a contentious issue.

And Who Shall Pay the Taxes?

It was recognized early in the AZORIAN program that the question of tax payments was going to be a problem. The ultimate magnitude of the problem, however, was not perceived. Eventually, the tax question was to result in publicity to AZORIAN and force the only and very limited public admission by the U.S. Government that the CIA was involved with the *Hughes Glomar Explorer*. In the early days, the discussions focused only on the basic question of how much, if any, tax should be paid.

There was no question that as part of a government operation the physical assets acquired in AZORIAN should not be subject to taxation by the state and local governments. But there was a dilemma. Millions of dollars would be saved by not paying all the taxes on the *Explorer* and its associated barge; however, tax avoidance could expose the government interest in the program. A decision was made in the beginning not to clear and brief all the cognizant taxing authorities in order to get their approval of the non-payment of taxes. To help preserve the commercial facade, however, some taxes were paid on items like spares and consumables for the ship and the *ad valorem* tax on the barge. The first serious examination of the tax issue began in the fall of 1971.

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The initial hardware item chosen for a complete tax study was the steel pipe which was to be used as the lifting mechanism for the target submarine. Since it was to be procured openly, it had the cover name of deep ocean mining pipe. The study was done by counsel for the Texas-based Hughes Tool Company, the prime contractor for the pipe string. Counsel examined the applicability of the Texas Limited Sales, Excise and Use Tax Act to the purchase by Hughes of deep ocean mining pipe.

(b)(1) contracted to manufacture at its (b)(1) plant or to have manufactured by the Earle M. Jorgenson Company at its plant in (b)(1) the specified semi-finished and finished heavy-walled pipe for delivery to Hughes Tool Company at its plant in Houston, Texas. After taking delivery of the pipe, Hughes Tool performed certain completion work including threading pipe ends, treating and coating pipe, and performing tensile load proof-testing of the pipe at Houston. Afterwards, small quantities of the pipe were to be shipped by common carrier to Chester, Pa., and there loaded on the ship being constructed by Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company under contract for Global Marine, Inc. (GMI), a California company. Upon completion of construction, the ship was to be registered in the name of GMI but equitably owned by Hughes Tool Company. After loading on the ship, the pipe was to be used in mining operations performed exclusively outside the limits of any state in the United States.

It was the opinion of counsel that the sale of pipe (b)(1) to Hughes Tool was not subject to the sales tax laws of the states of (b)(1) because of the interstate commerce exemptions under the sales tax statutes. These exemptions excluded from the sales tax the receipts from sales of personal property which, pursuant to the contract of sale, was required to be shipped to a point outside of either state by the seller. For the most part, sales taxes on all major items were either exempt or explained as delivered to the ostensible sponsor out-of-state and/or in international waters.

Although the Texas Sales and Use Tax exemptions appeared to be applicable to the deep ocean mining pipe, the Hughes Tool Company counsel recommended, as a safety measure, a conference with the Office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts for Texas. This office was responsible for the collection of the Texas sales tax. The Comptroller ruled favorably and the tax exemptions were applied to the pipe.

At Headquarters was initially involved in not only the tax matters, but all aspects of the cover operations), established an AZORIAN Cover Advisory Committee. This group formed a special subcommittee for the tax problem. The chairman of this committee contacted the four major contractors, Honeywell, Lockheed, Hughes Tool and GMI, about state sales and use taxes. Their view was that there would be no major unprogrammed taxes. To be sure all was well in this sensitive cover area, GMI and Hughes Tool obtained additional legal advice in both Pennsylvania (b)(1) These two states, in addition to Texas and California, were the sources of the program's major assets. With legal expertise coming from the four states, the program sailed ahead without running afoul of any tax problems. That is, until it collided with the tax assessor of Los Angeles County in early 1975.

The collision was over a year in coming. Once it occurred, it required over three years to resolve and involved both a lawsuit and an admission by the U.S. Government that it was the owner of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer*. To adequately explain this case, one has to begin with the visits to the Office of the Attorney General, State of California.

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Agency representatives met with the California Attorney General in August 1973 and then with two of his tax experts on 9 October 1973. They were given a briefing on all the program details except the target object and asked for their guidance on the tax situation. In brief, the California tax experts recommended that we head off the tax assessment rather than waiting to handle it after it had been made. They pointed out that tax assessors are aggressive by nature, preferring to assess and collect the tax before allowing arguments about whether it was due. Two members of the California State Board of Equalization were identified to the Agency representatives as people who could help head off the assessments, and on 7 November 1973 they were given the same program briefing given the Attorney General and his experts. General agreement was reached that the best way to avoid the California tax was to have GMI turn over title to the ship to the Summa Corporation (the new Hughes organization which was replacing Hughes Tool Company as the ostensible sponsor) at a ceremony at sea outside California territorial limits. This was done on 21 June 1974 as the *Explorer* was departing for the recovery mission.

A review of the documentation relating to the legal status of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* revealed some weak points with regard to who held title to the ship during the testing program. One more meeting was held on 27 August 1974 with representatives from the California State Board of Equalization along with the principal auditor from the Los Angeles region, and on their advice we modified the documentation to conform to California sales tax exclusions.

Everything now appeared to be in order on the tax front. This lasted until a ruling was issued in another case by the California Supreme Court in December 1974, (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) This ruling substantially weakened the "home port doctrine" used by ship owners to resist the *ad valorem* property tax assessed on California property owners every year on 1 March. Because California ship owners routinely registered their ships in out-of-state ports to avoid this tax, the *Explorer* was registered in Wilmington, Delaware, and thus was exempt under the home port doctrine. As an additional precaution in 1974, the ship had been taken outside California territorial waters on 1 March. For these reasons, Summa Corporation, as the ostensible owner, did not pay the *ad valorem* tax on the ship in 1974. But after the December ruling by the State's Supreme Court weakened this doctrine, the legal experts feared that the local tax authorities would claim the *Explorer* was subject to taxation and ask for 1974 as well as 1975 taxes.

The fact that the *Explorer* was to be classified by the Coast Guard as an oceanographic research vessel was legal reason to believe the tax rate should be one percent rather than the 25 percent levied on commercial vessels. The lawyers, however, cautioned that the research classification did not preempt the tax authorities from deciding for themselves what the rate should be. For example, they could assert the right to explore the nature of the research and obtain evidence on it prior to the rate determination.

With these thoughts in mind it was decided that the only proper action would be to approach the Los Angeles County tax assessor privately and tell him that the U.S. Government owned the ship. In this way it was thought that the tax avoidance issue could be resolved quietly and in the government's favor.

The meeting with the tax assessor, Philip Watson, took place on 31 January 1975. In attendance were two Agency representatives and two lawyers, one each from Summa and GMI. *Bona fides* were established by an FBI agent from the Los Angeles field office and through a prior phone conversation between the tax assessor and a cleared member of the State Board of Equalization. Further guarantees were offered

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to the assessor by stating that he could check it out with State's Attorney General (he was a neighbor of the assessor). After these preliminary discussions, the assessor was briefed on the U.S. Government ownership of the *Explorer*, the various contractor relationships, on the reclassification process then in progress to have the ship classed as an oceanographic research vessel, the work done on the ship while in port, the function of the barge and its use in Los Angeles County, and finally the fact that the ship would be in port on 1 March 1975.

The assessor was assured that it was the government's aim to avoid embarrassment to tax authorities. To do this and yet retain the commercial facade, he was told that agreement had been reached with other tax authorities, who were informed on the project, that the government would pay some taxes. Also it would continue the work to reclassify the *Explorer* as an oceanographic research vessel in order to qualify for a lower tax rate if that would protect him from criticism.

The assessor was persuaded that the ship really belonged to the U.S. Government and said he would be satisfied with a letter from GMI's lawyer to this effect. Told that even this much documentation posed too great a security risk, he suggested that the group take the position that the *Explorer* was only temporarily in Long Beach for repairs and that no tax was due on the ship or its equipment; in effect, he advised them to let him handle the tax problem. He waved aside the group's concern that this approach might catch him up or embarrass him; he did not consider that likely. He doubted that simply classifying the ship as a research vessel would take care of the problem, but agreed to keep that option open in case his own approach ran into problems. He was indifferent to the government sponsor's willingness to pay some tax if necessary to protect the deep ocean mining cover; his position remained that no tax at all should be paid. The possibility of questions being asked and his methods of handling them to preserve the program's cover and security were brought up, and he gave complete assurance that he could handle his end.

The meeting concluded with the tax assessor signing a security agreement which prohibited him from making any disclosure of the classified information that he had received. The government group left the meeting feeling that their purpose had been achieved and there was no misunderstanding. They would have done well to consider more deeply the situation of a locally elected official and his likely behavior under extraordinary public pressure.

Shortly after Jack Anderson broke the story of the *Glomar Explorer* to the public in March 1975, the Los Angeles County tax assessor, Mr. Watson, called a press conference to explain his role in the affair. It is worth quoting at length the *Los Angeles Times* story of 3 April 1975 on the presss conference:

> Assessor Philip E. Watson disclosed Wednesday that four CIA men pleaded with him in January to conceal the true purpose of two Howard Hughes vessels which recovered part of a sunken Soviet submarine in the North Pacific.
>
> "I had heard of the *Glomar Explorer* when it was being refitted at the berth next to the hangar of the Hughes flying boat (the Spruce Goose) at Long Beach. It reportedly cost $40M and I thought it was a mining boat. . . . These men told me it would be used for undersea detection of Polaris-type submarine missiles and other Russian ship and aircraft movement. . . . They were afraid if the true cost of the boat was listed that perhaps $300M would excite suspicion somewhere. . . . Somebody is going to pay—who in hell owns a $300M boat?"
>
> In a cloak-and-dagger description of his contact with the four CIA men, Watson said his help was sought in a complete cover-up of the two-vessel project

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reportedly totalling $400M or $450M. On a CIA assurance that the U.S. Government is the true owner of the *Glomar Explorer* and the barge, HMB-1, based at Redwood City, Watson signed a secrecy form in quadruplicate and kept the *Glomar Explorer* off the Los Angeles County tax roll (the reason being that Federal property is not taxable).

However, he (Watson) warned that he may reverse his position if the Hughes Summa Corporation does not formally identify the 618-foot-long *Glomar Explorer* as government-owned when it files its annual declaration of business property in May '75.

If Hughes or his Summa Corporation owns it as private property, the property tax will run about $9M annually based on the market value appraisal of $300M for this vessel.

(Watson) showed a lump of black manganese which the *Glomar Explorer* had sucked off the ocean floor at a depth of 17,000 feet. "They gave me this as an introduction when they walked into my office. . . . I had gotten a call from a man identifying himself as a special agent of the FBI (who said) "Four people from Washington have to see you." . . . Watson asked, "What about?" The agent said, "I can't tell you on the phone but if you have any questions" . . . and he gave Watson the name of an attorney who works for the State government in Sacramento. Watson continued, "I called the attorney and he said he couldn't tell me anything over the phone but urged me to meet the four gentlemen."

Watson then telephoned the Los Angeles FBI office and invited the men to his office. (When the group arrived at Watson's office) "the FBI agent first asked if I had any recording devices" . . . "Not unless you brought them" was Watson's reply. The FBI agent then introduced the four men and said "These gentlemen are from the CIA." One from Wahington had no business card to offer—the other three gave Watson their regular business cards indicating they must divide their time with the CIA. One, a Los Angeles attorney, is a friend of Watson. Another is a Houston attorney and the other is with the Summa Corporation. They informed Watson that title to the *Glomar Explorer* and HMB-1, also described as a submarine tractor, is with the U.S. Government. They were built under a secret contract with the billionaire Hughes. The barge was manufactured by the Lockheed Missile & Space facility of Redwood City. The *Glomar Explorer* was built by the Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company at Chester, Pa.

Watson showed a handbill describing launching of the *Glomar Explorer,* 4 November '72, as a deep ocean mining vessel being built for Hughes. The public was invited then to a family day with balloons for children. Watson said, "As long as the Soviet submarine cover-up continued, the *Glomar Explorer* was the scene of parties both in the East and at Long Beach. Some were almost of 'Pearl (sic) Mesta' proportions."

The assessor said he was surprised when the four CIA men insisted he sign the standard government secrecy pledge because he has held a full secrecy rating since he himself worked at Lockheed years ago. "But they argued this was of higher or highest secrecy of some kind so I signed again," Watson continued. "They said Hughes had no investment in either the boat or the barge. The barge was assessed first in 1974 in San Mateo County. The ship was registered in Delaware. The Summa Corporation wrote us 29 March 1974 that it was brought to California to complete construction. It was on sea trial on the lien date, 1 March 1974, so our people agreed it did not have tax status here at that time." Watson said the CIA men attempted to persuade him to assess the ship at one

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percent of its fair market value instead of the usual 25 percent. The one percent appraisal is permissible for fishing boats and oceanographic vessels. Watson refused to make a one percent listing and pointed out that either a one percent or 25 percent listing would have to be accompanied by a specific record of the true market value of around $300M.

He demanded a letter saying the vessel is the property of the U.S. Government but the CIA men balked. Watson went on, "I told them I would seal it and keep it in our safe. . . . We have some secret contracts on government work and on public officials which may be critical. Years ago we had queries about Richard Nixon—before he was President—as to whether he had filed for his veteran's exemption. He had, and we put that in the safe."

The CIA men refused to yield and Watson now must wait until Summa files its declaration next month (May). If Summa, or Hughes, is then listed as the owner, a $9M tax bill will follow. If the government is the owner there will be no tax. Watson concluded, "This project was a cover-up for mining. They had agreements with American Smelting & Refining to process the ore. They didn't mention any submarine. They had this other story—that the task was related to detecting movements of submarines. I told my own council and the chief of that division—but not the whole story. I had just seen 'The Sting' and I was suspicious. I asked who will own the boat when this is all over and they said the U.S. will own it."

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)
(b)(3)(c)

This news article portrays a classic case of how the interpetation of a meeting depends upon one's perspective and motives.

The tax bill facing the program was between $11-12 million. It was comprised of the property tax on the ship (Los Angeles County) and the barge (San Mateo County) and all the state sales and use taxes. The latter included the sales tax on modification of the capture vehicle and the ship, plus the use tax on the barge. Heavy pressure after the media exposure was being applied to the several different taxing authorities to explain the tax treatment that they had given to the AZORIAN assets. These officials could no longer hold the line for the Federal Government.

At the state level the officials did put a hold on the tax audit and refused to give information to the press, citing statutes that prohibited divulgence. These same officials, however, told the government that they could no longer accept the cover contracts. At the local level tax bills were issued. Los Angeles County hit Summa with two bills— for 1975 and one for for 1974.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)
(b)(3)(c)

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[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) In order to resolve this issue the government had to decide whether to pay the taxes through the contractors and thus preserve the commercial facade or to withhold payment and make public the U.S. Government ownership of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer*.

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n) By the end of June 1975 the decision, for all intents and purposes, was forced by other events. [redacted] There was little reason now to maintain that the *Glomar Explorer* was a commercial vessel in the face of tax bills that eventually might amount to [redacted] The problem became one of admitting U.S. Government ownership and only that, without further disclosures. Up to this point the government's position had been one of "no comment." Now it was recommended that the following certification in the name of an Agency official be given to the several California jurisdictions involved with the tax issue: (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

> I Certify that the Below Listed Property was Acquired Pursuant to the Terms of a Classified Contract for and in Behalf of the U.S. Government; that it has been used Exclusively for Governmental Purposes; that Title Thereto has been Held for the Convenience and Exclusive Benefit of the U.S. Government; and that Such Property is, in Accordance with Law, Immune from Local or State Taxation:
>
> MV HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER

The certification was to be classified, but past experience with Watson had shown there was no guarantee that it would be honored. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

The DCI, William Colby, approved this course of action on 30 June 1975 with the provision that the tax authorities should be provided with a statement that they could make public. It would state that they were in possession of classified information demonstrating that no taxes were due. Mr. Colby also wanted the National Security Council and the Defense Department to approve the course of action. Concurrently, action was under way with the Coast Guard to transfer the title of the ship and the barge to the U.S. Government.

Legal counsel for Los Angeles County decided that the assessment on the ship was valid. They informed the U.S. Government (by this time the Tax Division, Department of Justice, which was representing CIA) that the county was going forward to defend the assessment and collect the taxes due. To force the issue, the tax assessor put a lien on the *Explorer* for back taxes and posted a notice that the ship would be sold at public auction on 27 August 1975. On 18 August he, in effect, seized the ship for non-payment of taxes. The amounts due were:

Taxes	$4,395,152.43
Penalty 6%	$ 263,709.14
Seizure Fee	$ 3.00
Mileage: 25 miles at 70¢ per mile	$ 17.50
	$4,658,882.07

The seizure notice was lifted after one day, and the *Explorer* sailed on 20 August for its last time as an Agency vessel. It was at sea for a few days on some final phaseout tasks. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) It supported this

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position with certified documents from the Coast Guard which substantiated the government's ownership. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) The petition was accompanied by the corporate and Coast Guard certifications of the government ownership.

Los Angeles County remained firm in its position that the *ad valorem* taxes on the ship were valid. There was no question but that litigation would be required to resolve the issue. The government ownership would have to be made public at trial if the taxes were to be avoided. An agonizing reappraisal was made. The government would enter a civil action against Los Angeles County in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. It would make a very limited admission—"The CIA was involved with the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* for intelligence purposes. The Summa Corporation (and its Hughes Tool Company predecessor) and Global Marine, Incorporated were also involved." Civil Action No. 75-2752-R was entered in late 1975. The case was heard by United States District Judge Manuel L. Real.

On 26 January 1976 Judge Real rendered the following decision:

> IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
>
> (1) The United States of America has at all times to the date of this judgment been the actual, real, and beneficial owner of the vessel known as the "HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER" and that the Summa Corporation has no rights of ownership to this vessel.
>
> (2) The two (2) County of Los Angeles *ad valorem* assessments for the years 1974 and 1975 (assessment number H7285-9990450663 and M0753-200547527 respectively), assessing the vessel "HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER" to the Summa Corporation on the basis that Summa Corporation was and is the owner of this vessel are illegal, invalid and void.
>
> (3) The attempted seizure on August 18, 1975 by the County of Los Angeles of the vessel "HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER" to collect and satisfy the aforesaid tax assessments is illegal, invalid and void.
>
> (4) The parties shall bear their own costs.

The decision was appealed by Los Angeles County. During the appeal process all other tax issues were held in abeyance pending the decision of the appeal court. Finally, on 8 January 1979 the U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, upheld Judge Real's findings. This action finally should resolve the tax issues that faced the government in AZORIAN.

As of this date (May 1979), however, Los Angeles County had not removed the two tax liens against Summa from their records. Nor has Global Marine Incorporated received a refund from the State Board of Equalization for taxes paid as part of the commercial cover plan. The Tax Division, Department of Justice, is attempting to resolve these issues by letter rather than having the government initiate a show cause hearing before Judge Real.

The experience of AZORIAN clearly indicates the need to examine in detail the tax situation in a technical collection program using a commercial facade for cover. All potential sources of taxation should be uncovered and budgeted for if the commercial cover is to be maintained. Elected officials in state and local government are subjected to tremendous public pressures. It would be unwise to rely on the ability of local and

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state officials to protect a commercial cover and at the same time provide the tax benefits or other preferential treatment that might be due a federally funded program.

The $100,000,000 Brouhaha

You can predict most problems, but not all. No one had anticipated a patent infringement suit against the government over equipment developed and used in the AZORIAN project. Especially, there was no thought of a $100,000,000 one. But on 16 July 1975 Ocean Science and Engineering, Incorporated (OSE) and Williard N. Bascom filed a "Petition for Infringement of Letters Patent and Breach of Implied Contract" in the United States Court of Claims.

Two months earlier there had been a clue that this might happen. *Science*, a publication of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, had an article in its 16 May issue entitled "Deep-Sea Salvage: Did CIA Use Mohole Techniques to Raise Sub?" The article questioned whether or not CIA had used a recovery scheme based on Bascom's suggestion for a similar mission. In 1962 Bascom had given the Agency a proprietary proposal for the recovery of Soviet nose cones from the ocean floor. Bascom's attorney was quoted as saying that "a review of his rights is being undertaken." The principle patent in question was United States Patent 3,215,976 issued 2 November 1965. Its title was "Method for Surveying and Searching the Ocean Bottom and Recovery of Objects Therefrom."

Actually, when the case was first filed in July, two patents were cited as infringed. This petition was answered by the United States of America (the defendant) on 13 January 1976. The plaintiffs (OSE and Bascom) amended their petition as a result of the discovery process. In this process of examining the evidence provided by the government, the plaintiffs decided that they should dismiss claims for infringement of the second patent, United States Patent 3,472,191. They then filed a "First Amended Petition for Infringement of Letters Patent and Breach of Implied Contract" on 16 July 1976. The government answered this petition on 16 August 1976. Meanwhile, examination of the evidence continued.

A critical decision that had been made initially allowed the discovery process to take place. To be able to defend itself adequately, the government had to use material that was extremely sensitive and highly classified. It included the exact location of the Soviet submarine, details on how it was located and retrieved, methods used on and data from (b)(1) contractors involved in the project (b)(3)(n) Eventually, CIA personnel, who were under cover, would have to testify, and CIA organizational information would be revealed. All this material would have to be made available to the plaintiffs in the pre-trial discovery process. A decision had to be made—should the government go all out and defend itself against what it felt were groundless charges or should it seek a compromise out-of-court settlement with the plaintiff, thereby protecting the sensitive AZORIAN project from exposure? It was a classic security dilemma—what price to pay for silence.

The lawyers for the government, Thomas J. Scott, Jr., Department of Justice, and (b)(3)(c) OGC, argued that the government should go for broke on this case. It was a winnable one. Furthermore, the case would be held in the U.S. Court of Claims, which had some experience in handling and protecting sensitive information; it routinely hears patent cases in which corporations and individuals must expose priceless proprietary information. Scott (b)(3)(c) felt that the court would issue a

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protective order which would seal the court records and permit the trail to be held *in camera.*

The government agreed to the lawyers' position—the case would go to trial. This meant that the plaintiff, Bascom, and his attorneys would have to be cleared, briefed, and given access to the documentation compiled during AZORIAN. Also the trial judge's law clerk, the clerk of the court, and personnel in the firm providing the court reporting service would have to be cleared. The decision to make an active defense was an important one and was justified fully by events.

The plaintiffs and defendant filed a joint motion for a protective order on 25 March 1976. The trial judge, Francis C. Browne, signed the protective order on 26 March. This order put under seal all documentary evidence presented and all transcripts of the trial proceedings. The court would retain the material under seal, and only a judge of the court could order it to be opened. The proceedings were to be *in camera.* All persons involved were ordered not to disclose any information that was subject to government security regulations. Scott ar(b)(3)(c)had been correct—the game would be played under the rules the government had wanted.

The discovery process continued through 1976 and into 1977. A multitude of documents and records were provided from government archives to the plaintiffs. Attorneys for the plaintiffs interviewed government employees who had worked on AZORIAN. There seemed to be a never-ending demand for more records, but finally the attorneys appeared satiated. On 18 January 1977 a pre-trial hearing was held with Judge Browne. Procedures to be used for handling the classified material during the trial were worked out. The Agency would provide a safe for the court's use as well as security officers to courier material to and from the court and to guard the entrance to the court room. Everything was in order for the trial to begin.

The first trial session was held 12 April 1977 and the final one on 2 May 1977. During that time 17 witnesses testified. Six were Agency employees, five of whom were under cover. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) Good security control was maintained by the court and no classified information left the court room.

The plaintiffs were seeking three things. First, they asked for recovery of reasonable and entire compensation for the defendant's alleged infringement of United States Patent 3,215,976. They alleged that the government had infringed the claims of the patent by using the claimed invention upon the *Hughes Glomar Explorer,* which was built in accordance with and used the inventions claimed in the plaintiff's patent. The second thing they sought was recovery of damages for breach of express and implied contract by the government's use of trade secrets and confidential information without compensation of the plaintiff. This charge went back to the proposal given to CIA by Bascom in 1962. Finally, the OSE and Bascom sought recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.

The basic idea for the patent under contention was conceived by Bascom on Christmas Eve in 1961. At that time he was an employee of the National Science Foundation. His idea was to equip the end of a drill string deployed in the deep ocean with a device for viewing the bottom. The data generated by this equipment would be used to make a bathymetric chart of the ocean floor. From the chart, a search plan could be developed for close inspection, identification and retrieval of objects from the ocean bottom. These ideas were set down on paper and witnessed by Bascom's wife late that Christmas Eve. The patent was filed for in 1962 and issued in 1965.

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There were 12 claims to the patent, of which the first was the essential one for the trial. It claimed the method for surveying the ocean bottom from a moving ship whose position was determined from acoustic transponders placed on the ocean floor. The following eight steps were required:

1. Establishing the approximate area of search by known navigational techniques,

2. marking the area with a deep moored transponder,

3. defining the area of search by deploying several more deep-moored transponders,

4. moving the ship in a predetermined manner within the area using the transponders for navigation,

5. making a detailed bathymetric survey of the area with an echo sounder on the surface ship to establish bottom contours,

6. formulating a search plan following the bottom contours at a relatively constant depth,

7. lowering a sensing element on the end of a pipe under the ship near the bottom, and

8. moving the ship about the contours using the search plan to keep the sensing element at a relatively constant distance from the bottom.

All other claims were derived or modified versions of the first one. Expert witnesses for both the plaintiff and the defendant testified that the novel aspect of the Bascom patent was moving the ship with drill string deployed along the predetermined bottom contours in such a manner as to keep the free end of the pipe and sensing element at a relatively constant depth from the ocean floor (steps 6 and 8 above).

The U.S. Government offered several defenses to the plaintiffs' claims of infringement under Count I of their petition. One, obviously, was non-infringement. Others were invalidity of the patent due to prior patents; unpatentability of the claims; non-applicability since the method was on the high seas outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. Patent Law; and finally, since Bascom was a government employee at the time of his discovery, the U.S. Government should have royalty-free use of any patent that he received.

After hearing all the testimony Judge Browne ruled that the patent was valid and that because the ship involved was an American-owned vessel of United States registry, it and acts committed on it were governed by the applicable United States law. He further ruled that although Bascom was employed by the National Science Foundation at the time he had his idea, the work was done on his own time and thus the patent belonged to him. But when Judge Browne ruled on the gut issue of infringement, he found that none of the claims of the Bascom patent were infringed.

(b)(3)(n) therefore, there was no infringement. The plaintiffs' petition was dismissed as to Count I.

The second part of Bascom and OSE's petition alleged that the CIA had caused a breach of express or implied contract. In January 1962 Bascom submitted a proposal to CIA (and also the Air Force and NASA) for the recovery of missile nose cones from the deep ocean floor. The proposal contained information that was commensurate with

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the patent in contention. The proposal also contained reference to the use of the Bascom vessel as a cover for intelligence purposes. The plaintiffs claimed the proposal constituted confidential information which was and remained the exclusive property of Bascom and OSE.

There was no question over the fact that CIA had received a copy of the proposal. It had rejected it (as did the other agencies), citing among various reasons fiscal constraints. Some copies of the proposal had carried the "Proprietary" marking. Also, there was no evidence that any of the agencies receiving the proposal had given it to non-government personnel. The matter in question was whether or not CIA had used the proposal to formulate both the cover and technical basis for the AZORIAN project.

Judge Browne found that Bascom and OSE had lost all claims to confidentiality of the matters disclosed in the proposal when the patent was issued in 1965. Thus, the CIA had not breached an express or implied contract on issue of technology. There was left only the cover concept, not mentioned in the patent, that might be considered as proprietary information.

In this instance, Judge Browne found that Bascom had lost his case for confidentiality through the act of giving the proposal to a number of different agencies. The co-plaintiff, OSE, also was found not to have a case for having devised a proprietary cover. Judge Browne had this to say about cover:

> By the very nature of intelligence operations there are many guises or covers which may be utilized in both overt and covert activities. Many such guises have been disclosed in works of fiction as well as true accounts of intelligence operations. To the extent that there may be various types of cover which have not become publicly known, it is unlikely that anyone outside the intelligence community would be apt to come up with a cover concept which was not either obvious to or employed previously by people in the intelligence community. While there is no evidence in the record of this case to establish that defendant was in possession of the cover concept disclosed by Bascom on his own behalf or on behalf of OSE at the time it was first disclosed to defendant, plaintiff has failed to show sufficient novelty in the concept to take seriously plaintiffs' contention as to its value.
>
> It is inferred from the circumstances that OSE included its cover concept in its proposals to defendant's agencies primarily for the purpose of stimulating sufficient interest on the part of such agencies to enter into a contract with OSE to finance its earnest desire to conduct deep ocean research.
>
> I am convinced that defendant's actions to date would have been no different if OSE had never made a proposal to any of defendant's agencies.

The conclusion was that there was no express or implied contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant; therefore, there was no breach of contract. Count II of the petition was dismissed. The trial ended with the petition being dismissed on all counts and no award to plaintiffs of compensation, attorney's fee or court costs.

But the case was not closed. Bascom and his attorneys filed an appeal which meant that the case would be heard by three judges in the Court of Claims. The proceedings continued.

The protective order remained in effect so the records were kept sealed by the court. The appeal hearing would be held *in camera*. During the process leading up to the hearing, the plaintiff filed written objections to the judge's findings as well as additional (or alternative) findings of fact and conclusions of law. The government

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replied in writing to each of the plaintiff's filings. After exhausting this procedure, both parties allowed the case to come to trial. The hearing took place on 1 December 1978 (about 18 months after Judge Browne's opinion) before Judges Nichols, Kashiwa and Smith.

The hearing was short. The attorneys could make only very brief (about 30 minutes) oral arguments. The case had to be decided on the established written record. The judges decided the case on 18 January 1979. They upheld Judge Browne with regard to the dismissal of all counts in the plaintiffs' petition—there was no infringement or breach of contract.

As a side note, the judges decided that this case was not the one to test the claims of the government that U.S. patent law did not apply outside the territory of the United States or that because Bascom was a government employee at the time of his conception of the idea, the government should have royalty-free rights to it. The opinions of Judge Browne on both these issues were omitted from the new opinion.

The only appeal left to Bascom was the Supreme Court. Recently, his attorneys have indicated they do not intend to exercise this option. All classified material held by the court has now been returned to CIA. One may hope that the case has ended.

Although this patent suit pointed out one of the many problems a technological project can encounter, it did show that the government can defend itself and still protect highly classified information in civil cases. The Court of Claims was scrupulous in its handling of the sensitive information, as were the attorneys for plaintiff and Bascom himself. Perhaps the intelligence community need not always choose silence over an active defense against a wrongful action. This so-called Bascom case proved the point, at least, for the Court of Claims. It also showed that this court believed cover stories were the private domain of the intelligence community.

Care must be taken, however, against drawing sweeping conclusions about the legal recourses available to the intelligence community. In criminal cases there can be no "closed" trials; the U.S. Constitution guarantees the defendant's right to a public trial. Here the protected use of classified government information can take place only in the judge's chambers and only, of course, if the trial judge consents to the procedure. Furthermore, except when extraordinarily sensitive information is involved, the defense counsel is permitted to take part in these *in camera* proceedings. In short, while each case must be decided on its own, managers should remember that silence is not necessarily the only option.

Will It Ever End?

Although a number of the legal issues have been resolved in the five years subsequent to the AZORIAN recovery operation, there are still two continuing cases under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). One is called the Phillippi case and seeks the details of the efforts made by the DCI, William Colby, and any other Agency personnel to persuade members of the news media not to print or broadcast any information relating to the *Glomar Explorer*. The other case is called the Military Audit Project (MAP). In this case, information is being sought on the contractual relationships between the government and Hughes Tool Co., Summa Corporation, and Global Marine, Inc., in particular the financial arrangements with, the sums of money paid to and the profits earned by the corporations involved.

The Phillippi case gets its name from Harriet Ann (Hank) Phillippi, who was a reporter for *Rolling Stone* when she filed her FOIA request on 21 March 1975. Her

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request was turned down by letter on 4 April 1975, and she appealed on 21 April. Again her request was rejected, by a letter dated 21 May 1975 and signed by John Blake as Chairman of the Information Review Committee. The letter reminded Phillippi that she could appeal the decision to a United States district court for a judicial review of her request.

This she did. An attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union represented her. The government presented classified affidavits to the court *in camera*. On the basis of the disclosures in these affidavits, the court on 1 December 1975 ruled in favor of the government's position that it could neither deny nor confirm the existence of any records responsive to Phillippi's request.

The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which, on 16 November 1976, reversed the decision and remanded the suit to permit further inquiry into the public record of the basis for the government's rejection of the FOIA request. A change in administration had meanwhile changed the posture of "no comment." The DCI, Admiral Turner, and the national security advisor to the President, Dr. Brzezinski, concluded that the Carter administration should disclose the fact that the CIA was involved with the *Explorer* and, on 18 May 1977, the Agency admitted in court that it had attempted to persuade the press to withhold publishing or broadcasting information about the CIA and the *Hughes Glomar Explorer*.

Documents could now be released, but with 10 categories of deletions. By 28 November 1977, 154 documents with deletions were given to Phillippi and her attorney. Arguments continued over the deletions. The Agency gave ground on some; the plaintiffs gave up on others. The documents were reviewed again after the new Executive Order 12065 was issued. The same basic core of deletions was determined to be valid under the new standards.

And that is how the case rests today. The government (the defendants) asked the court on 30 April 1979 to make a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The ACLU attorney for the plaintiff (Phillippi) was granted a delay. The end is not yet in sight.

The other case was brought by a self-styled public interest group, the Military Audit Project, more commonly called MAP. It has a history very similar to Phillippi's; in fact, the attorneys for the two plaintiffs routinely exchange information on their cases. MAP began in December 1975 with a request by Fritzi Cohen for information on the contractual arrangements, dollars involved, and corporate profits related to the *Hughes Glomar Explorer*. Later, the request was expanded to include any audits of the project. The latter request stemmed directly from a document released in the Phillippi case.

After denying the requests, the government was taken to court by MAP in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Again classified affidavits were filed by the government, and again, the court on 20 October 1976 ruled in favor of the government. The court stated the documents were properly withheld under Executive Order 11652. As with Phillippi, the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

After the Administration's decision to abandon the "no comment" posture on the CIA-*Hughes Glomar Explorer* relationship, the government filed an unopposed motion to remand the case to the trial court and withdrew its insistence that it could neither confirm nor deny existence of any pertinent records. On 16 June 1977 the Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal order granted by the lower court in October, and the case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.

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The government released approximately 2000 pages of documents with 13 categories of deletions. In the spring of 1978 the government filed affidavits from Secretary of State Vance, DCI Turner, and Messrs. Tom Yale and Ernest Zellmer of CIA explaining the nature of the deletions and the justification therefor. The deletions were once more examined in early 1979 in light of the new Executive Order 12065 and found to be valid. Another affidavit was filed by Mr. Zellmer stating the findings under E.O. 12065.

In July 1978 the government had tried a different tactic. It had offered to give the plaintiff (MAP) the shipyard cost of the ship, the outfitting cost, the fee received by Global Marine, the total cost including fixed fee of the pipe string provided by Hughes Tool Co., and the total cost with fixed fee paid to Summa Corporation. For this MAP would agree to dismissal of the case with prejudice, and they together with their attorneys would agree not to bring another FOIA suit in regard to the project. The government's compromise was rejected.

On 20 April 1979 the government filed a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant (the government). MAP countered by dismissing its attorney and requesting a delay. The delay has been granted.

Will it ever end?

Moral

One may wonder why anyone would want to undertake to manage a large covert technical program considering the pressures of the job and the potential for being submerged in an endless morass of legal issues. Ogden Nash has furnished a reason why:

> The moral is that it is probably better not to sin at all, but if some kind of sin you must be pursuing,
>
> Well, remember to do it by doing rather than by not doing.*

*From "Portrait of the Artist as a Prematurely Old Man," by Odgen Nash.

(*This entire article is classified* **Secret No Foreign Dissem.**)

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How the secrets of the clandestine recovery of a Soviet submarine were preserved

SECURITY: HIDDEN SHIELD FOR PROJECT *AZORIAN*

(b)(3)(c)

The technological feats accomplished in building and operating the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* and maintaining the Hughes deep-ocean mining cover were the "up front" elements of Project AZORIAN.* But behind the scenes equally important activities were taking place, quietly and professionally.

One of staunchest, most dedicated groups participating in AZORIAN was CIA's Office of Security. Their policies and their procedures provided the day-to-day shield which protected the program and the myriad of people working on it. It was the individual security officers assigned to the program who implemented the policies and procedures, or often quickly improvised new ones on the spot in unusual situations. They provided the rivets that held the security shield together and in place.

The immediate purpose of the security shield was to prevent the leakage of information to the news media. Its ultimate purpose, of course, was the denial to the Soviets of any shred of knowledge about the true objectives of the program.

The first security officer on the scene set the tone and standards for security from Day One. He was followed by more than 20 others who were assigned for varying lengths of time directly to the AZORIAN project and its related activities. They were supported by the unheralded troops in the Office of Security's field offices and in the trenches at Headquarters who did the routine legwork and deskwork so essential to the maintenance of a successful security program. The dedication and hard work of all the officers made it possible for the program to run as long as it did without the erosion of the cover story and without a breakdown in program security.

Establishing the Security Base

The CIA-Department of Defense agreement which established AZORIAN as a priority program was signed 19 August 1969. It gave the security management responsibility to the Director of Security, CIA, who would act for the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Security had already asked the chief of his Special Security Center to assume day-to-day responsibility for the compartmentation which would be necessary to protect program information. The first security officer had been assigned to the embryonic Special Projects Staff and had been drawing up the over-all security plan as well as the specifics for the AZORIAN program. It was the security plan that was code-named JENNIFER, and because this word would appear on the cover of all AZORIAN-related documents, among those on the fringes of the program it came to be synonymous with the project itself.

* The story of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* is told in *Studies in Intelligence* Volume 22 No. 3, Fall 1978. Other aspects of the AZORIAN program are dealt with in Volume 23 No. 2 and No. 3, Summer and Fall 1979.

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By 15 July 1969 a draft of the security plan was sent to the DOD for comment and on the day the AZORIAN project agreement was signed the first JENNIFER security guide was issued. This policy paper was a 13-page directive covering the background of the program, general security policy, personnel security, personnel restrictions and requirements, physical security, contracting and funding security, communications security and public information control. The second security directive was issued on 12 December 1969 and spelled out procedures for handling program documents in government and industry. Industrial aspects of security were to grow increasingly important as the commercial nature of the AZORIAN cover plan unfolded.

The program manager had a philosophy about security that proved to be invaluable; it was especially applicable to the movement into a new world of commercial cover and security for a major technical effort. This philosophy was that security would be involved in every aspect of the program, including planning, from the very first. Security was not to be used just to clean up a mess or tamp down flaps after they developed. It was to be part of all program deliberations. The imprimatur of security was to be obtained before any action was taken. In this way many potential problems were avoided or finessed without causing a stir. The security officers responded to the philosophy with an attitude of, "How can we help you solve your problem?" In this way a healthy and mutual respect developed between the engineers and their enormous engineering problems and the security officers who were charged with protecting "Mission Impossible" from disclosure.

Design and Development

As the program moved out of the formative stage into design and development, there was an increasing demand for security approvals on contractor employees. A concerted effort was made to restrict the numbers of individuals briefed on AZORIAN in order to limit the targeting and penetration opportunities available to industrial and foreign espionage. But the program couldn't be done in a vacuum; contractors had to have access to the program. Because it was an ostensibly commercial effort, all industrial personnel had to be investigated by the Office of Security without showing government interest. To have shown a U.S. Government footprint during a background investigation would have blown the cover. Approximately (b)(3)(c) investigations were done. All personnel approved for access met the strict security criteria for AZORIAN. It was the largest effort of this type ever undertaken by the Office of Security.

Within the security approval for the program, three levels of access were established based on the need-to-know principle. The highest level gave full program knowledge and was limited to those who needed the information to carry out their part of the program and to those going on the mission. The more remote one's activity or involvement, the lower his access approval.

Mechanisms were developed to obtain other special security approvals. Certain commercially employed individuals needed (b)(3)(c) but it had to be granted without widespread knowledge within the (b)(3)(c) It would not make sense to be granting (b)(3)(c) to Global Marine or Hughes Tool Company employees. The Office of Security worked out an arrangement with their counterpart (b)(3)(c) to have these clearances granted and at the same time limit the knowledge of it to a handful of AZORIAN-cleared people (b)(3)(c) It was the use of this kind of procedure that allowed AZORIAN to go ahead on a very rapid time scale.

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During this stage of the program another landmark security decision was made. This was the so called "team spirit approach." Contractor personnel at the top level were to be considered full members of the team. What the government knew, they would know within the area relevant to contractors. And on board ship there were to be no second-class citizens. This policy was kept, and the only information withheld from top-level contractors (they were told in general terms what was being withheld) (b)(1) concerned primarily (b)(3)(c) All information on the target and its value was explained, particularly on the nuclear weapons problem, and all questions were answered on this potentially hazardous situation. Later on, in the spring of 1975, after AZORIAN was blown in the news media but not yet officially canceled, this team spirit philosophy produced its rewards. Contractor personnel were offered money—as much as $1500—for stories, but none of the ship's crew succumbed. One man who was on the program as an office employee for four months did talk to the press at that time, apparently on his own volition. The team spirit concept also drew out of everyone involved an effort above and beyond the call of duty. Several hazardous tasks were performed and nothing extra was sought. Future programs of this nature could profit immensely from the application of the team spirit approach to security.

Security personnel handled almost all the briefings of people, both government and industrial, coming onto the project. The briefings were not just time-consuming; they were the first aspect of AZORIAN that newcomers encountered, and it was important that they be done right. Likewise, as people left the program, security officers gave them their final briefing. It was the last and, perhaps, most lasting impression people would have of the project. It, too, had to be done just right. Just one disgruntled individual, either as he came on the program or as he left, could blow AZORIAN out of the water. It is a tribute to the security officers that no such incident occurred.

During the design and development phase a more commercial flavor was coming into the program, and it became necessary to use individuals with industrial security experience. The program office (b)(3)(c) was staffed with a cadre of security officers Others were hired and integrated into Global Marine and Summa (the successor to Hughes Tool.) The senior commercial security officer on the West Coast became the alter ego for the senior Headquarters security officer. Often these security officers were used as generalists and advisors to give commercial guidance on methods that should be used. The U.S. Government footprint was to be avoided while at the same time the government's seal of approval had to be obtained.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

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Hardware Acquisition

While management was preparing material for the never-ending reviews of the program, security was being burdened by a never-ending demand for security access approvals from contractors. Hardware acquisition was beginning, and that meant even more personnel involvement; operating crews for the *Glomar Explorer* were being recruited, and still more background investigations were required. All were being done by the Office of Security without showing government interest. To add to the load, the Agency technical, planning, and contracting officers were traveling more frequently to visit contractors. The work schedules had to be met; face-to-face meetings were required. It wouldn't do for the contractors to continually troop into Washington, D.C. The Agency people had to visit the contractors at their home plants or at neutral meeting places. Stringent security measures were required to permit these activities to occur without damaging cover. Every detail had to be examined in order to mask the government's presence.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

Security provided support of all types to meetings that took place in cities all over the country. No task was too small or ignoble if it meant protection for AZORIAN. Many of these meetings were attended by very senior government officials as well as by senior corporate officials, some of whom were closely allied with Howard Hughes. The cover would never have held if meetings between officials at this level had

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become public knowledge. Rooms, apartments, and meeting places were obtained. (b)(3)(c) Security officers acted as chauffeurs getting the high and mighty as well as the not-so-high and mighty to meetings (b)(3)(c) They served as caterers, too, providing a food service so that meetings could continue through the lunch and dinner hours when necessary. Security handled the glamorous with aplomb, the mundane with professionalism, and the trivial with a smile.

Along with the steady flow of people around the country, there was a cascade of documents that required movement. In the government world, there were the usual security classification stamps. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) To move all these documents securely among the many contractor and government offices was an onerous task. This was made worse by the spate of aircraft hijackings that was taking place in the early 1970's. Security officers spent many hours (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) in order to keep the information moving. (b)(1) (b)(1) The ability to move documents almost immediately was one more factor which helped to keep the program on schedule.

Testing

As the hardware took shape and became pieces of operating equipment, this equipment had to be tested, and government employees would be heavily involved in all aspects of the testing phase. They would be in charge of at-sea operations and also be members of the various working crews. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) There was also essential equipment to be loaded aboard which could not stand public scrutiny, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) For each problem the security officers devised a successful solution.

For those going on the *Glomar Explorer* it was that offered protection. In this program every government employee (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

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(b)(1)

Equipment that needed protection from disclosure also was put on the ship in a secure way (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

Government visitors to the ship during the at-sea testing phase moved under the constant and watchful eye of security officers. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

An extra hazard during the testing phase tried security's mettle. This was the labor strife at the pier stemming from the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association's attempt to unionize the crews working for Global Marine. The Global Marine management people were adamantly opposed to the union, and the case went to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which scheduled hearings and pondered whether to conduct a union shop election among Global Marine's employees. The hearing process was long, tedious, and full of delays, and all the while CIA had to walk a tightrope and maintain a neutral posture. Global Marine was notorious for its swift firing of employees who did not meet management's strict standards, and some of the *Glomar Explorer's* crew were union sympathizers; on the other hand, unionization of GMI at this stage, and the imposition of hiring hall procedures, would complicate the background investigation process and crew selection. For a while the government considered taking the union leaders into its confidence and asking their help in preserving AZORIAN's security.

Two incidents particularly stretched the security officers' nerves during the proceedings: Early on, the union forces, including some strong-arm types, appeared at the gate to the pier and things got quite tense; the non-union crew members were not

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shrinking violets either. The union gang slashed a few tires and strewed nails on the roadway, but the security people kept their cool and no fight erupted. Meanwhile, during a recess in the NLRB hearings, some union lawyers were heard to mutter that the DOMP was not what it purported to be. A union member was able to reassure the alarmed security officers that the comments were just so much hot air; there was no problem with the DOMP cover.

Finally, as the AZORIAN project neared completion, the NLRB hearings worked their own way to a conclusion, and Global Marine remained non-unionized. More important to the government, CIA had been able to preserve its involvement from public exposure without affecting the course of the labor negotiations.

Operations

The D-day for the mission approached rapidly. The Headquarters and program office members of security were working on the security annexes to the mission plans. All contingency situations had security connotations. There were casualty and accident plans to be drawn up. (b)(1) How was the port call to be handled? How was the crew change going to be conducted at either Midway or Hawaii? Security strategies and procedures for these situations were formulated and incorporated into the mission plans. Wives of the government employees going on the mission were given limited briefings concerning the absence of their husbands. Security officers were to be their point of contact if any of them had problems they couldn't cope with. There was flurry of last-minute activity which assured that mission readiness was achieved.

The mission director adopted the program manager's philosophy about the role of security in the program. On board the *Glomar Explorer*, the security officer was part and parcel of all management discussions, and no actions were planned without seeking this security officer's advice and counsel. In this way potential security problems were exposed and resolved before they became flaps.

During the mission one of the mundane jobs was the routine destruction of classified paper, most of it generated This problem (b)(1) first surfaced (b)(3)(c)
(b)(1) solution then was to hand-tear small amounts of paper into tiny pieces and dump them
(b)(3)(c) over the side One night while the paper was being dumped the old axiom "don't spit into the wind" was relearned at the cost of anxious moments spent gathering up tiny pieces of paper from the main deck. A few weeks later while
(b)(1) under surveillance unclassified paper trash (mostly old
(b)(3)(c) invoices) dumped overboard by the Global Marine supply man was promptly collected by the inquisitive Soviet crew. Thanks to these lessons, the security officer aboard the *Glomar Explorer* had a paper shredder which he used to turn all classified paper into a powder-like material which was dumped overboard at night. He was also in charge of the emergency destruction procedures.

(b)(1)

The security officer worked with the ship's crew to be sure that the well area was secure from visual observation as well as Soviet satellite surveillance. In his work with the crew, the security officer became the crew's morale officer, (b)(1)

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(b)(1) His success in generating crew support and confidence was a very positive factor in keeping the crew together during the periods of Soviet surveillance and later on when the news media were on to the program.

One of the hairier aspects of the on-board security officer's job was his intimate involvement in the precautions against any aggressive actions by the Russians. When the Soviet range ship *Chazma* was diverted from its homeward-bound course to give the *Glomar Explorer* a close-in examination, it was the security officer who directed the stacking of boxes and barrels on the ship's helicopter pad prior to the appearance of *Chazma*. (b)(1)

The security officer was also charged with investigating any attempts by outsiders to penetrate the ship's security while at sea, a seemingly unlikely circumstance addressed seriously by the mission's contingency planners. Observing that it is customary for ships with doctors aboard to respond to calls for medical help from nearby vessels, it had occurred to the security planners that a suspicious or merely curious captain could fake a medical emergency to get some of his men inside the *Glomar Explorer*. And, indeed, a request for medical aid was received while the *Explorer* was at the recovery site from the British freighter *Bel Hudson*, which signaled that one of its crew had suffered an apparent heart attack. After some soul-searching deliberations, the mission director responded to the call and the *Bel Hudson* altered course to meet the *Glomar Explorer* and lay to. The doctor, a medical technician and the security officer went over to look at the victim who, it turned out, was in shock from a minor injury after a fall. He was brought back for treatment and in an hour or so was returned to the British vessel. The security officer was satisfied that the British captain's request was legitimate and that no penetration effort had been attempted.

While the mission was under way, Headquarters security personnel were caught up in the damage assessment of the robbery at the Romaine Street offices of the Summa Corporation. Eventually they had to call in the FBI, which in turn enlisted the Los Angeles Police Department in an attempt to get back a program-related document that supposedly was obtained in the burglary. The document never came to light, but the Romaine Street robbery and the LAPD's attempts to retrieve the document ultimately resulted in the *Los Angeles Times* story which first broke the cover of the program. (b)(1)

When the mission ended (b)(1) the security people had the task of returning a crew (b)(1) and exchanging them at the island of Maui for a fresh crew. The exchange was effected without any erosion of the cover story, but (b)(1)

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When the *Glomar Explorer* finally returned to Long Beach

(b)(1)

MATADOR Preparations

Once the decision was made to make a second attempt to complete the recovery mission, the Office of Security's thoughts turned towards the procedures to be used on the new program, code named MATADOR. A review of the procedures used on AZORIAN

(b)(1)

In February 1975 the *Los Angeles Times* combined in one front-page story four sure-fire attention grabbers: the unsolved Romaine Street robbery, Howard Hughes, the CIA, and the recovery of a sunken Soviet submarine. According to the *Times*, the CIA had attempted to recover a Soviet submarine from the depths of the Atlantic Ocean with a ship that Hughes had built with government money. The *Times* managed to link these rumors with a detailed recapitulation of the eight-month-old robbery of the Hughes office on Romaine Street in Encino, in which the burglars had made off with cash and "sensitive papers." Despite the obvious errors in the account, it focused the attention of other journalists on the *Glomar Explorer*. For a while DCI William Colby, by personally appealing to the senior managers of the nation's news media, managed to hold the line against further revelations, but in March Jack Anderson went on national television with his version, and the press floodgates were opened. MATADOR, however, was not yet wholly engulfed, and preparations continued for a mission start date in early July.

The *Glomar Explorer* was soon a fortress besieged as local, regional and national news people poured into the Long Beach area. Helicopters carrying network television crews hovered over the ship. Reporters frequented the Long Beach bars and tried all the arts and tricks of their trade to find knowledgeable sources and persuade them to talk. Waterfront hangers-on were plied with drinks and prostitutes were enlisted in attempts to buy crew lists. Crew members were pestered, badgered and propositioned. The security team gave repeated crew briefings on the dangers of any kind of conversation with people from the news media; their admonition was: "Don't answer any question, no matter how trivial, about the *Glomar Explorer* or its purpose." And the crew and other workers on the program responded by holding the line, even when the press got after their families at home or came at them directly with offers of substantial sums of money.

Only one internal breach marred the record, and security quickly tracked it down. A story appearing in the *New York Times* early in April 1975, though it contained much that was wrong and was designed to be provocative, revealed

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information that must have been obtained from an insider. Clues in the story pointed in one direction, particularly an incidental reference to the issuing of a pair of boots to a new crew member. The logistics records were searched, the receipt for the boots found, and the leaker uncovered. He was an office worker who had been on the program only four months in 1974, resigning shortly before he would have been dismissed. He had not been on the ship, but he had a younger brother among the "B" crew, the one that had met the ship in Hawaii to relieve the recovery crew and help (b)(1) Under the influence of his older brother, the crew member had discussed aspects of the mission, but it was the older brother who went to the *New York Times* with his own cockeyed, contentious version. Security could do nothing at the time except redouble its warnings to the crew members and everyone else connected with the program to maintain the "no comment" policy.

In 1978 the older brother struck again. He was the co-author of a book about the project, a book mixed with fact and fancy. Although he had signed a secrecy agreement, he had not submitted his manuscript to CIA for review as his secrecy agreements with the Agency required. So far, he has gotten away with the breach of his signed agreement and his word; to prosecute him, the government would have to reveal further classified information, define the factual material in the book, and thus compound the security breaches left ambiguous by the author's uninformed errors and inventions.

Other incidents occurred as the ship was being readied for the new attempt. The Long Beach Harbor Patrol had official access to the pier, and on one occasion a uniformed Harbor Patrol officer accompanied by a civilian drove to the gangway leading up to the main deck of the ship. The civilian jumped out and began to take pictures—a strictly forbidden activity—and then quickly drove away. Security, through the Global Marine superintendent, phoned the Harbor Patrol and explained what had happened. The Harbor Patrol authorities, chargrined, investigated and found the officer responsible for the intrusion. The film was returned undeveloped with an apology. The guilty officer allegedly was helping a college friend do a story on the types of ships in the Long Beach Harbor.

(b)(3)(c)

Security measures on the ship were increased in reaction not only to the press investigations, but to a wave of bombing threats in the general Los Angeles area. The concern for security was reinforced after a Catalina tour boat was targeted and destroyed by a radical group at a pier in the nearby Los Angeles Harbor. Howard Hughes and his reported relationship with CIA made the *Glomar Explorer* a natural target for the radicals, and security mounted a deck watch to warn of any suspicious approaches to the ship from the harbor channel. Anti-swimmer nets were made and kept handy on the main deck to be used against any swimmers approaching the ship. The guard force at the pier gate was increased, and packages, sacks or bags going on the pier had to be opened, inspected, and stamped by security. No explosives were going to go on the ship through either deliberate attempts or the duping of innocents.

Vigilance against Soviet observation and espionage was maintained. Russian ships were constantly docking at a pier directly across the channel. Precious little shipping activity seemed to be taking place around them, and, as someone said, they probably (b)(1) The opening of hatches which would expose the well area to photographic surveillance had

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to have the approval of the security officer. Yet no overt or covert interest in the *Glomar Explorer* by the Russian ships was ever observed.

(b)(1)

Phase-out

But the harpies of the shore had been busy all the time the crew was putting the ship through its paces, and in late June the word came down from higher authority that the mission was canceled. There would be only one last trip to sea for the *Explorer* and its crew, and that would be for the purpose of a final clean-up (b)(1) A few days prior to departure, the tax assessor of Los Angeles County slapped a tax lien on the ship for $4,685,882.07. He had in effect seized the vessel and was going to put it up for sale at public auction on 27 August. The assessor sent a watch keeper to the pier to prevent the ship from departing. While he was watching the ship, the on-board security officer was watching him. The eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation was resolved within a day by the necessary legal maneuvers. The *Glomar Explorer* departed the pier on 20 August for her final clean-up.

Meanwhile, although the government maintained its "no comment" stance after the Jack Anderson expose' in March, the newspapers continued to trumpet the story, playing and replaying articles combining the wildest of speculations, inventions, half-truths, conjectures and fragments of the facts. In this they inadvertently served the security interests of the government, for it looked very much as if the Soviets were as confused about the mission's purpose and degree of success as were ordinary American newspaper readers. It was security's job to keep it that way; there was to be no confirmation or denial of any of the stories circulating in the press.

This became a delicate task as the program phase-out began. Crew members and other workers were laid off, since only a small maintenance force was to be kept on the ship. The debriefings by security had to be done in a way that would minimize the chances that employees would leave the program with a grudge against it; news stories could easily result from such sources. The debriefings were conducted professionally and with empathy toward the work force. No leaks to the press resulted from the crew roll-off procedures.

A serious effort was made to find alternate uses for the ship; the General Services Administration undertook this responsibility along with Global Marine, Inc. When tours of the ship were arranged for interested parties, it was security's job to make sure the critical spaces were avoided. The control center was the only major portion that needed protecting (b)(1)

Global Marine was permitted to make a commercial movie about the *Glomar Explorer* in order to advertise its capabilities. Richard Anderson from the *Six Million Dollar Man* television series was the narrator. Again some glamour returned to the ship, and again security had to be alert to prevent any would-be movie stars among the

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crew from making unauthorized film debuts. Also, certain areas of the ship had to remain protected from the camera's sweeping eye.

In November 1975 the government's on-board staff security officer was removed and replaced by a former employee hired on contract. By now the ship was in a configuration in which there was essentially no chance for erosion of security. Efforts to find alternate uses had not been successful, and there was little activity on board other than routine maintenance. Finally, when the U.S. Navy took over control of the *Glomar Explorer* and started the mothballing process a staff security officer returned to the ship during the turnover activities to conduct a physical inspection in conjunction with officers from the Navy and the Maritime Administration.

After a couple of years in mothballs, the *Glomar Explorer* was reactivated for legitimate deep-ocean mining tests. While the ship was in drydock for refurbishment some material was found in a remote part of the well that looked suspiciously like remnants of Soviet canned goods, either cabbage or carrots, left over from the exploitation of the submarine. The item was quickly and carefully sequestered by some of the ship's crew who had remembered their lectures on security and radioactive contamination. A team of experts was sent to examine the find. It turned out to be non-radioactive sauerkraut of U.S. origin.

Exploitation

(b)(1)

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(b)(1)

Valediction

It has been said that a program designed to have no risk has the best security. Too often this implies no action and no results. AZORIAN was a high-risk program, full of action and results. The security afforded it was the best.

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Kennedy School of Government
Case Program

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CIA and the Fall of the Soviet Empire:
The Politics of "Getting It Right"

In the wake of the 1991 collapse of the Soviet empire and the most dramatic realignment of geopolitical forces since World War II, the Central Intelligence Agency found itself fighting for its institutional life. At what should have been its moment of greatest glory—the demise of its prime ideological adversary—the CIA stood charged that it had failed the mission for which it was founded: accurately assessing the political, economic and military state of the Soviet Union.

Critics contended that the CIA overstated the strength of the Soviet economy, underestimated the power of republican independence movements and overestimated the military threat (thereby forcing the US into what some considered an unnecessary arms build-up). Stansfield Turner, head of the CIA from 1977-81, wrote in late 1991 that "we should not gloss over the enormity of [the CIA's] failure to forecast the magnitude of the Soviet crisis ... "

> I never heard a suggestion from the CIA, or the intelligence arms of the departments of defense or state, that numerous Soviets recognized a growing, systemic economic problem.[1]

Many in the media judged the CIA harshly. One representative judgment said that "the agency was left virtually in the dark about the Soviet bloc's political, economic and societal decay, as well as the speed with which communism would collapse in Eastern Europe."[2] The same article said "economists were amazed at the extent to which the CIA had overestimated the performance of the Soviet economy, leading many to speculate that the numbers were hyped to fuel the arms race." The most vociferous critic was Democratic Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a former vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who said that "for a quarter century, the CIA has been repeatedly wrong about the major political and economic questions entrusted to its analysis."[3] Moynihan introduced a bill to abolish the CIA and place intelligence under the secretary of state.

Lieut. Gen. William Odom, director of the National Security Agency (NSA) from 1985-88, expresses even stronger views on the CIA's contribution to understanding the USSR. He argues that the Agency has always been a marginal, and expendable, player in the policy world. The CIA, says Odom, should be disbanded and its functions distributed to the departments of State and Defense, not simply because it was wrong about the Soviet Union, but because it is superfluous.

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1 *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1991. p. 151n.
2 Griffin, Rodman D. *The New CIA*. CQ Researcher, Dec. 11, 1992. p. 1075.
3 *New York Times*, May 19, 1991. p. 17.

This case was written by Kirsten Lundberg for Professors Ernest May and Philip Zelikow at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, for the Harvard Intelligence and Policy Project, with support from the Central Intelligence Agency. (0994)

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> I can think of almost no time when the findings of an NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] caused any policymaker to change his mind on anything or caused a policy to move in one direction or another. ... You could close down the DDI [intelligence analysis directorate] tomorrow and nobody would miss it. ... The only serious issue here is whether you want to continue to pay all these people. I guess you keep idle *intelligentsia* off the streets. I consider by and large their analytical effort a welfare transfer package.

The charges prompted anger and soul-searching at the agency spawned by the Cold War and long on its front lines. Through an internal review, in public speeches by its leaders and in private conversations, CIA analysts responded: the Agency missed almost nothing. In paper after memorandum after National Intelligence Estimate from 1979 to 1991, say CIA officials, analysts described rising social tensions within the Soviet Union, a slowdown in economic growth, reduced rates of growth in military spending, emerging ethnic movements, changes in Soviet Third World policy and, after 1989, the *ad hoc* nature of Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership.

CIA defenders—and they included many senior policymakers in the Reagan and Bush administrations—pointed out that no one, including academic Sovietologists, predicted the end of the Soviet system at a certain time and place. As Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock puts it:

> As far as being served by the CIA, I think we were served well. Policymakers have to be reasonable on expectations. No intelligence organization is going to be able to tell you precisely what events are going to occur when.

Robert Gates, a lifelong CIA Russian analyst who rose to become Director of Central Intelligence, defended the Agency in a 1992 speech to the Foreign Policy Association.

> Obviously there were deficiencies in CIA's work on the Soviet Union—things we did not know and areas where we were wrong. But the body of information, analysis and warning provided to policymakers and to Congress was of extraordinarily high quality. To claim that US intelligence in general and CIA in particular failed to recognize the systemic weakness of the Soviet system, failed to inform policymakers of the growing crisis, or failed to warn of impending collapse of the old order is not consistent with the facts.

If there was a public sense that the Soviet Union's implosion caught the world by surprise, says the CIA, that was due not to a lack of intelligence but to an informed decision by top US government officials that US interests would be ill-served by sounding public alarms about the doubtful future of Gorbachev and the USSR.

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To a significant degree, critics of the CIA on the left and the right were reacting to the debate over Agency accuracy (or inaccuracy) in estimating Soviet GNP. Yet the economic estimate was only one tool for reaching political judgments about the future of the USSR. In the world of intelligence, where CLASSIFIED is a standard imprint, assembling a comprehensive record of proceedings is not yet possible. The following account, based on the public record and interviews as well as on documents declassified for this project by the CIA, chronicles what participants consider important moments in the Agency's analysis of Gorbachev's USSR from 1985 to 1991.

Part I: The Reagan/Gorbachev Years, 1985-88

When Mikhail Gorbachev took over from Konstantin Chernenko as General Secretary of the USSR on March 11, 1985, Ronald Reagan was in his second term as president. George Shultz was secretary of state, Caspar Weinberger was secretary of defense. The United States had seen signs of a softening in Soviet-US relations when, in January, Soviet Foreign Secretary Andrei Gromyko and Shultz had agreed to open negotiations on nuclear and space weapons. But it was not immediately apparent in what direction Gorbachev—a youngster among the Politburo geriatrics—would take his country.

Early Gorbachev

At Chernenko's funeral, at least one American thought he discerned in Gorbachev a new attitude. "In Gorbachev we have an entirely different kind of leader in the Soviet Union than we have experienced before," Shultz told Vice President Bush.[4] Shultz noted in his memoirs that he was impressed with the new general secretary's "quality of thought, the intensity and the intellectual energy of this new man on the scene."[5] Gorbachev quickly accepted an invitation from Reagan for a meeting but suggested it be held in Moscow instead of Washington. Since the last summit had been in the Soviet capital, a compromise was reached for a summit in Geneva in November 1985.

At the summit, Gorbachev impressed Reagan with his willingness to take concrete steps on such contentious issues as reducing strategic arms by 50 percent and working toward an agreement on INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces). Gorbachev also welcomed bridge-building measures such as opening consulates in Kiev and New York, and resuming direct airline service between the two nations. Only two months later, in early 1986, Gorbachev demonstrated a growing talent for grabbing headlines when he proposed cutting nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to zero by the year 2000. He conditioned the proposal on American agreement to give up the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a favorite project of Reagan's.

Domestically, too, Gorbachev was taking dramatic steps, both concrete and symbolic. He instituted a campaign of *glasnost*, or openness, unleashing free discussion of political topics for the first

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[4] One small hint, typical of the kind of thing Kremlinologists considered significant in that period, was that Gorbachev kept the military off the podium during the funeral.

[5] Shultz, George. *Turmoil and Triumph. My Years As Secretary of State.* Macmillan Publishing Co. New York. 1993. p. 532.

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time in decades. Simultaneously, he launched a campaign to turn around the lagging economy through investment and modernization of an antiquated and technologically backward industrial base. To improve productivity, he emphasized discipline in the workplace and ran a draconian anti-alcohol campaign. Gorbachev shook up the personnel at the top of the Communist Party hierarchy, dismissing eight economic ministers and several Central Committee department chiefs, as well as supervising turnover among regional Party first secretaries.

Gorbachev also demonstrated a personal style in marked contrast to his predecessors. He met with Soviet citizens and answered their questions. He held press conferences. He spoke openly of sensitive subjects. In February 1986, Gorbachev told the 27th Communist Party Congress that Afghanistan was an "open wound" for the nation. In December 1986, he brought home from six years of internal exile the Nobel Peace prizewinner Andrei Sakharov.

While millions of Soviet citizens welcomed Gorbachev's promises of reform and renewal, the general secretary's actions dismayed many millions more accustomed for decades to hearing nothing but flattering propaganda about the well-being of their country. For different reasons, this far-from-standard Soviet leader also proved disconcerting to his audience in Washington. Both within the Central Intelligence Agency and within the top circles of the US government, Gorbachev's policies accentuated long-standing ideological differences over how to assess the abilities and intentions of the other superpower.

The CIA of 1985 (DI)

The analysis branch of the CIA, called the Directorate for Intelligence (DI), had had the Soviet Union in its sights since 1947.[6] The CIA was founded in that year with a mandate to provide policymakers an unbiased, nonpartisan, non-ideological picture of Soviet actions and aims so that US leaders could make the best possible decisions on US strategies for dealing with Moscow.[7] Since the early 1960s, however, a debate about the ideological character of the Soviet Union had divided scholars and policymakers alike. The CIA, as incubator for some of the nation's most critical studies on the Soviet Union, was hardly exempt from this contest between two persuasive schools of thought on what Ronald Reagan might have termed the "evil empire" question.

The Fault Line. Simplistically put, the dividing issue was: did the Soviet Union operate primarily from ideological motives of world domination, fundamentally and dangerously different from Western societies; or had it evolved past the "Stalinist" model to a rational world actor, with a leadership looking for modest reform, susceptible to pressure from increasingly potent grassroots forces? The majority of Agency analysts took, by the 1970s, a more nuanced view of Soviet motivations than

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6 For a description of the CIA *qua* organization, as well as of the larger intelligence community, see Background Note 1. While other branches of the intelligence community, such as INR and DIA, also contributed importantly to intelligence assessments of the USSR, this report spotlights the CIA as the chief purveyor of intelligence on Soviet affairs to US policymakers. The CIA was also most widely criticized for its work during this period.

7 For an account of the CIA struggle to make intelligence analysis useful to policymakers, see Background Note 2.

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these characterizations suggest. Nonetheless, various periods in Agency history were marked by significant animosity between "hawks" and "doves."[8]

The Casey Years. During the Reagan Administration, hawks were unusually well represented in the CIA's leadership. Reagan appointed William Casey, his campaign manager and trusted associate, as Director of Central Intelligence.[9] Casey held firm hardline views on the Soviet Union and had a longstanding affection for covert operations dating from his experiences during World War II. Robert Gates, who served as head of the Directorate for Intelligence (DDI) from 1982-86, was a Soviet scholar and longtime CIA analyst also known for his hardline interpretation of Soviet actions. Reagan dismayed many who worried about the Agency's delicate balancing act between analysis and advocacy when he made Casey a member of the Cabinet, the first time in history that a DCI had had that status.

The Agency did, in fact, fall prey to charges that under Casey it politicized intelligence reports. Secretary of State Shultz, for example, grew to distrust all intelligence documents for fear Casey had filtered their contents. As he would later write:

> He had very strong policy positions, which were reflected in his intelligence briefings. He claimed he was objective. But his views were so strong and so ideological that they inevitably colored his selection and assessment of materials. I could not rely on what he said, nor could I accept without question the objectivity of the "intelligence" that he put out, especially in policy-sensitive areas.[10]

Gates recalls trying to persuade Shultz that Casey was not influencing CIA reports, only exercising his legitimate right in Cabinet meetings to give his own interpretation of events.

> I said, you may not agree with the printed product, but what really sets you off is what Casey says at the table. Go back to your office and look at the printed product. That's not necessarily what Casey thinks. In fact, he disagrees on a lot of the stuff that I publish. But I happen to think that the director, as long as he represents at the table what the views of the community are, ought to have the freedom then to say 'But here's what I think.'

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8 In 1991 congressional hearings, an Agency officer characterized members of the two factions as "knuckledraggers" or hawks, versus "com-symps" or doves. Other CIA officers feel these terms were overly dramatic and emphasize that the labels were not common usage within the Agency.

9 This meant Casey was not only head of the CIA, but also chief of some 15 intelligence agencies arrayed through the State Department, the Department of Defense and the armed services.

10 Shultz Memoirs. p. 691.

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Others, too, argued that Casey had every right, indeed a responsibility, to present his own views to his colleagues in the Cabinet. As Prof. Harry Rowen of Stanford University put it in a crisp letter to the *New York Times:* "A CIA director is not supposed to be an intellectual eunuch."[11]

Whatever the justifications may have been, it was a fact that within the Agency—as within the ranks of the Administration—many individuals worried about the possibility that intelligence was being politicized. During the early to mid-1980s, several CIA projects on Soviet affairs sparked internal controversy over their conclusions: one assessment of Soviet strength in the Third World, another on possible Soviet links to the assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II, a third on the potential for Soviet interference in Iran. In all three cases, a number of analysts felt that Casey and Gates had ensured the final product made the most damning case possible against the Soviets, based on what they considered flimsy evidence.[12]

SOVA Hardest Hit. While many departments within the CIA contributed to assessments of the Soviet Union, the chief responsibility for following Moscow lay with the Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA). Not surprisingly, it was hardest hit by the "politicization battle." Even analysts who had no personal grudge against Gates conceded that the atmosphere within SOVA (along with the Global Issues Office, which also closely monitored the USSR) was confrontational. A number of analysts felt themselves unfairly singled out for being "soft" on communism. As Robert Blackwell, a high-ranking CIA official, puts it, "there was a tension in this building."

> It was palpable. Whether anything was being twisted or reordered upstairs or not, people felt that they were under extra burdens to somehow be very careful about how things were said. ... Papers that were exceptionally hard hitting and very negative about whatever it might have been didn't seem to get quite as much critique as ones that weren't, or at least many felt that.

Douglas MacEachin, director of SOVA from 1984-89, would later say that "the [Third World] division [of SOVA] tended to see themselves in a holy war with the administration."[13] He, too, felt the burden.

> The period during which I felt I had the least impact [on policy] was during the Reagan administration. They thought of us as the enemy. ... The implication was that part of the national threat was that the CIA undercut our ability to rebuild our national forces. The administration charged the

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11 *New York Times*, Letters to the Editor. Sept. 13, 1987. Section 4, p. 34.

12 Charges were aired in public only in 1991, when Gates was nominated for the second time to become DCI under President Bush. The nomination hearings allowed many disgruntled analysts to vent their anger against Gates. Gates' defenders said the unhappy analysts were young and taking personally rather than professionally what could be biting comments from Gates.

13 Robert M. Gates Nomination Hearings, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Sept. 16-Oct. 18, 1991. Vol. 3, p. 34.

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> CIA with being too liberal. It said we underestimated the military threat, underestimated the Soviet threat in the Third World.

Thus by 1985 the CIA, especially SOVA, was trusted neither by the left nor the right within the Administration. Hardliners distrusted the CIA as "Communist sympathizers" because its assessments tended to be less strident than Casey's. At the same time, potential CIA allies within the policy community, such as Shultz, also mistrusted CIA documents because they feared the influence of Casey.

Gorbachev would provide a new focus for these preexisting divisions both within the CIA and between the CIA and the Administration.

Reaction in Washington

Gorbachev's arms proposals, his domestic program, his public relations savvy, left the US administration divided. Many members of Reagan's White House felt that Gorbachev was playing a divide and conquer game against NATO and the United States, seeking to lull them with apparent concessions only to return in strength once the Western alliance had lost its cohesion. Others gave Gorbachev the benefit of the doubt, taking him at his word as a reformer until proven otherwise.

By 1986, Shultz and Reagan had concluded that Gorbachev, as Shultz put it, "was proving to be energetic advocate of appealing positions."[14] But where Shultz and the president saw opportunity, Weinberger, Casey, Richard Perle and others in the administration saw Soviet cunning and trickery. They pointed to strong historical precedents for refusing to believe that Gorbachev was operating in good faith.

No Downsides. The Administration sought a Soviet policy which took into account both points of view. For decades, US self-interest vis-a-vis the Soviet Union had been defined almost exclusively in terms of the concessions Washington could extract on arms control. Now the White House, as then-National Security Council Special Assistant Jack Matlock describes it, wanted to expand the definition of US self-interest to take into account the possibilities Gorbachev offered for revolutionizing East-West relations. Says Matlock:

> What you had to do was find a policy that would protect you if [true reform] didn't happen, but would take advantage of it if it did. And that's what we devised. It was a policy with no downsides.

The policy became, in Matlock's words, "to bring down the Iron Curtain without saying so, and to cooperate on and demilitarize conflicts in third areas." Arms control, he and others believed, would "follow, not precede" internal Soviet change, and "we really had to force them to change internally and to bring pressure to bear." Skeptics like Casey raised no objections to the new policy, says Matlock, "because we weren't really sacrificing anything." Besides, part of the pressure the Reagan

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1. Shultz Memoirs, p. 704.

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Administration put on Moscow came in the form of a massive US arms buildup, plus the early development of a space-based nuclear deterrent dubbed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars"—both very welcome to hardliners.

Shultz, however, felt Casey and his fellow hardliners remained stubbornly negative in their view of Gorbachev. During senior-level meetings on Soviet affairs, Shultz came to discern a pattern.

> I would describe how the Soviets were moving in our direction and point to steps we should take to keep that positive movement going. Cap Weinberger would then say that we were flaking for Soviet propaganda. CIA director Bill Casey or his deputy, Bob Gates, would say that CIA intelligence analysis revealed that Gorbachev had done nothing new, only talked a different line. And most of those present would try to stimulate the president's fear that any US diplomatic engagement with Moscow would jeopardize the future of SDI.[15]

Whatever the discussion at the Cabinet level, such negative judgments were not typical of CIA estimates during Gorbachev's early years. While Agency analysts had a vivid appreciation of the difficulties confronting Gorbachev, assessments were also cautiously optimistic about his sincerity and his chances for success.

For decades, the primary focus of CIA Soviet analysis had been on the balance between the two superpowers. Thus papers examined in detail Soviet activities in the Third World, the minutiae of weapons programs, and the state of the economy. Only in 1984 did the Agency establish a new branch called "Societal Issues" to examine domestic political and social developments. Most CIA reports continued, however, to focus on the "big three" topics.

An Early Assessment of Gorbachev & the Economy

In September 1985, six months after Gorbachev took over, DI published one of its early analyses of Gorbachev's USSR under the title "Gorbachev's Economic Agenda: Promises, Potentials and Pitfalls." The report noted that Gorbachev has "set in motion the most aggressive economic agenda since the Khruschev era." It acknowledged the enormity of his task: reforming an economy "that cannot simultaneously maintain rapid growth in defense spending, satisfy demand for greater quantity and variety of consumer goods and services, invest the amounts required for economic modernization and expansion and continue to support client-state economies." Gorbachev, said DI, "in our view has a clear understanding of these limitations; he is obviously extremely impatient that they be addressed now."

If anyone understood what Gorbachev was up against, it was the CIA. For decades it had tracked the Soviet economy, estimating annually both the absolute value of various segments of the economy, and long-term trends. Every year, the CIA submitted declassified reports on the Soviet economy to Congress, specifically to the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) and its subcommittees. The

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15 Ibid., p. 707.

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most important measures CIA provided policymakers were an estimate of Soviet GNP (gross national product) and its rate of growth.

Chronic Slowdown. The Agency had been pointing to a chronic slowdown in the Soviet economy since the 1970s. In 1977, the CIA told the JEC that "the Soviet economy faces serious strain in the decade ahead" and that the low growth rate would pose hard choices for Soviet leaders. That refrain was heard again in 1980, when then-DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner told the JEC that "the combination of slowing economic growth and rising military outlays poses difficult choices for the leadership over the next several years."

Blunter still was the 1981 report:

> The Soviet pattern in many respects conforms to that of a less-developed country. There is remarkably little progress toward a more modern pattern. The USSR is indeed the world's most under-developed developed country. Long-continued investment priorities favoring heavy industry and defense, coupled with a rigid and cumbersome system ... combine to produce a consumer sector that not only lags behind both West and Eastern Europe, but also is in many respects primitive, grossly unbalanced and in massive disequilibrium.

Gorbachev's Tough Course. By 1985, the CIA characterized the economy Gorbachev inherited as "backward." In its September report, for example, the Agency reported record-low growth in Soviet GNP of 1.4 percent from 1979-82, recovering to over 2 percent in 1983-4. But the CIA did not find Gorbachev's first efforts to improve it encouraging.

The assessment identified a number of inherent contradictions in his reform program. On the one hand, Gorbachev outlined ambitious modernization goals for industry, but financing them would require "a potential decline of some 60 percent" in funding for the consumer sector. Yet if Gorbachev wished to succeed in his campaign to improve abysmal worker productivity figures—another declared goal—he needed to increase the availability and quality of consumer goods as an incentive to work harder. In another example, Gorbachev announced plans to hold energy investment constant, yet "demand for energy will grow and the cost of offsetting declining oil production will be rapidly rising." Moreover, noted the assessment, the "increased managerial independence necessary to spur effective technological development and utilization is inconsistent with a centrally planned pricing and allocation system." Gorbachev, it summarized, must support more radical reform or fail.

> Continued reliance on marginal tinkering despite clear indications that the plan for economic revitalization is faltering would indicate that Gorbachev, like Brezhnev before him, has succumbed to a politically expedient but economically ineffective approach.

One of the surest measures of Soviet economic priorities had always been the amount of money evoted to defense. Within six months, the CIA was able to report that Gorbachev appeared willing

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to move beyond "tinkering" to take on the defense establishment. A report published in March 1986, the one-year anniversary of Gorbachev's ascension, examined the implications of Gorbachev's economic reforms for Soviet defense spending.

Soviet Defense and Economic Reform Compatible?

In "Gorbachev's Modernization Program: Implications for Defense," the CIA pointed out that the two industries Gorbachev depended on to produce the machinery to fuel civilian industrial growth were the same as those supplying hardware to the military and durables to the consumer. Thus these industries—machine building and metalworking—were under triple pressure to produce.

In the short run, said the intelligence document, the military might be willing to harness its demands because the bulk of production facilities for new weapons systems were already in operation. The real crunch would come, it projected, in 1988 or so when the military establishment would need to plan for new generations of weapons.

Following publication of this paper, SOVA put together a briefing that went somewhat further and expressed the view that:

- the crunch was not just a possibility but a likelihood, because Gorbachev's half measures were not likely to result in the sought-for gains in productivity
- this meant that Soviet defense spending was not likely to increase through the end of the decade

The principal difference between this view and the more traditional view was not that defense spending was a burden for the Soviet economy, but that now there was a leader who would try to contain defense in order to deal with economic problems.

MacEachin and two other SOVA officers, Jim Noren and Derk Swain, briefed Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz on this assessment. Weinberger's reaction was in line with hardline thinking within the administration: if the Soviets fixed their economy, they would be even better equipped to then rebuild the military. Such a course would pose an even greater threat to US security than the current Soviet Union with its weak economy, and would never justify cutbacks in US defense outlays. That was essentially how Bill Casey and Robert Gates, too, interpreted the intelligence reports. Shultz, on the other hand, saw in the analysis some favorable indications for arms control. According to MacEachin, Shultz specifically asked what was meant by the term 'crunch point in 1988' and pursued the issue at some length.

The March 1986 assessment itself predicted little near-term impact from economic reform on Soviet foreign policy, particularly on arms control negotiations, because "the benefit to Gorbachev's industrial modernization plans would not be great over the next few years." However, the CIA noted that "by promoting a more relaxed atmosphere and a perception of arms control opportunities, Gorbachev probably hopes to encourage downward pressure on US defense spending and greater access to Western technology and trade credits."

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The CIA had long recorded the rising strength of the Soviet military. It estimated that Soviet defense spending had grown by 50 percent from 1965-81, from some 45 billion rubles to over 80 billion.[16] From 1974 to 1985, the USSR added more than three times as many strategic weapons to its stockpile as did the US. It also modernized and added to conventional forces. In 1976, the CIA had announced publicly that the Soviet "defense burden"—the percentage of GNP devoted to defense—stood at 11-13 percent.[17]

As early as 1982, however, and again in 1983, the CIA reported something new which caused it to revise its own estimates. Although absolute levels of Soviet spending on defense were still high, they had stopped growing. In 1983, SOVA reexamined previous estimates and concluded that growth in defense spending—specifically in procurement of military hardware, which accounted for 50 percent of the defense budget—had in fact tailed off beginning in 1976.[18] This had halved the growth of overall defense spending from the 4-5 percent of the early 1970s to 2 percent (the CIA had reported contemporaneously 4 percent growth for the period 1976-81).

This development was considered significant and puzzling. The report said, "[b]ecause we do not fully understand the causes of the slowdown, we cannot provide a confident answer" [as to whether procurement will quickly rebound]. "Such a prolonged stagnation has not occurred since the 1950s," it said.

George Kolt, then the assistant National Intelligence Officer for the USSR (NIO/USSR), remembers that CIA analysts would have liked to make a strong statement in an NIE being written at that time (summer 1982) about the leveling they saw in defense spending, going beyond simply noting it to conclude that "the Soviet Union could not forever sustain the defense burden."

> But I couldn't get this into the estimate. That was turned down at the direct opposition of the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] ... On the analytical level [at CIA] there was willingness to accept our judgment, but when it came to the top, there was nobody willing to fight for it.

This reluctance stemmed in part, perhaps, from an unwillingness by intelligence community statisticians to give critics any more grounds for complaint than they had already. In the mid-1970s, the CIA had suffered embarassment and censure when its estimates of Soviet missile-building capability were found to be too low. In the early 1980s, ironically, the Agency reported that its estimates of growth in military procurement dating back to 1976 had been too high. In response, the CIA provided Congress, as well as critics in the academic and policy worlds, with lengthy explanations of its methodology for estimating both the Soviet economy and the size of its military. But by and large, Agency statisticians and economists were proud of the quality and consistency of their work.

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16 *Soviet Defense Spending: Recent Trends and Future Prospects*, Directorate of Intelligence. July 1983. p. 2.

17 This was an upwards revision of an earlier estimate which put the "burden" at 6-9 percent. Some CIA critics, however, felt the defense percentage of GNP was even higher and cited émigré reports that it reached 18 percent. For purposes of comparison, the US "defense burden" was roughly 5 percent of GNP.

Soviet Defense Spending, p. iii. The CIA disclosed these findings in open hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance and Security Economics of the JEC on Sept. 20, 1983.

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Economic and defense spending estimates, they pointed out, had been particularly reliable in detecting trends.[19]

While the military and economic estimates may have drawn their share of criticism, at least those areas of Soviet activity were heavily studied. Social issues, on the other hand, got short shrift until 1984.

"Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System"

Analysis of social issues was not something to which the CIA traditionally devoted much staff time or energy. Nonetheless, some pieces examining social problems through the prism of economic analysis did reach publication. In 1979, for example, SOVA analyst Kay Oliver drafted a paper for National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski which chronicled an array of problems, including "Soviet consumer discontent [which] is rising and will cause the regime of the 1980s serious economic and political problems." Where the paper lacked insight, says Oliver, was in its assessment of what the Soviets were going to do about it. But the dilemma facing the Politburo was clearly explained.

A paper in 1982 laid out serious forebodings about popular unrest and high-level corruption. Another paper disseminated in 1983 drew attention to the importance of civilian discontent.

> The scope and character of popular grievances that are suggested in recent civil unrest probably present a greater long-term challenge to the regime than the narrower intellectual dissident movement.[20]

But SOVA settled into serious study of social issues only in 1984, when MacEachin—at Gates' behest—created a new Societal Issues branch and appointed Oliver as its chief.[21] This branch established itself with the publication in 1985 of an estimate drafted by Oliver and analyst Paul Cocks. At that point, Gorbachev had been in power barely half a year. The paper, therefore, provided a snapshot of the country Gorbachev inherited.

The Estimate. Titled "Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System," the NIE was coordinated by NIO/USSR Fritz Ermarth and NIO/Europe George Kolt.[22] In a more comprehensive fashion than any earlier paper, the estimate catalogued and diagnosed the ills of Soviet society in the mid-1980s. The USSR suffered, it said, from an economic slowdown, an unmotivated labor force, a "parasitic" bureaucracy, a "moribund" leadership, from a wide variety of criminal activities, as well as alcoholism and civil unrest. While the NIE characterized the Soviet Union as a "very stable country" in a global context, it noted that the political system itself had become an obstacle to growth and reform.

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19 For a more substantial discussion of internal and external criticisms of CIA methodology, see Background Note 3.

20 from a conversation with Douglas MacEachin, 7/14/93.

21 The branch at first was called Security Issues, but intelligence/security questions later spun off into a separate branch, leaving Societal Issues behind.

22 This study was published both as a SOVA paper and as an NIE; it was unusual for this to happen.

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> Unless the system is reformed in fundamental ways, it will hamper the growth its leaders seek because it stifles the innovation on which technological and social progress depends.[23]

The Soviet regime also, reported the NIE, faced developing tension between popular aspirations and the system's growing inability any longer to satisfy them—an inability which could ultimately threaten regime stability.

> We do not exclude the possibility that these tensions could eventually confront the regime with challenges that it cannot effectively contain without system change and the risks to control that would accompany such change.

The NIE predicted reform efforts from Gorbachev, but expected they would be conservative, system-preserving measures on the model of those initiated by former General Secretary Yuri Andropov.

Ermarth worked hard to get the piece coordinated despite opposition from the Defense Department and others. DOD registered two footnotes taking exception to the CIA view that Gorbachev was seeking détente with the West in order to concentrate on domestic reforms. In the view of DOD, Gorbachev continued to regard as primary concerns the "advancement of its foreign and trategic goals."[24]

Ermarth regrets only that the estimate did not follow its observations to a logical conclusion.

> I'm not proud of some of the bottom lines, because we pulled our punches. Not because Casey said so or Reagan said so, but because it would have been too hard to get coordinated in the bloody intelligence community. So in our first paragraph it says 'terrible problems but they're not going to spell the end of the Soviet system.' If we'd said they could spell the end of the Soviet system, none of the institutions would have signed up. Too sweeping a judgment, especially for the Defense Department.

The NIE itself acknowledges with considerable insight, in the "scope note" preceding the analysis, that the intelligence community was increasingly at a loss for a theory that could adequately explain Soviet behavior.

> Our analysis has also been encumbered by a lack of good social theory for describing the behavior of a society that is far from

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23 *Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System*, NIE 11-18-85, November 1985. p. 19.

Ibid., pp. 5, 20. The State Department's INR also noted its disagreement with the CIA characterization of "anti-Russian" nationalism in Central Asia, arguing that local nationalists had largely accepted the Soviet system.

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> fitting the old "totalitarian model" but is still ruled by a regime that strives to fulfill many of that model's features.

The estimate, recalls Ermarth, was well received in several quarters. Oliver personally briefed President Reagan on its key points. Hardliners, such as Casey, felt it confirmed their belief that the Soviet Union was "sick, powerful and dangerous," says Ermarth. Kolt, on the other hand, felt the estimate "supported those in the community who thought that those faults were out there, that this was not a monolithic society." That said, he added, the Agency could not predict when or even whether the faultline might crack wide.

> One could not forecast when these weaknesses would become so prevalent as to make the whole establishment either change or collapse.

NSC official Jack Matlock remembers that estimate and the resulting debate among policymakers.

> That sort of analysis was objective. It was fairly complete. We got a lot of it. It was just, okay, where do you go from there? Some would say this is all true, but the sort of system they have, they can somehow weather it. They still control everything. They control the media. The KGB and the Party have informers all over the country. And you can't tell me that a system of that sort can't keep things under control. And I would have to concede and say that is true. On the other hand, if they ever start opening up—and there are good reasons for them to open up—then it's going to be a new ballgame.

Throughout 1986 and 1987, the evidence mounted that Gorbachev—if not a radical—was at least a skilled politician capable of shifting with the political winds as necessary to keep his reforms rolling. The question was: how bad was the Soviet situation which Gorbachev had to manage?

Increasingly, some observers found the CIA estimates of Soviet defense spending and economic performance rosier than warranted. Coincidentally in early 1986, critiques from two very different quarters questioned the accuracy of CIA estimates on Soviet defense spending and its economy. The report on the Soviet economy was commissioned by the CIA from outside experts; the observations on Soviet defense spending came from within the Agency.

Challenging the Estimates

The first critique came from Harry Rowen, a well-respected academic and public servant who had served as chair of the NIC from 1981-1983.[25] His thinking on the CIA economic estimate had

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25 Rowen in 1986 was a professor of public management at the Hoover Institution, Stanford. He had been at various times in his distinguished career president of the RAND Corp., a deputy assistant secretary of defense and an assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget.

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evolved over two years, starting with a request in 1984 from DDI Gates to form a committee of prominent academics to look at the CIA's economic work. The committee's report, issued in March 1985, was not classified but it was private. Rowen says the committee awarded the CIA a C+ or B- for its work: "It basically said the Soviet economy is probably worse off than you're saying, but we don't know enough to say you're horribly off."

During 1985, however, Rowen's own views evolved to the point where he concluded that the Soviet economy was deteriorating much faster than reported by the CIA. In the summer of 1985, he circulated a paper to that effect to Weinberger, Shultz, Casey and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane which said that, while the CIA had estimated annual Soviet GNP growth of 2.5 percent over the past decade, "there are reasons to believe that this number is probably the upper bound of performance. Actual growth overall might have been less, perhaps close to zero."[26] Rowen cited testimony from emigres which "is widely discounted by Western scholars" that the standard of living as well as productivity was in decline.

In April 1986, Rowen and three like-minded Soviet experts reiterated their skepticism to Reagan and Bush in a half-hour meeting.

> I said we really don't know what's going to happen here as a result of this rather different portrayal of the economic situation. We were not saying it's going to fall apart politically. But one thing we were very clear on, and that's that everybody who was negotiating with that country ... is in a stronger inherent position than one might believe if one were listening to ... intelligence from the CIA. You're better off than you might realize.

Reagan, says Rowen, "understood that perfectly well."

At the same time Rowen was briefing the president, a high-ranking CIA official was finalizing a memo questioning the accuracy of recent CIA estimates of Soviet military spending.

MacEachin's Memo. In April 1986, Douglas MacEachin was director of SOVA. In a memorandum which he submitted to then DDI-Richard Kerr, MacEachin argued that the recently observed flat line in Soviet military spending was going to stay that way. Toward the end of 1985 and the beginning of 1986, argued MacEachin, it became clear that Gorbachev wanted to fix the economy and that the only place to turn for immediate savings was the military. MacEachin wrote that all projections in the current NIE for Soviet military spending were too high.

> Our analysis shows that the *"low* forces" projected in the NIE would require Soviet procurement spending on the strategic mission to increase [deleted] an average annual growth of 11 percent. To support the "high" forces projected in the estimate,

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[26] The paper was published shortly thereafter in The National Interest, *Living with a Sick Bear.* Winter 1986. pp. 14-26.

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> procurement spending would have to increase at an average annual rate of 13 percent.

Such sustained growth even at the lower rate, the memo pointed out, had occurred only once before: over the five-year period 1966-70, when Brezhnev built up the military after he ousted Khrushchev. The current NIE procurement projections, the memo continued, "would imply that Moscow has no intention of *attempting to* carry out" the industrial modernization program "which the new Soviet leadership has publicly made the centerpiece of its agenda."[27]

Additionally, MacEachin contended that not only the current NIE, but those going back for a decade, had systematically overstated the Soviet arms procurement program. Kerr took the memorandum to NFIB (National Foreign Intelligence Board), which does a final review of NIEs. There Kerr reiterated the memo's argument that "we can't go up at the rate of these numbers. Something is wrong." Kerr brought along a proposed dissenting footnote to the NIE on Soviet strategic forces. As MacEachin remembers it, Casey was impressed by the reasoning and evidence of the memo, but the footnote never appeared.

> It was, quite frankly, not Mr. Casey's fault and I know that. But there were others in the Community who felt that they could not put out an annex that showed projections with a note on the front of it that said these are all wrong.[28]

The NIE projections remained the same despite MacEachin's memo. Actual Soviet performance, however, never approached the optimistic US predictions. The CIA documented the USSR's deteriorating situation.

Down the Troubled Path. In July 1986, the joint CIA-DIA report to the JEC, "The Soviet Economy Under a New Leader," restated many of the CIA concerns and conclusions voiced the previous fall in the assessment "Promises, Potentials and Pitfalls." It laid out once again the potential tensions between a powerful military and a needy industrial base, not to mention a grossly underserved consumer sector. One subsection was brusquely titled "Dependence on Unrealistic Conservation and Productivity Goals." Gorbachev's economic plan, said the report, was illogical.

> Moderate investment growth appears inconsistent with a radical modernization of the economy.

While the report emphasized once again the impressive strength of the Soviet military, rising military hardware sales to Third World countries and sweeping improvements to both strategic and conventional forces, it also reported that overall growth in defense spending had held steady at 2 percent from 1974-85. The document noted that while differences continued to exist between CIA and DIA on estimates of Soviet defense spending—"we have not settled on an estimate for last year"—the two agencies were near agreement that the growth in military procurement was nearly flat (which the

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27 from Douglas J. MacEachin, Memorandum to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, April 22, 1986. p. 2.

28 Gates' Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 274.

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CIA had been saying since 1982). The report put the "defense burden" for the early 1980s at some 15-17 percent.

Some within the US policy community saw the leveling in defense spending as an indication that the Soviet Union, whether by choice or because forced to by economic stresses, was embarked on a new road which could lead to improved relations with the United States and its allies. Others, however, remained highly skeptical of Gorbachev, his motives and his mission. Gorbachev had failed to win the trust of top CIA official Robert Gates.

Gates on Gorbachev

Many thoughtful people within the intelligence community had legitimate doubts about Gorbachev. Lieut. Gen. Odom of the NSA articulated the thinking of many when he wrote in 1987 that the Soviet leader's program, if followed to its logical conclusion, would lead to Gorbachev's political suicide and the collapse of the system. As this seemed unlikely, concluded Odom and others, Gorbachev did not intend to do what he said he would. As the general wrote:

> It seems more and more clear that Gorbachev himself does not intend systemic change. He is exercising with remarkable energy and cunning the system bequeathed him by previous general secretaries. He is struggling to regain the vitality once possessed by the system and which especially Brezhnev, but also Khrushchev, let slip into decay. If what one means by reform is a significant improvement in the standard of living for Soviet citizens and increased protection of their individual rights under law, that kind of reform cannot go very far without bringing about systemic change—the kind of change that Gorbachev cannot want.[29]

Gates remembers holding similar views in 1986, when he was DDI (promoted in April to Deputy Director for Central Intelligence, or DDCI). Gorbachev, he says, "could not carry out a process of democratization and leave the Communist Party structure and the national security structure, including the KGB, intact."

> Perhaps the source of my great pessimism in terms of the prospects for his reform over time was my belief that his economic reform program was deeply flawed and contradictory, that in fact he remained a Communist and was unwilling to take [real] steps toward a market economy.[30]

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29 Problems of Communism, *How Far Can Soviet Reform Go?*, November-December 1987, p. 30. Odom recalls that when, at intelligence community and NFIB (National Foreign Intelligence Board) meetings, he articulated the view that Gorbachev was destroying the system, his observations "provoked ridicule in the CIA and the NIC [National Intelligence Council]."
Hearings, Vol. 3, p. 129.

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Reflecting such convictions, Gates in testimony on March 16, 1986 seemed to dismiss the possibility that Gorbachev's changes so far should be taken seriously. In hearings before Sen. Bill Bradley and other members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Gates was asked what kind of work the intelligence community was doing to prepare policymakers for the consequences of change in the Soviet Union. He responded:

> Quite frankly, without any hint that such fundamental change is going on, my resources do not permit me the luxury of sort of just idly speculating on what a different kind of Soviet Union might look like.[31]

Six months later, promoted by then to the position of DDCI, Gates had apparently changed his mind, at least about the advisability of closely monitoring Soviet developments. On Oct. 16 he sent a memorandum to his replacement as DDI, focused on the quality of CIA analysis of changes within the Soviet Union. In this memo, Gates expressed concern that "we are not being creative enough in the way we are analyzing internal Soviet developments."

> From talking with Soviet defectors and émigrés and people who are in touch with middle level Soviet officials in one way or another, I sense that there is a great deal more turbulence and unhappiness in the Soviet Union than we are conveying in anything we have written.

Gates asked for more information on Gorbachev's concrete undertakings, on the state of the economy, for a broader overview pulling together all the strands of his program.

> While we have talked about tinkering with the system, has he actually done a great deal more than that and set in motion even more to create the possibility of qualitative change in the Soviet system over a several-year period?

However, lest anyone within the intelligence community take Gates' memorandum as a sign that his skepticism about Gorbachev had softened, he delivered a speech barely a month later in which he accused the Soviets of waging virtual war against the United States in a variety of theatres around the world. He called the Nov. 25 speech "War By Another Name." In it, Gates declared that:

> We are engaged in an historic struggle with the Soviet Union, a struggle between age-old tyranny—to use an old-fashioned word—and the concept that the highest goal of the State is to protect and foster the creative capabilities and liberties of the individual. The battle lines are most sharply drawn in the Third World.

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31 Hearings, Vol. 3, p. 177.

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He accused the Soviets of encouraging terrorism, and of targeting four areas for expansion: the Middle East oil fields, the Isthmus and canal of Panama, the mineral wealth of South Africa, and the Western alliance.

> [The Soviets] use conflict in the Third World to exploit divisions in the Alliance and to try to recreate the internal divisions caused by Vietnam in order to weaken the Western response and provoke disagreement over larger national security and defense policies.[32]

In January 1987, Gates testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, in Iran, the Soviets "remain poised to take advantage of the inevitable instability and opportunities that will present themselves in a post-Khomeini era."[33] This was not the consensus within the CIA.[34] Yet Gates' views were fully in line with the thinking of many Administration leaders at the time. In January, 1987, the White House issued a 41-page paper, *National Security Strategy of the United States* which, according to one informed reader, reflected none of Gorbachev's changes and "could have been written in the 1950s at the nadir of relations."[35] Among other conclusions, the report said that "Moscow seeks to alter the existing international system and establish Soviet global hegemony." This paper, reports Soviet expert Raymond Garthoff, had little influence on policy.

Nonetheless, Gates' speech and the testimony dismayed many within the Agency, and some outside, for its political partisanship. In the speech, even though Gates subsequently said the views expressed were his own, he gave the appearance that his words reflected the analysis of the intelligence community and especially the CIA. In the testimony, he seemed explicitly to speak with the authority of the community.

This was particularly the case given that Gates since December 1986 was acting DCI. Suffering from a brain tumor, Casey had resigned as DCI from his hospital bed in January 1987. Reagan nominated Gates as his successor. During confirmation hearings, however, grave doubts were raised about the role Gates might have played in the unraveling Iran-Contra scandal and his nomination was withdrawn. Judge William Webster, head of the FBI, in May 1987 became the new DCI while Gates stayed on as DDCI.

Shultz Still Unhappy. Secretary of State Shultz was among those offended by Gates, Casey and their apparent bias. In January 1987, Shultz told Frank Carlucci, the newly-appointed National Security Advisor and a former DDCI, how little confidence he had in the intelligence community. Shultz protested "that I had been misled, lied to, cut out. I felt that CIA analysis was distorted by strong views about policy."

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32 Hearings, Vol. 2, pp. 639-655.

33 Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 411.

34 Testimony at the Gates' hearings publicized a February 1986 estimate, which reported that worries about growing instability in Iran had abated. An earlier estimate, in May 1985, had warned that growing instability could offer Moscow opportunities.
Garthoff, Raymond. *The Great Transition, American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War.* The Brookings Institution, 1994. p. 308.

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> When Gorbachev first appeared at the helm, the CIA said he was 'just talk,' just another Soviet attempt to deceive us. As that line became increasingly untenable, the CIA changed its tune: Gorbachev was serious about change, but the Soviet Union had a powerfully entrenched and largely successful system that was incapable of being changed, so Gorbachev would fail in his attempt to change it. When it became evident that the Soviet Union was, in fact, changing, the CIA line was that the changes wouldn't really make a difference.[36]

Shultz's accusations seem intended chiefly for the CIA leadership. The Agency itself was, according to its analysts, doing its best to bring to policymakers' attention the changes within Gorbachev's USSR.

What the Assessments were Saying

NIO/USSR Robert Blackwell was proud during that period of publishing, despite opposition from the Defense Department and elsewhere, "what I thought of at the time as some forward-leaning estimates, trying essentially to say the guy's for real and means to have real change."

> This is not smoke and mirrors. Now was I saying he was going to disband communism and break with Eastern Europe? Did I say very early that he was getting out of Afghanistan? I didn't say that. But we were saying things like he'll allow almost as much reform in Eastern Europe as a communist regime can tolerate.

In late 1987, for example, the CIA produced a warning piece on nationalities within the 15-republic USSR. The report, published as an article in the National Intelligence Daily, looked at the common features of the instability in the Baltic states, the Caucasus and Central Asia. In combination, said CIA, these incidents portended a crisis which would be difficult to contain. The State Department's intelligence branch (INR) did not agree. In a dissenting footnote, it called the CIA assessment alarmist.

At roughly the same time, the Defense Department took exception to CIA views in a November 1987 estimate on Soviet policies and politics in the 1990s. Blackwell says the NIE stated outright that what Gorbachev was doing "has the potential for the most significant changes in Soviet policies and institutions since Stalin's forced regimentation of the country in the 1920s." The document included debate as to whether Gorbachev could carry off his reforms successfully or not, but it discerned a potential for dramatic change within the system. Gen. Odom penned a long dissent to the estimate for the National Security Agency, says Blackwell, disagreeing with the fundamental conclusion of the assessment. The NSA view was that there was no potential for fundamental change in the USSR;

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36 Shultz Memoirs, p. 864.

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rather, Gorbachev's personnel changes were another purge along the lines of those Stalin engineered, meant to reinvigorate the Communist Party and increase Gorbachev's own power.

Another estimate in the spring of 1988 addressed the implications for Eastern Europe of the changes within the Soviet Union. Its conclusion was, for the time, fairly bold: any government would be acceptable to Moscow if it called itself communist. The USSR would not invade to protect its empire. Kay Oliver, then head of SOVA's Domestic Policy Division, likewise takes pride in papers from the mid-1980s.

> During this critical period—early and mid-Gorbachev—I think we were pretty far ahead, at least as far as the social and nationalities end of things went. In terms of raising the question of the difficulty of empire under those conditions and pointing increasingly to the contradictions in Gorbachev's program, that were having the effect of knocking out the props of the old system without providing a coherent new set of institutions and policies, in terms of marketization but without private property, a thousand voices heard as far as nationality grievances but no devolution of power, democratization but maintenance of the Communist Party monopoly.

New Measure of Defense. Meanwhile, the CIA took a new look at Soviet spending on defense. A February 1987 research paper, "Defense's Claim on Soviet Resources," broadened the definition of defense to include military and economic assistance to client states, as well as the costs of maintaining strategic reserves. The paper then broke down the impact of defense spending on individual industries, as well as its drain on the labor pool.

But the report drew no provocative conclusions, preferring to be noncommittal. Noting the huge role defense played in the Soviet economy, the paper predicted once again fierce competition for resources between the military and civilian sectors. Its heavily qualified conclusions:

> ... the Soviet leadership would *probably prefer to favor industrial modernization over defense* when allocating newly produced equipment, intermediate products such as electronics and high-quality metals, and newly available labor resources. [Yet] Given an apparent worsening of the external military threat or good economic results in the early years of the five-year plan, the leadership *might perceive an acceleration of defense activities* to be the appropriate resource allocation policy. (italics added)[37]

Gorbachev on Tightrope. A July 1987 SOVA report was more opinionated. In the preface to "Gorbachev: Steering the USSR into the 1990s," author Jim Noren warned that "judgments regarding

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[37] *Defense's Claim on Resources*, Directorate of Intelligence Research Paper, February 1987. p. vii.

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Gorbachev's situation will appear somewhat less sanguine than those found in earlier CIA papers," both because the focus would be on Gorbachev's difficult choices, rather than on consolidating power; and because of newly observed "indifference and opposition" from entrenched interests and average workers alike.[38]

The SOVA report said that Gorbachev's economic reform—now christened *perestroika* (renewal)—"amounts to a set of partial measures."

> Gorbachev has been searching for a formula that encourages more initiative at lower levels while permitting control to be maintained from the center. This is a delicate balance at best. ... Even his supporters are concerned that he will need to win new victories before long if he is to sustain the momentum for change he has generated.[39]

In pursuit of victory, predicted SOVA, Gorbachev would seek arms agreements in the final years of the Reagan administration; he would push forward with more radical reform; and he would promote elections at lower levels as a means of exposing opponents. But to date, said the SOVA report, Gorbachev could boast only of good intentions; he had as yet no coherent plan.

> Gorbachev ... seems disposed to go beyond the tinkering with the system that satisfied his predecessors. But a great deal of uncertainty surrounds his ultimate economic reform objectives. Indeed, Gorbachev admits that his reform program is being worked out 'on the march.'

As for Gorbachev's support among the military, SOVA noted that while there were repeated instances in which "Soviet officers openly discuss the opportunity costs of resources devoted to defense," overall defense establishment support for "industrial modernization coupled with constraints in defense programs is ambiguous." But SOVA had observed a general reluctance to increase defense spending. "SDI, in particular, confronts the Soviets with an extreme form of competition they wish to avoid," it said. The authors also pointed out that Soviet leaders had discussed cutting assistance to client states as an economy measure.

But Gorbachev, the report made clear, was walking a tightrope. With understated drama, a section entitled "The Consequences of Failure" raised the possibility that the Soviet leader would be ousted.

> The risks in a more radical reform and a rewrite of the social contract are that confusion, economic disruption and worker discontent will give potential opponents a platform on which to

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38 This report was the first in a series of three, examining respectively the economy, the dynamics of party-military relations and the debate on Soviet security policy. *Gorbachev and the Military: Managing National Security Policy* would be published in October 1987; *Soviet National Security Policy: Responses to the Changing Military and Economic Environment* came out in June 1988.

39 *Gorbachev: Steering the USSR into the 1990s*, Directorate of Intelligence, July 1987. pp. vi & viii.

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> stand. Gorbachev's position could also be undermined by the loosening of censorship over the written and spoken word and the promotion of limited democracy. If it suspects that this process is getting out of control, the party could well execute an abrupt about-face, discarding Gorbachev along the way.

In other words, Gorbachev could be brought down by the very reforms he initiated.

A joint DIA-CIA assessment for the JEC published just a month later, in August 1987, was considerably less assertive, presumably due to the process of "coordination" or consensus-seeking which typified intelligence community documents. The assessment, titled "Gorbachev's Modernization Program: A Status Report," listed once again the limited successes of Gorbachev's program, while pointing out the obstacles he faced. While 1986 appeared by most measures a success—with GNP growth of 4.2 percent the highest in decades and agricultural production up a stunning 7.3 percent thanks to a record grain harvest—consumers had fared poorly, hard currency exports (especially oil) were seriously lower and bureaucratic resistance to reforms was growing. The intelligence community observed that Gorbachev needed to make 1987 a banner year in order to show solid returns for his reforms and face down his opposition. The assessment projected GNP growth at 2-3 percent through 1990, compared to Soviet targets of 4 percent.

Gorbachev's chosen path, it concluded, was "inherently risky."

> The decisions Gorbachev will have to make over the next few years will be controversial and could well solidify opposing interests in the party and government.

One of the decisions Gorbachev had to face was what to do about Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Yet CIA reporting on a possible withdrawal from Afghanistan was, according to a variety of experts, surprisingly scant.

The Withdrawal from Afghanistan

The question of whether or not the Soviets would pull out of Afghanistan was one of those which split the policy and intelligence communities down their ideological divide. The hardliners doubted it would happen; the opposing camp noted mounting signs of the possibility. In February 1986, Gorbachev had called Afghanistan an "open wound." Starting in early 1987, he and his deputies started to signal a willingness to pull out. In July 1987, Gorbachev told a newspaper reporter of an agreement in principle to withdraw. In September 1987, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze confided to Shultz that the Soviets would be pulling out soon.

Yet the CIA had little to say on Afghanistan. Shultz remembers that, when asked, the Agency dismissed the Soviet talk as "political deception."[40] Eric Edelman, a State Department officer assigned to the Moscow embassy in charge of the Afghan portfolio, recalls a deafening CIA silence on

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Shultz Memoirs, p. 1,087.

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Afghanistan at a time when he went out on a limb to predict imminent withdrawal. In December 1987 Edelman, supported by Ambassador Jack Matlock, drafted a cable to that effect.

> The reaction I heard from people back in Washington was that the embassy had gone soft, the embassy had developed client-itis for the Russians. There was an absolute unwillingness to accept the notion that the Russians might be willing to get out and wanted to finally negotiate. I always attributed that in part, frankly, to the stake that the CIA had in the counter-insurgency program in Afghanistan.

Edelman proved insightful. On Feb. 8, 1988, Gorbachev announced to the nation that the Soviet Union would begin a 15-month phased withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning in May. Only then did the CIA do an estimate reporting that Gorbachev was serious about pulling out of Afghanistan. But even then, says Shultz, the CIA was wrong when it predicted that the Soviet-supported regime would topple once Moscow pulled out. In fact, it survived to continue the war against the US-supported *mujaheddin*.

NIO Blackwell thinks the delay on Afghanistan was motivated not by allegiance to CIA covert operations, but by a chronic difficulty confronting intelligence analysts.

> There is always a problem in intelligence. After something is already evident, it doesn't do you much good to project it. But if there is no data on which to really say it, what are you doing other than giving your opinion? ... There is a great tension. Some of us felt that it would be consistent for [Gorbachev] to find a way to get out of [Afghanistan], just as it was consistent that he would be prepared to go with INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces].

Whether it should have been predicted or not, Gorbachev did surprise many observers with his withdrawal from Afghanistan. Likewise, he repeatedly startled US leaders with his concessions in arms control negotiations.

Arms Control

The litmus test for the "new" Soviet Union under Gorbachev became whether it would accept proposals which the old Kremlin would have rejected out of hand. Although in the earliest months of his rule the CIA told policymakers Gorbachev would unlikely push for arms agreements because they offered few short-term benefits, by early 1987 that had changed. By then Gorbachev had mentioned frequently the need to be more efficient in the use of military resources. Soviet military officers, in turn, seemed aware of the pressing need to favor growth in the civilian economy. Now arms control agreements, said the CIA, would lessen the pressure on Gorbachev to reallocate massive resources to the military.

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Events seemed to bear out this analysis. Early into Gorbachev's rule, as top Reagan Administration officials such as George Shultz saw the possibility that Soviet reform was for real, US policymakers sought arms policies which would help Soviet reformers persuade hardliners that compromise was to the advantage of the USSR. Matlock remembers he and others worked on offers "which were not to their disadvantage."

> If you assume a peaceful intent—and probably that's something Gates and Casey would not have assumed—then you define something that for a peaceful state will not be to their disadvantage. And what we defined was precisely that ... We had to give them, by such things as deployment [of INF], by the military build-up, an irrefutable argument to the Soviet military that look, if you don't do this, you're going to get something even worse.'

Following the get-acquainted Geneva summit of November 1985, Gorbachev and Reagan met again at Reykjavik, Iceland in October 1986. Although Reykjavik is remembered as a failure, most participants subsequently agreed the only failure was in measuring up to spectacular expectations. In fact, the summit led to dramatic advances in a number of fields. The presidents agreed to make human rights a permanent part of their agenda. They established the basis for reducing strategic nuclear forces on both sides by 50 percent over five years. As for intermediate nuclear force (INF) arsenals, the Soviets agreed to a remarkable cutback from 1,400 warheads to 100 worldwide. There was even talk of eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

Building on the progress made at Reykjavik, Gorbachev and Reagan were able only 14 months later, in December 1987, to sign an INF treaty at a summit meeting in Washington. The Administration was gratified, but not complacent. As Shultz said, US policy should be the same whether Gorbachev proved sincere or not.

> We can continue to afford to let [Gorbachev be] the innovator as long as he keeps innovating in our direction.[41]

In fact, say some insiders, Administration hardliners may have been stupefied at Gorbachev's willingness to sign the INF Treaty. Says NIO Blackwell:

> The INF Treaty was never meant to be said yes to by those who drafted it. By Ronald Reagan, yes, but not by Richard Perle. No one ever thought they would do that because it had all sorts of things in it. It was deliberately loaded so that that would never happen.

MacEachin saw Gorbachev's acceptance of the INF Treaty as yet another signal that he was a new brand of Soviet leader. As MacEachin told a group of senators in a classified briefing in late 1988:

- Ibid., p. 1,003.

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> The INF position was designed with a careful calculation that the Soviet Union would never say yes to a zero-zero proposal like was offered. The correct calculation. That Soviet leadership wouldn't have. This one did.[42]

But Gorbachev had long since proved himself a master of surprises. The next one would come just a year later, when Gorbachev addressed the United Nations on Dec. 7, 1988. Before that, however, many CIA analysts and policymakers had concluded that the Soviet Union was changing in ways more profound than anything since the 1917 Revolution.

Mid-1988 Assessments

In May 1988, President Reagan registered yet another historic moment in the fast-evolving US-Soviet relationship when he paid his first visit to Moscow for another superpower summit. Reagan arrived reinforced by last-minute Senate approval of the INF Treaty. At the summit, the chief focus was human rights, as Reagan met with human rights activists and spoke out on the issue of individual freedom.

But while Reagan's presence in Moscow was testimony to Gorbachev's elevated status in the global community, domestically US intelligence analysts saw growing and disturbing signs that the Soviet leader was losing control over the process he had unleashed. In the wake of the largely symbolic achievements of the May summit, the intelligence community in June 1988 published three assessments examining Gorbachev's progress to date. Although not designed as a package, the three simultaneous reports reflect the different kinds of work coming out of the CIA. A joint CIA-DIA report to the JEC is an overview of the economy. Two SOVA publications look respectively at the Soviet budget deficit and national security policy.

Problems Emerge. The report to the JEC was called "Gorbachev's Economic Program: Problems Emerge."[43] Instead of a banner year as planned, 1987 proved a disaster. GNP grew by less than 1 percent, compared to government plans for 4 percent and CIA projections of 2-3 percent. Although bad weather and a poor harvest contributed to the bad results, the chief reason was particularly troubling: Gorbachev's efforts to force through higher production levels concurrently with improved quality resulted in managerial revolt and productivity stagnation. The implications for Gorbachev's future efforts were not good.

> The leadership had hoped that a strong economic performance last year would provide a firm foundation for the future development of Gorbachev's economic program, but this did not occur.[44] ... The short-term outlook for Gorbachev's economic program is not good.

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42 Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 554.

43 This report was also the third in a series on the economy under Gorbachev. The author has not seen the other two.

44 *Gorbachev's Economic Program: Problems Emerge*, DIA-CIA, June 1988. p. iii.

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The assessment said the leadership, to continue its high-investment strategy, would have to tap resources from defense and/or other sectors of the economy or increase imports. Even these measures, however, would prove minimally useful if economic performance continued to lag.

Budget Deficits Threaten Reform. A SOVA report put Gorbachev's quandary more candidly than the joint CIA-DIA paper, saying "USSR: Sharply Higher Budget Deficits Threaten *Perestroyka*." The research document reported a six-fold increase in the 1987 deficit over 1984, equal to a sobering 7 percent of GNP (the record-high US budget deficit in 1986 was 3.5 percent of GNP). Moscow, said SOVA, "is essentially financing its deficits by printing money and the resulting inflation is clearly visible." It blamed *perestroika* for much of the deficit rise: state investment spending was up, but receipts on alcohol sales were down; revenues from import taxes were down due to cutbacks in import purchases; enterprise profits, and therefore taxes, were down due to new quality-control measures instituted by the government. SOVA outlined some remedial steps Gorbachev could take, but stressed that he "must act quickly" to forestall serious inflation.

Among the extra costs for the Soviet government, SOVA reported rising subsidies to agriculture, steadily higher defense costs, outlays for the war in Afghanistan, rising social welfare needs, and spending on the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Thus, total government spending rose a record 30 billion rubles in 1986 and another 18 billion in 1987, while revenues during the same period grew by only 5 billion rubles.

The Politburo apparently recognized the gravity of the situation, calling for cuts to "national economy" spending (capital improvements and subsidies) for the first time in 25 years. In May 1988, the official newspaper *Pravda* made a rare public reference to a budget deficit. But a speech from the finance minister provided no clues on how the deficit would be financed, said SOVA.

> His vagueness is understandable, however, since we believe the revenue shortfall will be made up by money creation.

The Soviet government, it explained, was able to create money "from thin air" using loans from the State Bank to meet current expenses, as though the loans were tax revenues. Under its own accounting procedures, the State Bank's balance sheet showed no effect from these loans. The result was an apparent 9 percent inflation rate in 1987, compared with 2.2 percent the preceding five years. Meat prices in Moscow state markets rose 18 percent from 1985-87. In a related development, shortages intensified as people started hoarding goods. As for defense spending, SOVA noted an interesting comment from a Soviet general who said in an interview that "our plans include a reduction of military spending in order to allocate the money to other areas." In a formulation apparently designed to counter criticism that SOVA underestimated Soviet military determination, the report commented that:

> While this statement and similar ones could reflect a propaganda motive, they might also reflect the budget situation.

Gorbachev and others had in recent years boldly identified the nation's economic problems, "even at times suggesting that a crisis situation existed." While such high-level statements could be politically useful to motivate the population, SOVA felt perhaps a crisis was truly in the brewing.

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> There is also a tone of real concern in many of the comments, which is reflected in the hurried and heedless nature of many of Gorbachev's initiatives. [Sentence deleted by CIA.] However, the rush to put new policies in place has, if anything, exacerbated the economy's problems. ... The cost of living is higher, shortages have intensified, modernization is proceeding at a snail's pace and the economy's fastest growing industry is moonshining.

While this report was relatively hard hitting, it attracted only ordinary attention. The third of the June 1988 assessments aroused, however, considerable controversy.

Soviets May Impose Unilateral Military Cuts. This assessment was titled "Soviet National Security Policy: Responses to the Changing Military and Economic Environment." In it, SOVA acknowledged the view of Administration hardliners that much of a burgeoning debate in the USSR over the size and composition of Soviet military forces "is designed to influence Western opinion by portraying Soviet military aims as nonaggressive, seeking only what is necessary to ensure the security of the USSR." But SOVA felt there was more going on.

> Nonetheless, there is, we believe, persuasive evidence from both classified and open sources that the discourse goes beyond mere propaganda and involves fundamental issues that have potentially important ramifications for Soviet security policy and military forces over the longer term.

Lest this passage, which appeared in the opening Key Judgments section, seem oblique, the authors spelled out their position on the last page of the 22-page assessment, which documents the military history and philosophy of the Soviet era. If Gorbachev continues to require financial resources to put his economic reforms on track, it said, "he may well try to impose unilateral cuts" on defense spending.

> The poor results from Gorbachev's efforts so far to launch economic revitalization suggest that there is, we think, a good chance he will be forced to adopt this course.

This judgment jarred the internal CIA bureaucracy, recalls MacEachin, one of the authors of the report. First of all, it took nearly nine months to get the document, the third in a series on the impact of Gorbachev's reforms, through the CIA's internal coordination and publishing process. Most disappointing, remembers MacEachin, was that for the most part, "people simply ignored it [the paper]" because it ran against Administration thinking.

> The idea of warning the administration that the whole foundation for their existence was going to go away voluntarily or because of social evils was not on. ... Nobody was standing up to the Reagan administration. They dominated everything. And so the senators were all running for cover. Nobody

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> challenged them on that. You could challenge them on a lot of things, but you certainly didn't challenge them on the Communist threat.

MacEachin sees the failure to pay attention to this estimate as part of a larger pattern of US self-deception, willingly promoted by an Administration anxious to rebuild American military power and aided and abetted by inflated intelligence community projections of Soviet military strength.

> Never mind that the Soviet Union never in 10 years, from the late 1970s through the entire 1980s, ever lived up to the projections that were made. It wasn't that the Reagan administration spent them into a crash. We projected these huge forces, then used those projections as a rationale for our spending, and they never lived up to those projections.

With such views, it must have been satisfying for MacEachin when, a scant six months after SOVA published its unpopular prediction, Gorbachev stunned the world by making unilateral cuts in Soviet forces.

Gorbachev Forges Ahead

By fall, Gorbachev's position had looked precarious. In September 1988, SOVA wrote a memorandum warning that Gorbachev was running up against so many vested interests that a leadership showdown was likely. Within days of that memo, Gorbachev at a Party plenum moved to outflank the Party by calling for multi-party elections and his own appointment as president. Most observers felt it was during that period that Gorbachev finally gave up on reforming the Party, realizing his only course was to break its monopoly hold on political power. As MacEachin says:

> As important as we thought it was at the time, in hindsight it was even more important.

Gorbachev's action at the plenum, however, reinforced those both at the CIA and among US policymakers who felt that the General Secretary was effecting real change. Approaching Thanksgiving, Gates and MacEachin together testified to a Senate Intelligence Committee task force on the Soviet Union chaired by Sen. Bill Bradley. At the meeting, Gates opined that the Soviets would not cut military spending any time soon. MacEachin disagreed and remembers he told the committee so.

> I said, just to prove we're not a monolithic center, I'll tell you I'll disagree with my boss and I'll say that they will.

Gorbachev's Surprise. The next month, on Dec. 7, 1988, MacEachin and other top-ranking CIA officials appeared again before the task force as Gorbachev spoke at the United Nations. With a flourish, Gorbachev announced not only unilateral Soviet reductions of 500,000 troops in the Warsaw Pact forces, but articulated a Soviet national security philosophy of "live and let live."

> Everyone ... is required to restrict himself and to exclude totally the use of external force ... The compelling necessity of the

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> principle of freedom of choice is also clear to us ... This objective fact presupposes respect for other people's views and stands, tolerance, a preparedness to see phenomena that are different as not necessarily bad or hostile and an ability to learn to live side by side while remaining different and not agreeing with one another on every issue.[45]

As the news of Gorbachev's startling offer was brought to the hearing room in Washington, MacEachin commented on its significance.

> If Gorbachev is able to politically manage this, it would suggest to me that there is enough consensus behind the whole issue of resource allocation between civilian and military purposes that, even if he should pass from the political scene himself four or five years from now because of the nature of certain reforms or political infighting or political scars, that there is at least enough of a body of opinion that wants to move in that direction that that part of it may well sustain itself.[46]

MacEachin made the further observation that it was important for the intelligence community to recognize that the fundamental changes in the USSR could provoke a similarly profound transformation in US ideology.

> The Soviet Union is so fundamental to our outlook on the world, to our concept of what is right and wrong in politics, to our sense of security, that major change in the USSR is as significant as some major change in the sociological fabric of the United States itself.

In this hearing, MacEachin also voiced for perhaps the first time in public the frustration of at least some within the intelligence community who felt they had been unable to promote a comprehensive understanding of the Soviet Union in what he termed a "not-neutral political environment." MacEachin noted that the CIA, while studying political instability in other nations around the globe, "never really looked at the Soviet Union as a political entity in which there were factors building which could lead to at least the *initiation* of political transformation that we seem to see."

> Moreover, had [such a study] existed inside the government, we never would have been able to publish it anyway, quite frankly. And had we done so, people would have been calling for my head. And I wouldn't have published it. In all honesty, had we said a week ago that Gorbachev might come to the UN

45 Shultz Memoirs. p. 1,107.

46 All of the following quotes are taken from the transcript of the task force proceedings made public during the Gates hearings. Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 516 et al.

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> and offer a unilateral cut of 500,000 in the military, we would have been told we were crazy.

In truth, added NIO/USSR Robert Blackwell, Gorbachev had Soviet experts in all fields baffled.

> Gorbachev for us is a discontinuity in our understanding of Russia and the Soviet Union. And we are having, as a community, as analysts individually, as a government and as academics, an enormous difficulty coming to terms with that because by what he is doing, he has broken all of our china.

One result, elaborated Blackwell, is that even though SOVA in a 1987 publication, for instance, "really tried to press the envelope" on what Gorbachev would dare to do, the assessment didn't go far enough.

> If you look back at it now, it's too conservative. ... It's too conservative both in we didn't capture how radical he would go and we didn't quite capture how much disorder would be created. We acknowledged it would happen but we didn't get its dimensions.

By then, the Reagan administration was drawing to a close. On Jan. 20, 1989, George Bush was sworn in as President of the United States. His secretary of defense was Richard Cheney; James Baker was secretary of state.

Part II: The Bush/Gorbachev Years, 1989-91

Many within the intelligence establishment and elsewhere assumed that Bush would build on the legacy left him by Reagan, particularly in relations with the Soviet Union. They were wrong. Bush decided instead on a pause to reevaluate the relationship and in particular the reliability of Gorbachev as a negotiating partner. At the same time, he reenergized the way the executive branch used intelligence.

New Chain of Command

Personnel changes alone made a considerable difference in the way the new government used intelligence analysis. For one thing, Bush himself as a former DCI took an active interest in intelligence, knew the kinds of questions he wanted answered and had respect for the product. Brent Scowcroft, the newly-appointed National Security Adviser, chose as his deputy Robert Gates—another intelligence veteran. The Soviet specialist on the NSC staff was Condoleeza Rice, a Russian speaker and expert on the Soviet general staff who quickly proved herself an informed and skillful intelligence consumer. She together with Baker deputies Dennis Ross and Robert Zoellick became the administration's chief counselors on Soviet policy.

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As important to the CIA as individual appointments, however, was the reconstitution of the National Security Council itself as a strong policy body with influence in the Oval Office. Traditionally, the NSC served as the CIA's primary client, filtering intelligence analysis for Cabinet members, the vice president and president. Under Reagan the institution lacked authority, which Bush restored.

Early on, Bush demonstrated that he expected top-quality intelligence reports. When he ordered up a national security review of the Soviet-US relationship, the State Department chaired the so-called Policy Coordinating Committee steering the interagency effort.

There were two parts to the exercise. The first was an intelligence assessment examining how real were the prospects for change in the USSR; the second part explored the policy implications of that. Within SOVA, remembers NIO Blackwell, there was no real dispute over the analysis in the intelligence piece. But the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) found unacceptable SOVA's conclusion that real change was possible, arguing instead that Gorbachev's reforms were still reversible. In the end, the SOVA language prevailed.

In the end, the community's debate over details in the report proved irrelevant, for Bush found the overall result unusable. With conclusions "coordinated" as customary down to the lowest common denominator of consensus, with opposing views largely weeded out, the final product was, as Rice termed it, "a bureaucratic document."

> It wasn't in any sense of the word presidential. It wasn't in any sense of that word forward-leaning. It wasn't operational. It got the moniker 'status quo plus' ... I think that's the last time we did anything that way.

Bush asked Rice, who had served as executive secretary to the committee, and senior NSC staffer Robert Blackwill to redo it with a more practical policy focus. The resulting 7-page report, given to Bush in the spring of 1989, came in the middle of his "pause" to reevaluate Washington's policies toward Moscow.

The Pause

Arnold Kanter, a senior NSC staffer for arms control during the Bush period, remembers some of the compelling reasons for stopping to reconsider.

> Bush's advisors felt strongly in almost an un-selfconscious way that they were a new administration. I think the outside world thought it was kind of the third Reagan term. [But] Bush didn't see it that way at all. He thought it was a new administration.

Gorbachev's record, says Kanter, did not inspire 100 percent confidence.

> Very few people who thought seriously about it thought of Gorbachev as a democrat. A brilliant tactician but a poor

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> strategist. An expedient democrat, that is, someone who faced with horrendous economic problems came to the realization that the Soviet Union would not enter the 21st century as a major power on its present course. Coming to be convinced after trying real hard that the Party was part of the problem rather than part of the solution. ... This is not a guy who has deep principles, abiding commitments and who was frankly dependable. He had also given evidence of someone who would take advantage of you if he could.

The new philosophy toward US-Soviet relations which Rice and Blackwill articulated for Bush seemed suited to a fresh start: beyond containment. As their document, called NSD-23, said:

> Containment was never an end in itself. It was a strategy born of the conditions of the postwar world. ... A new era may now be upon us. We may be able to move beyond containment to a new US policy that actively promotes the integration of the Soviet Union into the international system.[47]

Rice remembers thinking that the time had come to go beyond the postwar division of Europe.

> The idea was that détente had really been about mediated or moderated competition between two systems. What we now had was the collapse of the Soviet social system and the possibility that it could integrate into the international order.

Bush, sticking to his decision to be deliberate in his Soviet policy, signed NSD-23 only on Sept. 22. He used the "beyond containment" phrase, however, in a speech in May. The crux of his message was that the US did not need to leap at Soviet proposals: if Moscow was serious, the offers would not vanish; if they disappeared, then they were not real.

Meanwhile, events in the USSR and Eastern Europe were unfolding so fast it was sometimes difficult indeed to distinguish between what was real and what was not.

1989—Watershed Year

The year started quietly enough. March 26, however, took its place in Soviet history as the date for the first multi-candidate elections in over 70 years. Around the country, the Communist Party found its monopoly challenged and toppled, as even unopposed Party candidates failed to win votes. The elections also marked the emergence for the first time of a threat to Gorbachev's preeminence on the Soviet political landscape. In a stunning political comeback the radical reformer Boris Yeltsin,

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47 Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*. Little, Brown and Co. Boston, Toronto, London. 1993. p. 69.

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bounced from the Politburo in 1987 by Gorbachev, won election to parliament as Moscow's at-large candidate.

Milestone events continued to mount. In April, violence broke out in a corner of the Soviet empire. Soviet troops massacred peaceful demonstrators for independence in Tbilisi, the capital of the Georgian republic. In July, coal miners in Siberia went on strike, an historic rebellion by some of the state's most eulogized workers. In August, a top Soviet official publicly denounced the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop protocols which gave the Baltics into Soviet hands. Immediately after this, Lithuania declared its annexation by the Soviet Union illegal. In retaliation, Moscow hit Lithuania with a trade embargo. But that same month, Gorbachev advised the head of Poland to let Solidarity come to power.

In November, the most startling event in a disturbing year shook the world: the fall of the Berlin Wall. While Gorbachev did not ordain its opening, many felt his lukewarm support of the East German leadership contributed to the courage of those who breached the wall and, within months, brought about the fall of Communist governments across Eastern/Central Europe.

A New Question for Intelligence. The intelligence community worked overtime to make sense of it all. The avalanche of change had finally laid to rest the question dividing analysts and policymakers alike. Debate no longer focused on whether Gorbachev's changes were bona fide. That point was moot, as NIO Bob Blackwell relates.

> These are tangible things. The notion that somebody is doing all these things to undermine you and is ready to suck you in somewhere and then lower the hammer on you became a ludicrous proposition. So thereafter the proposition shifts to how far is this going to go and how much can he manage the instability? ... And a lot of our debates were how long can he stay on top of this? Is he still pushing things forward or holding them back?

The year 1989 challenged the intelligence community to answer instead the question: Can Gorbachev survive his own reform program?

View from the CIA-1989

The CIA's answer, at least in the first half of the year, was a qualified "maybe." In January, an estimate noted ethnic tensions rising to the point where "the stage appears to be set for a protracted struggle in which the risk of miscalculation is considerable." This was followed by an April document, "Rising Political Instability Under Gorbachev: Understanding the Problem and Prospects for Resolution." Calling the Soviet Union "less stable ... than at any time since Stalin's great purges in the 1930s," the assessment reported that "[e]ven Gorbachev realizes ... that it is far from certain that he will be able to control the process he has set in motion."[48]

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48 *Rising Political Instability Under Gorbachev: Understanding the Problem and Prospects for Resolution*, Directorate for Intelligence, CIA. April 1989. p. iii.

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> His apparent impatience and determination to push reform simultaneously on many fronts could alienate so many groups that even Gorbachev's political skills will not be able to prevent a coalition from forming against him.

It pointed out the growing threat from nationalism, with fully half of some 1,200 political and economic demonstrations or work actions since January 1987 inspired by nationalist aspirations.

> Gorbachev's hope of buying local support with greater autonomy is a dangerous gamble. ... It is far from clear that Moscow will be able to control this process, and it could unleash centrifugal forces that will pull the Soviet Union apart or create such serious tensions among nationalities that the ensuing social and political chaos will undermine Gorbachev's reforms.

The report called the economic program a "near disaster" and predicted that the next few years would be "some of the most turbulent in Soviet history." Drawing a comparison with Czechoslovakia in 1968, the paper said a constituency arguing for more radical reforms, led by Yeltsin, might gain control. On the other hand, the analysis also raised more pointedly than before the possibility of a conservative backlash and coup attempt against Gorbachev.

> A growing perception within the leadership that reforms are threatening the stability of the regime could lead to a conservative reaction. ... Should a sharp polarization of the leadership prevent it from acting resolutely to deal with a growing crisis, the prospects would increase for a conservative coup involving a minority of Politburo members supported by elements of the military and the KGB.

The piece predicted that Gorbachev would be looking for foreign policy successes to bolster his position at home, including arms control agreements which would allow him to reduce military spending.

A month later, the National Intelligence Council sponsored a piece on Gorbachev's chances for survival. The intelligence community view was that he would continue in power for at least the next three to four years. But SOVA took a formal dissent from the report, writing that the situation was so volatile and tensions so great within society and within the elite that Gorbachev could not survive unless he turned to the right politically. SOVA gave Gorbachev a blunt 50-50 chance of survival unless he retreated from his reforms.[49]

But even that gloomy view turned more pessimistic by late summer, when SOVA began its annual review of the research program for the year ahead.

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[49] from a speech by Robert M. Gates, *CIA and the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Hit or Miss?*, Foreign Policy Association, New York, May 20, 1992. p. 6.

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SOVA Breaks Away: "Domestic Gambles." George Kolt had just taken over as director of SOVA from Doug MacEachin. At the annual planning session for next year's research program, some analysts said that, in their opinion, Gorbachev's policies were not sustainable and were leading the country toward disaster. Says Kolt:

> I think that's the turning point at which we really started to see the growing dangers to Gorbachev, and the dangers were from two sides. Number one is that others in the [Communist] Party would see where his policies were leading and would throw him out. ... The second process going on is that these critics of Gorbachev in the party were really right, that his policies were not sustainable, that they were leading to the loss of the Party's supremacy which Gorbachev was simultaneously trying to sustain.

The second point was strongly argued in a paper titled "Gorbachev's Domestic Gambles and Instability," prepared by senior analyst Grey Hodnett and published in September 1989. The paper blamed many of the symptoms of crisis on Gorbachev and his inconsistent policies. It argued that *perestroika* was too limited to fulfill expectations, that "direct and violent confrontation" with the Baltic states was nearly inevitable, that the failure to push through a free-market system would produce only economic deterioration, social unrest and perhaps revolution.

> Conditions are likely to lead in the foreseeable future to continuing crises and instability on an even larger scale—in the form of mass demonstrations, strikes, violence and perhaps even the localized emergence of parallel centers of power.[50]

While conceding he had no easy choices, the assessment said Gorbachev was gambling on ill-conceived strategies. Gorbachev's most generous offer to non-Russian nationalists, for example, would not satisfy them, while "allowing these people freedom to protest without being able to redress their basic grievances is a recipe for escalating crises." The regime's recent emergency financial stabilization plan "more likely than not will fail," while Gorbachev's tinkering with Communist Party authority was "undermining its ability to integrate Soviet society before new political institutions are capable of coping," said SOVA.

The paper predicted growing pressure on the regime to crack down, or on Gorbachev to resign. It foresaw the possibility of a "traditionalist restoration" or coup. Even were Gorbachev to remain in power, much would depend on his ability to move to a market economy, without which SOVA warned of a potential breakup of the union, or what an academic article SOVA cited had called "Ottomanization—a slow process of imperial decline with unplanned piecemeal emancipation of constituent entities."

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50 *Gorbachev's Domestic Gambles and Instability in the USSR*, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA. September 1989. p. iii

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> By putting economic reform on hold and pursuing an inadequate financial stabilization program, Gorbachev has brought Soviet internal policy to a fateful crossroads, seriously reducing the chances that his rule—if it survives—will take the path toward long-term stability.

The United States would need skill in reacting to a volatile situation, said the paper. Soviet domestic problems were, however, likely to keep the USSR out of foreign adventures.

> Whether or not Gorbachev retains office, the United States for the foreseeable future will confront a Soviet leadership that faces endemic popular unrest. ... This instability is likely to preoccupy Moscow for some time to come and ... prevent a return to the arsenal state economy that generated the fundamental military threat to the West in the period since World War II. Moscow's focus on internal order in the USSR is likely to accelerate the decay of Communist systems and the growth of regional instability in Eastern Europe.

Kolt felt the paper deserved strong support, although some CIA analysts forcefully disagreed with the paper's conclusions. The paper's scope note reflected this, saying "the report is a speculative paper drafted by a senior analyst in the Office of Soviet Analysis."

> In a period of epochal change in the USSR, anticipating the future is a hazardous undertaking, and the issues dealt with in the report hardly invite unanimity of judgment.

"I decided," declares Kolt, "that I was not going to let this thing be coordinated down to the lowest common denominator."

> We were saying no, he cannot muddle through. This situation is changing so much qualitatively, there is such a dynamic at play, that this is going to lead to major discontinuity. ... What that paper did is begin to set us aside from the rest of the community, whose view in effect didn't change through let's say early 1991.

The SOVA paper mentioned in passing "populist figure" Boris Yeltsin. Privately, some analysts within SOVA felt that the growing domestic opposition to Gorbachev would be headed by Boris Yeltsin.

The Prevailing View. The countervailing view on Gorbachev's chances for survival were laid out in an NIE prepared under NIO Bob Blackwell. The paper predicted that, although the economic situation in 1990-91 would be critical, Gorbachev would weather it. While noting that Gorbachev's policies could threaten the system's viability, and in any case would produce one of the most tumultuous periods in Soviet history, it went on to say most believe Gorbachev would survive this period of tumult

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without imposing the kind of repression that would snuff out reform. The estimate predicted that although harsh measures might be taken against nationalists, as in Tbilisi in April, they would be neither widespread nor lasting.

Thanks to Kolt's efforts, Hodnett's views were included in the NIE as parallel, dissenting, text. Secretary of Defense Cheney, for one, found Hodnett persuasive. The lower levels of the State Department also proved a receptive audience. Gates, too, was listening. As a result of the stream of reporting out of SOVA, he set up in September 1989 a top-secret contingency planning group "looking at the possibility of the collapse of the Soviet Union and what we would do."

But as Kolt remembers it, "the high level people rejected it." The more optimistic NIE assessment resonated at the White House and the National Security Council. It was ironic that, just as SOVA lost hope for Gorbachev, Bush and his senior administration officials took up Gorbachev's cause in earnest.

The Administration—Learning to Love Gorbachev

By July 1989, Bush had concluded that Gorbachev was a force for stable change and should be supported. Bush decided secretly to invite Gorbachev to an "informal" summit off the coast of Malta in December 1989. Scowcroft advised against it. Gates likewise told Bush to make no moves until the Soviet internal situation grew clearer, that it was too soon to cast his lot with Gorbachev. But Bush had made up his mind. "Look, this guy *is* perestroika," he told Scowcroft.[51]

The Administration members who remained skeptical of Gorbachev were, in fact, asked to keep their opinions to themselves. Gates was scheduled to deliver a speech in the fall of 1989 at a conference in Bethesda, Maryland. The State Department vetoed the speech on the grounds that it departed too radically from Administration policy. As Secretary of State Baker observed at the time:

> If we keep saying he can't pull it off, it'll begin to sound as though that's what we want.[52]

Gates' view had, in fact, changed remarkably little since 1985. NIO Blackwell, who saw drafts of the speech, recalls that it portrayed Gorbachev as "really out more to undermine us than he is to fundamentally change."[53] The prohibition on dissenting views did not, apparently, extend to Vice President Daniel Quayle who, in October, publicly called Gorbachev a "master of public relations" and *perestroika* a "form of Leninism."

As the Malta summit approached, however, the unfolding drama of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe came to dominate world headlines and policy discussions alike. Debate over the future of the USSR and Gorbachev shifted with the latest developments in the rapidly-changing East bloc situation. On Nov. 9, the Berlin Wall fell. In response, intelligence officers presented Bush, Baker

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51 Beschloss, Talbott. p. 94.

52 Ibid., p. 123.

53 At lower levels, too, dissenting views were censored in the interests of presenting a common policy front. Alexander Vershbow, for example, Soviet desk officer in the State Department, was unable to publish in the spring of 1991 an article advocating a slight shift in US policy to support devolution of power to the republics.

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and Scowcroft with a wide range of views on Gorbachev. A CIA briefing at Camp David before Malta revealed the growing complexity of Gorbachev's situation. Led by DCI Judge Webster, George Kolt, Bob Blackwell, SOVA's Bob Abbott and Fritz Ermarth gave brief presentations on Soviet economics, politics, society and nationalism. At the briefing, says Ermarth, "the whole range of issues was laid out, including Gorbachev's increasingly troubled future." Asked whether *perestroika* could succeed, Ermarth replied that, first of all, different definitions of *perestroika* abounded.

> What one believed about the long term depended in large part on whether you believed something very important but unprovable: that all humans including Russians want and are capable of democracy.

But overall, the Bush White House was sending the message that the president had confidence in his negotiating partner and was prepared to do serious business with him. His confidence seemed justified when, at the Malta meeting Dec. 2-3, 1989, Gorbachev told Bush that "we don't consider you an enemy anymore." Bush returned the gesture of reconciliation when he pledged to exercise restraint on the issue of Baltic independence if Gorbachev would promise to prevent violence in the region.

Bush emerged from the Malta summit, where gales tested the physical as well as the moral mettle of both presidents, with a four-part Soviet policy agenda: help Gorbachev remain in power; keep him on the path to reform; lock in agreements favorable to the US; and concede nothing which could be harmful in the long run were Gorbachev forced out of office.[54] In substance it resembled closely the Reagan agenda, the "pause" notwithstanding. But Bush had a new factor to contend with which had arisen since Reagan left office: Boris Yeltsin.

The Yeltsin Factor

When Grey Hodnett developed his analysis of Gorbachev's decline, he and others at SOVA predicted that the growing domestic opposition to Gorbachev would be headed by Yeltsin. Events seemed to bear them out. On May 29, 1990, Yeltsin was elected leader of the Russian parliament. At the 28th Communist Party Congress in July 1990, Yeltsin quit the Party in a public display of defiance. As far as analysts could observe, Yeltsin had a more legitimate claim to representing democratic forces than did Gorbachev.

The majority of Administration officials did not welcome this assessment. While a few, such as Cheney, agreed that Yeltsin represented the best hope for the future, most felt that Yeltsin was unstable, lacking in leadership qualities. There were substantiated reports that he was a heavy drinker. Most important, policymakers did not want to undermine Gorbachev by appearing to accept Yeltsin—who was only a parliamentarian—on equal terms. Thus when Yeltsin visited Washington in September 1989, he was—despite pleas from Gates and Fritz Ermarth, chairman of the National Intelligence Council—granted an appointment with Scowcroft, not Bush. Instead, Bush "dropped in" on Scowcroft while Yeltsin was there. Yeltsin favorably impressed neither Bush nor Baker.

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[54] Beschloss, Talbott. p. 168.

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The issue of what to do about Yeltsin from a policy viewpoint would continue to divide the policymaking and intelligence communities. The issue became even more complicated in early 1990 as German reunification became more certainty and Moscow's approval a necessary part of that historic process. Meanwhile, Yeltsin's popularity in the USSR continued to grow, seemingly in inverse proportion to the declining reputation of Gorbachev.

Is Gorbachev Slipping?—1990

According to CIA reports in March, Gorbachev's government was losing control.

> It is likely that political instability, social upheaval and inter-ethnic conflict will persist and could intensify. ... [There is] a general inability to implement its directives in many national republics, a loss of control over society in general and the precipitous decline of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, secessionist movements in the Baltic Republics and elsewhere, serious interethnic strife and continued economic deterioration.[55]

The Cheney-Webster Affair. Clearly, not all branches of the US government shared this view. In an unusual display of publicly aired, differing views, Secretary of Defense Cheney and CIA chief William Webster testified on the same day before different congressional committees. Webster, in testimony approved in advance by Secretary of State Baker, told the House Armed Services Committee on March 1 that he found it highly unlikely there would be any revival of the Soviet military threat. In contradiction, Cheney the same day warned the House Foreign Affairs Committee that a turnaround in the Soviet reform process could give rise to a renewed military threat.

Cheney was defending the proposed Bush defense budget of $306 billion for fiscal 1991. Nonetheless, the conflicting testimony highlighted the ongoing debate within the administration about the durability of Gorbachev's reforms. Webster asserted that even a successor regime to Gorbachev would "probably continue to pursue arms control agreements with the West. It would be unlikely, in addition, to seek a broad reversal of the changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe or to try to revive the Warsaw Pact."[56] Cheney took an opposite tack, stating that another Soviet leader "could reverse military course decisively." Both men agreed, however, that the long-term outlook for Gorbachev was not secure.

In late May, Gorbachev attended another summit with President Bush, this time in Washington. The Soviet leader clearly welcomed the adulation of American crowds. But at summit events, policymakers could see for themselves that Gorbachev was losing influence, even over his own military. On at least one occasion, he had to renege on a statement after whispered consultations with

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55 from Gates' speech, 5/20/92. p. 7.

56 *Washington Post*, "Webster Sees No Revival of Soviet Threat; Conflict Continues Between CIA, Defense." March 2, 1990. p. A1.

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aides. A measure of Gorbachev's growing desperation was that he begged Bush to sign a trade agreement not specifically linked to the Soviet embargo against Lithuania.[57]

The news was no better in June when, once again, the CIA raised the possibility of a coup.

> The recent acceleration of political events in the USSR could soon produce major discontinuity in Soviet policy and substantial changes in the top leadership. President Gorbachev is losing control over the political process and will be under increasing pressure to make a dramatic move to the left or right to try to regain the political initiative. The period of measured reform, directed by the central authorities in Moscow, is coming to an end.[58]

In July the Agency reported that "differences in the economic development of the republics are fueling ethnic tensions and strengthening the centrifugal forces that threaten the Soviet Union's continued existence as a multinational state." By September, Central Asia was the focus of concern.

> Moscow's challenge in Central Asia is likely to evolve from policing outbreaks of violence to dealing with outright defiance of its policies by republican regimes and, in the region's poorest and most Islamic areas, insurrectionist and secessionist movements.[59]

But by then, the fall of 1990, Bush needed Gorbachev as much as Gorbachev needed him. Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait on August 2 and the United States embarked on a crusade to muster the support of the world community, through the United Nations, against Iraqi aggression. No country was more crucial to this multilateral effort than the Soviet Union. The two presidents met in Helsinki in September to discuss their cooperation in the Gulf.

The Helsinki Crossroads

At Helsinki, the two men felt warmly towards one another. Bush had done Gorbachev the favor of signing the trade agreement at their May summit. Gorbachev had made a major concession to Western geopolitical aims when, on July 14, he withdrew Soviet objections to a reunified Germany under NATO. His agreement laid to rest the most enduring symbol of the Cold War: a divided Germany.

The Helsinki meeting clearly had one overriding goal: to get Bush and Gorbachev together in order that they might publicly reaffirm their joint opposition to the Kuwaiti invasion, and in this it succeeded. The meeting was historic for reversing 45 years of US policy aimed at keeping the Soviets out of the Middle East, seeking instead their active cooperation. The two leaders also devoted several

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57 Despite considerable opposition from Congress, Bush agreed. On June 30, Moscow lifted its embargo on Lithuania.

58 from Gates' speech, 5/20/92. p. 7.

Ibid., p. 8.

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hours to discussing progress on arms control negotiations, including START and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

But lively discussion centered on developments within the Soviet Union. Gorbachev seemed taken with a much publicized economic reform scheme for the Soviet Union known as the Shatalin plan. The so-called 500-Day Plan by economist Stanislav Shatalin called, among other things, for the sale and privatization of state enterprises, the dismantling of state farms, reductions in government subsidies to a wide array of enterprises, currency reform and a new banking system. It was an admittedly ambitious effort to jump-start Gorbachev's stalled economic reforms.[60]

But within months, Gorbachev had abandoned the Shatalin plan and taken a sharp political turn to the right. Gorbachev's move dismayed his reform-minded supporters, confirmed those doubters who had always seen in him a Communist in free-market clothing and put his international reputation as a reliable partner at risk.

A Missed Opportunity. Some of the ranking US experts on the Soviet Union saw the Helsinki meeting both at the time and in retrospect as a failed opportunity for Bush to put some very straight talk to Gorbachev. Blunt advice on the need to cooperate with even distasteful political opponents, if acted upon by Gorbachev, might in their opinion have prevented subsequent violence, kept Gorbachev as president and fostered a peaceful transition to a confederation. Jack Matlock went to Moscow as US ambassador in April 1987, attended the Helsinki meeting, and witnessed Gorbachev's subsequent turn to the right.

> This was one of Gorbachev's great failures, that he didn't push his reform more rapidly. But we could have pushed him harder in the fall of '90 to do so and I think if we had he might have made it. I think we had the chance, and I think Reagan would have done it because Reagan had more confidence in his own ability and was more willing to take chances than Bush. Bush had his emotional attachments, but basically he was very conservative and had more of a caretaker president attitude.

Matlock argues that direct advice was "the only way to have prevented [Gorbachev's] turn to the right."

> We would have better served the Union by pressing him to accept the Shatalin plan and by giving him some encouragement that he would find support in the West. ... Also [we sent a message] by our own actions in being too cautious in dealing with Yeltsin and the other [republican leaders] ... I didn't feel I should have to go over and explain to the foreign

60 The Shatalin plan had plenty of critics. CIA economist Jim Noren feels its implementation "would have wrecked the economy to an extent that didn't materialize until 1992."

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> minister every time we had a high-level appointment with Yeltsin. And the White House seemed to have that attitude.

Eric Edelman, who moved to the Defense Department as liaison for the State Department in April 1990, also calls the summer and fall of 1990 a "tremendous missed opportunity ... when Yeltsin and Gorbachev were groping towards a rapprochement and working together on the economic issue."

> But the idea of trying to promote a coalition or a grouping, a union of the reform forces, never was pushed. In part, because everyone's attention got refocused after Aug. 2 on the Gulf. And secondly, because there was very real bias that Gorbachev was our guy ... Gorbachev's been a real prince. He's given us everything we've wanted in arms control.

What Edelman considered an overfocus on arms control prevented the US government in his opinion from understanding that "the political dynamic was such in Russia, moving in such a direction that if the democratic movement succeeded, not only would what we had negotiated be preserved, but that you'd be able to go further."

George Kolt at the CIA likewise felt that earlier US attention to Yeltsin could have averted later developments.

> It was not a question of Gorbachev's policies are going to fail, therefore you should no longer deal with him. You have to deal with existing governments. But I do fault the policy people for ignoring other things that could have been done, such as dealing with Yeltsin much earlier by giving him much greater recognition, being much more supportive of the democratic movement in Russia. ... We could have facilitated a much smoother evolution in the Soviet Union than what occurred, which would have been not only in Gorbachev's interest, but our interest as well.

But Bush administration defenders object that any attempt to push Gorbachev faster along the path of reform would only have galvanized his right-wing opponents earlier, when they might have been successful. Condi Rice, for example, believes that "had the coup come in January [1991], not August, it would have succeeded."

Arnold Kanter, the arms control expert at the NSC, also believes that Gorbachev could not have moved any faster.

> If he would have moved in the direction of loosening Moscow's control over the various republics, if he would have moved faster or more ostentatiously from strong central control to a looser federation, it seems to me that would have done nothing but reinforce the conviction of the coup plotters that this guy is

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> dangerous. And it would have motivated them to move sooner rather than later.

Gates, then deputy National Security Advisor, recalls that top US officials, and Bush in particular, may well have given Gorbachev advice. In fact, says Gates, Gorbachev "was encouraged to deal with Yeltsin."

> But you are dealing with human beings. And they hated each other by that time.

In any event, believes Gates, an earlier official acceptance of Yeltsin would have changed nothing for US policy.

> The real issue was less Yeltsin than the pressure to abandon Gorbachev and swing to Yeltsin. While the Soviet Union still existed, that didn't make any sense at all. You could stop trashing Yeltsin. You could open lines of communication to Yeltsin. But it was Gorbachev making the decisions on START and on all of the issues that we were engaged with the Soviet Union on, about Afghanistan, on Cambodia, on Angola. So the notion that we stuck by Gorbachev too long is just nonsensical and doesn't reflect the reality.

What had become a reality was that SOVA's backing of Yeltsin since the fall of 1989 had been noted at the White House. According to Gates, "a lot of policymakers thought the intelligence folks had an agenda and therefore I think tended sometimes to discount their influence."

Don't Shoot the Messenger. The strength of administration commitment to Gorbachev was illustrated when DCI William Webster felt compelled to deny that the CIA was in some sense "pushing" Yeltsin. "Don't shoot the messenger," pleaded Webster. NIC chairman Ermarth in turn denied accusations that he was a Yeltsin lover. "I'm a Yeltsin watcher," he replied.[61]

Such defense aside, it was true that those within the CIA advocating greater openness to Soviet republican leaders came to feel that even though this administration listened to their assessments, it paid them no heed. As George Kolt puts it:

> A lot of our analysis might have been read, but it was completely rejected when you started talking about Gorbachev's weaknesses, the weaknesses of his policy, the danger of his policy.

Gorbachev Swings Right

By December 1990, Gorbachev gave alarming signs of retreat from his reform program as he strengthened ties to the Communist right wing. In late November, Gorbachev had proposed a union

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61 Beschloss, Talbott. p. 349.

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treaty giving greater autonomy to the republics. But he countermanded that conciliatory gesture when, on Dec. 2, he fired his moderate interior minister and replaced him with a former KGB chief. Gorbachev's close advisor, Alexander Yakovlev, warned publicly about the reemergence of reactionary forces.

On Dec. 17, Gorbachev told the assembled parliament that the national crisis was deeper than initially thought, and he asked for emergency powers to create "strong government, tight discipline and control of the implementation of decisions."

> Then we shall be able to ensure normal food supplies and rein in and stop interethnic strife. If we fail to achieve this, we will inevitably see greater discord, the rampage of dark forces and the breakup of our state.[62]

The Congress of People's Deputies gave Gorbachev much of what he asked for despite a plea from Yeltsin, who argued that the nation did not need "Kremlin diktat."

> The way out of the crisis requires honest dialogue, with equal rights between the center and the republics. This does not mean the disintegration of the Union. On the contrary, this is the only way to save it.

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, tired of blame from the right for "losing" Eastern rope, added his own warning to the rising chorus. On Dec. 20, he resigned, startling not only the Soviet Union but the US administration. Shevardnadze warned that "dictatorship is coming."

> No one knows what kind of dictatorship this will be and who will come—what kind of dictator, and what the regime will be like.[63]

Within weeks, Shevardnadze's sober prediction seemed on its way to fulfillment. On Jan. 2, crack Black Beret Soviet troops seized buildings in Lithuania and Latvia, two of the rebellious Baltic states. On Jan. 13, Soviet troops killed 15 peaceful demonstrators in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. On Jan. 20, dubbed "Black Sunday," Black Berets shot their way into the Latvian Interior Ministry, leaving four dead.

In the midst of this, on Jan. 16, 1991, the United Nations under US leadership launched Desert Storm to retake Kuwait from Saddam Hussein.

Did Gorbachev Know?

The White House debated furiously how to respond to the Soviet developments. When Shevardnadze resigned, Bush had told reporters that:

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62 Ibid., p. 294.

63 Ibid., p. 295.

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> Any time you move from a totalitarian, totally controlled state to an open state ... you're bound to have problems. ... Far be it from me to try to fine-tune the difficulties that they're having there.[64]

But the charges against Gorbachev were much more serious in January. Although Gorbachev denied foreknowledge of the Baltic attacks, most observers were inclined to discount this disclaimer.[65] As the State Department desk officer at the time for the Soviet Union, Alexander Vershbow, remembers it, "the Lithuanian crisis sort of jarred everyone."

> In the view of those who saw the devolution process as accelerating, spinning out of control, it was a sign of things to come. But for those who were determined to press ahead with a Gorby-centric approach, it was seen as an aberration that we had to manage and tamp down.

NSC Soviet expert Rice remembers early 1991 as the most alarming period of her tenure at the National Security Council because Gorbachev had so isolated himself from his reform-minded supporters.

> He began to resemble the classic isolated leader surrounding himself with people who had no purpose in mind but to reestablish an authoritarian state. ... The costs of *perestroika* were suddenly clear. Lithuania was about to declare independence, Ukraine and Russia were talking independence. [Plus] we were occupied in the Gulf. I still to this day think they thought they had us over a barrel. Add all of that up, and I thought that was a point of maximum danger.

Most observers concur that, whether or not Gorbachev gave the direct orders to shoot in the Baltics, "he created the conditions," as Rice says. But public reaction, both domestic and abroad, unnerved Gorbachev at that point. The hardliners were "shocked," she adds, when the US and European nations threatened to withdraw aid. Even more important, Gorbachev couldn't go through with it because of his personality.

> Confronted with the bloodshed, he couldn't stomach it and he backed off. In that we were lucky it was him. I think, by the way, that was when the hard right in Russia lost faith in him and decided he was part of the problem.

The Intelligence Report. The CIA took the view that Gorbachev was behind the violence in the Baltics. In a SPOTCOM (Spot Commentary) written for Bush, the Agency assigned Gorbachev

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64 Ibid., p. 297.

65 Garthoff takes a more benign view of Gorbachev's role in the Baltic incidents, writing in *The Great Transition* that "Gorbachev had been fed a steady stream of false and misleading information on events and public opinion by his conservative security advisers." p. 452.

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responsibility "strategically if not tactically." On Jan. 24, the National Intelligence Daily carried an article titled "Crisis at the Turning Point." It said that "Gorbachev has started a conflict without a visible program and with scant prospect of long-term success. He will not easily escape the predicament for which he is largely responsible, and he may become its principal casualty."[66]

Throughout the crisis, Rice for one felt that the intelligence community performance was "magnificent." Much of her time during that period was spent chairing emergency sessions of a small, secret inter-agency committee working on contingency plans for the Soviet Union.

Using Intelligence—A Policymaker's View

Rice's committee was the one started by Gates in the fall of 1989. The committee was, says Rice, "a very small and secret effort to ask ourselves the radical questions" about the Soviet Union's future.[67] Some of the questions the committee examined were: what if Soviet nuclear weapons fell into dangerous hands; what if the USSR ended violently; if the US government learned of plans for a coup, would it tell Gorbachev; what if Soviet troops in Germany refused to go home? Recalls Rice:

> These meetings were so secret our secretaries weren't allowed to put them on our calendars because all we needed was a story that the administration was making contingency plans for the violent breakup of the Soviet Union, and our Soviet policy was dead.

The committee, as well as her expertise, made Rice one of the more aggressive users of intelligence in the Bush administration. She was known within CIA circles for actively seeking out differing opinions directly from analysts. In general, Rice found intelligence analysis most useful in a crisis situation such as the Baltic events.

> I think that looking for big strategic answers from the intelligence community is actually the wrong use. I think where they're best is at the tactical level. If you ask me, did I need the intelligence community to know that the Soviet Union was collapsing and that Gorbachev was trying to put a finger in the dike, but that in fact the dike was coming at him and Eastern Europe was exploding? No, I could read that in the *New York Times*.

She found the "big picture" National Intelligence Estimates too obvious.

> They would say, for example, Gorbachev could try and hold onto Eastern Europe, or he could not try and hold onto Eastern

66 Beschloss, Talbott, p. 317.

67 Other members of the committee were Dennis Ross from State, Fritz Ermarth from CIA, Eric Edelman from Defense; metimes Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Bob Blackwell from CIA. The group was apparently not so secret, as many staffers at the different agencies wrote papers for it.

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> Europe. Well, I probably could have figured that out, right? But what they're very good at doing is watching with a real worm's-eye view. They can tell you it looks like the threat to move airborne forces into Lithuania to enforce the draft is credible. And they can marry that up with hard-core military intelligence. ... What you need help with is, 'This is going to happen today.' So we're not caught in the position of announcing a summit tomorrow, and the next day they invade Lithuania. That's where intelligence is helpful.

Verbal Intelligence. Analysts and their customers alike emphasize that in many instances, the most useful intelligence to the policymaker is that conveyed in a briefing. In such a setting, policymakers solicit the well-informed opinions of analysts on issues of pressing concern. The responses, freed from the need to "coordinate" views as in a carefully crafted written estimate, can be frank and enlightening.

Two analysts recall instances when they were asked to brief top officials at the White House. "Collectively," says one "we knew somewhat better than we wrote. ... While our documentary record was careful, our dialogues with top policymakers were far richer." The other asks rhetorically, "How is intelligence conveyed?," and answers himself: "Much more is conveyed orally. The written product represents 1/10th of the total."

Andrew Carpendale, an assistant to Secretary of State Baker concurs that informal networks of communication were very important for intelligence reports.

> Because these types of communications ... leave little of a paper trail, there is a natural tendency to downplay them, but in my estimation, they were probably more important in shaping the mindset of decision-makers than the formal communications.

At the State Department, he recalls, analysts would visit every two or three months to meet with top officials. Such meetings, comments Carpendale, allowed analysts to "present a more personal and sophisticated assessment of the evolving situation, as they were not required to vet their views with others [and] allowed us to ask them questions which were more policy relevant and useful than would be the case otherwise." Officials at State would, in turn, draw on this information when drafting their own analytical memoranda to the Secretary before key meetings with Soviet leaders.

An Analyst Turned Consumer. Robert Gates, knowledgeable about how intelligence analysis is produced, was not so critical of the NIE format. But he had his own problems with the intelligence he was getting at the NSC. Most had to do with the old CIA predicament of seeking a consensus view versus airing differences of opinion. Gates had concluded that seeking a completely unified view was a "serious mistake."

> One of the most difficult problems that I had was that I knew there were bitter differences of view across the board on Soviet

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> policy. And it was very tough to get SOVA to bring that to the surface.

To counteract this, recalls Blackwell, Gates would order up estimates which would try to get at the differences of opinion within the community, to explore different scenarios. By and large, comments Blackwell, who found the exercises thought-provoking, "analysts hated this. It was not sources and methods." Gates may have been unaware of analyst resentment at what appeared to them a form of "make-work." But they did not charge him with telling them what to write. Neither did Gates ever feel during his time at the NSC that CIA intelligence analysis was written to suit a policy agenda.

> I was worried about the lack of an expression of differences. I was worried about the lack of greater candor about the reliability of some of the sources. I was worried about the lack of alternative scenarios. I had a lot of worries. Politicization wasn't one of them. I had no concern that somebody at the agency had an agenda. The process is too uncontrollable for that.

If anything, as 1991 unfolded, CIA assessments of Gorbachev's dwindling odds came increasingly into conflict with Administration hopes for his survival. In publishing these views, comments Nick Burns, then-deputy to Rice, the CIA exercised its unique responsibility within the policy community.

> I think elements of the Agency were kind of fearless. They did not tell policymakers what they wanted to hear. ... You've got to have somebody [in government] who doesn't care what the president thinks of them.

The Soviet Cauldron

SOVA paused in April 1991 to do a comprehensive assessment of the unraveling events in the USSR. In a special 9-page report entitled "The Soviet Cauldron" and sent to policymakers on April 25, SOVA warned that "economic crisis, independence aspirations and anti-communist forces are breaking down the Soviet empire and system of governance." The estimate characterized the central economy as broken and Gorbachev's credibility as zero. It once again raised the possibility of a coup attempt, but also the chance that such a coup might fail.

The report pointed specifically to burgeoning independence movements in the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltics and Georgia. It pointed out that the centrally-planned economy had "broken down irretrievably and is being replaced by a mixture of republic and local barter arrangements, some of whose aspects resemble a market, but which do not constitute a coherent system." New media were springing up daily, mirrored by the rise of "inchoate" new political parties.

Gorbachev, reported SOVA, had transformed from "ardent reformer to consolidator."

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> His attempts to preserve the essence of a center-dominated union, Communist Party rule, and a centrally-planned economy without the broad use of force, however, have driven him to tactical expedients that are not solving basic problems and are hindering but not preventing the development of a new system.

SOVA predicted five possible early developments: public riots or strikes; heightened activity by anti-government forces; the deaths from overwork or assassination of either Gorbachev or Yeltsin; the rise of strong republican leaders; a reactionary coup in the name of law and order. The report found a coup attempt "the most fateful" possibility, although it discerned signs of preparation for such an event.

> Explosive events have become increasingly possible. ... The reactionary leaders, with or without Gorbachev, could judge that the last chance to act had come and move under the banner of law and order. ... Military MVD and KGB leaders are making preparations for the broad use of force in the political process.

The primary target of coup plotters would be Yeltsin, said SOVA, because he "is the only leader with mass appeal." But long-term prospects for coup leaders, it opined, "are poor, and even short-term success is far from assured" because of the uncertain loyalty of the armed forces and the likelihood of widespread opposition.

SOVA foresaw a confederal Soviet Union by the end of the 1990s.

> With or without Gorbachev, with or without a putsch, the most likely prospect for the end of this decade, if not earlier, is a Soviet Union transformed into some independent states and a confederation of the remaining republics, including Russia.

The report gave scenarios for three possible Soviet Unions in the coming year: a continued political stalemate; an attempted dictatorship; a breakthrough by the pluralists (republican forces).

"Gorbachev's Future." By May, the agency had become even more forceful, pronouncing Gorbachev's rule over and a major shift of power to the republics already underway. In an analysis dated May 23, DI said:

> Gorbachev remains an important player on the Soviet political scene, especially in foreign and defense policy, but his domination of it has ended and will not be restored. Whether or not he is still in office a year from now, a major shift of power to the republics will have occurred unless it has been blocked by a traditionalist coup.[68]

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68 *Gorbachev's Future*. Directorate of Intelligence. May 23, 1991. p. 1.

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No authority was any longer in a position to cope with nationalist demands and the deteriorating economy. Although the CIA analysis saw a ray of hope in an April agreement between Gorbachev and republican leaders, long-term and lasting compromise seemed unlikely given Gorbachev's record of fighting to maintain central control.

> The reformers' and traditionalists' basic goals for the future of the union are diametrically opposed, so there is little prospect that Gorbachev's so called centrist course can defuse the crisis. ... No matter what happens, the current political system in the Soviet Union is doomed.

The assessment posited several possible outcomes: republican leaders force out Gorbachev; massive strikes topple the government; a coup by hardliners. The analysis conjectured that the danger to Gorbachev from hardliners was greatest if he were perceived as selling out to the republics.

> In short, the Soviet Union is now in a revolutionary situation in the sense that it is in a transition from the old order to an as yet undefined new order. Although the transition might occur peaceably, the current center-dominated political system is doomed. As happened in Eastern Europe over the past two years, the ingredients are now present in the USSR that could lead not only to a rapid change in the regime, but in the political system as well. ... The current political situation is highly volatile and could quickly unravel and throw the country into a succession crisis with little warning. The security services are feeling increasingly desperate and there is a possibility that they could act against Gorbachev at any time.

Also in May, DI published an assessment of the Soviet economy which sounded many of the same gloomy notes as more political analyses. It made the point once again that Gorbachev had undone the old command system yet hesitated in the difficult process of introducing a market economy, with disastrous results. A smooth evolution toward a federal structure based on a draft union treaty published in March might, said the analysis, "improve economic organization by eliminating much of the confusion concerning areas of authority."[69] But DI still foresaw a minimum drop of 10 percent in 1991 GNP.

"The Soviet Cauldron" and subsequent analyses were circulated to all leading members of the government and the relevant congressional committee members. Within the administration, the CIA warnings were listened to, even believed. But they did not significantly affect US policy in large part, say administration officials, because it was not in the US interest to tilt support away from Gorbachev and toward the republics.

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6 *oviet Economic Futures: The Outlook for 1991.* Directorate of Intelligence, CIA. May 1991. p. 11.

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To What Degree Yeltsin?

Once again, the question of Gorbachev's staying power raised the issue of how much official support the US should offer Yeltsin and his followers. His sway was growing: 100,000 supporters defied a Gorbachev-imposed ban on March 28 to demonstrate in Moscow on Yeltsin's behalf. Disagreement within the administration was leading to mixed policy signals. During the Baltic crisis of January, for example, some voices had argued forcefully for sending Ambassador Matlock to see Yeltsin. Rice and others at the NSC felt that was unwise. As it was Matlock, who in Moscow did not know of the Washington discussion, visited Yeltsin on his own initiative in the midst of the crisis.

Within the executive branch, one faction strongly favored encouraging greater openness toward Yeltsin. Its members included Cheney, to a lesser degree Baker, Gates and Matlock. Yeltsin, says Matlock, "really was the leader of the opposition in the whole country as well as increasingly the leader of Russia." Gorbachev, he says, had become a spoiler.

> Certainly from 1989 on, every time they had a deal Gorbachev would walk away from it. [Yeltsin aides] would bring drafts [of agreements] and Gorbachev would sit on them. ... He wasn't dealing in good faith.

On the other side were President Bush and most members of the White House staff who still saw signs that Gorbachev was working toward reform. In March, for example, Gorbachev sponsored a nationwide referendum on whether the country should be reestablished as a federation of republics. A draft union treaty was published. In late April, Gorbachev met with Yeltsin and the leaders of eight other republics in what proved indeed to be the beginning of a political swing back toward the center.

US National Interest. But even without these encouraging political developments, say administration officials, the US national interest continued to lie with supporting Gorbachev. As National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft told his aides in no uncertain terms: "We're not going to do anything that looks like we're casting our lot with Yeltsin against Gorbachev."[70]

The Soviet leader had been cooperative in many areas of US concern, not least arms control, emphasizes Rice. With the START agreement under negotiation in the spring of 1991, says Rice. "I believe we had an obligation to push as much [as possible] through that window before it did collapse."[71]

But even had it been clear that Gorbachev was finished and his country ready to implode, adds Rice, the US should have done nothing to accelerate the process—"The United States of America should not have any fingerprints on it."

> If it was going to fall, let it fall of its own weight. Because we weren't prepared to deal with the consequences of a collapse

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70 Beschloss, Talbott, p. 350.

71 Ermarth words this thinking somewhat differently: "Our diplomatic business with Gorbachev is preeminent; to conduct that business we must assert that he has a bright future; to assert this we must believe it and reject the case that he does not."

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> that we helped engineer. We weren't going to go defend Ukraine if Russia decided to take it on.

Rice says she did make successful efforts to organize meetings between Bush and several of the republican leaders. But President Bush "didn't want to go out and recognize independent states."

> He knew there was a possibility the Soviet Union was going to fall apart. ... He could see it happening. But it's one thing for me, out of a government role, or [others] to stand up and say the Soviet Union's going to fall apart, than for the president of the United States to say it. Or someone who works for him. Because actions have consequences. And words have consequences. And [what] if it happens and it happens violently and some republic bolts prematurely because it thought the United States was going to support it?

NSC arms control expert Kanter adds that stability, after all, was one of the overriding US interests.

> If there was an ambivalence in US policy toward Yeltsin before the coup, it was not because of the belief that Gorbachev was in such a solid position but, on the contrary, that things were very volatile and that US interests would be better served by a soft landing than a crash landing when the Soviet Union collapsed. Fomenting the collapse of the internal Soviet empire in the shortest period possible come what may was not our policy objective.

However, the Bush administration, particularly the NSC, did begin to look more favorably on Yeltsin once Ed Hewett replaced Rice in March 1991. Edelman remembers that:

> The first thing he said was, 'This government's got a major Yeltsin problem and we've got to work our way out of it.'

Moreover, in the spring the CIA began to include a situation report (sitrep) on circumstances in the republics in its National Intelligence Daily classified report to the president and top officials.[72] By June, matters had evolved to the extent that Bush received Yeltsin at the White House for what proved to be a 3 1/2- hour conversation.

View from the CIA. The intelligence directorate submitted its assessment of Yeltsin's political agenda in June 1991, as Bush prepared for the meeting with the Russian leader. The Agency saw in Yeltsin a "coherent Russian democratic alternative to the imperial authoritarianism of the traditionalists."[73] Charges Yeltsin was an "unprincipled opportunist" were not, said DI, "borne out by his actions."

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72 Garthoff, p. 448n.

Yeltsin's Political Objectives. Directorate of Intelligence, CIA. June 1991. p. iii.

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The assessment gave Yeltsin credit for helping to defuse the dangerous situation in January when, among other things, he went to Estonia and signed documents effectively recognizing Baltic independence. As the likely first president of Russia (elections were scheduled for July), the analysis predicted that he would promote "rapid marketization. ... He is certain to emphasize that [foreign] aid should be channeled primarily through the republics and to specific projects." Yeltsin would also, it said, continue to work for a reconstituted union of equal republics.

> The "order" and "stability" projected in President Gorbachev's vision of the union is—in Yeltsin's view—inherently unstable because it denies the striving for national self-determination. True stability now will come only with a genuinely voluntary association of republics.

Yeltsin, in a considerable boost to his own power base, was elected president of Russia on July 12, 1991. On July 16, Secretary Baker in Paris told journalists that the US intended to have contact with the opposition forces Yeltsin headed.

> I think if you take a look at the way we have approached similar situations in the countries of Eastern Europe and in other countries as well, you would see that we have taken care to touch base with the opposition to make sure that we understand where the opposition is coming from, that they understand where we are coming from. I don't think that is inappropriate just because it is the Soviet Union.[74]

But there was no significant shift in US policy. Instead, intelligence and policy efforts focused on preparing Bush and his staff for a late July summit with Gorbachev in Moscow.

The atmosphere was business as usual. Despite the warnings out of the CIA, despite the contingency planning by Rice's group, despite even an early summer dress-rehearsal for a coup, there was little sense when the two presidents met in late July that Gorbachev would face the ultimate crisis of his career a little less than three weeks later.

The Coup

The group gathered in Moscow for the summit July 29-Aug. 1, 1991 was upbeat. Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union were signing the historic START treaty on reducing nuclear weapons. The two nations also announced plans to co-sponsor a Middle East peace treaty. It was not a crisis atmosphere. Says Kanter:

> The world was transformed three weeks later. [But] I certainly didn't have the sense in Moscow that we were on the brink of an historical transformation.

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74 *New York Times*, "Baker Says US is Ready to Create Links with Soviet Non-Communists." July 17, 1990.

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There was, however, a general consensus that events in the Soviet Union were moving so fast nothing could really surprise observers anymore. "By 1990, certainly by 1991," says Kanter, "you could believe anything ... you literally couldn't tell if someone was pulling your leg. It could be preposterous and it could also be true."

> Everyone knew that Soviet society was in turmoil. Everyone knew that Gorbachev was riding the tide, that he was taking bold actions born of desperation rather than inspiration. Everyone knew how fluid, how volatile things were. And so in that sense no one was shocked that there was a coup three weeks later. ... But the event, when it happened and how it happened, did surprise people. If you will, people were tactically surprised but not strategically surprised.

In the event, coup leaders moved against Gorbachev on the eve of the scheduled signing of a union treaty giving greater autonomy to the republics. Gorbachev was placed under guard in his vacation home on the Black Sea while the hardliners fought it out in Moscow against Yeltsin and his supporters. The coup leaders buckled in a surprisingly short time, revealing the amateur character of their takeover plan. Most were placed under arrest; senior military official Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev committed suicide. Gorbachev returned to Moscow, but he had lost the last shreds of popular respect. In a widely noted omission, he even failed to thank Yeltsin for his part in toppling the tsch.

The Agency before the Coup. The coup did not surprise the CIA, although it could not foresee the exact timing. SOVA director George Kolt had taken a short leave in early August during which he had time to think about the Soviet situation away from the pressure of daily events. The US had already received potent warning, via Ambassador Matlock, of a coup attempt in June. That coup never took place, but plans for it clearly identified those individuals who would be involved in any future takeover attempt.

On Kolt's return to work, he requested SOVA put together an analysis of the prospects for a coup. The outlook, he recalls, was not encouraging. But the paper did not go so far as to say that Gorbachev's downfall would be linked to signing the controversial union treaty, even though one analyst made exactly this connection. Says Kolt:

> We could have said very clearly that a catalyst is this union treaty. There was one analyst who said they cannot let this be signed. But this thought was brought to my attention only after the coup. We did not pursue it in the piece. We had a hard enough time internally getting it agreed—not with our leadership; we always argued among ourselves. ... We said the possibility of a coup was growing. We even said Gorbachev may not go along this time and said it could not succeed in the

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> long run, which was all right. But we couldn't predict it to the exact date.

On Saturday, Aug. 17, however, signs were growing that action against Gorbachev was imminent. Alexander Yakovlev warned against a Stalinist "party and state coup." The President's Daily Brief for that date published SOVA's analysis, which explicitly warned that "the danger is growing that hardliners will precipitate large-scale violence."

August 18, 1991. When the coup started on Sunday, Aug. 18, the administration seemed caught unawares, despite the intelligence reports. Most senior level policymakers were on vacation, including President Bush who was in Kennebunkport, Maine. But from the start, there were signs the coup would not stick. The CIA noted virtually no military preparations by coup leaders. Kolt personally called National Security Adviser Scowcroft a few hours after the coup started, said it might not succeed, and implicitly suggested a firm condemnation of the coup leaders.

Bush's first public statement on the issue, given Monday morning, was relatively subdued, saying that "I've said over and over again that we did not want to see a coup backed by the KGB and the military, and apparently that is what is under way." But, he added, "I think it's also important to note that coups can fail." As Gates puts it, there was little reason initially to hope the coup would fail.

> Based on all prior experience in Russian and Soviet history, when you know at the outset that you've got the KGB and the army and the Party all together in a coup attempt, the chances of it not succeeding based on past history are near zero ... [Bush's] first public comments were as much a holding action as anything else, but fairly pessimistic based on the information.

By Monday afternoon, however, intelligence reports indicated the coup was not going well and Bush became far tougher. By evening, and ahead of virtually all Western leaders in condemning the plotters, Bush stated that "We are deeply disturbed by the events of the last hours in the Soviet Union and condemn the unconstitutional resort to force. ... This misguided and illegitimate effort bypasses both Soviet law and the will of the Soviet people." He expressed support for both Yeltsin and Gorbachev. Gates feels that the contingency planning at the NSC helped the administration cope with the unfolding events.

> A lot of thinking had already been done about how we would deal with this problem. And so I think people were a lot better able to cope and move with some facility in a very dangerous and unpredictable time, and I think that the way it was managed sort of underscores that it was done pretty well.

What could not have been predicted, he says, is the degree to which the coup plotters themselves were disorganized.

> The key in August was that the leaders were behind the coup, but the institutions that they headed were not, or were

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> divided. But the fundamental thing was that the coup leaders themselves were half-hearted. And nobody could count on that.

Matlock, who had left Moscow for good on Aug. 11, thought that a coup wouldn't occur because its leaders would understand in advance that it would fail. He agrees that the plotters "didn't know, until they confronted [Gorbachev] and he refused, what they were going to do."

On Monday Bush returned to Washington. He tried several times to telephone Gorbachev but could not get through. Meanwhile, Yeltsin had emerged as the leader of the opposition to the coup, rallying citizens from his stronghold in the "White House" Russian parliament building. On Tuesday, Bush telephoned Yeltsin to offer his support. The coup folded by Wednesday and Gorbachev returned to Moscow.

In subsequent weeks, Gorbachev's small remaining influence dissipated. One by one, the republics declared their independence from Moscow. One of the most radical republics was Russia. On Dec. 8, Yeltsin and the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus met in Minsk, agreeing to form a Commonwealth of Independent States. On Dec. 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned and the Soviet Union was dissolved.

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Background Note 1

The Organization

The Central Intelligence Agency, based in Langley, Virginia, is only one part of a widespread intelligence community. The larger community includes the long-unpublicized National Reconnaissance Office (imagery satellites), the Defense Department's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (signals intelligence) and the much-smaller Intelligence and Research Bureau at the State Department.

To most outsiders, however, US intelligence means the CIA. It employed in 1985 an estimated 20,000 people at an annual cost of some $3 billion.[1] The CIA comprised four directorates, of which two attracted the most public attention: the Directorate for Operations (DO) handled covert activities and collected secret intelligence; the Directorate for Intelligence (DI) analyzed both covert and overt intelligence and wrote up their findings for policymakers.[2]

DI had four functional staffs: Arms Control Intelligence; Collections Requirements and Evaluations; Planning and Management; and Product Evaluation. DI also ran offices of Current Production, Global Issues, Imagery Analysis, Central Reference and Scientific and Weapons Research. Finally, there were five offices organized on a geographical basis. One of these was the Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA).

SOVA was charged with analyzing the wide array of intelligence on the Soviet Union and projecting Soviet intentions. The department's job was to look at the Soviet Union from as many points of view as seemed helpful to policymakers: its economic performance (by industry as well as overall), arms program, agricultural output, foreign policy and so forth. Individual analysts with sector expertise produced both current intelligence—incorporated most importantly into the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) as well as the National Intelligence Daily (NID)—and long-range assessments of Soviet behavior known as National Intelligence Estimates (NIE). The Agency also generated research papers.

Typically, contributions to NIEs would go to the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for the area who, within the context of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) would coordinate reports from the various branches of the intelligence community into a single, cohesive document. The NIC, founded in 1979, is independent of the CIA and answers to the DCI as director of all intelligence activities. Its members are drawn broadly from the intelligence community, as well as from academic circles. The National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), composed of top officers from other intelligence agencies and chaired by the DCI, would give final approval to NIEs.

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1 The budget for the entire intelligence community, while still a secret, is estimated at some $30 billion. Some 85 percent of that is under the control of the Secretary of Defense through NSA, NRO, DIA and the intelligence arms of the four armed forces.

2 The other directorates were Administration, and Science and Technology (DDS&T).

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The chief audience for NIEs were the president, vice president, and the National Security Council (NSC). To a considerable degree, the influence of the intelligence community depended on the vigor of the NSC. The CIA's other important clients were in Congress where intelligence "watchdog" committees kept a close eye on agency activities.

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Background Note 2

Intelligence Analysis: Just What Should It Do?

In crafting their product, CIA analysts must keep constantly in mind two conflicting demands. Ideally, intelligence analysis is policy-neutral, non-partisan, objective. At the same time, it is supposed to serve the needs of the policymaker. The proudest product of the analytical community has been the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and the more crisis-driven Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE). Much debate has focused on the form of NIEs—should they be long, short, pose questions, prescribe action, detail scenarios? The other overarching question is whether NIEs best serve the policymaker when they represent a single, coordinated view of the intelligence community; or when they reflect the lively debate on most issues which animates the community from within? As one ranking CIA officer says:

> The line between policy and intelligence is we don't make policy, but if we're not involved in policy, we can't do the other. You can't support it in the sense of providing the wherewithal for [policymakers] to make decent decisions or interpret what they're getting.

The Written Product. How analysis is presented can greatly influence how it is received at the highest levels of government. For many years, the CIA behaved and indeed regarded itself as a classified version of a university. So-called current intelligence, provided on a daily basis to the president and top national leaders, naturally read much like newspaper articles. But NIEs were often long and, to critics, impenetrable. Their subjects were frequently of interest to the analysts, not to the White House which employed them. That changed somewhat with reforms in the early 1980s meant to make analysis shorter, more crisply written and more timely. But even with those changes, readers complain about the Agency's use of equivocal language. As one late 1980s National Security Council staffer puts it:

> Intelligence estimates typically are written so they can never be wrong. The consequence of course is they are never right. You have hedged conclusions and weasel words, and they're not crisp. They're not clear and they therefore feed the debate. Rather than challenging preconceptions, they allow the preconceptions to dominate. That's not to say the intelligence community pulls its punches. Frankly, it doesn't know.

Some CIA insiders think the difficulty is in trying to sound too authoritative. According to a top-ranking analyst and National Intelligence Officer:

> We don't do two things well: sometimes we don't make a clear distinction between what we know and what we think. ... The

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> other thing we don't do well is identify what might make us wrong in this judgment, articulating the assumptions that go into the analysis we've just laid out.

Single vs. Multiple Views. Others feel that estimates suffer from striving for too great unanimity, eliminating valuable dissenting views which the policymaker deserves to hear. But again, reform does not necessarily help. Robert Gates, who implemented widespread writing reforms in 1982, sought at the time:

> To make analysis more rigorous and intellectually tougher. To encourage alternative views. To rely less on assertion and to make more use of evidence. And to be more open about the level of confidence in our sources and in our judgments.

Yet a decade later, a State Department officer largely supportive of the CIA says that "what I found disturbing about a lot of the estimates is that they did not lay out explicitly the evidence which led them to their conclusions. And therefore they were not open to intelligent inspection by an intelligent reader."

At the same time, being too inclusive carries its own risks. Within the CIA, most analysts welcome the use of footnotes to register dissent. But they recognize that estimates which take no firm view become self-defeating. Says one National Intelligence Officer:

> If [the policymaker] gets an estimate that's all over the lot, where you have no consensus anywhere, you know: 'Some believe this, some believe that on this issue,' it's actually worse. It's worse because no one knows what to make of this except that the community doesn't know what it's doing.

A consumer at the NSC level agrees that providing dissenting views creates its own problems.

> It feeds the impression that these guys don't know what they're talking about. They can't even agree among themselves. And remember that these are people who are doing information collection and analysis. They're not supposed to have any policy views.

User-Friendly Intelligence. A few of the Agency's harshest critics argue that it doesn't matter how much the CIA recrafts its reports or pursues relevance because, in the final analysis, it is precisely the Agency's political independence which makes it ultimately useless. Lieut. Gen. William Odom, for example, former head of the National Security Agency (NSA), maintains that the CIA is "an institution whose activities don't really affect things that much. Ninety percent of the information any policymaker needs to make decisions is in the open source material."

> It's not their fault. They have a lot of brilliant people, but they are institutionally not in a position to affect anything. As the chief intelligence officer of the army, how could I affect

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> the chief of staff of the army? By knowing him, being in his councils and knowing what's on his mind. ... I've never seen people in the administrations that I've been connected with be terribly concerned about what the CIA says.

Less trenchant observers feel that intelligence analysis is at least handicapped by the degree to which its influence depends on the prior receptivity of the reader. "Intelligence," says one NSC official, "is in the eyes of the beholder."

> I find that it not only helps to influence people's thinking, but that people use it to reinforce their preconceptions and their policy positions.

Others ascribe policymakers' tendency to ignore intelligence assessments to the disjunction between the somewhat theoretical world of the analysts and the crushingly real-world realities with which policymakers struggle daily. Says one official who has been an intelligence consumer at both the State and Defense Departments:

> A lot of intelligence community folks feel that their job is to tell truth to power. ... Whereas policymakers in a certain sense are Marxists, if you start with Marx's judgment that up to now all philosophy was an effort to interpret the world; the point is to change it. [So] there is an intrinsic tendency to be somewhat skeptical of what they're reading from the intelligence community because it sometimes lacks warp and woof, the feel of the real world experience.

A former NSC staffer agrees that intelligence estimates are not "operational."

> Intelligence doesn't replace judgment. I still have to make judgments about, first of all, do I think that's right? Secondly, even if it is going to happen in six months, does it matter for what I've got to do the next three months? And what's the operational implication of that conclusion?

For her, the most useful intelligence product was the daily report on unfolding events she could request on short notice.

> I would say 'This is moving way too fast for me to track. Give me two pages tomorrow on what you think is really going on ... and do you think these guys are about to invade?' It was the quick turnaround.

While CIA officials find some of the criticisms of their work valid, they argue that much of it misses the point of how intelligence analysis can best be used. As NIO Robert Blackwell posits:

> Good staffs down there [at the NSC] realize that this building essentially, if it's used correctly, is their research organization,

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from small things and quick things to big things. Not necessarily because of the uniqueness of the sources, but because you have a lot of horse power out here to pull together things from everywhere and try to package it in a way that you can digest. There can be an academic article that challenges your thinking in a big conceptual way, but it is not going to help you in an immediate response to something, and you can't get it that quickly.

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Background Note 3

Criticizing the Estimates

The CIA provided lawmakers with two kinds of quantitative estimates. The first looked for trends by examining rates of growth, both in Soviet GNP (gross national product) and in defense spending. The second gauged the size of the economy by comparing Soviet GNP and industrial sector estimates with similar figures for the US and other countries. The CIA has had to contend with charges from within and outside the intelligence community that its methodology—both for estimating the Soviet economy and its defense expenditures—was flawed.[1]

Certainly the methodology was imperfect, largely because the Soviet government was secretive about much which might reflect poorly on the Communist system. Thus, Western economists were heavily dependent on published Soviet data which, while fairly reliable on physical production statistics, omitted much information. Secondly, ruble prices were difficult to compare with prices in other currencies, since they were set by central planners with little reference to market preferences. Thirdly, estimates of goods and services had difficulty quantifying the poor quality that characterized much of the civilian economy. Moreover, the black market flourished outside of official statistics.

Nonetheless, the CIA argued that its data was valuable for detecting trends in economic activity. CIA analysts did check published Soviet statistics on physical output against classified information whenever possible. Adjustments were made for the worst distortions of ruble prices. In fact, as NIO George Kolt reported in 1990 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "the shortcomings of official Soviet statistics provided much of the impetus for the development of independent Western estimates."[2] Finally, the CIA points out, its estimates were widely used even by critical scholars.[3]

To track Soviet military expenditures, the CIA compiled two estimates—one denominated in dollars, the other in rubles. The dollar estimate made possible comparisons between the Soviet and American military forces. The ruble estimate enabled the CIA to calculate the proportion of Soviet GNP devoted to defense—the so-called defense burden.

To calculate how much the Soviets spent on defense, the CIA estimated what it would cost the United States to operate an equivalent military establishment: the "dollar costing" method. The US, through satellites and other sources, had generally reliable information on the actual numbers of tanks, weapons and so forth the Soviet Union was producing. Assuming similar quality, CIA economists calculated how much it would cost the US to produce the number of tanks, for example, that satellites could see the Soviets had built. By adding together similarly derived costs for the components of the

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1 In one celebrated case involving the East bloc, the CIA (1987) reported that per capita GNP in East and West Germany for 1985 was roughly equal. That mistake, due to currency conversion errors, was swiftly corrected.

2 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Estimating the Size and Growth of the Soviet Economy*, July 16, 1990. p. 13.

3 Interestingly, it would come out in the late Gorbachev years that General Secretary Yuri Andropov, too, trusted only CIA figures on his own country's expenditures.

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Soviet military, the CIA arrived at an estimate of Soviet defense spending. When available, the CIA used actual Soviet prices as a basis for computing costs.

"Dollar costing," however, suffered from some of the same inherent weaknesses that beset estimates of the economy. It did well at detecting trends in military spending. As with the economic estimates, classified data on actual physical output provided a useful check against published Soviet figures. But the methodology, while correcting for the instances of which it was aware, could not fully account for the unknowable percentage of Soviet defense spending hidden within the civilian economy, from military training within the school system to individual factories which routinely channeled the best quality 10 percent of production to military procurers.[4] Moreover, even the "physical" estimates contained some errors undetected for years and still publicly uncorrected. For example, estimates of Soviet military manpower in Europe assumed 95 percent manning levels when the average was 85 percent; chemical warfare stocks and their deployment in Eastern Europe were overstated; the range of the Tu-22M Backfire medium bomber was exaggerated, as was the accuracy of the SS-19 ICBM.[5]

Gates, for one, felt that military costing methods "didn't capture the full scope of the burden of Soviet military efforts" on the economy as a whole. A sharper critic was the often iconoclastic Lieut. Gen. Odom who, as a young military attaché in Moscow in the early 1970s, researched the defense share of Soviet GNP based on interviews with the kinds of sources—dissidents and emigrants—the CIA rarely used. Although CIA analysts themselves say they did "carefully evaluate the many 'inside' estimates of the Soviet defense burden,"[6] Odom remembers differently.

> I got a Sakharov paper that said it was 42 percent. A couple of economists in Leningrad said it was 52 percent. I found a published book on military economy which said that over 20 percent in peacetime is *normal*. ... And I reported all that. I didn't change anybody's mind. ... [But] what the CIA could never be forced to deal with is how do you account for this huge force structure being purchased at such a small resource allocation? ... The first thing you should have done was take some of these inside estimates seriously.

In an example from later years, Odom says the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had a defector's report that the defense burden was as high as 17 or 18 percent, "and the CIA didn't want that in" any estimate. Odom also feels that the Soviet statistics the CIA used as part of the process for deriving estimates had little meaning.

> A ruble account can't give you any idea of what actually is being allocated. You might as well be adding up the stock numbers. I mean, Brezhnev himself couldn't find out ... what he was actually allocating ... [The CIA] should have taken

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4 CIA military and civilian economists did, they hasten to point out, make adjustments for such factors.

5 Garthoff, p. 507n.
comment from Gertrude Schroeder Greenslade and Laurie Kurtzweg, 4/25/94.

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> seriously that there were a lot of institutional mechanisms for allocating resources that no number system is going to catch. It was not even allowed that the CIA model disallowed this. You got no response on those kinds of issues.

Prof. Harry Rowen, chair of the NIC from 1981-83, agrees that the CIA—like the mainstream academic community, to which it had close ties—did not give much credence to émigré reports about life in the Soviet Union. The economic estimates in the mid-1980s, for example, put Soviet GNP growth rates at 2-3 percent, roughly in the same range as the US and Western Europe. Yet, says Rowen, "practically every émigré, of which there were thousands, said the place was falling apart." He argued:

> What effect did this have on the American specialists in the subject? None. Well, why? Because [the Americans felt the Soviets were] just badmouthing it because they are émigrés, they have a biased view.

Jack Matlock, on the NSC from 1983-87 and subsequently ambassador to Moscow, concurs that "both academic economists and CIA economists, try as they might, placed too much credence ultimately in Soviet official data." Added Matlock:

> Now if you're a quantitative economist, there's no getting around that because there were no other figures to use. So I didn't think this was being soft-headed or anything.

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Moving Up to the Big Leagues

The Founding of the Office of Special Operations (U)

Michael Warner and Kevin C. Ruffner

At the end of World War II, the Truman administration dismantled the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), giving most of OSS to the War Department for "salvage and liquidation." The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities of OSS went to the War Department as the "Strategic Services Unit" (SSU). This new organization, however, waited in a state of bureaucratic limbo for several months while the administration decided how to revamp the nation's intelligence establishment. In early 1946, a rough consensus emerged: the Stations, personnel and assets preserved in SSU would go to the newly created Central Intelligence Group (CIG) to form the nucleus of a permanent foreign intelligence capability. (U//FOUO)

That consensus left much unsaid. How was this transfer to be accomplished in a secure and efficient manner? Who would actually make the jump from SSU to CIG? Indeed, how would CIG structure its foreign intelligence arm, and how would it operate overseas? Perhaps the primary question was this: How long would it take before America had a peacetime human intelligence capability comparable to that of its Allies and adversaries? (U//FOUO)

These questions had to be solved in haste by a small group of decisionmakers and managers who were compelled to act with little guidance, limited consultation, and sketchy precedents for reference. The ways in which they addressed the various dilemmas would hold lasting significance for the subsequent development of the clandestine services of the CIA. By the beginning of the Korean conflict in June 1950, CIA's Office of Special Operations (OSO) had taken enormous strides, establishing not only Stations and procedures but also an operational strategy as well. OSO had not, however, had much success against the Soviet target. The ways in which the Agency dealt with this paradox would hold great significance for the development of CIA during and after the war in Korea. (U//FOUO)

From War to Cold War

The SSU bridged the past and the future in the months after VJ Day. When OSS was disbanded on 1 October 1945, its overseas Stations and personnel were transferred overnight to the War Department. Brig. Gen. John Magruder, Director of SSU, sent the Assistant Secretary of War an

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inventory of SSU's resources shortly afterward. SSU had major missions in London, Paris, Rome, Vienna, Cairo, Chungking, Calcutta, New Delhi, and Rangoon, as well as smaller posts, liaison details, and research teams scattered across Germany, the Low Countries, the Balkans, China, India, and Indochina. In all, more than 5,000 employees of SSU were working abroad, virtually all under various forms of military cover.[1]

Nothing changed immediately for men like Allen Dulles in Berlin, James Angleton in Rome, and Winston Scott in London. SSU officers in the American occupation zone in Germany, for example, continued to monitor local political activities, especially those of the Communist Party. Members of SSU's counterespionage branch (X-2) gathered evidence for war crimes trials of Nazi officials, searched for suspected members of Nazi underground movements, and helped recover gold and art looted by the Germans throughout Europe.[2] (S)

The targets of SSU shifted gradually away from wartime concerns to potential threats to American security. This reorientation was directed from Washington but implemented in response to the orders of local military and intelligence officials. Following a November 1945 conference in Wiesbaden to discuss future SSU projects in Germany, for instance, X-2 officers were directed to abandon German intelligence organizations and the chimerical Nazi underground.[3] SSU began to collect on all foreign intelligence services. "It was, therefore, decided," Capt. Eric Timm reported from Munich, that SSU in Germany:

> *would serve the future CIA [the projected, but not yet formed CIA] best by limiting its primary targets to the gathering of information on personnel, activities, and objectives of all intelligence services. This will enable a CIA to have at its disposal central records of a worldwide nature concerning the various groups which come within this purview.*[4](U//FOUO)

After a few months, it became clear that the main intelligence service of concern was that of the Soviet Union. By March 1946, Sgt. Boleslav A. Holtsman, the lone SSU/X-2 representative in Munich, finally learned that "our objective is the SIS" [Soviet intelligence services] and that "the GIS [German intelligence services] was liquidated and is to cease to figure in our consideration."[5] (S)

SSU's personnel situation was changing at the same time as its targets shifted. Many SSU officers and enlisted personnel returned to the United States alongside the millions of soldiers and sailors who were homeward bound for demobilization. Indeed, most of SSU's employees had left government service by 1 March 1946, when SSU's roster stood at 1,734 (with roughly 400 overseas in 24 Stations).[6] Such rapid demobilization brought SSU into line with its personnel targets, but General Magruder still wondered if the best people had been retained in the right jobs. "We are like an old man: the fat isn't in the right place to be handsome," he told his staff meeting in January 1946.[7] (U//FOUO)

Formulating a Strategy

In the spring of 1946, the US intelligence establishment, such as it was, had to confront two issues. First was how to organize and staff the clandestine office in such a way that enhanced the

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security of operations and personnel which retained strong associations with the defunct but now widely publicized OSS. Second was to how gather intelligence on Stalin's Soviet Union, a growing threat to the United States. The organization that would have to confront these two dilemmas was the newly formed CIG and its chief, the first Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), RADM Sidney W. Souers. (U//FOUO)

Souers had a crowded agenda when he became DCI in January 1946, but one of his first tasks was to decide what to do with the Strategic Services Unit. General Magruder had recommended that the tiny CIG adopt certain components of SSU while the War Department liquidated the rest.[8] Souers's overseers in the National Intelligence Authority soon appointed a panel to evaluate SSU and the feasibility of Magruder's idea. A six-man team, headed by Brig. Gen. Louis J. Fortier, met with SSU's leadership in early 1946, and their discussions were recorded in what appears to be an edited but contemporaneous transcript.[9] Anxious for the survival of their outfit and the future of American intelligence--as well as for their own careers--General Magruder and his lieutenants answered the Fortier team's questions with patience and candor. The result was a remarkably frank assessment of progress to date and a revealing glimpse of plans for the future. (C)

General Magruder prefaced the discussions with an explanation of how SSU had salvaged the pieces of OSS in an ongoing agency. "Always in the back of our thinking," he admitted, "was the idea that a central agency would emerge." In demobilizing OSS's administrative functions, for instance, "we thought in terms of maintaining experienced specialized service, personnel, and administrative units that would serve in the future not only for clandestine activities but for any other activities that a central agency might require."[10] (S)

After Magruder's introduction, the chiefs of SSU's espionage and counterintelligence branches briefed the Fortier team on their activities. They had to provide plenty of context to help the Board's members to understand these arcane professions, which America (that is, OSS) had learned in World War II only with prolonged British tutelage and plenty of trial and error. One committee member, for example, asked the chief of Secret Intelligence (SI), Whitney Shepardson, how SSU would go about the posting of an American spy in a faraway place like Bulgaria. Shepardson explained how, and used this opening to mention that the capability to collect clandestine intelligence from human sources was a fragile asset that had to be husbanded for truly national purposes:

> *I think one of the things we have had to learn is how misleading the idea of "coverage" is. At first you think it desirable to cover a lot of areas with a lot of people. But with experience you come to ask what interest of the United States is at stake in Bulgaria, and [t]hen you ask what part of it can best be served by secret intelligence. We believe here that this job deals primarily with the security of the United States, and, therefore, that we are concerned with the intentions and capabilities of the powers who alone or in combination might influence the basic interests of the United States by bringing us into a war situation.*

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Foreign Liaison Dilemmas

OSO's efforts to establish a clandestine service on a secure and professional basis also had to confront the various problems with liaison relationships. The old OSS in wartime had learned that certain activities (particularly in counterintelligence work) depend on close and confidential dealings with foreign services. Such contacts continued after the Axis surrender. In January 1946, for instance, General Magruder noted that SSU had ties with 10 foreign intelligence services (all wartime Allies) and "certain relations" with the services of four additional countries that had stayed neutral during the war.[20] The difficulty for OSO would be that of maintaining profitable liaison links while severing or altering--in as secure a manner as possible--those relationships that were not productive enough to conserve. (S)

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OSO stuck to its principles for liaison contacts even in the face of temptations to compromise them. The Office's leadership confronted this dilemma even when they examined their most stable and mutually beneficial intelligence alliance: that with Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, sometimes called MI-6). The end of the war had prompted simultaneous re-evaluations of the relationship on both sides of the Atlantic. London wanted no competition from SSU or any American service in the far-flung lands of the Empire; British authorities, for instance, politely dissolved Southeast Asia Command and evicted SSU's Detachment 404 and other military cover outfits from India and Singapore. In other areas, however, British liaison contacts seemed almost too ingratiating. Senior SSU officials in the summer of 1946 fended off what must have seemed--to a young intelligence agency--tempting British proposals for joint operations and operational commands. Col. William W. Quinn, who had became the Director of SSU after General Magruder's retirement, subsequently hinted why when he complained that SIS seemed to want something that was:

> *Typical of the "liaison" type of penetration wherein the preponderance of coverage being in favor of the US the British desire to tap same as their greatest source. (This liaison technique is not followed in areas where the British have preponderance of coverage and need no help from anyone.)*

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As a result of these efforts, the new OSO started life with a handpicked staff and fewer potentially compromising links to OSS and foreign liaison services. Indeed, the dissolution of SSU and the creation of OSO went so well that the new clandestine service, at least in Washington, began life with few links to the past and to other US Government agencies--including other offices in CIG (and later CIA). Colonel Galloway in August 1946, for instance, ordered OSO officers "to confine their contacts and visits to other offices of CIG to the minimum necessary to transact official business."[22] Outside observers--who of course could not see the new OSO--were left wondering why the United States was dismantling entire foreign intelligence organizations that had served with distinction in World War II. A *New York Times* story in May 1947, for instance, quoted anonymous sources complaining that the National Intelligence Authority had "compelled the War Department to liquidate its worldwide secret intelligence network" [SSU] as well as the FBI's Latin American intelligence operations. "Security restrictions," the article noted, "made it impossible to obtain an appraisal of the quality of the replacements and the efficiency of the new system."[23] (U//FOUO)

Under Foreign Eyes

The shifting status of SSU and its components, combined with the wholesale demobilization of American overseas military units and facilities, greatly complicated clandestine operations in this period. Money was not really a problem; both SSU and OSO soon had enough to pay their bills.

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From Theory to Practice

With an organization established and cover arranged, the OSO crafted a strategy to guide its activities. Over the course of 1946, the leadership of SSU and CIG pondered what sort of intelligence service the new office should become. Their conclusions--which they had previewed for the Fortier survey team that February--were ready to be presented to the Station and mission chiefs as a coherent whole in early 1947

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Without question, we are preparing to enter the big leagues in the intelligence business. For a considerable period of time during the war, the American service was recognized as being a necessarily weak but growing concern. By now we should have at least reached the period of adolescence, and we must make vigorous efforts to achieve maturity in the shortest possible time. Such maturity can be attained only through the establishment and long-continued maintenance of firm policies of operation, changes in which will be made only in response to changing conditions and not because of a rapid turnover of personnel. Professionalism in the American intelligence service is a sine qua non if we are to be accepted on anything approaching an equal basis by other professional services with longer histories.[43]

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Testing the New Order in the Field

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Theory collided with practice as OSO assumed control of SSU's field operations and initiated own activities. OSO's leaders had two major tasks: to build, as fast as possible, a worldwide clandestine service and to create from scratch a capability to collect intelligence on the Soviet Union. The difficulties involved in doing both missions simultaneously forced Galloway, (b)(3)(c)

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Helms, and colleagues to accept a series of compromises as they pondered the constitutive decisions that would shape the new office. The ramifications of the

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and earlier decisions on cover and targets would soon appear in places as distant as

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Conclusion

OSO's creation and early course embodied the consensus among America's handful of intelligence professionals that clandestine operations constitute a national, strategic asset that should be managed from Washington. The fragility of human source intelligence--its rarity and potentially great value--suggested to the cadre of experienced intelligence leaders that espionage should be tightly controlled and used only for the most important tasks. These officers sought to cut it away from potentially compromising liaison contacts and potentially distracting tasking from local American commanders and diplomats. (C)

The high goals of this strategy were perhaps too ambitious for the limited resources available to CIG and the early CIA.

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Considering that the United States developed the modern discipline of foreign intelligence only after Pearl Harbor, it is truly impressive that CIA had a professional, worldwide clandestine service operating at all by 1950. OSO had started with a clean slate, carefully maintaining security and planning rational collection priorities and strategies in 1946-47.

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-but it was "competitive," and improving steadily.

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The compromises made in OSO's early years would influence CIA's clandestine capabilities for decades to come. (C)

Notes

(1) John Magruder, Director, Strategic Services Unit, to John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, "Strategic Services Unit as of 1 October 1945," 9 October 1945, reprinted in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Ingelligence Establishment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 237-242. (Hereafter cited as FRUS).

(2) Secretariat, SSU, "The Office of Strategic Services on VE Day-VJ Day," 11 March 1946.

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(3) As early as 27 September 1945, OSS field stations received the following directive: "The conversion of this agency from a wartime to a peacetime basis brings with it a shift in emphasis in counter-espionage targets. No longer are the German and Japanese Intelligence Services the focal point of our attention. Instead, all foreign intelligence services, and personnel connected thereto, now become the legitimate object of observation and study for this Branch." JJ1 to All Field Stations, 27 September 1945, X010-927,

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(4) 1st Lt. Sidney H. Lenington, Deputy Chief, SSU/X-2, Germany to SAINT, Washington, "Semi-Monthly Reports," 12 December 1945, LMX-005-1130, enclosing Timm to Commanding Officer, SSU/X-2 Germany, "Semi-Monthly Operations Report SCI Munich," 15 November 1945, LMX-005-1130, in WASH-REG-INT-163, Record Group 226, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Entry 108A, Box 275, (no folder listed), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

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(6) CIG, "Report of Survey of Strategic Services Unit under CIG Directive No. 1" [the Fortier Report], 14 March 1946, reprinted in FRUS, p. 259 (U). The number of stations is adduced from

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the fact that X-2 had 24 missions at that time, and that SSU had 23 stations in May 1946; (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

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(8) S. Leroy Irwin, Interim Activities Director, War Department, to John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, "Tentative Plan for Disposition of Strategic Services Unit," 28 January 1946. reprinted in FRUS, p. 250 (U); (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

(9) President Truman's advisers were the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, plus his personal representative, Adm. William Leahy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; they met together as the National Intelligence Authority and commissioned the Fortier Board in "CIG Directive number 1" of 19 February 1946. That directive and the Board's 14 March 1946 report are reprinted in FRUS, pp. 255-271 (U). The transcript of the Board's sessions is Strategic Services Unit, "Factfinding Board--Minutes of Meetings," February-March 1946, (b)(3)(c)

(10) "Factfinding Board--Minutes of meetings," minutes of 20 February 1946 morning session, p. 2. (S)

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(12) *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16 (S)

(13) SSU, "Factfinding Board--Minutes of Meetings," minutes of 6 March 1946 session, p. 11 (Secret).

(14) *Ibid.*, p. 12. (S)

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 2. (S)

(16) *Ibid.*, p. 6. (S)

(17) The title "Assistant Director" is equivalent to the modern CIA position of "Deputy Director," denoting a rank subordinate only to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The second-in-command at OSO held the title "Deputy Assistant Director for Special Operations," or DADSO. (U)

(18) OSO hired SSU's remaining field personnel but only SSU headquarters. Various administrative offices of CIG acquired an additional SSU personnel in Washington. SSU ceased to exist as an active intelligence organization on 11 April 1947. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

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(20) John Magruder to S. Leroy Irwin, Interim Activities Director, War Department, "Assets of SSU for Peace-time Intelligence Procurement," 15 January 1946, in Michael Warner, ed., *The CIA Under Harry Truman* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), p. 23.

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(21) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

(22) Galloway's order--CIG Administration Order No. 8, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

(23) Anthony Leviero, "Army's World Intelligence Ring Reported Halted by New Agency," *The New York Times*, 21 May 1947, p. 1. (U)

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(40) The new guidance was codified in General Operational Instruction no. 1, approved b (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) Galloway three weeks earlier.

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(41) to Richard M. Helms, Chief, Foreign Branch here was echoing the March 1946 statement by the Fortier Report that CIG needed "a plan which will permit the special development of purely clandestine intelligence operations...leaving more overt United States Government intelligence collection activities to other agencies prepared and authorized to act in the field with a minimum of embarrassment to the United States." Central Intelligence Group, "Report of Survey of Strategic Services Unit Under CIG Directive No. 1" [the Fortier Report], 14 March 1946, reprinted in FRUS, p. 266. (S)

(42) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

(43) (b)(3)(c) to Colonel Galloway, "Report on European Trip," 22 February 1947,

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(45) Acting Chief, SPD-S, to Colonel Galloway, "General Report on Strategic Operations in Europe," 25 February 1947, (b)(3)(c)

(46) to Helms, 3 February 1947, (b)(3)(c)

(47) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

(48) (b)(3)(c) to Helms, 3 February 1947. (S)

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Preparing for the 21st Century

An Interview with NRO Director Keith Hall (U)

Editor's Note: Keith Hall's service to the Intelligence Community has spanned more than 30 years. A native of New York, Hall received degrees from Alfred University and Clark University. He commanded two overseas Army intelligence units, before coming to Washington as a Presidential Intern. Over the years, he has held senior positions in both the executive and legislative branches of government, including that of Budget Examiner in the White House Office of Management and Budget, Deputy Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, and CIA Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs. In the latter capacity, Hall played a central role in implementing counterintelligence and security improvements across the IC in the wake of the Aldrich Ames spy case and consolidating US imagery and geospatial capabilities in the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. He spearheaded the development of the (b)(1) *architecture and established the first integrated programming and budgeting process across the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community.* (U)

Named Director of the National Reconnaissance Office in March 1997, Hall has focused on strengthening the financial management of the organization and improving mission partnerships. He elaborated on these issues and others in an interview with members of the Studies in Intelligence Editorial Board (b)(3)(c) *and* (b)(3)(c) *on 21 June 2001.* ~~(C)~~

* * *

Let us begin by looking back. You have had this extraordinary experience. What were your thoughts when you set off, when you were confirmed as D/NRO? (U)



Keith R. Hall, Director of NRO since March 1997. (U)

I had three goals. I mentioned them to the workforce at the time, and I have been mentioning them ever since. The first goal was to get the financial house in order. The credibility of NRO programs was at risk because of the lack of confidence in the financial management. The second one was to improve our bedside manner. We were the organization everyone loved to hate. I knew that, because I had spent the previous 15 years talking to all the other agencies and entities about what they thought about each other, and I knew that the NRO always came up high on the list of, "We do not like those guys. They are arrogant." The view that others always had was, "This is a very high performing organization, but, boy, are they a bunch of SOBs." The third thing

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was to prepare the NRO for the post-Cold War world. I thought that we were through the period of consolidation, budget downsizing, and all the rest of that from the early part of the 1990s. We really needed to focus on revolutionary approaches for the future. Just keeping doing what we were doing all along, in the same way we were doing it—maybe a little bit cheaper—was not the road to our survival. We needed a bold plan for the future. So those were my three objectives. (U)

How well did you do on meeting your objectives? (U)

You always look back and wish that you could have done more. But, after five years, I think we have done a reasonably good job on all three. If I had to grade us, I would give us a "B+" on financial management. We have "auditable" books. We are the only element in the Department of Defense that has auditable books. The good news is, our books are so good that they have been audited by a private accounting firm; the bad news is, we have been audited! Because we have things to do. But at least the books were audited and we know what we have to do. Our cash and finances are all in balance—we actually got good marks on our budget execution and reconciliation of cash balances. The thing that we had a problem with was plant, property, and equipment. If that were in better shape, I would give us an "A." But it is not. We have got work to do to fix that. That is another long story. But we actually did very well on the financial management front. I think we have restored confidence in the NRO's financial management abilities. I would go so far as to say that we have the best in the Intelligence Community. (U)

On the bedside manner, I would give us a "C." We have clarified in our own minds, I think, what our role is with the other intelligence agencies and the end users. There was some confusion about that. There are some who think that the NRO's only customers are NIMA [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] and NSA [National Security Agency]. But we cannot survive with just them as our customers, because they do not understand everything that we do from top to bottom in their organizations, and they do not have the expertise that we have on what the satellite systems can and cannot do. We have to interact with end users, also, so that we understand their requirements and can respond to them through our mission partners in a way that best meets their needs. By end users, I mean people who are not in the intelligence collection business, but who use intelligence—State Department diplomats, military commanders, the President of the United States, whoever that set of users is. (U)

Relations with our mission partners are still uneven. We have, at any moment in time, difficult relations with NSA. NSA, I think, looks with envy upon the size budget that we have, and feels that if they were in charge of these expenditures and they were being applied to their programs, then we would get more SIGINT bang for the buck—despite the fact that NSA, itself, has validated the architectures that we are building against the requirements. It is the perversity of the budget process that gets in the way. I think in NIMA's case, we have much better relations and a much closer working relationship. Perhaps that is because it is symbiotic. Without the overhead systems, NIMA would not have much to do, whereas with NSA, they would still have plenty to do, even without overhead systems. So, it is much more linked on the NIMA front. With our other mission partners—CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], and Space Command—I think we are doing reasonably well. But we are still not universally trusted or loved, and our budget certainly is not fully supported in private. When our mission partners are asked, "Do you support the amount of money the NRO has?" most of them usually say "No." Even though they do give us support in open fora, and with the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence]. (U)

How did you go about achieving those broad-based goals? How did you build the team to

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accomplish them? (U)

First of all, I do not like to use the word "I" all that much. It really was a corporate effort. I believe in collaborative management, and I also believe in delegating and giving people a job to do, and then trying to get out of their way. What I tried to do was provide the leadership. One of the manifestations for that was in our strategic planning process. After agreeing on a vision at the outset, we established 11 strategic goals. We have had 20 offsites since I have been at the NRO, including the time when I was Acting Director. We do it about every three months. That is the time when we sit down and take stock of what we are doing over the long term, and where we are trying to get to. Otherwise, I find, no matter what your intentions are on any given day when you come into work, you are wedded to your inbox, the phone, the e-mails that you have to get out, and the issues of the day, not the long-term direction. So, around those three objectives, we established 11 corporate goals. Some of the objectives had many goals attached—certainly in the area of financial management—that went beyond having books that reconcile and got at trying to be the best-in-class in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. You cannot do any of this without having a motivated workforce, personnel who feel rewarded both by their work and by managers who convey that their work is valued. (U)

We set up a scorecard that consists of customer goals, business and process goals, employee goals, and financial management goals. Then I appointed one of my senior executives in the NRO to be both the goal manager and the director of the whole enterprise for that particular area. In some cases, it fell kind of naturally. The financial management goals went to the equivalent of our comptroller. But the other areas cut across the organization and were outside the normal boundaries of the wiring diagram. For example, the head of my Imagery Intelligence Directorate was put in charge of the workforce goal—attaining and maintaining a world-class workforce. Each goal had a goal champion who was responsible for telling the Board of Directors, "Here are the objectives, here is the plan to get there, and these are the resources we need." (U)

What is your view of leadership? Can you share some of your thinking on how you create followers as well as a next generation of leaders? (U)

First of all, I think that the offsites went a long way towards forcing people to confront complacency. That was part of it. The other part was how we evolved our management meetings. When I first came to the NRO, there was a thing called the Management Committee, the MCM... the second "M," I guess, stood for "Meeting." We would sit there, listen to a briefing, have a discussion, and then make a decision. I revamped that. What we have now is a Board of Directors. If we are going to have an issue meeting where a decision is to be rendered, we send out a "read-ahead," and we set the rule that there is no briefing at the meeting to present the issue. We are not perfect in this. Sometimes people will say, "Can I put up one or two viewgraphs just to frame the issue?" and sometimes that is helpful, so we allow it. But we do not allow any full-scale briefings. People are expected to come to the meeting prepared to discuss the issue, not to get informed on what it is that they have to make a decision on. We try and go around the table. As I said, I have a participatory leadership style, so I am open to any and all suggestions, ideas, and points of view, even if they differ from mine or other people's around the table. We try and provoke a good discussion on these types of things. (U)

We have a mentoring program that was begun fairly recently, but I decided to kick start it by being the first out of the Executive Committee group to say, "I am going to mentor some people." I do not know whether or not people actually volunteered, or were volunteered by their Board members, but I sat down with a group of seven for two hours at a time, in seven sessions over the

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period of December-January 2001, when I thought I was leaving. We structured that period of time to accomplish what they wanted to achieve from the mentoring. (U)

We have also attempted to identify leadership attributes. As a start, on my badge here, it says "NRO Leaders, Catalysts for Change." Then, we expanded on the things that we expect leaders in the NRO to do, including creating a responsive workforce that provides superior customer service; providing a strategic view linking the work that people are doing at any moment in time to broader goals; and thinking and acting corporately, as opposed to parochially, whether parochial means my agency, my office, or my tower, in the case of the NRO. Leaders must walk the talk. We have tried to set the tone that way. I guess time will tell. (U)

I think that we have pretty good bench strength in terms of people ready to take on big jobs at the NRO. Whenever someone leaves—retires, gets reassigned, or what have you—we seem to have a number of good people to choose from. I think we have a pretty strong talent pool. This is helped by the fact that we rely on the larger leadership and skill development resources of the Air Force, Navy, and CIA, and those three organizations are not slouches in developing leaders. (U)

Could we talk about that dynamic—different cultures, different kinds of objectives? (U)

At the very first offsite that we had in 1996, we came up with a vision statement that said, "Freedom's sentinel in space, one team revolutionizing global reconnaissance." The "one team" part of this vision captures the answer to your question. We recognized that we came from a legacy of really different cultures—an Air Force culture, a Navy culture, a CIA culture—and that we were flowing into a new organizational arrangement that was creating cultures of signals intelligence, imagery, and communications. As a result, the distance between tower two and tower three could be just as big as the distance between Los Angeles and Langley back in the Program A and Program B days.1 We clearly recognized that we were not one team. That extended to our mission partners—NSA and NIMA—which we absolutely rely on. We were not one team with them, either. So we recognized we had different cultures and we needed to have a better team approach to things. (U)

Five years later, have we made progress? Yes, we have made progress. But we still have different cultures. I think that, as long as we rely on the Air Force, the Navy, and the CIA separately to do the management of the personnel, and people have an allegiance back to those organizations, we are not going to have complete cohesion of the NRO workforce. But that is not all bad. I think that one of the things that the CIA presence, for example, brings to the NRO is a focus on the intelligence mission that you do not have from the rocket scientists and acquisition professionals that come in from the Air Force and the Navy. We have very few intelligence officers in the NRO outside the people from CIA. We do not bring any military people into the NRO, by and large, until they have had ten years' experience, and we get to cherry-pick who we want. As a result, we get a very good pool of technically skilled people in acquisition, program management, and all the rest, but they do not have an intelligence background. In addition to their connection to the intelligence mission, CIA personnel provide continuity, because they can stay longer. The different cultures have their individual advantages. I think we have about the maximum amount of team balance that we are going to achieve right now. The baggage that would come from becoming a whole-up agency—where we would run our own personnel system, do our own recruiting, and all the rest—is not worth the effort, as far as I am concerned. I think the advantages from living with the different cultures are probably good. (U)

Please expand on the comment that you made recently about the role that mission motivation

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plays in team-building at the NRO. (U)

When the IG [Inspector General] came in and looked at the NRO right after I got here, it was not only the IG at CIA, it was the DoD IG—a joint team. As you can imagine, with the financial management challenges that the NRO faced, we had more auditors than rocket scientists out there in 1996. The IG gave us a report that started out, "There is an unusual degree of attention to the mission." I mean, the mission focus of this organization was worthy of noting in the IG report—it was above and beyond anything that they had seen previously. Of course, that was part of our problem. We were saying, "Let us get the mission done, and we will worry about the books and the money later." (U)

The mission itself, I find, brings a team together. If you look back ten years, there were two separate [redacted] satellite teams—one at CIA, building one satellite, and the other in the (b)(1) Air Force, building another. Both were doing signals intelligence collection, but each had a [redacted] and was going after [redacted] targets. We have come a long way. What we have now is called a space SPO [System Program Office], which builds high altitude systems and has CIA, Air Force, and even some Navy people in it all together. When you get a team like that together, this thing that they are causing to be created is almost like a child. I guess I would liken it to a mother and father being different sexes, but still one family. And, by God, that satellite is theirs. It is that type of mission focus, particularly since you also have a very dynamic event, the launch, that leads to the birthing. I mean, everybody works towards the launch day, and pours heart and soul into it, government and industry alike, and, when it is successful, the team really feels that they have accomplished something important. I guess it is like taking the hill if you are in the Marines. That causes the teamwork to form around the mission. That is not what worries me, however; it is all of the extraneous stuff, not really associated with the mission, but in the support arena, where the culture gets in the way—Air Force people being treated better than CIA people, or vice versa; or, "I cannot get my organization to let me stay as long"; or, "Why are CIA people allowed to come in in casual clothes, and General Weston still requires me to show up in my Class A uniform?" It is that type of stuff that is probably more the irritant on the cultural side. ~~(S)~~

If you look ahead five years, at the role of CIA within the NRO and the role of the military within the NRO, do you see the relationship changing? Do you see it stable? What is desirable? (U)

In order for me to answer that, I have to talk about what I see as the long-range situation all tipped to national security in space, and that is tied up in the Space Commission recommendations, which, by the way, I wholeheartedly support. I advocated last summer that they do something very similar to what they ended up doing. I was not the only one advocating it, but I did advocate a radical change. What I see is a shift occurring. If the Defense Department is serious about the centrality of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and C4 ISR in the conduct of future military operations, the country is going to require a much more robust C4 ISR capability than anything that we have today, as good as what we have today is.2 I think that the natural outcome over the next 10 to 20 years will be to move from things that are basically suitable for reconnaissance to a system that is really surveillance. Rather than a periodic ability to learn information about what is going on somewhere in the world, we would transform the whole system into one that provides nearly continuous coverage of particular locations on demand. That is going to require a lot more resources in the space arena than what the DCI is going to put forward because of his own needs. He does not need continuous surveillance. (U)

What I see happening is a gradual shift in the preponderance of space activities from one that has

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had the DCI in the lead—through the NRO, where we do more, we spend more, our systems are more complex, more state-of-the-art, in terms of the national security community today—over to the Defense side. What you will see is what I call "NETCAP," which would be "National Exploitation of Tactical Capabilities." For years, we have had the inverse of that. We have had tactical exploitation of national capabilities. The DCI builds up the national intelligence capability, and then the Services find a way to use it to support tactical operations. I think the opposite will take place over the next 10 to 20 years. You will see robust constellations of imagery, signals intelligence, and other types of sensor systems in orbit, which are largely financed by the military side of the budget, and the DCI, if we have done it smartly, will be able to hook into that. You will have a situation where the DCI, who would never pay to be able to look, for example, at the palaces in Iraq continuously, would use the capability—as long as it is not being used somewhere else. That is what I see happening. (U)

Now, what organizational construct will that take? I think that the fastest path there is to use NRO-type business practices—streamlined management from cradle-to-grave, reliance on industry, all the things that I think have made the NRO great over the years. Indeed, the Space Commission has said, "Air Force, do it like the NRO does," and pull the disparate expertise in the Air Force that does R&D, acquisition, and operations, into one entity, just like the NRO does it. I think that you will eventually start seeing some areas of merger between black [classified] and white space. When that happens, the DCI will need to keep his hand in and make sure that, as this is fashioned, it is done in a way that, even though the Defense Department is putting up most of the funding, the DCI's equities can be addressed in the system. Of course, what he can contribute is considerable talent in the form of the CIA workforce, which he should keep involved in this effort as "CIA personnel," not transferring them to the Department of Defense. Do it just like the NRO has done for years, with CIA and DoD people together. I think that is the road ahead. (U)

At the end of this, what is likely to exist? It could be a Defense agency, in partnership with the DCI. It could be a Department of Space as another entity in the Department of Defense with, perhaps, a sizeable CIA contingent there looking out for the things that the DCI is particularly interested in. It could be a Space Corps within the Air Force. It could take any of those directions, but, over the long term, we probably do not need both a Department of Defense white space apparatus and an NRO. When? Ten, 15, 20 years from now—whenever there is a good business case to be made for it. (U)

Address, if you will, the partnership with the private sector. How have you seen that evolve, and where do you see it going? (U)

Obviously, the private sector is the lifeblood for the NRO. We rely on industry to get our job done. Ninety-five percent of our resources are put on contract, so we have always had a very special relationship with industry. I would give you a couple of points on this. Number one, in the space segment itself—when I say space segment, I am talking about things that actually fly in orbit—the state-of-the-art work continues to be financed overwhelmingly by the government. Industry is not real heavy on taking risks in terms of technologies in space. They may take some risks on whether or not they are going to make money off the thing they are putting into space, but they are not going to take risks on whether or not the thing is going to work. The private sector is not the one that drives the development of state-of-the-art space-deployed capabilities—the government is. We have to recognize that, to the extent that space is important to our nation and to our economy, continued, heavy government investment for the foreseeable future in state-of-the-art space capabilities will be required. That is different from the information technology field, where a decade or more ago the government really lost the edge. Industry is driving state-of-the-art

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developments there. Not true in space, and I do not think very many people appreciate that. The government is where the action is on the development side, and, as a consequence, we have a direct effect on the nurturing of the space industry, to the extent that it is going to go commercial. (U)

Point number two is that we had Booz-Allen do a major study of the space industrial base last year, under sponsorship of the NRO and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. That told us that, given the current base of business in both the commercial and government sector—which includes NASA [the National Aeronautics and Space Administration] as well as the Department of Defense and the NRO—we still had over-capacity in the aerospace industry. As the study noted, it is apparent that there is going to be more consolidation going on, even though we have had a tremendous amount of consolidation already. Shortly after that, Northrup-Grumann said it was buying Litton TASC. (U)

How have the dot coms affected the aerospace industry? (U)

Many of the aerospace companies were heavily in debt in the 1990s. The return on investment in the aerospace business, particularly for those companies that were reliant primarily on government business, was miniscule compared to the rates of return that investors could get when they went into dot coms or some of the other startup companies. Now, that has tailed off somewhat. But how long is that going to be the case? I think that whole area, after the euphoria is over and people look at it with clearer vision, is going to come back. What we are going to see is a continuation of the problem we had before. Given their low rates of return, the aerospace companies will have a hard time holding onto the talented workforce that they need to do the high end of the space business that the government is fostering. I think we need more rational policies with regard to this arena. I think that it is probably more of a problem on the white space side than it is on the classified space side, primarily because the last people that want to leave are the people working on our type programs—they are so interesting, and the people feel they are so important that, as long as people see that there is work ahead in this business, they will stay the course, even if they could go to a dot com and make a few more bucks. But, it is an area of worry. (U)

The last thing I would say is that the landscape has changed for the NRO since we came out into the open. By necessity now, we have to be more defensive in our interactions with industry, because of the ease with which the companies can protest our source selection decisions. There was not a single protest of an NRO acquisition decision in the first 30 years of its existence. It was only after we came out into the public eye that companies began using the tools available to them in the General Accounting Office to levy protests. Now, we have had protests, or at least the opening gambits of protests, on practically every major acquisition decision that the NRO has made in the last nine years. That fosters a more standoffish relationship with industry than what the NRO is used to having. We are having to grapple with that. (U)

I first raised the issue of protests at a meeting that we had with aerospace industry CEOs—I think it was in 1997. At that time, industry knew we were getting ready to embark on a whole new future imagery architecture acquisition. Two of the companies that ended up being the final prime offerers said, "We will take a no-protest pledge. Where do we sign up?" I consulted with my lawyers, and the lawyers said, "Well, they can sign a pledge, but they do not give up their rights by doing that." They cannot sign away the rights granted to them by law and the Constitution. So the lawyers said it would not be worth anything. The two companies whose CEOs had said, "We will not protest. If we lose fair, we will not protest," lost the bid. Of course, we had a protest! Anyway, we have to be a lot more defensive, and that means that we have to be careful that we do not share

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with one company things that we are not sharing with the others. We probably have always done that, but I think we are just much more cautious now. In the past, the focus was on getting the job done, not on making sure that you are not going to lose a protest. (U)

There was a remark in the paper this morning about the Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Space Command talking about the vulnerability of space. From your perspective, what is the vulnerability of space? (U)

The vulnerabilities of space systems are among the most highly classified things that we deal with, because we do not want to advertise specific weaknesses. Let me speak about it in general terms. What everybody in the world has basically learned is that if you are an important target and you stay put for any length of time, your life expectancy decreases rapidly. There are two obvious defensive measures. One is going deep, hard, underground with some of the high-value targets, which is obviously something that vexes us. The other thing is going mobile. But there is a third thing that they can do, and that is attack the basis of the US ability to identify threats, and that involves the entire intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and C4 apparatus that we operate. Any manager in this area, recognizing that the world clearly sees how capable we are and that our capability makes a target out of anything that is key in the intelligence cycle, has got to ask, "Am I protected? Can I survive? What do I have to do to harden against cyber attack, against terrorist attack, against physical attack, in orbit, on the ground?" We have looked at all of that, and I think have appropriate plans in place that match the threat. But, just like any defense, I would much rather be on the offense than on the defense. As we see every day across the Intelligence Community, we are successful against defenses that are supposedly secure. This is troubling, and I am glad to see that it is getting the attention it deserves. We will see whether or not this translates into resources. Whenever the Intelligence Community in the past has been faced with an investment decision between more capability that delivers more information versus expenditures that do nothing more than provide protection of the means to do the collection, as a Community, we always opt for more collection and live with the vulnerability. I am hopeful that will not be the answer as we go into the future. (U)

You had long experience on Capitol Hill and then became subject to Congressional oversight as D/NRO. Would you look back at oversight generally, and then particularly with respect to the NRO and where are we today? (U)

I think oversight is moving through what is probably a natural cycle. We have probably reached the part of the cycle that is indicative of the enduring relationship between the Intelligence Community and the oversight committees. In the case of intelligence, the cycle initially was characterized by very strong support, nurturing, and protecting of the Intelligence Community, after what Congress—and the executive branch, as well, and the public, probably—perceived as the excesses of the oversight reviews of intelligence that took place in the early-to-mid-1970s. The intelligence committees were formed, and, if you look at their writings and my interaction with some of the members, they clearly saw their mission as protecting the Intelligence Community from the excesses that might occur as a result of that furor that was stirred up in the 1970s. So, the first part of the cycle was almost a honeymoon period, strangely enough. Next came the first major set of difficulties between the executive branch and the Congress that shook the foundation of that nurturing relationship. It involved the controversy surrounding aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. That break in the honeymoon period involved the House first, because the House was opposed to Contra aid. The Senate was in favor of it, but, even then, there were difficulties in dealing with the Senate. I can certainly have a separate session with you on the whole mining of the harbors incident and give you my perspective on it, but the Agency really screwed that up—not that the

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Senate intelligence committee was without fault. (U)

I say that the evolution of the oversight relationship is a natural cycle, because there is no way that you could set up the separation of powers arrangement and stay in a honeymoon for a long time, anyway. Something was going to come up that would shake the foundation. Ever since then, we have been in more of a "Congress is skeptical of the executive branch" phase of the cycle, with them probing and looking for things that are going wrong, while at the same time trying to protect the areas that they want to protect. It is a much more even-keeled arrangement now. When I say "even-keeled," it is the standard separation of powers difficulties that you are going to have, with two different points of view. I always point out to folks that this ends up working pretty well. You know, do not look at how the sausage is made—you do not want to know. But the end result, in most cases, is not that bad. I also like to point out that the advantage we have in the executive branch is that we are able to reject most of our stupid ideas in private. In Congress, they have to state their stupid ideas and reject them in public! So you get to see how the sausage is made. The sausage is just as ugly in the executive branch; it is just that we get rid of most of the evidence of the bad ingredients privately. (U)

The net advantage to the Intelligence Community of having strong, empowered oversight committees—which the Congress itself vests with the authority to look into intelligence matters and then basically stay out of them—is important. As much as we may not like that proctology, we have to recognize that unpleasant procedures are good for our own long-term health. The alternative is not a blank check; it is much more intrusive, wider-ranging action in the Congress vis-à-vis the intelligence branch committees. (U)

The Constitution comes as close as you can to a job description for a senator or a member of the House, but, if one were to write such a job description in executive branch parlance, one of the prominent requirements would be, "Be outraged when the executive branch screws up." Congress does not need any training at this. They know how to do this automatically! Congress was in full outrage mode by the time I came to the NRO, because of the financial management difficulties that the organization was in. In one respect, I had the advantage of "it could not possibly get any worse"! As I said earlier, I think we have gradually eliminated the main source of the problem in our relationship. We have returned to a period where the committees have confidence in our ability to manage our finances and accurately report to them what we are doing. If you look at the outcome of the NRO Commission—which was chaired by Senator Robert Kerrey, who had been the Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Representative Porter Goss, the Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence—and what it had to say about the NRO, you clearly see that the NRO is an institution that has the respect of certainly those two members and the other Congressional members on the Commission as well. While they found areas that needed improving, their report showed a very healthy recognition of the accomplishments of the organization that continue to this day. So I think we have returned to the same norm that everybody else is at, vis-à-vis the Congress. There is a certain degree of difficulty in conveying things that are complex and technical to members of Congress, who do not have a lot of time. We are no different in this regard than the S&T [Directorate of Science and Technology] at CIA, or NSA. I do not claim any special problem in that regard. (U)

Is there anything that keeps you awake at night? (U)

There are a lot of things that keep me awake at night. "Screams in the night," as I call them. Number one is the fear associated with something like a terrorist attack at one of our installations that really could have a tremendously deleterious effect on the nation's intelligence capabilities.3

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The NRO started with the notion that we would achieve our protection based upon secrecy. Since nobody would know where we were, they could not attack us. Well, we have been in the same places for a long time, and people know where we are. There are limits to the amount of physical protection we can give to locales that started out with the notion that we were going to be safe because we were [redacted] That is my number one worry, because that could be a devastating blow, not only to the personnel of the NRO, but also to the continuity of operations that are critical to national security. Obviously, we are doing everything we can to [redacted] (S)

The second thing that has concerned me is the [redacted] To free up money to modernize the systems for the post-Cold War mission, the NRO [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] As we were swinging from tree to tree, we let go of the branch, and now we are in mid-air, swinging towards the other one. We generally do not do that. We usually will hold onto the old one until we get a firm grip on the new one! It looks like we will [redacted] We clearly could have some [redacted] in the level of support that the nation is used to, if things go wrong, if we have launch failures with the new systems, or if the new systems do not work, God forbid. They will work. But the [redacted] worries me, because, while everybody was part of this [redacted] I do not think that the nation would look kindly upon the NRO if it turns out that [redacted] was not something we should have done, in retrospect. (S)

The third thing that I think would keep any Director awake at night, and I am sure it worries all my Intelligence Community counterparts, is the bad actor inside—you know, a Hanssen or an Ames. That is the "scream in the night." When you look at how linked the NRO is across all our networks and at the ease of getting information across the entire enterprise—we do have a very capable infrastructure in this regard—a bad actor on the inside could really do us a lot of damage, not just from stealing information, but also from putting viruses, and what have you, in our information systems. (U)

The final thing is some type of major screw-up that causes us to come back on the oversight committees' scope as another poster child for ineffective government, like we were in the middle of the 1990s with our financial management. I do not think the NRO could stand a second one of those, whether it would be a major overrun or some other huge mistake that causes something not to work. Again, I do not think that any of the things I just said are likely, but you could not be the Director of the NRO and not worry about those types of things. (U)

In closing, I would like to ask you to think back on your 31 years of being in the intelligence business. Talk to the next generation about this business. What is it that you find satisfying about your career? (U)

Well, as I look back at 31 years—do not get me wrong, I have had some bad days that were not the greatest fun—on balance, there was not a day, by and large, that I did not look forward to coming in to work and feel that the work I was doing was important. I imagine there are other places in the government where you get that feeling, but in intelligence, you have the combination of very challenging work and being operational all the time. Look at our colleagues in the Department of Defense, for example. They are getting ready to do something that they hope they never have to do. In the intelligence business, we are fighting the information systems of our adversaries every day, so we are in the trenches in some way all the time. You can easily connect the dots between something that you are doing and something that has affected the life of the

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nation in some way—some decision, some direction, or some position that the nation is taking. That is, indeed, tremendously satisfying work. I think that the combination of the challenge and the psychic reward you get from doing it—of course, that is the only reward you get, unless you are heading towards Leavenworth!—really makes the intelligence field a fascinating and wonderful place to be. It is a privilege to be a part of it. I say this no matter which part of the Intelligence Community one might go into. I think all of them have this attribute, whether you are in the DO [Directorate of Operations] in CIA, a cryptanalyst at NSA, an all-source analyst at DIA, or a rocket scientist at the NRO—it does not make any difference. (U)

As I look to the future, we have to find a way to get around the inefficiencies and barriers to getting the job done that are there because our organizational structure dates to Dwight Eisenhower and Harry Truman. It made great sense in the 1940s and 1950s, but it really is in the way now. I like to point out that at any moment in time, the Intelligence Community is three MOAs [Memorandums of Agreement] away from getting the job done! Fortunately, when there is a crisis—the Balkans, Kosovo, an EP-3 [reconnaissance aircraft] down in China, whatever the crisis is—we forget about the need for an MOA, and we sit down and get the job done, and we end up doing a pretty good job of it. But, in almost any other venue—the budget, the planning cycle, anything short of a crisis—we do not do very well. As a consequence, I think we get less out of the systems than what we have invested in them. We do not do our analysts any favors, because we maintain stovepipe prerogatives. They make the job of an all-source analyst, for example, much more difficult than it would be if we were cooperating and not all trying to get the credit for providing this little nugget of information or that one. (U)

The two things that divide us as a Community are the budget and ignorance. We have been trying, as a Community, at the senior level anyway, to work the ignorance problem. We have not found a way to cause the leadership of the Intelligence Community, the agencies at the next level down, to start supporting somebody else's budget other than their own. But we have to get there eventually. And that is just at the top level. I mean, if the seniors are that way, you can imagine the trench warfare that is going on down below. Again, fortunately, when it really counts, we do not put up with all that foolishness. We really pull together as a team. We have just got to find a way to do that across the board of activities that the Community is involved in. (U)

May we ask what is next for Keith Hall? (U)

I do not have the slightest idea. I have 31 years in, and, according to CIA, somewhere around 70 percent of my high three is all I will get. So, at the point where I leave the government, that is when I will start figuring out what I am going to do next. I am sure I will find something to do. But I do not want to start looking yet. (U)

As I recall, when you came to the NRO, you said you really had two jobs that you wanted in life. One was to be the Director of the NRO, and the other was to be the coach of the Baltimore Orioles. (U)

Well, one out of two ain't bad. I do not know what I am going to do. I certainly want to stay connected with the Intelligence Community. I do like to talk about this stuff, so, after I am retired, if you would like to call me in to the Center for the Study of Intelligence to give some talks on my perspective, I would be happy to do so. (U)

We will take you up on that. Thank you. (U)

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Footnotes

1. A reference to the NRO's organization from 1961-1992, when its components were divided into separate accounts by agency: Air Force (Program A), CIA (Program B), and Navy (Program C). (U)

2. C4 refers to command, control, communications, and computers. (U)

3. D/NRO made these comments several months before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. (U)

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Early Years at the National Reconnaissance Office

Interagency Dynamics and Organizational Myths (U)

R. Cargill Hall

Editor's Note: This article presents a different angle on the NRO's early years from that found in Robert Kohler's essay "One Officer's Perspective: The Decline of the National Reconnaissance Office." (U)

Former NRO Deputy Director and CIA officer James Reber used to describe the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) as the first hybrid American intelligence organization. In early 1961, President Kennedy linked military and civilian members of the Intelligence Community involved with satellite reconnaissance programs on a permanent basis for the first time. That "shotgun marriage," Reber mused, was unappreciated by those reluctantly brought to the altar, and the early years unquestionably were turbulent ones as the partners sought to establish their prerogatives and authorities.[1] (U)

Needless to say, in the compartmented, covert world of the early NRO, where information frequently was not shared among its program elements, fact and misperception combined easily to produce enduring myths. This brief essay reviews the primary bureaucratic issues that provoked officials of the various organizations involved, and cautions analysts and historians about perpetuating myths by relying solely on the records or recollections of personnel in one directorate or office. (U)

The Charter Battles (U)

The NRO was the product of a review of the Defense Department that President Kennedy's new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, conducted shortly after he arrived in office. The Secretary of Defense decided to consolidate like functions in single organizations, a move that also created the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Supply Agency (the current Defense Logistics Agency). The NRO emerged as a civilian-led agency of the Department of Defense, which, by virtue of an earlier decision by President Eisenhower, was located administratively in the Department of the Air Force. McNamara's directive also made the NRO a classified organization, the existence of which was known only to those directly involved. (U)

Consolidating the nation's overhead reconnaissance assets under an NRO made perfect sense to McNamara, and he delegated operation and oversight of the new office to co-directors Air Force Undersecretary Joseph Charyk and CIA Deputy Director (Plans) Richard Bissell. The

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accompanying charter and interagency agreement transferred control of the CIA-managed CORONA film recovery satellite program to the NRO—to the dismay of CIA leaders. A follow-on agreement provided for the shift of the Navy's GRAB satellite program to the NRO in 1962. (U)

Charyk and Bissell worked well together, but that partnership ended when Bissell departed from government service in February 1962, in the aftermath of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. That left Charyk as sole Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (D/NRO). A second NRO charter executed by the Defense Department and the CIA in May 1962 made this leadership arrangement formal and identified the Defense Department as responsible for funding the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). (U)

On 23 July 1962, D/NRO formally identified each of the overhead reconnaissance organizations in the NRP: Program A, the Air Force satellite reconnaissance element in El Segundo, California; Program B, the CIA satellite reconnaissance element at Agency headquarters in Langley, Virginia; Program C, the US Navy element, made up of representatives of the Naval Research Laboratory, the Naval Security Group, and the National Security Agency, also located in the Washington, DC, area; and Program D, which oversaw support of all aerial reconnaissance assets—the U-2 and A-12/SR-71—until the program's demise when those assets were transferred from the CIA to the US Air Force on 1 October 1974. (U)

Having the organizational components identified and ordered was one thing; getting them to respond and act together as a team was quite another matter. President Kennedy had selected John McCone, a Republican and well known corporate leader, to succeed Allen Dulles as DCI. Confirmed by the Senate, McCone assumed his new duties in late 1961. With a reputation as an able and effective manager, he set about reorganizing the CIA in keeping with the recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In August 1963, he established a new directorate devoted to science and technology (DS&T). To head the new directorate, McCone chose Albert "Bud" Wheelon, who had come to the Agency's space program from industry in 1962. Together they set about securing advanced devices for technical intelligence collection, including overhead reconnaissance systems such as CORONA, in an Agency culture that still preferred human agents engaged in clandestine operations. (U)

By early 1963, when D/NRO Charyk left government service, McCone had come to regret the 1962 charter that gave so much authority to the NRO and its director. The Defense Department-CIA charter of May 1962 had placed technical management of the NRP in the hands of Charyk, who exercised that technical management in the manner of a Chief Executive Officer, just as McNamara had intended. In line with these authorities, the D/NRO not only identified each of his organizational components alphabetically, but also approved funding for existing programs and new starts. In practice, this worked more smoothly for Programs A and C, than for Program B. (U)

DCI McCone and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick negotiated and executed a third charter in mid-March 1963. It named the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent for the NRP, established a Deputy Director of the NRO as a CIA billet, defined the duties of the director and his deputy, and gave to the DCI concurrence in the selection of future NRO directors.[2] But Brockway McMillan had already been named as Charyk's successor. McMillan, a former executive at Bell Laboratories, soon made plain he would operate the NRO as a CEO, in the manner of his predecessor. Not only did he direct activities of NRO Programs A and C, he acted to direct affairs in the CORONA Program and approve new program starts in the CIA's Program B. McMillan and Wheelon had had professional differences before they came to government service.

Those differences, and Wheelon's preference for operating Program B unfettered by D/NRO instructions, colored their relations for the next two years. (U)

Unlike Wheelon's Program A and C counterparts who reported directly to D/NRO, he reported to the DCI. Wheelon also appeared before Congressional committees, something that the military program directors of the NRO could not do. That advantage gave the director of the DS&T enormous leverage in the NRP. Wheelon, with McCone's support, declined to report to D/NRO except under circumstances when funding or new program starts made it unavoidable. Program B, meanwhile, pressed ahead with studies of new and technically sophisticated signals intelligence and imaging satellite systems. (U)

Between 1963 and 1965, the relationship between D/NRO and the CIA went from bad to worse. McMillan called on Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatrick to intervene in the management of Program B. At CIA headquarters, Wheelon viewed D/NRO guidance as unwanted meddling in the Agency's internal operations. He urged McCone to renegotiate the NRO charter. McCone agreed and advised Gilpatrick that a new charter was absolutely essential. His aim was to strip D/NRO of any CEO authority that allowed him (or the Defense Department—now termed "Air Force" in internal correspondence) to be involved directly in CIA affairs, making him instead a Chairman of the Board, who would preside over separately managed operating companies. (U)

The CIA negotiated a fourth charter directly with the Defense Department, without NRO headquarters' involvement. It was signed by DCI McCone's successor, William Raborn, and Gilpatrick's successor, Cyrus Vance, on 11 August 1965, which was a few days after D/NRO McMillan left government service to return to Bell Labs. (U)

The resulting *Agreement for Reorganization of the National Reconnaissance Program* remains the charter in effect today. It curtailed the authority of D/NRO and thus hewed more closely to McCone's desire for a chairman-of-the-board arrangement. It reaffirmed the NRO as a "separate agency of the DoD" responsible for the "management and operation" of the NRP. Under its terms, D/NRO continued to report to the Secretary of Defense on matters of NRP operations and budget, and to the DCI on intelligence requirements and tasking. (U)

This charter established an Executive Committee with the power to approve or modify the NRP and its budget, and to allocate responsibilities and funds for specific reconnaissance programs to those CIA or Defense Department components of the NRO "best equipped with facilities, experience, and technical competence to undertake the assignment." The EXCOM, as it came to be called, consisted of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the President's Science Advisor. The D/NRO, a non-voting member, appeared at EXCOM meetings to present cases for new program starts and future plans or to answer questions. Other attendees included the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, or his designee, and the DoD Comptroller. (U)

For the next eight years, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the EXCOM addressed and decided key NRP issues and administered its affairs and budget effectively. In early 1973, however, President Nixon named DCI James Schlesinger Chairman of the EXCOM. Schlesinger had argued successfully that the DCI headed the nation's Intelligence Community and thus should chair the committee that oversaw the NRP. Thereafter, the Deputy Secretary of Defense ceased attending meetings and sent in his place the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. At about the same time, Nixon abolished the position of Science Advisor, severing the connection between the NRP and the White House. (U)

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What previously had been EXCOM decisions now became DCI "recommendations." These recommendations were staffed at both the Defense Department and through the recently formed Intelligence Community Staff, which increased the time that it took for agreement to be secured on all sides. The EXCOM functioned fitfully for a few more years, until President Ford abolished it in 1976, placing the NRP budget in the hands of the DCI. (U)

Program Frictions (U)

The contention over NRO authorities and prerogatives had produced a charter that all could live with in 1965, but it hardened attitudes and distorted perspectives among many in the NRO for years afterward. Some ranking Air Force officers in Program A and on the staff at NRO headquarters came to view the leaders of the CIA's Program B as untrustworthy dissemblers who would say or do anything to take over the National Reconnaissance Program—a near-mirror image of the views held at Langley. A former NRO official recalled in an interview that a Program A director, in his dealings with Program B, "became nearly paranoid—but not without cause." At Langley, many Program B officials in the DS&T viewed Program A's effort with undisguised disdain. Deputy Director for Science and Technology Bud Wheelon recalled telling DCI McCone that the country could not rely on "the Air Force" for satellite reconnaissance: "The fact is that the Air Force has done a miserable job with its own [reconnaissance] space programs. SAMOS [a near-real-time analog film-readout satellite] has been an unqualified disaster. By contrast, the Agency's program in this area has been an unqualified success."[3] (U)

One more example should suffice to underscore the bitter-ness, distrust, and misperceptions that afflicted some, but of course not all, members of NRO Programs A and B in the years that followed the charter battles of the early 1960s. In late 1971 (b)(3)(c) the director of the newly authorized Electro-Optical Imaging satellite program, wanted Air Force Maj. Jimmie Hill—who had made a name for himself as a comp-troller in Program A and had worked well with members of Program B—reassigned to the CIA to help control the budget on this technically risky endeavor.[4] As Hill recollected the episode:

> (b)(3)(c) *was the program director for the [Electro-Optical satellite effort] and worked under Harold Brownman, who reported to Carl Duckett, who was DDS&T. I was then reassigned as an Air Force officer to CIA, which at the time was a questionable move, but General [David] Bradburn had agreed that he would continue to be my reporting official so that my career wouldn't suffer by being assigned to the CIA.*
>
> *To illustrate some of the tension that existed, one of the people I had worked with was* (b)(3)(c) *depu*(b)(3)(c) *had been on the source selection committee with me for the [program] and was running the program once it was approved. We had gotten along quite well during the source selection process. But it was* (b)(3)(c) *Dirks, and Brownman who had in fact talked me into coming back. The day I reported in to the Agency Headquarters at Langley, as it turned out,* (b)(3)(c) *was gone. So I went up and* (b)(3)(c) *was there. His secretary, Betty, told him that I was out there. He asked me to come in, sit down, and have a cup of coffee and we "chitty chatted" for a little while, and he said, "Well, what can I do for you?" And I said, "I am here to go to work."... I'm in uniform. And he said, "A [expletive] blue suitor in this organization—over my dead body!" And up he got and stormed out of the office.*
>
> *So I sat there, dumbfounded, and he came back about an hour later and told Betty to*

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> *have that [expletive] Air Force Major get up and go to another office. I was taken to another office to wait, and* (b)(3)(c) *went back into his office. And for the next 18 months we worked in the same program, but he never said a word to me. He was one of my bosses, but if he had any tasking for my office, he would pass it through* (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) *who [had just joined the Agency and] worked for me at the time.*[5] *(U/FOUO)*

Other NRO alumni have offered recollections on related matters great and small. To establish a useful perspective, an NRO context, and verisimilitude, however, all recollections should be compared with the written records of the day, specifically *records drawn from the files of more than one program or directorate*. The famed flier, James "Jimmy" Doolittle—who was a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board between 1960 and 1963 and played a key role in establishing the Directorate of Science and Technology at the CIA—counseled his godson in 1984 about the dangers of relying on memory alone. For those of us in the trade, it is worth repeating:

> *The human mind is a very complicated thing. When one thinks over and over a certain event in which he participated, or even watched—particularly if the action is fast—[he is] inclined to change it an infinitesimal amount each time—always in his favor. After a long period of time he may change it 180 degrees and never realize that he has done so. This is one reason why, in recalling an event after a long period, people who all saw it—for example an accident—may later remember it very differently.*[6] *(U)*

On Myths and Misperceptions (U)

Once committed in print, misperceptions can assume myth-like qualities, especially when they coincide with one's own worldview and are rebroadcast and footnoted in "scholarly sources." In terms of NRO and CIA history, the two most treacherous myths are those already broached: that the CIA in the early 1960s successfully blocked an Air Force attempt to "take over" the NRO and redirect its reconnaissance activities toward tactical instead of strategic intelligence; and that the Air Force element of the NRO, in developing reconnaissance satellites, had demonstrated such gross incompetence that it made the threat posed in the first myth all the greater. (U)

When Charyk's office became the NRO in 1961, except for the low altitude tactical signals intelligence satellites that collected against Soviet air defense radars, *all* of the imaging reconnaissance satellite programs that composed the National Reconnaissance Program between 1961-1965 were planned and directed exclusively to serve the strategic reconnaissance needs of the national command authorities. Moreover, under the terms of the early NRO charters, the DCI controlled National Reconnaissance Program collection requirements through the United States Intelligence Board and its Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), ensuring a strategic rather than a tactical military focus. An Agency historian, nevertheless, could mine the files of the DCI and DS&T, and, without offering any serious supporting illustrations, emerge to declare emphatically: "McCone, with Wheelon's assistance, turned back the Air Force's attempt to take over space reconnaissance for tactical intelligence purposes."[7] DCI McCone helped foster this misperception in his own correspondence, referring time and again to the NRO as "the Air Force." However, the NRO, like the CIA, *was a civilian office* directed by a civilian. (U)

To be sure, President Eisenhower had approved establishing what became the NRO in the Department of the Air Force, and D/NRO for many years was the Air Force Under Secretary. But that civilian official reported to the Secretary of Defense *and* to the DCI, not to the Secretary of the

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Air Force. Moreover, the Air Force element in the NRP, the Program A Special Projects Office and its extensions located on the other side of the country, reported only to D/NRO; it remained *entirely outside* the Air Force chain of command. Indeed, Program A was so isolated geographically and so insulated operationally from US Air Force control that Air Force Secretary Eugene Zuckert (1961-1965), on hearing a reference to the Special Projects Office at a staff meeting, reportedly snapped: "That's Charyk's Air Force!" Ultimately, the bureaucratic tensions that swirled around the formation of the NRO involved struggles over authority, particularly the authority of D/NRO, rather than over program direction. (U)

What about the quality of Program A satellites in the 1960s—were they the failures that are the stuff of lore? The actual story is rather different. Conceived in the mid-1950s, the novel SAMOS imaging system at that time represented cutting edge technology.[8] When launched into a low-earth orbit in late 1960 and early 1961, however, SAMOS E-1 imaging payloads encountered problems. Like Program B's CORONA satellite that recovered film capsules, the E-1 readout payload was a film-limited system and did not have a long life on orbit. Second, it had no image storage and recall capability and had to transmit its take to a ground station on the next pass. Third, the images were not encrypted; therefore, for security reasons, the film had to be read-out over the continental United States. Finally, SAMOS, operating at a bandwidth threshold of six megahertz and in view of a ground station for only a few minutes as it passed overhead, would lose part of its reconnaissance take on each revolution. In September 1961, therefore, NRO Director Charyk terminated the SAMOS film read-out payloads, subsequently concentrating NRO efforts on CORONA and the other film recovery satellite systems then under development. (U)

The SAMOS imaging technology was transferred to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for use in its deep space exploration program, a fact just recently declassified.[9] Instead of representing an "unqualified disaster," as Wheelon described it, Program A's SAMOS not only was the nation's first near-real-time film imaging system, but also it helped to make manned lunar exploration possible. Program B's near-real-time electo-optical imaging system that followed in the 1970s was, to be sure, the wave of the future; it evolved into the first near-real-time digital imaging system. But, as near-real-time myths go, it ran second to an earlier Program A contribution to America's deep space exploration. (U)

SAMOS signals intelligence payloads went on to form, with the Navy program, a family of low earth orbiters that, in the main, were directed to tactical reconnaissance applications. Two other Program A signals intelligence satellite projects were approved in the mid 1960s, both of them directed toward collecting strategic intelligence related to the Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) threat. One collected ABM radar signals and pioneered for the Intelligence Community highly elliptical earth orbits; the other, a communications collector, operated successfully in a geosynchronous orbit. [redacted] (b)(1) (S) (b)(3)(n)

In 1961, Charyk authorized Program A to begin work on a meteorological satellite that would fly ahead of NRO imaging satellites and assay the cloud cover over the Eurasian land mass. Pictures of cloud-obscured sites retrieved from a film-limited spacecraft cost dearly—a fact made plain in 1960-1961 by the return from Program B's early CORONA missions. A small group of Air Force officers modified a TIROS experimental satellite for operational use, integrated it with a new booster, and, beginning with the first successful launch in August 1962, advanced the technology so well, so quickly, and so inexpensively that the Commerce Department adopted the NRO version for its own meteorological purposes.[10] Finally, in the fall of 1962, D/NRO Charyk approved another Program A initiative for a "proof of concept" launch of a reconnaissance satellite

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employing a new technology that opened the way to a new form of overhead imaging. (S)

Keeping Things in Perspective (U)

Certainly by 1965, NRO reconnaissance satellites provided the nation's leaders with a relatively quick response to intelligence requirements through unimpeded, unobtrusive access to denied areas worldwide. Collectively, the NRO alphabetic program elements revolutionized overhead reconnaissance in the years that followed. Whatever the early bureaucratic disputes in Washington, they were but one aspect of the NRO's larger history. (U)

Throughout the early years, NRO contractor and government personnel at the working level collaborated closely and effectively. In fact, during the 1960s, no single NRO element "did everything," as some in Programs A and B would have it. In prosecuting CORONA, for example, CIA Program B and its contractor personnel furnished the camera payload, the security system, and the mission plans and requirements. Air Force Program A representatives and other contractor personnel provided the Thor launch vehicle and the Agena second stage CORONA satellite. They tested them; integrated and checked them out with the CORONA payload at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California; launched the combination; tracked and controlled CORONA satellites on orbit; and captured the film buckets after reentry. Program B's KH-9 follow-on imaging satellite was also a joint effort with Program A. The CIA and Air Force veterans of these early programs who gathered in September 2000 to mark the 40th anniversary of the National Recon-naissance Office agreed that there was more than enough credit to go around. (S)

This elucidation of early NRO actions and events is intended to remind analysts and historians of the pitfalls of "making history" inadvertently—of perpetuating myths by relying on the perspectives and resources of only one entity in the complex NRO constellation. Once fashioned, such myths tend to undercut the accomplishments and dedication of the many who devoted their careers to advancing the national reconnaissance effort. (U)

Footnotes

1. The CIA's disquietude, in particular, is documented in such works as (b)(3)(c) "Charting a Technical Revolution: An Interview with Former DDS&T Albert Wheelon," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2001, pp. 31-44 (S); David Robarge, "John A. McCone, Bud Wheelon, and the Wizards of Langley: The Creation of the DS&T and the Battle Over Spy Satellites," in Michael Warner and Scott A. Koch, eds., Fifty Years of the CIA (Washington, DC: CIA, 1998), pp. 147-178 (S); Gerald K. Haines, *The National Reconnaissance Office: Its Origins, Creation, & Early Years* (Washington, DC: NRO, 1997) (U); and Robert L. Perry, *Management of the National Reconnaissance Program*, 1960-1965 (Washington, DC: NRO, second printing, 2001). (U)

2. First among the duties of the CIA deputy was supervising relations between the NRO and the DCI-chaired United States Intelligence Board, which set intelligence requirements and target priorities for the NRP. See Appendix H in Perry, p. 173. (U)

3. Wheelon, as cited by (b)(3)(c) p. 38. Extract is UNCLASSIFIED. (U)

4. Jimmie Hill began his NRO career as an Air Force officer and concluded it as the CIA's deputy

director of the NRO, which lends credence to his perspective. Having served at the NRO from the mid-1960s until his retirement in 1996, he is one of the Office's longest serving and most respected alumni. (U)

5. Jimmie D. Hill, oral history interviews with R. Cargill Hall, 27 June, 7 July, and 21 July 1997, pp.16-17. Extract is UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. (U)

6. Jimmy Doolittle, letter to Thomas Lanphier, 27 December 1984 (emphasis in the original), as cited in R. Cargill Hall, "The Yamamoto Mission: A Retrospective," in Hall, ed., *Lightening Over Bougainville: The Yamamoto Mission Reconsidered* (Washington, DC: The Smithsonian Press, 1991), p. 30. (U)

7. Robarge, p. 167. Extract is UNCLASSIFIED. This interpretation of events, though more nuanced, is now in open literature courtesy of Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), cf. Chapter Four: "Space Reconnaissance Wars" and its endnotes. (U)

8. The Eastman Kodak Company built the E-1 (preliminary) and E-2 (advanced) payloads. The E-1 featured a six-inch focal length lens in a camera that spooled a special two-component EKC Bimat (positive) film and SO243 (negative) film. The exposed negative film, converged with the Bimat gelatin-coated Estar, was developed in a semi-dry chemical process, and then was scanned by a Columbia Broadcasting System flying spot line-scanner that consisted of a cathode-ray tube and a rotating anode having a high intensity spot of light. A photomultiplier converted the light passing from the scanner through the film into an electrical signal whose strength varied with the density of the emulsion layer of the film. The images were then radioed to earth and assembled much in the manner of a wire photo, each image built up in swaths. (U)

9. The Eastman Kodak Company modified the E-1 camera with an 80 mm focal length Schneider-Xenotar lens and an off-the-shelf 24-inch telephoto lens procured from Pacific Optical. The two lenses were bore sighted at the surface of the moon for an orbit of about 30 miles altitude. Light passed through each lens to the film, but the simultaneous images were interspersed with other exposures and not placed side by side. The camera employed the existing velocity-over-height sensor to regulate the speed of the lens shutters, which compensated for image motion. The Boeing Airplane Company designed and built a solar-powered spacecraft stabilized in attitude on three axes and integrated it with the payload and an Atlas-Agena rocket combination. NASA launched five of the "SAMOS Lunar Orbiters" successfully in 1966-1967. Equipped with film storage and in view of earth receiving stations for over one-half hour on each revolution of the moon, the near-real-time film-readout imaging system photo-mapped virtually the entire moon, paving the way for Project Apollo's manned lunar landings that began later in the decade. (U)

10. R. Cargill Hall, "A History of the Military Polar Orbiting Meteorological Satellite Program," *Quest, The History of Spaceflight Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2002, pp. 4-19. (U)

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R. Cargill Hall, is the NRO's chief historian. (U)

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Overseeing An Era of Change

An Interview With NSA Director Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden (U)

Lt. General Michael V. Hayden (U)

Editor's Note: On 5 January 2000, Lloyd Salvetti, the Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence and Chairman of the Editorial Board of Studies in Intelligence, accompanied by Studies Editorial Board members William Nolte, Joseph Hayes, and Maj. Gen. Richard O'Lear, USAF (Ret.), conducted the following interview with Lieutenant General Hayden. (U//FOUO)

We asked for the opportunity to interview you for Studies in Intelligence at a classified level to give the Intelligence Community a full appreciation of the vision you have for the National Security Agency (NSA) and the cryptologic service, and particularly to come to an understanding of the future of the Agency. We are all grappling with how our Community and our individual services are going to respond to the nation's priorities in the years ahead. To kick this off, we have all heard about the 100-days program--it has gotten a lot of attention, a lot of publicity--and to ask you what made you choose a marker of 100 days and how is it going midway through the process? (U//FOUO)

As for the technique of 100 days, they pulled me from Korea and didn't have time to send me to DIRNSA school en route to NSA, and so I just needed a technique to create an artificial sense of urgency--or create a sense of urgency--one way or another. There is a real sense of urgency with regard to change. (C)

NSA as an institution is methodical, and it is thoughtful in its decisionmaking. It's comfortable deferring decisions until it has more precise data, taking it to the sixth significant digit. The questions facing NSA were so difficult that an institution with that kind of an approach would always subject issues to additional analysis in the hope that the desirable future course of action would become more clear. (C)

I consider myself part of NSA now, but my cultural background is a bit different. So my instincts weren't along those lines. I quote to the work force something I think it was Colin Powell said, "When I've got about enough information to have a 40-percent probability of making the right decision, I'll start thinking about making the decision. And if I've got enough information that I have something approaching 70-percent probability of certainty, I've overworked the staff." So I've tried to impress on the Agency the need to start moving. The

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100-days approach allowed me to do that and to reinforce the process of change, day by day, action by action, through a series of "Directorgrams"--DIRGRAMs--pointing to specific actions. (C)

The alternative to that was to go to the mountaintop, get everyone together, get the whole package sewn up, and then come down in one great expository leap saying, "Here's the future." I don't think we would ever have gotten the ribbon tied, and the institution itself couldn't have digested either the information or all the actions that are enclosed in such a grandiose thing. So we're moving it out one day at a time. I have a pretty good idea of where we're going. The downside is that it does come out piecemeal. So I'm expecting the work force to make a creative act in taking this shard of glass and putting it appropriately with others in what will become a mosaic. (C)

But you're dealing with a work force that's been jostled a lot, one that has been on a downslope like the rest of DoD. They know, for example that we may privatize or outsource the information technology backbone--that's 3,000 or 4,000 jobs, and lots of other things, many of which are very unsettling. They hear me saying, "We're going to change, and button your chinstraps, because here we go," but then we come out with these changes one bit at a time. It's like Chinese water torture to some portions of the work force, and that's unfortunate. (C)

I talk to the work force a lot, and about every two weeks, I'll stop and say, "You see how the picture's developing here with one of the DIRGRAMs?" The first one after the [December] holidays focused on trying to fit individual actions into a pattern, divided up into about five general areas, and on how each action fits under those general areas. The longer we go, the easier it is for the work force to accept that. I did it this way because it seemed the best way at the time. It imposes an urgency. It makes you go ahead and do something each day, even though the DIRGRAM was almost never just right; there seldom was total agreement on the language as it existed when it just came time to pull the lanyard. In that sense, it's worked. I received a lot of responses saying, "I don't understand where we're going,"--but the longer we go, the fewer of those I get, and those are in the forms of e-mails, 7,000 to 8,000 e-mails from the work force. Just hit return on any DIRGRAM that comes out, and it comes to my machine. So I get a lot of feedback. (C)

Is the pace of this 100-day program going the way you had envisioned it, and where are you? (U//FOUO)

It is going the way I envisioned it. There is a portion of the work force that is a bit fragile. I was trying to characterize in my own mind what is causing this flurry of e-mails I'm getting--600 a day early on. By and large, they've been positive. We're talking 80 to 90 percent. But there was a stretch where there were some that were almost venomous in their cynicism. And we've attempted to deal with that. Let me cite one example. We took the flags off the badges of the seniors. These badges, which for the Pentagon are just badges, are symbols of rank for NSAers. Everybody in the Senior Executive Service (SES) at NSA had flags on their badges. One of the five major themes, and the first theme we hit in all this, was communications. As a way to enhance communications, I accepted the recommendation to take this artificial distinguisher off what really should just be an identification to get in the door. A lot of e-mails I received about that step regarded it as trivial. "I thought you were going to make big changes, and now I get this," and so on. When I laid the groundwork for this, there were a lot of people who thought that on Day One there would be heads on pikes as you entered our

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compound, and that would symbolize great change. When that didn't happen, there was a fair amount of skepticism. My only tool for overcoming this skepticism was to be absolutely relentless. Every day, you'd get more of these. I am trying to bring the work force along, but I'm not above being sharp edged. (U//FOUO)

Right after the Seymour Hersh article in *The New Yorker* , I was on one TV call-in show, and I was prepared for a lot of "softballs." But I wasn't given the opportunity to say what I wanted to say. At the end, I said, "I realize the process we're going through is tough. We're in the press a lot more, and there's some public criticism of us. We have to get over it. This is what it takes to be what we have to be in the 21st century." (U//FOUO)

I never use first-person, singular pronouns. It's always first-person, plural. I'm not a guy who comes in on horseback and says, "Forty-seven years of error is long enough. Aren't you glad I'm here?" Because that's not true. (U//FOUO)

This is not an Agency that's failed. This is not an Agency recovering from a Desert One. This is an Agency that is intimately successful today. We're talking about being successful in 2005 and 2010. And that's a positive message, but the hard edge of that message that is equally important is that we're going to do what we have to do. I briefed the work force in October 1999 on the internal and the external teams that I'd commissioned to look at what NSA was doing. I talked about the need for our personnel system to be tougher. For example, we don't direct people to do anything. "I need you to go work in the Pentagon." "I don't want to go." "Oh, okay. How about you?" That's the NSA personnel system. We've got to stop that. The overwhelming result of behavior of that kind is that we come to believe that there are things more important than the mission. (U//FOUO)

During my October briefing, I got a question from the floor asking if I would consider a Reduction in Force (RIF). I said that I would. Something like that has never been done at NSA. We've reduced the size of the Agency by one-third, and no one has left involuntarily. But what you end up with is a work force of the size you want with an average age of 43 years and not the right balance of the skill sets you need. So we're going to get a harder edge to our personnel practices. Someone I really trust sent me an e-mail almost immediately after the briefing and said that he sensed "a great disturbance in the force." And I accept that. The only virtue I can bring to smooth that turbulence is being "semi-right" about the direction we're going, and I feel comfortable about that. We'll "adjust fire" as necessary. It's the right direction. I'll be relentless, and I'm willing to go ahead and just do it. That's what I'm bringing to the game. The specifics about what we're doing inside there, the broad direction of NSA. (U//FOUO)

> *There's this unwritten folklore about NSA that folks at the top come in wearing uniforms, but that they come and go. And so all the permanent structure really needs to do is wait you out. How do you deal with that?* (U//FOUO)

One of my predecessors told me, "They want to treat you like Pharaoh. To carry you around on a sedan chair and let you have the occasional lunch with a visiting foreign delegation but to keep you away from anything else that goes on at NSA." I'm willing to get my hands dirty. I try to watch my time. I try to be available to the work force. I try to eat lunch in the cafeteria. I try to run in the gym. I try to have town meetings. I try to walk into offices unannounced. There are those who think this period of change is so important that they have begun to suggest that this DIRNSA is going to stay longer than three years. I have avoided

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any view on that subject, but I find the rumors useful. (U//FOUO)

> *When you came in, you had an internal team and an external team look at the Agency, and one of the things I found most striking in the external team report--and it may touch a little bit on that cynicism that you're talking about--is that the external team said, in effect, people have been here before you, and have given wonderful sets of recommendations that have not been implemented. What's different this time?* (U//FOUO)

The doing. An example: until recently, NSA used to promote people to GS-14/15 from Agency-wide boards. If you picture the process, a shop provides candidates for promotion. They have a little miniboard, and it goes up from the office level to another board at the directorate level, to the branch level, to the group level. And then to the key component level. Then these names pour in, and you have a board at the Agency level. To be fair, however, the Agency does a zero-based review at each level. (U//FOUO)

I can find no prima facie case that doing that at the key component level makes you any less good in the quality of people you select than doing it at the corporate level. So one of the recommendations from both teams was to push 14/15 promotions down into key components. Unfortunately, the existing process has almost nothing to do with fairness. It's about making a sufficiently large pool, with sufficiently good people, that you have good chances of picking SESs out of it. That's what this is all about. I did a little sanity test with some of my predecessors. They're all convinced that that pool is big enough, that even if the key components were a little less effective at picking the right people, you've still got a big enough pool to do it. If we didn't award any 14/15 promotions in any one year, we'd save $1.2 million in our payroll. What is the cumulative pay for the seniors sitting on those boards for the period of time I've just described? It is $1.6 million. So I think the two studies are right--we ought to cancel these. There were quite a few antibodies that said, "I think I agree with you objectively, but you can't do this until we have put in a human resources system that gives the proper support in terms of mentoring, career development, EEO considerations, and so forth. Put those in place, and this decision is absolutely golden." I said 47 years has been long enough. Too late. We pushed that down on the key components. That's the difference. That's my small value added. I'm willing to say, "Tough," and move on. (U//FOUO)

Personally, this is not an easy position for me to be in, and this sounds like I'm taking credit. But you asked me what the difference is, so this is the best description I can give you. In the past, we'd have studied that again. We need to move forward on the 14/15 boards. How do we need to restructure to do that? Just do it. With the stroke of the pen, it's done. Now somebody else is going to have to go back and sweep up some broken china on EEO things. (U//FOUO)

By the way, a few days before we announced that that change, a DIRGRAM was issued on equal opportunity, and that one also had almost nothing to do with fairness. It talked about EEO purely in terms of mission effectiveness. And, again, the work force reaction was "You know, I thought he was going to make some significant change, and I get this." You should see some of the e-mails on how they would describe it. It was essential step to set the stage for doing something I actually thought was pretty necessary. (U//FOUO)

> *Earlier, you characterized NSA as an organization which was impressively methodical and deliberate in its decisionmaking. At a time of exploding technical growth and challenge that may be a prescription for failure, if not disaster.*

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Later, you characterized the performance of the Agency as a success. How do these two fit together? (U//FOUO)

That's a great question. I've got a long presentation that I actually use often with the work force, again to avoid conveying the impression that, "You're wrong, I'm right, and I'm here to fix you." That's bad technique, and it's also incorrect. But then I have to explain why we need the change, and I go through this fairly long explanation. I note that we're an Agency that grew up in an age in which there was a threat to national survival, so money kept flowing. We knew who the enemy was, and, although he was ugly, he wasn't technologically agile. We were always technologically superior. So we built habits of thought and behavior that were optimized for an environment in which the stream of money was steady, the target was focused, and technology was our ally. Now, however, the money is at best intermittent. I can't tell you what the target will be next week. And our technological adversary is not a nation state but the global telecommunications industry. I then say that on a good day, technology for us is a two-edged sword. NIMA, DIA, and DoD generally use technology to cut the corners on the common problems of less money and demands that are far less focused than they used to be. That is not true for NSA, and that is what makes us unique. Technology is part of our problem set. It can be part of our solution set. But it begins life as part of our problem set. (U//FOUO))

(b)(3)(c)

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Now I realize doesn't quite look that wa(b)(1)
but over time it will. It will move in that direction, and we have got to look like our target(b)(3)(c)
Our technology has to mirror our target's technology. That's really hard to do because of the limited funding that's coming down.
(b)(3)(c)
(U//FOUO)

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I am part of an Agency that has to somewhat look like the global telecommunications industry in order to work. So that's the kind of change that we're not feeling yet, but, as the global telecommunication industry rushes into this kind of technology, we either have to look like that or we slowly begin to lose. So, we've got to make this fundamental change in direction. It's not that hard if somebody says, "Here's another But it's really hard when you're working on the margins, and you topline with just minor adjustments. Because you can't go do the new stuff, unless you're intellectually agile and you have the ability to take decisive actions to change direction. The reality is we can't do new things until we reach agreement to stop doing some of our traditional business. And when you say, "Let's stop doing some of the old stuff," everyone goes, "Yeah, you're right." But when you got to the next level and propose specific cuts, the response tends to be a chorus of "Oh, no, not that." Every choice begins to look like "Sophie's Choice." But since last summer, some things we had traditionally done did not show up in our budget. They would be in our overguidance. Pick a system.
(U//FOUO)

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(1)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

No one's made these decisions yet, but something like this is eventually going to happen, and probably soon. Take, for example, It's not going to be in the NSA budget. It's going to be

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(b)(3)

in the NSA overbudget. If somebody wants it, send money, because we've got to do a range of new things, deal with new technologies, [redacted] issues, and encryption in a world in which we have just raised the level of global encryption by changing US export policy. (S)

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Some of us have been working in this particular area, with colleagues at the Fort in the Cryptanalysis Group (Z Group) and in the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) throughout the DO, but, particularly in Z Group, in this new encryption environment regime that is threatening to engulf us. Do you have any particular thoughts about how to deal with that problem? (U//FOUO)

What I'll say publicly is what we have done is a fair balancing of a whole bunch of national priorities: security, law enforcement, privacy and commerce. It has the virtue of staying power, the equities are evenly enough balanced so that we shouldn't have to visit this in 60, 90, 120 days and start worrying about bit length again. We debate all this bit length, and we're always sucked into the argument. This has staying power. That's really good. (U//FOUO)

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(b)(3)

Have you yet had the opportunity to think in depth about the relationship between NSA and the [redacted] (U//FOUO)

Yes. Let me give you a longer answer, because there's another point I need to make that's tied to something that's gone earlier, and then I'll come directly to what you just said. If you look at the changes we're making, they're in two areas. One I'll call ethos, and the other I'll call mission. Ethos comes back to fixing our basics, getting back to mission, making mission the most important thing, getting rid of nonessentials, cutting duplication on programs, and setting up processes that force you to make decisions. The mission's got to change. As the target, I mean, we have to look like our target--and for us that means a target that's still evolving, not the Cold War target set we know so well and got so comfortable with. (U//FOUO)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

In the future, our target will increasingly be [redacted] It inevitably will lead us in the direction of different kinds of partnerships. In the telecommunications world of the last 40 years, the gravitational pull between NSA and the NRO was irresistible. As that world is replaced by one based on newer technologies, some partnerships rise and others decrease a bit in importance. And so the partnership of NSA with [redacted] has got to be a growth industry; in fact, the DCI is fond of saying, [redacted] That's exactly right. That is a real "industry" and our ADDO--Rich Taylor's deputy--is a CIA officer. (C)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

I've used that phrase myself in talking with CIA DDS&T Joanne Isham, likening the Intelligence Community budget to the last bastion of Soviet-style central planning.
(U//FOUO)

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Central planning. Almost a five-year plan? (U//FOUO)

People used to joke that NSA looked very much like the adversary. A Group was the evil empire, B Group was inscrutable, and G Group behaved like the Third World. And there really was some truth to that. (S)

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And I'll go one further. Everything's secret. I mean, I got an e-mail saying, "Merry Christmas." It carried a Top Secret NSA classification marking. The easy option is to classify everything. This is an Agency that for most of its existence was well served by not having a public image. When the nation felt its existence was threatened, it was willing to cut agencies like NSA quite a bit of slack. But as that threat perception decreases, there is a natural tendency to say, "Now, tell me again what those guys do?" And, therefore, the absence of a public image seems to be less useful today than it was 25 years ago. I don't think we can survive without a public image. (U//FOUO)

The nation still expects us to keep information secrets--that's what NSA's all about. I'm certain there are many things about us that we can show to the public. We have got to put a human face on the Agency, and, hence, you saw my name, my quotes, and my picture in this whole raft of newspaper articles beginning late last fall. We're counterpunching now. Traditionally, NSA would have responded, "We do not comment on operational matters." We had already had in the wings a plan saying that we needed to be more proactive with our public affairs approach. Not surprisingly, that got wrapped up within the NSA graveyard of decisionmaking called "out for staffing." And it was stuck there for about three months. The principles imbedded in that plan, however, were the ones that helped us work our way through Seymour Hersh and all the other folks that we met. (U//FOUO)

On balance, when you extract some of the really nasty ad hominem attacks out of a couple of the articles, a couple of areas that seemed to get to close to truly classified information, and a couple areas of fact, the articles are fairly accurate, and, for my purposes, pretty useful. So that's a good thing, but that's a different approach for NSA. And there's going to be more of that.
(U//FOUO)

> *NSA has had the reputation of "You call, we haul." You have alluded to the possibility that there are some things that you might not be able to do. In the context of the NSA customer--the policymaker, the war fighter, and the law enforcement community, and perhaps other communities--how are you approaching the balance that you want to bring to servicing those customers?*
> (U//FOUO)

First, let me give you a box score. We actually did this in great detail within the last year, and we get good marks across the board. As I said earlier, NSA is not dealing with recovery from failure. This is a very successful organization. I flew to Mons [Belgium] at the height of the bombing of Kosovo and talked to General Wes Clark [CINC Europe]. He was generous in his praise. NSA did quite well in gaining and protecting information. Yesterday, I got a briefing from J-8 on the Joint Staff as part of the Defense Support Agency review which is required by law every two years. We're doing fine. Good marks.
(U//FOUO)

We did a study of our customers. We get better grades from our nonmilitary customer than we do from our military customer. A pretty constant criticism that I hear from senior leaders is, "You know, you've got people out there who are depending on you who don't wear military uniforms." You've got the policymakers, and so on. So I think the broad perception is that NSA is very DoD-centric in what it does. That's probably not true. I think we're pretty well balanced. Otherwise, I'd probably try to change it. As I said, the military customer gives us a bit lower grades than our nonmilitary. I don't quite know what to attribute that to. Maybe

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demands are higher when you're being shot at. Maybe the military knows us better and expects more of us. (U//FOUO)

We got universally good grades for that first report. But the grades faltered badly when customers need amplification of a report, and then we don't do well. And that's wrong. If you're been at the Fort, you know why. Now put yourself in Stuttgart, Germany, as a captain in the J-2. You have a question on an NSA report. You need to ask the Fort. When the question comes back, however, we are almost impermeable. That is something we'd better work on. A final point I'd make is that, as an Agency, we do not have the ability to say no. And I think it's a skill we have to develop very quickly. If I say, "I know that's important to you, I know you've got to have it, and we'll do everything we can," you can stretch the US SIGINT system beyond its ability. So far, the tears caused by stretching the system have not caused a catastrophic failure, but it's only a matter of time. We can't do everything all the time for everybody. So we have to say, "No. I'm sorry. You're not going to get that anymore." (U//FOUO)

When you're looking at SIGINT requirements, at parcelling them out, how do you make the trade between requirements and affordability and the prioritization requirement. (U//FOUO)

That's a great question because culturally we're inclined to do it just the way you just described. What do you need? Okay. "You got it!" Then that becomes the measure of success or failure. And the expert in whatever discipline we're talking about, be it imagery, HUMINT, SIGINT, ELINT or however you define COMINT, the expert then is tasked with going out and trying to get this list of things, but the list is unconstrained and frequently not prioritized. The people who know SIGINT best have to have a far more creative and decisive role in deciding what the SIGINT system will try to provide. There isn't a CINC in the world who would tell me to go do something that I know is absolutely gold. NSA has to be more sure of what it is we do and what people's expectations are. We have been expected to do many things with national tools at the same time. The services have been badly constrained by budgets. They're going through the same stresses that NSA is. Consequently, one way they've tried to get off the dime

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(b)(1) (b)(3)

But back to this question. Can anyone tell me how much money we have invested in putting an ELINT (b)(3) the United States currently has or has planned, compared to ELINT There's an imbalance. To me, that's the great debate that has to take place as we move forward. We have grown up, and we have developed habits with a national SIGINT system that has been really very fungible to go do theater and tactical things. HF is HF (S) P.L. 86-36

If you look at the first thing we did at NSA, let's talk more about the ethos issue. First, moving past a traditional ethos, then using that changed ethos and the running room it creates for us--in terms of intellectual running room, personnel running room, or financial running room--to begin to change our mission orientation. Mission orientation has to be in the (b)(1) direction of our target, As we do that, the next concentr (b)(3) circle that began with ethos and is now at mission is what that does to our Intelligence Community partners. NRO's still important, but not in the same way it used to be. The

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HUMINT services are all really important. More than they used to be. Then the circle outside that is the linkage among what we programmatically call the Consolidated Cryptologic Program; the Defense Cryptologic Program; Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities; and the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program, and that's just got to change. Because it's got to be different than it is now, and that's a tough sale. But I've raised this to a few of the service chiefs, and they agree.
(U//FOUO)

Knowing where the power lies, can you win that argument as a combat support agency within the DoD? (U//FOUO)

I can paint the issue. We can perform the minimum within these structures. This is not a question of talent. It's a question of money. In conscience, I know only NSA can provide some capabilities, so we've got to move NSA in that direction. Now, other things are going to become uncovered if we go in this direction, but there are other ways of doing them. I mean,

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This is a hard one. NSA needs to be the technological engine for a broad range of missions, from strategic to technical. And the decisions we make involve difficult trade-offs. To cite one case,

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You mentioned earlier your visit wi(b)(3) in which you talked about newer technologies and about going after the target. The implication for processing and exploitation is immense. Are you making commensurate efforts on processing and exploitation? (S)

When I talked about the investment needs of the future, access is hard, by which I mean access to communications we need to acquire. We've got to work on that. (b)(3) We've also got to work on that. But if we're successful in these without making other improvements we'll die in a flood of information. So then we must invest in P.L. 86-36 Even today, and this is instinctive for the Agency, too, if you've got a problem, the first thing you do is try to I think you realize

You alluded to a balance between collection and exploitation of your analysis. How do you see the Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TPED) situation from NSA's standpoint? You hear a lot about General King's [Lt. Gen. James King, Director, NIMA] problems with that. How do you see the SIGINT side of that, and how does the SIGINT side relate, breaking the stovepipes? (U//FOUO)

It should relate very closely--to the "T and the D" of TPED. We've got our own acronyms; SMM is known as SIGINT Mission Management, and now we use CMM, Cryptologic

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Mission Management, but a lot of that should translate to the "T" and the "D" in TPED. Now we need to do a lot more work on that. TPED is so hard and challenging, so large, just for the imagery problem. It's hard to say, and now we need to see how this is going to overlay on SIGINT issues, as well. But you're right. I can draw parabolas here, and unfortunately that's what they look like that show the funding we need in the outyears for these problem sets, you know, access, decryption, SMM, analysis tools. They all get frighteningly high, and so we're going to have to look for economies, and that's one we really should work at. (U//FOUO)

> *You've touched on what is sort of a trinity of speed, volume, connectivity, and we all deal with it. Connectivity is still a migraine inducer, I think, for the Community. It's what the Intelligence Community Common Operational Network (ICON) folks call the "need to know versus need to share" problem. How do you see the Intelligence Community gaining the efficiencies that we need to work in this information environment and still maintain protection of sources and methods?* (U//FOUO)

That's several ridge lines down the battlefield from where we are now. In my old metaphor, these concentric circles, it sits down there several more. It's really important, and we're going to have to face it. I have mentioned the J-8 briefing I received yesterday, giving us a scorecard on our combat support agency role. One of the issues they raised was connectivity. At the same time, we have within the NSA this changing paradigm (b)(3) We've experimented with that, and we did a testbed. It was very successful. It requires a lot of training. Actually, it requires some unlearning and then training. Even when this is done, however, it doesn't do us much good if all we do is So how do we lash up with the Community--and, even more importantly, intelligence consumers? And do it securely? There's a whole bunch of acronyms out there. We've got to figure out the answer, and then we have to build connectivity into it. (U//FOUO)

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Picture the typical 24-hour watch center at any of the unified commands, and in there you would see two people who worked for the J-2, and they were doing their part of the watch. And somewhere nearby you would see two people who worked for NSA who had their own systems, their own machines, their own connectivity. Why? Because NSA wouldn't let those other two guys do this. Period. You can pretty that up with a whole bunch of other statements, but NSA wouldn't let them have access to the NSA databases. I'm wondering if maybe letting them have access is not a good idea. But how do you protect sources and methods? (U//FOUO)

Behind my credenza, I have a gray phone, a STU-III, an STE, and a red phone. NSA has a gray phone because it was ahead of everybody else. But everyone else has caught up. So I actually made the note today to go back and see how much it costs us to sustain these systems. We need to get out of the old models where NSA did things because NSA was the only one who could do them. Now they're commonly available, so why are we continuing to sustain these special things? I'll go one further. It's not my idea. I recently invited Diane Roark, a staff member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to fly to Fort Gordon to see the Regional SIGINT Operations Center. Our most important subject of conversation was reporting at NSA. She asked, "Why is NSA doing reporting?" Although we've been reporting for 47 years, when you step back and think about it, maybe she's right. Why are we issuing SIGINT reports? And then it gets to another question I've already asked myself--serialized products. What's that about? Do you go home and work with serialized

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products when you sit in front of your home computer? I don't think so. You go to get the information. How do we adapt that reality to a web-based, analytic community? This is the kind of question that we need to ask as we make these fundamental judgments. (U//FOUO)

It gets back to the point that we did a lot of these things because the technology made you do them. And it's not there any more. The industrial approach. (U//FOUP)

That's right. The data came into Fort Meade. Are you going to type it up, give it to a courier, and run it down to Arlington Hall? No, so you do it at Fort Meade. But now you can make it appear instantaneously on a web, and somebody at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center can just pull it and repeat it.
(U//FOUO)

Do you think Congress is prepared to deal with some of the changes taking place--the way the technical environment is changing, the technical communications environment, because one of the reasons NSA reports is because there are laws in terms of who sees raw SIGINT? (U//FOUO)

I don't know. I think what I described to you is consistent with the laws. Without getting too much into some really sensitive stuff, let's think about conducting operations against a major international terrorist leader. Think about SIGINT and HUMINT sources. Think about two agencies, for illustrative purposes, 35 miles apart, trying to marry the data to get the son of a gun. And each of them saying, "I'll give you my finished reporting, but not my tickets." You cannot tell me that's the correct approach in the first year of the 21st century. We're like two foreign potentates, negotiating a transfer of prisoners, and we're both wrapping ourselves around our own tradecraft. So that's a great question, and it's out there. I don't know if I can get to it on my watch, but somebody has to. (S)

As you look ahead at the changing of the work force, what is the next generation like? We are bringing a whole new generation of operations officers and analysts into CIA, and they're great. They have enormous talent. Would you please speak to the topic of the next generation of NSA officers? (U//FOUO)

That is a great and tough question because we don't have a new generation. Remember that one-third downsizing with no RIF that we've experienced in the last 10 years? We have not really hired in any significant way for the better part of a decade. I think the number last year was fewer than 200 in an Agency with a civilian population of 17,000. This year, it's been 600 or so. I want intellectually agile and technologically smart people, which is the way their parents and grandparents were at NSA. The new part that needs to be added is collaborative, which their grandparents were not at NSA. We were very much self contained in our culture. On the other hand, we can't do the mission without that almost overwhelming intellectual power the Agency's always had. The new ingredient we've got to add is this communal spirit, part of a broader Intelligence Community, part of a broader DoD community. Our old message, "I can't show you tech data, you don't know the secret handshake" has to naturally erode. (U//FOUO)

We have to change career models. If we hired two people today, one a Nobel laureate mathematician and the other to run a forklift on our loading dock, the implicit contract with both would be that they're there for 35 years. This worked well for an Agency in which the

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cutting edge of practically everything the Agency needed was at Fort Meade. Now we're an Agency that I've already suggested needs a more public face, and I'd also suggest to you the cutting edge of most of what the Agency needs is not resident at Fort Meade. It's out there in private enterprise. So, in addition to perhaps being more communal and collaborative than their moms and dads and grandparents at NSA, we may see more flowing in and out of the Agency at multiple levels, so that their career in the Agency may not be defined as from age 22 to 57. It may be that span of eight years from 42 to 50, or pick your combination. But I think we'll see more of that. I actually laid that out to the work force and got negative vibes from it on that. I think that may be the salvation. (C)

If you were to define your legacy, what would you like it to be? (U//FOUO)

That I took a national treasure that was given to me when I took the directorship, handed over to my successor something that was still a national treasure and with the high probability that it should also be a national treasure for his successors. (U//FOUO)

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Intelligence In Recent Public Literature

Into Tibet: The CIA's First Atomic Spy

By Thomas Laird. New York, NY: Grove Press, 2002. 364 pages.

Reviewed by Nicholas Dujmovic

In April 2000, a meeting convened at CIA to consider whether to roll back the cover on a case that is half a century old. The fiftieth anniversary of the death of Douglas S. Mackiernan, the first CIA officer to perish in the line of duty and the "First Star" on CIA's memorial wall, was fast approaching. The meeting was called because the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) sought permission to establish an unclassified exhibit at CIA honoring Mackiernan, which would require acknowledging him as an Agency officer operating in China from 1947 to 1950 under Department of State cover. (S)

I attended this meeting because I had written a classified chapter on Mackiernan for a History Staff anthology, *Fifty Years of CIA* (1998). Along with the curator of CIA's museum and a representative from CSI, I advocated for openness after fifty years, particularly since Mackiernan's status has been publicized in various open forums over the decades. I thought then, and still do, that the concrete benefits to the Agency of officially disclosing Mackiernan's story greatly outweighed the potential damage, which remained speculative and, to my mind, not very persuasive.

(b)(5)

In the end, the opposition to declassifying the Mackiernan story prevailed, and a "compromise" was declared: a classified exhibit on Mackiernan could be placed in a secure facility in Washington or elsewhere. (S)

And that was that. I thought that the decision was shortsighted, a great opportunity missed, but otherwise it was tolerable, even neutral in its results, because the wider world did not know what it was missing in the Mackiernan story. (S)

Now, that decision has come back to haunt us and to hurt us. The publication last year of Thomas Laird's *Into Tibet* demonstrates the cost of not seizing opportunities to tell the great stories that Agency history offers. *Into Tibet* is a deeply flawed book that plays fast and loose with the facts while tendentiously and irresponsibly denigrating CIA. But without the Agency's side of the story, it will remain the last word on the subject. (S)

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The real story of Douglas Mackiernan is compelling. A former US Army weather officer and a radio expert , Mackiernan joined the Agency in 1946, when it was still the Strategic Services Unit of the War Department. Operating under State Department cover in the US Consulate in Urumchi, the capital of the northwest Chinese province of Xinjiang, Mackiernan sent back intelligence on Soviet activities in the region—including the mining of uranium—and on the complex interplay of ethnic and political forces there. Mackiernan had extensive contacts with various ethnic leaders,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

After fleeing Urumchi with three White Russian assets, Mackiernan led his party across mountain and desert north of Tibet, Mackiernan and his party headed south, into Tibet, en route India. While still in northern Tibet, the party was met on 29 April 1950 by Tibetan soldiers who had not learned of their government's promise of safe passage. The solders fired on the party, killing Mackiernan and two of the Russians. (S)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

Thomas Laird worked for years on the Mackiernan story, piecing together research in the National Archives; documents he managed to get released through FOIA; several key secondary sources; and, especially, interviews with survivors of the Mackiernan party, Mackiernan family members, and other participants in the events described in the book. Laird wants his book to be treated as serious
history and says repeatedly that this is "a true story." Yet his treatment of the Mackiernan saga is notable for its straying from the facts in ways that suggest not only sloppiness (though that is here in abundance), but also a willful desire to tell the story he wants to tell, facts be damned—and a story that hurts CIA as much as possible. (U)

In Laird's hands, Mackiernan becomes a caricature of an early Cold War CIA operations officer—a sort of comic book superhero. In his book and in subsequent interviews on his book tour, Laird asserts that Mackiernan:

- Joined OSS after serving as the chief of cryptoanalysis for the US Army Air Force.
- Penetrated into Soviet territory in late 1945, and maintained daily radio contact with assets he was running within the USSR.
- Acquired and sent back samples of uranium that the Soviets were mining in Xinjiang province, and, using equipment that he had fabricated, verified that it was U-235.
- Directed his assets to mount a raid on the Soviet uranium mine in Xinjiang.
- Knew in 1947 that he would be going to Tibet and started boning up on Tibetan.
- Kept his cover supervisor, the Consul General in Urumchi, completely in the dark regarding his intelligence activities and even his true employer.
- Buried "sonic detectors" provided by the US Air Force to detect a Soviet atomic test.

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- Maintained a regular radio channel to his brothers' station in Massachusetts, transmitting encrypted data that were transferred to the Air Force.
- Detected the first Soviet atomic test and radioed the data to the United States, providing the critical information that determined the test's location and the bomb's yield.
- Had advance knowledge of the arrival in Urumchi of fellow CIA officer Frank Bessac, and surprised Bessac with a car and driver at the airport.
- Was "sent" to Tibet to organize anti-communist resistance and keep open a "pipeline" for "atomic intelligence." (U)

Unfortunately, none of these "facts" are true—not one. There are many other lesser falsehoods, but these are the core fictions at the heart of Laird's version of events. (S)

Laird is not shy about reckless speculation, either, as long it sounds good and advances his theories. Relying on his interviewees' hazy memories and his own imagination, he suggests that sometime in 1945-1947 Mackiernan went on a preparatory trip to Tibet (never happened); that he led an attack on a Soviet mining operation (if he had, he kept it secret from CIA); that his agents in the USSR placed detection equipment near the Soviet atomic site near Semipalatinsk and gave him several months' advance notice of the atomic test (sheer fantasy); even that he went to Eniwetok to witness a US atomic test in April 1948 (he actually went to Las Vegas to get a divorce). (S)

Besides these fictions, there are too many sloppy mistakes to count, suggesting an overall cavalier approach to writing—spelling errors; dates gone wrong ("1949" when "1948" or "1950" is meant, and vice versa); the erroneous location of CIA headquarters in Virginia in 1950; a reference to Malaysia, which did not exist in the 1940s; and even getting Mackiernan's birthday wrong. At one point, he says "north" when he means "south." Now, you would think that a careful researcher would get the small things right, but most of Laird's obvious howlers were the result of taking at face value—and not independently verifying—what the people he interviewed told him.[1] Bessac told Laird that CIA had its headquarters in Virginia in October 1950, so it must be true. Mackiernan was killed on his birthday because that is what Bessac said (he erred by four days). (U)

Laird's sloppy research aside, how could he exaggerate and twist into sheer silliness what, unadorned, is a good story about a brave CIA officer and the Agency doing the best they could in difficult circumstances? There are three main problems with Laird's approach to the Mackiernan story: (S)

First, it is clear that, despite his protestations, Laird is not really interested in what most people regard as the historical method. What DI analysts call "tradecraft"—attention to detail, disinterested marshalling of evidence, weighing the veracity of sources—is unfamiliar, and perhaps anathema, to Laird. (U)

It is telling that Laird in his acknowledgements thanks Oliver Stone for advice regarding the "narrative path."[2] The reader paying close attention to the footnotes learns that key facts are deliberately bent to serve this "narrative path"—one date, for example, is simply invented "at the convenience of the narrative." Laird also creates dialog and claims the right to use invented speech as a device to introduce the next part of the story. He admits in his footnotes that he has

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invented scenes and almost swears he will not do it again, except that it happens more than a dozen times. My personal favorite is: "To the best of my knowledge this is what happened." The author's mea culpas show that he thinks he can use footnotes essentially to be absolved of writing fiction. It starts off being funny and then gets tiresome. (U)

Second, Laird, who left America at the age of 19 to live in Nepal because he was so angry at US foreign policy, is still angry and has an agenda. All but calling CIA a rogue elephant, Laird joins the ranks of other purveyors of dark CIA conspiracies by taking a tragic story of courage and devotion to duty and turning it into a morality play ("a shameful chapter of American history") with CIA as the villain. In the world Laird creates, the flawed superhero Mackiernan works for a cynical, manipulative, and inept CIA:

- CIA, Laird says, was obsessed with obtaining Soviet "atomic intelligence," and so ordered Mackiernan to stay in Urumchi past the point of safety while the Chinese communists advanced.[3] (Actually, the Agency's interest in "atomic intelligence" from Mackiernan was tertiary, and it was the State Department and the Air Force who wanted Mackiernan to remain in Urumchi. CIA gave Mackiernan the option, and he insisted on staying to try to establish an anti-communist resistance force.)

- CIA ordered Mackiernan to supply arms to the legendary Kazakh chieftain Osman Bator, which led to a massacre of Kazakhs by the Chinese communists, consistent with CIA's cynical use of peoples it ultimately leaves to die. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

- CIA ordered Mackiernan into Tibet, knowing he was a "blown spy," on a "mission" to begin covert aid to Tibet.[4] (Laird refuses to believe the more mundane reality that CIA was doing everything it could to help Mackiernan escape to safety in India or Pakistan. Moreover, the Agency had dropped any plans to aid Tibet in response to the State Department's policy that Tibet was part of China.)

- CIA (and the State Department) spent the entire winter of 1949-1950 planning by radio with Mackiernan to establish Kazakh and Tibetan resistance. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) most of the Mackiernan-CIA radio dialog concerns how to get Mackiernan to safety.)

- CIA's blind distrust of "communists" in the State Department—a result of the influence of Senator Joe McCarthy—created friction between the two agencies that delayed the transmission through State Department channels of CIA's request for safe passage for th Mackiernan party in Tibet. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) the Department expeditiously handled CIA's request, turning it over in one day to the US Embassy in New Delhi.)

- CIA treated Mackiernan's widow with gross insensitivity, never telling her how or why he had died, and even denying her Mackiernan's life insurance. At one point, according to Laird, Mackiernan's CIA desk officer tried to seduce his widow. (b)(6) CIA disclosed to her how he had died without getting into operational information and some gruesome details; (b)(3)(c) (b)(6)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Laird's anti-CIA animus knows no bounds. If Mackiernan gets his girlfriend to take pictures of Soviet soldiers and their equipment, it is because CIA taught him to use people. Even Laird's assessment of Mackiernan as a "terrible father" is somehow tied to CIA's alleged culture of manipulation. In a deliciously sophomoric passage that reflects the flavor of the entire book, the author speculates that, on the journey to Tibet, Mackiernan began having doubts about his CIA work:

> *From what we are allowed to know of Mackiernan, he apparently only began to question his use of his family as well as whole tribes and people for the benefit of the United States in the last days before he arrived in Tibet. There, in the heart of the Tibetan wilderness, some part of Mackiernan may have had a bloody glimpse into the future, toward the ultimate result of the policies that guided his actions. Perhaps as he sat there the Himalayan panorama before him faded—replaced by the roofline of Saigon. Perhaps his frozen skin suddenly warmed and a tropical sweat rolled down his back. Perhaps for a moment Mackiernan stood on the roof of the US Embassy as America evacuated Vietnam. (U)*

As humorist Dave Barry might say, I am not making this up. It is amusing in this regard to note that, on the last page of the book, Laird quotes Mackiernan's nephew, who observed: "It is not the CIA's place to rewrite history." (U)

Third, as has already been alluded to, Laird's use of interviews is wholly suspect. One would expect discrepancies between still-secret contemporary accounts and debriefings and the memories of people Laird interviewed a half-century after the events.[6] But the huge gap between, for example, what Bessac says in 1950 in his debriefings and what he tells Laird suggests to me that the author is coaching his interviewees, or at least asking leading questions. Both of Mackiernan's surviving brothers have said that Laird misquoted them and other family members and even fabricated statements they never made. (S)

Why does it matter that Laird has written such a bad book? Other than the obvious violence done to history, everyone concerned with CIA's image should consider the publication of this book a tragedy. It has been extensively reviewed, and the reviews, to my great surprise, have mostly been positive. They generally assume that Laird's gratuitous bashing of CIA has merit. Why should Laird's negative book—or a rumored movie based on it—be the last word on what is a positive story about a CIA officer and CIA operations?[7] The answer is: It should not. The only review of Into Tibet I have come across that saw past his animosity and got it right observed that CIA "carried out daring and valuable work in northwest China." This is the story that we can and should tell. (S)

The Agency should declare the Mackiernan story with pride. The facts can be revealed without damage to sources and methods and without harming US-China relations—the Chinese knew in 1949-1950 what Mackiernan was up to, and, after a half-century, certainly we can own up to the fact that CIA officers worked to fight communism. We owe it to the American people to tell them about the bravery of CIA men and women in fighting communism during the Cold War. We also owe it to the memory of Douglas Mackiernan to describe unashamedly what he and others did

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during the long twilight fight against America's enemies. (S)

Disclosing the story of our First Star would demonstrate to historians, scholars, and journalists, and even to marginal hacks like Laird, that CIA can be forthcoming regarding Cold War history. Finally, it would fire the imagination of other adventurers of Mackiernan's type whose talents would be welcome at CIA. (S)

Footnotes:

[1] Grove Press bears responsibility for the apparent lack of competent editing and quality control. (U)

[2] It is also clear that Laird has a movie in mind. Even the shallowest perusal of the book suggests a movie screenplay, with short chapters flitting back and forth between Washington, China, California, and Tibet. (U)

[3] How Laird deals with contradictory evidence is telling: a CIA officer says State ordered Mackiernan to stay behind, while a State officer says CIA ordered it. Laird concludes, on no basis other than his views about CIA, that the CIA officer "was lying." (Actually, the CIA officer was closer to the truth.) Anything uttered by any State officer, by contrast, is gospel: Laird cites a memo between two State desk officers on the desirability of sending a covert mission to Tibet to prove that Washington intended to do so. (S//NF)

[4] Laird ridicules CIA on this score, especially for saying that the Tibetan journey was an escape. (U)

[5] In a radio interview, Laird claims that the "in-house biography" of Mackiernan was written as part of an internal CIA investigation into the Agency's mistakes in the case. It is news to me that that is why I wrote the Mackiernan study! It just shows that Laird will say anything if it fits with his theories. (S//NF)

[6] Laird should not be let off the hook because he did not have access to all the secret documentation extant on Mackiernan. Ted Gup, with no classified access and with fewer open resources than Laird, wrote in his recent Book of Honor (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2000) a mostly accurate and far more responsible account of Mackiernan's work. (S)

[7] On 29 September 2002, for example, the Grand Rapids Press noted: "Until more information is available and verifiable, *Into Tibet* stands as the definitive account." (U

Nicholas Dujmovic serves in the CIA Directorate of Intelligence. (U)

(b)(3)(c)

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Shifting from Wartime to Peacetime Intelligence Operations

On the Trail of Nazi Counterfeiters (U)

Kevin C. Ruffner

> **"By 1939, the German Reich had begun to formulate a plan—known as Operation Bernhard—to undermine the economies of the British Empire and the United States through currency destabilization. (U)"**

Dr. Kevin C. Ruffner serves on the CIA History Staff.

(b)(3)(c)

In November 2000, CBS television broadcast to the world its efforts to locate hidden Nazi treasures in the deep waters of Lake Toplitz in the *Totes Gebirge* mountains of western Austria.[1] During the previous summer, Oceaneering Technologies—the same underwater salvage company that discovered the Titanic—had mapped the lake and used a sophisticated one-man submarine to scour its freezing, dark bottom. Only at the end of the search did Oceaneering detect the remnants of wooden crates, which turned out to contain counterfeit British pounds and American dollars. The bills were in excellent condition. The lake—which has no oxygen below 65 feet—"preserves everything" that falls into it, according to a local resident.[2] Although more valuable treasures did not emerge from Lake Toplitz during the expedition in 2000, the discovery of the forged currency reawakened interest in one of the most bizarre intelligence adventures from the climactic end of World War II. (U)

[1] For information on the Lake Toplitz expedition in 2000, see CBS 60 Minutes II, "Hitler's Lake," produced By Bill Owens, 21 November 2000. (U)
[2] Emmanuel Serot, "Underwater Search for Nazi Relics in Austrian Lake," *Agence France Press*, 7 June 2000. (U)



Plate for counterfeit British pounds recovered from Lake Toplitz in 1959 during a search sponsored by the German magazine *Stern*. The Austrian government conducted its own recovery operation four years later, surfacing additional artifacts. (U)

Operation Bernhard (U)

By 1939, the German Reich had begun to formulate a plan to undermine the economies of the British Empire and the United States through currency destabilization.[3] Known as Operation Bernhard, the plot was launched by SS officers Alfred Naujocks and Bernhard Kruger of the Reichsicherheitshauptamt (the German Security Main Office, or RHSA), who

[3] For information on Operation Bernhard, see Anthony Pirie, *Operation Bernhard* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1962) and Wilhelm Hoettl, *Hitler's Paper Weapon* (London:R. Hart-Davis, 1955).

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decided to produce bogus currency in addition to false documents, as part of a broad wartime intelligence campaign. The German counterfeiting scheme ranks among the war's most interesting clandestine activities and involved the highest officials in the Third Reich. "Had this counterfeiting operation [been] fully organized in 1939 and early 1940," Holocaust scholar Rabbi Marvin Hier has commented, the "results of World War II may have been quite different."[4] (U)

As it turned out, it took the Germans until 1942 to put Operation Bernhard into high gear. At Sachsenhausen concentration camp near Berlin, SS Sturmbannfuhrer Bernhard Kruger, oversaw the work of 140 Jewish prisoners trained as forgers. Isolated from the main prison area by barbed wire fences, two barracks were set aside for inmates working as printers, binders, photographers, and engravers. The Nazis placed a prisoner as the head of each section under the overall charge of Oskar Stein, an office manager and bookkeeper. In addition to sparing their lives, Kruger offered the prisoners better food and other privileges for their hard work. (U)

[4] Reuters, "'Hitler's Lake' Yields Counterfeit Currency," 20 November 2000. (U)

"The German counterfeiting scheme ranks among the war's most interesting clandestine activities and involved the highest officials in the Third Reich. (U)"

The Germans faced numerous technical difficulties in counterfeiting British and American money. By mid-1943, the SS had contracted with the Hahnemuhle paper factory in Braunschweig in northern Germany to make the special rag needed to replicate British money. The Germans used ink produced by two companies in Berlin. Wartime shortages, coupled with imperfections, limited the production of British currency. The Germans reportedly printed some 134 million pounds sterling in less than two years, yet Stein estimated that only 10 percent of it could be considered usable. Efforts to reproduce American currency proved less successful, despite the work of Solly Smolianoff, an experienced criminal forger whom Kruger added to his collection of skilled workers at Sachsenhausen.[5] (U)



Bernhard Kruger, in charge of counterfeiting at Sachsenhausen concentration camp. (U)

In addition to British and American currency, the SS crafted a wide array of forged civilian and military identity cards, passports, marriage and birth certificates, stamps, and other official documents. Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler reportedly planned to use these forged documents and money to create havoc among the Allies as well as to underwrite Nazi agents throughout the world. Himmler, for example, wanted to drop the imperfect British pounds on the United Kingdom by airplane. These notes "were good enough to fool anyone but an expert," a postwar report noted. "Therefore, if a large quantity was dumped and the English

[5] For further details on Smolianoff, see Murray Teigh Bloom, *The Brotherhood of Money: The Secret World of Bank Note Printers* (Port Clinton: BNR Press, 1983) and Murray Teigh Bloom, *Money of Their Own: The Great Counterfeiters* (New York: Scribner, 1957). (U)

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government declared them counterfeit, many would say the government was merely trying to avoid redeeming them."[6] (U)

The rapid advance of the Soviet army in early 1945 necessitated the evacuation of the Jewish counterfeiters from Sachsenhausen and their transfer to Mauthausen concentration camp in Austria. In mid-April, the Germans again moved the prisoners and machinery to an unused brewery at Redl-Zipf where they hoped to start up production in an underground factory in the mountains. The Nazis had little time to resume counterfeiting before the war came to an end. By the last week of April, the Germans had ordered the inmates to destroy as much of the machinery and the money, and as many of the records as possible. In one of the last desperate acts of World War II, the SS dumped crates full of counterfeit money into nearby Lake Toplitz. They then moved the inmates to Ebensee concentration camp. The US Army's liberation of the camp on 6 May prevented the Germans from killing the inmates. Once freed, Operation Bernhard's workers quickly scattered.[7] (U)

"In one of the last desperate acts of World War II, the SS dumped crates full of counterfeit money into Lake Toplitz."

Fears of "The Nazi Redoubt" (U)

In 1945, the US Army and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) raced to investigate rumors of a Nazi counterfeiting operation, fearful that such resources might be used to finance an underground Nazi resistance movement.[8] Worries about a last ditch Nazi stand in the Alps had mounted appreciably over the final year of the war. Even as German forces melted and Allied armies swarmed through the shell of the Thousand Year Reich in the spring of 1945, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower noted that "If the German was permitted to establish [a] Redoubt, he might possibly force us to engage in a long, drawn-out guerrilla type of warfare, or a costly siege."[9] (U)

As the noose tightened around the Third Reich, the OSS began to glean bits of information about an intricate German plot to manipulate currencies. In March 1945, the OSS in Bern learned that the former chauffeur of the Hungarian ambassador to Switzerland had come across a "Herr Schwendt" while traveling through Merano, northern Italy. This "Schwendt" had urged the Hungarian to get a job in the American or British legations in Switzerland and provide information to the Germans in return for dollars and pounds to sell on the Swiss black market. Instead, the chauffeur contacted the OSS. He said that "Schwendt" lived at Schloss Labers on the outskirts of Merano and that his castle had a radio station and extensive telephone installations. He also reported

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[6] Germany: Economic. "Manufacture of English Pound Notes," 20 June 1945, (Information: 26 May 1945; Date of Distribution: 10 July 1945) Report No. B-2832, in Col. William G. Brey, Chief, Foreign Exchange Depository, Finance Division, Office of Military Government/US (hereafter cited as OMGUS), to Director, Finance Division, OMGUS, 3 October 1946, enclosing untitled, undated report by Maj. George J. McNally, Chief Counterfeit Detection Section, with attachments, in Record Group 260, Records of US Occupation Headquarters, World War II, OMGUS Records, Office of Finance Division and Finance Advisor, Central Files of Foreign Exchange Depository Group 1945-50, Box 451, File 950.31, Currency–Counterfeit Investigations, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter cited as NARA). This source is subsequently referenced as *McNally Report*. (U)

[7] For an account by one of the Jewish inmates involved with Operation Bernhard, see Adolf Burger, *Unternehmen Bernhard: Die Geldfalscherwerkstatt im KZ Sachenshausen* (Berlin: Edition Heinrichs, 1992). (U)

[8] The US government also focused on locating other types of Nazi assets that could be used to sustain the enemy. In Project SAFEHAVEN, the State and Treasury Departments embarked upon a worldwide effort to locate Germany's hidden resources. The OSS played an important role in reporting on German assets in such countries as Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. See: Donald P. Steury, "Tracking Nazi 'Gold': The OSS and Project SAFEHAVEN," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1999), pp. 57-71. (U)

[9] Joseph E. Persico, *Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II* (New York: Viking Press, 1979), p. 11. (U)

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that he happened to see that "cases full of brand new Italian Lire were being unpacked." The OSS reported Schloss Labers as a bombing target.[10] (S)

In April, a German deserter told the OSS in Switzerland that Himmler had formed "Sonderkommando Schwendt" as an independent unit "to purchase abroad a variety of objects including gold, diamonds, securities, as well as certain raw materials and finished products."[11] Two weeks after VE-Day in May, the OSS intercepted a letter in Switzerland from what appeared to be a German civilian who had been involved in obtaining the right paper stock for the printing of British currency. The letter-writer provided an account of the beginnings of the operation, the firms involved, and the names of several SS officers who had supervised the production. The author had even visited the production facility and met the Jewish inmates.[12] (S)

[10] "Italy–Bombing Target (Sketch Attached)," 16 March 1945, B-2037, (no classification stated), in Fritz Schwend, File 201-0206556, Records of the Directorate of Operations (hereafter cited by name, 201 file number, and DO Records). (S)
[11] "Sonder-Kommando Schwendt," 12 April 1945, B-2460, (no classification stated), in Schwend, File 201-0206556, DO Records. (S)
[12] *McNally Report.* (U)

"A former Secret Service agent...McNally soon found his peactime skills in demand in occupied Europe."

Military Investigation (U)

In early May 1945, US Army Capt. George J. McNally, Jr., received word that US troops in Bavaria had located a factory stocked with boxes of counterfeit British pounds. McNally was assigned to the Currency Section of the G-5 Division's Financial Branch at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, in newly captured Frankfurt. A former Secret Service agent who had specialized in counterfeiting cases before the war he soon found his peacetime skills in demand in occupied Europe. McNally heard that American soldiers and Austrian civilians were busily fishing out millions of dollars worth of British money found floating in the Enns River. Meanwhile, a German army captain in Austria had surrendered a truck with 23 boxes of British money, valued at 21 million pounds sterling. McNally spent the next eight months untangling the twisted webs of Operation Bernhard that extended into Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Luxembourg, seeking to uncover how the Germans had compromised the security of the monetary systems of the Allies.[13] (U)

In late May, McNally began coordinating his investigation into German currency operations with the British. From intelligence sources in the Middle East, the British already knew that the Germans had been busily undermining their currency. At a meeting with British officials in Frankfurt in early June 1945, McNally met P. J. Reeves, the manager of the St. Luke's Printing Works in London (the British equivalent to the US Bureau of Printing and Engraving). Reeves was visibly perturbed when he saw the amount of British currency that McNally had recovered in Austria. "He began going from box to box, rifling the notes through his fingers. Finally he stopped and stared silently into space. Then for several seconds," McNally later recalled, "he cursed, slowly and methodically in a cultured English voice, but with vehemence. 'Sorry,' he said at last. 'But the people who made this stuff have cost us so much.'" Indeed, the Bank of England had to recall all of its five-pound notes and exchange them for new ones.[14] (U)

[13] George J. McNally, with Frederic Sondern, "The Nazi Counterfeit Plot," in *Secrets and Spies: Behind-the-Scenes Stories of World War II* (Pleasantville: The Reader's Digest Association, 1964), pp. 507-514. Originally published as "The Great Nazi Counterfeit Plot," in the July 1952 issue of *Reader's Digest.* (U)
[14] McNally, "The Nazi Counterfeit Plot," p. 507. (U)

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McNally, joined by Chief Inspector William Rudkin, Inspector Reginald Minter, and Detective Sgt. Frederick Chadbourn from Scotland Yard, and Capt. S. G. Michel, a French army liaison officer attached to the Americans, focused on interviewing Germans involved in planning Operation Bernhard and the concentration camp inmates who produced the fake money. Throughout the summer and fall of 1945, they crisscrossed Europe to interrogate witnesses, including *Obersturmbannfuhrer* Josef Spacil, Kruger's commanding officer at Sachsenhausen.[15] McNally also tried to raise the crates of money that the Germans had reportedly dumped into Lake Toplitz, but a special team of US Navy divers found nothing.[16] (U)

Drawing on support from the US Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), the OSS, and the US Navy, McNally wrapped up his investigation by early 1946 and completed an extensive report on the history of Operation Bernhard and the known disposition of the false currency. "Thus," he wrote, "in

"The OSS set out to locate members of Operation Bernhard who could pinpoint hidden Nazi wealth before it could finance underground resistance efforts."

disorganization, flight and destruction, ended the most elaborate and far reaching scheme that an invading army ever devised for the wholesale counterfeiting of the money and credentials of other countries."[17] The US military returned the counterfeit British currency to the Bank of England and closed its file on Operation Bernhard. Only small amounts of forged American money were ever found. As far as the American military was concerned, Nazi Germany's counterfeiting activity became a curious footnote in the annals of the war. (U)

OSS Seeks the Kingpins (U)

As the war closed, the OSS, too, set out to locate members of Operation Bernhard who could pinpoint hidden Nazi wealth before it could be used to finance underground resistance efforts. Working at the same time as, and on occasion in coordination with, the McNally team, OSS/X-2 (counterintelligence) already had several hot leads by mid-May 1945. 1st Lt. Alex Moore, an OSS officer assigned to the Sixth Army Group's Special Counter Intelligence (SCI) detachment, was the first OSS officer assigned to the counterfeiting case. He took Karl Friedmann, a captured SS officer and member of Operation Bernhard, to Rosenheim near Munich to pick up George Spitz, a 52-year old Austrian Jew whom Friedmann had fingered. A prewar art dealer who had lived in the United States as a youth, Spitz was identified as one of the distributors of the counterfeit funds. Spitz admitted to Moore that he had worked for the Germans, but claimed that it was under duress because he feared arrest by the Nazis.[18] (S)

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[15] Transcripts of interviews with former concentration camp inmates are found in the *McNally Report*. The apprehension of Spacil by the OSS is recounted in Capt. F. C. Grant, SCI Detachment, Seventh US Army, to Commanding Officer, SCI Detachment, Twelfth Army Group, "Weekly Report," 16 June 1945, LSX-002-616, in WASH-REG-INT-163, Record Group 226, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Box 276, [no folder listed], NARA (hereafter cited as RG 226, OSS Records, NARA). (U)


[16] Capt. McNally to Capt. W. A. New, US Naval Forces, Germany, "Recovery of Enemy Materials and Equipment from Inland Waters in Germany and Austria," 26 September 1945; Capt. New to Capt. McNally, "Enemy Materials and Equipment from Inland Waters in Germany and Austria, Recovery of," 11 September 1945; and J. H. McDonald, US Naval Ship Salvage Group, to Cdr. R. P. McDonald, 4 July 1945, in RG 260, OMGUS Records, Office of Finance Division and Finance Advisor, Central Files of Foreign Exchange Depository Group 1945-50, Box 451, File 950.31, Currency–Counterfeit 1945, NARA. (U)

[17] *McNally Report*, pp. 1-11, with attachments and addendum. (U)

[18] SCI Sixth Army Group, "Interrogation of Subject, George Spitz," 16 May 1945, (S); and SCI Sixth Army Group, "Sale of Foreign Currency by the RSHA," 17 May 1945 (S); and SCI, Sixth Army Group, "Agents Used by Lieutenant Moore, SCI 6 AG," 17 May 1945 (S), in George Spitz, File 201-0131075, DO Records. (S)

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Schloss Labers in northern Italy—Schwend's headquarters for the distribution of Nazi counterfeit money. (U)

Spitz soon provided extensive leads into the Nazi campaign to undermine the Allies' monetary systems. He recounted to Moore how he had escaped from the Nazis and then obtained false documents from a corrupt SS officer, Josef Dauser, and his secretary, Bertha von Ehrenstein, who worked for the Nazi foreign intelligence service in Munich. Spitz claimed to have met a German named Wendig in Munich in 1943, who asked him to travel to Belgium to purchase gold, jewelry, and pictures. Spitz made six trips and exchanged some 600,000 marks worth of counterfeit English pounds. Moore interrogated both Dauser and his secretary to check Spitz's account.[19] (S)

Moore's investigations continued to bring out new details of the Nazi counterfeiting operation. By the end of May, the OSS officer had pinpointed Friedrich Schwend (sometimes spelled Schwendt) as Operation Bernhard's pointman for the distribution of bogus money and identified his various cover names, including Dr. Wendig and Fritz Klemp.[20] According to OSS sources, Schwend had worked from Schloss Labers in northern Italy—the same location reported by the Hungarian chauffeur—and used couriers to sow counterfeit money throughout Europe. Although not a member of the SS, he took the rank and identity of *SS Sturmbannführer* Dr. Wendig who had died in an Italian partisan attack in 1944. Schwend's castle was guarded by a detail of Waffen SS soldiers and identified as *Sonderstab–Generalkommando III Germanisches Panzerkorps*, the Special Staff of the Headquarters of the Third German Armored Corps. (U)

Schwend apparently retained one-third of the profits derived from the sale of the counterfeit money. He and his underlings used the fake currency to purchase luxury items on the black market as well as to buy weapons from Yugoslav partisans anxious to make money from the arms provided by the British and Americans. The Germans, in turn, sold the Allied equipment to pro-Nazi groups in the Balkans. Money distributed by Schwend also went to pay German agents abroad—Elyesa Bazna, a famous German agent in Turkey known as CICERO, was

[19] "Interrogation of Bertha von Ehrenstein," 25 May 1945; "Additional Statement of Mrs. Von Ehrenstein," [undated]; and "Memorandum on Schwend alias Wendig," 30 May 1945, (no classification listed), in Spitz, File 201-0131075, DO Records. (S)

[20] Born in 1906 and a member of the Nazi party since 1932, Schwend lived a charmed life. A businessman who had settled in Abbazia, Italy, Schwend had married a wealthy German woman in 1929 whose aunt resided in Argentina. Drawing on family ties, he managed the aunt's business in Latin America and established numerous contacts throughout Europe and the Americas. In the 1930s, Schwend also established himself as an arms dealer and provided aircraft and other weapons to China. At the outbreak of the war, his contacts and travels drew the attention of the Gestapo and he was arrested as a suspected Allied agent and extradited to Germany from Italy. Schwend's time in prison was short, however; he was released to become the leading salesman of counterfeit currencies from Operation Bernhard. (U)

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paid in false British currency produced by Operation Bernhard.[21] (U)

Schwend's job was not without risks. The Gestapo was on the lookout for counterfeiters and black marketers and sometimes apprehended Schwend's men by accident. Rivalries among senior German SS officers, including Himmler, Reinhard Heydrich (first head of the RSHA), Heinz Jost (first head of RSHA's foreign intelligence section), Ernst Kaltenbrunner (Heydrich's successor as RSHA chief), Heinrich Mueller (head of the Gestapo), Otto Ohlendorf (head of another RSHA section), and Walter Schellenberg (Jost's successor in the foreign intelligence section), impacted on many aspects of Operation Bernhard. Mainstream German bureaucracies, including the Foreign Ministry and Reichsbank, vehemently opposed any tinkering with the monetary systems, even those of the enemy. As it turned out, German use of counterfeit pounds destabilized the already fragile economies of several friendly countries, Italy in particular. (U)

As the OSS pieced together the Operation Bernhard network, it made plans to apprehend those participants not already in custody.[22] On 18 May, Spitz led Moore to Prien, where they

Rivalries among senior German SS officers...impacted on many aspects of Operation Bernhard.



located a large collection of trunks and crates belonging to Schwend. Schwend, however, was nowhere to be found.[23] Spitz also helped Moore collar persons on the Allies' wanted list not associated with Operation Bernhard, including Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler's personal photographer, and Loomis Taylor, the American "Lord Hee Haw," a Nazi collaborator close to Hitler. (S)

On 10 June, the OSS reported that it had arrested Schwend and started to interrogate him to gain further details about what it called the "RSHA Financial Operation."[24] The Americans initially held Schwend at the Seventh Army Interrogation Center in Ludwigsburg. Describing Schwend as a "mechanical engineer," the Center's records note that he "bought machinery and tools for factories." Whether the Army listed Schwend in this category out of ignorance or for other reasons is not known. Shortly afterward OSS officers removed Schwend from the Interrogation Center and placed him in Munich's Stadelheim prison where he remained for three weeks before he relented and spoke to his captors.[25] (U)

Meanwhile, Moore had been transferred back to the United States and Capt. Charles Michaelis, an X-2 case officer for several OSS double agent operations in France during the war, began to handle Spitz and Schwend. Spitz impressed Michaelis as "reliable, trustworthy and intelligent... [and]

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[21] Richard Wires, *The Cicero Spy Affair: German Access to British Secrets in World War II* (Westport: Praeger, 1999), pp. 85-96. (U)

[22] 1st Lt. Charles Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, "Preliminary Statement of Agi Zelenay in Connection with RSHA Operations," 4 June 1945; Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, "Continuation of the Statement by Agi Zelenay," 26 June 1945; and Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, "RSHA Financial Operations," 5 June 1945 (no classifications listed), in Spitz, File 201-0131075, DO Records. (S)

[23] Moore to Commanding Officer, SCI, Sixth Army Group, "Financial Operations of RSHA Amt VI," 22 May 1945 (no classification listed), in Spitz, File 201-0131075, DO Records. (S)

[24] Numerous documents pertaining to the RSHA Financial Operation, Spitz, Schwend, and other members of Operation Bernhard are located in the declassified OSS records at the National Archives. Spitz's classified 201 file is more complete, containing many early OSS reports on the RSHA Financial Operations. (S)

[25] Weekly Status Reports for the Seventh Army Interrogation Center (SAIC) commanded by Maj. Paul Kubala are found in Record Group 338, Records of United States Army Commands, 1942-, Records of the European Theater of Operations/US Forces European Theater, Records of the Seventh Army Interrogation Center, Box 74, Folder 2, NARA. Interestingly, Schwend's departure from the SAIC is not found in the Daily Status Reports for that period. The Center prepared hundreds of interrogation reports from April until its disbandment in October 1945. Schwend's name does not appear in the index of any of these reports. See Seventh Army Interrogation Center, Index of SAIC Reports (6 April 1945 - 2 October 1945) in Box 73. (U)

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willing to cooperate."[26] In an effort to get Schwend to talk, Michaelis took Spitz to Stadelheim prison. Spitz "persuaded Schwend that his best chance would be to confess his activities with the RSHA and to cooperate with us." The OSS judged that "Spitz is primarily responsible for the success of this mission."[27] (S)

As an initial act of good faith, Schwend agreed to turn over to the OSS all of his "hidden valuables." Michaelis and Capt. Eric Timm, the X-2 chief in Munich, accompanied Spitz and Schwend to a remote location in Austria in July 1945, where Schwend uncovered more than 7,000 pieces of French and Italian gold that he had buried only days before the end of the war. Michaelis reported that Schwend estimated that the gold, which weighed over 100 pounds, had a value of $200,000. Michaelis recognized that the "money constituted a possible threat to Allied security as it could have been used to finance anti-Allied activities."[28] (U)

[26] Capt. Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, "George Spitz," 25 June 1945, X-645 (S), in Spitz, File 201-0131075, DO Records. For information about Spitz's use by OSS and the employment of other Operation Bernhard personnel, see Capt. Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, "Situation Report on Prospective Penetration Agents," 29 June 1945, LMX-002-629 (S), in DO Records, Job 92-00373R, Box 3, Folder 21, CIA Archives (hereafter CIA ARC). A copy is also filed in Spitz, File 201-0131075, DO Records. OSS headquarters in Germany approved Spitz's use on 12 July 1945. (S)

"Schwend uncovered more than 7,000 pieces of French and Italian gold that he had buried only days before the end of the war."

With one successful mission under its belt, the OSS began to use Schwend as a "bird dog" for other hidden assets. In late July, Timm and Michaelis took Schwend and Spitz to Merano to visit Schwend's former headquarters. The Army's Counter Intelligence Corps had already rounded up several of Schwend's employees who had remained in Merano, but CIC reported that the detainees did not have a clear picture of the overall counterfeiting operation.[29] Nonetheless, after further interrogation of one of Schwend's staff still in Merano, the OSS was able to recover nearly $200,000 worth of gold, American currency, and diamond rings. (U)

By then, both Spitz and Schwend had clearly demonstrated their value to OSS. According to Michaelis, Schwend added to his laurels by writing a history of Operation Bernhard.[30] (U)

[27] Capt. Michaelis, SCI Detachment/Munich to Commanding Officer, OSS/X-2/Germany, "RSHA Financial Operations," 20 July 1945, LWX-50, in WASH-REG-INT-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, Box 287 [no folder listed], NARA. See also, Capt. Timm to Chief, X-2/Germany, "RSHA Financial Operation," 20 July 1945, with copies of receipts; and Capt. Timm, Capt. Michaelis, 1st Lt. Stewart French, and Mrs. Jane Burrell, Memorandum for the File, "RSHA Financial Transactions," 19 July 1945 (S), in Spitz, File 201-0131075, DO Records. (S)

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] 1st Lt. Edward R. Weismiller, Chief, Operations, OSS/X-2/Germany to X-2/Washington, "RSHA Financial Operations," 2 August 1945, LWX-61, enclosing Michaelis to Commanding Officer, OSS/X-2/Germany, "RSHA Financial Operation," 28 July 1945, in WASH-REG-INT-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, Box 287, [no folder listed], NARA. (U)

Shifting Gears (U)

As tensions mounted between East and West during the early Cold War, American intelligence began to use several former members of Operation Bernhard as agents to collect information extending beyond their wartime activities. In August 1945, Timm reported that "it has been for sometime apparent that a well-balanced network of counter-intelligence and counter-espionage agents must include persons from all spheres of activity." Timm observed that "the implementation of the penetration agent program wherein the use of former GIS [German Intelligence Service] personalities is contemplated remains of critical importance." With an eye to a resurgent Nazi party, the Munich X-2 chief commented, "such persons are of importance because they are in a position to recognize other GIS

[30] Schwend's report has not survived. (U)

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personalities and are logical contacts for any illegal resistance group."[31] (S)

To target the resurgent Nazi movement, X-2 recruited some 13 agents in Munich and had another dozen under consideration.[32] Spitz and Schwend were among Timm's stable of assets. Schwend, in turn, brought other Operation Bernhard associates on board, including George Srb, a Czech, and Guenther Wischmann, his "salesman" in Slovenia. Wischmann had been arrested in June 1945, but Michaelis was able to obtain his release from prison.[33] (S)

Timm used Spitz, codenamed TARBABY, in a variety of ways, although initially he was not tasked as a regular agent. In

"During the early Cold War, American intelligence began to use several former members of Operation Bernhard as agents to collect information extending beyond their wartime activities."

September 1945, Spitz supported an OSS effort to enlist released business and banking leaders to provide information on the financial aspects of illegal Nazi activities within postwar Germany.[34] Timm felt that Spitz had "an encyclopedic knowledge of all figures of any importance in industry and economics throughout Europe."[35] The Munich X-2 chief recorded in late October 1945 that "TARBABY will prepare and submit regular semi-monthly reports on financial and economic matters, as well as other items of interest which he can obtain." In this capacity, Spitz provided information on the German Red Cross and the Bavarian Separatist Movement in southern Germany.[36] (S)

By November 1945, Michaelis and Timm had been reassigned, leaving Sgt. Boleslav Holtsman as X-2's lone representative in the Bavarian capital. Holtsman used Schwend to obtain a variety of reports on persons who "might be used by the American intelligence in some way."[37] Additionally, Schwend told Holtsman about the organization and structure of the Czech intelligence service and the exploitation of Jewish refugees by the Soviets.[38] Holtsman was impressed with Schwend's work in Munich and commented, "His knowledge of personalities and underground

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[31] OSS/X-2/Germany to X-2/Washington, "Semi-Monthly Operations Report, SCI Munich," 22 August 1945, LMX-010-815 (S), enclosing SCI/Munich to Commanding Officer, OSS/X-2/Germany, "Semi-Monthly Operation Report SCI Munich," 15 August 1945 (S), in DO Records, Job 92-00373R, Box 3, Folder 21, CIA ARC. (S)

[32] SCI Detachment/Munich, to Commanding Officer, OSS/X-2 Germany, "Semi-Monthly Operations Report, SCI Munich," 31 August 1945, G-TSX-2891 (S), in DO Records, Job 92-00373R, Box 3, Folder 21, CIA ARC. (S)

[33] Security Control (the successor to X-2 in the new Office of Special Operations, or OSO) in Munich eventually dropped Srb, because of his black market activities and his denunciation by the Czech government as a German collaborator. Wischmann, a sub-source of Schwend's, traveled throughout Germany and Austria, but X-2 in Munich did not use him as a "full-time agent" because of suspicions about his dealings on the black market. See various reports in Guenther Wischmann, File 201-0131080, DO Records. (S)

[34] Timm to Commanding Officer, OSS/X-2/Germany, "Semi-Monthly Operations Report, SCI Munich," 15 September 1945, G-TSX-3310 (S); Timm to Commanding Officer, OSS/X-2/Germany, "Semi-Monthly Operations Report, SCI Munich," 30 September 1945, G-TSX-3747 (S), both in DO Records, Job 92-00373R, Box 3, Folder 21, CIA ARC; 1st Lt. Sidney H. Lenington, Deputy Chief, SSU/X-2/Germany to X-2/Washington, "Semi-Monthly Reports," 12 December 1945, LMX-005-1130, enclosing Timm to Commanding Officer, SSU/X-2/Germany, "Semi-Monthly Operations Report, SCI Munich," 31 October 1945, LMX-005-1130, in WASH-REG-INT-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, Box 275, [no folder listed], NARA. (S)

[35] Lenington to X-2/Washington, "Semi-Monthly Reports," 12 December 1945, LMX-005-1130, enclosing Timm to Commanding Officer, SSU/X-2/Germany, "Semi-Monthly Operations Report, SCI Munich," 31 October 1945, LMX-005-1130, in WASH-REG-INT-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, Box 275, (no folder listed), NARA. (U)

[36] Lenington to X-2/Washington, "Semi-Monthly Reports," 12 December 1945, LMX-005-1130, enclosing Timm to Commanding Officer, SSU/X-2/Germany, "Semi-Monthly Operations Report, SCI Munich," 15 November 1945, LMX-005-1130, in WASH-REG-INT-163, RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, Box 275, NARA. (U)

[37] Quote found in AB-43 [Holtsman], "Dr. Robert Scherkamp, Munich, Fuchsstr. 5," 30 August 1946, MSC-332, LWX-002-916a (S), in Schwend, File 201-0206556, DO Records. Examples of Schwend's reporting on various personalities are in Schwend's 201 file. (S)

[38] Reporting on the Czech services and Soviet targeting of Jewish refugees is found in Schwend, File 201-0206556, DO Records. (S)

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groups in Italy, Yugoslavia, and in Germany is very wide."[39] Perhaps reflective of his ability to get information, X-2 gave Schwend the codename FLUSH. (S)

Balancing Ends and Means (U)

Given their wartime affiliations and postwar opportunism, none of X-2's assets had clean backgrounds. In the ruins of Europe, the agents' access to sources and the pressing need for intelligence outweighed concerns about their tainted reputations. (S)

Nonetheless, files continued to fill with damaging information as postwar debriefings proceeded. Walter Schellenberg, RSHA's foreign intelligence chief, was among those who surrendered in 1945. Transferred to Great Britain for interrogation, he offered the Allies a window into German operations from the highest vantage point. Schellenberg told his captors about the intrigues that had riddled the intelligence and security organs of the Third Reich and filled in the gaps about Operation Bernhard. He claimed to have grown

"Given their wartime affiliations and postwar opportunism, none of [the US intelligence] assets had clean backgrounds."

incensed at the latitude that Schwend enjoyed in dispensing false British currency and described him as "one of the greatest crooks and imposters." Because Schwend marketed some of the false money in territories controlled by the Germans, Schellenberg said that the Reichsbank itself ended up buying some of the counterfeit currency.[40] (S)

Neither Schwend nor Spitz maintained a low profile in the ruins of Munich and they soon attracted attention. Spitz became a well-known figure in early postwar society circles. As X-2's sole representative in Munich for most of the period between 1945 and 1947, Holtsman needed to maintain good relations with local officials. According to a 1947 report, he found Spitz's parties to be an excellent way to meet the senior Americans in charge of the city's military government.[41] In turn, Holtsman assisted Spitz in obtaining a vehicle and supplies.[42] Since Holtsman did not receive much guidance or support, he had to scrounge for supplies and ran his own operations. (S)

It did not take long, however, for Spitz's past to catch up with him. The Dutch representative at Munich's Central Collecting Point—which handled art recovered from the Nazis—listed several pieces of art and rugs that Spitz had sold to Schwend during the war. In November 1946, Edwin Rae, the chief of the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section of the military government in Bavaria requested that US authorities in Italy assist in tracking down looted Dutch art in that country, to include a

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[39] X-2/Germany to X-2/Washington, "Review of Activity since 10 December 45 to 10 September 46," 17 September 46, L-010-910, enclosing AB-43 [Holtsman], Munich to AB-51 [Henry Hecksher], American Zone, "Review of Activity since 10 December 1945 to 10 September 1946," 10 September 1946 (S), in DO Records, Job 91-00976R, Box 1, Folder 14, CIA ARC. (S)

[40] X-2/London to X-2/Washington, "Interrogation Report on Schellenberg, 27 June-12 July 1945," 2 November 1945, XX-9667 (S), enclosing a copy of the British interrogation report. Walter Schellenberg, File 201-0009930, DO Records. (S)

[41] Security Control/American Zone, to Foreign Branch M for Security Control/Washington, "Present Contacts of SC Munich, Munich," (true names), 24 March 1947, FSRO-1535 (S); Chief, SCB/American Zone to Foreign Branch M for SC/Washington, "Present Contacts of SC Munich," (cryptonyms), 19 March 1947, HSC/OPS/34, FSRO-1545; SC/American Zone, to Foreign Branch M for SC, "Discontinued Contacts of SC Munich," (true names), 24 March 1947, FSRO-1548 (S); and Chief, SC/American Zone, to Foreign Branch M, for SC, "Discontinued Contacts of SC Munich," (cryptonyms), 19 March 1947, HSC/OPS/33 (S), all in DO Records, Job 81-00815R, Box 514, Folder 4, CIA ARC. (Hereafter cited collectively as "SC Munich Present and Discontinued Contacts.") (S)

[42] Holtsman, Refugee Control Unit, to Whom It May Concern, "Transportation, Supplies," 15 January 1947, and Holtsman, Refugee Control Unit, to Verkehrsdirektion, "Provision of Tires," 29 May 1947, in Spitz, File 201-0131075, DO Records. (S)

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search of Schwend's last-known location in northern Italy.[43] (U)

In October 1947, H. J. Stach, another Dutch investigator, questioned Spitz at his house in Munich about his activities in Holland during the war. According to Stach, Spitz "became furious" and demanded to know why he was being sought after, when he was a Jew who had been in the "underground." Spitz produced a September 1945 letter of reference from X-2's Capt. Timm and also told the investigator to check with Holtsman. Stach, however, continued to distrust Spitz and commented, "It is of great importance that this case should be handled very carefully. Spitz is one of the greatest swindlers."[44] In January 1948, Spitz again fell under suspicion for his role in the looting of art in Europe during the war.[45] Then, a year later, he drew high-level attention because of allegations that he worked in the Munich black market with August Lenz, a banker and former OSS agent.[46] (S)

Finally, in the spring of 1947, Holtsman dropped Spitz as an agent, terming him a security risk.[47] Two years later, the CIA tersely summed up the reasons in a cable: "[Spitz's] activities Holland and Belgium during war never satisfactorily clarified... Services both Spitz and Lenz minimal and reports praising their services need grain of salt. Both believed [to be] opportunists who made most [of] connections with American officials to further personal positions, which [were] quite precarious [in] early days [of] occupation since it [was] known that Spitz particularly had served as agent for SD [foreign intelligence service] and possibly Gestapo."[48] (S)

Schwend also attracted scrutiny. In February 1947, the Central Intelligence Group in Rome reported that US military counterintelligence personnel and the Italian police had raided a number of buildings in Merano in 1946, including Schwend's old headquarters at Schloss Labers. The raid netted large quantities of counterfeit pound notes, which led the Americans to believe that the Germans had a plant still producing counterfeit dollars and pounds as well as US military occupation script.[49] (S)

In 1947, Schwend's situation became more precarious when it was discovered that he had defrauded what appears to have been the Gehlen Organization, the nascent West German intelligence service, then under US Army sponsorship. In early 1947, Holtsman attended a party in Munich where Schwend

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[43] Edwin C. Rae, Chief, Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section, Restitution Branch, Economics Division, Office of Military Government for Bavaria, to OMGUS, Economics Division, Restitution Branch, Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section, "Art Objects of Dutch Origin, now in Italy," 18 November 1946, enclosing R. F. P. de Beaufort, Dutch Representative, to Mr. Rosenbaum, "Restitution of Art Objects in Italy to the Netherlands," 18 November 1946, in RG 260, OMGUS Records, Records of Museum, Fine Arts, and Archives Section, Restitution Research Records, Box 484, [no folder listed], NARA (hereafter cited as RG 260, OMGUS Records, MFAA Section, Restitution Records Research, NARA). (U)

[44] H. J. Stach to Stewart Leonard, "Interrogation of George Spitz, Opitzstr. 4, Munich," 28 October 1947, in RG 260, OMGUS Records, MFAA Section, Restitution Records Research, NARA. (U)

[45] For numerous cables between the CIA in Germany and Washington about Spitz in 1948, see Spitz, File 201-0131075, DO Records. See also Lt. F. S. E. Baudouin, Belgian Representative, to Herbert S. Leonard, Chief, MFAA Section, "Information Concerning the Spitz Case," 5 August 1948, in RG 260, OMGUS Records, MFAA Section, Restitution Records Research, NARA. (S)

[46] In August 1945, August Lenz had worked with X-2 to gain the release of the head of the Bavarian Red Cross, a wealthy countess who had been arrested by CIC after an anonymous denunciation. Later, he was involved in the INCA operation and also helped to manufacture the false Czech and Polish documents that American intelligence used to evacuate Anatoli Granovsky, one of the first Soviet defectors. See various cables in Spitz File 201-0131075, DO Records. For details on the defection, see Anatoli Granovsky, *I Was a NKVD Agent: A Top Soviet Spy Tells His Story* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1962). (S)

[47] SC/American Zone to Foreign Branch M, "Progress of Munich Operations," 15 May 1947, HSC/OPS/33, FSRO-1796 (S), in DO Records, Job 81-00815R, Box 516, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (S)

[48] Cable, Special Operations to Karlsruhe and Munich, 11 May 1949, Washington 3385, OUT 81161 (S), in Spitz, File 201-0131075, DO Records. As late as 1959, the US Army and the West German Federal Intelligence Service sought information from the CIA about Spitz. By that time, the Agency had lost track of the Austrian Jew who played both sides. (S)

[49] Intelligence Report, External Survey Detachment, Rome, "Counterfeiting Plant in Milan Area," 11 February 1947, PIR-1095 (S), in DO Records, Job 76-00780R, Box 288, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)

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announced that he would soon take a trip "to visit his family in Italy." From there, he fled to South America. He later wrote two letters to Holtsman from abroad, noting that he would "always remember the Americans for the kind treatment he received."[50] Using the name of Wenceslau Turi, a Yugoslavian agricultural technician, on a Red Cross passport issued in Rome, Schwend and his second wife arrived in Lima, Peru, after crossing the Bolivian border in April 1947. The new immigrants declared their intention to take up farming.[51] In fact, Schwend went to work for Volkswagen in Lima and also served variously as an informant for several Peruvian intelligence and security services.[52] (S)

Schwend's past caught up with him in South America. In early 1948, Louis Glavan, who had run Schwend's affairs in Yugoslavia during the war, denounced him in a letter to Gen. Lucius Clay, the US military governor of Germany. Schwend had described Glavan in glowing terms to US intelligence in 1946, but, clearly, the two men had had a falling out.[53] In Glavan's letter to Clay—subsequently sent to the European Command's Office of the Director for Intelligence and the CIA—he claimed that Schwend and his wife had moved to Lima using false identities and were living from proceeds derived from counterfeit RSHA funds. Furthermore, Glavan fingered Spitz as the individual who had persuaded the Americans not to investigate Schwend for his Nazi activities.[54] After a preliminary investigation, the CIA concluded that the allegation "comes from a person who ... may possibly be denouncing Schwend for personal or business reasons. Thus, the reliability of that information should not be taken at its face value until confirmed by other sources."[55] The Agency told the Army in January 1948 that it had no contact with Schwend and had nothing to do with his immigration to South America. (S)

"Years later, reports of Schwend's counterfeiting activities, drug smuggling, and arms dealings throughout Latin America attracted the attention of numerous intelligence agencies."

Years later (U)

In the 1960s, reports of Schwend's counterfeiting activities, drug smuggling, and arms dealings throughout Latin America attracted the attention of the CIA, the US Army, the US Secret Service, the British Intelligence Service, and the West German Federal Intelligence Service. A West German informant in Algiers in 1966, for example, claimed to be able to provide fresh samples of bogus dollars produced by Schwend in exchange for "financial help."[56] The CIA directed a source in the Peruvian Investigations Police to pursue the lead. Schwend denied any current counterfeiting activity, but divulged his wartime role to the Peruvians. When pressed, he continued to deny knowing where the plates for the British counterfeit pounds from Operation Bernhard were buried, although he said he suspected that they might still be located with a cache of RSHA chief

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[50] See "SC Munich Present and Discontinued Contacts." (S)
[51] "Suspicious Personalities–Wenceslau Turi and Hedda De Turi," 17 February 1948, TPL-263 (S), in Schwend, File 201-0206556, DO Records. (S)
[52] Unsigned Memorandum for the Record, "Fritz Paul Schwend," 7 February 1963 (S), in Schwend, File 201-0206556, DO Records. (S)
[53] In 1946, Schwend had described Glavan as "capable, intelligent, dependable (though, no doubt, without regard for law or regulations), and [a] daring man open for any proposition... Smuggling is Glavan's trade, and he can smuggle things, news or people and keep his mouth shut." Munich, AB-43 [Holtsman], "Louis Glavan," MSC-283, 16 August 1946 (S), in Schwend, File 201-0206556, DO Records. (S)
[54] See various 1948 cables in Schwend, File 201-0206556, DO Records. (S)
[55] Foreign Branch M to Chief of Station, Lima, "Fritz Schwend," 5 February 1948, TPL-W-275 (S), in Schwend, File 201-0206556, DO Records. (S)
[56] Cable, Algiers to Director, Bonn, Info Lima, 25 November 1966, Algiers 8023, IN 46069 (S), and Cable, Lima to Algiers, Info Bonn, Director, 28 November 1966, Lima 0063, IN 47738 (S), in Schwend, File 201-0206556, DO Records.

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Kaltenbrunner's papers near Lake Toplitz in Austria.[57] (S)

In 1969, a trace done by the US Army turned up a 10-year-old report on Schwend in which the German claimed to have written "various American authorities charging that, during confinement by CIC in 1945, he was robbed of a considerable amount of money and that much of his immediate personal property was confiscated and never returned." Given the late date of Schwend's allegations, the Army was unable to investigate and found nothing in its files to substantiate them.[58] (S)

In a bizarre epilogue to a bizarre life, the Peruvian government took Schwend into custody following the murder of a wealthy businessman in early 1972. Papers found in the victim's possession revealed the extent to which Schwend had blackmailed Peruvian officials, traded national secrets, and broken currency laws.[59] Although Schwend was initially released, his life began to unravel. A Peruvian court subsequently convicted him of smuggling $150,000 out of the country and he was given a two-year prison sentence.[60] Then, in 1976, Peru deported Schwend to West Germany, where he landed in jail once again when he could not pay a $21 hotel bill.[61] The German and Italian governments still held a warrant for Schwend's arrest in connection with a wartime murder, but decided not to prosecute. Schwend was freed, but left homeless.[62] He returned to Peru only to die in 1980.[63] (S)

Weighing Operational Decisions (U)

Shortly after the war, the Strategic Services Unit wrote a classified history of the OSS during World War II. The pursuit of the Operation Bernhard counterfeiters was fresh in the minds of the compilers who hailed it as a great success story for the OSS because it recovered large sums of money and other valuables.[64] Yet for all of the positive attributes of that financial operation, the project clearly linked American intelligence with some unscrupulous characters. Useful to the Americans in 1945 as Europe lay in ruins and the Cold War loomed, Friedrich Schwend and George Spitz were among the most prominent of the agents-of-opportunity who—for decades after the war—profited from their association with the OSS. Their cases illustrate the perennial challenge of balancing ends and means in the complex world of intelligence operations. (U)



Friedrich Schwend in Peru. (U)

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[57] Cable, Lima to Director, 11 October 1963, Lima 4632, IN 37627 (S), and James Angleton to Chief, United States Secret Service, "Frederick Schwend," 21 October 1963 (S), in Schwend, File 201-0206556, DO Records. (S)

[58] An unconfirmed statement in CIA records indicates that at least one OSS officer may have materially gained from his work on the Operation Bernhard case. See Headquarters Liaison Team, US Army Intelligence Center, to Deputy Director for Plans, "Schwend, Frederico (Fritz)," 19 August 1969 (C), in Schwend, File 201-0206556, DO Records. (S)

[59] The publicity surrounding Schwend's arrest exposed infamous SS officer Klaus Barbie's hideout in Peru, leading to Barbie's eventual extradition to France in 1983 to face justice for his war crimes. In late 1972, the *New York Times*, citing a London *Daily Express* series on Martin Bormann, reported that South America provided refuge for four major Nazi war criminals: Schwend, Klaus Barbie, Josef Mengele, and Walter Rauff. See "Paper Identifies 4 Nazis Said to be in South America," *New York Times*, 1 December 1972, p. 11. (U)

[60] Reuters, "Nazi in Bolivia Called Chief of Peruvian Currency Ring," *New York Times*, 7 December 1973, p. 7. In addition to Schwend, the Peruvian prosecutor indicted Klaus Barbie and four other individuals. (U)

[61] Reuters, "Nazi Forger's Bad Bills," *The Washington Post*, 14 July 1976. (U)

[62] In 1955, an Italian court had sentenced Schwend in absentia to 24 years in prison for having ordered Louis Glavan to kill Theophic Kamber, an Operation Bernhard agent who had embezzled some of the counterfeit money in 1944. While this conviction was later overturned, Italian officials still sought Schwend's arrest, as did West German authorities under an Interpol warrant. Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, DDCI to DD/P, Memorandum Number A-279, 1 August 1963, ER 63-6111 (S), in Schwend, File 201-0206556, DO Records. (S)

[63] "Nazi Plotted to Cripple British, American Economies," *Los Angeles Times*, 7 April 1980, p. 22. (U)

[64] Strategic Services Unit, History Project, *War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services)*, Vol. II, *The Overseas Target*, with new introduction by Kermit Roosevelt (New York: Walker and Company, 1976), pp. 353-354. (U)

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CIA-NSA Partnership

A Brave, New World (U)

(b)(3)(c)

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) are moving their strategic partnership beyond the optional cooperation of the past into a new era of collaboration. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has stated that much of the success against the al-Qa'ida network and its terrorist allies has been the direct result of CIA and NSA working together in the field and at headquarters. And the Director of NSA (DIRNSA) calls the two agencies' collaboration in response to the war in Iraq "unprecedented and powerful." (S)

This article looks at the changing relationship between NSA and CIA in response to today's intelligence challenges. It examines why after 50 years of competition and uneasy alliance the two agencies are seeking new ways of doing business. Only time will tell whether this strategic partnership will last, but developments to date indicate growing awareness that the success of intelligence collection and analysis rests on the strength of collaboration. (S)

Origins of Discomfort (U)

CIA and NSA have a tradition of being able to work well together during a crisis or on a critical issue with predefined roles and responsibilities. A number of successful joint programs have been established over the years, and the two organizations have long provided each other with tactical assistance on a case-by-case basis. (S)

But there is another organizational reality. CIA and NSA share a painful history.1 Cycles of competition and mistrust between the two agencies, begun in the 1940s and 1950s, produced formidable barriers to partnership. Attitudes and issues carried over from predecessor organizations—the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA)—gave the two entities little chance to build partnership and trust. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cut OSS off from cryptologic intelligence during World War II as part of an effort to derail the fledgling organization. With its creation in 1947, CIA inherited this lack of access. During the early years of the Cold War, CIA assessments and reports were regularly contradicted by closely held cryptologic information, damaging the Agency's credibility with consumers. To avoid being blindsided, the CIA worked to secure access to signals intelligence, in the process becoming a highly vocal opponent of AFSA in Washington. (S)

NSA, which inherited AFSA responsibilities in the early 1950s and was determined to control the fractious cryptologic community that had defeated its predecessor, viewed CIA actions as a threat. NSA leaders believed that the Agency intended to establish a rival cryptologic organization, a view reinforced by CIA's hiring of some of NSA's top cryptologists. The signals intelligence

agency considered CIA claims that it had neither the budget for nor interest in establishing parallel capabilities as disingenuous. NSA limited its assistance to CIA whenever and wherever it could, regardless of possible damage to operations and analysis. CIA felt it was being driven into competition because it needed SIGINT support for intelligence collection and counterintelligence purposes, which NSA could not or would not provide.2 (S)

Some of the actions that took place early in the history of the two organizations seem petty from today's vantage point. At the time, however, they were serious matters with lasting consequences. At one low point in the 1950s, CIA denied NSA's formidable chief, Gen. Ralph Canine, clearance for cryptologic information that it was collecting, citing security concerns. Allen Dulles later said he would never have denied the clearance had he known the trouble it would cause the two organizations in the long run. Ultimately, the clearance had to be given—CIA found it needed NSA's help to process the volume of signals information it was collecting. (S)

As the Cold War heated up, each organization was forced to cooperate when in need of services and expertise exclusive to the other. However, no joint success was sufficient to dislodge the suspicion and mistrust that had become entrenched early on. Over time, the "stovepipes" created by separate collection missions and responsibilities hardened. Fierce competition over who controlled resources and tasking became a regular feature of interaction. CIA and NSA remained engaged in a relationship characterized by myopia, paranoia, and suspicion from the 1960s through much of the 1990s. (S)

Barriers to Partnership (U)

CIA and NSA evolved into organizations that had little in common except on the relatively rare occasions when their intelligence interests overlapped. As separate collectors, the two organizations naturally had different mission priorities, legal authorities, and responsibilities. They also had distinct approaches to the development and use of technology; dissimilar risk management philosophies for operations; and different expectations for action and definitions of success. The cultural divide between the two entities was apparent in everything from vocabulary to workforce management styles. The bureaucratic barriers to partnership were formidable. (S)

From NSA's perspective, CIA was a tactically focused, reactive entity that preferred a "go it alone" approach. From CIA's perspective, NSA was incapable of taking any action before an end-to-end system was in place, leaving it mired in "process." The perception, in the words of one CIA officer, was: "If it wasn't theirs, NSA wouldn't cooperate." (S)

Few line managers at CIA or NSA had in-depth knowledge of the mission, equities, and issues driving their counterparts. Especially vulnerable were the new managers appointed as a result of bureaucratic reorganizations at both organizations during the late 1990s. These officers had little understanding of their sister agency and, given the personnel reductions following the end of the Cold War, little time for building cross-organizational understanding. (S)

Collaboration between employees in line units was handicapped by limited information system connectivity. Regular, computer-based information exchange, creation and/or maintenance of joint databases, and other necessary modern-day interactions were difficult at best.3 Fax messages, "sneaker net," and "tire net" remained the most efficient ways of moving information. (S)

At the strategic level, the two agencies had few processes in place for establishing common goals, joint planning, and sharing credit among line units. In the absense of mechanisms for addressing

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partnership-related problems, the attitudes and interests of individual managers determined, for the most part, the extent of cooperation between the two organizations. (S)

Hints of Change (U)

Advances in information technology provided the first serious challenge to these barriers. By the late 1990s, a handful of senior officers at both CIA and NSA sensed that collection realities were changing with the maturing of the information revolution and developments related to computer and telecommunication technology. The once-clear delineation of SIGINT and HUMINT was becoming murky. New targets requiring new collection means and new management structures were emerging. The officers judged that the two agencies were at a crossroads: They could remain locked in a cycle of competition and distrust with increasing risks of collisions in cyberspace, or they could turn to strategic partnership. (S)

For these officers, the future success of intelligence collection rested on partnership and collaboration. They believed that neither organization could succeed over the long term without the other's assistance. Neither side would be able to duplicate the strengths, expertise, and comparative advantage of the other. (U)

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The challenge for both agencies was to understand and accept that each could be more successful with the assistance of the other than it could be on its own. (U)

The small group of committed senior officers began to actively promote a CIA-NSA strategic partnership. Within each organization, they were able to make some progress, including improving collaboration in key collection forums and initiating new, joint projects. They were unable, however, to effect the large-scale institutional changes needed to fundamentally reshape interagency relations. (U)

Impact of 9/11 (U)

In the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the US-declared war on terrorism created an imperative for strategic collaboration, particularly the cross-enabling of collection beyond anything previously imagined. It unleashed demands for new products, faster services, and immediate responses that had to be met. For the first time in CIA-NSA history, a clear requirement existed at both organizations to protect and promote collaboration. Also for the first time, managers and employees received strong, consistent signals from the highest levels: cooperate, partner, get together. In the blunt words of the DIRNSA: "Collaborate or die [as an organization]." (S)

Interviews and observation suggest that four sets of changes have occurred over the past two years:

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- Revolutionary new policies and procedures are now in place aimed at moving relevant information faster and more effectively between CIA and NSA. Such efforts began one month after 11 September 2001 and continue.

- CIA and NSA have begun exchanging line managers. There is increasing recognition that expertise can be better utilized and problems more efficiently dealt with by working together closely on a daily basis.

- New products and services have been created to strengthen support to the missions of both organizations. NSA no longer considers formal reporting to be its sole product. Informal, near-real-time alerting—such as "white wolf" tipoffs to reconnaissance aircraft approaching hostile air defense environments—is no longer confined to the cryptologic world.

- DCI George Tenet and DIRNSA Gen. Michael Hayden have sent consistent signals that institutional barriers must come down, and come down fast. As a result, senior and mid-level managers at both organizations feel empowered to remove obstacles to a more effective partnership. In the words of a senior NSA official: "Our goal is to get to 'yes.' We do not accept 'No, it can't be done.'" (S)

Tangible Results (U)

In January 2002, the DCI and DIRNSA created the Strategic Partnerships Advisory Group, a team of senior officers from both organizations focused on identifying strategies and actions to enhance collaboration. This team has promoted a number of collaborative ventures that have already borne fruit. In the generally improving climate for partnership, leaders at both organizations have been willing to take on partnership challenges. In the past, for example,

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This action has removed a major barrier to information sharing that had existed between the two organizations for more than 50 years. (S)

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The two agencies also created a joint Counterproliferation Fusion Cell to help focus SIGINT collection and reporting on high priority proliferation targets. Located at CIA's Langley, Virginia, headquarters, it is headed by an NSA officer and is staffed by analysts from both organizations.

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CIA and NSA also have established a number of joint target-development teams that meet regularly. Covering both regional and transnational issues, these teams represent a major change in the stovepipe mentality that once dominated targeting. The two organizations also have begun to collaborate on (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

At NSA's request, CIA has placed senior officers from the Directorate of Intelligence and Directorate of Operations in key positions at NSA. (b)(3)(n) To increase the number of general officers on rotation to NSA, the Agency is developing ways to incorporate rotations into career planning and is building an incentive package. NSA has established the position of National Cryptologic Representative at CIA to manage NSA's large number of employees on rotation at Langley. (S)

CIA University and the National Cryptologic School have agreed to establish a joint training program that will involve developing new courses, exchanging training professionals, and opening existing classes to employees of both organizations. Entry-level orientation programs at both agencies include newly developed segments on understanding and working with each other. CIA and NSA also have established a new awards program that will recognize and celebrate outstanding contributions by joint teams or individuals working on joint projects. (S)

Will Partnership Last? (U)

Clearly, CIA and NSA have begun to move beyond traditional ways of doing business. But what are the prospects for strategic partnership over the long term? (U)

The skeptics hold that the barriers separating the two agencies remain formidable. They point out, for example, that CIA and NSA are still years away from real computer connectivity. Some believe that current collaborative work on terrorism and Iraq reflects only the latest phase in the well-established pattern of working together during crises, then reverting to type when the emergencies have passed. They note that most of the changes shaping relations between the two agencies on terrorism have not migrated to other issues. In the words of one CIA official: "The further you go from terrorism, the less likely you will find that anything is different." Relations may have improved overall at the senior level and on key issues that are the focus of attention, but that does not mean that strategic partnership is a reality for most mid-level level managers and working-level officers. The behavior of those who obstruct collaboration is still tolerated; there is little recognition or reward for those who actively promote partnership. (S)

These are valid points. On the other hand, officers who believe that a fundamental change is occurring point to a critical difference between the past and the present: the active commitment of the DCI and DIRNSA to institutionalizing strategic partnership. The new policies and products resulting from the war on terrorism and related military actions *will* migrate to other issues because they are *systemic* changes that cannot be turned back easily or selectively applied. The officers now working partnership issues will be available to protect and promote collaboration over the long term. Finally, partnership goals are beginning to be factored into long-range planning at both organizations. Problem-solving mechanisms will be available to help navigate the rough patches likely to arise from time to time. (S)

With the partnership effort less than three years old, it is too early to tell which side is right. Organizational change is always hard. Individual entities find it difficult to transfer knowledge of what needs to be done into action, even when it is clear that failure to do so will damage or destroy

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their organization. The complexity of change increases exponentially when multiple organizations are involved. (U)

Challenges Ahead (U)

Both sides—those believing that CIA and NSA are moving toward a brave new world and those doubting that such a world exists—agree on one point: the challenges ahead are formidable. For partnership to thrive over the long term, collaboration must grow in areas where there has been limited progress to date. Specifically:

- The policy improvements and lessons learned from joint work on terrorism issues should be expanded to counterproliferation and other high-priority transnational issues.

- The agencies must develop joint strategic planning forums so that shared needs, objectives, and targets can be incorporated into the decisionmaking processes at all levels of both organizations. This could begin with biannual strategic planning sessions at the directorate level.

- CIA and NSA need to increase the pace and scope of efforts to find joint solutions to technical problems. Robust computer connectivity between workforces, high-volume data management, and automated analytic tools are among the areas where there is a shared need for solutions and where both organizations have capabilities to bring to the table.

- The practical concerns of line officers at both organizations must be included in the issues and initiatives being worked. Partnership must include a robust effort aimed at making the work environment between the two organizations productive and efficient. Mid-level managers, who are best placed to frame the debate on how partnership should work on a daily basis, need to become more engaged in this work. (C)

Ultimately, collaboration must become a requirement for doing business when CIA and NSA interests on targets, objectives, methodologies, or tools are mutual and complementary. Senior managers have to be willing to take action when subordinates fail to promote or protect partnership. They must remain consistent in signaling the values and rewards of CIA-NSA engagement. And managers at every level must be held accountable for advancing collaboration. (C)

The walls of the traditional CIA-NSA stovepipes will come down most quickly in an environment in which those in positions of responsibility understand that *change must happen*. It is going to take time—a new generation of managers may need to be trained at both organizations to overcome inherited prejudices. Partnership at the working level requires extraordinary effort in the absence of full connectivity between CIA and NSA. And it is not necessarily popular—many in both organizations still believe that they can work faster and smarter alone. But, given technology and tradecraft requirements, there is no choice: CIA and NSA need each other for SIGINT and HUMINT mission success. There is no turning away from the brave, new world ahead. (C)

Footnotes

1. The following is a summary of 50 years of a complex relationship. It is based on my interpretation of classified material available in CIA and NSA historical collections as well as

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interviews with knowledgeable people at both organizations, including Dr. Thomas Johnson, who has produced a four-volume classified history of NSA. (U)

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3. The reasons for limited connectivity are complex. Most have more to do with policy and procedural issues—primarily related to information security—than with technical limitations. They include concerns at each agency about information ownership, including fears of inadvertent access by foreign liaison, compromise of operational intelligence, and dissemination of information outside the chain of command. (S)

(b)(3)(c) serves on the DCI's Strategic Partnership Advisory Group.

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In March 1968 a Soviet submarine was lost with all hands 16,500 feet below the surface of the Pacific Ocean. On 8 August 1974 (b)(1) *that submarine was brought to the surface in the giant talons of a recovery system designed and developed specifically for that mission. The story of Project AZORIAN was told in Volume 22 Number 3 (Fall 1978) of* Studies in Intelligence. *This article, the last in a series, recounts, in language understandable to the general reader, the technological marvels that were the essence of the project.*

ENGINEERING FOR AZORIAN

(b)(3)(c)

The engineering aspects of the AZORIAN program were a challenge which many thought rivaled that of a space program. It had been said that we knew more about the backside of the moon than the bottom of the ocean. Now the CIA engineers and management were being asked to undertake in an unstudied abyss an engineering marvel: in one gigantic effort, pull an estimated 3,920,000 pounds of wrecked submarine out of the ocean bottom and lift it intact over three miles into a surface ship. Never had such a feat been accomplished. CIA was being tasked to do it in not only a poorly understood environment, but also in record time. And no one was to know about it. If the United States could get its hands on the Soviet submarine's code books and machines, the nuclear weapons, the strategic plans, and . . . well, it was just plain too good to be true. Their potential value was inestimable. To have it all tomorrow would hardly be soon enough. These were the pressures CIA felt, especially the line managers and engineers.

There is no way to describe the engineering for Project AZORIAN without bringing in facts and figures. To many people, this promises to be dull, boring and tranquilizing. Yet to ignore them leaves a gaping hole in the AZORIAN story. For it was these very facts and figures, so fascinating to the engineer and so fearsome to the layman, that proved the project's feasibility. They and the engineers who made them a reality were the true underpinnings of Project AZORIAN.

Feasibility Studies

Because the target was judged to be of great value to the intelligence community, the higher echelons of the U.S. Goverment had decided it was a "go" situation before the technical feasibility studies were completed. Those were the days in which it was assumed American technology could solve any problem. The Agency engineers studied three methods of lifting the target: direct lift; trade ballast/buoyancy; and *in situ* generation of buoyancy. (b)(1)

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as the new baseline (Figure 2). The original *Studies In Intelligence* article describes these early efforts and recounts the story of the program in detail.

Impinging on the feasibility studies was the fact that the recovery system was to be used in a one-time effort. There was no way in which a full-scale test could be run within the time, fiscal, or design constraints. To design, build, and test the recovery and lift equipment for multiple use would have increased the costs to an unacceptable level. AZORIAN would be a single-shot, go-for-broke effort.

To turn a "go" situation into a "go" decision for the U.S. Government, three fundamental questions needed to be answered. One of the answers was provided early in 1970 by the drilling ship *Glomar Challenger*, operated by Global Marine Inc. for the National Science Foundation. The question was, "Can a large surface ship maintain a position accurately enough at sea in order to lower a string of pipe to an exact geographic position on the ocean bottom?" The answer was a resounding yes. The *Challenger* rig had drilled a hole in the deep ocean floor, withdrawn the drill bit, and then successfully re-entered the hole. This feat required maintaining the surface ship within a circle whose radius was of the order of 15 feet.

The other two questions involved the heavy lift portion of the recovery system, in particular the heavy lift pipe. One question concerned the ability to make pieces of pipe of the requisite strength and quality in large numbers. The other concerned the effects on the ship and its drilling platform if the pipe string should break while under maximum load. This could transform a controlled, 17-million-pound, relatively static load into an uncontrolled dynamic one. Or, as the Deputy Director, Research and Engineering for the Department of Defense (a nuclear physicist) stated when first advised of the magnitude of the effect, "That's the energy equivalent of setting off a nuclear explosive of 8 kilotons." Needless to say, such an analogy did not lessen the concerns of management. Satisfactory answers to these questions and others were not in hand in the early days. They were arrived at later. But the lack of answers at this time did not stall the program, thanks to an important decision made by management.

A Courageous Decision

The project managers made a key decision in the fall of 1970: design and construction of the hardware would proceed on a concurrent basis. Several factors led to this decision. There were perishable aspects to the program including the cryptographic material being sought, the cover and the security. The yearly two-month weather window for the operation also was a factor. A delay of two months in the design and construction meant a 12-month slip in the operation. A delay of this magnitude would add maintenance costs to the program and magnify the chances of cover and security erosion. Nothing was simple; all factors were inextricably tied together. With the knowledge available at the time, the only prudent decision was to go ahead on a concurrent basis. To wait until all technical risks were resolved would mean not only more dollars, but perhaps no mission at all.

In October 1970 the engineering staff faced 11 major unknowns or technical risk areas. Problems existed in all elements of the program and included such basic items as the exact dimension and condition of the target, the ship design, the working machinery to provide the lift capability, the pipe string, [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] The unknowns and their individual solutions presented a frightening array of interfaces still to be resolved.

Four to eight months for each of the 11 unknowns were estimated as necessary to get better definitions; they totaled 60 months in all. If the engineers had to wait for a

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


Figure 2. Schematic drawing of recovery sequence

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sequential resolution of each of the risk areas, at least three to four years could be added to the schedule. Furthermore, the entanglement of each of the items with all the rest meant that a solution to one affected all the others. No final solution could be obtained until all were resolved. The only way to handle the situation was to start the design and construction on a concurrent basis, recognizing that changes would have to be made and that the designs would have to be kept flexible to accommodate them. In fact, senior management at the national level recognized that in some cases we might have to build the hardware in order to resolve the problems; design alone would not be able to do it. This proved to be prescience of the first order with regard to the pipe handling system and also the ship itself.

The concurrent design/construction philosophy that kept flexibility in the program paid off handsomely in an area that was not fully anticipated in the fall of 1970. (b)(1) To fit the target inside the ship required that the well be widened, which in turn added 10 feet to the beam—the width—of the ship. While this caused a dollar increase in the program, the other alternative would have been more costly. (b)(1) In this aspect alone, program costs would have been greater than those under the concurrent design/construction philosophy because of the additional year of program activity.

It took a high order of vision and courage for the program managers and engineers to go with the concurrent design/construction philosophy. They recognized that it would mean changes and cost increases from the baseline of October 1970, and that they could incur ex post facto criticism of their decision. But they made the decision, they stuck to it, and it proved vital to the program. Without it, the project might have died in birth or incurred costs far in excess of what they turned out to be.

Engineering Organization


The interwoven and potentially chaotic engineering responsibilities for design and construction were managed by a four-level planning structure (see Chart). The highest level (0) was the over-all recovery system, the totality of the hardware. The next level (1) contained the four principal hardware systems and contractors, which were the surface ship system (Global Marine), (b)(1) the pipe string system (Summa/Hughes Tool Co.), and the data processing system (Honeywell). These were broken down into their major components for the next lower level (2). For example (b)(1) Finally the lowest level (3) to be controlled by CIA project engineers contained the major components of Level 2. Obviously, the levels could go on *ad infinitum*, but it was concluded that major decisions would not go below Level 3; therefore, the lower levels were supervised by contractor engineers under the direction of Agency engineers.

Project AZORIAN was managed by the Special Projects Staff (SPS) of CIA's Directorate of Science & Technology. Within SPS the engineering group was headed by (b)(3)(c) His deputy was Dave Sharp, who later took part in the mission as Deputy for Recover (b)(3)(c) staff comprised only seven additional engineers, an incredibly small number to manage this complex and costly system. Needless to say, each of them was "a rambling wreck and a helluva engineer."

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AZORIAN SYSTEM PLANNING STRUCTURE



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The Surface Ship

The *Hughes Glomar Explorer*, or as it come to be known, the HGE, was created from the vision in one man's mind. John Graham of Global Marine was the chief designer and supervisor of construction. It was the culmination of his career as a naval architect. For anyone who had anything to do with the design and construction of the HGE, John was the hub around which all engineering activity took place. A man who was often frustrating to work with, he was nevertheless single-minded in his efforts to construct a ship that would do a salvage job heretofore believed impossible.

a. **Requirements**

Stated simply, the requirement on the surface ship system (the HGE) was to pick up 3,920,000 pounds (1750 tons or the equivalent of a World War II light destroyer) from the ocean floor, lift it over 3 miles to the surface, and place it within the bowels of the ship. (b)(1) All this was to be done covertly. The HGE had to provide space (b)(1) It also had to provide berthing for the (b)(1) crew for up to 100 days at sea.

These general requirements were translated into detail lists of very specific design requirements for each of the lower system levels. To give some flavor of what these requirements were like, two examples are presented:

Ship Underway

Sea State	Storm conditions with significant wave height of 103 feet
Wind Velocity	100 knots
Temperature	40-105°F
Pitch	15°
Roll	60°

Static Hold (Fail/Safe While Lifting Target)

Sea State	12 foot sea, 18 foot swell
Wind Velocity	50 knots
Temperature	40-105°
Pitch	15°
Roll	22°
Heave	32 Feet
Drill Floor	
Gimbal Pitch	10°
Gimbal Roll	17°
Heave Compensator	14 Feet Working
Dead Load	17,750,000 Lbs.
Live Load	19,750,000 Lbs.
Overload (Max.)	29,800,000 Lbs.

Lists similar to these two examples were compiled for each of the sub-systems which, in total, comprised the surface ship system. Besides being interwoven among themselves, these requirements were also tied into all the other requirements of the other Level 1 systems.

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b. **Construction of the HGE**

During the spring of 1970 contractors were being selected to design and build the major elements of the HGE. Global Marine, because of its experience as a ship designer and fleet operator in offshore and deep ocean activities, was selected to design and build the HGE with a subcontract to Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. The initial visual assessment of the Sun Shipyard in Chester, Pa., was made from a Metroliner as it rumbled close by enroute to Philadelphia. The lift system was done by Global Marine with a subcontract to Western Gear. Global Marine also became the total system integrator. The success of the *Glomar Challenger* was another factor favoring the selection of Global Marine. They had designed, built and operated this ship for the National Science Foundation. She had an outstanding record of service and had been a huge scientific success.

By mid-1970, with the heavy lift systems concept defined, total system design was initiated. The concurrent design/construction philosophy required continual compatibility assurance among all the elements and extremely accurate initial design weight estimates. Rigid weight budgets were placed on the massive machinery of the lift system. Equipment was being sized relative to the estimated weights of the target, the capture vehicle, and the 16,700 feet of drill pipe. Any erroneous estimate resulting in a major hardware overweight could stall the lift system, which would not be tested under full load until the mission. As it was, and in spite of some increases and some decreases, the system element weight estimates proved accurate in terms of the total lift. The estimated weight of the target proved conservative.

Although system design continued into late 1971 with the publication of the major element specifications, a few long lead-time items were ordered starting in November 1970. Major long lead-time procurement began in March 1971. This included materials (steel) for the ship hull, ship center well, A-frame, gimbal platforms, gimbal bearings, and the 5-foot-diameter by 20-foot-long heave compensation and heavy lift system cylinders. These latter items required from 15 to 18 months lead time and were needed for installation in the fall of 1972.

One problem incurred in the procurement cycle was the "Buy American" policy. A very few small items (b)(1) were available only from a sole source. Two major procurements were a more severe problem and required the appropriate permission to buy foreign. (b)(1) Adding spice to the latter case was the delivery of the cylinders (b)(1) by a Communist bloc freighter.

The major elements of the system were already undergoing bid evaluation and vendor selection during late 1970 and early 1971. By July 1971 improvement in the target object definition led to some major specification changes. Measurement of the effective horizontal distance from the keel to the top of the sail of the target was increased by several feet (b)(1) This required widening the center well of the ship from its 69-foot width to 74 feet. This, for geometric, structural and stability reasons, increased the beam from 106 to 116 feet (now making passage through the Panama Canal impossible). The ship's length was also increased to 589′-7″ at waterline or 618′-8″ overall. These dimensional changes were driven as much by stability requirements as by geometric and structural considerations. Without them, the ship's self-righting capability when it rolled in heavy seas under worst-case loading conditions would be marginal. Worst-case loading would occur at the beginning of target recovery after the target had been freed from the bottom, with the combined total load estimated at 16,300,000 lbs. hanging off the gimbal platform 100 feet above

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the waterline. Anti-roll tanks also were incorporated in the ship's design to further improve stability in heavy seas.

By late 1971 work on hardware for all the major elements of the ship system had started at the same time the engineering specifications were being completed. The ship's keel was laid on 16 November. Final designs were frozen after confirmation and re-confirmation through simulation, analysis, and model testing.

The builders of the heavy lift system were well into testing components and systems during the spring and summer of 1972. When one of the lifting yokes failed under a proof load, metallurgical and structural investigation of the failure dictated a change from the T-1 steel specified by the designers to the more forgiving HY-100 steel. The tests surfaced this problem in time for two new HY-100 yokes to be built and delivered to the ship for installation without seriously disrupting the schedule.

Other major equipment was arriving at the Sun Shipyard by fall 1972 for installation as the hull neared completion. On 4 November 1972 the ship was launched, installed briefly in drydock to have its false bottom removed and the well gates installed, then tied dockside for resumption of equipment installation. Figures 3 through 10 depict construction activities during this period.

The intense activity at the Chester, Pa. shipyard and the pace of related construction programs were reviewed weekly by managers meeting in nearby Philadelphia, where they charted current progress, determined what corrections were




Figure 3. The first stage of construction—laying down the docking well gates

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


Figure 4. Wing walls going up from the gates and forming the sides of the docking well




Figure 5. Interior construction looking forward from the stern

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


Figure 6. The bow in final stages of construction




Figure 7. A view of the stern showing the twin propellers

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


Figure 8. Final hull work including painting




Figure 9. Almost ready for the launching ceremony

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


Figure 10. Sliding down the ways

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necessary, and passed these on to all program managers. After each session, detailed scheduling meetings would be held the next day at the shipyard to focus on the progress and problems of the HGE.

By January 1973 the HGE engines were running and shore power was disconnected. The 800 tons of gimbal platforms and bearings, which had been concurrently pre-assembled pierside, were installed on top of the shipboard heave compensation cylinders with the Sun 800 barge crane (Figures 11 thru 14). The Sun 800, specially constructed by Sun for this lift, was the largest capacity (800 tons) barge crane on the East Coast (Figure 15). Later, because the ship's derrick was too tall to pass under the Delaware Memorial Bridge, this crane followed the HGE downriver to set the derrick aboard after the ship had cleared the bridge.

It was a busy time and the headquarters engineering representatives found themselves more often at the shipyard than anywhere else. The magnitude and complexity of the installations were greater than the initial shipyard estimates—more manpower and more time were being consumed. Continued meetings were held with shipyard management in an effort to keep electricians, pipe fitters, mechanics, welders, and their foremen working on board the HGE in the face of stiff competition from other ships also under construction. It required the clearance and briefing of a Sun Shipyard vice president (he was also the production manager) to improve the situation.

During February and March 1973, installation of major recovery system component plumbing, wiring, and lift system control equipment continued. The




Figure 11. A-frame structure which provided the load path from the lift system to the ship

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Figure 12. Aft heave compensator cylinder. This is one of the shock absorbers which removed the up-and-down motion of the ship from the recovery mechanism.



Figure 13. Inner and outer gimbals which removed the roll and pitch motion

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


Figure 14. Gimbals being set on the A-frame

docking legs were installed and welded. The rig floor had been installed and was receiving equipment for the draw works. Coast Guard representatives were following all activities. Tie-down castings were installed in the well floor. These would later be changed to weldments* because the porous castings absorbed leakage from well-gate ballast. The balance of shipyard effort was devoted to dock trials of basic ship's systems in preparation for the builder's sea trials on 12 April.

The period after builder's trials (which were successful in demonstrating the intended basic ship's systems) from mid-April to 24 July 1973 marked the completion of the recovery system installation and the initiation of its dock trials. After extensive hydro-testing to 4500 pounds per square inch and rework, the heave compensation system held pressure. The piston rods with their yokes supporting the 800 tons of gimbal platforms and lift system finally made the 15-foot trip up the guides from full low to full high position and back down again, The heave compensation system had completed dockside checkout.

Like the heave compensation system, the heavy lift system required several cycles of hydro-testing, repair, and retest before the system held pressure. The flanged joints were a particular concern. Their surfaces had to be perfectly machined and aligned in order to hold the proof test pressure of 4500 psi. After considerable rework, this system held pressure and was ready for final dockside test. Finally both sets of the lift cylinders with their rods and yokes were stroked 15 feet, but not without damage to the upper yoke. An out-of-synch condition between the two piston rods caused the yoke to tilt and bear against one of the rods. Metallurgical and structural assessment showed the damage was repairable and the yoke stiffener plate was repaired in place.

With completion of the stroking, the lift system testing had progressed as far as was feasible while the HGE was still dockside. Little shipyard testing was done on the pipe handling system because of the intensive shipyard activity on other systems. In

* Weldment: structure formed by welding individual pieces of steel into a desired shape—Editor.

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


Figure 15. The barge crane, Sun 800, lifting on the prefabricated aft deck house

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fact, there was nothing more at all that could be done in the yard, and the HGE departed the Sun Shipyard on 24 July 1973 for further sea trials (Figure 16). Construction of this remarkable ship had been completed in the equally remarkable time of 20 months after laying of the keel.

The story of the construction of the HGE would not be complete without skipping ahead 15 months to October 1974 and the preparations for the follow-on mission code-named MATADOR. AZORIAN had tested fully the basic design of the surface ship system. Although the equipment gave us many problems during the recovery mission, nothing had faulted the soundness of the basic design. What was needed were repair of damaged hardware and engineering improvements—fine tuning of the major sub-systems, if you will—in order to make the over-all operation more smooth and trouble-free. This was especially true in the heavy lift system and to a much lesser degree in the pipe handling system. The HGE itself had come through with flying colors. All that she required was a facelift—cleaning and painting the hull—after a thorough non-destructive inspection and minor repairs. The MATADOR test operations were very successful and proved the value of the modifications.

c. HGE Technology and Cost

The HGE and its associated sub-systems created a number of significant technical achievements and breakthroughs. The ship was the first one to be designed and analyzed using finite element analysis (approved by the American Bureau of Shipping). It had the largest (199 feet by 74 feet) center well with movable gates. The 24,500 horsepower diesel electric marine power system was the largest built that used 4100-volt alternating current coupled to silicone-controlled rectifiers. The use of jack-up type legs, derived from the offshore oil industry, as the docking mechanism solved the problem of mating two massive bodies in a seaway and was an important breakthrough.

The heavy lift system was the largest and most powerful (8000 tons) lift system ever built. The pipe handling system was the largest automatic one in use and could store and assemble 60-foot pipe sections averaging about 15 tons each. The heave compensator and gimbal platform were the largest in the offshore industry. They supported 10,000 tons and isolated them hydraulically and pneumatically from ship motion. This in turn permitted precise bottom operations to be carried out with highly accurate positioning while the surface ship was responding to wave and wind forces.

The cost (in millions) of the surface ship system were:

basic ship	(b)(1)
heavy lift	
docking legs	
spares	
Total	

The World's Largest Submersible

The *Hughes Mining Barge-1*, known as the HMB-1, was and still is the world's largest submersible. During its construction in San Diego, President Nixon was photographed in front of it giving a speech about U.S. Government support to the American shipbuilding industry. Presidential publicity for the HMB-1 was not a planned part of the cover program, and the Agency received only 24 hours notice of the visit. Fortunately, no undue attention on AZORIAN resulted from the photograph and speech, which were featured in many newspapers.

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


Figure 16. The final product

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a. **Requirements**

The HMB-1 had to meet three main requirements. First, it was to serve as the facility for the covert construction of the capture vehicle (CV). The CV was so large it could not be built in the well of the HGE. Even if it could have been, management could not wait until the HGE was completed to begin construction of the CV because the schedules were so tight. Since any public exposure of the CV would blow the mining cover, it had to be built beyond the reach of the prying eyes of news reporters; the construction facility had to be enclosed and protected. Second, because the CV and the HGE were built in separate facilities, the CV would need to be transported to a mating site; so the enclosed construction site had to be movable. Third, a covert method of transferring the CV into the HGE was needed; the construction facility, therefore, had to be submersible to a depth at which the HGE could moor over it and extract the CV, concealed by the intervening water. In any case, the HGE itself was the only device powerful enough to lift the CV's weight of 1600 tons (wet).

b. **Construction**

Building a barge is normally a straightforward process involving uncomplicated structures. A barge is a floating box, and the HMB-1, when surfaced, was not overly complex. But it had to be submersible. Hard and soft tanks were needed for flooding in order to change the bouyancy of the submersible barge. (Hard tanks are built to withstand external pressure; soft tanks are pressure-equalized.) Floodable stabilizing cylinders also were added to control diving and surfacing operations.

(b)(1) developed the design, construction plans, and specifications under contract to Lockheed, the prime contractor(b)(1) previously had designed a partially submersible barge called FLIP. (b)(1) was selected to do the working drawings, construction, and builder's trials.

(b)(1) began fabrication on 11 May 1971 with the laying down of the stern soft tanks. Construction progressed from stern to bow and keel to roof in several planned stages (Figure 17). The submersible complexities did not hinder the construction process, and it went ahead rapidly. Lockheed completed the movable roof design and moved their engineers (b)(1) to prepare the test procedures for dock and sea trials. The last structural items, the bow, roof sections, and stabilizing tanks, were completed by early April 1972. On the 14th of April the hull was launched and placed at the outfitting dock (Figures 18 and 19). Here the roof sections and stabilizing cylinders were added. On-board outfitting of the control rooms, roof drives, anchor windlasses, instrumentation and aft bulkhead was completed within a week. The HMB-1 was ready to prove itself as the world's largest submersible.

Sites had been surveyed for the sea trials. Requirements were a smooth and sandy bottom, a gradual slope (less than three degrees), and sufficient water depth for progressive testing to about 185 feet. Two sites were chosen. The first was off Coronado Island in San Diego. The water depth was 55 feet, which meant that the crew, procedures, and barge could be tested without full submergence, and it was close to(b)(1) in case problems were uncovered. The second site was Isthmus Cove on Catalina Island. Here there was sufficient water depth to check the barge at 125 feet, 165 feet and 182 feet.

On 20 April 1972, 11 months after construction began, the HMB-1 headed for its first dive off Coronado Island. After the anchors and buoys were set and all pre-dive checkouts were made, HMB-1 started down (Figure 20). By late evening it was nestled on the bottom. No major problems were found, and the next morning it surfaced. The

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


Figure 17. HMB-1 on the ways (b)(1)




Figure 18. She floats!

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


Figure 19. HMB-1 being outfitted at the dock




Figure 20. Getting ready for a dive at Catalina. The support barge is at the right; tow boat on left.

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following day, 22 April, the tow to Catalina Island began. By 24 April the small test flotilla was anchored in place and ready to begin a series of four dives—twice to 125 feet, once to 165 feet, and a final dive to 182 feet.

The dives were conducted between 24 April and 10 May. On the first dive, air remaining in the barge collected under the roof as it descended; almost as quickly as it went down, the HMB-1 rose to the surface. As the air vented through holes in the roof, negative buoyancy returned and it dropped to the bottom. This yo-yo effect was overcome in subsequent dives by blowing the ballast tanks to insure that the HMB-1 remained negatively buoyant throughout the dive sequence.

There were minor, correctable problems with the next two dives, but on the fourth dive a really tough one appeared when a float valve in the starboard control room closed, shutting down the constant air supply essential to the operation of the barge's instruments, including the valve controls by which buoyancy was regulated. The HMB-1 lay dead at the bottom, unable to respond, until divers were sent down and into the control room to operate the valves by hand. The diving sequence proceeded to a successful completion without incident or damage to the barge. The problem was quickly identified: the float valve had reacted to excessive moisture in the compressed air, "identifying" it as water and dutifully closing down. A design correction erased the problem and on 10 May the HMB-1 cleared the test site for Redwood City on San Francisco Bay, where it would become the construction hanger for the capture vehicle.

c. HMB-1 Technology and Cost

The HMB-1 contributed its own technical achievements to the AZORIAN program. It was the world's largest submersible in addition to being the construction facility, transport vehicle and covert transfer mechanism for the 2400-ton (dry) capture vehicle. Another technical accomplishment was the unmanned submergence of this huge barge. A floating vessel goes from positive buoyancy through zero buoyancy to negative buoyancy during the submerging process. At zero buoyancy the vessel is unstable and theoretically could go belly-up at this moment. It was no small achievement for the HMB-1 to go through this critical instability point while unmanned.

The barge was built in 11 months at a cost of (b)(1) After completion of the test dives it was towed to the Redwood City facility which was to be home base. There, on 30 May 1972 the assembly of the capture vehicle began in total secrecy.

My Darling Clementine

The one piece of equipment that couldn't bear public scrutiny was the capture vehicle. Its giant arms with davits (forearms) and beams (upper arms) could serve only one purpose—encircling something huge. They deserved their name, the Grabber System. Although the CV was christened Clementine, no one would ever believe that she was ever remotely related to the Miner and Forty-Niner immortalized in song. The design, therefore, had to be done in secret, as did the assembly. Any failure here would end the cover and the mission. To give credence to all the security precautions taken, Clementine was billed as Howard Hughes' latest engineering marvel. She was the key to making him even richer by efficiently harvesting the manganese nodules lying on the ocean floor. No one was to see Mr. Hughes' new device. The story was floated, believed, and served as the perfect cover. No unauthorized individual ever saw Clementine, not in her boudoir, not in her drawing room, nor as she went about her calling.

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"The Claw is in the Bay" was the headline splashed across the front page of a local newspaper when the HMB-1 first appeared in the San Francisco Bay area. What a surprise it must have been to the writers when they found out how close their headline actually was; not to the Claw, the local nickname for Howard Hughes, but to a not so dainty lady named Clementine.

a. **Requirements**

The CV, like the HGE, had detailed lists of design requirements for each of its major elements as well as all of its many subsystems. Strength requirements for the various load-carrying structures were defined, total system weights were carefully estimated since the lift-off weight was a critical factor in mission success, and controls for setting the massive CV down on the target were exactingly specified to achieve an accuracy of placement within one foot. The alignment would involve two massive objects (each the weight of a light destroyer), one of which would be remotely controlled at the end of a flexible pipe string. Analogies to help grasp the complexity of the task are not completely satisfactory. But imagine standing on the top of the Empire State Building with a four by eight-foot grappling device attached to one end of a one-inch-diameter steel rope. The task is to lower the rope and grapple to the street below, snag a compact-sized car full of gold (for weight simulation, not necessarily value) and pull the car back up to the top of the building. And the job has to be done without anyone taking note of it. Mission Impossible?—one might think so.

The structures and mechanisms of the CV had to provide the mechanical features necessary to seize the target on the bottom, free it from the surrounding muck, and hold on to it and lift it to the surface, and place it within the HGE. The same mechanical features also had to have the capability of disposing of the submarine at sea after it had been gutted, analyzed and stripped of its secrets. Other design requirements on the CV system involved sensors and controls which provided the necessary navigation and status information for operational decision-making. Two complex electromechanical cables tied the CV with the control center and were part of the CV system requirement package, as was the control center itself.

The CV arrangements were designed with personnel safety as the prime requirement. Concern for personal safety was high in the designers' minds because of the massive size of the equipment that had to be handled at sea on a rolling and pitching ship. And divers would have to work around the CV during the deployment operation. Next in the designers' priority list came satisfaction of functional requirements, followed by protection from damage, accessibility, minimum complexity and minimum structural foundations. A useful life of three years was the design goal for all components and subsystems. The CV was not to exceed 4,929,000 pounds dry weight or 3,300,000 pounds weight in water and was required to withstand 10 exposures to 16,700 feet and survive for 500 hours of continuous operation at this depth.

b. **Construction**

The prime contractor selected to build the CV system was the Lockheed Missile and Space Company (LMSC). They were selected for three main reasons: their Ocean Systems Division had considerable experience in building submersibles, LMSC had shown good system engineering methodology in their aerospace efforts, and they were long and successfully experienced in running "black" programs. The latter was particularly important because the success of the cover story hinged on keeping the CV in the "black." LMSC had the ability to go to a wide range of subcontractors without letting them in on the true story. For example, the backbone of the CV was

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constructed by the U.S. Steel's American Bridge Division in South San Francisco. The steel for the beams and davits was supplied by Allegheny Ludlum in the East; they were fabricated at the Kaiser-Fontana steel works in Southern California. One major subcontractor to LMSC was brought into the black side of the program. Honeywell's Marine System Division in Seattle was given the contract for the electromechanical cable and all the sonars and controls for the CV.

The CV system was broken down into three elements, the CV element, the electronics element, and the construction barge element, the last being the HMB-1 already described. The CV element was the principal structural and mechanical assembly of the CV system. The electronics element provided the CV element with electrical power, sensors, and controls.

Within the CV element, the hull structure served as the primary load-carrying member. Originally it was designed as a truss and girder structure. When this design ran into a problem, a "tiger team" from Kelly Johnson's U-2 skunk works was put together to come up with an alternative. As a result of this effort a much lighter box beam design was put forward and approved. It used a relatively new bridge steel, T-1, with a yield strength of 100,000 pounds per square inch (Figures 21 and 22). This box beam design, called the strongback, turned into the world's largest single weldment structure. Some of the welds required as many as 250 passes to complete. The hull structure contained a 15 by 17-foot opening to allow pipe to be deployed while the CV was carried in the HGE's well. It also was compartmented for ballasting. This meant that the CV could be adjusted 0.6 degree and 2.5 degrees in list and trim, respectively, for docking operations. The hull structure also carried all the sensors, propulsion units, and the electronics spheres and cabling.




Figure 21. Strongback being loaded on the HMB-1 at the Ambridge plant in South San Francisco

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


Figure 22. Strongback shored up in the HMB-1 and ready for outfitting

Attached to the hull were the four massive bottom setting legs, 12 feet in diameter with 15 by 16-foot rectangular foot pads (Figure 23). Each leg had an inner cylinder which could be extended 35 feet at a rate of 1.5 feet per minute using hydraulic pressure from sea water pumped down the pipe string. These legs could develop a total lift of 5,740,000 pounds which was to be used to extract the target out of the sticky bottom soil. Once the target was broken out of the bottom, all four legs would be dropped off—their connector pins pulled hydraulically—to reduce the critical lift-off weight.

Also attached to the barge's hull structure were the eight beams and davits (called grabbers) for encircling and holding the submarine hull like a set of gigantic tongs. There were five on the port side and three on the starboard side of the CV. The beams and davits were fabricated from maraging 200, a high nickel steel. This steel had the property of high strength per unit weight of material, which was necessary to keep the over-all weight of the CV within the design goal.* Each grabber had a design load limit of 1,340,000 pounds or about 600 long tons. The safety factor was 1.5—the grabber could take 1.5 times its design load before failing, for a total load capacity of 900 long tons per grabber. In the event that the target object strength or geometry precluded any single grabber from carrying its share of the load, the spacing was designed so that the added load on the adjacent grabber would not reduce the safety factor below 1.15.

Seawater pumped down the center of the lift pipe (maximum rate 1,240 gallons per minute at 3,000 psi above ambient) provided power for the eight large thrusters

* Unfortunately, the nickel gave the maraging 200 steel ductility characteristics which proved to be insufficient during the recovery operation.

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


Figure 23. One of Clementine's feet

mounted on the hull of the CV. These thrusters plus two small electrically driven units provided the forces necessary to maneuver the CV and accurately position it over the target for the delicate set-down operation. The pumped seawater was also used to drape a chain net under and around the No. 1 missile tube on the submarine target. Its purpose was to contain, support and prevent the loss of the almost severed tube and its missile contents during breakout and lift.

The CV was attached to the heavy lift pipe by the bridle assembly. This was made from pieces of the small-diameter heavy lift pipe. The apex assembly (the flexible joint between the bridle and the pipe) was made from maraging 200 steel forgings. These were the largest components ever made from this type of steel. The design load for the bridle itself was 9,460,000 pounds. It was stowed in a collapsed position on the CV hull and erected as the CV was lowered on the docking legs.

The electronics element was the third major portion of the CV system. This element, including its array of sensors, provided control of all electromechanical and hydraulic CV equipment, navigation data for determining position and attitude of the CV, imaging of the target object and the surrounding bottom terrain, and status monitoring of the hydraulic and mechanical equipment. There were long-range sonars, high-resolution sonars, altitude/attitude sonars and 11 TV cameras with 22 lights providing the "eyes" for the CV. Target capture could be achieved with either the acoustic or the optic system independently. A beacon transponder array carried on the CV was also deployed around the target. Interrogation of this array by hydrophones on the CV allowed the CV to be positioned with an accuracy of one foot at a range up to 500 feet from the transponders. Maneuvering controls took data from all the sonars and automatically executed commands to the thrusters, thereby controlling the CV heading within ± five feet in surge and ± two and one-half in sway.

Two fully redundant electromechanical cables comprised the transmission portion of the electronics element. These cables were 18,500 feet in length and were

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the first ones manufactured (b)(1) The cables handled ship's power provided at 2000 volts, three phase, and 60 cycles. They also provided up- and down-link telemetry channels, a video data channel and an acoustic sensor data channel. A minimum of 9,600 bits of information per second could be handled. The electrical network was designed in such a way that no single equipment or circuit failure could cause mission abort or failure.

The final portion of the electronics element was the control center. It provided the working space for the Mission Director, the Deputy for Handling, the Deputy for Recovery and one assistant, the CV operator, CV work systems operator, optics equipment operator and two acoustic equipment operators. Each station contained the necessary displays and controls to operate all the CV equipments. Three vans made up this complex, which also served as the focal point for secure communications to the forward pilot house, aft pilot house, heavy lift control center, the divers and the ship's center well.

After the major assembly of the CV was completed, it was given a final dry test at Redwood City. This test was completed by 30 June 1973. Prior to this test exhaustive engineering, evaluation and factory acceptance tests were run on components and subassemblies. The engineering team that was building the CV and would eventually operate it was, for all intents and purposes, in permanent residence at the Redwood City facility. By the time the CV left the San Francisco Bay area for mating with the HGE, the CV was complete except for final rigging of the beams and davits. The full area of the HGE's well was needed for the final readiness activity to prepare Clementine for testing and the recovery operation (Figures 24 and 25).




Figure 24. Clementine inside the HGE. Outfitting is almost completed. On the left note the chain net used to contain the missile tube on the Soviet submarine.

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


Figure 25. Clementine with her bridle being readied for use

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c. **Post-Mission Adjustments**

After the AZORIAN recovery operation, in which three of the grabber arms failed, the CV design was re-examined in order to determine high stress points in the grabber arms. Four new beams and davits were fabricated from HY-100 steel and one from A-36 steel. This heavier but more forgiving steel could be used now because the remaining target object was smaller, and its weight had been more accurately determined to be less than half the previously estimated weight (1750 tons) of the original target. These facts dispelled the earlier concern that the heavy lift system would be stalled by an excessive load.

Since the breakout legs had been left at the target site, four new legs had to be fabricated for Clementine. The sonar and optic sensors were repositioned to match the new target configuration and pan/tilt controls were added to two TV cameras. All structures were given a thorough non-destructive inspection. After a successful systems test, Clementine was ready for a new attempt, but the second chance was not to be.

d. **CV Technology and Cost**

The CV system contributed a number of technical achievements in its evolution from design to reality. The electromechanical cable pushed hard against the state-of-the-art in high-strength, long-length, low-diameter, and low-attenuation undersea cables. This cable carried a digital data link used for the first time to control and precisely maneuver a very large machine suspended at the end of flexible drill pipe. The bottom reference system allowed deep operating equipment to be positioned with an unheard-of accuracy of one foot. At the same time, the automatic station-keeping system provided positioning of the large HGE with an error of only ±15 feet. The CV itself had a hull which was not only the largest structure made from T-1 steel, but also the world's largest single weldment. The deep sea hydraulic legs of about 1000-ton capacity were unique, as was the pressure-compensated electrical system. Finally, the spider and apex block (the flexible top portion of the bridle) were the largest components ever machined from maraging steel forgings.

The CV preliminary design began in mid-1970 and detail design was completed by the end of 1971. Steel acquisition and pre-fabrication efforts started in the first half of 1972. The assembly of the CV began 30 May 1972 and was completed in eight months on 28 January 1973. The dry test was completed 30 June 1973. The over-all cost for the CV was (b)(1) When the HMB-1 costs were added in, the total capture vehicle system costs totaled (b)(1)

Hanging by a Thread

There was clearly a single-point failure mechanism in the approved recovery scheme—the heavy lift pipe. If it failed, not only would the mission end abruptly but major damage would be done to the HGE. The sudden release of energy to the upper portion of the pipe string would create havoc on the drill floor and cause severe injury to the men operating it. The pipe had to be designed with a good safety margin, and it had to be built perfectly. Tight quality control and proof testing would be mandatory. The Hughes Tool Company was selected as the prime contractor for this critical portion of the hardware. It would be almost inconceivable that a Hughes-sponsored mining adventure would not use its own company, Hughes Tool Company, to provide the drill pipe. These pioneers in the oil field and mining supply business had long experience manufacturing drill bits and had a thorough knowledge of pipe machining and metallurgy. Hughes Tool Company was the right combination of technical expertise and cover logic.

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a. **Requirements**

The principal requirement on the heavy lift pipe was to provide enough strength to lift the target object and the CV while sustaining its own weight and any dynamic forces added through sea motion. Early CIA studies had concluded that it would not be possible to manufacture a pipe that could meet these strength requirements. Global Marine and Lockheed, after studying the problem, convinced the Agency engineers that the requisite strength could be achieved, but the proof still was in the making. The maximum estimated load on the pipe was 17,126,00 pounds during fail-safe hold conditions.

Other design requirements on the pipe were specially designed screw threads to hold the pipe pieces together. The roots of these threads were highly stressed. The design allowed the joint to be made up to a final torque of 300,000 foot-pounds in about one and one-half rotations of the pipe. To keep the weight of the pipe string down, it was designed in six diameters varying from 15½ inches to 12¾ inches. The design also spelled out a protective outer coating—to prevent corrosion from degrading pipe strength—and a zinc coating on the threads to lessen the chances of thread galling and sticking.

b. **Construction**

The closest technology for the pipe string was that used in making 16-inch gun barrels for battleships. Since battleships were resting in their Valhalla, there was no current 16-inch gun barrel activity to draw upon. But the Army did produce from their Watervliet Arsenal a metallurgist who knew gun barrel technology. The Army brought him to Washington on very short notice and, for him, no apparent reason. He was totally surprised when two CIA officers picked him up at the Pentagon and took him off for briefings. Perhaps he was thinking that the Agency was going to duplicate a circus feat and hurl agents, like cannonballs, into denied territory. After hearing a description of the AZORIAN program and the metallurgical problems, the Army metallurgist was very helpful, especially in the evaluation of the manufacturing process and the manufacturers to be used on the pipe.

The Hughes Tool Company sought out potential contractors to pour, forge, and trepan (cut the center hole in) the rough pieces. Hughes itself would do the final machining, coating, and proof testing. From the candidate steel companies, they chose (with Agency approval) (b)(1) obviously was not producing pieces of the required size, they were making smaller gun barrels and had the capability for making high quality steel. When it became clear rather early on that (b)(1) couldn't handle the entire load, Jorgensen Steel, with its forging plant in Seattle, was brought in. Later on, as the pressures on the production schedule increased, a third company, National Forge in Erie, Pennsylvania, was hired to complete the production run. These three companies ultimately delivered a total of 590 rough-machined forgings in 30-foot lengths.

The steel selected to furnish the high strength was formally called AISI 4330V (mod.). This meant that it was a standard, well-known alloy steel that was modified by the addition of vanadium. Vanadium was added to give the proper strength, ductility, and toughness properties to the steel. Its minimum yield strength was 125,000 pounds per square inch. There was much concern over the ability to make forgings of the size required and at the same time maintain uniformity of material properties throughout the forging. The forging process was followed closely by Hughes, Agency engineers, and metallurgical consultants who were hired for their expertise.

Nothing about this single-thread failure mechanism was taken for granted. Several one-eighth scale pieces of pipe were made and subjected to scaled model tests.

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The testing machine was computer-controlled with a program that mimicked the load condition imposed on the pipe by ocean forces. The goal of the test program was the completion of four life-cycles of testing without indications of fatigue cracking in the specimen. Each life-cycle was defined as 340,000 individual load cycles, which was equivalent to 940 hours of operation. During testing six life-cycles were successfully completed before fatigue cracking began. These results indicated a high probability that the pipe would successfully survive the estimated operational time (testing plus mission), which was 250,000 cycles or 690 hours.

The final, full-scale proof test of the heavy lift pipe further demonstrated the "take nothing for granted attitude." After Hughes had finished the final machining, coating, and color coding for size, they also subjected each piece to a proof test of 125% of its maximum expected load. This meant that the largest pieces would be loaded to 21,460,000 pounds. To do this required the design and the construction of a special proof test machine for the Hughes facility in Houston. Battelle Memorial Institute in Columbus, Ohio, designed and supervised the construction of the machine. It was the largest tensile test machine ever built. On 30 January 1972 the design engineer with much trepidation initiated the first full-load test of the pipe and the machine. Neither failed. Nor did they ever fail, even once, during the tensile testing of the 584 finished and delivered pieces (Figures 26 and 27). This was a fine tribute to the design effort and the quality control that went into the production of the pipe string. As the pieces were completed in Houston, they were assembled into 60-foot doubles and loaded on rail cars for shipment to the HGE (Figure 28).

The only refurbishment the heavy lift pipe required for MATADOR—the second mission—were the inspection and retorquing of the joints made up at the factory, and the repair of some minor corrosion pits on the threads.

c. Pipe String Technology and Cost

The forgings, from which the basic pieces were cut, were the largest members ever produced to such high strength, ductility, and fracture toughness requirements. Stringent metallurgical controls and inspections were required throughout the manufacturing process. The large pipe threads had a unique design which accommodated a high-load capacity simultaneously with a quick make/break connection. The proof test machine was the largest in the world. It had a maximum load capacity of 24,000,000 pounds.

The pipe string was designed, built, tested, and delivered in a 29½ month period from 29 May 1971 to 15 October 1973. Forging and machining required 21½ months, testing 8 months, and deliveries took place over the last 7 months. All pieces were at the pier well before the first sea trials took place in January 1974. Total costs, including the proof test machine, were [redacted](b)(1)[redacted]

Data Handling

A relatively small but important item was the data processing system. It was developed by the Marine System Division of Honeywell, Inc. under a covert contract from the U.S. Government. Honeywell had other key parts of the AZORIAN hardware, including the station keeping and the sonar systems, but they were done as subcontracts to Global Marine and Lockheed. The main requirement on the data processing system was to have all the data logging and retrieval plus the control of the HGE and the CV operated from a single, centrally located computer facility. The system that was developed was a complex multicomputer system used for both on-line control of shipboard machinery and off-line data processing functions. The system

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


Figure 26. Piece of pipe being lowered into the proof test machine

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Figure 27. The Dutchman, first piece of pipe in the string, under load in the proof test machine

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


Figure 28. Pipe at Pier E showing pipe assembled into doubles 60 feet long. Threads are coated with a titanium dioxide/silicon oil coating to prevent seizure.

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consisted of six ruggedized computers each with 32K of core memory, along with various peripherals such as magnetic tapes, disk packs, alphanumeric CRT displays, card readers and punch, line printers, and plotters.

Primary functions of the system were control of vessel position (automatic station keeping), coordinated control of underwater machinery, and data logging and retrieval. For example, the automatic station keeping routine used data from the heavy lift system and the ship's basic instrumentation to calculate the movements required to position the ship correctly in relation to the target. The results of these calculations could be fed directly into the ship's controls, causing the ship to maneuver without the laying on of human hands.

Of special interest were the operational support programs. One was used to help track the intelligence material retrieved from the target. Another was a weather applications program which predicted the response of the HGE and CV as well as the stresses in the heavy lift pipe resulting from weather induced sea conditions. Still another program calculated the adjustments needed in the anchor chains of the HGE to align her over the HMB-1 for mate/demate operations. This was undoubtedly the most precise four-point moor of any major ship.

A training simulator was built as a part of the data processing system. It consisted of a movable array of lights and miniature TV cameras to represent those on the CV. A software program was developed to simulate motion, forces, movement, and other information that would be coming to the control center operators during the actual recovery operation. Using a model of the submarine wreck as a target, the AZORIAN control center crew developed and perfected procedures for the critical maneuvers required for set-down and target capture.

To summarize, the hardware and software system specifications for the data processing system were submitted on 30 November 1971 and approved on 12 January 1972. It took a period of approximately 19 months (23 May 1971 to 2 January 1973) to design, build, and deliver the system. It was delivered to the HGE while she was at the Sun Shipyard in Chester, Pa. The cost was (b)(1) The system required only general refurbishment in preparation for the MATADOR program.

Field Engineering

As engineers know, all the design and laboratory testing in the world cannot anticipate each and every problem that will surface when you "go to the field." It is here that Yankee ingenuity and Kentucky windage come to the fore. AZORIAN was no exception to this general rule. A few examples should make the point. Engineering purists may want to skip the next few paragraphs; those of a more practical bent will understand and should find beauty in them.

After the first deployment of the pipe string during integrated systems test off Catalina Island, some of the threaded joints connecting two pieces of pipe were frozen together. No amount of applied force from the shipboard detorquing machine could loosen the joints. The immediate problem was to devise a method to unscrew the pieces of pipe without damaging them. Next, the cause of the problem and a solution for it had to be found.

A retired Navy engineering officer solved the immediate problem. He quickly designed what was probably the world's largest and strongest spanner wrench. (Figure 29 shows the super wrench in action.) Made from high-strength steel and operated with a manual hydraulic jack, Super Wrench could deliver one million foot-pounds of force to the pipe joints. This force plus a judicious heating of the outer surface of the

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Figure 29. Super wrench being readied to free a stuck joint

pipe joint produced the desired effect with no serious damage to the threads (Figure 30).

As for the cause of the problem, it was determined that inadvertently a natural battery had been built into the threaded joint. The surfaces of the thread were coated with zinc and then covered with a normal oil field lubricant to prevent galling and sticking. Red lead was a constituent of the lubricant, and this together with the zinc formed the two opposing plates of a battery. All that was needed to complete the battery was an electrical conducting medium to connect the two. Even with tightly threaded pipe joints, enough sea water was forced into the joint to provide the electrical path. The resulting corrosion caused the threads to lock.

Immediate testing of alternate lubricants was started. One, a very sticky, gooey synthetic called Aqua-Lube, proved to have insufficient holding power. The final solution was a witches' blend of titanium dioxide, silicon dioxide, and zinc chromate in a silicone oil. After testing on the one-eighth scale model pipe, this new lubricant was used successfully on all the joints—but only after each full-scale joint had been thoroughly cleaned of the red lead and Aqua-Lube mixtures, perhaps one of the messiest jobs mankind has ever undertaken (Figure 31).

Another and quite different problem occurred during the operation in which the HGE picked up the capture vehicle from the submerged barge. In the program jargon this exercise was called mating. Not only was there an engineering mating taking place, but unbeknown to the ship's crew there was a biological mating taking place, too. The squid had returned to Catalina for their annual frolic in the shallow waters of Isthmus Cove (Figure 32).

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Figure 30. Examining red lead coated threads for damage

After the capture vehicle was securely stowed within the HGE and the well gates shut, the pumps started removing the water from the well. This lasted only a short while; the pumps were constantly clogged with ecstatic squid, and no headway could be made in removing the water. Finally, the HGE was moved out of the cove to deeper water, the gates reopened, and lights hung over the side (it was the middle of the night) to draw the squid out of the well. Light seems somehow to discourage encounters of the sexual kind. Out came the squid; the gates were reclosed, and the pumps were free of squid except for a very few stragglers. There had been no text book solution available to the engineers for this problem. It was an exercise left entirely to the reader.

One last example from the mission will show still another form of engineering fixes—using a man to replace a device. Two large cylindrical devices called heave compensators absorbed the up-and-down motion of the sea and kept the rig floor (the pipe deployment area) at a constant level. These shock absorbers were located under the rig floor, fore and aft, and had a total stroke of 14 feet. It was critical that they move in unison, for if they got out of synchronization, the rig floor would be canted, not only causing metal-to-metal contact (and damage) but also putting a severe strain on the deployed pipe string.

Devices called rotapulsers measured the amount of stroke in each of the heave compensator cylinders. The measurement in each rotapulser was made by a wire which was on a pulley and a distance counter. This information was constantly fed to the control center for the lifting operation and was used to automatically keep the two cylinders in synchronization. Various problems had been experienced with the rotapulser, but on one occasion during the mission the wires failed. The cylinders got

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Figure 31. Applying Aqua-Lube to the threads. It didn't work and had to be removed.

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


Figure 32. The HGE at the mating site at Isthmus Cove, Catalina. She is moored over the submerged barge HMB-1 whose support barge is just visible at the extreme right.

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out of "synch," and the resulting metal-to-metal contact caused an impressive display of sparks and noises as well as real damage. It was not a mission-ending failure, but because the operation was in a critical phase, it had to continue while the wires were replaced.

To gather the position information needed to keep the heave compensators in unison, a quite simple method was devised. Yardsticks were affixed to the ship near the moving cylinders and a welding rod was used as an indicator needle. One man with a headset telephone was stationed at each of the cylinders to read out the position of the rod on the yardstick as the cylinders moved up and down. The men at the other end of the phone in the heavy lift control center could then control the relative position of the two cylinders. It was a simple but effective solution to a nasty problem.

Later calculation showed that the wires failed at their predicted life cycle. The number of accumulated cycles on the wires had exceeded the original predictions—a small fact easily overlooked in the stress of solving larger and more pressing problems.

The Price Tag

Charges of exorbitant cost escalation have been levied on the engineering procurement for Project AZORIAN. The most critical one claimed that the Agency sold the program on the basis of a (b)(1) initial estimate. Charges such as this one were made without a careful examination of what actually took place. Here is the real history of the cost growth of Project AZORIAN:

a. **Fall 1969 and Spring 1970–** (b)(1)

The original concept used pentane tankage to provide buoyancy for lift and anticipated a total program encompassing three years. The recovery was to be performed covertly by means of specially constructed salvage barges with the target-lifting barge mated within a larger barge. The target was to be exploited in a safe harbor. No testing costs prior to the mission were included in this preliminary estimate. The earliest cost information included estimates of (b)(1) for design, (b)(1) for the barge and (b)(1) for operational costs the third year. Barge cost estimates were based on costs per pound for barge construction. Subsequent tank tests showed that interactions between the subsurface and surface salvage barges were impossible to control, and the use of pentane lift under these circumstances was too dangerous. The buoyancy concept was therefore abandoned.

These early estimates in the fall of 1969 totaled (b)(1). By the spring the complexity and problems associated with the buoyancy concept were more fully understood and a test program had been added. The dollar estimate increased to (b)(1) (b)(1). No attempt had yet been made to get program approval. The barge concept was not used but most importantly the program was not sold at this time with these cost estimates. Thus, the claims that cost growth estimates should use a (b)(1) base are erroneous.

b. **October 1970–** (b)(1)

The initial concept of a system for covertly lifting the target by the use of heavy lifting equipment mounted on a large surface ship had now been developed. Equally important, however, was the development of management and cover concepts using the image of Howard Hughes and the more plausible cover of a commercial deep ocean mining effort. These initially-estimated costs were based on incomplete data and on recovery projected for FY 1973. Estimates were obtained by scaling up the cost of an existing smaller vessel (the *Glomar Challenger*). The estimates totaled (b)(1) (b)(1)

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On 16 November 1970 the procurement of certain long-lead-time equipment was authorized for the first time. Some people, therefore, argue that the (b)(1) estimate should be taken as the cost base. Those who would do that should remember that the initiation of procurement of long-lead items does not constitute a full program go-ahead. This type of procurement contract can be stopped with relatively small default penalties. Also there were still 11 major unknown or technical risk areas facing the engineers at this time. Resolution of these would almost certainly increase costs. Senior national-level management was advised of these, as was the ExCom. In fact, a five-month hold on major procurements was placed on the program two weeks after authorization for certain long-lead items was obtained.

c. **March 1971**– (b)(1)

During the period from October 1970 through March 1971 systems specifications and a total scenario for the project were being developed. The figure of (b)(1) was the first estimate given to ExCom based on preliminary engineering design studies and, as such, could be considered as a base cost reference point. Improvement of (b)(1)

d. **August 1971**– (b)(1)

Estimates presented at the March 1971 ExCom meeting had listed a number of uncertainties and costs that further definition would refine. Based on a year-long detailed computer mensuration study of photography, it became apparent that the target was lying more nearly on its side than previously estimated, thereby increasing the effective width of the target. As described earlier, this required a significant redesign of the surface ship and capture vehicle. Additional cost growth was experienced due to strengthening of the lift shoulder of the pipe string. These cost increases caused the ExCom, in August 1971, to undertake a total review of the AZORIAN project and to order a moratorium on major procurement actions. The moratorium included deferring the keel laying of the surface ship. After a full review of target value, program costs, cover and risks, on 1 October 1971 the ExCom decided to proceed with the AZORIAN Project.

There were still a few uncertainties in the engineering areas: work needed to be done on the control system and the fail-safe portions of the heavy lift system; the grabber configuration on the CV was not finalized nor were the operator displays, the breakout legs, and the hydraulic system. The software for the computer system was just starting and simulation studies were still being run to determine operational red-lines for the equipment.

Since ExCom decided finally to proceed with AZORIAN and the keel was laid in November, the dollar estimate at this time, (b)(1) could serve as the cost base. The keel laying was a most significant event. It would be difficult to explain stopping ship construction after this occurred, and cancellation now would be costly in both a dollar and a credibility sense.

e. **April 1972**– (b)(1)

Contracts were made definite with the four prime contractors. The new program increases derived from funding required for engineering change proposals, proof-test equipment, increased costs associated with the construction barge, and increases to cover post-acquisition handling. An argument can be made that the basis for cost growth should be taken from this base, at which the contracts were made definite.

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At this time also a major program review was undertaken by the Special Projects Staff in order to remove any "gold plating" from the hardware or any other aspect of the project. There was great pressure to make an attempt to keep the total costs under $200 million. At the same time, ExCom again reviewed and approved the continuation of AZORIAN.

f. **August 1972**— (b)(1)

This increase was caused principally by structural modifications to the surface ship needed to meet U.S. Coast Guard specifications, which were prerequisite to obtaining cover-related maritime risk insurance. The overall costs were estimated as follows:

Hardware	(b)(1)
Cover/Support	
Operations	

A furious debate was going on at this time over AZORIAN. A strong effort was mounted by senior Navy and Defense Department officials to kill the program. ExCom decided to go to the 40 Committee for a political assessment on running the operation in 1974. The upshot of all this was that President Nixon wrote a letter praising the project and approving its continuation. All debate on AZORIAN ended.

g. **October 1974** (b)(1)

The final hardware aquisition costs of Project AZORIAN totaled approximately (b)(1) They were broken down as follows:

Surface Ship System	**Dollars—Millions**
	(b)(1)
Heavy Lift System	
Docking Legs	
Spares	
Basic Surface Ship	
Capture Vehicle System	
Capture Vehicle	
HMB-1	
Data Processing System	
Pipe String System	
Special Purpose Vans	
Total	

Other costs associated with the total progr

Mining Machine	
Cover/Support	
Operations	

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These brought the total costs for AZORIAN to (b)(3)(c) as of October 1974. An additional (b)(3)(c) was spent through October 1975 on preparations for MATADOR and program phaseout. The overall costs for the six and one-half year project were (b)(3)(c)

h. **Summary**

There are five points in time in the AZORIAN program that could be used to establish a cost base on which to calculate cost escalations. Of these five, two are really not valid. The first estimates of late 1969 and early 1970, in fact, are meaningless. They were based on a concept that wasn't used, and no program approvals or decisions were made on their merit. The charge that AZORIAN was sold as a (b)(3)(c) project is thus without foundation. The next estimate, (b)(3)(c) made in October 1970, also had little validity. It was made without having preliminary engineering or a total program scenario in hand. No major procurements were authorized; they were in fact expressly forbidden. Limited long-lead procurement was authorized at this time, but it cannot be said that full program approval was obtained.

The three remaining reference points, (a) March 1971 at (b)(3)(c) (b) August 1971 at (b)(1) and (c) April 1972 at (b)(3)(c) are valid, and arguments can be made for all three. Using the March 1971 date as a basis for cost, the escalation would be (b)(1) percent; for August 1971, (b)(1) percent; and for April 1972, (b)(1) percent (based on the costs of AZORIAN only). Of the three, the April 1972 date has the least persuasive argument for it. Although this was the time that the major contracts were definitized, all the important planning and engineering work that leads to a cost estimate had been done prior to this. The date is really a bookkeeping bench mark for finalizing contracts.

In the view of the project managers, the only valid dates for setting a base cost estimate are March 1971 and August 1971. By March a total scenario had been developed covering all essential elements of the program and the preliminary engineering had been completed. Although major long-lead procurements had been authorized, the ExCom had been made aware that significant engineering uncertainties remained and that their resolution could increase the costs. By August most of these solutions had been worked out and their price tags estimated; a major one was the required redesigning of the ship's hull. ExCom ordered the keel laying postponed until a thorough review was conducted, but the review was favorable and the keel was laid as planned in November 1971.

The estimate of (b)(3)(c) made in August 1971, then, is the best point from which to calculate cost escalation, for it was then that the ExCom authorized the keel laying, a momentous undertaking after which it would be difficult to abandon the ship construction. Calculating from this point, the cost escalation for AZORIAN registers as (b)(1) percent.

A Final Word

The equipment developed for Project AZORIAN lives on. After a short period in mothballs, the HGE was reactivated as an honest-to-goodness mining ship. A consortium led by Lockheed is using the ship and the pipe string to test a mining machine. Some tests have been completed and others are in the offing. The National Science Foundation is planning on converting the HGE to a deep ocean drilling ship. Their program is one to explore the ocean margins for scientific and economic purposes. It will be a large program carried out through 1989 with a cost in the neighborhood of $600 million.

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The world's largest submersible (HMB-1) has been used by the Department of Energy in their ocean thermal energy conversion program. The San Francisco Bay base for the HMB-1 is being used by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey as an operational location.

Recently, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has made inquiries about using the proof test machine to test steel plate. Even a part of Clementine (the CV) has found use. One of her arms is part of a tensile test facility in Southern California.

The same technology developed for the AZORIAN simulator was used recently to construct a simulator to train operators to emplace a huge offshore oil platform. The platform, costing $750 million, was constructed in several hundred feet of water off the Lousiana Coast. In this way the training procedures and hardware developed for AZORIAN have played a role in helping to develop the oil resources of the United States.

So the labor of love created by a group of Agency managers and engineers has borne a continuing reward. Let us hope that Agency officials of the future will be blessed in kind.

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Organizational Innovation

An Interview with TTIC Director John Brennan (U)

"A National Counterterrorism Center . . . will build upon the concept of TTIC and allow further integration of US government counterterrorism capabilities."

Editor's Note: John Brennan was named director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) on 12 March 2003. After joining the Central Intelligence Agency in 1980, he served in a variety of analytic and management positions focusing primarily on the Middle East and terrorism. He was a daily intelligence briefer at the White House in the mid-1990s then served as (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) *Mr. Brennan is a graduate of Fordham University and earned an MA from the University of Texas. (U)*

Mr. Brennan was interviewed on 21 July 2004 by (b)(3)(c) *of the* Studies in Intelligence *Editorial Board. Subsequent to the interview, the TTIC director reflected on the recently proposed National Counterterrorism Center, telling* Studies: *"I am a strong proponent of a National Counterterrorism Center, as it will build upon the concept of TTIC and allow further integration of US government counterterrorism capabilities. The design, mission, and responsibilities of such a center need to be carefully thought through, however, as we must find a construct that optimizes those capabilities without disrupting the very important and critical work that is underway throughout the government. The center's mission* ***must*** *be clearly defined and its structure well engineered if it is to realize its potential." (U)*

On 27 October, Mr. Brennan was appointed as the (interim) director of the National Counterterrorism Center. He will continue to serve as the director of TTIC until its functions are absorbed by the new national center. (U)

As with all Studies in Intelligence *articles, the statements, assertions, and opinions expressed in this article are those of the interview participants alone and do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of any US government entity. (U)*

(b)(3)(c)



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* * *

John, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center was established in 2003 by order of the president, and you've recently consolidated your staff here at the new (b)(3)(c) *facility. Looking back, what are the criteria by which you, as the director, believe the effectiveness of TTIC should be assessed after its first year of existence? What should the cate-*

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gories on the report card be, and what kind of grades would you award the center against these criteria? (U)

Well, I think that the report card would be diverse because TTIC has such diverse responsibilities. First of all, we were charged by the president to make sure that there is one place in the US government that has access to all of the information that is available to the government that is related to the terrorist threat. And I think, looking back over the past year, we have been successful in terms of bringing all of those different networks into TTIC. Right now, we have access to 26 networks, classified and unclassified, an unprecedented breadth of access within the US government on terrorism-related matters. We are soon going to expand to 28 networks, so the first metric, I think, should be the extent of improved, shared access to information, and I think we get a pretty good grade there. And our grade should reflect positively on the partner agencies that have been willing to provide us this unfettered and unrestricted access. (U//FOUO)

Secondly, it's not sufficient just to have access to all these networks; you have to be able to take advantage and leverage that access. And so we are now moving forward on having an integrated architecture within TTIC so that those networks can be brought together to enable us to conduct federated searches against them. By the end of this month, we will have, for the first time, databases from different networks pulled together so that we can do a federated search against them. Through the rest of the year, we are going to be adding networks onto that integrated architecture so that the analysts and others can do these federated searches, because a simultaneous search against multiple networks is much more powerful than sequential searches against individual networks. So, since we are not there yet, I would give us a very tentative grade there of "in progress;" we seem to be on track, we are not there yet, but we certainly have the design ready to go. (U)

"TTIC has access to 26 networks, classified and unclassified, an unprecedented breadth of access within the US government."

Another of our responsibilities is to make sure that we are able to disseminate information and analysis to all of the appropriate federal consumers. Here I think we get a pretty good grade; I'll give us something in the B-plus category. We now have two principal mechanisms to get information out electronically, which I think really is the way we need to go as far as making sure there's timely dissemination.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

One of the areas that we are still "growing" is actually doing the analysis. We have, quite honestly, precious few analysts; there are a couple dozen analysts who are doing all-source analysis. And we are really looking forward to additional analysts coming in from our partner agencies. We do a good job as far as reportorial coverage, but as far as the in-depth, strategic pieces that really provide insights and understanding to the customers about the nature of the terrorist threat, we're not there yet. (S//NF)

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"I see terrorism analysis as a distinct discipline in the intelligence arena."

That's a good segue for discussing the challenges you face regarding staffing and subject matter expertise. With respect to the infusion of new analysts that you are receiving into TTIC from various agencies, what portion of them arrives with subject matter expertise on terrorism? Are most expected to learn on the job, and do you envision a training program of sorts in TTIC to supplement on-the-job training? (U)

Well it's a little bit of all of the above. Most of the analysts who come to TTIC have some established area of expertise. Sometimes it's in the terrorism area, and sometimes it's in areas that are very much related to terrorism. They could be analysts of those countries that play an important role in terrorism. They may come with background related to potential targets of terrorist attacks. So they have relevant experience. What we are trying to do here in TTIC is to develop a whole analytic cadre of different backgrounds and expertise so we can leverage their expertise. (U//FOUO)

We have to develop our own training programs and training classes, but we are really looking to those partner agencies to provide analysts who are already trained in intelligence and have a background in terrorism. We recognize that a lot of these agencies are strapped as far as the number of qualified officers and analysts they have available, but over time, I think we are going to be getting more and more individuals with the requisite background in intelligence and substantive expertise. (U//FOUO)

How do you incentivize these assignments and ensure that you get the quality of people that you need over time? Do you envision, for example, a terrorist-related intelligence challenge so enduring that we ought to develop a professional cadre for the Intelligence Community of terrorism analysts, perhaps even with a separate career service? (U)

Well, a couple of points there. First of all, everyone who comes here is an assignee from his or her home agency, not a detailee. That's an important distinction because they bring with them their authorities from their parent organization. I believe that the terrorism threat to US interests is going to be an enduring one, and we need to have a sustained and very robust capability in the terrorism arena in order to deal with it. I think that TTIC is the first step toward having a real collaborative and integrated environment for analysts. And if we are going to do it well, we really are going to have to make some adjustments as far as the Intelligence Community's personnel system. We need to make sure there is recognition that service within TTIC is looked upon as a career enhancing assignment, just as a tour of duty in a "joint assignment" is seen as a prestige factor for career development in the military. We are right now completing the negotiation of MOAs with all of the partner agencies regarding what the personnel obligations are. These will include commitments from those agencies that service in TTIC will be appropriately recognized and that those individuals will serve in TTIC for a minimum of two years. (U//FOUO)

Are we moving toward a time when "counterterrorism analysts" will represent a distinct professional career track, analogous to economic analysts, political analysts, and military analysts? (U)

I think terrorism analysis is rather unique and really requires some well-developed skills. And so I very much see it as a distinct discipline within the intelligence arena. I believe that an analyst can serve his or her entire career working on terrorism. I would encourage them, as I would any analyst, to spend time outside of their specific field of interest, because it really helps to put their area of expertise in some kind of context and perspective. But I fully expect that younger analysts who are either in TTIC or in one of our partner agencies, if they're committed to being terrorism analysts, are going to find ample opportunity for a 20- or 30-year career to serve in support of specific and discrete missions related to terrorism. (U)

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"Within the walls of TTIC, there has been a tremendous blending together of the different [organizational] cultures."

As an Intelligence Community, we need to think through what the career tracks should look like so that analysts have a variety of attractive options. They shouldn't see themselves as on a conveyor belt moving up within a single stovepipe. One of the great things about TTIC is that you have analysts from the Secret Service, the Coast Guard, CIA, DIA, FBI, whatever, sitting next to each other and really understanding what other government organizations do and seeing the importance of terrorism analysis for those agencies and missions. This has opened up the horizons, not just in terms of what the requirements are, but what the possibilities are as far as their involvement in some of these areas. So, for anybody who really wants a career on terrorism, there is going to be no dearth of opportunities and positions. (U)

In recent discussions about intelligence transformation, a prominent theme is the need to break down old organizational barriers, promote horizontal integration, and intensify collaboration. It's often said that one of the immediate challenges that goes along with this is understanding and minimizing the effects of "culture clash," when employees from a wide variety of organizations are brought together. What are your impressions of how that has worked? Has "culture clash" manifested itself in ways that were unexpected or require some work to overcome? (U)

It's interesting. People ask how we have been able to deal with all these representatives from these different agencies being put in this cultural cauldron. To be quite frank, we never really had to work at trying to develop a TTIC culture. When you bring together analysts, information systems, and databases, and when you have a critically important mission, individuals quickly forget whether they are from CIA or DIA or Secret Service. They work together because the mission is so important. What they are here to do is to understand the terrorist threat and to prevent future 9/11s. And so we found an immediate bonding among the analysts here. (U)

Quite honestly, some clashes arise when we deal with some of the partner agencies, because some individuals look upon TTIC as a competitive organization. I think they need to view us as a part of them and they a part of us. But within the walls of TTIC here, we find that there has been a tremendous blending together of the different cultures in an enriching sense, because they better understand what the others' missions are. I think a lot of the cultural clashes that take place are the result of ignorance, because an analyst or an individual officer from one agency really doesn't understand or appreciate what the mission requirements are of another department or agency. If they become intimately familiar with those missions then they say, "Oh, I understand," and a lot of those barriers quickly break down. That's why I'm a strong proponent of an overhaul of the Intelligence Community, because we have grown up within stovepipes, which have been detrimental to the overall intent of the Intelligence Community. (U)

Do you regard TTIC's organization and practices as a model for the way Intelligence Community components should operate in the future? (U)

TTIC is so new and innovative, and I really believe that it is the shape of things to come in the future. We should not still be operating in the 1947 mindset of capabilities-based organizations that pursue related objectives and initiatives separately. What we need to do is to make sure that we establish centers like TTIC, where the capabilities of CIA, DIA, and NSA, as well as of some of the newer players on the intelligence field—such as the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI—are fused together in an integrated environment. (U)

That's why the concept of a Director of National Intelligence is an appealing one because it moves the Intelligence Commu-

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nity away from being focused solely on "foreign intelligence," which has been the case for the past 55 years or so. Intelligence is more than foreign intelligence; it is domestic intelligence as well. And there really needs to be better orchestration of the overall intelligence effort across the community. (U)

Let me ask about analytic redundancy. There's a limited pool of experienced counterterrorism analysts and so how they're concentrated and distributed makes a difference. Given the limited talent pool, you've got to think carefully about how much competing analysis makes sense. And today, your mandate is shared in whole or in part by DHS's Information Analysis and Information Protection Directorate, by FBI's Counterterrorism Division and Office of Intelligence, by OTA and CIA, and by DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force-Counterterrorism (JITF-CT). Could you describe the types of analytic tasks uniquely performed at TTIC and explain how they differ from those being performed at other CT centers around town? (U)

Well, there are a couple of issues here. First of all, with the standup of the Department of Homeland Security and with the Office of Intelligence of the FBI, there was strong interest in the White House and elsewhere that we have the ability to integrate terrorism information and related analysis, so you don't have separate information and



TTIC Headquarters. (U//FOUO)

analysis streams going to senior officials and others. TTIC now has the responsibility to provide integrated assessments of the terrorist threat; for example, when there are Principals Committee meetings or Deputies Committee meetings or the president needs to be briefed on something about the terrorist threat, TTIC represents the views from throughout the community and provides an integrated, fused assessment identifying differing views within the community as appropriate. So that is sort of a unique responsibility that we have on behalf of those partner agencies. (U//FOUO)

But getting to your point about competitive or redundant analysis, one of the real concerns that I have is that there needs to be better orchestration of the different analytic elements that exist within the federal government because as you point out, analytic resources are finite. We cannot waste the time or talent of any analyst by doing unnecessarily redundant work. I still see unnecessary—and unhelpful—redundancy when there is a terrorist incident or threat, and a half a dozen or more analytic entities produce very similar products. When we do that, we are wasting those precious resources, because we are not covering the universe of terrorism issues appropriately. TTIC has been trying to promote the idea of a national framework that has a rational allocation of responsibilities so we don't have that unnecessary duplication. Clearly, some redundancy and

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alternative analysis is desirable—indeed, essential—but there needs to be a common game plan and not just a free market analytic environment out there. (S//NF)

At times, unfortunately, I would equate the situation to what happens in soccer played by seven-year-olds: When the ball goes to one end of the field, all those little feet scurry to that side of the field, leaving the rest of the field unattended. We cannot afford to do that on terrorism analysis in the US government. We need thoughtful and intentional competitive analysis—not haphazard redundancy. We need to make sure that every part of the field is covered 24 hours of the day, and that requires overall orchestration. In this manner, the "orchestrator" knows exactly what TTIC is doing, and what CIA, FBI, DHS, and others are doing, and he or she can make informed decisions about adjusting areas of analytic emphasis. (U)

Your remarks suggest to me that TTIC should emerge as the US government's unquestioned, authoritative center of gravity for CT analysis. This would leave the important departmental intelligence components to focus on their unique responsibilities for packaging, presenting, and communicating information in a way that is most responsive to their leadership. With such an arrangement, it becomes tougher to argue for maintaining a truly robust counterterrorism analytic capability in CIA's Office of Terrorism Analysis. (U)

"We need thoughtful and intentional competitive analysis—not haphazard redundancy."

I agree with you completely on the need for the TTIC—or an eventual National Counterterrorism Center—to be the "center of gravity" for terrorism analysis. That center of gravity you refer to, and I use that same term myself, is a place where the shared statutory responsibilities of those partner agencies can be fulfilled in an integrated, collaborative environment. And if you look at the statutory language that set up the CIA, and you look at the Homeland Security Act, and you look at other statutes and commissioning documents that have given these departments and agencies responsibility for assessing and analyzing the terrorist threat, you can understand why same types of things are being done in different places. Those statutory responsibilities, however, can be fulfilled in this collective joint venture known as TTIC on behalf of all those departments and agencies. (U)

There are discreet mission responsibilities that can and must be fulfilled inside of those agencies themselves. For example, DHS has tremendous responsibility for understanding the vulnerabilities of the US homeland—what opportunities at the state or local level could terrorist groups take advantage of; what are the materials, the venues, the security weaknesses, and lapses? These are the things that DHS is uniquely able to address. But the task of analyzing the nature and scope of the threat that is coming from the terrorist groups need not be done in DHS as well as in TTIC. (U)

Also, I think you need a place within the US government where there is truly an independent and neutral assessment of the terrorist threat. Each of TTIC's partner agencies has a responsibility for actions related to the threat. DHS has responsibility for mitigating the threat, putting in place defensive measures, and making the homeland a more difficult place for terrorists to ply their trade. CIA has responsibility for helping to neutralize the threat and for collecting against it. FBI, from the law enforcement perspective, has the responsibility to find individuals here in country and overseas who are threatening US interests. While these agencies need internal analytic resources to guide their activities, operations, and investigations, I would argue that the assessments of the threat posed by terrorist groups should be done primarily by TTIC and, eventually, by a National Counterrorism Center. (U)

So would you then confine the role of departmental CT analysts and those in CTC to "direct support"—for example, targeting

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support to the Directorate of Operations? (U//FOUO)

Not exactly. There are also analytic responsibilities, I think, that need to remain within those individual agencies and departments. CIA analysts for example, will need to track, understand, and analyze the root causes of terrorism. Also, they need to address the political, economic, and social consequences of terrorism, as well as state sponsorship issues, and the counterterrorism policies and capabilities of foreign governments. These are areas that are best addressed by the country and functional analysts in CIA who have tremendous breadth and depth of experience on foreign intelligence issues. We shouldn't try to build that capability within TTIC when it already exists somewhere else. CIA is uniquely qualified to do that. Likewise, DHS is uniquely qualified to be doing the analysis on homeland vulnerabilities, while FBI analysts are uniquely qualified to address purely domestic intelligence matters. (U//FOUO)

Within TTIC, you have an Information Sharing and Knowledge Development Department, including an element that's charged with Advanced Analytic Techniques and Red Teaming. Can you tell us a bit about the types of advanced analytic techniques being explored and considered and perhaps as well a word about how your red teaming activities are being developed and deployed? (U//FOUO)

“There are areas that are best addressed by the country and functional analysts in CIA who have tremendous breadth and depth of experience.”

Well, it's one of the areas that we are still in the process of developing, but let me talk a little bit about it conceptually. We have unprecedented access to all these networks and all these databases—terabytes upon terabytes of data—but there's absolutely no way that we could put eyes on every bit of information even if we had thousands of analysts here. What we really need to do in an environment like TTIC that has this type of access to data, is to apply robust analytic tools, the computing power that's out there, so that we can make the connections between seemingly unrelated bits and pieces of information. (U//FOUO)

And there is tremendous analytic tool capability and tremendous computing power available to do this. We're not doing "data mining," but we're applying the analytic tools for sophisticated search queries against those different databases and information systems. And if you have individuals and databases from diverse organizations such as the Transportation Security Administration, Coast Guard, Secret Service, FBI, CIA, and others, you can do queries in ways that traditionally have not been done in the foreign intelligence community. So what we are trying to do is to match the expertise, the backgrounds, and the skill areas of the people in this team with databases, computing power, and analytic tools. If you bring that together, you are able to leverage the knowledge of the individuals, the capability of technology, and the existence of data. We are going to be seeing new ways of surfacing connections between those dots and creating new knowledge, and that's what we mean by know-ledge development. (U//FOUO)

Another aspect of the analytic mission is guiding collection priorities and tasking. A coordinated US government strategy for collecting and exploiting intelligence across the domestic intelligence-foreign intelligence divide implies the need for an analytic center of gravity that directly supports and guides tasking. Can TTIC perform that function today? (U)

Well, right now TTIC is the mission manager on terrorism for the community as far as the collection requirement system is concerned. We do play a lead role; we work with the other agencies and departments to determine the national intelligence priorities framework for terrorism. As you know, there is a very well-developed collection requirement system on foreign intelligence, and what we have been trying to do over the past year or so is to broaden that focus in the terrorism world, so it's not just foreign intelligence. For example, right now we are dealing with the

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threat to the homeland that al-Qa'ida poses, and so we've had a number of meetings where organizations that have focused traditionally on foreign intelligence get together with those departments and agencies that are now responsible for domestic intelligence collection and dissemination. As the Intelligence Community evolves over the next year or two, we are going to see continued changes so that, for example, the National Intelligence Collection Board, which has had a foreign intelligence focus, is likely to expand to include domestic intelligence requirements. (U)

Information acquired at the local level in the US could be of high value to TTIC. For example, the local police department in a large Midwest city has an ongoing surveillance program aimed at potential terrorists who are affiliated with a local mosque. Some may be US citizens, others not. Local police have been monitoring their communications with other residents of the US suspected of terrorist ties. Can TTIC request or routinely receive a list of these names and the assessments or observations of that local police department, or are you receiving them now? (U//FOUO)

The FBI has the responsibility for working with local law enforcement as far as getting information that is relevant to the terrorist threat. The FBI, working with its federal, state, and local partners on the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), is putting in place a system that will facili-

"The National Intelligence Collection Board . . . is likely to expand to include domestic intelligence requirements."

tate the reporting and onward dissemination of information acquired by local law enforcement to the broader counterterrorism community. The FBI puts all that information into its databases and information systems, and TTIC has unfettered access to those FBI systems. (U//FOUO)

So it's a "pull system," in effect, for TTIC. (U)

Right, data do not have to be pushed to us by the FBI or by other organizations. That's the great thing about TTIC, we don't have to rely on CIA or FBI or others to package up information and send it to us. We have full real-time visibility into their information systems and databases. So anything that's committed to an electron in the FBI system or the CIA system, we have real-time access to it. (U//FOUO)

One of the most difficult challenges has been access by others in the community to the databases of CIA's Directorate of Operations. The Homeland Security Act provides that DHS is to be given necessary and adequate accesses to all databases containing covered information. To your knowledge, do the legacy IT architectures, which are designed mainly for vertical information flow, currently permit the kind of ready access to raw DO data by both TTIC and the Department of Homeland Security that's mandated by law? (U//FOUO)

Well, we at TTIC have full and unfettered access to DO information systems, DO cable traffic, and DO databases. DHS representatives here in TTIC have that type of access, so the obligation on the part of CIA and FBI to make even the most sensitive information available to DHS is being met. A lot of that is being fulfilled through the TTIC construct, and other types of avenues of information sharing have been created over the past year. So, we feel good here about the visibility that TTIC and the partner agencies have into those information systems. Now what we have to do, as I mentioned earlier, is apply those analytic tools against the databases so that we are able to surface relevant information. (U//FOUO)

If I understand correctly, you're saying it is the responsibility of DHS officers assigned to TTIC to determine whether data they have access to should be relayed to their colleagues back in their home agency of DHS. (U)

It is correct up to a point. DHS analysts have visibility into the CIA and FBI databases and information systems, and if they see anything that is of relevance to the Department of Homeland Security that has not yet been formally disseminated, we have mechanisms in place that allow

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that analyst to go back to CIA or the FBI and say, "you may not realize this, but this information is important. It must be disseminated." We at TTIC do not disseminate raw intelligence. But it is our responsibility to make sure that if we identify something that is important, we then tell the originating agency, "You must get this out, you must disseminate this, it is important to others." (U)

But we cannot allow individual officers to decide and then disseminate on their own what within that great mass of raw intelligence should go to other entities. It has to be done the right way; we take very seriously our obligations to protect sources and methods. We have been given visibility into the most sensitive information that the US government has available to it, and we have to make sure that we protect sources and methods and do the right thing as far as sharing that information. (U)

You've touched already on the dissemination challenge and the important progress that's been made. Do TTIC responsibilities for dissemination of your products stop at the national level now, deferring to DHS or the FBI for further dissemination to state and local officials under certain circumstances? (U)

Correct. When TTIC was stood up, it was decided that we would disseminate information directly only to our federal partners. And so we share information with DHS, FBI, DOD, and others.

"What we don't want is to have everybody 'shotgunning' information to all the different constituencies."

DHS has the statutory responsibility and the primary responsibility for sharing information with state and local officials as well as the private sector. The FBI has a statutory responsibility to make sure that information is shared with law enforcement. So, what we do is provide information and analysis to DHS and FBI so that they can then share it as appropriate with their non-federal constituents. (U)

This is part of the nascent national architecture for both horizontal and vertical information sharing. We need to be able to move information from the Top-Secret level of a federal department all the way to the Sensitive-But-Unclassified (SBU) level such that it is available to the cop on the street or the local mayor. But it has to be done in a coordinated and orchestrated fashion. What we don't want to do is to have everybody "shotgunning" information to all the different constituencies. We have to recognize roles and responsibilities, and DHS has a certain responsibility for forwarding that information down vertically, as does the FBI. (U)

Suppose TTIC prepares a classified report on a likely foreign terrorist threat to a private oil refinery in Texas. DHS wants to alert the affected private sector persons. Who makes the decision regarding the scope and nature of what DHS or the FBI can disseminate further? Is that determination made by DHS, or must the "data owners" or originator give prior approval? (U)

I prefer the term "data stewards" to "data owners," because stewardship implies an obligation to fulfill the responsibilities of information sharing. Right now, to take your example, DHS would have to make sure that the data steward—for example, the CIA or FBI—is comfortable with the language being sent to a broader audience. In most cases today, there's no reason, from a technical or policy perspective, that even sensitive information acquired by CIA's foreign intelligence collection should not flow expeditiously from the point of origin to TTIC, DHS, and FBI, as well as to non-federal entities. And if it has to go down to the governor or the mayor or the local police chief, you can shape the information at the point of origination or put it into a format that is going to be usable at its endpoint that also protects sources and methods. (U)

I would argue that CIA officers abroad need to send in a report that can be broken down automatically into two parts. One part contains the "who, what, where, when, and how" of an imminent terrorist attack, and that information goes quickly at the SBU level to all the appropri-

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ate end users. The other part of the report that provides the classified contextual information that's operationally sensitive and is not needed at the local level goes to a more restricted group of users. If the report has to go to the governor, mayor, or local police chief, there must be recognition at the point of origination that what's involved is the need to rapidly share actionable intelligence, and that means creating a format that makes information in the report "separable." (U)

Right now, using your example, we see too many human interventions: a report comes in; a request is made for a releasable tear-line; it's then put into tear-line format; then it goes out to a federal consumer set at a classified level; and then that consumer will come back with a request to prepare it again at the SBU level for sharing with local law enforcement, and it has to go back to the originating agency to approve the language. There are too many steps here; it eats up time and resources. So we need to reengineer the system to make it more efficient from the get-go. That's why I emphasize so much the importance of coming to agreement on the overall business process architecture, to include greater clarity of information requirements based on agreed-upon roles and responsibilities. (U)

Some of the analytic puzzles you work at the TTIC level may benefit from information first discovered by state or local authorities—for example, reports of suspect behavior or casing activity at vulnerable sites. How well does the flow of information work in this direction, and who is responsible for ensuring local law enforcement knows what activities or behavior may have intelligence significance at TTIC? (U)

"TTIC-like organizations are sprouting up worldwide."

You are absolutely right. It needs to be a two-way flow, from locals coming up as well as from federal officials going down, and all the way into the international environment. At this point, the FBI has the unique responsibility of ensuring that local law enforcement is kept informed of the terrorist threat and is provided requirements and information that will allow them to identify those things that are potentially terrorist related. DHS has a similar responsibility with respect to non-law enforcement officials at the state and local levels and leaders in the private sector. This is the direction in which the whole national architecture is evolving. (U)

It is a very complex "system of systems" for ensuring education, information flow, and product dissemination systems across multiple domains within the US. And then you expand it into the international context, because we're really talking about an international coalition against the terrorist threat. So it becomes an enormous challenge to integrate and knit together the different elements. Many have shared interests and responsibilities, but they frequently have very different mission responsibilities. This is obviously a daunting challenge and meeting it will take time. (U)

Can you expand on the new challenges in the international context, particularly as they affect traditional intelligence liaison activities? Within the Intelligence Community, there is increased emphasis on horizontal integration to respond effectively. Liaison relationships, however, typically have been the province of vertically organized collection organizations. Can you, as the director of TTIC, interact seamlessly and efficiently with counterparts in other countries without being impeded by business practices that grew up around older organizational arrangements? (U)

Well, TTIC isn't trying to take over the liaison responsibilities of these individual agencies. CIA and FBI will always maintain close, robust relationships with sister services overseas. But interestingly, other TTIC-like organizations are sprouting up worldwide. This reflects recognition that, with the very complexity of the challenge and the multitude of official entities involved in terrorism, national governments need a "portal," a place where you can plug these elements and information systems together. And so we

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have a very close relationship with our British counterpart, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center. The Australians also have a TTIC-like structure, and other countries are moving down that road. The existence of these integrated, multi-agency national entities like TTIC makes for more effective international cooperation on terrorism than exclusive reliance on agency-to-agency connections. (U//FOUO)

Given the level of scrutiny and evaluation the Intelligence Community is receiving from so many quarters today, it is not surprising that radically different arrangements are being considered for managing and organizing intelligence. From the perspective of your unique mission, what would be the distinctive characteristics of a transformed Intelligence Community? (U)

> **"The key to success involves harnessing the diverse capabilities from all elements of the US government."**

First and foremost, I would say better integration of effort. This is the key to success. It involves harnessing the diverse capabilities from all elements of the US government and applying them in an integrated way against priority national security issues. This will enhance both effectiveness and efficiency. A second desirable feature would be orchestration—clear leadership of a complex community. This is where the concept of a National Intelligence Director (NID) becomes attractive. It responds to the growing need for a well-coordinated effort, involving a vast array of capabilities applied against a very complex problem so that what emerges sounds more like a symphony than a cacophony. This orchestration of effort obviously is important not just for the foreign intelligence establishment, but extending to domestic intelligence as well. These are the main characteristics of the Intelligence Community I would like to see evolve. (U)

John, thank you very much for your time today. (U)



John Brennan with *Studies* Editorial Board Chairman Paul Johnson. (U//FOUO)

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Maintaining Vigilance

Counterintelligence in the War Against Terrorism (U)

Michael J. Sulick

> **"Closer integration could maximize the contributions of powerful counterintelligence tools in the fight against terrorism."**

Michael J. Sulick served as the Associate Deputy Director for Operations at CIA.

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US counterintelligence (CI) sometimes failed during the Cold War. Until unmasked, a number of Soviet spies inflicted serious damage on national security that could have shifted the balance in a war with the Soviet Union. The Soviets would have enjoyed significant military advantage armed with, among other secrets, the US Continuity of Government plan passed by Robert Hanssen, the volumes on US Navy capabilities from the Walker spy ring, and information on tactical nuclear weapons and military communications from retired Army Sgt. Clyde Conrad. Fortunately, the United States and the Soviet Union never went to war, and Moscow never had the opportunity to exploit the advantages gained from its Cold War spies. (U)

Now, however, the United States *is* at war. The enemy can immediately exploit information gained through espionage to launch attacks. Imagine a Hanssen or an Ames spying for a terrorist group, providing them data about US counterterrorist sources, analyses, and intelligence gaps—the damage could be catastrophic. Terrorist espionage inside the US Intelligence Community is no longer a remote possibility. Clandestine reporting has surfaced terrorist plans to infiltrate the community, and the number of government employees and applicants investigated on suspicion of terrorist connections is steadily increasing. Considering the potential speed of implementation and high-casualty focus of terrorist tactics, US counterintelligence cannot afford to fail to uncover enemy spies in this war. (U)

Neutralizing espionage is only one of the roles that counterintelligence plays. CI also compiles and analyzes information on the enemy's security services to disrupt their intelligence collection against the United States and facilitate our penetration of their ranks. It establishes mechanisms to protect sensitive intelligence through compartmentation, yet disseminate that intelligence to appropriate consumers. CI provides critical support to intelligence collection by vetting sources to ensure that information is comprehensive, accurate, and not designed to deceive—in the terrorist arena, disinformation from a single double agent could divert us from a real attack. The very nature of terrorist tactics, relying on surprise, clandestinity, and compartmentation, has thrust intelligence into a central role in the war against terrorism. (U)

The critical role of intelligence in this war argues for closer integration of counterintelligence and counterterrorist efforts than now exists. In a recent article in *The Economist*, six distinguished IC retirees emphasized the need for a new approach: ". . . the jobs

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"Terrorists spy before they terrorize."

of countering terrorism and countering hostile intelligence services are hardly distinguishable from the other. To separate them artificially, as the IC does now, is to make a difficult task even harder."[1] Along the same line, retired Gen. William Odom, a former director of NSA, noted the link between counterintelligence and counterterrorism in testimony before the US Senate: "CI is intelligence about the enemy's intelligence . . . because terrorists have much in common with spies, operating clandestinely, CI must also include counterterrorism intelligence, both domestically and abroad."[2] (S)

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This article examines the many ways in which closer integration of these similar missions could maximize the contributions of powerful counterintelligence tools in the fight against terrorism. (U)

Terrorists as Intelligence Operatives (U)

Simply put, terrorist groups operate like intelligence services. Terrorists spy before they terrorize. They case and observe their targets. They collect intelligence about their enemy's vulnerabilities from elicitation and open sources. They vet potential recruits by rigorous screening procedures. Like intelligence officers, terrorists practice tradecraft. Materials found in al-Qa'ida safehouses in Afghanistan and other countries include training manuals on espionage tradecraft, such as the identification of clandestine meeting and deaddrop sites, techniques to recruit sources, covert communications, and tracking and reporting on targets. (U)

Terrorists also prepare their operatives to live cover with an intensity Soviet illegals would have envied. In an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Afghanistan, US forces discovered handwritten notes with guidance on operating under cover, including tips on traveling in alias, pocket litter to carry, and types of clothing to wear, down to details about the proper underwear to don in a foreign land.[3] (U)

For al-Qa'ida terrorists, living cover even has the sanction of Islamic doctrine. Some of the September 11 hijackers were believed to have been adherents of *takfiri wal Hijra*, an extremist offshoot of the Moslem Brotherhood spawned in the 1960s, whose adherents claim that the Koran advocates integration by Moslems into corrupt societies as a means of plotting attacks against them.[4] According to *takfiri* precepts, al-Qa'ida operatives can play the infidel to gain access to the enemy's targets and can even violate Islamic laws provided that the goal justifies the otherwise illicit behavior. The September 11 hijackers wore expensive jewelry and sprayed themselves with cologne at US airports, believing that these Western traits would shield them from the scrutiny given orthodox Moslems. The immersion of these 19 hijackers into American society tragically illustrates the effectiveness of living cover down to the smallest detail. (U)

If terrorist groups operate like intelligence services, counterintelligence can play the same role in combating them as it has and

[1] Bob Bryant, John Hamre, John Lawn, John MacGaffin, Howard Shapiro, Jeffrey Smith, "America Needs More Spies," *The Economist*, 10 July 2003: 3. (U)
[2] William Odom, Testimony to the US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 21 June 2002. (U)
[3] Susan B. Glasser, "A Terrorist's Guide to Infiltrating the West," *The Washington Post*, 9 December 2001: A1. (U)
[4] Jane Corbin, *The Base: Al Qaeda and the Changing Face of Global Terror* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 131–32. (U)

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> **"The best defense is recruitment of our own spies in their ranks."**

continues to do against the Russian SVR, the Chinese Ministry of State Security, and other intelligence services hostile to US interests. One of the primary tasks of CI is gaining a thorough knowledge of an adversary's intelligence service—its capabilities, organization, modus operandi, personalities, and use of cover. Such comprehensive knowledge can enable defensive measures to disrupt terrorist intelligence collection, but its primary goal is offensive counterintelligence: the recruitment of spies within the ranks of adversary intelligence-like organizations. The best defense against enemy spies, whether from foreign intelligence services or terrorist groups, has been and always will be the recruitment of our own spies in their ranks. (U)

Exposing Terrorist Spies (U)

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John Walker Lindh, however, was of a different mold. Dubbed the "American Taliban" after his capture in Afghanistan, Lindh, came from an affluent northern California suburb, had no criminal record,

[6] *Ibid.* (S)

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and carried decent academic credentials. He had studied Arabic and traveled extensively in the Middle East, experiences that might have made him an attractive candidate for US intelligence. If terrorists operate like intelligence services, intelligence officers should assume that they will attempt to infiltrate the security agencies of their main enemy by cultivating promising candidates for employment with backgrounds similar to Lindh's. (U)

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Terrorist spies within the Intelligence Community also would present more imminent risks than Cold War spies who passed information on US plans, intentions, and capabilities. Once the Cold War spies were discovered, the government had time to adopt and implement countermeasures to balance the losses. But time is not on our side in the war on terrorism. Terrorist spies within the Intelligence Community could acquire information on gaps and vulnerabilities that could be used to plan attacks in very short order, or could even launch attacks from within against the agencies themselves. Our current security system was designed in the Cold War to protect classified information, not personnel and physical infrastructure. Now, however, we must develop a system that can do both. (U)

More Employees to Worry About (U)

The problem of protection against spies from within is further complicated by the fact that personnel and facilities must also be defended from individuals with minimal or no clearance—custodial staff, cafeteria workers, maintenance and delivery personnel—who have no access to areas with classified information, but could still pose a threat. While some government employees still flinch at the rumble of jets from a nearby aircraft, the terrorist insider with minimal or no clearance could silently poison the food or water supply or plant a time bomb while cleaning an empty office. (FOUO)

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"Terrorist D&D borrows from the Soviets and Islamic tradition."

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Terrorist D&D (U)

Terrorist groups have proven their ability to adopt the sophisticated D&D techniques of our Cold War adversaries: double agents reporting on the same threat to validate each other's information, passing vague yet enticing tidbits without details, and engaging in intentionally misleading telephone conversations that they expect to be intercepted. (U)

Terrorist D&D not only borrows from the Soviet bloc services but also is deeply rooted in Islamic tradition. Shiite Muslims, for example, practiced the concepts of *taqiya*, precautionary deception and dissimulation, and *kitman*, the concealment of malevolent intentions, against their Sunni enemies in the 7th century, and they continue to do so against today's adversaries.[8] One of the common tactics of kitman and taqiya involves "deceptive triangulation,"—persuading one enemy that a jihad is directed against another enemy. Taqiya is regarded as a virtue and a religious duty, a "holy hypocrisy" that justified lies and subterfuge in defense of the faith. Current attempts by double agents to plant bogus information about planned attacks draw from this ancient practice. (U)

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[8] "Taqiya and Kitman: The Role of Deception in Islamic Terrorism," <www.CI-CE-CT.com>, 2 December 2002. (U)

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Caveats (U)

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> **"Intelligence is now vital to a host of non-traditional users."**

Counterterrorism entails rapid turnover of agents, fast-paced operations, quick reactions, and tactical moves to exploit actionable intelligence in order to counter imminent threats. Counterintelligence, on the other hand, inherently involves long and patient study, painstaking review, and correlation of details to gradually illuminate the shadows around its targets. It is the difference between a quick game on a pinball machine and an elaborate jigsaw puzzle. (U)

Sharing Intelligence Down the Line (U)

One of the most dramatic developments after September 11 was the recognition that intelligence information needs to be shared among a vast number of consumers to prevent future terrorist attacks. Intelligence previously disseminated to a handful of top policymakers is now vital for a host of non-traditional users in the counterterrorist arena, particularly the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies and state and local law enforcement that had never required such access in the past. (U)

The budding alliance between intelligence and law enforcement is still an uneasy one. As former CIA General Counsel Jeffrey Smith wryly noted, "It's like putting diplomacy in the War Department."[10] Intelligence collects secrets, informs policymakers, and warns of threats; law enforcement catches criminals and tries them in public. In the counterterrorist arena, these distinctions are now blurred by the need to share intelligence with law enforcement and the need for law enforcement to act on that intelligence. (U)

Expanding the number and type of recipients of intelligence inevitably increases the risk of leaks of classified information. Such compromises can be costly, jeopardizing the security of agents operating in the most unforgiving environments, shutting down technical collection operations, tipping off terrorists to our capabilities, and perhaps driving them toward new plans and targets. (U)

Leaks of counterterrorist intelligence can also damage one of our most critical assets in the counterterrorist campaign: cooperation with foreign liaison services. The transnational activities and compartmented nature of terrorist groups require in-depth knowledge of foreign environments and cross-border

[10] Jeffrey Smith, quoted by Ralph Blumenthal, "War of Secrets," *New York Times*, 8 September 2002: 16. (U)

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cooperation that unilateral efforts alone cannot provide. The United States cannot promote liaison cooperation, however, without ensuring that counterintelligence concerns are addressed. (U)

Unfortunately, our record in protecting liaison information and sources has been flawed on occasion. As a result, some foreign governments and their intelligence services deliberately withhold information from us out of concern for leaks in the US media. Other governments cooperate with us only behind the scenes because of domestic political considerations and the absence of good counterintelligence in handling their information could abruptly halt this discreet flow of information. (U)

Counterintelligence alone will not eliminate the probability of some compromises of counterterrorist information. We have never avoided compromises in other areas, and we face a far more daunting challenge in counterterrorism considering the volumes of information and increased numbers of consumers. Nor will counterintelligence resolve the inherent contradiction between expanded intelligence sharing and compartmentation of sources and methods. CI can, however, help establish mechanisms to achieve some balance between the two. (U)

CIA and the FBI have developed special controls to disseminate

> **“Leaks can damage critical cooperation with foreign liaison services.”**

sensitive counterespionage information to appropriate consumers without jeopardizing penetrations of our most hostile and vigilant adversaries. Counterintelligence can now assist other counterterrorist programs in developing similar controls balancing the “need-to-know” principle with the requirement for increased dissemination. Counterintelligence also develops strategies to mitigate the damage from intelligence compromises once they occur to enable crucial decisions on the continued use of particular sources and methods. Finally, counterintelligence conducts damage assessments after compromises and produces “lessons learned” studies to enable necessary adjustments that may prevent similar losses in the future. (U)

Counterintelligence training can also help to familiarize new consumers with the proper procedures for handling intelligence. The Department of Homeland Security has established a counterintelligence office of its own and set among its main tasks a counterintelligence awareness program for its constituent agencies and state and local law enforcement officials. CIC already manages an extensive CIA training program open to Intelligence Community members that focuses on counterintelligence awareness. To the extent resources permit, CIA as well as other agencies sponsoring similar training should collaborate with DHS to develop and implement tailored counterintelligence awareness training for state and local officials who are granted access to intelligence information. All efforts to ensure that the expanded pool of recipients handles sensitive material carefully are steps in the right direction. Any leak averted as a result may be a source protected or, perhaps, a terrorist attack prevented. (U)

Next Steps (U)

While many of the comments above apply to CIA’s two core missions of operations and analysis, the integration of counterintelligence practices throughout the Intelligence Community could enhance overall US intelligence collection and analysis on terrorism. Some have argued that Intelligence Community reorganization is required to integrate the two disciplines. Gen. Odom has advocated a new “National Counterintelligence Service” to manage counterterrorism and counterintelligence.[11] The retired intelligence professionals cited in *The Economist* article proposed a new organization within the FBI incorporating counterintelligence and

[11] William Odom, Testimony to the US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 21 June 2002. (U)

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counter-terrorism and subordinate to the DCI—somewhat similar to the National Reconnaissance Office's joint relationship with the Department of Defense and the DCI.[12] (U)

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Discussion of broad Intelligence Community reorganization goes beyond the scope of this article. While debate proceeds about reorganization, however, valuable time is lost as terrorists plan more attacks. Counterintelligence operational, analytic, and investigative capabilities already exist and are well-developed in key national security agencies. The issue is marrying these capabilities more closely with counterterrorist efforts and ensuring that counterintelligence professionals and their tools—their knowledge of intelligence service modi operandi, agent validation procedures, D&D analysis, and compartmentation mechanisms—are fully integrated into counterterrorist components of the IC. (U)

[12] Bryant, *et. al.*, *The Economist*, 10 July 2003: 4. (U)

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> **Counterintelligence must impose itself now.**

In Conclusion (U)

CIA and other US intelligence agencies were established by law for the primary purpose of collecting intelligence to protect national security, not to catch spies and conduct counterintelligence activities. But we cannot ensure that our intelligence is complete, accurate, and protected unless it is supported by solid counterintelligence practices. Counterintelligence, sometimes described as the "skunk at the party," is often resisted by intelligence officers troubled by its innately mistrustful and skeptical approach. As former Chief of CIC Jim Olson has remarked: "There's a natural human tendency on the part of both case officers and senior operations managers to resist outside scrutiny . . . when necessary, a CI service has to impose itself on organizations and groups it is assigned to protect."[14] Considering the high stakes in the war on terrorism, it is time for counterintelligence to impose itself now. (U)

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[14] James Olson, "The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence," *Studies in Intelligence* 45, no. 3, 2001: 57–58. (U)

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Setting Operational Precedents

The Road to Covert Action in Iran, 1953 (U)

Scott A. Koch

> **"US decisionmakers perceived Iranian events through the broad strategic lens of the Cold War."**

Scott Koch is chief of the CIA History Staff.

(b)(3)(c)

August 2003 marked the 50th anniversary of TPAJAX, the US government's covert action in Iran that culminated in the fall of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq. Washington feared that the deteriorating Iranian political situation and Mossadeq's inability or unwillingness to deal with the increasingly confrontational Iranian Communist Party would lead to the collapse of the central government in Teheran. The Iranian communists, with Moscow's full backing, would then step in amid the chaos, seize power, and declare Iran a peoples' republic. Yet another country would fall behind the Iron Curtain. (U)

Reverberations from the US government's role in deposing Mossadeq continue. At least one contemporary account links the CIA's action in Iran 50 years ago to current global anti-American terrorism, making it timely to revisit that era.[1] Over the years, most scholars have focused on the tactical aspects and outcome of operation TPAJAX itself, but US decisionmakers at the time perceived Iranian events through the broad strategic lens of the Cold War. This article examines the policymaking dynamics in Washington that led to the pivotal covert action. (U)

Antecedents (U)

During the 1950s, Washington considered the Middle East in general, and Iran in particular, to be among the great strategic prizes in the geopolitical and ideological struggle against the Soviet Union. But it was not always so. For almost 175 years, American policymakers ignored Iran because they had no reason to do otherwise. (U)

World War II and the immediate postwar years changed the US government's attitude toward Iran. During the war, the country had become an important route for American aid to the Soviet Army, engaged in a life-or-death struggle with Hitler's *Wehrmacht*.[2] Soviet troops remained in northern Iran immediately after the war, encouraging pro-communist separatist regimes in Iranian Azerbaijan and the Kurdish


[1] See Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003). The reader will find a review of Kinzer's book in *Studies in Intelligence* 48, no. 2 (2004)—available at http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies.html. (U)

[2] Eventually, almost a quarter of American aid for the Soviet Union went through Iran. Convoys using northern sea routes lost about 20 percent of their cargoes to the Nazis; however, only 8 percent of cargoes sent to the Persian Gulf for shipment through Iran failed to arrive. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 284, 404. (U)

region. Washington anticipated that Moscow would demand the "unification" of Iranian Azerbaijan with Soviet Azerbaijan, and the crisis escalated from January through March 1946. In response to aggressive Soviet troop movements, Iran, with the strong support of the United States, took the matter to the United Nations. Faced with an almost certain diplomatic defeat, the Soviets removed their troops from Iran before the UN could consider the matter.[3] (U)

The United States would have preferred to withdraw from the Persian Gulf after the end of World War II, but the postwar British retreat and retrenchment "East of Suez" created a vacuum that Washington felt obligated to fill. After London announced that Great Britain could no longer supply military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey in their struggles against communist-inspired insurgents, President Harry Truman publicly declared in March 1947 that the United States would support free peoples everywhere who were "resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[4] For Iran, this "Truman Doctrine" meant that the United States was

Iran and Environs



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[3] For discussions of the Azeri crisis in early 1946, see Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977); Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–73*, 2d ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974); and John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). (U)

[4] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, Harry S. Truman (Washington, DC: Federal Register Division, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1947), 179. (U)

replacing Britain as the main geopolitical counterweight to the Soviet Union. (U)

For the first three years after President Truman's declaration, the United States paid relatively little attention to Iran, even though that oil-rich country was experiencing serious economic problems, widespread popular discontent with the government, and growing agitation by supporters of the Iranian Communist (Tudeh) Party. (U)

In April 1950, Director of Central Intelligence Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter drew Secretary of State Dean Acheson's attention to "the urgent need for additional intelligence coverage of Iran." DCI Hillenkoetter emphasized that the CIA was unable to draft reliable national intelligence estimates on the country because it simply did not have enough information. He wrote:

> *[We can] tell US policy makers that some sort of crisis does exist, but cannot confidently answer such specific pertinent questions as: (1) how serious the situation actually is; (2) how adequate are Iran's own resources for meeting its present difficulties; and (3) how capable the Iranian Government is of using these resources.*[5] *(S)*

Hillenkoetter proposed two solutions: the CIA could try to diversify its sources, or, alternatively, "existing coverage might be expanded through the establishment of a consulate in the strategically important southwestern part of Iran."[6] The extant records do not contain Acheson's reaction to Hillenkoetter's letter. (S)

"The DCI drew the Secretary of State's attention to 'the urgent need for additional intelligence coverage of Iran.'"

Twisting the British Lion's Tail (U)

On 7 March 1951, an Islamic fundamentalist assassinated Iranian Prime Minister Gen. Ali Razmara.[7] Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's initial choice to succeed Razmara, Hussein Ala, resigned after only a few weeks. Then, on 29 April 1951, the Shah appointed Mohammed Mossadeq, a career politician and leader in the National Front, a loose coalition of political parties professing liberal democratic aims and opposing foreign intervention in Iranian affairs. Mossadeq's elevation set in motion a series of events that were to bring American and British officials face to face with one of the most mercurial, maddening, adroit, and provocative leaders with whom they had ever dealt. (U)

Severe economic and political problems awaited Mossadeq, and it was not obvious that he had the skill to solve them. In a Special Estimate prepared one month after the new prime minister took office, the CIA's Office of National Estimates (ONE) characterized him as an "impractical visionary and a poor administrator," but, at the same time, recognized that he was in a strong political position that was unlikely to deteriorate in the foreseeable future.[8] (S)

Mossadeq immediately turned his attention to the unfolding struggle for control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The Shah had renewed the British oil concession in Iran in 1949; however, by 1950, the arrangement had become a sore point in relations between the two countries. In March 1951, when Mossadeq was a member of the Majlis (the Iranian Parliament), he had submitted a bill, which was quickly passed, nationalizing the AIOC. Just three days after becoming prime minister, he signed the bill into law; nationalization went into effect on 2 May, retroactive to 20 March 1951. (U)

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[5] Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Rear Adm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 11 April 1950, Records of the State Department, RG 59, Lot 57, D 529, NND959286, "Iran 1946–54," box 4, National Archives and Records Administration. (S)

[6] *Ibid. (S)*

[7] Razmara's assassin was a member of the Fadayane Islam underground organization. (U)

[8] Office of National Estimates, "*Current Developments in Iran,*" SE-6, 22 May 1951, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA Archives and Records Center [hereinafter ARC]. (S)

The AIOC's nationalization brought Mossadeq and Iran into immediate conflict with Britain. The British government owned half of the AIOC's stock and did not intend to permit nationalization of its assets without the compensation that international law required.[9] (U)

"The Antics of Incomprehensible Orientals" (U)

Britain and Iran tried to resolve the dispute over nationalization, but differing negotiating styles and personalities made agreement elusive. Many Britons found inexplicable Mossadeq's seemingly impossible demands and unpredictably shifting arguments. L. P. Elwell-Sutton captured the mood of British policymakers at the time when he wrote, "Really, it seemed hardly fair that dignified and correct western statesmanship should be defeated by the antics of incomprehensible orientals."[10] (U)

For his part, Mossadeq found the British comprehensible, but evil. He and millions of Iranians believed that for centuries Britain had manipulated their country for British ends. Many Iranians seemed convinced that British intrigue was at the root of every domestic misfortune. In 1951, Mossadeq told US Special Envoy W. Averell Harriman, "You do not know how crafty they [the British] are. You do not know how evil they are. You do not know how they sully everything they touch." Harriman protested that surely the British were like people everywhere, some bad, some good. But the American envoy did not persuade Mossadeq. "You do not know them," he insisted. "You do not know them."[11] (U)

> **"Mossadeq found the British comprehensible, but evil."**

When it seemed clear that Tehran had no intention of providing compensation for AIOC assets at any level London might accept, the British mounted a multi-pronged effort to reassert control over the company. They hoped legal and economic pressure would convince Mossadeq to settle on British terms. If not, they were prepared to force him from office and replace him with someone open to compromise on terms favorable to the AIOC. (U)

London first asked the International Court of Justice to arbitrate the dispute, but Iran rejected the tribunal's jurisdiction on the ground that the nationalization of the AIOC was a purely domestic matter. London then offered Mossadeq two separate proposals to resolve the compensation dispute, but the prime minister did not consider them because neither addressed the issue of Iran's sovereignty over its own oil. The British thereafter refused to deal directly with Mossadeq. (U)

Turning to economic weapons, in September 1951, Britain placed an embargo on shipments of steel, sugar, iron, and oil-processing equipment to Iran—affecting almost everything that the Iranians could exchange for dollars. The AIOC laid off 20,000 oil workers at the port of Abadan, leaving Mossadeq little choice but to put them on the government payroll. Gradually, the flow of Iranian oil to the rest of the world stopped. (U)

London also staged ostentatious military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf to try to weaken the Iranian leader's negotiating position. A British airborne brigade arrived in Cyprus, and a Royal Navy cruiser and four destroyers exercised near the oil facilities at Abadan. Not intimidated by the display of British force, Mossadeq announced that the first shot would start World War III. (U)

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[9] In March 1951, the CIA estimated that 6–8 percent of Iran's national income came from the AIOC and that the company contributed nearly 25 percent of Iran's treasury's receipts. Office of National Estimates, "Iran's Position in the East-West Conflict," NIE-6 [draft], 21 March 1951, Directorate of Operations, Job 79-01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, ARC. (S)

[10] L. P. Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics* (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1955), 258. (U)

[11] James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 64–65, quoting Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), 247–48. (U)

Mossadeq Looks To America (U)

Like many in the Third World immediately after World War II, Mossadeq saw the United States as an anti-colonial power and looked to Washington for support against the British. His hopes were not entirely misplaced; the Truman administration thought that his position had some merit. (U)

Secretary of State Acheson viewed the British as overly preoccupied with their oil interests and concluded that London did not fully understand the broad communist threat. He saw Mossadeq as a potentially important part of a solution to the problem of Soviet influence in the Middle East. In Acheson's opinion, the nationalistic Iranian prime minister, in time, would become an effective bulwark against Soviet penetration into Iran. To that end, Washington consistently urged London to reach an equitable settlement with Tehran. Acheson apparently was convinced that an agreement would strengthen the Iranian government and, thus, promote regional stability.[12] (U)

Other considerations complicated the Truman administration's approach. The United States was loath to side publicly with Iran or put excessive pressure on London. Washington needed cooperation and support from Britain—America's closest ally—elsewhere in the world. The war in Korea was not yet over, and the presence of British combat troops was an important symbol of Anglo-American solidarity. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created in 1949, was still in its formative stages and depended upon British participation as evidence of Western unity and determination. (U)

"Mossadeq saw the United States as an anti-colonial power and looked to Washington for support against the British."

President Truman had no patience with those refusing to view the Anglo-Iranian problem in a global context. When US Ambassador to Iran Henry Grady wrote to Truman complaining that the White House was not listening to his advice, the president let him know exactly where he stood:

> *Let me tell you something about the Iranian situation from this end . . . . [We] held Cabinet meetings on it—we held Security Council meetings on it, and Dean, Bob Lovett, Charlie Sawyer, Harriman and all the senior staff of the Central Intelligence discussed that awful situation with me time and again . . . We tried . . . to get the block headed British to have their oil company make a fair deal with Iran. No, they could not do that. They know all about how to handle it—we didn't according to them.*
>
> *We had Israel, Egypt, Near East defense, Sudan, South Africa, Tunisia, the NATO treaties all on the fire. Britain and the Commonwealth Nations were and are absolutely essential if these things are successful. Then, on top of it all we have Korea and Indo-China. Iran was only one incident. Of course the man on the ground in each one of these places can only see his own problem.*[13] *(U)*

The CIA's Position (U)

The suggestion that British forces might occupy the port city of Abadan or launch some other military action against Iran set off alarms in the CIA's Office of National Estimates. In an April 1951 memorandum to DCI Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Dr. William Langer, the deputy chief

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[12] Acheson criticized "the unusual and persistent stupidity of the [Anglo-Iranian Oil] company and the British Government" when it came to Iran. See, Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), 501, as quoted in Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 453. Also, see Richard W. Cottam, *Iran & the United States: A Cold War Case Study* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 102. (U)

[13] Farhad Diba, *Mohammad Mossadegh: A Political Biography* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 131–32, citing papers of Henry Grady (emphasis added). (U)

of ONE, warned that the appearance of British troops in Iran might result in Soviet occupation of the northern part of the country under the terms of the 1921 treaty of friendship between Persia and Soviet Russia.[14] (C)

> **"The CIA feared the [communists] would be able to seize control under the chaotic conditions of a British occupation."**

In June 1951, Langer sent another memorandum to Smith

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[14] William L. Langer, Assistant Director, Office of National Estimates, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith, "Situation in Iran," 20 April 1951, Directorate of Operations Records, Job 79-01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, ARC. (C)

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The documents in the CIA's files do not indicate whether Smith relayed Langer's concerns to President Truman. There is no historical evidence to suggest that he did so, or even that the president knew about the memorandum; whether the memorandum influenced the president remains speculation. Nonetheless, after Langer's memorandum, the administration let London know that the US government disapproved of *any* military action against Iran. At a British cabinet meeting in September 1951, the government of Prime Minister Clement Attlee decided that it "'could not afford to break with the United States on an issue of this kind.'"[18] A potential military crisis had passed. (U)

[16] *Ibid.* (S)
[17] *Ibid.* (S)

Counting on Mossadeq (U)

The question of Iran's domestic stability remained, however. Could Mossadeq resist the Tudeh if it came to a confrontation? Neither Langer nor any of the Iran specialists in the CIA's clandestine service—the Office of Special Operations (OSO) and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)—thought that the Iranian communists had sufficient strength to topple Mossadeq without help. As long as the central government remained able to deal with events, Langer and others considered the danger of a Tudeh coup to be negligible.

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The Tudeh Party would come to power, the

[18] H. W. Brands, *Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918–1961* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 234. (U)

CIA judged, only through chaos and impotent central authority. (S)

As of 30 July 1952, the US government was committed to supporting Mossadeq because he represented the only alternative to political chaos.[20] That evening, CIA representatives met at the State Department with Secretary of State Acheson, Under Secretary of State David K. E. Bruce, and senior department officers.[21]

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[20] It is difficult to underestimate the importance that American policymakers placed on improving domestic stability in the region. In July 1952, the Psychological Strategy Board characterized this part of the world as "a military vacuum, an economic slum, a political anachronism, and a house divided against itself." (S)

[21] Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department of State and member of the Senior Staff, National Security Council; Robert P. Joyce, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. (U)

"The US was committed to supporting Mossadeq as the only alternative to political chaos."

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The CIA's Office of National Estimates continued to think that Mossadeq would remain in power for the near future and that a Tudeh coup was unlikely—the same conclusion that OSO and OPC had reached the previous January. A November 1952 estimate informed readers that if the unrest plaguing Iran in 1952 continued through 1953, "rising internal tensions and continued deterioration of the economy and of the budgetary position of the government might lead to a breakdown of government authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by Tudeh." Soviet intervention was unlikely "unless there is a far more serious deterioration of Iranian internal stability than is foreseen in this estimate. However, the USSR has the capability for greatly increasing its overt and covert interference in Iran at any time, to the detriment of US security interests."[25] (U)

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During the last two months of 1952, both ONE and the Iran Branch of the DDP watched events in the Gulf, hoping that things would not change radically and that Mossadeq would be able to hold things together. Events soon dashed their hopes. (U)

Shift in the Wind (U)

Newly-elected President Dwight Eisenhower did not immediately turn his attention to Iran after taking the oath of office in January 1953. He meant to end the Korean War, having pledged to do so during the presidential campaign. To complicate the foreign policy problems facing the new administration, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin died in March 1953, and the White House had to deal with the implications of his death for Soviet-American relations.[26] (U)

Allen Dulles became Director of Central Intelligence in late February 1953 and on 1 March drafted a memorandum for the president apprising him of developments in Iran. Mossadeq remained the single strongest Iranian political leader, Dulles wrote, but the political situation in Teheran was "slowly disintegrating." Given the Shah's predilection to hesitate, forceful action on his part to stabilize and

> **"The British hoped Washington would finally see Mossadeq as the demagogue they thought he was."**

strengthen the government was unlikely. If, however, a showdown developed between the Shah and Mossadeq, "and a real armed conflict ensued between the two opposing elements, the communist Tudeh elements might come up as the victors with their relatively small but well organized group of supporters, and with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, disposing of plenty of funds." Dulles told the president that the CIA was working with Qashqai tribal leaders in the southern part of the country to organize a resistance movement that could become active if the communists took control of the northern half.[27] (S)

The Eisenhower administration had decidedly different views than its predecessor on the desirability of an Anglo-Iranian oil agreement. President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson had encouraged both countries to agree on equitable compensation for the oil company's nationalized assets. Negotiations had collapsed, however, when Mossadeq severed diplomatic relations with Britain in October 1952. By the time Eisenhower took office, neither the British nor Mossadeq appeared willing to back off from their publicly stated, and passionately held, positions. To London's relief, the new US administration abandoned the search for a negotiated end to the crisis. Perhaps now, the British hoped, Washington would finally begin to see Mossadeq as the demagogue London thought he was and take appropriate action. (U)

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[25] Office of National Estimates, "Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953," NIE-75, 13 November 1952, Directorate of Intelligence, ARC. (U)

[26] Brands, 272. (U)

[27] Dulles reported that "A considerable supply of small arms and ammunition [for support of Qashqai tribal leaders] has been assembled

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Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Memorandum, "The Iranian Situation," 1 March 1953, Records of DCI Allen Dulles, Job 80-R01731R, Box 11, Folder 350, ARC. (S)

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That same month, State Department officials and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden met to discuss the Iranian situation. Eden found American officials more receptive to the British viewpoint than they had been under Truman and Acheson. Washington now considered Mossadeq a source of *instability* and feared that his continued tenure invited a Tudeh coup. (U)

The State Department agreed with Eden that Mossadeq had to be replaced, but its reasons differed from his. For Eden and his government, Mossadeq's policies damaged "British prestige, influence, and vital commercial interest." For the Americans, Mossadeq represented a weakened Iran and its increasing vulnerability to Soviet domination.[29]

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[29] Cottam, 103. (U)

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> **"The consensus that Mossadeq had to go did not result in agreement on his replacement."**

Next Steps (U)

The emerging consensus that Mossadeq had to go did not result in agreement on his replacement. US officials briefly considered backing religious leader and former Mossadeq loyalist Ayatollah Abul Quassem Kashani. Kashani was attractive because he had a large following and had become a strident—and vocal—opponent of the prime minister. (U)

CIA headquarters viewed the prospect of a Kashani government with alarm and thought a Kashani-led Iran would be worse for Western interests than Iran under Mossadeq. The ayatollah was likely to be even more difficult on the oil issue and more resistant to Western influence, such as it was, than Mossadeq. While Kashani had a large following in Tehran, his support was not deep and he did not command the respect of the military. Consequently, the CIA thought Kashani was susceptible to overthrow by the military or even Mossadeq's followers. Moreover, a Kashani government would probably result in a "progressive general deterioration of Iran possibly leading to the eventual assumption of power by the Tudeh."[31] (S)

US officials gradually settled on Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi. Zahedi had served as an irregular soldier under the Shah's father, Reza Shah, in 1915, and subsequently had risen through the ranks of the Iranian Army. Zahedi's anti-British views had led him to work for the Germans during World War II, although he was not pro-Nazi. The British arrested him in 1942 for his activities under Nazi agent Franz Mayer and deported him to Palestine; he was released on VE Day in 1945. Zahedi retired from the Iranian army in 1949 and subsequently served in a series of mostly honorary posts. The State Department recognized that he was not ideal but considered him acceptable because he was friendly to the United States and Great Britain. More importantly, he was willing to take the job. (U)

By that time, whoever succeeded Mossadeq was guaranteed American support. In a March 1953 internal memorandum, the State Department's Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs outlined the steps that the United States was likely to take if Mossadeq were to fall. Although American officials would limit their public pronouncements to expressions of unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, privately they would use non-US channels to assure the Shah and the new

[31] Office of National Estimates, "Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime in Iran," SE-33, 14 October 1952, 3; Records of the Office of National Estimates, Directorate of Intelligence, ARC. (S)



CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt in Tehran in 1953. (U)

prime minister that Washington was eager to help. Sensitivity to Iranian concerns that the country was becoming a foreign base precluded ostentatious and immediate American military assistance, but privately the Americans could assure Tehran that meaningful military aid (trucks, communication equipment, and other military-civilian dual-use items) would be forthcoming.[32] (U)

Eisenhower Turns to the CIA (U)

President Eisenhower had several options to promote a regime change in Iran. He could use military force, but that was impractical because it would lead to war. He could hold out hope for a diplomatic solution, but that option, too, was unattractive. Diplomacy had already failed and the political situation in Iran was worsening daily. Finally, he could turn to the CIA to mount a covert political operation—in June 1948, the National Security Council had decided that covert action was a legitimate instrument of US policy.[33] This alternative held the promise of attaining the result that the administration wanted with a minimum of cost and world attention. If such an operation failed, the White House could disavow any knowledge or connection. (U)

Available documents do not indicate who authorized the CIA to begin planning the operation, but it had to be the president himself. Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose has written that the absence of documentation reflects the president's style:

> *Before going into the operation, Ajax had to have the approval of the President. Eisenhower participated in none of the meetings that set up Ajax; he received only oral reports on the plan; and he did not discuss it with his Cabinet or the NSC. Establishing a pattern he would hold to throughout his Presidency, he kept his distance and left no documents behind that could implicate the President in any projected coup. But in the privacy of the Oval Office, over cocktails, he was kept informed by Foster Dulles, and he maintained a tight control over the activities of the CIA.*[34] (U)

Official approval to execute the operation came from the US (b)(3)(n) in July 1953. The CIA had already funded TPAJAX, when, on 6 April 1953, DCI Allen Dulles and DDP Frank Wisner signed an authorization reserving up to (b)(3)(c) for the operation.

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Events Play Out (U)

The CIA was not quite six years old when the Eisenhower admin-

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[32] "Measures Which the United States Government Might Take in Support of a Successor Government to Mosadeq," March 1953, Department of State, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Issues, RG 59, Lot 57, D 529, Box 40, National Archives and Records Administration. (U)

The photo of Kermit Roosevelt is from his book, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). It may be copyrighted and should not be reproduced. (U)

[33] See National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects, NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948. (U)

[34] Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. 2, *The President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 111. Ambrose repeats this paragraph verbatim in *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 333. (U)

[35] Kermit Roosevelt, Chief, Division of Near East and Africa, to Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum, "Support for Special Operation," Directorate of Operations Records, Job 79-01228A, Box 29, Folder 1, ARC. (S)

istration authorized and executed TPAJAX. The "can do" attitude prevalent in the Agency's clandestine service during the initial years of the Cold War was about to face and meet its biggest challenge. (U)

As originally conceived, TPAJAX called for a royalist-led military coup against Mossadeq. The conception of the operation changed when the Shah issued *firmans* (royal decrees) replacing Mossadeq with Zahedi, thus providing Mossadeq's removal with constitutional legitimacy. Mossadeq learned of the *firmans* and made plans for mass arrests on 16 August; royalist troops arrived at his house on the evening of 15 August to arrest him. The prime minister knew they were coming and had troops loyal to him arrest *them*. Officers and troops not in Mossadeq's custody fled. On the morning of 16 August 1953, Radio Teheran broadcast news that the government had thwarted a military coup.[36] (U)

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The demonstration quickly grew in numbers and enthusiasm as the crowds surged through the streets of the Iranian capital, shouting their support for the Shah and demanding that passersby demonstrate their loyalty by displaying the monarch's portrait—even if only on Iranian paper currency held up to a windshield. The soldiers that Mossadeq deployed to keep order lined the streets but did not interfere. Military passivity gave way to fraternization, which in turn became overt support. The prime minister fled for his life as the crowd headed for his residence. Monarchist forces seized the government radio station and Mossadeq's authority collapsed. The Shah, who had left Tehran on 12 August and eventually landed in Rome on 18 August, returned to Iran several days later convinced that the people had risen to his defense.[37] (S)

Postscript (U)

It is no exaggeration to say that TPAJAX owed its success to Kermit Roosevelt,

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Roosevelt returned to a hero's welcome at the highest levels of government. (S)

Although the CIA did not conduct a post-mortem analysis of TPAJAX, in September 1953 Roosevelt talked about his role before a group that included President Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Cabinet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others. John Waller, chief of the Iran Branch in the CIA's Near East and Africa Division, was among the CIA invitees and vividly recalled Roosevelt's presentation. Roosevelt kept his audience enthralled for two hours and emphasized that the operation had succeeded because it enjoyed the support of the Iranian army and the people. It also succeeded, he emphasized, because he did not have Washington second-guessing his every

[37] The Shah's reason for leaving Iran is open to interpretation. Roosevelt thought that the monarch's nerves had failed him. The Shah's recollection is dramatically different:

> *However, following a pre-arranged plan, the Queen and I had left Tehran before learning of the revolution's success. It had been decided weeks before that if Mossadeq should use force to resist his deposition, we would temporarily leave the country. I had decided upon this move because I believed that it would force Mossadeq and his henchmen to show their real allegiances, and that thereby it would help crystallize Persian public opinion.*

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1961), 104. (U)

move. Cables from Tehran were scarce during the critical days of 16-19 August—for good reason. "Gentlemen," Roosevelt joked, to general applause, "I made a point of not letting you know what was happening." No one seemed more amused than Allen Dulles.[38] (S)

Ending on a cautionary note, Roosevelt warned those present not to draw the wrong lessons from TPAJAX. "Now we'll think we can walk on water, everywhere," he said, "and we've got to be careful and restrain ourselves."[39] (S)

Secretary of State Dulles had other thoughts, however; he was already contemplating a similar operation in a country half a world away from Iran and much closer to home.[40]

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Neither the CIA nor the US government heeded Roosevelt's warnings about the seductiveness and danger of covert action.

[38] Author's interview with John H. Waller, 7 July 1995. (S)
[39] *Ibid.* (S)
[40] Roosevelt, 210. (U)

"Policymakers would do well to be mindful of TPAJAX as they continue efforts to marshal Arab public opinion against terrorism."

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The relative rapidity and ease with which TPAJAX had accomplished their objectives, however, deceived policymakers. They drew the erroneous lesson that, through CIA action, the US government could alter the Third World political landscape at will and with minimal expense. It would take the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 to vindicate Roosevelt, but by then the man who had brought down Mohammed Mossadeq had resigned from the CIA.[41] (U)

It would be a mistake to draw a straight line from TPAJAX to the rise of the current anti-American, Islamic-based terrorism for, as the late British historian Herbert Butterfield observed, "The study of the past with one eye, so to speak, upon the present is the source of all sins and sophistries in history . . . . It is the essence of what we mean by the word 'unhistorical,'"[42] Nonetheless, Middle Eastern perceptions of the operation and the American role exert a powerful influence on present attitudes toward the West. Policymakers would do well to be mindful of the dynamics surrounding TPAJAX as they continue their efforts to marshal Arab public opinion against terrorism.[43] (U)

[41] *Ibid.* (U)

[42] Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History*, (1931), 11, 31–32, quoted in Edward Hallet Carr, *What is History? The George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures delivered in the University of Cambridge January–March 1961* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1961), 35–36. (U)
[43] One of the participants in TPAJAX assured the author that many Iranians only suspected the American role in the operation, a subject of bazaar rumors for years. The *Cambridge History of Iran*'s assessment is probably more accurate: "Nevertheless, Iranians have never had the slightest doubt that the C.I.A., acting on behalf of the American and British governments, organized the conspirators and paid the pro-Shah mobs led by toughs from southern Tehran, which, together with army units, were in control of the streets by nightfall on 19 August. By 1982, this tenacious rumour had been fully confirmed and is now seen as incontrovertible" (footnote omitted). Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville, eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 7, *From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 263. (U)

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Taking Stock

An Interview with Dr. Ruth David, CIA's Deputy Director for Science and Technology (S)

(b)(3)(c)



"We are in the midst of a technological revolution that is affecting every aspect of our lives, and not just in the intelligence business."

(b)(3)(c) works for the National Security Agency.

(b)(3)(c)

Interviewer's Note: The scientific and technical history of the CIA is immediately apparent to anyone who walks through the atrium of the New Headquarters Building at CIA, with its mockups of the U-2 and SR-71. Other space-related aspects of CIA's scientific accomplishments have become well known to the general public with the release of information concerning the use of satellites in intelligence collection. (U)

The achievements of the past notwithstanding, the scientific and technical aspects of intelligence face the same problems of renewal and redefinition confronted by other areas of the profession. Dr. Ruth David, CIA's Deputy Director for Science and Technology, addressed these and other issues in an interview with *Studies in Intelligence*, recorded on New Year's Eve, 1996. Dr. David joined CIA in July of 1995, from the Sandia National Laboratories, where her last position was Director of Advanced Information Technologies. (U)

In a memo you addressed to the directorate in May 1996, you said, "We do not intend to neglect space-related issues, but the larger problems and opportunities facing intelligence in the years ahead are those of the information age." Expand, if you will, on that transition. (C)

In a very real way, the space age shaped where this directorate is today. That is where our roots are, that is why DS&T was originally formed, and the issues of space were the greatest challenges we faced. Though those remain important, we are, overall, facing a very different situation. We are in the midst of a technological revolution that is affecting every aspect of our lives, and not just in the intelligence business. With the explosive growth of information technologies—worldwide, not just in the United States—we have to step back and take a look at what this means to every phase of the intelligence process. Look at collection: we face major challenges in the way our targets communicate, the way they store information, and the way they share information. And then we have to pay attention to how we need to leverage information technology through all the other phases of the intelligence process. The information age is touching every aspect of our business, and it is touching it in ways that mean we no longer control the pace of change. (C)

In the space age, the government, including the Intelligence Community (IC), was at the front edge. We were pushing the state of the art in most of the critical technologies. We were, in that sense, the limiter of what could or could not be done. In the information age, however, the marketplace is being driven by commercial entities, by private businesses. (C)

That represents both good and bad news for us. It is good news in that we do not require massive Federal investments to advance the state of the art in many fields, but it is bad news in the sense that we have to be

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continually playing catch-up and trying to anticipate future technological changes and their impacts on the business of intelligence. (C)

What is it like for the people in this directorate to make that shift from government operating ahead of the state of the art to having to deal with commercial technology? (C)

It is a huge shift because our work force needs to spend a large percentage of its time understanding what is happening externally, and that is not the culture we have created in the IC. But, if we do not have that understanding of what is happening externally, we risk trying to recreate things that people on the outside have already done, probably at great expense or delay. Another danger is that, if we are unable to recreate it, we will not be able to leverage the changes taking place externally, with the result that we will operate inefficiently and at greater cost. We are somewhat unique, in that our success from a collection perspective often depends upon our ability to exploit how others use technology—and that requires a deep understanding of the technologies at play. We face a great many dilemmas in not being ahead in the way we used to be, but many of those problems are those of mind-set. (S)

You have been here a little over a year. How much have you accomplished in changing that mind-set? (U)

It is a difficult process, but I think we have made at least incremental progress. I have concluded over the last year that there are many people in this organization who see the problem and are doing everything they can to deal with it. Unfortunately, I believe this remains a minority of the

"It is important for me to have an appreciation of why things are the way they are before I start suggesting ways to change."

population—and we have a long way to go! (C)

But I am encouraged by the people who are speaking out and trying to move in this direction. As I step back and look at this, I do not think the movement to change is something I have created. I think I am simply trying to articulate something a great many people have already seen. What I am trying to do is build the momentum that will allow us to move forward. This is a fundamental shift that people working at the local level have recognized, and I am trying to put into place the strategic changes that will allow that to happen. The information-age technologies affect every business line we have. (C)

The fact is, though, that you are an individual who has come from outside a rather closed structure. Does that make the message harder to get across? (U)

In some respects, that is true, but much of that had to do with my initial learning curve, not knowing in detail the business of intelligence. I continue to devote a lot of time to learning this business and to developing my understanding of how things are done. It is important for me to have an appreciation of why things are the way they are before I start suggesting ways to change. (C)

I have spent a lot of time traveling to stations overseas to see how the people on the frontlines operate, and, ironically, I often find that the people on the frontlines have a greater appreciation of the need for change—the need to deal with a new technological environment—than do some people at Headquarters. I have learned a great deal through this process, and I think it has helped me better articulate the urgency that I feel. (S)

You have mentioned the impact of change throughout the intelligence process, not just in collection. How well postured did you find the directorate to deal with those other phases? (U)

Poorly. That comes from two realities: first, from its inception, DS&T focused primarily on collection problems; the other is that collection was the area involving the greatest technical barriers. Here, again, the information age is different. Technology is becoming increasingly important in all the other phases of the intelligence process. But it also is changing, in that those discrete phases are blurring. We can no longer be focused on just the collection problem, because in many areas we already have the capability to collect far more than we can process or report. We are confronting real issues of volume—how do we deal with massive amounts of data? (C)

There is also the reality that one challenge is going to be that of putting together fragments of data from different collection stovepipes or from different kinds of sensors. The ability to ferret out and correlate fragments from those various forms of collection and put them together in a meaningful picture will require an unprecedented capability to look

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across the collection disciplines and also an expanded ability to assimilate and fuse data. (S)

You established in 1996 something called the Office of Advanced Analytic Tools that one would suspect has brought this directorate into close contact with the Directorate of Intelligence. (U)

Absolutely. In fact, we created that as a joint DS&T-DI office. We set priorities and manage the office jointly. It is just now getting on its feet, and we face a real challenge in staffing the office appropriately. We, like every other office in government (and in industry), have significant shortages of computer scientists and engineers, so we are going to face some staffing challenges. But, in my mind, the office has several different responsibilities. We have talked about the need to purchase off-the-shelf software where we can or technology of any kind. There is an important role in evaluation of off-the-shelf products for suitability in our environment. That is one service the Office of Advanced Analytic Tools will provide. The emphasis is not one of "you can or you can't buy a piece of technology," but simply to provide an independent analysis of its suitability for the intelligence business. (C)

A bit more strategically, the office has a role in adapting commercial products that may have useful features but which will not fit cleanly into our environment. Probably the most important role the office can play in the longer term is in helping to define and create the future analytic environment. By that I mean having a strategic role in helping to build what I expect will be a different working environment for the

"Probably the most important role the office can play in the longer term is in helping to define and create the future analytic environment."

analyst. We are really talking about an environment that enables the analyst to change the way he or she does analysis—rather than simply automating today's practices. (C)

That implies a "bottom up" look at the way we do our business. Our partnership with the DI is vital in this, first of all, because the DI is the expert on how we do intelligence today. They also have a lot of visionary people who see an opportunity to do their business differently. So our ability to work with them from a technological perspective and help them create that more agile environment is one of this office's most important responsibilities. (C)

But when you bring these folks together, you are merging populations representing different backgrounds, educational preparation, and even professional languages. How is that going? (U)

It is mixed. In some cases it is working well, especially in cases where you can locate those analysts, who, despite a different background, are eager to encourage the greater insertion of technology into the analytic process because they see its potential. We have analysts who go home and spend their evenings surfing the Internet. So, even in the case of analysts who lack a formal technical background, this does not mean they do not appreciate what technology can do for them. (C)

On the other side, bringing the analysts closer to the technologists forces the latter to recognize that technology is nothing more than a tool—an enabler. If it does not enable the analysts to do their work better, then we are doing the wrong job. Forcing that dialogue, forcing that engagement is important from both sides. (C)

But it is not easy.

No. Not easy. We are trying to build a core of people who can do that well, and then to enable that core to grow. (U)

You mentioned people going home and hitting the Internet. That gets to the question of how much information is outside the classified context. How big is that issue? (U)

It is both a problem and an opportunity. It is a problem in the case of the Internet, for example, in that there is more data out there than information. Much of what is out there has absolutely no vetting. So you do not know what to believe and what not to believe. That is a very real problem. (U)

One other problem is that our consumers are living in that same environment, have access to those data (in varying degrees), and assume it to be information. So we have at least to be conversant with what is out there so we can evaluate its validity when our consumers read the data back to us. And we have to be able to use it effectively to provide context for our intelligence product. (C)

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The opportunity side, especially in the open-source arena, is that a growing number of our sources are going on-line. Today, it is still a small percentage of our sources, but it is growing. We are seeing radio stations go live on-line; newspapers all over the world are doing the same thing. But we have not discovered a way to predict how far or how rapidly this will grow. How reliable will the Internet be one year or five years or 10 years out? (C)

It is a business reality for the IC that we have to be able to leverage the Internet and the information explosion it represents. On the other hand, we cannot afford to become totally reliant on it. (C)

There is a fundamental change. Twenty years ago, on almost any target of consequence, the characteristic information posture was shortage. Now we are into information overload. How are we doing with that? (U)

It is a tremendous challenge, but not one that is unique to the IC. Every business is facing the same information overload. They have access to so much data that their ability to distill that which is relevant and meaningful to their business is the greater challenge. As a result, the commercial marketplace, once again, is driving the development of more effective search tools and browsers. We are not alone, but the reality is that we are having tremendous difficulty dealing with sheer volume. We do not have all the answers to this, but ignoring it is not the answer. (C)

Do you think we have been ignoring it?

Ignoring it is probably too harsh a term, but there has been a tendency to write it off because we could not

"We have to do better in figuring out ways to exploit the information environment, and that means developing greater agility to deal with this dynamic world."

deal with the volume and to turn to sources where we can control what we collect. We have to do better in figuring out ways to exploit the information environment, and that means developing greater agility to deal with this dynamic world. (C)

Agility in what sense?

Agility in changing our business practices as the external world of information changes. Agility in redeploying or reallocating resources in recognition that the information world we live in is changing. Our ability to plan any sort of program three or four years in advance and to have a relevant plan for how we intend to do our business is almost impossible. So we need to step back and think in terms of program objectives—what we intend to accomplish—rather than of the details of how we intend to attain those objectives. (C)

You have mentioned the increased information available to the customer independent of the IC. Telling the customer what he or she already knows and calling it intelligence is not going to be a good way to do business, is it? (U)

I have had more than one customer say that, as a matter of routine, they begin their daily business with a search on the Internet on topics of interest to them, only to get those same clippings from us several days later. We cannot afford to be in that position, though it is going to be hard not to be. (U)

CIA will turn 50 in 1997. One fundamental change we have witnessed is that, even 20 to 10 years ago, we and our customers had nothing like the access to global information media we have today. That has to change the way we think about our value added. Our consumers no longer rely on us as their sole source of information. We are but one of many sources, and we remain relevant and viable only when we add value to what customers can obtain from those other sources. One form of relevance and value may be saying that one or more of those other sources is providing invalid or incomplete information, and here is what they are not telling you. We still provide value added, but we need to understand how the nature of that value has changed because the information around us has changed. (U)

And we cannot calculate how to provide that unique value unless we understand the other sources out there in the marketplace, correct? (U)

Absolutely. Out ability to understand those other sources, to understand where we add value, and to articulate that value will determine our continued existence. (U)

What about the Community Open-Source Project Office and its ability to deal with out information problems? (U)

COSPO has done an absolutely superb job of increasing the Community's appreciation of open-source information. They have also

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advocated purchase of new information services from commercial sources in the form of bulk purchases that have been extremely valuable. We have statistics available that demonstrate that the value of our intelligence products has been enhanced significantly by open-source information. Sometimes, it is the only information available, but more frequently it provides background or context for intelligence. What I have found is that everyone in the Community, as well as the policymakers, are developing a greater appreciation for the value of open source. (U)

But don't you encounter some apprehension that efforts like this just enhance the view that open source has all the information decisionmakers need? (U)

That is a tightrope we have to walk. If the day comes where we lay our products down beside open-source products and we can demonstrate no value added, we are out of business. We are a long way from that day. Even assuming that open source provides much of the volume of information available to the decision maker, there is great value added by the IC in assimilating that information and putting it together in a coherent package. (U)

There is also great value in assimilating that information and packaging it with fragments from sensitive sources that build a more complete story—or perhaps present a contrasting picture. We all know that in some parts of the world things get reported in the media that do not correspond with reality. The message to us as a Community is that we have to know what is being reported. (U)

"I would like to see us increase the amount of time we spend together dealing with strategic issues, as opposed to debating budget numbers."

One of the roles for us in the future is vetting through that mass of data or information available in the marketplace, correct? (U)

In fact, one of the things our open-source community focuses on is source analysis, understanding the reliability of information provided by various sources and maintaining a current assessment of those sources. (U)

One issue raised by this closer link between open sources and our sensitive-source information is the technical security of our information systems. Are you involved in that? (U)

We have talked a lot about becoming a more tightly connected—more collaborative—IC, and it is imperative that we reach that goal. We are already seeing a growth, though, in the number of product dissemination systems across the Community, with each collecting source providing its own dissemination mechanism. One reason for this is the information security problems we have yet to come together to deal with. (U)

This is a make-or-break issue. If we as a Community do not come to grips with how we are going to deal with information security as a Community, we are not going to succeed in leveraging what information technology could do for us. (U)

Are you pleased with what you have seen in our ability to function as a Community? (U)

I personally think we have a long way to go. I would like to see us increase the amount of time we spend together dealing with strategic issues, as opposed to debating budget numbers. We have benefited greatly in certain areas from having shared strategic objectives. So there have been positive steps made in the last year and a half under Dr. Deutch's leadership. Pulling the Community together has really paid off. We have done well reaching a Community position on targets and priorities. It may be the techie in me, but I think we need to do equally well with setting Community objectives on technical enablers. These provide something of a "crosscut" to targets or intelligence issues, allowing us to function more effectively as a Community. (U)

One of the interesting things about this directorate is the range of its functions—from true R&D to efforts like the Foreign Broadcast and Information Service. Structurally, where do you see this directorate going in the next few years? (U)

The breadth of what we do is, once again, both an advantage and a disadvantage. It is an advantage, in that DS&T may be unique in the Community because we touch every single collection stovepipe, every INT. And I do not just mean touch; we are actively engaged with every INT. In addition, we are engaged in every phase of the intelligence process, from collection to dissemination. It is an advantage to see the whole spectrum and to be in a position to see opportunities for synergy and integration. (U)

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On the other hand, it is hard to focus our activities. As we have drawn down resources in the past few years, we have found ourselves trying to maintain this broad scale of engagement, and I am concerned that, as a result, we find ourselves something of a holding company of somewhat ailing businesses, as opposed to having a smaller number of robust businesses. So, we are taking a hard look at whether we can continue this breadth of engagement. (C)

Is this just a question of resources, or are some of the businesses just not healthy? (C)

The reason the businesses are not healthy is a lack of resources. What we have done over the last few years, as resources have declined, is to try to maintain today's operations at the expense of investment. This includes investment both in our work force or in our capabilities. As a result, we have fallen behind in technology, and we have fallen behind in maintaining the skills of our people. That is why we are poorly positioned in some of our business areas. We have worked so hard at running in place to meet today's operational needs that we have not stepped back to notice when the road may fall out from under us. (C)

So the danger of going too far with "doing more with less" is that you end up doing less with less. (C)

You reach the point where you are no longer even capable of performing today's operations. (C)

But then you have to make the decision to stop doing certain things, which alerts you immediately to who the constituents are for the things you no longer want to do. (C)

Oh, yes. You got it! And every business we have has a vocal constituency. We have run into this in spades. I have begged people to tell me what we can stop doing. And when you propose something to cut, you can get really bloodied. (C)

That is a universal phenomenon. What is the answer?

I wish I knew. This is another one of those issues the Community is going to have to come together on. Part of the problem is that it is hard to find out exactly where today's resources are and whether we have them aligned against the right priorities. As a result, we fight these battles on an incremental basis. I am a real believer in establishing decision criteria before you look at budget numbers. We tend to start with budget numbers rather than first deciding what is important to us. In the absence of sound decision criteria, you leave yourself open to a process where decisions are made based on who can outmaneuver everyone else. (C)

You mentioned that DS&T touches all the other INTs and the whole intelligence cycle. Without naming names, are there people who would prefer that you not touch their INT or their portion of the cycle? (U)

Undoubtedly. But I have always believed in changing from within: build the right partnerships and make people understand that it is to our mutual benefit for us to work together. It does not work across the board, but for the most part people understand there is value added in working that way. Things tend to go along well until we start arguing over resources. What we have lacked to date in that area is a joint planning structure—a way to develop shared strategies—to put order in our resource discussions. (C)

What impact has the creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency had on this directorate?

The operational impact is that our former National Photographic Interpretation Center is now under the control of NIMA. The employees remain CIA employees, and we are working with the career services to make sure that people remain properly aligned with their partner career services within the agency. This is another opportunity for us to build partnerships that, from a technological perspective, leverage investments across both agencies. We share common interests; for example, NIMA will be a success to the extent its imagery products contribute to all-source analysis. (C)

The challenge to our all-source analytic community will be to bring about a seamless integration of "stovepiped" outputs, including imagery, into all-source products and services. And I hope the bridge from the stovepipes will be the analytic tools office. That means we need to work together in areas such as information security and data warehousing to make sure we have a seamless connectivity. Even though the imagery product is different in its own way from other products, the imagery community faces the same challenge of volume confronting all of us. How do they ferret out meaningful images from the rest? To the degree we have other business areas facing this challenge, we have opportunities for synergy. One thing we are seeing even in the open-source arena is the need to look at video information. Technically, this represents a real similarity with the challenges faced by the imagery

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community. There are opportunities for us to build joint strategies. (C)

Absent those synergies, is it not likely that what we could hear, from Capitol Hill and other observers, is "Congratulations. You just went out and built another stovepipe."? (U)

The resolve to avoid that is strong, but I am not sure the focus of the resolve is as clear as it needs to be. It is going to take concerted effort to avoid this outcome. Our Office of Research and Development is working hard on this issue from the perspective of technology strategy. But it is going to take continued dialogue at all levels of the organization—including strategic levels—to make this work. I have heard at all the debates over stovepipes versus more or less horizontal structures, and I tend to be one of the rebels who believes that two models need to coexist peacefully. (U)

Stovepipes are good, in that they build and nurture substantive expertise along functional lines. That is very, very important. What information technology allows is the backplane connectivity that cuts through the stovepipes at different levels. We cannot wait until the product comes out the top of a stovepipe to establish connectivity. We need connective planes at different levels that are really going to allow us to leverage our assets as a collaborative community. (U)

Here, again, we have analysts who are comfortable with things like community e-mail. The technology is there, the mind-set to use it is there, but we may be running ahead of policy in some areas. You may not be able to put a stop to this. But would you want to? (U)

You certainly do not want to put a stop to it. What I worry about is that, because we have not done adequate Community-level planning in these areas, we are frustrating analysts who want to move ahead, and we are making it hard for them. That is something we have to turn around. We have to do the Community-level planning that enables that environment, rather than making it painful. Frankly, we are turning analysts off, and that is dangerous. (C)

Are there any technologies or technical challenges that need more attention? (U)

If I step back and look at other technological challenges we face as a Community, I would have to cite the (b)(1) area. The technical challenges in that arena are enormous. Having said that, however, we are not in this situation alone, and we need to work to leverage the expertise that has been accumulated in the military, in industry, and in the national laboratories. As intelligence issues, these are difficult for us to get our arms around. They are, in addition, not issues we will deal with from a single collection mechanism. They are the epitome of a problem requiring an all-source perspective and an enhanced ability to assimilate different kinds of information. (S)

We are doing a great deal of this, but I continue to believe there are additional opportunities for improvement through such things as (b)(1) information-gathering activities, and so on. We need to look at the broadest spectrum of activities that will point to potential development efforts in (b)(1) These are difficult issues, but we need to step back and look for better ways to assimilate all the information available. (S)

You have mentioned the national laboratories, which happens to be your background. Was that a good grounding for you coming into this job? (U)

It was a very good grounding, perhaps more in the last five years of my career than in the first 15. That earlier period was devoted almost exclusively to activities in support of nuclear weapons engineering, so I had little contact with industry and academia, except in the long-term research area. In the last five years, technology transfer efforts, along with increased use of commercial systems and technologies—in weapons and other products coming from the laboratories—changed my experience. (S)

The biggest difference I find coming from the laboratories to the Agency is that in the labs the majority of the work force, by far, consists of scientists and engineers. Here, they are a minority. So I have been dealing with a different perspective. I am used to building products for other technologists; this environment is very different. (U)

It was a good background because the labs function as something of a halfway house between industry and government. But the two cultures exhibit major distinctions. (U)

Has that been your biggest surprise? Is there a biggest surprise?

There have been a lot of biggest surprises. But that has been the most significant difference. By its nature, the intelligence business is one characterized by isolation. I see a need for greater outreach, but I also recognize the need to do that carefully. (U)

Thanks very much for your time.

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National Intelligence Support to the US Transportation Command ~~(S)~~

(b)(3)(c)

"After the end of the Gulf war, the United States became involved in a number of unique military operations other than war that ushered in a new era of intelligence support to a military command."

In early 1992, the United States Air force was preparing to fly dozens of sorties deep into the former Soviet Union. Traditional sources of intelligence were being used to support the operations. Very nontraditional information on Russian airfields, however, was provided to the mission planners. Instead of data on target aiming points, data on ramp space was provided; instead of data on air defense systems, data on ground-control approach instrumentation was provided; instead of data on the hardness of aircraft shelters, data on the thickness of runways were provided. The US military aircraft were not going to destroy the airfields with nuclear weapons. Instead, Military Airlift Command (MAC) transport aircraft were going to land on the airfields to deliver food and medicine to the people of Russia. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was about to embark on one of the first of many nontraditional missions it would undertake over the next several years that required a kind of intelligence support undreamed of at the height of the Cold War. (U)

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
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
USTRANSCOM was founded in 1987 in an effort to centralize the Department of Defense's (DoD) control of strategic-lift assets. Headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, it controls the Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC, formerly Military Airlift Command), the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Army's Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). The component commands, numbering more than 70,000 personnel, operate virtually all the strategic airlift aircraft, (more than 800 C-17s, C-5s, C-141s, KC-135s, and KC-10s); 18 active-duty fast sealift ships and roll-on/roll-off ships; many of the prepositioned equipment ships; and much of the Army's rolling stock and heavy-lift assets. The command is also empowered to activate reserve military and civilian transportation assets in time of national emergency. As a supporting command, it acts as the focal point (one-stop shopping) for the DoD for strategic-lift support to the warfighting commands. (U)


The first major test of the new command was Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. Desert Shield would prove to be one of the few "traditional" operations conducted by the command during the following years. After the end of the Gulf war, the United States became involved in a number of unique military operations other than war that ushered in a new era of intelligence support to a military command. (U)

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US TRANSCOM operations at Mogadishu airfield in Somalia. (U)

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Operations in Somalia

In the summer of 1992, (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) TV viewers worldwide were watching news reports of the growing famine in Somalia brought on by drought and internal conflict. As the shocking scenes continued to be broadcast, the command felt the impact of the "CNN effect," which helped spur the United States to take action. The increased efforts of the UN and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to provide famine relief quickly overwhelmed the existing capabilities to transport relief supplies into the country and then into the countryside. By mid-summer, USTRANSCOM was heavily involved in flying daily food-relief missions to remote airstrips throughout central and southern Somalia, well before the UN ordered troop deployments and months before President Bush ordered the deployment of US ground forces into the country. (U)

Demands for Information

Operations into Somalia presented the command with a variety of operational problems, and this resulted in a bewildering barrage of information requests to the intelligence staffs. Airlift and sealift planners and operators immediately requested detailed information on the transportation infrastructure of Somalia and neighboring countries. Because of Somalia's return to chaos and obscurity in the years following the departure of the Soviets, much of the available information was out of date or too thin. Planners requested information on the nature of the NGOs operating in the country that they were now tasked to support. Additional information requests included background data on the government of Somalia (nonexistent), civil conditions, attitudes of allies towards cooperation (French bases in Djibouti and Kenyan and Egyptian airbases were an important part of the operation), and availability of fuel en route in friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia. (U)

"Operations into Somalia presented the command with a variety of operational problems, and this resulted in a bewildering barrage of information requests to the intelligence staffs."

The demand for intelligence grew in direct proportion to the increased US involvement in Somalia. The deployment of several thousand UN troops was the next step. As the deployment of the first C-141 planeload of UN Pakistani troops neared, senior USTRANSCOM commanders wanted to know who controlled Mogadishu airport. That question, given the lack of a formal US presence, proved surprisingly difficult to answer quickly. (U)

When President Bush ordered the deployment of US ground forces, the scale of operations changed dramatically, and additional facilities were needed to support airlift and sealift operations. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

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This level of concern continued for almost 18 months, as USTRANSCOM supported US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and allied forces in Somalia. As part of its airlift operations, the AMC Security Police, working with USCENTCOM forces, were responsible for providing a portion of the perimeter defenses around Mogadishu International Airport throughout this entire period. Headquarters staff members were (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) on a daily basis going over the posted reading files on Somalia from the interagency intelligence task force. Security Police interest continued until the end of the UN withdrawal as the last AMC aircraft left with the remaining personnel of the AMC Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE, a mobile air traffic control center) that had run Mogadishu airport throughout this period.

Evolution of a Command

Somalia was the first of many operational crises (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) These crises involved deploying, or being prepared to deploy on short notice, personnel and equipment overseas by sea and air from a warfighting command or allied country, or quickly

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deploying significant amounts of material and relief supplies. The nature of these crises ranged from supporting conventional military operations (Korea, Kuwait, and Haiti), peacemaking and peacekeeping operations (Haiti, Angola, and Bosnia), humanitarian relief (Rwanda, Cuban and Haitian boat people, Bosnia, Nepal, Russia and states of the former Soviet Union), and special operations

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In 1994, USTRANSCOM conducted operations in all but three countries in the world. In all cases, the operational control of strategic-lift operations was directed from the USTRANSCOM J-3/J-4 operational control center and the AMC Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), both located at Scott Air Force Base in southern Illinois, a fact not always well recognized within the national Intelligence Community (IC). (U)

USTRANSCOM and AMC operations directors are eager consumers of intelligence, because their equipment is big, slow, and unarmed. They cannot shoot back when operating in remote regions of the world. Good intelligence is not just their first line of defense, it is often their only line of defense. (U)

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"The command's operational requirement to be ready to respond to any crisis anywhere guarantees that the intelligence staff is always scrambling to obtain current crisis information . . ."

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The J-2 staff was quite small (it is the smallest within the DoD), and it has to focus on the crisis of the day. It had little time to focus on a particular region or issue at length, although some long-term studies on regional transportation networks were continually under way. The command's operational requirement to be ready to respond to any crisis anywhere guarantees that the intelligence staff is always scrambling to obtain current crisis information from both the regional warfighting commands' J-2 staffs and the national intelligence agencies. (U)

Even seemingly unrelated events raise the concerns of senior commanders.

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IC Support

The IC's awareness of the command's supporting, and sometimes primary, role in virtually every world crisis involving the deployment of US or UN forces gradually increased This accelerated in the aftermath of USTRANSCOM's operations in Somalia

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In addition to the global aspects of USTRANSCOM operations, the time factor presented a serious challenge in meeting the commands' information needs. It was not uncommon for crisis-related priority information needs to shift suddenly. One week it could be providing information on a worsening crisis in Korea, and the next week it would be providing information on an Iraqi buildup along the Kuwaiti border and the onset of major airlift operations deploying US combat troops to the Middle East. The real-world operational consideration was always "We may be flying there soon." The timeliness of support was always crucial. Providing information late was worse than providing information that might be incomplete. If it was late, it was useless, as the operation had probably already begun. (U)

Community Connectivity

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CIA and Community task force situation reports were always a key part of the USTRANSCOM J-2 analysis provided to the command staff. During a crisis, the CIA Watch Office kept a constant stream of faxes going to its USTRANSCOM J-2 counterpart.

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Current maps were also always in urgent demand. As operational planning to support operations proceeded, the question was always asked, "Does anyone have a street map of ...?"

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CIA support to the command was facilitated by the Office of Military Affairs (OMA). OMA was formed in 1992 after Desert Storm, in an effort to provide better centralized and coordinated CIA support to the military. Its first impact was to begin the process of providing improved electronic connectivity, which included computer links and communications capabilities

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As international politics continue to evolve in the post-Cold War world, USTRANSCOM will continue to play a major role in projecting national power and in supporting US policy. The command's evolution will undoubtedly pose new and nontraditional challenges to the IC as it too seeks to redefine its role in providing intelligence in support of national policy in the wake of the Cold War. (U)

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Classification and compartmentation

Protecting Satellite Reconnaissance Photographs

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A powerful intelligence organization can develop sources of information of a value utterly beyond price. . . .

The revelation of such sources or even a hint of their identity will cause their extinction. . . .

Security is like armor. You can pile on the armor until the man inside is absolutely safe and absolutely useless.

Sherman Kent, 1949

Sherman Kent anticipated the dilemma that the imagery intelligence community has faced over the past 30 years: how to protect a space reconnaissance capability that has proved its value beyond price, yet avoid becoming so secretive about this capability that it becomes useless?

The community has struggled with this problem since 1960, when President Eisenhower directed establishment of the TK System as a Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) control system for the protection of intelligence and mapping products acquired by imaging reconnaissance satellites. This SCI "armor of security" has been maintained for more than three decades because the investment in satellite reconnaissance has been high, the benefits enormous, and the community has been convinced that wide dissemination of the intelligence product would increase the probability of a compromise that could result in neutralizing the investment.

The SCI control system for satellite imagery grew out of a mind-set in the 1960s and 1970s that saw all aspects of the US imaging satellite reconnaissance program as representing the state of the art. The view of satellite reconnaissance as a fragile collection capability was reinforced by evidence of Soviet countermeasures against US imaging operations.

The strict need-to-know criteria for imaging satellite reconnaissance products was given its first relief in January 1966, when the DCI's Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance published guidelines for the non-SCI dissemination of sanitized intelligence and mapping products. But it was not until November 1973, when President Nixon downgraded the "fact of" an imaging satellite reconnaissance program to Secret, that attributable imagery and related intelligence products could be disseminated at the Secret level outside of SCI control. Even though most of the intelligence products were eligible for Secret-level dissemination, the focus was on meeting specifically identified high-priority military and intelligence requirements. As a result, most of the imagery-derived intelligence remained under SCI control.

In 1978 President Carter authorized unclassified acknowledgment of the "fact of" photo satellite reconnaissance activities. This created an environment within the community that was open to development of further policy modifications. These modifications, which were implemented in 1982, resulted in making almost 98 percent of the imagery-derived products eligible for decompartmentation and subsequent dissemination at the Secret level. Continued SCI control, however, was mandated for the imagery used for intelligence analysis, the Primary Imaging Record (PIR). This resulted in maintaining a rather robust SCI infrastructure for much of the product, as well as this basic PIR and all its full-format reproductions.

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In 1992 the Department of Defense publicly acknowledged the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office and its role in developing and operating US reconnaissance satellites. This was followed by an extensive review of compartmentation under a DCI Classification Review Task Force. The CRTF considered a series of proposals focused on making fundamental changes to the security policy for protecting and handling imaging satellite reconnaissance products. As a result of this effort, the Central Imagery Office (CIO) has been preparing a series of proposals for the DCI. On 2 February 1994 the DCI approved the first of these, which recommended the automatic decompartmentation and Secret-level dissemination of almost all satellite reconnaissance imagery. The DCI is now considering other CIO proposals that would further liberalize the security controls over satellite reconnaissance imagery and its products.

The findings of the CRTF, along with other pressures, make it only a matter of time before the White House authorizes the DCI to declassify much of the early reconnaissance imagery in the archives. A fundamental finding of the CRTF is that the technologies and capabilities associated with many of these older imagery programs no longer exceed today's unclassified state of the art. At the same time, the environmental community has concluded that classified imagery offers data "of unparalleled significance to environmental issues." Additionally, the industrial sector is looking to older classified technology as a marketing opportunity. Finally, the findings of the National Performance Review, along with the Intelligence Community's new openness with Cold War records, has created a public expectation for declassification of older reconnaissance imagery, information that is seen as a primary source for scholarly research.

The Nature of Imagery

The task of determining the sensitivity of satellite reconnaissance imagery is difficult because of the unique nature of a picture—a medium that has both high information content and high ambiguity. A photographic image is a complete record of a scene, and it reflects a wealth of information about what is depicted in it. In addition to information about the scene, an image contains unique information about the imaging system that acquired the picture. The image actually is a record of complex data that requires experienced analysts to extract the full range of embedded information. As a first step to understand why the imagery intelligence (IMINT) community has maintained a conservative approach to the classification and compartmentation of imaging satellite reconnaissance products, it is useful to examine the nature of the embedded information, its ambiguity, and the uncertainty of its sensitivity.

Content Information

Satellite pictures can record an enormous amount of information about a significant portion of the Earth's surface, over 1,000 nautical miles in a single frame. This extensive data record of a large geographic area is preserved and displayed on a small piece of acetate film (or, alternatively, on a comparatively small cathode ray tube). Imaging systems can capture and display more information on a single piece of acetate or its equivalent than the human brain can extract from a comparable display on the retina. At 0.6 mile the eye is limited to seeing a small area of high-contrast objects that are spaced no closer than 8 inches.

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Imaging freezes time for a particular event, stops motion for a particular activity, and captures virtually the totality of information within a particular field of view. The image comes close to becoming a complete reproduction of that reality. In stereoscopic imaging, even the three dimensions of reality can be replicated. The picture is constrained in its information content only by the limits of the optics and recording medium. Other visual information records, like a drawing, sketch, or the written word, are constrained in their information content by the discrete symbols that represent the information being depicted. The photographic record can capture a view of reality with its full information content. An image, then, becomes as sensitive as the information in the scene being imaged. Sometimes the mere fact that the observer is aware of an activity in a scene is, by itself, sensitive. In this way, both the image of the scene, as well as a textual description of the scene content, can be sensitive.

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The content information in an image can have a wide range of sensitivity. A particular scene can include information with both high-content sensitivity and information with low-content sensitivity. For example, a sensitive, clandestine, terrorist staging area can be imaged adjacent to a known, nonsensitive rail line. To

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Technical Information

Another unique aspect of an image is the fact that it also contains technical information about the imaging system. Analysis of an image will provide insight into the operation and capabilities of the imaging system. This does not always require a sophisticated analysis. Simply viewing a picture usually will reveal the position of the camera in relation to the imaged scene. It becomes clear whether the particular scene was imaged from a horizontal, ground-level perspective, or imaged from an overhead, vertical perspective. In addition, a simple geometric analysis of an overhead image will reveal whether the imaging system was on an airborne or spaceborne platform. Before 1972, when the "fact of" space reconnaissance was maintained under SCI control, all satellite imagery—because it inherently revealed this "fact of"—also had to be maintained under SCI control. And it is only since 1978, with declassification of the "fact of," that proposals to declassify satellite images can be considered.

Further analysis of an image will disclose other parameters, such as acquisition information (altitude, position over Earth); camera description (focal length, resolution, conventional optical or electro-optical nature)(b)(1) (b)(3)(n) the same time, any individual part of the PIR (a "cropped" image or film "chip") often comes close to being the equivalent of the whole in terms of what can be disclosed about the imaging system through analysis of that film chip.

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Information Record

The shapes and patterns of a particular feature depicted in an image only begin to take on meaning when they are perceived in relation to the background and the neighboring features shown on the image. Factors such as brightness, tone, contrast, scale, resolution, and resolving power all contribute to ambiguity and complicate analysis.

The subjective process of interpreting or analyzing photographic images can often result in multiple interpretations of the same information. The animal drawings clearly illustrate this perceptual problem. Figure 1A is a line drawing of nine ducks with only the head of the center "duck" showing. Figure 1B is a similar drawing of nine rabbits. Only the head of the center "rabbit" is showing. When the two center drawings are compared, it becomes obvious that they are identical images. What

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


Figure 1A
Drawings from BIOPOLITICS by Thomas L. Thorson, copyright 1970 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., Reproduced by permission of the publisher.




Figure 1B

initially was perceived as a duck, can also be seen as a rabbit. It is either a duck or rabbit or neither, depending on the context of the analysis.

The imagery analyst has to interact with outside information, as well as the representations of reality recorded in the image. As new collateral information becomes available, analysts often may need to return to the image; frequently repeated analyses are required before the critical information becomes apparent. This is the nature of human perception and a characteristic of imagery. The real intelligence value—and the true sensitivity of the information content—may not become known until long after acquisition and repeated analyses. While an image on first inspection may not reflect anything unusual, subsequent detailed analysis may reveal unique information not previously observed in the scene.

The information record is both ambiguous and complex. The content and technical information in the image often are commingled. Reporting one kind of information can inadvertently reveal the other. For example, though a consumer might have little interest in embedded technical information—with the exception of how it might be an indicator of source credibility—this does not simplify separating content and technical information. The fact that the information is commingled will preclude "sanitizing out" the technical information from the content information, whether or not it is sensitive.

The ambiguity and complexity of the information content of an image have contributed to the difficulty in deciding how to protect only what is sensitive and give wide dissemination to what is not sensitive. It may not always be clear at first inspection what the full information content of an image is, or what the meaning of the information is. At the same time, the complex commingling of the embedded information has made it difficult to separate sensitive from nonsensitive information. Because of this ambiguity and complexity, the community has been reluctant to disseminate broadly the PIR and tended to err on the conservative side. Over the past 30 years the decision to keep the entire PIR under compartmented SCI control has been an effort to protect future, unknown, sensitive intelligence discoveries and served as a hedge against uncertainty.

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Predicting Information Sensitivity

It is difficult, if not impossible, to predict with complete confidence the sensitivity of an image before its collection and subsequent analysis. To some extent it may be possible to anticipate the general information content and sensitivity of a photograph. The best that one can hope to do, however, is to develop a general expectation that a particular image will likely contain sensitive information.

For content sensitivity, an analyst might be able to develop a general prediction about how likely it would be for an image to include coverage of a sensitive activity.

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It is the reality of being uncertain about the national security sensitivity of imagery that has reinforced the argument to protect the entire PIR in SCI channels. Only after frame-by-frame analysis could broader dissemination be given to those portions of the PIR that were identified as nonsensitive. The basic principle for 30 years has been "all imagery is presumed sensitive until analyzed and proven otherwise."

The Vulnerability of Imaging Satellites

The imaging satellite reconnaissance program has a limited number of assets fixed in space and time. The satellites are few in number and highly predictable—cost and technology limit their number, and the laws of physics determine their orbits and schedule. Their orbital deployment, at any particular time, represent the total US Government investment in imaging satellite reconnaissance.

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Information Denial

During the Cold War, the USSR was a primary target for US imaging reconnaissance satellites, and US policymakers closely watched for Soviet responses. The Soviet Government was sensitive to foreign governments collecting any information, especially space reconnaissance information.

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The Soviets had instituted a program that was nationwide in scope and consistent with *maskirovka*—a general doctrine designed to deceive, confuse, and deny information to enemy intelligence in peacetime and in wartime.

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Concealment

Soviet concealment activities constituted a broad effort to conceal from overhead view items or activities of potential military value, many of which previously had not been afforded such protection.

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Deception

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Evidence of extensive Soviet countermeasures raised serious concerns for the Intelligence Community. First, the community saw Soviet denial of information to US reconnaissance satellites as limiting the capability of the satellites.

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Intelligence analysis would be based on incomplete information. Second, the community saw Soviet deception directed at US reconnaissance satellites as resulting in flawed intelligence analysis.

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Intelligence Community's fear of either being denied information or being deceived by false information resulted in strong incentives to maintain strict classification and SCI control over satellite reconnaissance products.

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Countermeasures as Response to Knowledge

During the 1980s, there appeared to be an increase in the number of espionage cases and leaks related to imaging satellite reconnaissance. There also was increased speculation about US reconnaissance capabilities in the press and in scholarly literature.

With this increased public awareness of US success with imaging satellite reconnaissance, the USSR and other targeted governments appeared to put greater emphasis on information denial countermeasures.

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This line of reasoning reinforced the argument for maximum protection of the satellite IMINT product. The pressure for continued TK control was even greater when imaging satellite reconnaissance was viewed as a high-cost, high-value program.

Developmental Cost

The US Government had invested billions of dollars to acquire an imaging satellite reconnaissance capability. The level of technology necessary to develop the current constellation, which can produce a large volume of high-quality images on a near-real-time basis, is costly in terms of both time and money. R&D efforts have to be programmed years in advance to develop a system. At the same time, the dollar cost can run into the billions. For example, the total cost during the life cycle of one of the deactivated, film return systems was some

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Unique Value

The true value of acquired imagery is difficult to quantify. What figure can be assigned to an accurate and up-to-date target folder that is used during a combat strike mission? What value equates to evidence of an arms control violation? What is the value of intelligence that otherwise would not have been known had it not been acquired by imaging satellites? And what is the value of a capability that takes 4 years to develop when you need it today?

Imaging reconnaissance satellites have demonstrated their value by responding to a wide range of difficult and critical intelligence questions. In the case of historically denied areas, such as the former Soviet Union, they have been one of very few intelligence sources able to collect information. They also have supported a broad spectrum of other requirements: monitoring arms control agreements, developing targeting materials, maintaining order of battle data bases, deriving intelligence from foreign scientific and technical activities, assessing economic strength, providing indications of impending hostilities, and searching for unknown targets.

Changing Attitudes

Until the 1990s the Intelligence Community was convinced, although not universally, that the threat of countermeasures justified the implementation of stringent SCI controls. Recently, the mood has been changing. The new mood, as reflected in recent DCI decisions, sees a decline in the risk of countermeasures and an increased need for wider dissemination of imagery. The trend to relax the tight SCI security controls is consistent with the changing US political and policy environment.

- With the end of the Cold War, there is a growing perception that the international community is becoming more open. Reconnaissance satellites are not the only source of overhead imagery. As a result, there is less of a need to protect the overhead intelligence source. The mere "fact of" acquiring such information is no longer sensitive.

- Regional conflicts and coalition peacekeeping are beginning to dominate the international scene. Experiences, such as those in Desert Storm, have underscored the value of satellite reconnaissance imagery in supporting these military operations, as well as the need to share IMINT with coalition partners. Strict SCI control is inconsistent with this. Policymakers are concluding that the value in disseminating and using IMINT outside of TK channels outweighs the traditional security risks.

- There is new emphasis on environmental problems, and national security tools are being called on to address them. This has created pressure to decompartment, and even declassify, much of the imaging satellite reconnaissance product to support this effort.

- The US no longer has a monopoly on sophisticated remote sensing from space. What was a unique technological breakthrough on 18 August 1960—imaging 1,650,000 square miles of Soviet territory with a capability to see ground objects of some 35 feet—is no longer state of the art. Today's best commercial system, SPOT, has a resolution of 33 feet, and the planned French Helios intelligence system has an anticipated resolution in the 3.3 foot to 9.9 foot range. The proliferation of reconnaissance technology is no longer considered sensitive.

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- US policymakers are becoming more concerned with economic competition than military competition. There is pressure to declassify reconnaissance technology so that US industry can use this technology to compete in the open market. What is the point in denying US businesses the opportunity to market a technology that foreign competitors will be marketing? Foreign sources will not comply with US Government attempts to protect the technology as national security secrets.

- There are pressures across the government for more openness as evidenced in the findings of the National Performance Review. The Intelligence Community Implementation Plan calls for reviewing current classification policies, using the lowest practical levels of classification. There also are recommendations to develop programs to educate the public on intelligence. This philosophy will make it increasingly difficult to maintain strict SCI controls for all aspects of satellite IMINT.

Despite pressures to use satellite reconnaissance for non-national security applications, there will continue to be intelligence challenges that need a viable imaging satellite reconnaissance capability. These challenges include the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; the threat of terrorism; worldwide environmental assaults on the Earth's ecosystem; and support to regional military conflicts. The dilemma will be to respond to these new pressures for expanded use, yet continue to provide adequate security so that satellites can effectively continue to support the traditional national security requirements—the future Desert Storms, the future Iraqi violations of international agreements, and the future North Korean nuclear proliferations. Policymakers will look to the Intelligence Community to find novel ways to increase the utility of IMINT products while still protecting critical capabilities and successes in observing the Earth's surface from above.

With the approval and implementation of CIO recommendations to decompartment almost all the satellite IMINT products, the issue of whether imaging satellite reconnaissance material should remain classified or be declassified for public use now will be debated.

As this new issue is addressed, the Intelligence Community will have to consider whether the move to declassification will set precedents that require new legislation—legislation to raise the community's confidence level that the DCI will have the necessary authority to ensure protection of any remaining sensitive reconnaissance material. At the same time, the community will have to address the resource implications of conducting classification reviews and responding to an increasing number of Freedom of Information Act requests.

The fundamental policy question today is what degree of protection and what kind of security framework are necessary and appropriate for the current environment, especially with its new complexity and demands for wider dissemination of imagery? We do not want to expose our satellite reconnaissance capability and its successes so completely that we encourage and facilitate the development of fatal countermeasures. At the same time, we do not want to "pile on the armor until the reconnaissance capability is absolutely safe and absolutely useless." The challenge as we move toward the year 2000 will be to develop a security framework that will protect two categories of imaging satellite reconnaissance information:

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The new criteria for classifying reconnaissance data should focus less on identifying sensitive technology and more on identifying the kinds of information that reveal US successes in intelligence collection and analyses. The publicizing of these successes may represent the greatest potential damage to intelligence sources and methods. It is one thing to know intellectually that a technical capability is possible; it is another to have

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hard evidence of that success. It is being confronted with the success that will provide the knowledge, as well as motivation, for countermeasures.

In addition to balancing the need to protect intelligence sources and methods versus the requirement for wider dissemination and increased utility, policymakers will need to consider economic impacts. What is the cost to national security of replacing a reconnaissance investment that might be lost as a result of compromised critical information? Funding for new national security projects is now more difficult than it was in the 1980s.

If security rules require classifying most space reconnaissance technology, US industry will be prohibited from using this technology to compete in the international market, and this could erode our industrial base, which is looking for new non-national security markets. What is the cost to US industry if the Intelligence Community declassifies and publicly disseminates high-quality imagery—the same kind of imagery US industry hopes to market? This could erode the economic opportunity to market high-resolution imagery.

Despite these new economic questions, the core national security questions will remain: are we moving toward decompartmenting and declassifying information that could be used by foreign powers to collect intelligence more effectively against the US, and are we moving toward decompartmenting and declassifying information that potential targets could use to counter our reconnaissance operations and neutralize this national security asset? In answering both sets of questions, DCI Woolsey has warned against disclosing any information that could jeopardize the nation's security: "Our intelligence assets and capabilities are precious commodities—we invest heavily to develop and maintain them—and there are those who would benefit from the information to the detriment of our security."

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THE BRZEZINSKI INITIATIVE: FBIS AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

John D. Chandlee

In the autumn of 1978, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Council (NSC) and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, were concerned about the first rumblings of an Islamic revolution that would soon engulf Iran and affect other Muslim areas of the Middle East and South Asia. A particular worry was what was seen as a weakness in intelligence reporting on Muslim activity in Southwest Asia and along both sides of the Soviet border in Central Asia. This caused Brzezinski to complain about what he saw as a "remarkable lack of overt reporting" on an area that he felt would soon become of intense interest to the US Government. To help remedy the situation, Brzezinski initiated a request to the Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner, to have the CIA's major overt collection component, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), give greater attention to the region in question. The Brzezinski memorandum is the beginning of the story of an Agency administration reluctant to invest significant sums of money in overt collection, but whose hand was eventually forced by events in the Middle East and continuing pressure from the NSC.

In his memorandum to DCI Turner, Brzezinski said he was struck by the "thinness of coverage of the politically relevant output of radio and press" from Central Asian areas.[1] FBIS, by NSC directive, had long been the component responsible for the collection of data from foreign public radio, television, press, and press agencies for US Government agencies dealing with foreign affairs. As a unit of the CIA, FBIS provided overt intelligence information from foreign media as a "service of common concern." But FBIS had given little attention to coverage of South and Central Asia for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the budget. There had been little pressure from intelligence analysts to expand FBIS coverage in this part of the world because shortwave broadcasts from such major Central Asian cities as Delhi, Karachi, Tehran, Kabul, and Tashkent had provided the more significant political news and commentary and were easily monitored at FBIS bureaus in Cyprus, London, Tel Aviv, Bangkok, and Okinawa. Most of these broadcasts were in English, but FBIS did have some vernacular-language capabilities to process domestic broadcasts that were carried on shortwave beams. Domestic broadcasts not on shortwave were not available to monitoring, and many of the exotic languages of Central Asia were not represented on FBIS's staff of linguists. The existing FBIS installations were able to monitor some press agencies, but printed materials—newspapers

[1] Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser, to Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Stansfield Turner, 14 November 1978. The author is indebted to [redacted] DS&T historian, and David Shank, FBIS historian, for official documents cited in this article, as well as for access to Shank's excellent FBIS official history.

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and journals—were obtained only with considerable delay. (It was also difficult to obtain the vernacular press from Soviet Central Asia because it was often not available in Moscow.)

From the creation of FBIS in February 1941, when the administration dipped into emergency funds to establish overt radio monitoring of Axis broadcasts, to the mid-1960s there was little interest in Central Asia. To say, as the Brzezinski memorandum did, that coverage of the Muslim world from Iran to Bangladesh was "thin" was certainly true. The FBIS philosophy had been that overt monitoring stations should be so positioned around the world that coverage of any major crisis could be ensured. It had been proved many times that it was not feasible to establish on short notice a station to process the large volumes of overt media information generated by a sudden crisis. FBIS had, therefore, from time to time made efforts to improve its coverage of Central Asia but had invariably run into budgetary restrictions. The philosophy of Agency senior management was that FBIS was doing just fine—why add funds to its budget for an area that was quiet and of little interest to the US Government?

Long before the Iranian crisis of the late 1970s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war, FBIS tried to position itself to cover developments in the Muslim world. A 1967 "office objective" was to establish a bureau in Iran to supply new coverage of South Asia and the Soviet minority areas of Central Asia, but budgetary limitations (and balance-of-payments strictures) made this impossible. In 1969, FBIS helped the government of Shah Reza Pahlavi establish an overt monitoring service near Tehran as a "door opener" to eventual FBIS colocation with the Persians. In 1974 the Turks invaded Cyprus, and FBIS, forced to abandon its large station on the northern coast of the island, proposed the establishment of a bureau in Tehran. The US Ambassador, former DCI Richard Helms, turned down the proposal (wisely, one must say in retrospect). In the 1974-76 period FBIS lost two more bureaus—Saigon and Nigeria (to the Viet Cong and Nigerian militarists, respectively), and was preoccupied with restoring the coverage these bureaus had handled. Bureaus were set up at Nicosia, Athens, Amman, Tel Aviv, Bangkok, and Abidjan. By 1978, however, FBIS had done little in connection with South Asia, and was ill-prepared for the turmoil that was soon to grip the Muslim world.

The Turmoil Comes

At the time of the Brzezinski memorandum to the DCI calling for improved FBIS coverage, Iran had already become a crisis point and the Shah was attempting to overcome antigovernment demonstrations inspired by the Ayatollah Khomeini, then in exile. Afghanistan was also suffering domestic conflict. Soviet intentions with regard to the entire area became a matter of concern. Brzezinski noted in his memo that FBIS "some time ago" developed a plan for a South Asian bureau to improve overt reporting on the region, focusing on Afghanistan, Iran, and the Soviet minority areas. "But I am told," he said, "that FBIS's plans have been postponed until FY-81 at the earliest. This seems to be a mistake."

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Dr. Brzezinski said that the developing crisis in Iran "confronts us with the need to do everything we can to get more insight into what is happening in this whole area. Systematic exploitation of local-language broadcasts and newspapers in Soviet Central Asia might provide a better idea of Soviet capabilities and intentions toward Iran and Afghanistan." The national security adviser stressed that, rather than just put off expansion of FBIS capabilities in this critical region, "we should accelerate planning, find personnel with the needed languages and analytical skills, and shift funds, if necessary, to enable serious field (monitoring) surveys to begin immediately." He noted that the total cost for such an effort would be small compared with the investment required for more sensitive technical-collection capabilities.[2]

Nevertheless, senior Agency management moved cautiously in response to the Brzezinski memorandum and in regard to FBIS suggestions for remedying the situation. The attitude continued to be that, if FBIS needed further installations for technical facilities or security-cleared language specialists, these must be "reprogramed" from other activities. (It was difficult to convince some management officers that a person who knows Arabic doesn't necessarily know Farsi, Uzbek, or Urdu.) In addition to objections from senior management, there was division within FBIS on what a facility in South Asia could accomplish. Some were skeptical about the assumption that information from Islamic and regional broadcasts would give indications of Soviet intentions. FBIS sample coverage of unique vernacular-language broadcasts from Soviet Asian republics (done for a time in the early 1950s) had indicated that local-language broadcasts essentially paralleled Russian-language material from the Moscow central media—that is, a Soviet position, or hint of a position, on any given issue would be first reflected in the central media, then broadcast in both Russian and vernacular languages to areas of Central and South Asia. Cultural developments or trends, it was speculated, would be more evident from printed materials than from broadcasts. The FBIS Analysis Group was already engaging, as it had for many years, in analysis of Soviet central media coverage and statements by the elite for indications of changes in Soviet positions.

Many of FBIS's managers, including its director, Don H. Peterson, felt that White House support for an expanded FBIS would be useful, but not if it meant redirecting funds from existing operations. Up to this point FBIS had rarely, if ever, received funds to supplement its regular budget except to replace a bureau lost through a political or military crisis. The Agency attitude was that FBIS must cope within its base funding. An OMB officer once observed that trying to get funds to FBIS through Agency management was like pumping oil through a leaky pipeline. FBIS was transferred from the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) to the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) on 22 November 1976, a move that eventually helped to solve FBIS funding problems. But in 1978, FBIS was still "below the poverty line" in its ability to meet new obligations. The then DDS&T, Leslie C. Dirks, had a strong belief in high technology as a means for collecting intelligence information, but showed little concern for overt collection and gave FBIS little tangible support in

[2] Brzezinski-Turner memo, 14 November 1978, op cit.

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meeting its budgetary needs. FBIS management lost faith in Agency management's ability, or desire, to fund FBIS to a level that would enable it to meet its obligations.

FBIS Response

FBIS proposals in response to Brzezinski's request included the view that Islamabad, in northern Pakistan, would be the best possible site for expanded coverage to meet the NSC desires. Agency management required a monitoring survey from Islamabad with an evaluation of the "take" by the National Foreign Assessment Center (now the Directorate of Intelligence). DCI Turner informed Brzezinski on 4 January 1979 that FBIS would conduct a radio reception survey that month and that a bureau in Islamabad could be operational in three months, assuming the funding problems could be resolved.[3] During the survey, consultations with US Ambassador Arthur Hummel in Islamabad indicated he had serious concerns about a manned overt FBIS station which would require Pakistani Government approval and might arouse the concerns of the Chinese. There were also concerns about conflicts with other Agency activities in South Asia.[4] The FBIS reception survey in northern Pakistan indicated that the site could provide substantial improvement in area monitoring (including the monitoring of broadcast stations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Soviet Asia, eastern Iran, and western China). FBIS indicated it would reluctantly reprogram funds by cutting other existing operations.

Nevertheless, the FBIS operation fell victim to a conflict of Agency interests in Pakistan, and the DCI reported to Brzezinski in March that the FBIS project had been shelved.[5] Brzezinski argued that the matters did not "necessarily conflict," but on 2 April he asked that the Agency take at least temporary measures to improve overt monitoring, inasmuch as, with the Iranian and Afghan situations continuing to deteriorate, the value of FBIS reporting was, in his view, "even more obvious" than when he first raised the issue.[6] The Shah had fled and Khomeini had returned to Iran; in Kabul, the US Ambassador had been shot and killed by Muslim extremists. Brzezinski asked for word by 1 May 1979 that measures were being taken to improve FBIS coverage.

A DCI response to Brzezinski, dated 1 May, noted that FBIS surveys had indicated that "much of the coverage" requested could be supplied by a new bureau in Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, or the United Arab Emirates.[7] A small FBIS operation, meanwhile, was situated in Kuwait to cover Iran's regional stations, such as those at Isfahan, Ahvaz, Abadan, Kermanshah, and Shiraz, which produced unique material in the early stages of the Iranian revolution. An approach was also made to the Indian Government (which had its own overt monitoring station north of Delhi), but FBIS received an anticipated "no" from

[3] Memorandum from DCI Turner to Brzezinski, 4 January 1979.

[4] Interviews with Ambassador Arthur Hummel, in Islamabad, by author, February 1979.

[5] Memorandum from DCI Turner to Brzezinski, 21 March 1979.

[6] Memorandum from Brzezinski to DCI Turner, 2 April 1979.

[7] Memorandum from DCI Turner to Brzezinski, 1 May 1979.

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the Delhi regime in July. Late in May, the Amir of Qatar gave a negative response to a request to place an FBIS operation on his soil. He was afraid an FBIS connection would imply Qatar's support for the Camp David accords. Bahrain, however, agreed to an FBIS operation on condition there would be no publicity about its presence. The Bahraini Minister of Information was assigned responsibility for the FBIS establishment by the Amir. The facility became known simply as the "Gulf Bureau" in the FBIS lexicon. Operations at Manama, in Bahrain, began in September 1979, assuring coverage not only of Iran but also of Iraq, the Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia, and proved valuable in reporting on the long-running Iraq-Iran war which began in 1980.

As the Middle East situation continued to deteriorate, this limited effort to improve overt collection from the area did not satisfy the NSC. The Iranian crisis deepened, and there was the possibility of Soviet involvement. FBIS's British counterpart, the BBC Monitoring Service, with which FBIS had maintained a close relationship since 1943, had the responsibility under the mutual arrangment for providing the bulk of the coverage of Radio Tehran. This, initially at least, was unfortunate in that the Iranian crisis was seen in London as primarily a US problem. The BBC Monitoring Service responded slowly to the Iranian situation. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) To meet the crisis occasioned by this slowness on the part of the British, FBIS assigned its own Farsi-speaking monitors to Nicosia and Tel Aviv, where they handled Soviet broadcasts in Farsi (including the Soviet-controlled clandestine radio, "National Voice of Iran," which was located at Baku) and backed up the British monitoring of Tehran.

New Pressure on FBIS

November 1979 saw further ominous developments in the Muslim world that served to increase pressure on FBIS to add scope and depth to its coverage. Muslim fanatics attacked the Great Mosque in Mecca, the American Embassy compound in Islamabad was burned, and—to the lasting consternation of the Carter administration—the American Embassy in Tehran was seized by fanatic Islamic militants and the US staff was held hostage for the next 444 days. At this time the NSC staff sent a memo to the Agency noting its "great concern about the Soviet role in the Iranian crisis," and asked to be assured that FBIS had committed "the necessary resources to monitor all Soviet broadcasts to the Middle East and trouble spots in the Persian Gulf." As part of its response, FBIS began wire-filing weekly analytical notes on Soviet material related to the Iranian situation. In December, it published a compilation of Soviet commentaries and started publishing *Focus on Iran,* which was wire-filed not only to Washington consumers but to embassies and military missions overseas. *Focus on Iran* not only summarized developments but also alerted consumers to special coverage and production.

On 11 December, the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) at the White House discussed improvements in US radiobroadcasting to the Muslim world, including the minority populations of the Soviet Central Asian republics. The meeting was chaired by Brzezinski, who noted that President Carter was

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displeased with the US Government's "failure to influence the Muslim world" and to anticipate developments in those areas. The main purpose of the meeting was to discuss a plan devised by NSC staffer Paul B. Henze to expand US broadcasting in Farsi and the seven languages of the Muslims in the Soviet Union. Voice of America programing was to be expanded to about $1 million, plus $2 million for Radio Liberty broadcasts in Muslim languages to the Soviet Union. There was also discussion of new US transmitters for beaming to the Muslim world and the purchase of time on friendly Middle Eastern radio stations. To the consternation of Dr. Brzezinski, much of the key information in the plan was leaked to the press.[8]

Invited to the same meeting were DDCI Frank Carlucci and FBIS Director Peterson.[9] It was not surprising that, in connection with the Henze plan, Brzezinski again raised the question of FBIS coverage, asserted that it was "inadequate," and asked DDCI Carlucci to take decisions that would enable FBIS to make improvements. Following the meeting, the DDCI again asked FBIS to reprogram funds for improving Muslim world reporting. FBIS responded that it would require $3.6 million and 26 positions to meet the NSC request, and that a reprograming of these resources would seriously cut into other activities.[10] This focused attention on the longstanding FBIS dilemma: FBIS was faced with a need for growth; the US Government had an obvious need for a strong media collection system that could keep pace with the growing sophistication and importance of the foreign media; previous FBIS proposals for expanded funding had been turned down; and CIA management would have to make a decision on whether FBIS could be allowed to grow in response to the NSC request.

Solving the Problem

In January 1980, American focus on the Muslim world was intense. Soviet troops had invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. The hostages were still being held at the American Embassy in Tehran. President Carter emphasized in his State of the Union address that Soviet attempts to consolidate a strategic position in the Middle East posed a threat to US and Western oil imports. The new director of FBIS, John Pereira, consulted with numerous managers, consumers, and collectors on what FBIS might do.[11] In addition to the NSC requests, FBIS was confronted by a workshop sponsored by USICA (now USIA) at which government and academic representatives expressed concern at the lack of systematic monitoring of local-language media in Soviet Central Asia. The workshop had concluded that areas on both sides of the Soviet border were undergoing "dynamic change" and suggested that FBIS expand its effort. Henze sent word that "there is a lot of support on the NSC staff for increased FBIS coverage."

Two budgetary proposals were submitted to higher authority by FBIS to bring about the desired expansion of FBIS activity: one recommended spending

[8] See article by David Binder, The New York *Times*, 17 December 1979, p. A16.

[9] Peterson, who became FBIS d[illegible] in 1973, retired at the end of 1979.

[10] In FY-79 FBIS had a budget [illegible] (b)(3)(c)

[11] John F. Pereira was FBIS Director from January 1980 to December 1983.

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$1.7 million for a "remote" monitoring facility (essentially unmanned) in Islamabad and further development of the Gulf Bureau, units in Libya and Omdurman, enhanced coverage of the printed media of Muslim nations, greater media analysis of Muslim areas, and production of a "Middle East Roundup" to be distributed electrically in Washington and to US missions abroad. Another recommendation suggested $1 million for monitoring Soviet communications satellites that were carrying television and fascimile transmissions of the Soviet central newspapers prior to actual publication; a unit in Helsinki; additional coverage of Soviet media in vernacular languages; and increased Soviet media analysis focusing on the Muslim minorities.[12]

The breakthrough finally came on 31 January 1980 when DDCI Carlucci took the matt(b)(3)(c)tol Hill. On 6 February, FBIS was notified that Congress had approved release for overt collection on the Muslim world. For the first time, FBIS had been allocated significant funds beyond the base budget that would permit it to respond fully to the NSC requests. An FBIS technical facility was established in Islamabad on 2 November 1980 through the simple expedient of Embassy notification to the Pakistani Government. The Pakistanis not only did not object but helped FBIS establish a commercial satellite feed to the London Bureau. The line would carry some 45 broadcasts a day for processing (translating) at the London end. Persons knowing the exotic languages of Central Asia were hired in London and put to work on the new material. The circuit from Islamabad also proved significant when Kabul reduced its transmission power and had to be monitored from Islamabad rather than London.

This new money allowed FBIS to install, for the first time, antennas ("dishes") in London and Okinawa to monitor satellites that carry the authoritative Moscow newspapers page by page to printing plants around the Soviet Union, thus obtaining official statements and permitting media analysis some six hours before the papers come out. Soviet television, in its many forms, was also now available. A special Middle East Branch was established to analyze Muslim materials, using Arabic- and Persian-speaking analysts. Staff officers were hired at Headquarters to enable the FBIS Production Group to have cleared personnel with a knowledge of the exotic languages of the area in order to peruse newly acquired printed materials. Two volumes of the *FBIS Daily Report*, as well as the FBIS Wire Service, were automated in a project dubbed MIDAS (for Media Intelligence Dissemination System), to handle increased collection. The Muslim world funding enabled FBIS to get into satellite monitoring and automated text editing for the first time.

The Hostage Crisis

Probably the biggest foreign affairs problem for the Carter administration was the Iranian hostage crisis. Even though coverage in depth of the "arc of crisis" was slow to develop, the NSC indicated it was pleased with the unique coverage of the Iranian situation provided by FBIS and its British counterpart service. The establishment of the bureau in Bahrain, the augmentation of Farsi monitoring by FBIS in Cyprus and Tel Aviv, and the ability of the British to

[12] Plans for units in Libya, Omdurman, and Helsinki were never implemented.

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monitor Tehran in London gave FBIS the capability needed to provide fast and unique service. The principal NSC staffer on the Iran situtation said "the speed and accuracy with which complex texts were translated and transmitted during the hostage crisis never ceased to amaze me"; he added that "often FBIS was the only source of information about what was going on in Iran." Unique FBIS material included such items as the Tehran broadcast of a fraudulent letter purporting to be from President Carter to Khomeini, which occasioned a presidential denial; a speech by Khomeini on 12 September 1980 that kicked off the final US-Iranian negotiations; and a report from Tehran Radio on Inauguration Day 1981 concerning the impending release of the hostages (the latter item was phoned to President Carter in his limousine from the White House).[13]

Road to Modernization

In addition to encouraging the Agency to provide better overt collection on the Muslim world, the Brzezinski initiative had another, long-term benefit to FBIS and the Agency. It produced an understanding of the need to modernize and update a collection apparatus that had not changed to any significant degree since World War II. From 1941 to 1980, FBIS did woefully little to meet changing modes of media communication and dissemination. And its pleas for additional funding generally went unheeded. Some of the measures taken under the Muslim world funding served to introduce FBIS employees to modern technology. As a result of the first tentative steps toward change undertaken in response to Brzezinski's request, long-range FBIS planning for a substantial upgrade was initiated and completed in 1982 by FBIS officers concerned about the future of overt collection.

The CIA Executive Committee approved a formal FBIS modernizaton program on 2 September 1982 as part of the Agency's budget for FY-84. It would be the biggest, most complex, and most expensive undertaking in FBIS history. With the strong support of DDS&T R. Evans Hineman and DCI William J. Casey, the plan that came to be known as the "FBIS Modernization Program" came into being. It provided for comprehensive worldwide monitoring of foreign satellites including television, a modern wideband communications system to tie FBIS field installations and Washington consumers into an overt network, automated text-editing systems for all FBIS publications, and computerized storage and retrieval of published materials to assist analysts. The development of a modern FBIS overt collection system now seems to be firmly set; FBIS should be able to provide the kind of comprehensive coverage of foreign media envisaged in its charter.

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Note about the Author: John Chandlee was chief of the FBIS Operations Group from 1978 to 1979, when he was named Deputy Director, FBIS. He served as FBIS Director from December 1983 until his retirement in January 1986.

[13] Sick, Gary G., *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran*, Random House, 1985, pp. 271-2, 310, 341, 356.

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Addendum

A major milestone in this technical modernization program was reached in the summer of 1987 when FBIS Headquarters employees packed up their b(b)(1)ags at Key Building in Rosslyn and moved to a new building at the (b)(3)(c) Awaiting them in their new headquarters was the first segment of the Automated FBIS System, a computerized information handling system developed by (b)(3)(c) AFS gives FBIS editors, media analysts, and language officers unprecedented capability to prepare quickly large amounts of information from foreign media for dissemination to the intelligence community. The typing staff that had prepared *Daily Reports* since 1941 finally was disbanded. A separate segment of AFS scheduled for delivery in 1988 will give FBIS the capability to store and retrieve material, including classified information, electronically.

At the same time, increasing amounts of information on foreign developments are being monitored from communications satellites with new dish antennas located in Thailand and Panama. Field bureaus are being equipped with word processing computers compatible with headquarters equipment. In the introductory phase of the new wideband satellite information transmission system called INTERNET, Soviet, Libyan, and other TV news and special event programs are being relayed live to analysts at CIA Headquarters. Completion of the Modernization Program is scheduled for 1992.

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SOVIET TELEVISION: A NEW ASSET FOR KREMLIN WATCHERS

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Although regularly scheduled television broadcasts began in most major industrialized countries in the early 1950s and soon surpassed radio and the press as the prime source of information for a large portion of the population, only in recent years has television begun to be widely used as a source of intelligence. This lag was largely due to the logistic problems of monitoring television and making it quickly available. The picture began to change in 1981 when the Foreign Broadcast Information Service acquired the capability to monitor television from satellites, and information from foreign television could be factored into the current intelligence process. Despite a promising start, television from most areas of the world remains an underutilized source that offers new opportunities and challenges to analysts.

Thus far, FBIS has had the most experience analyzing Soviet television. Initial FBIS efforts to monitor television from satellites were primarily targeted on the Soviet Union, which regularly transmits national television programming from Moscow by satellite to almost every corner of the country. This article attempts to draw on FBIS' early experience to identify some of the benefits, limitations, and still unsolved problems involved in integrating television sources into the intelligence process.

Using Soviet television as a source has posed methodological as well as logistic problems. Analysts pioneering the use of television did not have at their disposal the kinds of voluminous files and experience that have been amassed by Kremlin watchers over the years from the Soviet press and radio. Drawing on the methodology used in analyzing other media sources, FBIS analysts are now attempting to apply a systematic approach to Soviet television. While our experience with reviewing, analyzing, and storing texts of radio and press materials could be applied to the audio portion of television, developing a methodology for systematic exploitation of video material has proved to be a more challenging task.

The first lesson we learned is that analyzing television is extremely labor intensive. The visual material cannot be quickly scanned like a written account. The scanning and screening process requires a more serious commitment of time. The problem is compounded when the analyst sets out to compare Soviet coverage of a current event with treatment of like events in the past—the process at the heart of media analysis. Using Soviet newspaper sources, for example, an analyst with good files should be able to compare the printed reports on the last several appearances of the leadership in Red Square in a few minutes. Comparisons of television treatment of the same events require many hours. For example, parades attended by the Politburo in Red

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Square on May Day or the anniversary of the October Revolution last about two hours.

The second problem we encountered was the lack of a data base that could be used to determine the norm for Soviet television handling of various types of events. While it is useful to know how a current event is reported in the media, it is more useful to be able to assess that reporting in the perspective of past treatment of similar events. For many subjects, we are still at the stage of having only impressions of the patterns of Soviet television behavior. What we need is a solid basis for making comparisons. For example, an analyst viewing Soviet television coverage of a foreign leader visiting Moscow often does not yet have the data to evaluate that coverage in the perspective of Soviet television coverage of past visits by VIPs from the same or other comparable countries. As we begin to accumulate files, it is becoming evident that treatment of visitors on television is a useful means of gauging the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the countries represented by the visitors.

New systems for storage and retrieval must be developed for video material. Unlike back issues of newspapers, videotapes of previous Soviet television programs cannot be purchased or found in major libraries. To establish a data base on the Soviet leadership, FBIS began in 1981 to create videofiles of major appearances by Politburo members. To establish a basis of comparison for other materials, we began compiling written summaries of major news programs—brief descriptions of the audio and video content of every item on these programs, prepared by FBIS field bureaus.

Television as a Source

Television now reaches more than 90 percent of the Soviet populace, and efforts are under way to bring it to remote mountain areas and regions of the far north where it is not yet available. The broad impact television has on the Soviet population was strikingly evident in a Soviet survey published in 1983 which reported that 90 percent of those questioned said they receive most of their information on international and domestic events from the nightly news program VREMYA (Time). The high priority the regime attaches to television is clear from reports in Soviet professional journals that salaries are higher for those working in television than for people in comparable positions in other media.

Television in the Soviet Union is, of course, an integral part of the controlled media apparatus that encompasses TASS, radio, and the press. The content of television, like that of the other media, is calculated to serve party goals and policies. But because the message is conveyed visually as well as in words, the advent of television has significantly widened the window on the Soviet Union afforded by the public media.

For analysts of the Soviet Union, the video content is the most obvious new source of intelligence information provided by Soviet television. For political analysts, video coverage of the Soviet leadership has been particularly valuable during the post-Brezhnev transition of the past 3 years. During this period there has been intense interest in video both for the information it

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contains about the political status of leaders (b)(3)(n) By monitoring television, FBIS can inform consumers about some significant leadership developments within minutes of when they are first seen in Moscow. Because some key programs are broadcast to eastern regions of the Soviet Union and monitored by FBIS before they are shown in Moscow, analysts in Washington learn of some developments before television viewers in the Soviet capital. While FBIS analysis of television video has focused primarily on the Soviet leadership, analysts elsewhere in the community have become avid consumers of video material showing Soviet weaponry, space exploits, industrial enterprises and technologies, agricultural production, and key personalities.

Beyond its purely visual aspects, Soviet television carries some of the most valuable reports, interviews, and commentaries available from the Soviet media. Due to the wide impact and prestige of key prime-time television programs, leading authorities are often featured as guests. For example, USSR deputy premiers and ministers frequently appear to discuss domestic topics, while the heads of major academic institutes often discuss domestic and international affairs. Guests of similar stature appear less frequently on radio.

Television commentaries on domestic and foreign affairs can provide important insights into regime concerns. The subject matter for VREMYA commentaries on domestic matters appears to be carefully selected and is used to elaborate issues raised at weekly Politburo meetings or to criticize specific ministries or sectors of the economy. Criticisms frequently draw responses from top officials which are aired in subsequent VREMYA telecasts. Television commentaries on foreign affairs give insight into official thinking on key issues and clues to how official policies are evolving. The speakers are frequently the regime's top foreign policy experts.

Programming

Two main Soviet television channels are broadcast from Moscow to virtually the entire country. Both are on the air from about 8 a.m. until 11 p.m., local time. Most programs of intelligence interest are on the first channel. The second channel contains primarily educational and cultural programming. The evening news and coverage of major events are carried simultaneously on both channels. In addition, many local areas also have their own stations that are not available from satellites. Surveys of the local Moscow station have shown little of intelligence value, but no surveys of local television in any other area have been conducted. A better understanding of Soviet national television programming can be gained from a brief survey of the regularly scheduled programs that have been the most productive sources of intelligence.

VREMYA is the major evening news program broadcast throughout the Soviet Union. It features reports and occasional commentaries on major domestic and international topics. It usually lasts about 35 minutes but is extended to cover major events, most often leadership activities. Unless there is live special-event coverage, VREMYA carries the most extensive highlights of leadership activities. Broadcast live during prime time in Moscow (9 p.m.) and repeated the next morning, it is the equivalent of the ABC, CBS, and NBC

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evening news rolled into one, and it is the only program aired without competition on all three channels available in major cities. It uses less video material than American network evening news programs, and the production comes across as less sophisticated. VREMYA is not immune from the kinds of bloopers that occur from time to time in live telecasts anywhere. In October 1983, for example, a report on developments on the Caribbean island of Grenada on the eve of the US-led invasion was read against the backdrop of a map showing Granada, Spain. The mistake was quickly recognized and a correction was read at the end of the program.



Wrong map with Grenada report . . . Error was corrected.

VREMYA is updated throughout the day for various time zones, and versions of the program have already been shown in most areas of the Soviet Union before it is aired in Moscow. During a visit to the Mosocow television studios in 1982 I was told that three versions of the program are broadcast live every day and that they are recorded and updated to create several additional versions. Each of these can include late-breaking material as well as unique items designed to appeal to specific regional audiences.

NOVOSTI (NEWS) is a shorter news program, usually lasting between 5 and 15 minutes, several different versions of which are broadcast during the day. It is often the first source of video coverage of major events. During my visit to the Moscow television studios I was told that all versions of NOVOSTI are broadcast live except for two to the Far East, which are recorded before the end of the work day in Moscow for later transmission.

THE WORLD TODAY is Moscow's only regularly scheduled weekday television commentary on world events. Two different versions of the program, usually lasting 15 minutes, are broadcast each weekday. It is hosted by a

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"political observer," a leading commentator who prepares his own remarks, and usually contains several short segments on current international topics. At the Moscow studios I was told that the host of the program is totally responsible for its content. In addition, I learned that this program is recorded shortly before air time and that there is no time to make any changes even if mistakes occur. Video plays a relatively minor role on the program, and most footage used appears to be of non-Soviet origin.

INTERNATIONAL PANORAMA is a weekly 45-minute program with reports by Soviet television correspondents from around the world. It covers a broad range of subjects and can provide useful insights on important international issues. A frequent host of the program, Genadiy Gerasimov, told me that the host writes his own material and selects the correspondents' reports that are used. Gerasimov said the program is usually recorded in a single session on Saturday for broadcast on Sunday and that it is shown without editing or retakes unless a serious mistake occurs.

I SERVE THE SOVIET UNION is a weekly 1-hour program on Soviet military affairs. It often provides video of military equipment and training of high interest to the intelligence community. It also contains commentaries on military affairs and has occasionally provided the fullest available version of speeches by the Defense Minister and other officials.

STUDIO NINE is a monthly 1-hour discussion program on international affairs. The most authoritative and prestigious regularly scheduled foreign affairs program on radio or television, STUDIO NINE often offers valuable commentary on major current international affairs topics. Guests on the program include some of the most influential Soviet foreign affairs experts. STUDIO NINE uses little supplementary video material, a practice moderator Valentin Zorin has described as considered policy. Advanced preparation clearly takes place, but some participants exhibit a degree of spontaneity suggesting that the program is unrehearsed. According to a leading Soviet journalist, STUDIO NINE is Zorin's "own program" and Zorin personally oversees its production, writes his own material, and selects the guests. In a 1982 interview, Aleskandr Bovin, a frequent guest on the program, alluded to the special place that STUDIO NINE occupies in Soviet media programming. While acknowledging that "polemics" are "not particularly accepted" in the Soviet Union, he remarked that he engaged in them "occasionally" on STUDIO NINE.

Other regularly scheduled programs provide basic intelligence information on a wide variety of domestic issues. For example, the weekly 1-hour program PROBLEMS, SEARCH, SOLUTION is an important source of economic data. It frequently has ministers or other top officials as guests, and it carries extensive interviews with them on specific aspects of the economy. Viewers have on occasion been invited to call in with questions while the program is in progress, affording insight into popular concerns. The weekly program LIFE AND SCIENCE often has the Soviet Union's top scientists as its guests and deals with a wide range of issues from the economy to high technology.

Much of the most valuable information from Soviet television is carried on special programming. Many of these programs are pegged to specific events such as major occasions attended by the top Soviet leadership, speeches by

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republic first secretaries on important local anniversaries, and press conferences by top Soviet officials. Other specials—including features on the consequences of nuclear war or on US activities in Latin America—appear to reflect current concerns of the regime. Presumably in order to reach a broad audience, on a few occasions special unscheduled announcements have been carried during hockey games. For example, in an effort to prevent hoarding occasioned by rumors of a price hike, a top official went on the air in the middle of a major match in November 1981 to deny that any increase was imminent.

It was on television in September 1983 that the Soviet public heard the most elaborate defense of the downing of the Korean Airlines passenger plane. Although reports of a highly unusual 2-hour press conference explaining the incident were carried by all Soviet media, the most complete one was shown on a special 75-minute telecast. It contained extensive excerpts of the conference and omitted little of substance. In several cases questions of obvious sensitivity raised by foreign correspondents were aired in an apparent effort to show viewers that the Soviet version of the incident was being strongly challenged abroad. A map shown during the broadcast provided specific details of the Soviet version of the incident, and photographs of it distributed by FBIS were used by top US officials in briefings on the incident. No other version of these Soviet graphics was available in Washington at the time.

Soviet Leadership on Television

For political analysts, probably the most productive aspect of television monitoring has been the new information it has provided to help penetrate the closely guarded secrets of politicking within the Politburo. Video coverage of the Soviet leadership gives a much more complete picture of events than the still photographs that have long been the staple fare of Kremlinologists. In addition to the information on the relative protocol standing of the top leaders that is provided by newspaper photos, video coverage adds another dimension that can convey more subtle messages, (b)(3)(n) Unlike photographs which can be carefully staged and even doctored, video is much more difficult to control or manipulate, particularly when events are covered live.

The practice of providing live coverage of major leadership speeches has presented special problems for the aging Soviet leadership. In Brezhnev's last years there appeared to be uncertainty about his ability to speak in public. At the February 1981 party congress he was taken off the air and was replaced by an announcer after he dropped major sections of his speech in the first 7 minutes and had obvious physical difficulties. In an apparent effort to avoid similar embarrassment, plans for live coverage of his speech to a March 1982 trade union congress were canceled at the last minute, and a recording of his speech was shown later in the day. A speech 2 months later was shown live but, in a departure from normal practice, was not announced in advance.

Live coverage also created an embarrassment for Brezhnev during a trip to Baku in September 1982 when he started reading the wrong speech. As he

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began reading, other leaders became visibly agitated and an aide brought him the correct version. Brezhnev was slow to react. After a minute of apparent confusion, his aide interrupted him, saying, "Leonid Ilich, I implore you. . . ." Only then did Brezhnev realize what was happening and begin reading the new text. This incident was omitted from subsequent media accounts of the meeting.

Shifts from the normal pattern of television coverage can provide other important clues about the leadership.

(b)(3)(n)

Television coverage of the leadership is not always evenhanded. At times it appears intentionally to favor a particular Politburo member. For example, when Gorbachev presented an award in Smolensk on 27 June 1984 the event was highlighted as the first item on that evening's VREMYA. Normally the General Secretary is the only leader whose activities lead off the news. In contrast, similar award presentations in June and July 1984 by Politburo members Vorotnikov and Ustinov received less prominent attention on VREMYA, appearing as the fifth and tenth items on the cast. Several months later, Gorbachev's chief rival as the successor to Chernenko, Party Secretary Grigoriy Romanov, appeared to be shown special favor in coverage of a Kremlin award ceremony for Foreign Minister Gromyko, attended by the entire leadership. Romanov stood next to Gromyko during the ceremony and at several points the camera paused on the two leaders. Except for Chernenko, none of the other Politburo members received similar favor. In each case, the special attention given to Gorbachev and Romanov came at a time when other indicators suggested an effort to give them a particularly high profile.

Intentionally or not, television coverage can also help cast light on the personal relationships among leaders. Informal interactions among Politburo members shown on television have been revealing, sometimes suggesting that certain leaders are uncomfortable dealing with each other. Television coverage has also yielded evidence of close personal relations among leaders. For example, televised coverage of Andropov's funeral showed Gorbachev sitting with Andropov's widow and family. The fact that he was the only leader shown alone with the family reinforced the impression that had developed while Andropov was alive that a close relationship existed between the two. The decision to include this footage on television added to other signs that Gorbachev might have a strong position in the new regime.

Video coverage of events can provide other kinds of information about the leadership that is not available from other media. During Brezhnev's last years it was often evident only from television that Chernenko was acting as Brezhnev's closest assistant. For example, Chernenko's role in a Kremlin ceremony commemorating Brezhnev's 75th birthday could not be gleaned from the formal press photograph, but television clearly showed Chernenko standing close to Brezhnev and assisting him at several points during the ceremony.

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Television coverage of Brezhnev's funeral provided a rare glimpse into Politburo politics when it showed Party Secretary Kirilenko standing with Brezhnev's family and friends, not with other Politburo members. This indication that he was to be removed from the Poltiburo appeared two weeks before the official announcement.



Kirilenko shown with Brezhnev's family . . . Political indicator.

• • •

Our experience with Soviet television so far has uncovered only the tip of the iceberg. Other aspects of Soviet television of potential intelligence value have not yet been explored, particularly programming dealing with social and cultural issues. For other countries of the world, a great deal remains to be done. Initial use of (b)(1) East European, Chinese, and Korean television suggests that these will also be productive sources, and we are only now beginning to probe the potential of television from other regions. This will be a long-term, continuing effort as capability for monitoring and transmitting the yield from foreign television develops—and as television itself comes into wider use and becomes more sophisticated in countries where it is not yet a prime medium of communication.

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A Security Officer's view

On The Ground with the U-2

(b)(3)(c)

Editor's Note: This article is based on a 17 December 1992 interview with Joe Murphy, former Security Officer with the U-2 program. Some context is drawn from ***The CIA and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs, 1954-1974,*** *by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, which was published in 1992 by CIA's History Staff with a Secret Noforn classification.*

By the early 1950s, the United States had perceived an urgent and growing need for strategic intelligence on the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe, which had been curtained off from the outside world. The Soviet military was carrying out its planning, production, and employment activities with the utmost secrecy. The Communist states' stringent security measures had blunted traditional methods for gathering intelligence, including the use of secret agents, travelers, wiretaps, and postal intercepts. At great risk US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow-penetration overflights, but these missions were paying a high price in lives lost and increased international tension. Furthermore, many important areas of the Soviet Union lay beyond the range of existing reconnaissance aircraft. The Air Force had therefore begun to develop a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that would be able to conduct deep-penetration reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union.

Because the loss of such an aircraft deep in Soviet territory could escalate tensions, President Eisenhower and his advisers argued for civilian overflights in unarmed, unmarked aircraft. In their view, the organization most suited for this mission was the CIA. Accordingly, they authorized the development of a new non-military aircraft to be manned by civilians and operated only under cover and in the greatest secrecy. On 29 April 1955, Richard Bissell, Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence, signed an agreement with the Air Force and the Navy in which the services agreed that the CIA "assumed primary responsibility for all security" for the overhead reconnaissance project.

Coming Aboard

My association with the U-2 program began in New York City in 1955, when a priest friend of mine from an earlier foray into seminary studies arranged for me to meet with a recruiter from Washington. At the time, I was working as a sales trainee for American Airlines. During our meeting in my Brooklyn neighborhood, the recruiter never revealed his CIA affiliation; he simply identified a career possibility in a government program that required security officers. Job requirements included remaining single for a number of years and being willing to spend a good deal of time overseas.


Fascinated by the lure of secret government programs and overseas travel, my career quickly changed direction. Within a few months of my initial interview, I was in Washington where, along with about 80 other men recruited for the same clandestine venture, I underwent polygraph testing and medical exams. Most of the recruits were from New York and New England; all were college graduates, and some had advanced degrees or government backgrounds.

Training

After our initial screening, a CIA security official briefed us on the U-2 program and told us that we were needed in the field as soon as possible. For the next five to six weeks, my new colleagues and I underwent basic training in physical security in the Washington area, including a period of weapons training (b)(1)

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First U-2 flight, 4 August 1955.

We called this training (b)(1) where security and compartmentation were the order of the day. Our small group of recruits often mixed with a group of more experienced security officers who also were preparing for various overseas missions.

Everyone (b)(1) had an alias, and I did not know these officers' true names. Several years later, I would see some of them in Japan, where I was stationed with a U-2 detachment, but we were trained not to acknowledge any prior association to help preserve our respective covers. We laugh about it now, but the discipline helped to maintain clandestine programs.

The Ranch

After completing the basic training, I joined a contingent of CIA, Air Force, and contractor personnel sent in February 1956 to a remote site near the Nevada Test Site at Watertown, Nevada, to prepare for our specific overseas missions. From Monday through Friday at "the Ranch," experienced Office of Security (OS) officials supervised security officer candidates in personnel security, weapons training, access control, document control, and courier duties.

In addition to protecting project aircraft and personnel, we were to escort operational film from the field to Headquarters. Security procedures established at the Ranch were the model for overseas detachments. On Friday we would usually fly back to Burbank, California, to enjoy the beaches and golf courses for the weekend.

Team Spirit

All detachment personnel were fully cleared and briefed on the nature and purpose of the project as well as its CIA sponsorship. Contractor personnel not directly involved with the detachment also were cleared, but they were not given access to any project details. Despite our rather intrusive role, our security team maintained a close rapport with other members of the detachment.

The bonds that developed among project members were to become a hallmark of the U-2 program. From the beginning, all elements of the program—pilots, contractors, security officers—developed a tremendous esprit de corps that was to last well beyond the program's termination. In particular, the initial group of 80 security officers selected to provide support for the U-2 program developed a great fraternal spirit, bound by their devotion to the mission and by their common experiences in a secluded and truly novel world.


I also experienced some sad moments while supporting the training at the Ranch. Occasionally, I would serve as a contact person in Burbank that served as a gateway for personnel going to or departing from the Ranch. Wilburn Rose, a new pilot, died in a training flight two days after I had dinner with him in Burbank to brief him on ground rules at the Ranch.

Compartmentation

Another important aspect of the security program for the U-2 project was the creation of an entire new compartmented system for the product of U-2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 was strictly controlled, often limiting the ability of CIA analysts to use the products of U-2 missions. To achieve maximum security, the U-2 program developed its own contract management, administration, financial, logistics, communications, and security

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The Ranch.

personnel, and thus did not need to turn on a day-to-day basis to the Agency directorates for assistance.

Pilot Training

Most of the three-to-four-month training program in Nevada centered around the U-2 pilots. A dedicated cadre of trainers from the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was sent to the Ranch to train them. Initially, at least, the project used US Air Force pilots who held reserve commissions.

Air Force pilots interested in the U-2 project had to be willing to resign from the Air Force and assume civilian status to maintain the U-2 program's civilian cover. Although Air Force pilots were attracted by the challenge of flying U-2s over hostile territory, they were reluctant to leave the service and give up their seniority. Accordingly, the Agency offered attractive salaries, and the Air Force promised each pilot that, upon satisfactory completion of his employment with the Agency, he could return to his unit. In the meantime, he would be considered for promotion along with his contemporaries who had continued their Air Force careers.

A Unique Program

The U-2 program was one of the first of its kind, and it laid the groundwork for future collection and recruiting programs. Before the U-2 project, OS had provided personnel and physical security support to Agency components, but the project's close operational marriage with the military and industry was a first for the Office. The U-2 project established procedures for project development, security, contract management, tasking, operations, and information dissemination that remain applicable even in today's more advanced collection programs.

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At the Sites

The first overseas site was (b)(1) (b)(1) in the United Kingdom also used by SAC. By 4 May 1956, Detachment A's personnel and equipment, including four U-2 aircraft, had arrived at (b)(1) via C-130 transport planes. Before the "Deuces" even began to fly, however, Britain's relations with the Soviet Union soured, and Prime Minister Eden asked for the U-2 flights to be delayed, believing the missions were too much of a political risk. Consequently, before the summer, Detachment A moved to Giebelstadt AFB in West Germany, near the border with East Germany, where it launched the first U-2 overflights of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East.

In the summer of 1956, I and three or four others arrived at Incirlik Air Base, near Adana, Turkey, to prepare for the arrival of Detachment B. Several months earlier, the US had approached Turkish Prime Minister Menderes for permission to fly reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Bloc from Turkey. Although Menderes had given his approval immediately, Detachment B, which was still being trained in Nevada, was not prepared for deployment when Egyptian President Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal Company in July 1956. Because our unit would not be ready for deployment before the end of August and would not become established at Incirlik until early September 1956, Detachment A was assigned the first Middle East overflights, leaving a temporary base at Wiesbaden to overfly the eastern Mediterranean littoral and landing in Adana for refueling.

By the fall of 1956, Detachment B in Turkey was ready for operations, and it was in a better position to provide coverage of the Middle East. Under the covername Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Provisional II, Detachment B began flying missions in September. It soon became the primary detachment for Middle East overflights, conducting nine of the 10 such missions flown in October.

U-2 photography continued to keep the President and other key officials well informed about the progress of crises in the Middle East. The Adana detachment became the mainstay of U-2 activity for the next



three and a half years, primarily conducting periodic overflights to monitor the situation in the Middle East, including Beirut in 1958.

Personnel on Site

Our Adana detachment fielded 80 to 100 people. In addition to our security contingent, detachments generally consisted of five to seven pilots who were the centerpiece of the organization. An Air Force colonel generally served as the commanding officer, with an Agency civilian as his deputy. The Air Force also provided flight planners and operations, weather, logistics, and medical officers, while communications officers and imagery analysis were Agency personnel.

Large contractor contingents, especially from Lockheed, which built the aircraft, also served each site. Each of the aircraft had its own maintenance crew of about six mechanics. The engine manufacturer (Pratt & Whitney), camera producers (Hycon and Perkin Elmer), and navigational equipment manufacturers (Baird Atomic), provided technicians to service their respective equipment.

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Detachment B shared the airfield with Turkish military aircraft. The airfield maintained six or so hangars that supported Turkish military aircraft, US Air Force B-47s, and Navy A-6s on TDY from Spain.

We lived in trailers on the base at Incirlik amid tough conditions. Turkey was by far the harshest of all the sites, although rotations between detachments helped to boost morale. Operational activity would be quiet for several weeks until such events as a Soviet missile firing or a crisis in the Middle East provoked missions. All three hangars would then open up with B-47s deploying for peripheral photographic or SIGINT missions and the A-6s for low-level operations. (In Australia in 1969, I learned over a drink with Harry Fitzwater, who later served as CIA's Director for Administration, that he flew A-6s in and out of Incirlik.)

Security Operations

As deputy chief of the security staff at Adana, my first responsibility was to protect the aircraft and personnel physically and operationally, and the second was to bring the film from the overseas locations to the project headquarters in Washington. Basic guard duty was boring. Armed with .38-caliber handguns, our security team would set up a perimeter around the hangars and operations buildings to control access 24 hours a day. About 12 men were dedicated to securing the aircraft. Cameras supplemented our security. Fortunately, we never experienced any security break-ins during my watch.

Operational security was extremely important to the project's success. Throughout the early days of the U-2 program, the US Government remained sensitive to any possibility of public disclosure. It was decided that the best cover for the deployment of the U-2 was an ostensible mission of high-altitude weather research by the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, NASA's predecessor. This cover, which was scrupulously supported by our periodic cover briefings, lasted until the 1 May 1960 shootdown of U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers over the USSR. Even if the Soviets had known about the flights and their mission, they initially had little capability to do anything about them. While they appeared to be able to track U-2 flights, interception proved impossible until the shootdown of Powers.

We tried to hide operational activity by staging the U-2 to its ultimate departure point for missions. For example, we staged Powers's U-2 to Pakistan before his May 1960 mission. The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining the security of the program. To reduce the chance of a security breach, the Agency always referred to the aircraft as "articles." Similarly, pilots were always called "drivers."

Film Processing

To return the U-2's film to the US for processing and analysis, an armed security officer would travel on a C-119 from Turkey to Germany, where he would pick up a C-54 or C-118 to the United States. The officer, traveling with military orders under an effective SAC cover, would be the last man on the plane and the first one off to be sure no one had unauthorized access to the compartment holding the film. I never experienced any security problems during these flights.

Passing on the results of the missions to our consumers without compromising our source also presented a significant security challenge. The project director restricted the number of persons who could be cleared for access to U-2 photography. Moreover, we considered U-2 information too sensitive to use in CIA publications. Consequently, many analysts did not have access to information that would have greatly aided the production of intelligence estimates.

Another Job

I returned from Turkey to the United States in December 1956 to join Detachment C, Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Provisional III, at the Ranch. A few months later, we transferred to Japan's Atsugi Naval Air Station. From Atsugi, we would

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stage necessary equipment and personnel to Eielson AFB outside Fairbanks, Alaska, in C-130 transports for several weeks whenever we wanted coverage of the USSR—usually against ballistic missile impact sites. By the time I returned to Turkey in 1958, U-2 activity had wound down.

I came home from my second tour in Turkey in December 1958, and I left the program to join the OS (b)(1). In the summer of 1960, Col. Stan Beerli, the commanding officer in Japan in 1957 and my commanding officer in Turkey in 1958, had become the director of project headquarters in Washington. He was just beginning to develop a new reconnaissance program, which was codenamed Oxcart; I accepted his offer to join that program, and I stayed with it until 1964.



Francis Gary Powers.

The Release of Powers

While at project headquarters, I assisted in the release of Powers in February 1962, who was exchanged for Soviet spy Col. Rudolf Abel. I was selected to identify Powers during the exchange because I had been with him while he flew U-2s from Turkey in 1956 and 1958.

On 10 February 1962, I joined the Chief of the US Mission to West Berlin Alan Lightner and Jim Donovan, the American lawyer who had negotiated the exchange, on the Glienecke Bridge that connects East and West Berlin to meet Powers and his escorts. Powers and I went from Berlin to Rhein Main near Frankfurt, where we boarded a C-118 for first-class travel home. Accompanying us on the trip back to the US were Col. Leo P. Geary, the USAF Headquarters Project Director (and my daughter's godfather!), and Donovan. En route, I told Donovan not to tell my father—coincidentally a professional friend of his and his Brooklyn neighbor—of my role in the release because I was still under cover.

Appreciating Powers

"Frank" Powers was much like the other "drivers," a regular guy who loved to fly. As an Air Force officer, he had developed a strong work ethic and sense of duty. Most detachment personnel held him and the other drivers in awe and great respect, realizing that they were putting their lives on the line each time they flew a mission. During operational missions, everyone tensely awaited the pilot's safe return. And there always were the memories of the good and dedicated comrades, such as Wilburn Rose, who had lost their lives during training missions.

After Frank was released, he received mixed reviews from the vastly uninformed or misinformed American public and press. On the other hand, those officials who knew the man and his orders gave him an unqualified "well done." Particularly heartwarming was the reception he received from his former associate drivers and their wives at a reunion

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in California a few weeks after his release. I accompanied Frank to that reunion, and, true to the spirit of the U-2 program, Frank also attended my wedding shortly after his release.

While committed to the kinship of the U-2 program, Frank especially treasured his immediate family, with whom I remain in touch. He sometimes told me that his greatest hardship in captivity was the lack of communication with his family.

Frank became a celebrity, but publicity made him uncomfortable. Although he resisted pressures from ghostwriters and publishers to rush into print, he eventually began to write books. He always appeared reasonable and attentive to the US Government's concerns about classified information.

Epilogue

After the shootdown of Powers, the U-2 operation gradually began to return to the US. We continued to operate from Edwards Air Force Base in California for several years, staging to other areas as necessary. Although I became increasingly involved in other projects, my heart would always belong to the program that forged such deep ties among its founders.

This article is SECRET.

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(b)(1)

TO FLY SILENTLY IN THE NIGHT

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
For as long as can be remembered, military and special mission forces who, along with the rest of us, spend half their lives in the night have wanted to be able to see, navigate, and maneuver in dead dark, moving moderate distances silently and invisibly to do assigned tasks. In past wars military dietitians crammed us with carrots to improve night vision while nations and their armies blacked out and camouflaged to conceal vital data from enemy eyes. The mere thought of being able to see 24 hours each day conjures up hundreds of jobs one might do in pitch black that he would otherwise have to leave undone until the next day's light.

• • •

In 1970 a group of CIA officers, combining efforts with the Advanced Research Projects Agency and innovators in the military-industrial arena, made some strides in this area. They developed a quiet helicopter to be flown at night. Now, 15 years later, while the all-around undetectability of special mission aircraft has made some limited progress, not too much else has been done to improve the state of operational night-sight and silence. In effect, the requirement still obtains; special mission forces are still pretty much in the dark, still make noise, and still move not stealthily enough.

The high-tech boom of the 1960s and 1970s left in its train hundreds of gadgets

(b)(1)



* Currently, Directorate of Operations.

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requirements and frustrations remain much the same today—witness our aborted attempt to rescue US national hostages in Iran and our current desire to find means to retaliate meaningfully against those countries and terrorist organizations which continue to attack us around the world.

At the time of the *Pueblo* seizure, our nation's leaders were vocal in their criticism that we had neither created nor were we aggressively working to create a manned infiltration vehicle that, undetected, could enter and exit an enemy country to take an avenging action.

It should be noted here that there is almost always an institutional proclivity on the part of politically minded colleagues who, fearing the consequences of pilot capture by the enemy, again and again push the use of remotely piloted vehicles as a means of performing such missions. Besides being politicians first, such fellows are frequently of the liberal arts variety with only a vague or romantic grasp of the technical complexities involved in any given effort; or, alternatively, wide-eyed scientific types of great aspiration who want desperately to assert the stunning capabilities of then current technical accomplishment.

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Quiet Helicopters

As to silencing the aircraft, the Directorate of Science and Technology had two or three experimental programs in the works, but all were in early stages of development. It was discovered, though, that in response to US Cavalry requests in Vietnam, ARPA and Hughes Tool Company had already launched a program to quiet reconnaissance helicopters. The OH-6 or "Loach" was the bird on which the experiments were being run. Early results showed that the rear rotor bandsaw-like noise could be considerably reduced by adding two blades and reducing rotor speed, while the main rotor flapping noise could be softened by reconfiguring blades and adding a fifth blade. Muffler modifications also could help hold down the noise.

Fe(b)(1) Division officers could work up any great enthusiasm over a helicopter. Authorities consulted in the Pentagon or elsewhere in Washington

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When the idea of using a helicopter rather than a fixed wing aircraft was first broached to CIA management, the reception was cool and confused. The litany of advantages needed recitation.

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The impact of analysis

Arms Control Compliance and Intelligence

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Most intelligence professionals have an opinion on the extent to which intelligence analysis is considered in, or influences, policy decisions. This opinion is usually something like "if intelligence supports policy, it has an impact; if not, intelligence is ignored by the policymakers." Maybe this puts the case too nakedly, and certainly the extent to which this judgment holds depends largely on the administration and the individual policymaker. It could even be argued that how our analysis is used is largely irrelevant to how we do our work, so long as our conclusions are not subject to policy influence and so long as we create a paper trail for use, particularly when the Congress begins to debate administration policy. But most of us want to know what impact our work is having.

It is often difficult to determine to what use intelligence analysis is put. A US decision to take some action, or refrain from some action, depends on many factors—cost, reaction of our allies, practical feasibility—so even careful consideration of intelligence judgments is only part of the equation. There is, however, one area in which the contrast is more starkly drawn. This is in the area of arms control.

The DCI and Arms Control

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is engaged in (b)(1) preparation of US negotiating positions and bottom lines; (b)(1) monitoring with national technical means of verification, and development of compliance judgments. Most of the decisions regarding treaty provisions are made by the National Security Council (NSC) and are therefore "policy" decisions. Nevertheless, the DCI is an influential player in these decisions when they have an intelligence dimension, as do all decisions related to verification. All this is in addition to the DCI's traditional role of protecting intelligence sources and methods.

There also is an arms control role for the DCI in his relationship with the Congress, and this role is substantively much the same as when supporting the executive branch. The House and Senate oversight committees and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) are the Congressional elements most often interested in the progress of arms control negotiations and the capability of the Intelligence Community (IC) to collect data and make assessments concerning Soviet compliance with treaties being negotiated, as well as treaties in effect. The oversight committees maintain a continuing interest; the SFRC interest grows as negotiations approach their conclusion, and it peaks during the treaty ratification hearings. Because final treaty provisions may not always allow maximum feasible monitoring, the Congress is especially concerned about the DCI's efforts in this regard. That is, was the administration, and especially the NSC and the president, told of IC monitoring capabilities and concerns as the negotiations proceeded, was the case for greater monitorability made strongly, and what were the trade-offs when other considerations prevailed?

In the early stages of preparing US negotiating positions, and during the negotiations themselves, it is the responsibility of the DCI representatives to protect and enhance monitoring capabilities through appropriate treaty provisions and to provide judgments to the policymakers on how well

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we can monitor the provisions being negotiated. The function here is more than merely advisory, because it is often necessary to argue for provisions that enhance monitoring.

Even though policy officials often nod in the direction of "effective verification," political and resource considerations frequently get in the way of best-case monitoring provisions. Therefore, because there is never 100-percent monitoring confidence, and usually much less, there can exist a state of tension between the DCI and other elements of the government.

While monitorability always remains the principal DCI concern, as negotiations proceed other aspects of the prospective treaty also become important. For instance, in this new era of burgeoning on-site activities, DCI representatives must pay close attention to on-site inspection (OSI) provisions.

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A treaty goes into effect after the Senate has provided its advice and consent, and the instruments of ratification are exchanged between the parties. At this point, the IC role becomes operational. Using intelligence resources, the traditional IC treaty monitoring function is to follow Soviet activities pertaining to treaty provisions and to assess their meaning. National technical means of verification are important resources in this regard, but other resources also contribute.

OSI is a new feature of treaty monitoring. Starting first with the INF treaty, OSI has become a standard part of the verification regimes for all current negotiations.

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Monitoring and Verification

One of the lessons an intelligence officer must learn when first becoming engaged in arms control activities is the distinction between "monitoring" and "verification." Monitoring is the use of intelligence collection and analysis to determine what the Soviets are doing regarding activities associated with arms control treaty provisions. Verification is the judgment of whether or not the Soviet activities are in compliance with the treaties. Monitoring is collection of data and analysis of what the data mean. Verification is a political judgment for political purposes. It may have some relationship to the intelligence analysis results, but it also may not. Monitoring is performed by the IC; verification judgments are made by policymakers, primarily the NSC staff, with the advice of all agencies involved.

It might be argued that the definitions present a distinction without a difference. This presumes

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that policymakers hear what the intelligence analysts say, believe what they hear, and use what they are told without regard to politics or ideology. The focus of this article is narrowed to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which was signed in Moscow on 3 July 1974.

A second nuclear threshold treaty, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), was signed on 28 May 1976. It exists only to close loopholes in the TTBT, and it is not central to this article.

History of the Treaties

The principal provision of the TTBT is that each party undertakes not to conduct underground tests of nuclear weapons with yields greater than 150 kilotons. The treaty addresses only underground tests, because an earlier treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, prohibits all nuclear tests that are not underground.

Both sides recognized two difficulties associated with the TTBT. The first has to do with the large uncertainties in nuclear yield estimates obtained through national technical means. These uncertainties have been a factor in why this treaty has not been ratified. The second difficulty is that physicists and engineers who design and build nuclear weapons cannot with certainty estimate the precise yield that will occur when the weapon is detonated. Even after the fact, nuclear weapon specialists cannot determine the yield to better than 10-percent accuracy.

In the context of this second difficulty, the sides reached an understanding that was made part of the public record. The statement of understanding is that:

> Both Parties will make every effort to comply with all the provisions of the TTB Treaty. However, there are technical uncertainties associated with predicting the precise yields of nuclear weapon tests. These uncertainties may result in slight, unintended breaches of the 150-kiloton threshold. Therefore, the two sides have discussed this problem and agreed that: (1) one or two slight, unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation of the Treaty; (2) such breaches would be cause for concern, however, and, at the request of either Party, would be the subject for consultations.

The US also stated that while it would not consider such slight, unintentional breaches as violations, it would nevertheless carefully review each such breach to ensure that it is not part of a general attempt to exceed the confines of the treaty.

There is still sufficient imprecision in these statements to allow reinterpretation of the definition of compliance. For instance, no one knows what is meant by a "slight breach," and the interpretation is likely to vary considerably for reasons of physics, application, and politics. Another obviously important loophole is the word "unintentional."

The TTBT was not submitted to the Senate for advice and consent associated with ratification until July 1976, after the PNET was signed. For a variety of political reasons, these treaties still have not been ratified, even though President Reagan resubmitted them to the Senate in January 1987.[1] Nevertheless, each party has indicated its intent to comply with the treaty pending ratification, each party has accused the other of violating the treaty, and both parties claim not to have violated the treaty.

A number of related bilateral and unilateral occurrences have taken place since these treaties were signed. Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations were started and broken off, the Soviet Union declared a moratorium on nuclear testing that lasted for 18 months, and the two sides began Nuclear Testing Experts' Meetings that lasted over a year, and which have led to the Nuclear Testing Talks, full-scale negotiations aimed at rewriting the verification protocols so that the treaties can

[1] The treaties with their new protocols were submitted to the Senate in June 1990 for advice and consent to ratification, which was given in September 1990. The treaties entered into force in December 1990.

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be ratified. Meanwhile, the IC continues to assess Soviet nuclear testing and the US administration continues to decide which tests are violations.

Teleseismic Monitoring

The only monitoring capability of any consequence for the TTBT is the US ability to determine the yield of each and every Soviet nuclear test. The only way to do this at present is through the use of long-range seismic measuring instruments, called teleseismic monitoring. Workers in earthquake research discovered that shocks to the earth cause disturbances that radiate in all directions and travel for thousands of kilometers. This also is true for shocks originating from nuclear explosions. The same kinds of instruments are used for locating and measuring the strength of earthquakes and nuclear tests.

There are three steps in teleseismic monitoring. First, an explosion must be detected. There is a continuous background of natural and man-made disturbances, referred to as "noise," that makes detection difficult for low-level explosions. But for yields above about 10 kilotons detection is quite routine.

The second step is to discriminate between nuclear explosions and earthquakes or chemical explosions. There are certain differences in detail in the signals received from earthquakes and those from explosions, so that such discrimination is straightforward. Chemical explosions can be eliminated on practical grounds, again for explosions above about 10 kilotons. The mass of chemical explosives required for such large events is just too great to be assembled without detection by some other source.

The final step is the estimation of yield of the nuclear event. While the uncertainty for detection and discrimination is practically nil at large magnitudes of interest, particularly near and above the 150-kiloton threshold, the same cannot be said for yield estimation.

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The Soviet Nuclear Test Program

The USSR conducted its first nuclear weapons test on 29 August 1949 at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapons Proving Ground. A second nuclear test site was established at Novaya Zemlya, with the first nuclear test held there on 21 September 1955. All tests were conducted on the surface, underwater, or in the atmosphere, until 11 October 1961, when the Soviets conducted their first underground nuclear test at Semipalatinsk. After the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) went into effect in October 1963 banning all tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, the Soviet test program moved completely underground.

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The Compliance Report

Since 1984, the President has each year been responding to Public Law 99-145, which, in Section 1002, requires that:

> Not later than December 1, 1984, and not later than December 1 of each following year, the President shall submit to the Congress a

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report (in both classified and unclassified versions) containing, with respect to the compliance of the Soviet Union with its arms control commitments, the findings of the President and any additional information necessary to keep the Congress currently informed.

The report is an interagency product. It contains, for each treaty, a section describing related Soviet activities, a history of compliance evaluation, compliance analysis, and a finding. The finding is debated among the agencies of the government, but the final wording is decided by the NSC, and it contains the political judgment regarding compliance. In the 1 December 1988 report, the President found the Soviets to be in "likely" violation. This is consistent with the judgment made in previous years.


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The lingua franca of intelligence

TO LEARN A FOREIGN TONGUE

Apprendre une langue etrangere

Pierre Ali Gonzales-Schmidt

An organization seeking to recruit employees with highly developed foreign language skills has slim pickings in the United States. Americans appear to be favorable to foreign language study, but they do not acquire much foreign language competence. In a 1979 nationwide poll, 76 percent of the respondents thought foreign language study was "worthwhile;" yet, only 8 percent had studied language for four years or more, the minimum amount of academic time needed to develop any real communicative skill. In the only systematic survey to date using the oral interview, graduating college majors in foreign language were found to have attained only about the S-2 (limited proficiency) level. In a more recent survey of college students, only about 12 percent of the respondents claimed to be able to "talk quite easily about their favorite hobby at some length, using appropriate vocabulary." Fewer than 4 percent could "quite easily describe the role played by Congress in the United States government."

Over the past several years, language departments in American colleges and universities have tried new programs to help students develop communication skills for the "real world." For example, some campuses have instituted undergraduate and master's degree programs that attempt to "put language skills to work" in foreign internships of sufficient length to give students functional control over the language. A number of universities are reinstituting foreign language requirements, dropped in the early 1970s, although the trend is not universal. Some institutions are launching intensive language instruction programs during summer sessions to provide the opportunity for motivated students to make rapid progress. Even so, the vast majority of these programs are at the elementary level.

With a few notable exceptions, it is not likely that current or future graduates will have greater foreign language communicative skills than graduates of the 1960s during the heyday of foreign language study under the auspices of the National Defense Education Act. Neither can we tap with ease the once almost unlimited pool of ethnic groups made up of individuals equally facile with their parents' language and English.

The minimal state of foreign language competence in the U.S. creates a need for the Agency, with worldwide responsibilities, to train its employees in a worldwide assortment of languages. The Language School of the Office of Training and Education has the task. For most students, it has to start at the elementary level. It also has to be selective. There are approximately 200 principal languages. More people speak one of the Chinese dialects than any

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other language in the world. English is next, followed by Russian, Spanish, and Hindi. We can focus on only a few; the following pages tell the why, who, what, and how of the Language School's response to the challenge of the Agency language requirements.

The Need

La Necesidad

There is within the Intelligence Community a recognition that competence in one or more foreign languages is a valuable adjunct skill—that English is not the lingua franca of intelligence collection and analysis. More recently, full professional foreign language capability has come to be regarded as an integral part of overall job qualification, a required rather than a merely valuable adjunct to operational or analytical skills. Ethnocentrism and a lack of foreign language speaking proficiency severely hamper our intelligence mission both at home and abroad—and can cause outright failure in an overseas operational assignment.

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Full professional speaking/understanding capability and cultural awareness are critical to the success of

Liaison operations, whatever the objective, often involve contacts with non-English speaking internal security personnel and, in a hostile environment, contacts with individuals who may in fact speak English but either prefer not to, or simply refuse to do so. The intelligence officer is in a better position to confront such adverse conditions if he can exploit the human relations value of being able to speak the language of the community in which he lives and works.

A host of overseas support activities may not require the level of proficiency expected of the agent manager, but real world needs often involve the valuable participation of clerical, logistics, and finance personnel in actual operations and, consequently, more than a mere survival level capability in a foreign language.

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Military, economic, political, and social research analysts require reading skills to allow direct and timely access to primary sources, as well as the ability to communicate effectively and diplomatically when interviewing or briefing non-English speaking individuals during meetings here and while on familiarization and research assignments overseas.

In-house translations into English of sensitive and classified material require the ability to read foreign language items addressed to the general reader, and the ability to read all styles and forms, very often of a highly technical nature.

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A list of reasons why the intelligence profession is better served by language-competent personnel could stretch to infinity, but one basic query is reason enough: Wouldn't you be more responsive to a person who can speak your language?

About Instructors

The instructors on the staff of the Language School represent many cultures and countries of origin. Monique came to the Language School as the war bride of a staff officer. She has been teaching French for 21 years. She is a principal in the development and organization of total immersion programs.

Nina works on her Ph.D dissertation when she can. An Argentinian born to Italian parents, she teaches both Spanish and Italian and in her three years with the school has become our second expert on testing.

Surin, a former Thai newspaperman, brings not only language expertise to his students, but also cultural and political insights.

Nick, who left the Soviet Union over twenty years ago, stays abreast of the living language through the Russian media; he has written a comprehensive grammar workbook to supplement his texts.

In addition to Monique, Nina, Surin, and Nick there are [redacted] other full-time instructors who comprise our faculty. The full-time teachers are all native born and have an average age of 50 plus. Three-fourths of them are women. They are complemented by about [redacted] part-time instructors with similar qualities. Some are available on an intermittent basis, which enables the Language School to expand and contract to meet changing requirements. (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c)

Flexibility as well as intensive activity characterize a teacher's day at the Language School. Although there are no "typical" days for Language School instructors, most teachers give their students four to five daily class hours which students intersperse with laboratory work and self-study. Two of the class hours are usually dedicated to grammatical instruction. During the remaining hours, teachers reinforce in practice what students learned in theory. Field trips, role-playing, videotape viewing, individual and group discussion may be included in this segment of the instructional program.

Outside the classroom, teacher activity escalates. Instructors give employee and pre-employment oral proficiency tests, develop reading proficiency and achievements tests as well as supplementary written, audio and audiovisual exercises, create innovative class activities and produce in-house cultural and pedagogical videotapes.

To ensure consistency and excellence in language training, all new instructors are enrolled in a one-week [redacted] a course designed to initiate them in a practical and varied manner into adult language instruction as it is carried out in the Agency. Instructors read about, discuss, and experience through demonstrations a modest number of new teaching techniques. They also observe classes in their own and other languages. The experience is invaluable because it links immediately what is learned in the (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

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workshop to the real classroom setting. All discussions of and work with techniques is underpinned by the traditional four-skill—speaking, listening, reading, writing—approach to language situations. Why emphasize the four skills when we know that virtually all Language School students have speaking as their ultimate goal? The answer is simple although not necessarily obvious. Experience shows that skill in speaking is sharpened to a much greater degree in programs which not only provide for a great deal of speaking practice but also systematic listening, reading, and writing practice. The ability to read is, after all, basic to the ability to perform at full capacity in a foreign environment, quite aside from its value at Headquarters in the areas of research and analysis.

Beyond teaching techniques, instructors are briefed on the OTE resource centers that are available to them or their students. Finally, instructors are exposed to proficiency testing and achievement testing as they are done at the School. In maintaining this practical orientation, two other workshops are offered to instructors, [redacted] (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) In the former, instructors are given practice in writing graded final training reports on students. The (b)(3)(c) is centered on teaching methodology and theory. These seminars have two objectives: to give teachers an opportunity to expand their ideas on teaching, especially on teaching techniques and methods, and to deepen their awareness and understanding of traditional and new foreign language methods used in the United States and of the theory that underpins these diverse methods. (b)(3)(n)

Language teachers are also regularly scheduled to attend the seven-day [redacted] Course. Through this orientation the teaching staff has become familiar with the type of work which their students will be doing on overseas assignments. In addition, periodic seminars are devoted to the development of work-related syllabi and the preparation and int(b)(3)(c) into basic language courses. The Language Scl(b)(3)(n) brings in specialists in the methods area from other federal agencies or the academic world to conduct workshops. Recently [redacted] linguists taught a one-week workshop on a new approach to the teaching of reading. (b)(3)(n)

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About the Students

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The typical Language School student is a Directorate of Operations officer who is just as likely to be learning a new language for a second or third overseas tour as he is to be a first timer. He is in his thirties, possesses an average aptitude for language learning, and was probably exposed to one foreign language in high school or college.

In terms of where he comes from within the Agency and how many of "him" there are—Table 1 gives an overview of Language School enrollments, both full-time and part-time, over the last five years. In FY 82, overall enrollments were up substantially over the previous year for the third year in a row. For the second time in the six year period overall enrollments surpassed their 1977 level. Full-time enrollments, which had been below 1977 levels for three years, were slightly above that level. Part-time enrollment jumped dramatically for the second consecutive year. It is likely that the Language Incentive Program and the high visibility given to the issue of language competence by the highest levels of Agency leadership are primary driving forces behind the recent trend for increased enrollments, particularly part-time enrollments.

Table 1

Full and Part-time Enrollments FY 77-82

FY	Number Full-time	Percent Change from FY 77	Number Part-time	Percent Change from FY 77	Total	Percent Change from FY 77
1977		—		—		—
1978		−21.6		+ 3.7		− 3.9
1979		− 1.8		−17.6		−12.8
1980		−14.2		− 5.2		− 7.9
1981		+ 4.6		+29.7		+18.0
1982		+ 3.7		+42.5		+30.7

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Table 2 provides an overview of FY 82 enrollments, by directorate. The DO is by far the heaviest user of Language School training, accounting for 85.4 percent of full-time enrollments during the fiscal year.

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Table 2

Full-time and Part-time Enrollments by Directorate FY 1982

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Table 3 indicates the relative demand for full-time and part-time instruction, by language. French, German, Russian and Spanish in the recent past have been by far the most heavily enrolled languages if one looks at total enrollments. The place of Russian in this group is determined principally by a large part-time Headquarters program. These four languages account for 72 percent of the total enrollments during FY 1982.

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Table 3

Languages by Full-time and Part-time Enrollments FY 82

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Language
Spanish
Russian
French
German
Arabic
Chinese
Italian
Japanese
Greek
Thai
Dutch
Turkish
Portuguese
Indonesian
Polish
Hungarian
Korean
Scandinavian Fam.
Vietnamese
Norwegian
Serbo-Croatian
Persian
Bulgarian
Danish
Romanian
Total

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Shortened language training programs because of other demands on personnel remains the most vexing problem faced by the Language School. Full-time students, on average, are scheduled for or actually attend only two-thirds of the basic beginning program required to achieve a "3" or professional level of competence. The problem is apparent to the Operations Directorate, which enrolls most of the full-time students. As personnel shortages are eased and more training time is made available, the problem should be relieved.

Another problem for the Language School is the small size of full-time classes, averaging just [ ] students. Though effective and personalized, this type of teaching is hardly cost effective. An ideal class size would be [ ] (b)(3)(c)

Tailored to Professional Goals

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The Language School endeavors to tailor its language training programs to suit the specific professional and personal needs of its extremely varied and exacting consumers, employees from all Agency directorates who need a level of reading, speaking and/or listening skills for virtually any professional requirement. Basic full-time language courses consist of forty hours weekly of training which lasts from six months for the less difficult languages such as Spanish and Indonesian and extend to a year or more for the more complex languages such as Korean and Chinese. At any given period the Language School has an enrollment of from [ ] students in over 25 different languages. In classes which range in size from [ ] students learn to function both socially and professionally in their target languages. (b)(3)(c)

Although the traditional grammatical foundation forms the core of virtually all courses, the ultimate professional goals of students are developed from the earliest stages of training. Students are taught specific functions (persuading, denying, contradicting, requesting, etc.) with ever increasing degrees of sophistication as the courses progress; a beginning student, for example, might persuade a colleague to order coffee rather than tea while an advanced student might persuade a defector to repatriate and provide intelligence to the U.S. government. Functions permeate all classroom activities and are taught and practiced in grammar drills, role-playing situations, and free and controlled conversations. The latter are based on real life experiences, current events, videotapes, films, and pre-recorded audiotapes. Although culture is taught on a day-to-day basis from the first day of training, special exercises and in-house videotapes have been developed which are geared to teach special cultural points, expand students' cross-cultural insight, and reduce culture shock and the gaffes typically made by foreigners in a foreign country. Tradecraft, military, economic, political, communications and scientific terminologies are also woven into the established curriculum when there is a need.

A wide variety of part-time courses are offered to accommodate student work schedules and individual circumstances. A mini-language school offering three to four hours of weekly instruction in 10 languages has been set up in the Headquarters Building. Each year, approximately [ ] employees who cannot (b)(3)(c)

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be freed for intensive training maintain or improve their language skills through the Headquarters program. When warranted, language classes are also set up on an ad hoc basis in other facilities; (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

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The Language School is constantly reviewing the types of language training offered to ensure that our students are being provided with the skills they need to do their jobs. To this end, a revised Language Use Questionnaire for returnees has been designed to provide current information about language use of Agency employees overseas. Analysis of the data from collected forms will help the Language School to focus on areas of specific need.

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The Language School is also experimenting with longer courses and through the use of control groups in selected languages we hope to gain a better insight into the time required to attain at least a minimal proficiency level.

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Total Immersion Programs

完全浸透プログラム

The Agency's Language School is unique in its expertise in offering and executing total immersion programs which enhance and supplement normal

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classroom instruction. These programs expose students to very intensive language instruction and practice by placing them in an isolated environment in which they are required to speak, hear and read exclusively the target language not only in daily classroom sessions but also in myriad formal and informal everyday and professional situations. Programs vary in length from two and one half days to three weeks. To supplement the Language School staff in these programs, a cadre of adjunct instructors is drawn from other Agency components which have linguists with native fluency. This provides students an opportunity to hear a variety of accents in the target languages.

The longer programs are offered one or more times yearly in French, Spanish, German and Russian. These highly time-efficient and instructor-intensive programs are geared for [redacted] students who have reached an intermediate speaking proficiency level (S-2). They provide a wide variety of activities programmed throughout the day from 8 a.m. until well after 10 p.m. There is a steady progression from highly structured mornings through somewhat less structured afternoons to more relaxed evening activities. This division of the day corresponds to students' declining stamina and ability to concentrate and absorb new material. (b)(3)(c)

A typical day begins with three or more hours of grammar. Afternoons are usually dedicated to professional/operational role-playing exercises, monitoring of news broadcasts, individual conversation sessions with native speakers, debates, small group discussions of preassigned topics and monitored self-study time. Evening activities include films, most news programs, guest speakers, skits, games, student presentations or speech-inducing social events such as elicitation exercises.

Dramatic advances are made in participants' abilities to speak, understand and think in the target languages. During this type of training students invariably augment their vocabulary, improve their listening comprehension, and learn to speak more correctly and with greater ease and self-confidence.

Shorter immersion programs are offered several times yearly in most of the languages offered at the School. Similar to the longer programs in their content and general approach, they differ mainly in length, smaller number of participants, and the fact that students need not have reached as advanced a level to participate profitably.

Special week-long mini-immersion programs have been developed for specific professional needs. One such special program, for example, is designed to give survival level language ability to students who do not have time for traditional long-term training but who will need to communicate immediately after arrival in their country of assignment. Upon completion of such a course, students can give and understand directions, make simple requests, order food, book lodgings, and converse in a limited manner about biographical information and travel plans.

Total immersion programs have provided a quantum leap in efficient teaching. Other techniques are also worth exploring.

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Computer-Assisted Instruction

Unterricht mit Hilfe des Computers

The Language School has considered Computer-Assisted Instruction (CAI) several times in the past but did not find a system suitable for use. With recent technological advances in the area of computer power, video-disk and random access audio technology, and perhaps even voice synthesis, CAI now deserves a second look.

We believe that there is truly pioneering work being done in the domain of Intelligent CAI applicable to foreign language instruction which goes beyond the "frame-based" CAI representing the first generation of computer-assisted instruction. This new approach encompasses "expert-based" and "learner-based" systems, which incorporate subject-area expertise within the computer (in our case, knowledge of the grammar and vocabularies of the foreign language and English), and which build models of the learner's skills, thereby being responsive to the needs of the individual. While we do not believe that CAI, even Intelligent CAI, will ever replace the human instructor in the teaching of natural language, we do believe that its implementation would improve the quality of student self-study time and would free instructors to engage in more creative foreign language activity. School management considers it essential now to build awareness and expertise on the part of its instructional staff, and to monitor CAI systems and peripheral equipment as they are developed. To further this short-term goal of awareness- and expertise-building, the School is working with the Information Science Center to develop an in-house system, CAFLI (Computer-Assisted Foreign Language Instruction), which is currently being used in German and Spanish. We are also making available to instructors Agency and outside coursework in CAI development. The purpose of proceeding in this manner is to have available in the Language School the necessary support and expertise for the advanced CAI system that we suspect is not too far in the future.

Testing Language Competency

Dil Yetenegi Testi

Directly complementary to the training mission is the second Language School mission—testing the foreign language competence of Agency personnel. Recently, testing has assumed increased importance for three reasons: the Agency Language Incentive Awards Program, which pays employees with tested competence for the acquisition, maintenance, and use of language skills; the government as a whole, particularly the [redacted] (b)(3)(n) which is honing the text and application of the government proficiency definitions; and academia (colleges and high schools), which is searching for a valid and reliable test method for ascertaining the extent of students' functional foreign language proficiency.

The Language School has been in the forefront of all three of these endeavors and is now the recognized government leader in oral proficiency testing. Recently, we were asked by the [redacted] to help (b)(3)(n) transfer the oral interview technique from the East to the West Coast. Under

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this joint [redacted] Oral Interview Transfer project we have trained [redacted] instructors and administrators in our common languages. Currently, a field test version of an [redacted] Training Handbook is being used at both schools. Finally, the Language School is sharing its testing with the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Language in adapting the government definitions to academia, designing workshops, and training academic personnel in the interview's administration. We envision a day when a nationwide standard proficiency testing system will exist. (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(n)

How long does it take to learn French or Spanish or Russian or Thai or Arabic? This is the inevitable first question of both the manager who sends his employee to training and of the employee.

The Language School is just beginning to provide data-based answers to this question through analysis of information contained in the Language Training Database, which presently contains the records of all training done by the School during FY 1979, 1980, and 1981. (b)(3)(c)

We find that only [redacted] (or 9 percent) of [redacted] students in full-time training in the past three years who started with no prior knowledge of the language reached the "3" level; however [redacted] (32 percent) reached the "2" and "2+" levels which appear to be more realistic goals given the length of time able to be spent in training.

Time in training, although customarily acknowledged as the primary factor in determining proficiency attained, is not the only factor. Aptitude for learning languages must be taken into account as well. Our statistics show an obvious but unmistakable trend; students with higher MLAT scores tend to achieve higher speaking proficiencies at the end of their language training. Even so, the MLAT score is not an infallible predictor of achievement; one student with a superior MLAT received only an S-1 at the end of training, and a number of below average students were able to attain S-2 and S-2+ (although none attained an S-3).

It does appear that given sufficient time in training, i.e., up to six months for the easier languages, significantly longer for more difficult ones, a sizable portion of Agency personnel can expect to attain the S-2 or 2+ level of speaking skill. There are significant populations of individuals, however, that appear limited by low aptitude to the S-1 and S-2 levels of achievement. Continued research will enable us to better predict how long it will take to obtain a usable language proficiency and how much a student will learn.

External Activities

ВНЕИНСТИТУТСКАЯ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ

The Chief of the Language School represents the Agency on the Foreign Language Training Committee (FLTC), which is a creature of the Intelligence Community Staff. One of the primary functions of the FLTC, as a matter of self-interest, is to reinvigorate foreign language studies, which are at a low ebb, in the various schools and universities. To this end, the FLTC effort is far reaching. The Department of Defense members bring to the FLTC the results

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of participation in the DOD/Universities Forum. This group is dedicated to improving language and area studies through increased cooperation between government and academia. An education subcommittee of the FLTC is opening a dialogue with the Department of Education to determine the capability of major Education Acts to foster programs leading to improvements and increases in foreign language training throughout U.S. education systems. The Language School is devoting increased time and effort in the work of the FLTC and other organizations which have the capacity to either influence policymaking for increased language studies or are directly involved in improving academic capability to teach and test languages.

In addition to Agency requirements, the Language School is dedicated to increased participation in the language teaching profession. Along with the Foreign Service Institute, Defense Language Institute, National Security Agency, and the Department of Education, the Language School is a leader of the Interagency Language Roundtable, an informal governmental and professional association group which meets monthly to communicate and provide a forum for information and research exchange. Representatives from the FBI, Peace Corps, National Science Foundation, Center for Applied Linguistics, Modern Language Association, Library of Congress, AID, OPM, ICA and TESOL also attend the meetings of this polyglot group of about 25 organizations.

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Finally, both our staff and our teachers are consistent participants in professional language organizations such as the Modern Language Association, the American Council of Teachers of Foreign Languages, and all of the language specific groups. They stay professionally qualified and informed and totally committed to providing the best possible language instruction to Agency employees.

Language Incentive Program

Πρόγραμμα Ενθαρρύνσεως Διά Εκμάθησιν Ξένων Γλωσσῶν

Good students, dedicated teachers, special techniques in training technology, and research, have had positive effects on language learning, but nothing succeeds like material reward. To that end, a Language Incentive Program was instituted in 1979.

At the DDCI's request, the Language Development Committee, comprised of representatives from all Agency directorates, implemented the Language Incentive Program designed to reverse the trend in recent years of declining foreign language skills in the Agency. By 1 April 1982, over [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] had been disbursed for language achievement, use, and (b)(3)(c) maintenance.

The Language Incentive Program is actually three separate but interrelated programs: the Language Achievement Program (formerly known as

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the Language Proficiency Cash Award Program), the Language Use Program, and the Language Maintenance Program.

The Language Achievement Program is for individuals learning a new language or increasing a language skill already possessed. Upon designation to the program, awards are determined by tested proficiency showing an increase in skills and are paid according to a published scale.

Within the Agency, certain positions have been defined as having a need for foreign language skills. In certain domestic positions and most foreign field positions with this requirement, the Language Use Program permits an award to be paid to individuals occupying the position and using the required language if current language test records prove language ability at the required level.

Because foreign language skills tend to disintegrate through disuse, the Language Maintenance Program pays a yearly award to those individuals who keep their language skills honed while at Headquarters or while using other language skills if their office has determined that the language skill to be maintained is of immediate or future benefit to the Agency.

The question of whether the Language Incentive Program is helping to reverse the decline of recent years in foreign language skills in the Agency is being studied; the Report of the Language Development Committee for FY 1982 showed a modest gain in the overall number of language skills in the Agency filled by fully language qualified personnel.

In the light of an already established trend, the Language School anticipates a continued steady increase of enrollments in language courses. The goal is 100 percent fulfillment of language-required positions by language qualified personnel. [redacted] To attain it in the minimal time will not only tax the ingenuity of those who do the training, but will require the support of all those who believe that superiority in foreign languages is essential in achieving superiority in foreign intelligence. (b)(3)(c)

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Supporting Desert Storm

Inside a J-2 Joint Intelligence Center

Brigadier General Charles W. Thomas, USA

The following article is based on an interview with the author, who was the Director of the CENTCOM J-2 Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) during Operation Desert Storm.

The JIC's primary purpose was to provide tailored, all-source intelligence to the Commander in Chief of CENTCOM in Riyadh, before and during actual hostilities. CENTCOM had a JIC for a long time, certainly before Operation Desert Shield began. But when I arrived as part of a Military Intelligence Board team in November 1990, expansion of the 23-member element was under consideration. The team recommended that the JIC be expanded substantially. By the time I returned in January 1991, it had grown to 107 people. It was staffed almost entirely by original JIC members from the CENTCOM staff and by large numbers of augmentees, like me, brought in because of their expertise from reserve and active duty units all over the continental US and Europe.

The JIC served as the theatre's single focal point for analysis as well as for collection management, production, dissemination, and tailored intelligence, even though those functions were not specifically incorporated in the JIC's structure. They were sort of outside of it. But as the JIC Director, I coordinated those functions as well as pure analytical functions.

The idea was to give the J-2 the ability to depict accurately the current enemy situation. Before the formation of the enhanced JIC, CENTCOM operated under a federated concept. Because the CENTCOM J-2 had been so small, much of its intelligence analysis mission was delegated to the components, such as air analysis to the Air Force and ground OB analysis to the Army.

Organization

There was a current intelligence element built on the original JIC. It was a fairly large cell, including sections for air, ground and naval forces. It also included a shop which dealt exclusively with the Scud-hunting problem. The current intelligence element was the organization with which [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] NSA routinely coordinated. (b)(3)(c)

There was a section, separate from the current intelligence element, which primarily consisted of officers with the unique capability to write papers based on long-term assessments of issues like "what did the Iranians propose to do with the Iraqi aircraft they had sequestered?" or, "If we were going to change the strategy for our left hook in western Iraq, what would be [Iraq's] response?"

The third section within the JIC was the battle-damage assessment (BDA) cell. It was quite small at the start, but it expanded rapidly as we tried to get a handle on BDA.

The JIC took data provided by collectors at the theater level, by components, and data provided by national collectors, and it developed a current intelligence product that was briefed to the CINC daily. The same intelligence flowed into the long-term assessment section.

Analysis drove the collection-management function. Although not purely a part of the JIC, the collection-management section determined collection requirements based exclusively on contributions from the JIC and the components.

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Handling Requirements

The JIC had the flexibility to meet changing mission requirements. For example, the Scud mission was given a fairly high level of importance from the outset. We had a dedicated Scud search cell (for lack of a better term) before the ground campaign, when the air campaign and Scud launches began. But we increased our emphasis on that. This cell of two to three people working day and night was not adverse to looking at virtually any suggestion made for finding Scuds. It met with remarkably little success, considering the amount of effort expended.

One way we handled changing mission requirements was to "task organize" analysts as required. The use of our large current intelligence air desk is a good example. By Day 3 of the air campaign, with enemy air defenses badly suppressed and the Iraqi Air Force incapable of offering much opposition, we started shifting some of the analysts from the air desk to other sections, such as the Scud-hunting desk and the long-term assessments team, where there were greater requirements. We had enough talented resources that we could "mix and match," when necessary.

The JIC's targeting activity shifted when the coalition moved from Desert Shield to Desert Storm, in the sense that there always was a phased targeting effort. During Desert Shield, it was part of the planning process. The targets were divided into 13 categories, almost all of what we called a "strategic" nature from our theater perspective. These targets were defined in a joint effort between CINCCENT and the Department of Defense. Targeting depended on national technical means, with satellite imagery supporting target validation.

From the outset, almost all the strategic targets, whether they were rail networks, power or command and control centers, or air defense nodes were resident in target folders available to CINCCENT and to the Air Force component of CINCCENT. When we moved to Desert Storm, things went into high gear. Initially, we looked at the strategic targets, including the weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, large military storage and production facilities, and intelligence headquarters. We concentrated heavily on command-and-control targets, and in this area the national community played a vital role. A "tiger" team of CIA, DIA, and NSA analysts provided timely, accurate targets that contributed substantially to degrading command and control from national leadership- to operational-level military commands. The JIC did not have the analytical talent to handle command and control targeting exclusively in theater; as a result, national agency support was crucial.

As we started suppressing strategic targets, we began moving into a battlefield preparation stage. This was true really from the beginning, because the Republican Guard was always one of the strategic components, despite its very tactical nature as a discrete ground operating force.

Midway through the air campaign our orientation became even more tactical. We began battlefield preparation and started looking at frontline defensive units dug in along the Iraqi and Kuwaiti borders with Saudi Arabia and at the mobile heavy reserves that included armored and mechanized units as well as the Republican Guard. As we made this transition, we reprogrammed our collection assets. For example, the Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS) initially was used almost exclusively for targeting. As we shifted into a battlefield preparation stage, however, we moved toward developing information about the location of enemy units.

As we suppressed enemy air defenses, we were able to shift our collection activity so that we could use air-borne, air-breathing imagery systems like U-2s and TR-1s with H-cameras and IRIS cameras on board. Those gave us high-resolution imagery to use for planning the ground campaign.

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The Joint Imagery Processing Center (JIPC) allowed for the receipt in theater of timely imagery in response to CINCCENT requirements that otherwise would have been sent through secondary imagery systems from CONUS. This was done by the introduction in theater of a "receive" location and its attendant production and analysis activities. All of this was an effort to rectify real deficiencies in getting imagery in theater.

There was universal agreement in theater that there was a lack of annotated national imagery products to support fighting forces, particularly in the ground war; that imagery received in theater from CONUS would be too late during the war itself; and that there were inadequate imagery resources in theater to perform analysis on products, once we got them. In addition, the lack of adequate secondary dissemination capabilities in theater would preclude the provision of the number of images required. It was felt that we could reduce these problems by bringing in a JIPC. In fact, it helped substantially.

Ground Intelligence

It was hard for the JIC and the rest of the Intelligence Community to keep up with the rapidly evolving ground phase of Desert Storm. Most of the intelligence we had was historical in nature. The exact location of artillery, frontline, and mobile units was important to us for the first 24 hours, and we had that data. But from that point on, we depended heavily on data passed to us from cavalry units, from tactical reconnaissance and from JSTARs and corps-level Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) assets.

Once we moved into the fast-paced ground campaign, ground intelligence collection units were of minimal use in terms of theater needs.

Tactically, I doubt that our ground tactical intelligence community was able to keep up very well at brigade, division, and even corps level—the pace of combat was too quick. Immediate information of tactical value was not that critical to us at the theater level, and we relied a lot on sound analysis. Competent analysts, who had been studying this problem for months, came up with calls, reaching consensus, always with a minority dissenting opinion, that we were willing to take to the CINC. In almost every case, he bought it. And in almost every case, the analysts were right. They applied sound military judgment along with good training on Iraqi tactical operations, made judgment calls, went out on a limb, and it worked.

HUMINT Operations

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Prisoner interrogations also provided extremely useful information. Before the ground campaign started, the coalition took large numbers of Iraqi prisoners, but

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Once we started taking prisoners on our own, however, they were very useful.

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Coalition Intelligence

From a current intelligence point of view, friendly Arab nations made almost no contribution. In many ways,

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By mid-autumn, most of what we needed to know about Iraqi tactical doctrine had been gleaned from There was not much else to be learned about how Saddam's forces operated. I wish we could have learned more about his actual intentions and his will to fight. His tactical doctrine and capabilities were not a secret by Christmas, and I do not believe we gained much of that from our Arab friends.

These people were top quality; the imagery interpreters were usually highly experienced and competent. The US military tends to promote its best tactical imagery interpreters out of their analytical role, while our allies seem to leave their good people in these roles for a much greater part of their careers.

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Critical Issues

BDA and Iraqi order of battle are touchy issues. We did not depend wholly on the Intelligence Community for ground OB BDA because it was unwilling to make an assessment based on anything other than imagery. National-level imagery could not see many of the kills effected by cluster bombs and other modern munitions.

We relied on admittedly subjective military judgment to make calls, because, in the CINC's own words, "If we had to rely on the national community, we would never have started the ground war." And I am not sure that our in-theater assets were all that much better. You could not get better resolution imagery from an RF-4 or Tornado to determine whether or not a D-30 artillery piece was destroyed. We had to make estimates based on judgment calls by people who understood munition effects.

Once again, the CINC bought it, and it is fortunate that he did. I guess his instincts were good here, because I was doubtful for a long time.

In determining BDA on Scuds, we did not rely heavily on pilot reports. Pilots were notoriously optimistic on the Scud kills, and I would not even make an estimate on what we actually got there.

Iraqi OB estimates were directly related to BDA. If you are talking about total numbers of Iraqi troops lined up on the equipment that made up the OB, I would say that our estimates were high. We would all have to presume that we could have done better there.

In my judgment, we did not have a good grasp of the psychology of the Iraqi soldier. We never understood that his willingness to fight was limited substantially by a number of factors unknown to us. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) We did not get a sense of the Iraqi will to fight until we had taken prisoners.

OB estimates were a interesting part of what we did. We carried 42 Iraqi divisions with full equipment. We estimated that those divisions were at about 70-percent personnel strength on 15 January 1991 and at about 50-percent strength once the ground war started.

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Value of National-level Intelligence

The initial breaching or ground assault operations were based on national-level imagery that helped us lay down the exact location of obstacles and of units, right down to individual artillery pieces and infantry fighting positions. That kind of historical data was crucial to the success of the operation.

Satellite imagery was helpful for BDA, especially for damage on such strategic targets

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CENTCOM's Use of Intelligence

Before and during Desert Storm, CINCCENT relied heavily on his J-2. Just as important, the CINC trusted his own judgment and superb battle instincts. The term "warrior" in the military is overused, but if ever there was someone with warrior instincts, it was General Schwarzkopf. He had a good feel for whether or not he was being told what he needed to hear, and he did a good job of winnowing out that which was useful from that which was not.

Schwarzkopf did not make an operational decision without conferring with the J-2. The J-2, Brig. Gen. Jack Leide, or myself were virtually face to face with him daily during every important military decision he made for 45 days straight.

J-2 and J-3 functions were thoroughly integrated. The Joint Operations Center, which was next door to the CINC's war room and contiguous to the JIC, had six JIC members. They were not there as liaison officers but to work for the current operations chief inside the Joint Operations Center to make certain that the latest intelligence was always available. Anything of any value that devolved in the JIC was immediately placed on a TV monitor as a highlight, side by side with an operations video display.

The JIC was always able to communicate intelligence assessments to the CENTCOM staff. They would be willing to take any assessment we gave them, and they were willing to accept anything that looked like it had reasonable judgment applied to it and was a professional product.

There were times, however, when the operators would question what we were doing. For example, they would argue about our apportionment of collection assets. Still, they accepted our analytical products. There was near-universal agreement that the Iraqis had one hell of a BW/CW capability and that they were willing to use it, that there could be CW warheads on the Scuds, and that the Iraqis would fight hard—especially the Guard units.

Personal and Inter-service Relations

Throughout his career, General Schwarzkopf's relationships with intelligence officers have been somewhat ambivalent. When I was his division G-2, I would like to think that I had a certain credibility, but I was a G-2 in an infantry division in peacetime and there is a world of difference between that and what we were doing in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. When I arrived in Riyadh, I had not seen General Schwarzkopf in 6 years, and it was not like old home week. I would say that our former working relationship had little to do with whatever credibility I had with him, but I believe it was there.

General Leide's credibility with General Schwarzkopf was quite high. If Leide was willing to go out on a limb, Schwarzkopf listened to him. But personal relationships, by and large, were important in this sense. If the CINC liked you, it was because professionally you were pretty good. You had to know what you were doing or you did not last long. He zeroed you out of the decision process; you were not a player, if you could not give him what he needed to fight the war.

I do not know of any inter-service rivalries that got in the way of CINCENT's mission. When I arrived, it was clear that we were getting ready to go into a shooting war, and Americans were going to die. Inter-service rivalries were put on a shelf, and they pretty much stayed there until the war was over.

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Evaluating The JIC

The degree of competence in the JIC was high. We had exceptional analysts, who really understood their subject. The level of expertise among the reserve officers was much more than I expected. In peacetime, many of these officers are civilians in the national intelligence community. They knew how to reach out to the agencies that sent them; they could matrix into those organizations and dig out data that we needed to make good, solid analytical judgments.

Dealing with BDA caused the most difficulties for the JIC. We had to apply far too much subjectivity, and at first we did not have a lot of confidence that what we were doing was right. Towards the end, that changed and our level of confidence was quite high.

Another problem with the JIC was that, despite the fact that we had an Imagery Processing Center, it was difficult to get adequate, timely, overhead imagery of sufficient resolution to permit immediate targeting, especially against tactical targets. A-10 and F-16 pilots who were bombing from 12,000 feet needed imagery that showed them battalion lay-downs of artillery, armor, and mechanized vehicles. And they needed it before the Iraqis shifted location. It was not a JIC problem; it was an imagery distribution problem, as much as anything, and that is a lesson learned, something that we have to look at with an eye to future improvement.

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I wish that CIA had been a little more willing to talk about Iraqi intentions. [redacted] tantalize with intimations of intentions but without any real depth. We were getting so much on capabilities and so little on intentions that the dichotomy was obvious to anybody who looked at it for very long. And that angered the CINC a lot. CIA was willing to talk about BDA, and release numbers with comments, but it was not willing to make a judgment call on top of that as to whether or not the numbers were realistic. Its reliance on those numbers without being willing to make a follow-up assessment bothered us. Perhaps military assessments were not CIA business—in which case they should have stayed completely away from them rather than deal themselves only part way into the game.

Another of the JIC's problems stemmed from the fact that it had to mature quickly from a small organization before Christmas to an enormous one after Christmas. It was almost a bigger management problem than we wanted to tackle. Communications are always a problem; at the theater level they were not so bad for us, but at the operational level, at corps and below, there were problems. For the Intelligence Community, the need for dedicated intelligence communications is one of the lessons learned from this conflict.

It would have been nice to have an automated collection management and processing capability. We did not have anything that allowed us to correlate OB data onto a computer graphic that could be manipulated, that could have some decision tree associated with it, that would be an analytical tool. We were grease-pencil-on-acetate kinds of OB people, but it worked.

Future JICs

Several things could be done now to facilitate the smooth and rapid deployment of future JICs. The Defense Intelligence Reorganization Act has the services combining all their production facilities, reducing their scope and delegating a lot of that to the JICs at Unified and Specified (U&S) commands. This is important. Each of the combatant U&S commands will have its own JIC. And each of those JICs should be in a go-to-war mode. They should train that way; they should bring their reservists on active duty for major exercises. Computer war games should have a level of resolution in the intelligence side of the house that truly tasks the JICs. That is one of the problems with war games—not enough of them have the level of resolution necessary to do it. One of the lessons learned from this war was that collection management is an immense problem. Most war games do not even begin to approximate the difficulties one has dealing with all the various collection systems that are in theater, how to coordinate them and orchestrate them.

I do not believe that JICs are ever going to be as large as combatant commanders need them in a wartime mode. And that is where the reserve components play an important role. The national intelligence agencies should have permanent representatives in JICs, to assist in bringing these organizations up to wartime footing.

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An Admonition

General Schwarzkopf's ambivalence towards the national agencies stemmed from a perception of their unwillingness to provide the detailed support that he wanted on capabilities and intentions, to provide timely copies of satellite imagery, and to be willing to engage in more subjective assessments in the BDA area. Future CINCs will be likely to expect such support from the Intelligence Community.

Now, the national community, in particular CIA, may say, "Not my job, man. I'm not supposed to be laying down operational- and tactical-level military capabilities." The problem was that was not the way the CINC saw it: CIA did make those kinds of assessments from time to time in a minor way. BDA: "Hey, let's go to the President and tell him that only 385 Iraqi tanks are dead and that means that you really only knocked down two of his divisions. CINCCENT said there are over 1,200 of them dead, and that's way off the mark." That actually happened, and that is not good enough. It was a back-handed assessment.

I do not believe CIA should be in the business of projecting intentions at the operational level of war. But, as I said earlier, if you are going to go, you need to go all the way. You need to ask yourself, "After all the bombing, and there are only 385 tanks dead, what are we doing wrong? And if, in fact, the level of effectiveness is greater than that, what could it be? And if only 385 tanks are dead, what are the enemy's intentions? " I am not sure we ever saw that sort of thing. I refer to intentions in a sense of "is he going to defend, delay, withdraw, attack? Where? If so, what strength? When?"

Despite what I have said about this issue, the fact remains that it was only a single problem—one easily sorted out in the future—among literally hundreds of CIA and Intelligence Community success stories. In this context, CINCCENT told the world that his intelligence support was the best that any theater commander had ever enjoyed. I know that to be a fact.

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A Comprehensive Commentary

An Interview With Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet (S)

The end of the Cold War, the revolutions in information technology and military affairs, and changes in American national security policy and concerns: such issues, along with the day-to-day responsibility of leading the CIA and the Intelligence Community, accounting for their operations, and planning for their future, make for a full set of responsibilities for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). On 23 June 1998, Brian Latell, Director of the Center for Study of Intelligence and Chairman of the Editorial Board of Studies in Intelligence, *accompanied by* Studies *Editorial Board members Peter Clement, William Nolte, Barry G. Royden, and L. Britt Snider, discussed these and other issues with DCI Tenet.* (U)

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
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
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


There is, by the way, no separate pot of money someone has made available to me to pursue declassification and historical efforts, independent of the resources required to pursue the primary mission of the Agency. That said, we are leaning forward. How many Russian estimates have we declassified? Approximately 500. We have put out an enormous amount of information—millions of pages of previously classified information. And we will continue to do so, within a rational framework, all the while protecting sources and methods. (S)

“The interesting thing is that the American people appreciate our openness, but at the same time the American people also understand what a secret intelligence organization is all about.”

The interesting thing is that the American people appreciate our openness, but at the same time the American people also understand what a secret intelligence organization is all about. I do not think anyone is clamoring to come in take all our secrets and toss them into the street. If there were such a clamor, we could not do that. We have done a good job here. The balance is about right. We are not trying to hide behind anything. But do not put me in the position of saying whether this is more important than our core mission. That is not a choice I will make. (S)





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What about the idea that the DCI should be appointed for a term, say of five or 10 years? (U)

At one point, I did not favor that. But I now believe—and I do not say this from the point of view of my own job security—the time has come to consider a term for the DCI so there is some stability in this organization and in the Community. I do not believe anyone could serve for 10 years. I would be dead before 10 years. The job is too hard for that. But it is time to think about something like a six-year term that would allow a DCI to straddle administrations, make sure he or she had made an adequate transition, and to ensure stability.

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We do espionage. That is the nature of what we do. We steal secrets.... (U)

Another unsanitized phrase. (U)

I cannot explain what we do here other than to say we steal secrets for a living and we take those secrets and put them into all-source products that make a difference to somebody. If anybody thinks we are doing anything else here, they can come talk to me. But let's be blunt about what we do. There is no dishonor in it. We steal secrets for a living. If we do not steal secrets for a living, then we ought to shut the doors and do something else for a living. That is at the core, along with the analytic arm of this agency, with why we were put in business. They are the equal of each other. There can be no skewing toward one or the other. They are both the sharp end of the spear of the intelligence business. I do not know how else to tell people what we do. (U)

We're almost out of time. Have there been aspects of this job that have surprised you? (U)

No. What is different about this job is the importance you have to place on leading and caring for people. It is the most pleasurable part of the job. You cannot lead this organization and not be struck by the great talent that is here, the great enthusiasm that is here, the great will to work. The work ethic here is enormously high, and I am continuously struck by that. I am struck by how much people care about what they do and how much they care about this Agency. How much they care about each other. It is a big bureaucracy, you know, and nothing is 100 percent, but the truth is that what hits you as Director of Central Intelligence is that you lead and are partners with men and women who care deeply about the mission and about protecting this country. I am

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constantly struck by that, and by our diversity. By the different kinds of people we have working here and by how much they care about what they do. (U)

The most pleasurable part of the job is to meet all these people, either overseas or here. It is so important for a DCI to be aware of that. You get wrapped up in issues and process. You can get trapped on the 7th floor and never walk off the inner corridor of that floor. If you live like that, you do yourself a great disservice, because you do not quite get what you are here for. (U)

As DCI, you are not supposed to be the smartest person in Washington. You are not supposed to be the greatest operator in the world or the greatest analyst. You *are* supposed to be able to lead men and women who will do their jobs well, if you give them the opportunity to do it. (U)

It has been wonderful—for me and my family. We love what we do. And my wife is an equal here because she has gotten quite involved in family issues, caring for people overseas. Do their household goods arrive on time? Are the kids taken care of with school and so on? Are we taking care of our families? That is the kind of organization I want to work in. Most of the other organizations I have worked in have been relatively cold and detached about that kind of issue. (U)

The people here have been the great revelation. I have made friendships that will last the rest of my life. It is easy to become very fond of this place. I am an undying advocate of what we do. Because you see what people do and what they sacrifice. (U)

Thank you.

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UNORTHODOX: AIRPLANE AND MAN

Donald E. Welzenbach
Nancy Galyean

On Wednesday, 12 May 1954, a quiet, close-mouthed man left the Pentagon and returned to his office at the Central Intelligence Agency's original home at 2430 E Street, NW. There he began drafting a memorandum for the record, "Special Aircraft for Penetration Photo Reconnaissance." With that document, he was setting in motion an activity which would have world-shaking ramifications. Philip Grandin Strong, Chief of the Office of Scientific Intelligence's Operations Staff, signed his memorandum and started it on its way to the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles. Strong wrote:

> The following information was secured today in the Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force.
>
> 1. Overflight is now under consideration in the Air Staff as a separate problem. It has been recognized that existing Air Force equipment is not adequate for penetration overflights.
>
> 2. Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been received in the Air Staff from Lockheed, Fairchild, and Bell. Each of these proposals recognizes that the present bottleneck is the high-altitude engine. Consequently, the Special Assistant for Research, Air Force, has been pressing General McCormick, Deputy Commander, ARDC, (Air Research and Development Command) to establish on the most urgent basis the test facilities necessary to check engines such as the J-73 at altitude ranges between 70,000 and 80,000 feet.
>
> 3. The Lockheed proposal is considered to be the best. It has been given the type designation of CL-282 and in many respects is a jet-powered glider based essentially on the Lockheed Day fighter XF 104. It is primarily subsonic but can attain transonic speeds over the target with consequent loss of range. With an altitude of 73,000 feet over the target, it has a combat radius of 1720 nautical miles but the altitude over target would be reduced to 71,500 feet.[1] The CL-282 can be manufactured mainly with XF 104 jigs and designs. It has, however, a special wing and a slightly different nose assembly. It has no landing gear, being launched from a cart. It can take off within a thousand feet and lands on a reinforced belly rib. It is powered with a J-73 engine and at varied altitude has speeds between 450 and 500 knots. The prototype of this plane can be produced within a year from the date of order. Five planes could be delivered for operations within two years.

[1] Memorandum for the Record, 12 May 54, Subject File (S).

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4. The Bell proposal is a more conventional aircraft, having normal landing gear. As a result, its maximum altitude over target is 69,500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282.

5. The Air Staff has received information (Note: Of doubtful accuracy) that the British have already overflown Kapustin Yar with a Mark 1 Comet. As this information indicated that this plane had been attacked by Russian interceptors, the chances are that there is confusion with the Ferret interception of which we are already aware. The information received also indicated that the British plan further overflights of Kapustin Yar.

6. It is felt in the Air Staff that two factors are essential to the securing of NSC approval for penetration overflights:

a. A technical solution by Department of Defense which is near the ultimate in reconnaissance aircraft.

b. A friend in court when Defense makes its presentation, i.e. strong support from the DCI.

How did an Agency executive become the conduit for an Air Force project that, unknown to him at the time, had been turned down by the Pentagon?

Strong, a reserve Marine colonel, had been associated with intelligence most of his adult life. He arrived at the Agency in 1950 from the State Department, where he had been Chief of Acquisition and Distribution Division, a remnant of an Office of Strategic Services unit, and where he began an association with Air Force advisory committees that gave him an entree to high-level Pentagon officials. When he moved to CIA in 1950, Strong continued to attend meetings of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB) and several other panels investigating ways to use new technologies to collect intelligence on the Soviet Union. One of his assignments was on a unique Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP), chaired by the renowned optical expert James G. Baker of Harvard University. This was the key link which brought Strong to the office of Air Force Under Secretary Trevor Gardner in May 1954.

Momentum

Strong's memorandum eventually arrived at the desk of Richard M. Bissell, Jr., who was serving as Special Assistant to the DCI for Planning and Coordination.[2] Bissell thought the Lockheed plane had merit and told Strong to get some topflight scientists to advise on the matter. However, the CL-282 concept apparently made little impression on Bissell, because he promptly forgot about it. Bissell may have considered the spyplane as just one more in a series of ideas, some of them far-fetched, with which Strong bombarded his superiors.[3]

Strong's memorandum caused DCI Dulles to send a memorandum on 29 May 1954 to Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan Twining requesting that the Air

[2] Chief, Support Staff/SI, Memo for ADSI, 13 May 54, TS 115292, p. 6. Downgraded to Secret.

[3] Interview with Richard Bissell, 5 October 1984.

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Force take the initiative in obtaining the decisions necessary to permit overflight of the Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Dulles' memorandum reinforced the sense of urgency about gaining overhead reconnaissance and maintaining contact between CIA and Air Force officials who had met on a number of occasions to explore the possibilities of the proposal.[4]

Strong, taking advantage of his contacts on interagency panels, went about drumming up support for the CL-282 high-altitude aircraft. He mentioned the Lockheed project to fellow ISP member Allen Donovan of Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, formerly the Curtiss-Wright Research Laboratory, during a conversation, probably late in May.

In his turn, Donovan told ISP Chairman Baker about Strong's bit of intelligence on a new aircraft. Baker suggested that Donovan, an aeronautical engineer and sailplane enthusiast, go to southern California to search out whatever ideas on high-altitude flight might be available from the many aircraft firms there. At this point, neither Donovan nor Baker had seen a drawing of the Lockheed plane. Strong was the only ISP member who knew what it looked like. At some point in mid-1954, Strong apparently obtained a copy of the Lockheed drawing. Donovan was unable to make the west coast trip until late July, when he had other business there. He finally got to Lockheed's Skunk Works in Burbank on Monday, 2 August 1954, and Kelly Johnson showed him conceptual drawings of the CL-282. Donovan thus became the CL-282's next champion. When the ISP reconvened on 24 September 1954, Donovan recommended Kelly's plane to Chairman Baker.

Between the time of Donovan's trip to the west coast, in late July-early August, and the ISP meeting in late September, Polaroid President Edwin H. (Din) Land, also a member of the ISP, traveled to Washington to begin work as Chairman of the Project Three Group (Intelligence) of the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP). This panel, headed by MIT President James R. Killian, Jr., was organized at the specific request of Killian's close friend, President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The TCP's main task was to assess the nation's defenses against a surprise attack by the Soviets. Eisenhower's concern was heightened by the paucity of hard intelligence about Soviet capabilities and intentions, and the reportedly growing Soviet fleet of intercontinental BISON bombers. While Land was in Washington in August 1954 organizing his Project Three panel, Strong showed him drawings of the CL-282. As soon as Land saw them, he picked up the telephone and called Jim Baker, another Project Three member, to tell him: "Jim, I think I have the plane you are after." [5] At the time, Baker, an astronomy professor at Harvard who also designed special-purpose lenses for the Air Force, had taken up residence in the Alban Towers at 3700 Massachusetts Avenue for the six-month duration of the Project Three study so he could continue working on his lens designs when he was not involved in TCP activities. It was not clear to Baker at this time that the plane Land was telling

[4] Memo for RM Bissell from PG Strong, "Subject: Overflight of Kapustin Yar," 15 Oct 54, Downgraded to Secret.

[5] Interview with Edwin H. Land, 20 Sep 84.

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him about was the same plane Donovan had spoken to him about in late May or early June and had seen during his recent California trip. After Land showed Baker Strong's copy of Kelly Johnson's conceptual drawing, Baker returned to his apartment and began designing a camera and lens system that would fit in the Lockheed craft.

Toward the end of August, Land conferred with Bissell about the aircraft.[6] Once again, Bissell was not overly enthused about the subject, but he asked a young Air Force officer assigned to his staff, Lieutenant Douglas E. Ashford, to put together a general status report on aerial reconnaissance programs. In early September, Bissell sent Ashford's report to DDCI Charles Pearre Cabell, an Air Force lieutenant general. In his cover memorandum, Bissell called Cabell's attention to a "specialized aircraft called the Lockheed CL-282."

By late October 1954, Land's five-member TCP panel had drafted a complete program for an overhead reconnaissance effort based on the CL-282. Convinced that any overflights should be conducted by civilians in unarmed, unmarked aircraft rather than by military personnel in military planes, Land and Killian met with President Eisenhower to gain approval for assigning project management to the CIA with Air Force assistance. Kelly Johnson began work within days of hearing that the plane had been approved. He did not even wait for a signed contract. In less than two years the U-2, as the CL-282 was renamed in 1956, was flying operational missions over the Soviet Union.[7]

The First 35 Years

Philip Grandin Strong was born on 4 January 1901 in Englewood, New Jersey. His father, Benjamin Strong, served as Governor of the New York Reserve Bank from 1914 until his death in 1928. The elder Strong, who held numerous foreign decorations, including the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, was responsible for a gold fund of $100 million raised to meet financial obligations during World War I. By the time of his death, his bank's gold reserves were almost 10 percent of all the gold in the world. During the early 1920s, he conferred with West European bankers and financiers informally, helped stabilize currencies, and warned of the dangers of American isolationism.

Philip Strong's mother, Margaret, committed suicide in 1905, when Philip was four years old.[8] At the age of nine, Phil Strong was sent to the Fessenden School in West Newton, Massachusetts, and later the Hill School in Pottstown, Pennsylvania. In 1918, Strong enrolled in Princeton University, where he joined the varsity swimming team; he left without graduating in 1920.

After spending a few months in Europe, Strong joined the Citizens' National Bank of Oneonta, New York, as a teller in 1921. Two years later, he

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[6] Land interview, 20 Sep 84.

[7] J.R. Killian, Jr., on *Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1977, p. 68.

[8] Lester V. Chandler, *Benjamin Strong, Central Banker*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC., 1958, p. 30.

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moved to New York City to work in the credit department of Hamilton National Bank. In February 1926, Strong was given a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve. He also acquired an aircraft pilot's license that year. The small, low-budget military forces of the United States between the two world wars evidently could not provide a more permanent career for him, one which might have appealed to his restless temperament. Despite his father's example, banking had little appeal for Phil Strong.

In 1928, after another brief stay in Europe, Strong became an assistant to the president of the Scientific Production Corporation, a railway equipment manufacturer. In August of that year, he married Emma Thompson Smith of Ballston Spa, New York, and, in October, his father died, leaving a trust fund to his children.

In 1930, Strong left the Scientific Production firm to work for Alma Draft Gear Corporation, an Austrian venture-capital attempt to introduce new railway equipment in the United States. This endeavor failed and the firm ceased its US operations in 1932.

During the Great Depression, Phil Strong moved west, where he could supplement his income from the trust fund by working, first as a mill hand and later as a foreman, in an ore-concentration plant of Pacific Coast Borax Company in Amargo, California. While employed by Borax, Strong was granted six-months' leave to attend classes in chemistry, mathematics, mineralogy, metallurgy, geology, and Spanish at the Mackay School of Mines in Reno, Nevada. During this period, Strong became estranged from his wife, Emma, and they were divorced in Reno in November 1932. Strong left the Borax company in 1935 after a serious accident which injured his back. By this time, he had become a captain in the Marine Reserve and was recalled to active duty in September 1935 to attend staff training courses at the Reserve Section Headquarters in Quantico, Virginia. A good marksman, he led the Marine Reserve Rifle Team at national matches during 1935 and 1936.

Adventurer

By then, Strong was 35 years old with hardly a settled career. His trust fund, while not large, permitted him a measure of freedom. His active duty with the Marines ended, in January 1937 he embarked on yet another trip to Europe, only this time he kept traveling east and ended up going around the world. As he described it on his application for federal employment in 1947:

> The year 1937 was spent in travel which included the following countries and areas: Germany, Poland, East Prussia, Danzig, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia (including Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov, Caucasia, Trans-Caucasia including Tiflis & Baku), Iran, Irak, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Aden, Bombay, Ceylon, Singapore, Java (including Betavia, Soerabaja, and various Indonesian ports), Philippine Islands (including Mindanao, Cebu, Negros & Luzon), and Hong Kong. In Germany, the travel included close contact for the purposes of observation with various Youth Organizations. In Russia, by traveling "hard class," I was able to secure considerable knowledge of parts of the country visited. Some time was spent in Iran in contact

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with various Persian and foreign personalities. The knowledge and experience gained in these travels was and is of great value in my intelligence work.

From another application, it is clear that Strong spent six weeks in Nazi Germany; a month in the Soviet Union during the Great Purge trials; six weeks in Iran; traveled by ship from the Near East to Singapore, where he spent a month, possibly waiting for a tramp steamer to take him to Java, from whence, after waiting three weeks, he caught another ship to the Philippines, where he spent another month. Considering the unsettled political situation in the Baltic states and Soviet Union, and the fact that very few Americans traveled to these regions in the late 1930s, Strong's trip is particularly remarkable.

Intelligence Work

Strong returned to the Litchfield, Connecticut, home of his sister, Mrs. Katherine Strong Humphrey, in December 1937, and, in January 1938 he packed his things and headed west once again. He spent the next two and one-half years prospecting and mining in the deserts of Nevada and California, particularly in the Mohave area. During this period, he lived on his trust income. In October 1940, Strong was recalled to active duty as a Marine Corps captain and detailed to the Office of Naval Intelligence, which had begun building up for World War II. As an assistant section chief in the Strategic Information Section, he worked on various projects, compiling and analyzing information on island chains in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and airfield sites in Africa.



Philip G. Strong

From February to September 1942, Captain Strong served as a training officer attached to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He helped Colonel Garland H. Williams establish OSS schools at Catoctin, Maryland, and near Quantico, Virginia, specializing in operations, guerrilla techniques, sabotage, and use of explosives. Strong also lectured at these schools on various phases of foreign intelligence. In connection with this work, Strong attended a monthlong refresher course in undercover operations at the British Secret Agent School (Camp X) near Toronto, Canada. Then, in July 1942, he went to England at the head of a group of US officers sent to study at the British School of Industrial Sabotage in Brickendenbury, Hartfordshire. He was personally detailed to specialize in industrial sabotage and worked with groups of Polish, Belgian, Dutch, French, and Norwegian agents during their final period of instruction prior to being assigned missions on the continent.

After returning to this country in September 1942, Strong was given orders to serve overseas in the Pacific theater and left for the west coast, where he attended the USMC's Transport Quartermaster School at Camp Elliott, San Diego, California. Next, Captain Strong was assigned to the staff of Major

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General C.B. Vogel, commander of the First Marine Amphibious Corps. In his new assignment, he had to plan the embarkation of the First Corps from California to Noumea, New Caledonia, in December 1942.

Major Strong was transferred to Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee's staff as Chief Intelligence Officer, Flag Marine Officer, and Staff Legal Officer. At the time he joined Lee's staff, according to Strong's government application forms, there was practically no intelligence information except that received by radio. During the next 27 months, Strong "built up a reference library on all areas of the Pacific, supervised the use of captured enemy documents, prisoner interrogations, and radio intercepts; provided daily summary reports and spot intelligence" to Admiral Lee.

It was a busy period, during which Strong participated as Admiral Lee's representative in planning a number of major Pacific campaigns. He also acted as personal representative of Admirals Lee and Marc A. Mitscher in revising procedures for supplying intelligence to the Combatant Fleet by the Joint Intelligence Center. In all, Strong was involved in some 27 air-sea actions and two major fleet battles. By 1944, Strong was a lieutenant colonel and had been awarded the Legion of Merit (Combat).

In March 1945, Strong was reassigned to Camp Pendelton, California, as an executive officer in the Marine Training and Placement Command. He returned to intelligence work briefly as World War II came to a close, serving as assistant chief of staff, G-2 (Intelligence) and G-3 (Counterintelligence) for Lt. Gen. Holland Smith, commanding general of the San Diego area.

After Japan surrendered, Strong was placed on terminal leave until January 1946 and returned to inactive duty status. By this time, he was 45 years old and had been bitten by the "intelligence bug." He spent almost ten months looking for the "right" job. The Second World War had demanded large numbers of intelligence officers, but the postwar foreign affairs bureaucracy and military services could not accommodate all the talented and unusual people they had trained, people who, like Strong, had found a calling in intelligence work. Eventually, Strong was able to find a position at the State Department in late June 1946 as the Chief of Acquisition and Distribution Division. His responsibilities included procuring and disseminating intelligence materials and foreign publications and coordinating with other government agencies. He functioned as a liaison member of the State Department's Science Policy Survey Group and coauthored "Science and Foreign Relations" and its classified supplement, "Scientific Intelligence," published by State in 1950. Nonetheless, Strong appears to have found this job rather limiting, because he began applying to the Central Intelligence Agency the following year.

CIA Career

In mid-1942, before Strong left for duty in the Pacific, he attended a party in Washington given by his sister where he met Walter L. Pforzheimer, who was in military intelligence. Later that year, Pforzheimer introduced Strong to Gilbert Huntting and his Swedish wife, Margot. Strong and Margot Huntting began a correspondence which lasted through the end of the war. By the time Strong returned to Washington in late 1945, the Hunttings had divorced and

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Strong began courting the Swedish beauty in earnest. In December 1946, Phil Strong married Margot Berglind Huntting; Walter Pforzheimer was best man at the ceremony.

With a strong recommendation from Pforzheimer, Phil Strong became a CIA employee on 3 October 1950 as a physical scientist and Chief of Production Branch in the Plans and Production Staff of the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Seven months later, he transferred to OSI's Operations Staff, which he headed during 1952 and 1953.

In 1953, Strong began an association with the Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board that would ultimately lead him to the Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force on 12 May 1954. Strong's relationship with the community of scientists in Boston was bolstered by his association with the Boston Scientific Advisory Committee, a group of engineers and physicists from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard, and other New England universities, which advised CIA on technical matters.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was the Boston scientific community that fueled the Pentagon with vital ideas for defensive and offensive systems. Most of these scholars had participated in MIT's Radiation Laboratory effort during World War II where the British invention of radar was perfected and sonar was developed. Radiation Laboratory, a larger effort than the Manhattan Project, was headed by Dr. Lee A. DuBridge. James Killian, then an assistant to MIT President Karl Compton, was responsible for coordinating the federal government's funding of this project.

As a member of AFSAB, Strong was able to keep abreast of all the advanced projects being funded by the Air Force. He was also aware of a whole range of ideas being proposed by subcommittees and *ad hoc* units which needed funding. During the mid-1950s, Strong was the pipeline through which the Agency learned of numerous Pentagon intelligence collection projects. (It should be remembered that the Defense Intelligence Agency was not established until 1 October 1961.) During the 1950s, each military service had its own G-2 intelligence unit and engaged in all types of intelligence collection. By this time, Strong had become a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve and used his influence to gather information in the Pentagon, where he had a desk, telephone, and services of a secretary.

Strong forged firm relationships throughout the intelligence community during the mid-1950s that earned his membership on a number of committees and working groups. Quiet though he was, Strong was an inveterate "snoop" and used his membership on government-wide units to ferret out secret projects. His secretary kept a cardfile for each project by codename, by subject, and by funding unit.[9] Strong set little store by compartmentation, if it meant that some agency or Pentagon unit might be keeping something from him. Indeed, his papers in the Agency archives are one of the few locations for information on CIA's involvement in an infamous Air Force balloon project. These same holdings also provided the bulk of the information that gave rise to the "family jewels" revelations during the stewardship of DCI William E.

[9] Interview with C.W. "Bill" Sampey, 10 Oct 83.

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Colby in 1975. Strong was not on the distribution for many of these documents, and some were from Pentagon and Agency officers who were unaware that he possessed them.

For more than a decade, Strong was the Agency representative on the AFSAB. In 1955, he was named the CIA member of National Security Council Working Group 5520; the next year he added membership on the Nuclear Energy Working Group. During 1956 and 1957, he was a member of the Ad Hoc Requirments Committee which produced the targeting requests for U-2 overflights. In the fall of 1957, he served for three months as chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee's Working Group on Defense Against Ballistic Missiles. From February to June 1958, Strong was detailed as Chairman of the US Communications Intelligence Board's ELINT Task Force.

Strong was retired from the Marine Corps Reserve in 1957 as a brigadier general. In July 1958, he was appointed Deputy Assistant Director of Scientific Intelligence (Collection), a position he held for the next five years. In late 1963, when OSI was transferred from the Directorate of Intelligence to the Directorate of Science and Technology, Strong was moved to the staff of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, and in February 1964 he became the Deputy Chief of the Collection Guidance Staff.

Strong retired from the Agency on 17 April 1964 and was awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal by DCI John McCone for his "important contributions to the development of programs which have resulted in major intelligence gains to the United States." Strong and his wife, Margot, moved to a farmhouse in rural Vermont, where they lived until 1968, when Margot became ill with cancer. The Strongs then returned to the Washington area, where Margot died on 7 January 1970. Brigadier General Philip Grandin Strong (USMCR, Ret.) died in Washington, D.C., on 12 November 1971 and was buried in Arlington Cemetery.

• • •

One of CIA's "legends," Strong remains an impressive but enigmatic figure. He does not seem to fit the current profiles of what CIA employees should be. It is hard to imagine recruiting anyone like him today.

This article is classified SECRET.

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A Call for Standardization

Improving the Intelligence Community's No-Strike Target Support (U)

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> **"The IC's performance during the 1999 Balkans conflict illustrates the complexity of handling data on sites that should remain off-limits to military attack."**

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(6)

As the use of precision-guided weapons increases the feasibility of controlling damage in urban-area attacks, the Intelligence Community (IC) must ensure that the information it provides on potential targets keeps pace with the needs of attacking forces. NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during Operation ALLIED FORCE (Serbia 1999) revealed significant weaknesses in intelligence support. A subsequent White House report—*A National Security Strategy for a New Century*—specifically referenced the mistaken bombing of the Embassy as evidence that more attention needs to be paid to targeting, especially when urban areas are involved.[1] (U)

This article draws on the IC's performance during the 1999 Balkans conflict to illustrate the complexity of handling data on sites that should remain off-limits to military attack. Targets are designated as "no-strike"

[1] The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington DC: The White House, 1999), p. iv. (U)

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either because the facilities themselves are sensitive or because bomb impacts could cause collateral damage to sensitive sites nearby. Confusion over which sites should be protected and variations in IC products and procedures for dealing with no-strike data make a strong case for standardization to reduce the danger of costly mistakes during wartime.[2] (U//FOUO)

No Agreed-Upon Definitions (U)

During Operation ALLIED FORCE, intelligence analysts had no standard set of guidelines that they could draw on to produce the "no-strike data" that political and military leaders needed to make decisions on viable targets. Universal guides that address the issue of protected sites—such as the Geneva Conventions, the International Law of Armed Conflict, and the Hague Peace Conference Articles—were available, but not adapted for IC application.[3] The Geneva Conventions comprise a long series of documents prepared in 1949 and the validity of the items listed there can be debated in today's world. The International Law of Armed Conflict, a compendium of papers produced in various years, is a more manageable length, but does not provide many no-strike categories. The 1907 Hague Peace Conference Articles appear to provide the most extensive guidance that is still relevant today. These documents are not easy to find, however, despite today's electronic media. Moreover, IC officials had not distilled information from them either to steer collection and database building in advance of the 1999 Balkans conflict or to supply practical guidance to analysts struggling to provide data on no-strike targets under the fast pace of war. (U//FOUO)

US military documents provided little help on this complex subject. Joint Publications (JPs) contain the official guidance for the US armed forces and supporting agencies engaged in joint operations and training. During Operation ALLIED FORCE and several years afterward, there were 106 primary JPs.[4] Of these, 58 held some relevance for no-strike targeting—five in the Intelligence Series 2-0 and 53 in the Operations Series 3-0. Only three, however, contained any significant information on the subject. The two publications that best addressed the no-strike issue were JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* (9 March 2000) and JP 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support* (12 May 1998). (U)

Under the heading "Intelligence Cycle," JP 2-0 stated that "Collection managers will, when necessary, nominate 'no-strike' targets." It defined no-strike targets as "usually adversary entities whose intelligence value to future operations may exceed the benefit to be gained from attacking them."[5] The definition, however, did not state what comprised the no-strike targets, when it might be necessary to nominate no-strike targets, or where such guidance might be found. The JP was primarily concerned with civilian casualties and the possibility of eliminating key intelligence sources by damaging particular facilities.[6] JP 2-0 referenced JP 3-09 for "further information on 'no-strike' targets."[7] JP 3-09 confined no-strike issues to the glossary where it echoed JP 2-0, by

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[2] This article draws on research and interviews conducted for a project at the Joint Military Intelligence College in the spring of 2000. The author reviewed more than 100 documents from eight agencies and organizations, and interviewed 16 analysts and officials from five agencies. For reasons of privacy, interviewees are identified only by position. (U)

[3] The Geneva Conventions and the Hague Articles attempt to set standards in the conduct of war, notably with regard to the humane treatment of persons and the proscription of weapons deemed cruel. The International Law of Armed Conflict addresses the issues of combatants vs. non-combatants and legitimate military targets vs. civilian property. (U)

[4] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Electronic Library*, "Joint Publications," no date, internet website: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/index.html, accessed on 13 January 2000. (U)

[5] JP 2-0, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 5 May 1995), p. i. (U)

[6] SECRET-level interview with senior officer, Joint Chiefs of Staff Targeting Staff, 3 April 2000. (U)

[7] JP 2-0, II-5. (U)

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defining no-strike targets as those targets, designated by a commander, whose "destruction would interfere with or unduly hamper projected friendly military operations or friendly relations with indigenous personnel or governments."[8] JP 3-09 referenced JP 1-02, which contained no more than the exact definition used in JP 3-09.[9] (U//FOUO)

Other JPs made reference to "Rules of Engagement" and "Standard Rules of Engagement." JP 3-07—*Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (16 June 1995)—referred both types of rules, stating that in military operations other than war "political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement than in war."[10] In this JP, no attempt was made to depict or define those "rules" or reference any particular documents to clarify what types of restrictions may be standard. It did not provide guidance on no-strike facilities. (U//FOUO)

A review of 20 documents in the US Air Force's Intelligence Series-14, and 99 documents in its Operations Series-10 showed that only one contained significant references to no-strike facilities and none served as a practical guide.[11] In Air Force Pamphlet 14-210—*United States Air Force Intelligence Targeting Guide* (1 February 1998)—Chapter 5 stated that a target's geographic location could cause it not to be selected for strike. A target's location in relation to cultural features was listed as an important consideration. If an attack on a target might have political repercussions because of possible damage to a nearby installation or population center, the target might not receive strike approval.[12] Under "Target Validation," the Air Force pamphlet discussed no-fire lists, prohibited lists, protected lists, and collateral damage risks—these were the most extensive lists found in Air Force literature. Here, as in the international conventions and laws regarding no-strike parameters, the pamphlet stated that international law does not preclude targets from attack even when the possibility of collateral damage exists. However, the degree of military advantage gained by the attack must be considered in proportion to the possible damage such an attack may cause.[13] Chapter 4 of the Air Force pamphlet briefly discussed the types of guidance available and general objectives. It suggested that the International Law of Armed Conflict, Rules of Engagement, and command guidance be consulted. In Attachment 4, the pamphlet covered targeting and international law and focused on the immunity of civilians. It also referenced the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Peace Conference. The content remained at a high level of generality, however, and provided no concrete guidance for intelligence support on no-strike targeting. (U//FOUO)

No One in Charge (U)

With no solid doctrinal foundation, intelligence agencies took independent approaches to developing, handling, and presenting data on no-strike targets. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Vice Adm. Thomas R. Wilson has written that "no-strike lists...[were] an area not traditionally included in [DIA's] database structures but one that has become increasingly important in an era of urban

[8] JP 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support* (Washington, DC: GPO, 12 May 1998), GL-8. (U)
[9] JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, As Amended Through 10 June 1998* (Washington, DC: GPO, 23 March 1994), p. 303. (U)
[10] JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington, DC: GPO, 16 June 1995), I-1. (U)
[11] United States Air Force, Air Force Publications: Electronic Publications, no date, internet website: http://www.af-pubs.hq.af.mil/pubs/publist.asp.html, accessed on 6 April 2000. (U)
[12] US Air Force Pamphlet 14-210, Chapter 5, "Target Development." (U)
[13] US Air Force, Targeting Process, 8 October 1998, Intelink site: http://www.497ig.aia.ic.gov/target/process/objguid/obj_typ1.html, accessed on 31 March 2000. (U//FOUO)

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warfare."[14] This statement could apply to the entire no-strike target support process in the IC—existing procedures were uncoordinated and ineffective in keeping pace with the increase in urban area conflicts. (U//FOUO)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

absence of an established approach, a senior analyst would train new recruits on the job. Training apparently consisted of the identification of certain cultural and geographic features of the area. Asked how analysts knew what features to designate as "no-strike," an interviewee responded that they looked for places and facilities that might contain significant numbers of civilians. This method automatically excluded cemeteries and historical monuments, which are protected under the International Law of Armed Conflict, and additional potential targets covered by the Geneva Conventions, such as ambulances and drinking water facilities.[18] (S)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

facilities. Beyond that, the J2T relied on the judgment of individual IC analysts to refine the categories and decide which targets to put on the no-strike list.[20] (S)

A Theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) is authorized to provide "guidance on targets that may not be engaged under the law of war or applicable rules of engagement."[21] Normally, a CINC would pass guidance to the J2, who then would manage/monitor/disseminate targeting information to supporting IC agencies. During Operation ALLIED FORCE, however, the CINC's staff communicated directly with the Joint Warfare Analysis Center by briefing the JWAC liaison officer at Theater Headquarters or by calling JWAC analysts.

(b)(1)

The CIA's involvement in military targeting during the Balkans conflict was extremely limited. It did not enter information into no-strike databases or review areas under consideration for placement on the no-strike list. Once a target was

(b)(3)

[14] Thomas R. Wilson, Vice Admiral, USN, "From The Director: Focus On Attacking The Database Problem," Communiqué 12, no. 2 (March/April 2000), p. 1. (U)
[15] SECRET-level interview with production manager, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 20 December 1999. (U)
[16] For example, should schools for adult vocational or military training be off limits, or only schools for children? Should hotels containing diplomatic presence be treated as diplomatic facilities or lodging places? See:

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

[18] US Air Force, *Targeting Process*; Department of the Army, *Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field*, 6 July 1906, Geneva, Intelink site: http://www2.army.ucom.ic.gov/ace/snglsorc/osis/opensource/archive/2000/icrc_balkans/62791e65a370890ac125641e00369e45-OpenDocument.html, accessed on 31 March 2000. (U//FOUO)
[19] SECRET-level interview with senior officer, Joint Chiefs of Staff Targeting Staff, 3 April 2000. (U)

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Facility Types Accepted For Basic No-Strike List (U)

Ambassador residences
Areas for gathering sick/wounded
Art facilities/museums
Capital buildings (seat of Government)
Cemeteries
Charitable institutions
Chemical production facilities
City hall
Civilian population centers
Commercial areas—non-host nations
Dams, dikes
Deputy Ambassador residences
Dissidents/political prisoners areas
Drinking water installations
Embassies
Embassy staff residences
Grain elevators
Historical monuments
Hospitals
Hotels
Irrigation works
Libraries
Food stocks
Markets
Media Facilities
Medical means of transport
Nuclear electrical generation stations
Passenger terminals
POW camps
Prisons
Property of educational institutions
Refugee facilities
Religious facilities
Schools
Science facilities
Shopping malls
Stadiums
Undefended towns
USAID
USIA sites outside Embassy
(and)
Specific Rules of Engagement, defined by CINC, Chief/JTF, President

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Facility Types Rejected For Basic No-Strike List (U)

Agricultural areas
(facilities for processing crops)
Crops
Livestock
Personal Property (personal/collective)
Police Stations
Port facilities
Railroad facilities

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selected for bombing, the CIA, like other IC agencies, was charged with contributing any additional relevant information during the final target validation process. An interview with a CIA analyst who worked on the Balkans conflict did not yield evidence of standard operating procedures or no-strike designation criteria at that agency. The accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy stemmed from the one-time-only selection and processing of a target by a CIA employee inexperienced with targeting procedures and an IC target validation process that failed to recognize that the building thought to be the Yugoslav Federal Supply Building was in fact an embassy. (S//NF)

Working Toward a No-Strike Definition (U)

The Balkans conflict pointed out the need for a common understanding of no-strike targeting. In the spring of 2000, the author worked with 21 experts from five organizations—NIMA, DIA, J2T, JWAC, and CIA—to create working standards for identifying no-strike targets. The Delphi method—a structured means of arriving at a group decision—was used. This approach can be effective when little scientific knowledge or few facts surround an issue.[22] The process began with the completion of a questionnaire about types of targets by the IC experts. An administrator next consolidated the responses and then resent the questionnaire, modified to include new facility types suggested during the first round. Participants also were given the overall rating for each question, his/her original response to each question, and space to change answers, if desired. This process was repeated several times until the responses were stable. At the end, the administrator determined the "group position" by averaging the responses.[23] (U//FOUO)

The interagency group came to agreement on 42 types of facilities that might be considered sensitive, and therefore appropriate for a potential no-strike list. They rejected seven as insufficiently sensitive to qualify. (See chart on page 5.) Senior leaders could use such a generic list to tailor a no-target set for the unique political and military objectives of a specific conflict. (U//FOUO)

A Parade of Products (U)

Three IC agencies—NIMA, DIA, and JWAC—prepared nine types of products related to no-strike targeting in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999. (U)

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(b)(3)

[22] The Illinois Institute of Technology, "The Delphi Method: Definition and Historical Background," no date, internet website: http://www.itt.edu/it/Delphi.html, accessed on 2 August 2000. (U)

[23] *Web Dictionary of Cyberkinetics and Systems*, no date, internet website: http//www.pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ACS/Delphi_mtho.html, accessed on 2 August 2000. (U)

[24] SECRET-level interview with production manager, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 20 December 1999. (U)

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Standardizing Presentation Guidelines (U)

The nine IC products presented no-strike data in different ways, increasing the possibility of confusion that could have led to military errors. Inconsistencies in format also risked undermining customers' faith in the quality of intelligence support, of particular concern as the demand for data on no-strike targets grows in tandem with advances in precision bombing. To explore interagency inconsistencies, the same group of analysts, using the same Delphi process, arrived at a consensus on 21 standards for the presentation of graphics and other IC documentation related to no-strike targeting. (U//FOUO)

(b)(3)

Measuring the various types of no-strike products generated by the IC during the Balkans conflict against the 21 proposed standards illustrates the extent of the inconsistencies.[28] None of the eight main products earned a higher score than 63 percent compliance when judged by the newly suggested standards—the average of the individual scores was 54 percent.[29] The requirement that facility names be drawn from a common database rated a low 37 percent for compliance, primarily because only the DIA products relied on the MIDB. (U//FOUO)

(b)(1)

[28] The evaluation process consisted of reviewing samples of each product type until consistent patterns could be discerned, and then measuring those patterns against the new criteria. (U)

[29] JWAC's "briggsplats" were dropped from the analysis because only three of the 25 criteria ended up being relevant to that product. (U)

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Proposed Presentation Guidelines

General Requirements for No-strike Products, Including Databases

1. Data should be as factual as possible but allow for levels of confidence. Analysts should not reject or attempt to justify any particular target based on their findings.
2. Databases should include "statements of significance" of a feature/target whenever appropriate.
3. In product titles, facility names should be in all capital letters, followed by a two-letter country code, Basic Encyclopedia (BE) number, geocoordinates, and relevant category codes.
4. Facility names should be drawn from a common database—the MIDB.
5. All associated names for the given facility, found in alternate databases or official documents, should be listed.
6. All associated BE numbers, identifying the same facility or complex, should be listed.
7. Intelligence cut-off dates should be included on the product.
8. Production dates should be included on the product.
9. If the precise location of a facility is unknown, this should be stated plainly.
10. The same facility name should be used throughout the product or series of products.
11. A radius of 1500 feet from the target should be used when developing no-strike data.
12. Data should be entered into databases or onto products even when there is not 100 percent eyes-on-ground verification or multiple cross-referenced sources.
13. Levels-of-confidence should be included on all products.
14. Geocoordinates should identify the center of the target.
15. Producer codes should be on all products.

Specific Requirements for Graphics

1. North arrows are to be displayed on all image and graphic products.
2. The scale of the imagery should be as large as possible.
3. Oblique imagery is preferred over a near vertical angle.
4. Imagery should be oriented to convey maximum understanding—north does not always have to be at the top of the image or product.
5. Area features should be outlined in black or white lines—whichever shows up best on the imagery.
6. Point features should be identified by a single leaderline from the facility name to the center of the facility.

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names: a native name, a name provided by NIMA, and the MIDB name. NIMA's spreadsheets and some of the CIGs, for example, gave only the native names for areas and places, whereas a search of the MIDB could have yielded an anglicized name as a second reference point. Failing to cross check and moving ahead on the assumption that only one name exists can lead to military mistakes. During Operation DESERT STORM in the Persian Gulf, for example, confusion over names resulted in troops being exposed to chemical agents at the Khamisiyah storage facility.[30] (S)

Like place names, the existence of multiple BE numbers is a common occurrence, and one that can lead to significant confusion if not cross checked and clearly marked. In some instances during Operation ALLIED FORCE, JWAC analysts requested an image of a specific location only to receive photos of different installations with the same BE number. The lack of clarity caused the analysts to delay support to military operations until the conflicting

> **"No product appeared to have used cross-verification for names and BE numbers."**

information could be resolved.[31] Even in cases where multiple databases do not yield different names or BE numbers, the fact that searches have been made should be noted on the products. (S)

More encouraging, the six IC graphic products were 100 percent in accordance with four of the six graphic-specific criteria established by the interagency group. Standard presentation approaches were already in use for depicting the scale and orientation of the imagery, the use of North arrows, and the designation of area and point features. For the two areas not in accordance, area features were outlined in black or white lines only 20 percent of the time, and a single leaderline from a facility name to the center of the point feature was used only 40 percent of the time. The methods of outlining area features varied among the products, from different colors to different line styles (solid, dashed, dotted). For point features, leaderlines did not always point to the center of the facility. Since the group of analysts agreed that the coordinates given on a graphic should indicate the center of the area or facility, the leaderline should also point to the center of the target. Because these are matters of presentational style, IC analysts should be able to bring their graphics into line with the proposed standards with relatively little difficulty. (U//FOUO)

Looking Ahead (U)

The benefits from standardization are clear. The IC needs to take corrective steps before further crises occur. The development of a basic no-strike target list could allow rapid tailoring by the Joint Task Force, the President, or other leaders when a new conflict looms. Although some of the no-strike work for Operation ALLIED FORCE was done prior to the initial bombings, national databases contained insufficient data and graphics to meet targeting needs.[32] Interagency agreement on the contents of no-strike target databases would encourage proactive population of the files and trigger collection to fill data gaps before the information becomes

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

[30] IC and military databases contained different names and data for the storage facility. The troops responsible for securing the site received information from a database that did not identify the presence of chemical rounds, leaving the individuals sent to destroy the munitions vulnerable. Persian Gulf War Illness Task Force, *Lessons Learned: Intelligence Support on Chemical and Biological Warfare During the Gulf War and on Veterans' Illness Issues*, December 1997, p. 11. (U)

[32] Also see: Vernon Loeb, "To See and Not Been Seen: Behind the Grids of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA]–Two Overseas Incidents Popped Agency's Bubble of Invisibility," *The Washington Post*, 10 July 1999, Intelink site: http://delphi.dia.ic.gov/admin/EARLYBIRD/990712/19990712see.html, accessed on 4 April 2000. (U)

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critical in wartime. Standardizing formats for no-strike products would reduce the potential for confusion that can undermine confidence in the IC, cause operational delays, and risk serious military errors. (U//FOUO)

By identifying weaknesses in the past, this article hopes to establish ground rules for the future. Despite the complexity of the topic, interagency groups at the working level have demonstrated that progress can be made toward a common understanding. The foundation exists for IC leaders and analysts to integrate experiences from the current war on terrorism to enrich and refine definitions, procedures, and products to provide the best support possible to no-strike targeting in the future. (U//FOUO)

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An Intelligence Windfall

Uncovering a Chemical Weapons Program in the Balkans (b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c)

Editor's Note: After more than three and a half years of war among ethnically divided and heavily armed adversaries in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a multinational NATO-led force commenced Operation Joint Endeavor in December 1995 to restore order. Occurring against this backdrop, the intelligence discoveries detailed below contributed to NATO's operational planning.

(b)(3)(n)

❖ ❖ ❖

During a reorganization at the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) in January 1993, I was assigned the task of monitoring the chemical warfare (CW) research programs of the Balkans and other European countries. In my initial weeks, I received an Information Intelligence Report (IIR) from the US Defense Attaché in Zagreb, Croatia, concerning a former Yugoslav Army chemical weapons factory at Bijelo Polje.

(b)(1)

At that time, the former Yugoslavia was known to have a strong CW defense program, but the production of offensive chemical agents had not been confirmed.

(b)(3)(n)

When a country is suspected of having an offensive chemical weapons program, it is added to a Department of Defense (DoD) "most wanted list" of nations possessing weapons of mass destruction. My 15 years of experience in imagery analysis at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) sent me scrambling for satellite photography of the purported facility. I looked for other leads as well, including open-source reports. Over the years, some intelligence analysts had come to believe that the former Yugoslavia had an offensive as well as defensive CW program, and some suspect sites had been mentioned in reporting, but nothing definitive had resulted.

(b)(3)(n)

Identifying the Facility (b)(3)(n)

There are at least five different locations called Bijelo Polje (Serbo-Croatian for "White Plain") in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was able to narrow the search based on an article published in *Zagreb Vjenik* magazine on 26 November 1991 that mentioned a weapons plant in the village of Bijelo Polje near Mostar. Using this new information, I found overhead imagery of an odd-looking facility tucked into the mountains seven kilometers north of Mostar. (b)(1)

As a result of my search, on 19 February 1993 DIA formally identified the facility as the "Mostar Possible CW Production Plant" and began targeting it for imagery coverage. We also

> **"With growing excitement, we learned the details of a program hidden from the world's eyes for nearly four decades."**

(b)(3)(c) is an analyst at the National Ground Interpretation Center.

(b)(3)(c)

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issued reports in April, September, and October 1993 describing what we had learned from the sources and warning NATO of the potential danger. (b)(3)(n)

In-Country Visit (b)(3)(n)

On 4 April, I flew to Zagreb with another CW expert from NGIC. We were driven to the Croatian Ministry of Defense to meet the three scientists. Through our translator and the broken English of the sources, we received an account of the former Yugoslavia's chemical weapons activities. With growing excitement we learned, from those who had actually been involved in developing and running it, the details of a program hidden from the world's eyes for nearly four decades. The scientists not only had done research on CW substances—including the nerve agent sarin, blister agent mustard, psychochemical agent BZ (2-quinuclidinyl benzilate), and riot-control agent CS (ortho-chlorobenzalmalononitrile)—but also had worked on delivery systems. They had assisted in the testing of artillery shells, rifle grenades, hand grenades, rockets, bombs, aerial spray devices, and mines. (b)(3)(n)


> **"Driving into the ghost-like abandoned complex of nearly 30 buildings, we saw a plundered ruin."**

Out of the blue, we were asked if we wanted to visit the plant! There was a pause in the fighting going on around Mostar, so we jumped at the idea. With orders amended, we flew to Split, an ancient city on the Croatian coast. One of our sources (b)(1) accompanied us. I tape-recorded our conversation as we were escorted to Mostar through the many Bosnian Christian and Muslim checkpoints.

When we arrived in Mostar, the destruction in the city—especially in the Muslim sectors east of the Neretva River—reminded me of scenes from World War II movies. (b)(3)(n)

Passing an abandoned textile plant outside the village of Vrapcici, we turned right onto a narrow, paved access road to the secret plant. On both sides, high vegetation obscured the surrounding area. A long stretch of fencing topped with barbed wire and connected to concrete posts reminded me of typical security measures at military facilities in the former Warsaw Pact countries. We passed an abandoned sentry shed. No factory sign or logo told us what lay ahead. Driving into the ghost-like abandoned complex of nearly 30 buildings, we saw a plundered ruin. This had been a top secret complex in the former Yugoslavia, its activities unknown even to nearby villagers. Now the road was strewn with debris from items that local citizens had discarded as they removed anything that could be used in rebuilding their war-battered homes. A ceremonial garden with an empty fountain was overgrown with weeds. Some of the tall evergreens lining the inner connecting roads had been cut down for fuel. The approach of a small red car put our armed escorts on alert, but it was only another pilferer on his way to cut wood. (b)(3)(n)

We moved through the complex with cameras and tape recorder going. Upon entering the two-story headquarters building, the former shook his head in amazement at the shambles. He had not (b)(1)



Mostar chemical agent and munitions production building (photos supplied by author). (b)(3)(n)

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seen his office since January 1992, when the Serbs told him to take a "vacation" for a few days. Now, cold, damp air blew through the roofless and windowless building. Rain-soaked papers were strewn all over. The keys to the medical building lay on the floor. As the day drew to a close, we gathered classified Yugoslav Army documents from the now shelf-less technical library. On the way back to Split, we dropped the former (b)(1) off at his home in Mostar and spent a few moments in the city's park. It had been turned into a cemetery filled with recently interred victims of the war, with Christians and Muslims buried side by side. Our Croatian driver got us to Split just in time to catch the flight to Zagreb. Within weeks, bitter fighting intensified around Mostar. (b)(3)(n)

Exposing Program Secrets (b)(3)(n)


How could this CW operation have evaded detection for so many years? Thanks to the Zagreb sources, our own experience at the Mostar complex, and subsequent trips by the US Defense Attaché to collect documents, many questions could be answered. On one of my many later visits to Zagreb, I was asked to take charge of 16 boxes of Mostar documents being sent to Washington. After a succession of military flights, I arrived home with a sense of accomplishment. The Mostar documents not only gave details of the institution's research, but also explained all phases of the site's construction. The attaché had removed all of the blueprints from the engineer's shelves, in a building that was destroyed the next year. (b)(3)(n)

> **"Enough CW agent precursors to make 30 tons of sarin were returned from the Mostar complex to Lucani, Serbia, where they were originally produced."**

Why had the Serbs left so much information behind when they abandoned the institute? On 5 January 1992, Zagreb radio explained: "The day has been quiet in the town except for the alarming news that early yesterday afternoon the occupation army, using two tanks, three *pinzgauers*[1], and two trucks full of soldiers, entered the premises of the Military Technical Institute, which is in the Bjelo Polje town suburb... After taking the institute, occupation troops told the employees to leave and asked them to report back to work as late as 28 February." (b)(3)(n)

Anticipating the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Serbs had begun to dismantle their offensive CW program by late 1991. (b)(1) enough CW agent precursors to make 30 tons of sarin were returned from the Mostar complex to Lucani, Serbia, where they were originally produced. The Serbs also removed a large quantity of final-stage mustard agent

[1] A *pinzgauer* is an Austrian-made 4x4 soft-top truck that is used much like a US HMMWV ("humvee"). (b)(3)(n)



Technical library in shambles (b)(3)(n)



Pipes discarded during evacuation of Mostar plant. (b)(3)(n)

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(b)(1)

precursor, destroyed sarin-filled 122 mm artillery rounds, and took away the most highly classified production-related documents. As fighting closed in during January 1992, there was no time to remove anything more from the Mostar complex than some of the CW reactors and munitions-filling equipment. (b)(1) The dangers involved in dismantling such a plant in a matter of hours caused the deaths of several soldiers from CW agents. (b)(3)(n)

How did the former Yugoslavia hide its chemical weapons program?

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

Only after the roofs had been removed by local villagers were the venting pipes detectable. (b)(3)(n)

Hiding the program from local citizens was the task of the facility's security officer. Roving guards with dogs, two rows of chain link fencing, barbed wire, perimeter lighting, and fence sensors protected against intruders. Such measures were not unusual for military-related facilities and would not have provided clues to the plant's activities. Security towers scattered about the plant gave a bird's-eye

(b)(3)(n)


view of the surrounding area. (b)(1) told us that these lookouts also provided critical early warning of forest fires—fires were always a concern, because trash was regularly burned at a nearby city dump. At one point, according to legal records found among the Mostar documents, a few dozen villagers tapped into the plant's dedicated water line; however, the government chose not to prosecute to protect the true purpose of the facility. (b)(3)(n)

In its earliest days, a false association with SOKO, a nearby aircraft plant, disguised the complex—documents with covers labeled SOKO were found at the site. Later, the plant was directly associated with the Military Technical Institute, a CW defense research center. Chemical defense activity did occur at the Mostar facility, but its main purpose, chemical weapons development, remained hidden. (b)(3)(n)

The chemical munitions themselves were carefully disguised. (b)(1) told me the casings were referred to as "real smoke" rounds in order to camouflage their true function. Sarin- and mustard-agent-filled munitions were transported, with a military police escort, in nondescript cargo trucks. These munitions had yellow banding, which normally indicated a training round. Over the years,

(b)(1)

the Mostar facility began to produce the riot-control agent CS for commercial sale. This tear-producing chemical powder was shipped



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Toxic air-handling vents exposed. (b)(3)(n)

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in plain brown cardboard canisters, each about the size of a beer keg, to Krusevac, Serbia, where the CS was filled into rifle- and handgrenades and sold worldwide (as noted in *Jane's Police and Security Handbook*). The chemical's manufacturing site was never identified. (b)(3)(n)

The Serbs took additional steps to disguise their CW program.

(b)(1)

Beginning in 1968, secret CW field trials were held each September in Krivolak Polygon, Macedonia (formerly a Yugoslav province).

(b)(1)

The test site was at the center of a large former Yugoslav training area. The map in the commander's office did not have a label for activity in the area of the CW tests, but non-CW activity was clearly labeled. Our sources said physical evidence of test activity was removed to keep the site secret.

(b)(1)

One image even showed tests underway, although the nature of the activity could not have been determined from the imagery alone. In


> **"The source answered: 'If you have equipment that only makes chocolate milk, then what would you think the equipment produced?'"**

June 1996, I assisted in organizing a joint Croatian, Macedonian, and US dig at the site and discovered evidence of chemical weapons tests, including laboratory equipment, hidden bunkers, a blast chamber, and expended chemical munitions. (b)(3)(n)

Despite the Serbs' efforts to camouflage their offensive CW program, our sources believed that some Western European countries must have known about it. They spoke of the loose lips of the former Yugoslav Army's chemical weapons program leader, Bogdan D. Boskovic, who was known for talking openly at international conferences. Although no foreigners were permitted in the production complex itself, relevant business transactions sometimes occurred as close as downtown Mostar. I asked

(b)(1)

Most of the CW-related equipment was



(b)(3)(n)

Mostar reactor made by French company DeDietrich. (b)(3)(n)

purchased and delivered in 1958, a time when few collection and analytic resources were devoted to Yugoslavia. (b)(3)(n)

Where Things Stand Now (b)(3)(n)

The Serbs were players in the Conference on Disarmament through the 1980s, which preceded the present Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Serb officials carried out trial inspections during that period, primarily to test procedures. One such inspection took place at what our sources later told us was the country's first facility for CW agent production—the Prva Iskra complex at Baric, near Belgrade. The Serbs had listed the site as a phosgene plant, a chemical allowed under the regulations, but one that can also be used as a CW agent. According to an official report, a team composed entirely of Yugoslav officials carried out the inspection. Team members limited

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their investigation to one petrochemical plant in the complex that was dedicated to legitimate phosgene production, suggesting that they were knowledgeable about the cover-up. Belgrade suspended participation in the Conference following the breakup of the country in 1990. (b)(3)(n)

In July 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) signed and ratified the CWC and subsequently declared its CW-related sites. Information on the Mostar equipment was included in the declaration, but data on its current locations were imprecise. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency has identified equipment at a facility in Krusevac owned by the Trayal Company as probably being from Mostar, consistent with reporting from

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)(n)

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Celebrating the Life of Walter Pforzheimer

Timothy Naftali

> **"Walter Lionel Pforzheimer was a man of serious passions."**

Dr. Timothy Naftali is an Associate Professor at the University of Virginia, where he directs the Presidential Recording Program and the Kremlin Decisionmaking Project at the Miller Center of Public Affairs. He first met Walter Pforzheimer in 1982 while working on an OSS-related paper as an undergraduate at Yale.

Editor's Note: Dr. Naftali delivered these remarks on 11 March 2003 at a memorial service attended by many colleagues from the intelligence world that Walter Pforzheimer helped to shape. To honor this distinguished CIA trailblazer, Studies in Intelligence *awards a prize in his name each year for the best article on an intelligence-related subject submitted by a graduate or undergraduate student.*

❖ ❖ ❖

I asked Walter how he wanted me to start his eulogy. "Say, 'Hello,'" he suggested.

Well, "Hello."

In his beloved curmudgeonly way, Walter could be a tough taskmaster, and I want to be sure to get at least that part right.

The Early Years

Walter Lionel Pforzheimer was a man of serious passions. He loved his country, he loved his books, he loved his Yale, he loved his Agency, and he loved his extended intellectual and blood family. In short, he loved life. Not that his passions were always positive. He hated his middle name, Lionel, and he didn't like being a lawyer, though he was much better at it than he pretended. Walter's genius was to make something lasting out of each of these passions: great



Walter L. Pforzheimer, CIA "Trailblazer"

friends; two great libraries, one public, one private; and a lifetime of exemplary public service.

Walter seemed to know early on that he had much to accomplish. He arrived two months prematurely, just in time to witness the guns of August 1914—Walter loved a good show. It was such a difficult birth that the attending physician announced that a choice would have to be made: "Shall I save the baby or the mother?" In response, Walter's father fainted. From the womb—at least as Walter later told us—the little fellow screamed, "Save us both, you idiot!" And indeed the doctor did. Walter, as always, was very present at Creation.

It can certainly be said that Walter was born with a silver spoon in his mouth; but he's the one who turned it into gold. Seeing the joy that book collecting

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brought his father and his uncles, Walter began using his 50-cents-a-week allowance to acquire first editions of the adolescent literary favorite Frank R. Stockton. Having inherited the nose of a great collector, young Walter quickly exhibited a sense of which book to buy and which deserved a pass. Most collectors are happy if they create one unique collection. The Stockton was merely Walter's first.

Yale College nurtured this love of books. By his junior year in 1934, Walter had organized the first undergraduate book club. And, two years later, while at the Yale Law School, he became the youngest trustee of the Yale Library Associates. Thus began an unprecedented sixty-nine year relationship that would much enrich Yale's library system and bring Walter some of his dearest friends. But the years in New Haven also lit a new fire in the young Mr. Pforzheimer.

Dedication to Public Service

For Walter's generation of Yale men, the depression at home and tensions abroad bred a deep sense of civic responsibility. Walter, who liked to quote Wendell Willkie's phrase that "America is the Land of the Free because it is also the Home of the Brave," became a championship debater and tried his hand at the Yale Political Union. Yale connections insured that when he answered the call for public service, it would be in the new field of foreign intelligence. In 1942, before he enlisted in the US Army Air Corps, Walter was tapped to launder money for an OSS operation that used Sterling Library as a cover. Later that year, he found his way into Air Intelligence. This took him overseas, where under the patronage of fellow Yalie Col. Huntington "Ting" Sheldon he discovered a talent for briefing senior officers. In Germany, he would earn a Bronze Star helping the airmen make sense of documents captured from the defeated Luftwaffe. And it was yet another "Eli," who in 1946 would help recruit Walter for the Central Intelligence Group, a successor to the OSS and the precursor to the CIA.

What Yale had started, the Central Intelligence Agency would complete. It was always a toss-up whether Walter felt more at home at Langley than in New Haven. Next to Yale, no community would benefit as much from Walter's energy, intelligence, and generosity.

As the junior member of the magnificent in-house firm of Houston, Warner, and Pforzheimer, Walter helped craft the charter for the new CIA. Becoming the Agency's first legislative counsel, Walter then drew on all of his skills to establish support on the Hill for intelligence activities. He never took credit for being the CIA's legislative counsel at a time of Congressional deference—no doubt considered a golden age by all of Walter's successors. "Many congressmen were afraid of intelligence," Walter would later recall. But Walter cannot escape his share of the credit. A master cultivator, he built lasting relationships with often remarkably ornery committee chairmen. At the same time, he managed to earn the respect of equally ornery Directors of Central Intelligence. The high point of his legislative career came when Walter Bedell Smith, the boss he most revered, assured Congress that "Mr. Pforzheimer speaks for me on Capitol Hill and I stand behind whatever he says." Walter wore no badge more proudly.

Providence truly smiled on Walter in the early postwar period. As he was doing his part in building the CIA, Walter came across a rare letter from the American Revolution that revealed the thoughts on intelligence of a much earlier founding father. "The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent," wrote George Washington in 1777, "and need not be further urged." Acquiring that letter was a rite of passage for Walter. It launched him into collecting intelligence books and laid the foundation for his reputation as a man who understood the place of espionage and counterespionage in the American experience. It was only a matter of time before a DCI would enlist Walter to help current practitioners understand the roots of their tradecraft. In 1956, Allen Dulles created the CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection, with Walter as its first curator. For the next 18 years he would be its guiding force. By the time of Walter's retirement in

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1974, the HIC had grown to 22,000 volumes, the largest professional intelligence collection in the world.

Retirement brought new outlets for Walter to share his deep knowledge of intelligence history. Over the course of the last third of his long life, Walter dedicated himself to preserving and shaping the burgeoning public literature on intelligence. I'd love to use some of the words that Walter chose to describe the earliest works of this genre. But we are, after all, in a chapel. Fortunately, by the mid-1980s, Walter could delight in the growing professionalism of academic and journal writing about intelligence. He cultivated the new practitioners of this art: Chris Andrew, John Costello, David Kahn, Dan Mulvenna, Keith Melton, Hayden Peake, John Ranelagh, Wesley Wark, and Nigel West. Besides the HIC and the collections now at Yale, these protégées and their work would be Walter's most enduring legacy. Today, there is not a single course taught on intelligence in the English-speaking world that does not reflect his patronage.

Generous Nature

Besides being a good teacher, Walter was a fine friend and generous host. There were countless invitations to be Walter's guest for a fine meal at the Watergate or Tivoli, or for a resolutely mediocre but festive Baker's Soup at Mory's. What most people don't know is that Walter exhibited small acts of spontaneous generosity throughout his life. As a recent graduate of Yale, Walter donated money for an annual prize for the finest freshman debater. We talk about the intelligence collection and Stockton and Moliere. But Walter also created a magnificent collection of legal textbooks on copyright for the Yale Law Library. Like so many of you, I experienced this generosity firsthand. Having returned to New Haven for a short stint as a visiting professor in the late 1990s, I discovered that a benefactor had paid my dues for a three-year membership in the Yale Library Associates. It was Walter, of course.

Walter had a partner in these acts of generosity. Since 1966, Alice d'Angelo shared his life as a companion, debating partner, and minder. Walter loved her intelligence and respected her sense of irony. She coined the tongue-in-cheek title used by many of us for him. He was OGO, or Oh Great One. As with any outsized character, Walter occasionally needed a little grounding. Alice, dear Alice, always provided that.



Pforzheimer, in conversation with Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, at the CIA's 50th Anniversary celebration in 1997. Pforzheimer was honored as a "Trailblazer" during the celebration.

Walter, you never expected to live to be 65, or 75, or 85, for that matter. We were fortunate to have you as long as we did. I will miss your salon: the puckish comments on the newest spy book or the latest DCI, always served up with brandy and cigars. Most of all, I will miss your friendship. There is some solace for me in the fact that so long as there are American intelligence officers at work and the scribblers to study them, you will remain a forceful presence. Thank you, Walter.

Ave Atque Vale . . . OGO.

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LETTERS to the editor

There are only two additions and one comment I can usefully add to Jim McCullough's vivid, evenhanded description of the events that overwhelmed CIA's seventh floor during November and December 1986 ("Personal Reflections on Bill Casey's Last Month at CIA," by James McCullough; *Studies in Intelligence*, summer 1995). I do want to record, however, that with customary modesty McCullough fails to note his own steadying influence as a voice of reason and common sense during those troubled months.

The first addition concerns the atmosphere on the seventh floor during the last 10 days of November 1986. As McCullough relates, 19-21 November was occupied with preparing Casey's first Congressional testimony scheduled for 21 November. The meeting to discuss the testimony held late on the afternoon of 20 November was characteristic of the confusion that gripped the seventh floor during that period. Although all the seats were taken around Casey's ample conference table, no one present was able—or perhaps willing—to fit together all elements of the Iran-Contra puzzle.

In fact, the atmosphere at the meeting was surreal: many of the participants seemingly were more interested in protecting themselves than in assisting Casey, who was visibly exhausted and at times incoherent. It was clear to McCullough and me that the next morning we would be accompanying a badly confused Director to Congress. We both felt that we had let the boss down, that he was headed for trouble, and that we had not done enough to prepare him.

The second addition concerns Casey's condition when, on 10 December, McCullough and I again accompanied him to Congress, on this occasion to the cavernous hearing room of the House International Relations Committee. It was at this hearing, described in McCullough's article, that I first began to realize that Casey was ill, perhaps very ill. Something was clearly wrong with his motor control, to the extent that he lurched from side to side in his chair, while we took turns trying to keep the microphone within range of what by then was a barely audible mumble.

When late in the hearing Casey asked for a break, it took four of us—two security officers, McCullough, and myself—to steer him, stumbling repeatedly, up the risers to the back of the hearing room, down a flight of steps, and along a narrow corridor to his destination. The return trip was equally perilous. Not long afterward, Chairman Dante Fascell, recognizing that his witness was in no condition to continue, adjourned the hearing.

The hearing was, as McCullough writes, "another dismal performance." It was also the beginning of a tragedy, a larger-than-life man destroyed by a small rumor, just at the time when he needed all his powers to defend himself from questionable charges that he was the mastermind behind the Reagan administration's worst foreign policy disaster. After his death—after the opportunity for rebuttal that died with him—the charges grew in scope and detail, their creators safe from Casey's reach.

Next, I would like to comment on the role of excessive secrecy in first creating and then deepening public suspicion of CIA involvement in the Iran-Contra affair, an ill-advised effort that was devised, managed, and bungled by the staff of the National Security Council with support around the margins from CIA, NSA, and the Pentagon.

The essence of secrecy is compartmentation. Applied horizontally across CIA's organizational structure, compartmentation helps keep the secrets, a necessary goal in any intelligence agency. But in the Iran-Contra affair, compartmentation was also applied vertically inside CIA's chain of command. Thus, McCullough's remark that, in October 1986, he "became aware for the first time of the general outline of the NSC Staff's management of and CIA's support for the administration's efforts to trade arms for hostages."

McCullough was not alone. Many of the officers working directly for Bill Casey knew little or nothing of these events until long after they had occurred. Casey's General Counsel was unaware until after the event of the November 1985 use of a CIA proprietary aircraft to ferry missiles to Iran. The officers charged with meeting the press and with representing CIA to Congress (myself) were operating in near total ignorance until

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Clair George briefed Congressional staffers on 18 November 1986.

Further, vertical compartmentation impeded and, in some cases, defeated efforts not only to put all the facts on the table in preparation for the Congressional hearings McCullough describes, but also to provide documents, first to Congress and later to the Independent Counsel as he pursued his investigation. McCullough writes that knowledge of CIA's role was "scattered around the DO." The description is too kind. In fact, it required months to pull the scattered pieces together into an accurate account and years to provide complete documentary evidence to investigating authorities.

I recall vividly the frustration felt by members of the Executive Director's Iran-Contra review committee, as we were told with numbing regularity that excessive compartmentation made it nearly impossible to reconstruct events and locate relevant documents. In the end, these failings led much of the public to an inaccurate, but understandable, conclusion. CIA was deeply involved in the affair, and Bill Casey was its mastermind.

What lessons does the Iran-Contra affair teach? First, vertical compartmentation is a sure prescription for trouble whenever officers are called to account for actions about which they have incomplete knowledge. In the Iran-Contra affair, probably only one officer positioned three levels down from the Director's office had complete or nearly complete knowledge. Casey's loose management style and his contempt for the chain of command were partly to blame for permitting this to happen. Misleading testimony to Congress and inaccurate briefings of the press were among the consequences.

Second, prudent management of a high-risk operation, especially one in which another government organization is calling the shots, is impossible without making accurate information available to a circle wide enough to permit debate of different courses of action. In the Iran-Contra affair, vigorous debate on the seventh floor might have mitigated the most damaging mistakes, such as mishandling Presidential Findings.

Third, vertical compartmentation must not be a shield to conceal poor judgment or provide protection from accountability, as was the case in two Central American stations, where violations of Congressional prohibitions against supplying the Contras continued without knowledge of officers at higher levels in the chain of command. Although I now look at CIA from the outside rather than from the inside and thus often lack relevant information, my impressions of some of CIA's recent troubles is that many of the lessons of the Iran-Contra affair have not been learned.

David Gries

David Gries held a number of senior positions in the CIA, including Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs and Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

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This communication to the Editor is meant to stimulate a discussion in the pages of *Studies in Intelligence* on the role of CIA in the production of military intelligence. This is not a trivial issue. It is not simply a matter of turf, budgets, and prerogatives within the Intelligence Community. Much more is at stake, and the issue deserves thoughtful consideration by those who are now shaping the US intelligence system. I know that many within the Intelligence Community have pertinent experience and informed opinion to bring to bear on a discussion of this topic. I hope that the thoughts I offer below will encourage them to do so.

On 10 December 1994, *The Washington Post* reported that former DCI Robert Gates had fashioned a proposal to shift to the Department of Defense "all of CIA's current responsibilities for analysis of foreign weapons and military force levels." At the time, I reacted with a letter which was published by the *Post* on 21 December 1994 and is reproduced in part here:

> *Bob Gates's proposals for improving CIA, as quoted in the 10 December story by Walter Pincus, are living proof of the notion that even a very bright guy can generate some really dumb ideas. I cannot think of a more costly or dangerous change to the US intelligence system than eliminating CIA's role in the analysis of foreign military programs and activities.*
>
> *I am convinced—having spent more than 30 years closely observing the dynamics of CIA's relationship with the military in producing foreign military assessments—that the Agency's participation in the process has saved the US taxpayer many billions of dollars, contributed significantly to maintaining reasonable stability in the world balance of nuclear forces, and made nuclear arms control agreements possible.*
>
> *The point is not that CIA analysts are universally smarter or better than the analysts of the military services and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Clearly, neither group has a monopoly on analytic skills. The point is rather that military intelligence analysis conducted by military organizations is inevitably driven by the fundamental imperative of the military commanders whom they serve. This imperative is to ensure the US capability to achieve victory in the event of a military conflict.*
>
> *This creates a tremendous incentive throughout the DoD establishment to maximize ("worst case") the military threat of potential adversaries in order to justify sufficient superiority to ensure victory. But it is a clear case when more than enough to do the job is not necessarily better. Indeed, at the national policy level the DoD approach to military intelligence analysis left unchecked by the competitive civilian analysis of CIA—as proposed by Mr. Gates—invites economic and perhaps even military disaster.*
>
> *The 40-year history of the Cold War is replete with examples of overstatement of the threat by DoD intelligence organizations....Had the US reacted fully to these...overstated threats, the fragile stability of the East-West military balance could have been upset, and the Cold War could have ceased to remain cold. At a minimum, US defense spending would have been substantially larger than it was.*

Subsequently, Mr. Gates presented his proposal directly in a *Washington Post* op-ed piece on 30 January 1995, and I was pleased to see that he agreed with my view on the built-in tendency of the military to overstate foreign military threats. As Mr. Gates succinctly put it, "...having the military as the sole judge of the threats it faces ensures exaggeration." I was baffled, therefore, by his seemingly illogical conclusion and recommendation that CIA should, for all intents and purposes, get out of military intelligence analysis.

Although he concedes that it might be a good idea for CIA to maintain some analytic capability for weapons of mass destruction programs, this is an essentially empty concession. Military intelligence analysis is like preg-

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* This letter to the *Post* provoked a response from the former Director of DIA, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Daniel Graham, who said that I had demeaned DoD military intelligence analysts by calling them dishonest. In fact, I did no such thing, and it demonstrates that Graham missed the central point of my letter, which is that the propensity to overstate by DoD analysts derives primarily from how excessively prudent (not dishonest) military people are likely to be in assessing the strength of potential adversaries than it has to do with dishonesty.

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nancy—it's impossible to be a little bit involved. The only way an intelligence organization can participate effectively and credibly in the national security deliberative processes is for it to demonstrate persuasively a command of the complex details that comprise foreign military programs. Under the Gates plan, CIA would lose the ability to develop the necessary in-depth understanding of foreign military programs and activities. Maintaining a cadre of CIA analysts who would be required to make policy-relevant intelligence judgments on weapons of mass destruction issues without the benefit of an independent base of pertinent data such as order-of-battle and weapons capabilities information—as proposed by Mr. Gates—is simply unworkable.

Mr. Gates's focus on foreign programs relating to weapons of mass destruction is understandable, but accurate assessments of conventional force capabilities and programs around the world are also vitally important to US national security interests and, in many respects, of more immediate concern. The Gates proposal would assign sole responsibility for assessments of foreign conventional forces to the DoD. Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and the Persian Gulf provide excellent examples of the kinds of national security issues that are likely to continue to confront our policymakers in the years immediately ahead. The quality of US assessments of foreign conventional forces will play an important role in determining how successful the United States is in dealing with these kinds of problems, and in establishing the minimum resource commitment required to deal with them. It is worth noting in this connection that US conventional forces account for by far the lion's share of the US defense budget.

How the US Government decides to go about assessing the foreign military threats that it confronts is of paramount importance. The future US defense posture and the size of the defense budget will be driven to a substantial degree by intelligence assessments of foreign military threats to our national security interests—hundreds of billions of dollars are involved. Early in the Cold War, the principle of civilian (CIA) involvement in intelligence analysis of foreign military programs was established, and it developed into a complementary and competitive analytic process that overall served the US Government and the US taxpayer exceedingly well. To grant an analytic monopoly to the military at this juncture would deprive the national security policy process of balanced assessments of foreign military threats and would be penny-wise and pound-foolish in the extreme.

Noel E. Firth

Noel E. Firth served in the Directorate of Intelligence.

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David Henry Blee

CAREER: FORTY YEARS IN INTELLIGENCE

(b)(3)(c)

David Henry Blee retired from the Central Intelligence Agency on 2 March 1985. He served more than 40 years in American intelligence. At the time of his retirement, he was one of only four former Office of Strategic Services officers still on duty with the Agency. His extraordinary record included service as Chief of Station in three countries, as Chief of two area divisions, as Associate Deputy Director for Operations, as National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia and, for the last seven years, as Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff. He was awarded two Distinguished Intelligence Medals—one for (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) and one for his vigorous rebuilding of the Operations Directorate's counterintelligence program from 1978 to 1985.

Dave's first award for his work in intelligence, the Bronze Star, was presented to him by General William J. Donovan at OSS Southeast Asia Command Headquarters in Ceylon in July of 1945. He was cited for his initiative, courage, and devotion to duty in his first field operation—deep behind enemy lines in Japanese-occupied Thailand. In November 1944, together with a small team made up of several nationalities, Dave was put ashore by submarine on Chance Island in the Mergui Archipelago 600 miles from the nearest Allied forces and more than a 1,000 miles from his supply base. On landing, his first responsibility was to supervise the transfer of six thousand pounds of supplies by rubber boat across a coral reef to the shore. A falling tide continually forced the submarine farther out to sea and made passage of the rubber boats over the reef exceedingly perilous. Dave's unstinting exertion and good judgment were considered to be the determining factors in making the landing a success. For much of the next six months Dave worked on Chance Island collecting intelligence on the enemy whose nearest base was was only 40 miles away at Victoria Point. He sent out his reports by clandestine radio. He also managed to make contact with the Thai underground and provided support for its resistance activities. As part of a long range plan to set up a permanent OSS base on the Thai mainland, Dave reconnoitered nearby islands for future infiltration sites. Commenting on these missions, a fellow officer wrote that he believed Dave was the first person ever to make a reconnaissance of Japanese territory in a kayak in broad daylight.

California

Dave was born and raised in California. After graduating from Stanford* in 1938 with a bachelor's degree in political science, he entered Harvard Law School and received his LLB in 1942. During the summers while still in school,

* His roommate at Stanford was Allen Drury, who a few years later wrote the best-selling novel *Advise and Consent*.

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Dave picked up some engineering and surveying experience with the Interior Department at Shasta Dam in California and with the Highway and Parks Commission in Bryson City, North Carolina. He also worked in personnel for the Federal Security Agency, a predecessor of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in Washington. In 1942 Dave entered on duty with the Army as a private. A year later he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army Corps of Engineers and assigned to OSS. He was released from OSS in late 1945 and discharged from the Army as a captain soon thereafter. In addition to the Bronze Star, Dave received the Air Medal for his participation in hazardous air resupply flights into enemy territory in Southeast Asia.

When he returned to California at the end of the war, Dave intended to resume his career as a lawyer. He was admitted to the California bar and practiced briefly before he was lured to Washington to work for the Central Intelligence Group in December 1946. If he ever regretted his choice of intelligence over the law, he never said so. He often mentioned that his legal training came in handy in the intelligence business. On occasion, Dave was known to muse about retiring to practice law in Southern California to represent the interests of the poor and disadvantaged Hispanic population there. He once joked about a similar idea with Red White.* Dave suggested the two of them retire to open a law firm to be called "Red White and Blee."

Dave made another major change in his life in 1947 when he married Margaret Gauer, a young school teacher whom he had known and courted for some time. Ten years later the Blee family had grown by five children.** In (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) 1953, the expanding number of Blees prompted a colleague to chide Dave about his first major intelligence failure. Dave failed to anticipate the arrival of twins and the obvious need to have two of everything to handle the situation. Today, the five talented Blee children are all engaged in a variety of promising careers of their own.

(b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) The CIA was barely two years old in 1949 when Dave was sent Starting with little more than a safe and a set of one-time pads, he quickly built into one of the most operationally active and productive components (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) These ties proved to be of exceptional value to Agency operations long after Dave had left the scene. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) In one of these recruitments, Dave gained an early reputation for

* Colonel Lawrence K. "Red" White was Executive Director—Comptroller for CIA. An account of his career was published in the Winter 1981 issue of *Studies in Intelligence*, Volume 25, Number 4.

** The arrangements necessary to move his good-sized family around the world may account for Dave's well known avocation as an expert in airline schedules. Many who worked for Dave over the years learned not to seek his advice on their travel itineraries unless they wanted the most exhausting, sleepless direct connections possible.

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(b)(1)
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being ingeniously, if not irritatingly, resourceful.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)
(b)(3)(c)

In 1954, Dave began his second overseas assignment It was a small station principally engaged in liaison with He is often remembered during this period for yet another example of his resourcefulness. Dave had made repeated pleas to Headquarters to send him a secure direct communications system for use between and When his pleas went unanswered, he solved the problem himself by manufacturing his own one-time pads which he used to open the needed channel. When he reported this to Headquarters the Office of Communications reacted with indignation. He was instructed to cease using the system which according to Headquarters obviously was insecure and could easily be broken. Headquarters asked for a full report on Dave's system, how it was generated, and for copies of all his original messages. He gave a detailed explanation of how he made the pads

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(n)

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(b)(3)(n) He regretted that he had destroyed everything but the enciphered texts which he forwarded with the suggestion that Headquarters break them out. The link (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) was approved without further delay or mention of whether Headquarters had succeeded in breaking Dave's system.

For the first two years after he returned from (b)(3)(c) Dave wa(b)(3)(n) Branch Chief for three Near East Division branches: (b)(3)(c) In 1959 he was made Chief of Operations for the Division, the position he held until he was named (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

Compatible and Incompatible

Dave was often faced with the conventional wisdom that preserving a successful liaison relationship would force him to close down all but the most innocent unilateral operations.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

This was indeed the pattern in many countries at this time, notably in for many years, we generally shied away from unilateral operations for fear of jeopardizing our technical collection facilities there. As the need for an independent reading on (b)(3)(n) became more urgent, we found that our ability to fill this gap was frustratingly limited.

In considering how to deal with the problem (b)(3)(n) Dave chose to view the options not as liaison versus unilateral but rather as compatible and incompatible activities.

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

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(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

No recounting of Dave's years (b)(3)(c) would be complete without some mention of two cases in which he was deeply involved personally.

(b)(1)
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(b)(3)(n)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
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(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)
(b)(3)(c)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

Dave's relatively short term as head of (b)(3)(c) demonstrated again that he was often out ahead of the rest of us. In retrospect, we were surprised that his common sense approach to our apparently insoluble problems had taken so long to come about.

As Associate Deputy Director for Operations from 1973 to 1976, among his other duties Dave was able to oversee many of the programs he had originated in the Near East Division and (b)(3)(c) on a world-wide basis. He was next assigned as National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia from 1976 to 1978.

Counterintelligence

In July of 1978, Dave was asked to become Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff to undertake the rebuilding of the Directorate of Operations counterintelligence program. Taking a cue from his success in (b)(3)(c) Division, he started with the premise that counterintelligence was the business of the Agency as a whole. He promoted an open atmosphere about counterintelligence to encourage a broad-based approach to offensive as well as defensive programs. Many hostile operations against the US Government were identified and neutralized through his efforts.

Dave rebuilt sound working relationships with other parts of the US counterintelligence community and with selected foreign liaison services. He became an articulate champion of the military counterintelligence global double agent operations. His earlier liaison experience, as Chief of SE Division, with the FBI proved to be of special value in uncovering Soviet agents around the world.

Two cases deserve special mention. The first was the identification and neutralization through arrest, trial, and conviction of Dieter Gerhardt, the South African naval commodore who was a trusted Soviet GRU agent for more than 19 years. It was through Dave's personal involvement and his excellent relations with the FBI and cooperating liaison services that this case was successfully resolved. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) This was a totally new departure in counterintelligence, yet another example of Dave's creative operational style.

The Distinguished Intelligence Medal awarded to Dave for these productive years of leadership in counterintelligence speaks for itself and, undoubtedly, for many things too current and too sensitive to be mentioned here. This latest tribute also reminds us that Dave's career ended* as it began—in recognition for uncommon achievements in intelligence.

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Inside Story

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962: PRESENTING THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE ABROAD

Sherman Kent

It was 0737 in the morning of Sunday 14 October 1962 when Major Richard Heyser began the crossing of Cuba in his U–2. He flew almost due north—on a course some 60 miles to the west of Havana—and passed over the northerly beaches six minutes later. In that brief timespan he took 928 pictures, which covered a swath 75 miles wide. The resolution of his best shots was a matter of three feet.

Once past the target, he headed for McCoy Air Force Base near Orlando, Florida. There the exposed film was transferred to special shipping containers, loaded into a courier aircraft, and flown with all deliberate speed to the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center at Suitland, Maryland. It was late in the day when the film arrived; from then on and through the night the Center developed the original negatives and began making duplicate positives—not the usual kind of photoprints on opaque paper, as we amateurs might think, but a special kind of print on clear acetate that the pro's could study over a light table.

The first of these duplicates reached the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) just before 1000 on the morning of 15 October. By 1600 that afternoon the photointerpreters (PI's) were almost certain that they had identified large surface-to-surface missiles; in another hour or so they were sure enought for Arthur Lundahl, the Director of NPIC, to pass the word to CIA Headquarters. Headquarters, in turn, reached McGeorge Bundy about 2100 that evening. It was his decision to give the President a night's rest and the PI's a night's more labor before putting the earth-shaking evidence before his chief.

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The President and his principal advisors were informed the next morning.[1] This left the question of what to do—a matter which was resolved after five days of debate and deliberation in favor of a "strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba." Once the President reached this basic decision, he had a myriad of second-line but still important decisions to make. Just to touch on one—and incidentially the one that triggered the subject of this essay—consider that word "quarantine." The President used it to avoid the more provocative word "blockade," but no matter what he called it, the other man was free to take grave offense. Neither would go down easily with the USSR. In fact it was possible that the quarantine and its enforcement would lead to that well-known series of actions and reactions so often cited in intelligence papers as the unintentioned stairway to general conflict. Though the odds favoring this progress of events were small, they were by no means negligible. Even if events stopped a long way short of the cataclysm, there was still room for a thundering crisis, the outcome of which would depend in significant measure upon the way in which our allies would respond—whether they would support us or back away.

During the seven days between the President's learning of the Soviet's emplacement of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba and his speech announcing it, a few score principal officers of the Executive Branch worked endlessly and in unpenetrated secrecy. Except for the President, the members of the so-called Ex Comm (the ad hoc executive committee of the NSC), and the top echelon of the intelligence community, few indeed of our fellow countrymen knew what was going on and why, and practically no one in the governments of our allies. Until the President was ready to act, the Russians must not know that we knew their secret, and, when we were ready to act, our allies should know our chosen course before our adversaries. It was to this end that the Ex Comm drafted for the President's approval a time-table of consecutive actions which included the briefings of the chiefs of government of our principal allies.

[1] A good bit has been written on the subject of the missile crisis. The best full account is still Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (Philadelphia and New York, 1966). Mr. Abel's material comes in very large part from oral testimony—taken while events were still fresh in mind—from most of the major American policy officers and a few of the British. Robert Kennedy's *Thirteen Days* (New York, 1969) is an important first-hand account.

At A hour of D day (a time which became 1900 EDST Monday 22 October) the President was to tell publicly what was wrong in Cuba and what the US government proposed to do about it. At about A minus 12, the British were to receive formal advance notice, about four hours later the French and the Germans, and later still the Canadians.[2] Our ambassadors were to call upon the chiefs of government, deliver personal letters from the President and a copy of the speech to be delivered that night, and make whatever oral comment was appropriate. Each of them was also to have copies of the air photos and (for the presentations to the British, French, Germans, and Canadians) an intelligence officer from CIA headquarters to brief and answer questions as necessary.

Of our ambassadors to the UK, France, the Federal Republic, and Canada, only Mr. Bruce was at his post in London. Mr. Dowling was not in Bonn; he was in Georgia on compassionate leave. Mr. Bohlen, our ambassador-designate to Paris, was on his way on a boat in mid-Atlantic,[3] and Mr. Butterworth, the ambassador-designate to Ottawa, was not to assume his functions until after the New Year.

In Mr. Dowling's case there was a remedy, a speedy termination of his leave; as for Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Butterworth, there was no remedy but that of finding worthy substitutes. For the group heading for Europe there was to be a presidential aircraft (Air Force One) which would transport Mr. Dowling, Mr. Acheson (the substitute for Mr. Bohlen), the documents, the pictures and their CIA security courier Edward Enck, and the three CIA men to do the intelligence briefing. Chester Cooper, who had had a tour of duty in London, was to be with Mr. Bruce; R. Jack Smith (who was AD/CI at the time) was to go on to Bonn with Mr. Dowling; and I had the honor to be with Mr. Acheson. In place of the absent Mr. Butterworth, the President called from private life Mr. Livingston Merchant (who a few months earlier had resigned as our ambassador to Canada and left the Foreign Service). He and William Tidwell, his CIA intelligence briefer, made their separate ways to Ottawa.

There is some evidence that first planning in the Ex Comm did not envisage that the intelligence briefing of the chiefs of government

[2] The Turks and Italians were also to receive advance notice.

[3] Between ambassadorial assignments Mr. Bohlen had been keeping Soviet matters under special scrutiny for the benefit of the President and Secretary of State. His appointment to Paris had come only shortly before the discovery of the missiles in Cuba. After this turn of events, President Kennedy was torn between keeping Bohlen at his side in Washington or releasing him to take up his duties in France. The result was some temporizing which led to Mr. Bohlen's late departure.

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would take place simultaneously with the ambassadors' presentations of the case. Rather the technical intelligence colloquy was to take place on a service-to-service basis soon after the principals had met. I mention this to indicate that the Ex Comm did consider the intelligence aspects of the multi-national maneuver and came to attach a high importance to it.

Whether the Ex Comm worried about the credibility of photographic evidence (it was the only solid evidence there was) I do not know, but I do know that a few very important officers of the Agency did. Accordingly, Cooper, Smith, Tidwell, and I were urged to pay particular attention to the way in which our audiences responded to the photographs and to record these reactions in our memos for the record. We were also urged to make these memos as full and detailed as other demands on our time would permit.

Cooper and I did find the time to write up our experiences at length. Smith, who did not, spent some time last June (1971) giving me the benefit of his remembrance of the events almost nine years back. Tidwell wrote only a short memo, of which more later, since the magisterial Memorandum of Conversation which Mr. Merchant filed with the Department of State covered the subject with depth and thoroughness. In these communications there is much of interest to the intelligence calling. But let the memos speak for themselves.

First from a shortened version of Chester Cooper's "Memorandum for the Record" of 29 October 1962:

The Prime Minister

> On Monday, 22 October [1230 London time] I accompanied the Ambassador to the Admiralty to assist him in briefing Mr. Macmillan on the situation in Cuba. The letter from the President had been sent to the Prime Minister's office earlier in the day. We delayed our session with the Prime Minister for half an hour, hoping to bring with us an advance draft of the President's message.
>
> The Prime Minister was alone except for his Private Secretary. It was evident that the Prime Minister had some advance general knowledge of the developing situation in Cuba (as indeed he should have since we had briefed various members of the British intelligence community several days before in Washington). However, Mr. Macmillan obviously had no idea of the extent or precise nature of Soviet offensive capabilities in Cuba. His first reaction, which he addressed more to himself than to the Ambassador, was to the effect that the British people, who had been living in the shadow of annihilation for the past many years, had somehow been able to live more or less normal lives and he felt that the Americans, now confronted with a similar situation would, after the initial shock, make a similar adjustment. "Life goes on somehow."

The Prime Minister was obviously aware that this might be misinterpreted, and went to considerable length to explain to the Ambassador that this was more of a philosophical commentary on human nature than any indication on his part that he was not sympathetic with the US position or shocked at the news.

> After my recitation of the present Soviet offensive strength in Cuba, Mr. Macmillan said that, if the President were convinced that a meaningful offensive capability were present, "That was good enough for him." He did not spend more than a few seconds on the photographs. Although the Prime Minister did not develop this theme in my presence in detail, he did indicate that he felt that a blockade would be difficult to enforce and that the US would have problems in getting solid UN support. He also ruminated about whether it would not have been better to have confronted Khrushchev privately with our evidence and given him a private ultimatum.
>
> Lord Home then joined the Prime Minister and the Ambassador for a discussion of policy matters and I was excused. I was quickly followed by the Private Secretary who stressed the necessity for making our evidence as convincing as possible to the British public. . . .

Members of the Shadow Cabinet

Cooper also briefed Hugh Gaitskell and George Brown of the British Shadow Cabinet. He, Ambassador Bruce, and two embassy officers met with them on Tuesday evening. Cooper told the story and showed the photographs. Gaitskell, who up until that time had feared that the President was confusing the issue of the Soviet buildup by making it appear that surface-to-air missiles were offensive weapons, confessed his earlier apprehensions and acknowledged that they were ill-founded. He was visibly shaken by the evidence of the long-range missiles.

> He made much of the analogy between Cuba and Turkey and brushed aside most of the standard arguments about the difference between the two. However, he seemed much impressed with the fact that the Cuban missiles were outside the BMEWS sys-

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tem. He felt that this did, in fact, represent a change in the *status quo* and in the "balance of terror" question.

George Brown was concerned as to whether the United States had deployed more or fewer Jupiter missiles in Turkey than the Soviets were putting into Cuba and as to the Soviets' capability for early warning of the firing of these missiles. Cooper said he would try to get enlightenment for Brown on both matters. Brown's point, and one to which Gaitskell assented, was that if the United States did indeed have fewer missiles in Turkey than the Soviets would have in Cuba and if the Soviets did have an early warning capability, the argument about the equivalence of the Turkish and Cuban bases would be weakened.

Gaitskell said that he had been with the Prime Minister just prior to our discussion and that the Prime Minister expressed annoyance about the lack of advance knowledge of US actions. I pointed out to Gaitskell in fairly strong terms that there were two aspects to the question of advanced knowledge: one was the developing situation in Cuba and the other was US intentions with respect to Cuba. In connection with the former, I told Gaitskell that we had occasion to discuss Cuba with several important people in the British intelligence community who happened to be in Washington during the week of 15 October, and that several of them had been given a formal briefing on Friday, 19 October. We could only assume that they notified their government of the developing situation in Cuba. With respect to US intentions, I noted that we had hoped to get an advanced copy of the President's statement to the Prime Minister 12 hours before the broadcast, but that this was not possible because the President himself had not decided on the precise language of his statement until fairly late in the day. . . . This was unfortunate, but in the nature of the circumstances, was all that could have been done. . . .

The British Intelligence Community

Ambassador Bruce and Cooper agreed that it would be wise to give the briefing to the British Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Chief of Station got in touch with Sir Hugh Stephenson (the JIC Chairman), who set the time for 1000 Tuesday morning.

There was no evident skepticism of the validity of our evidence, but it was clear that the Air Ministry was anxious to get the photo take for analysis by their own PI's (a team of Air

Ministry officers was provided an opportunity for closer examinination of the photos later in the afternoon). There was, naturally, considerable speculation as to Soviet motives. To the extent that there was any consensus in the JIC, it was very much along the line propounded by Sir Dick [White] the previous evening. . . . [Namely: that the Soviet aim was to confront the President late in November with a *fait accompli* in Cuba, a vantage point from which Khrushchev could bargain for a definitive settlement of the Berlin question and the question of US foreign bases in general.]

The Press

Because of the adverse or skeptical press reaction to US claims that the USSR had offensive missile bases in Cuba, the Ambassador and the Public Affairs Officer were anxious to have a press briefing as early as possible on Tuesday. At 5:00 p.m., Tuesday, a press conference was held for representatives of all the dailies, BBC, and ITV. The conference was chaired by Evans, the PAO, and attended by Minister Jones and myself. After indicating the ground rule ("backgrounder," no attribution, etc.), Mr. Evans briefly described the situation in Cuba and indicated that I, a Department of Defense consultant, would show the photographs and explain some of the background of the build-up. I did this, guided by the instructions I had received from Washington. The questions which followed were friendly and I had the feeling after the conference was over (it lasted about an hour) that the press representatives were genuinely convinced of the US case. I released the photographs, without the identification of their precise locations, to the press. (A fuller description of the circumstances of the release of the photographs is attached at Annex.)

Later Tuesday evening both the BBC and ITV had major programs dealing with the Cuban crises. The BBC broadcast the Foreign Minister's speech [which indicated strong support for the US position and a condemnation of the Soviet Union] and documented his remarks by the use of the photographs which I had supplied to the BBC.

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Annex—Release of Pictures to Press [4]

The following consideration influenced my decision to release the photographs of the Soviet build-up to the British press:

Immediately following my briefing of the Prime Minister, Philip De Zuluetta, the Prime Minister's Private Secretary, expressed serious concern about the reception any strong Government statement would have in the absence of incontrovertible proof of the missile build-up.

On Tuesday morning (23 October) the British press was almost universally skeptical of the President's claim that the USSR had established offensive bases in Cuba. References were made to the forthcoming election and to the "failures" of past US intelligence efforts re Cuba.

On Tuesday morning, also, there was some uncertainty as to whether, at the DOD press conference following the President's broadcast, the press was *shown* the pictures or whether it was given the pictures.

After my briefing of key Embassy officers at noon on Tuesday, the PAO and the Minister urged the necessity of providing the British press with a clear and authoritative story on the build-up. I was asked to do this (the Ambassador subsequently expressed his own desire that this be done) and was also urged to show the pictures on a special BBC television program scheduled for Tuesday night. I refused to appear on television, agreed to participate (but not sponsor a press briefing) and requested Headquarters' permission to have the pictures shown on BBC.

I received permission to have the pictures shown on television on the basis of the Ambassador's urgent request. The localities of the sites were to be removed and the press and the television audiences were to be told that these were *typical* sites but were not to be informed of the *number* of sites.

After consultation with Embassy officials, I agreed that since the pictures were going to be shown on television (it subsequently developed that ITV as well as BBC was going to have a special Cuba program) we could release sanitized versions of the photographs to the press for publication Wednesday morning.

I informed Headquarters at my first opportunity (which was after the Gaitskell briefing at 2100) of this release.

Sometime after midnight I was in telephone communication with the White House (Forrestal) and explained briefly the circumstances of release.

R. J. Smith in Bonn

Air Force One—which had left Cooper at Greenham Common Air Force Base in the United Kingdom and had left Mr. Acheson and me at Evreux, an air base in France used by the USAF—flew on to Cologne in the Federal Republic and disembarked Ambassador Dowling, Edward Enck the courier, and R. J. Smith. The time was well on towards Monday's dawn (22 October).

The meeting with the Chancellor, who had been electioneering in Hanover all day, did not take place until 1900. Herr Adenauer received Dowling and Smith in the Chancellor's official residence. He had provided the interpreter. As Smith remembers it, Ambassador Dowling gave the Chancellor the personal letter from President Kennedy, and with the reason for the meeting clear, introduced Mr. Smith of the CIA who was to show the evidence for the President's concern. The Chancellor's first response was characteristic: it showed perhaps his amused annoyance at the Gehlen organization's habit of using pseudonyms even within the official family and certainly something more than a trace of his legendary suspicion of everything. "Are you sure your name is Smith? Perhaps you have two names,"

[4] Elie Abel (*op. cit.*, p. 138) has the following comment on the release of the pictures to the British press. The last line is in conflict with Cooper's testimony, as well as the fact that the London TV of Tuesday night showed the photographs, and the London press of Wednesday morning was loaded with them.

> Sir David and Lady Ormsby Gore had received a pre-crisis invitation to join the Kennedys that evening [Tuesday 23 October] for a private dinner-dance. The dance, of course, had been canceled. But Mrs. Kennedy invited the Ormsby Gores to bring to dinner some Embassy guests who had arrived from New York too late to be forewarned of the cancellation. The British Ambassador found the President in no mood for social chatter. The two went off together for a talk about the day's events and what the morrow might bring. Sir David was worried about the skeptical British press reaction. Even the President's friend, Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Labor Opposition, had talked of "so-called missiles" in Cuba. The Ambassador felt it was most important that the missile-site photographs be published, especially those that would most readily persuade laymen that the Soviet missiles were indeed installed. The President sent for the photographs and together the two re-examined them closely. Ormsby Gore's plea, reinforcing the direct appeal of Ambassador Bruce in London, helped the President decide to publish the pictures next day.

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he said, just by way of getting things straight at the start.[5] Unruffled, Smith said that his name was really Smith and began the briefing with the photographs, which were contained in an outsized carrying case. The Chancellor asked him if he slept in it, but Smith pushed on. They were seated at a low table, Smith and Herr Adenauer side by side, with Ambassador Dowling across. As the dramatically illustrated story unfolded, Adenauer was an attentive listener. Seemingly concerned to indicate his general familiarity with the sort of military intelligence being laid before him, he asked questions such as one regarding the state of readiness of the surface-to-surface missiles. (As it came through the interpreter, it was to the effect "were they warm or cold?")

There was no question but that he was impressed with the evidence. Far from showing any incredulity, he indicated that he was not at all surprised to hear of these Soviet doings. His tone was one of "this is what one must expect of them." Nor did he leave any doubt in Ambassador Dowling's mind that he would support the President's adopted course of action. "You may assure your President that I will be useful" is the way Smith remembers his reassuring comment.[6]

[5] Some three weeks after the dialogue in Bonn the Chancellor and key members of the German government made a state visit to Washington. As R. J. Smith recounts the incident,

> the White House decided that one of the features of the program for the Germans should be a briefing which would detail for Chancellor Adenauer precisely how the Russian missiles were removed from Cuba. Smith was asked to perform this chore, the venue for which was the Cabinet Room in full panoply. The German Chancellor sat on one side of the table, flanked with his defense and foreign ministers; President Kennedy sat across from him, flanked by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. Smith sat behind the Chancellor and, on signal from the President to begin the briefing, stood up and placed the first briefing board on the table before Chancellor Adenauer. As he did so, he said, "Chancellor Adenauer, I am Mr. Smith." Adenauer looked up, his ancient face impassive, and said, "Immer," which the translator rendered as "still." This cracked Smith up and the Chancellor chuckled, whereupon Smith felt obliged to explain the joke to the distinguished group. The President smiled frostily and urged Smith to continue.

[6] High officers of our government thought that there would be no harm in reinforcing the Chancellor's decision to be "helpful." Knowing of his warm personal friendship with Mr. Acheson and his high respect for General de Gaulle, they asked Mr. Acheson to pass through Bonn on his way home and discuss the situation anew and tell of de Gaulle's reaction to the President's chosen course of action. This is worth a footnote if for no other reason than to set a woefully confused chronology straight. Washington sent a night action cable to Mr. Acheson Monday night 22 October; it reached his attention in the small hours of Tuesday (23 October). He went to Bonn during that very day, and with Mr. Dowling saw the Chancellor for two hours late in the afternoon. Needless to say, the mission was a great success.

Neither the official memorandum of conversation, nor Mr. Acheson's memory of the interview—as reported in C. L. Sulzberger, *The Last of the Giants* (New York, 1970), p. 931, mentions the photographic evidence.

Paris—From My Memorandum [7]

Mr. Acheson and I with Mr. Dowling and Smith flew on from our UK stop to Evreux where we were met by Cecil Lyon, the chargé in Paris, Ambassador to NATO Mr. Finletter, and Edward Ryan, Deputy COS, Paris, and an armed courier. It was then about 0130 local time. Mr. Acheson, with Messrs. Lyon and Finletter, proceeded directly to Lyon's residence. Ryan, the courier, and I went to the Embassy to put the materials in the vault.

About noon (Monday 22 October) there was an assembly at Mr. Lyon's house of high-ranking officers from the Embassy, from our delegation to the North Atlantic Council, and from among our military men in France. I gave the intelligence briefing using the photographs.

Meeting with President de Gaulle at the Elysée Palace

At 4:40 Laughlin Campbell, the Chief of Station, Paris, and I again appeared at Mr. Lyon's residence where two modest automobiles from the Elysée Palace awaited us. Mr. Acheson and Mr. Lyon, with a presidential escort officer, took one; Campbell and I (with the photographs) the other. We entered the Elysée through the regular entrance on the Rue du Faubourg St. Honoré. Once within the first courtyard we followed a tortuous course from court to inner court to inner court and were finally brought up to an unprepossessing doorway under guard.[8] We proceeded down small

[7] The memo was dictated on 28 and 29 October 1962 and typed up a couple of weeks later.

[8] In short, the French neglected nothing in assuring that Mr. Acheson—a recognizable man in almost any corner of the world—would not be recognized by a casual bystander. His meeting with the President had to be kept secret until "A" hour which would have been about midnight in Paris.

Mr. Acheson's well-known powers as a raconteur were stimulated by the route we took; I kept getting playbacks from third parties which became harder and harder to recognize. The penultimate version occurs in C. L. Sulzberger's book, already cited, p. 930. He says he got it from Paul Nitze, who said he got it from Mr. Acheson, and it involved "Acheson [being] smuggled into de Gaulle's office by an underground tunnel from across the street." Apparently so high was the credibility of this unlikely story that ace newsman Sulzberger who had lived in Paris some twenty years and knew the environs of the Elysée as well as those of the White House swallowed that secret tunnel without even a footnote.

If perchance the reader happens to be the studious sort who checks references, he may be disturbed to read Sulzberger's two sentences following the one about the tunnel. They go: "Acheson went in alone except for the Elysée interpreter. Not even Sherman

(*See footnote on following page.*)

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corridors, up small corridors, up small stairways, through more corridors and stairways until we finally arrived at a large room adjoining the President's private office. My guess is that if this were not the Cabinet Room it served some such purpose. There was a very large oval table which would have seated perhaps 20 people. The four Americans and the escort officer were here joined by another Frenchman who turned out to be an emergency interpreter. After a few minutes' wait—which would have been a minute or so after—Mr. Lyon and Mr. Acheson were ushered into the General's office. Mr. Lyon has reported by cable on what took place. Campbell and I waited for perhaps 20 minutes; then the two of us were invited in. After I had completed the first draft of this memorandum, I saw Mr. Acheson, who told me the following about his discussion with de Gaulle. When he had conveyed his message he told the General that there was an intelligence officer waiting outside to brief him on the evidence. General de Gaulle's response was that he needed no such evidence; he was satisfied with Mr. Acheson's account; after all, President Kennedy obviously would not have sent a man of Mr. Acheson's eminence to give him misinformation. Mr. Acheson said he thought the General would be interested.[9]

The presidential presence was awesome. I was prepared for the height but not for the bulk. At the moment of shock he seemed to be about twice the size of normal men. His eyes too were somewhat unnerving, shielded as they were behind the thick lenses made necessary by the removal of cataracts. I can recall a feeling of

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(*Footnote 8 continued*)

Kent was allowed." May I assert that this is another error (either Nitze's or Sulzberger's—certainly not Mr. Acheson's); that I did go in; and that the memo for the record which you are now reading is not a self-serving fabrication.

The peak occurs in Kenneth Harris' write-up of an interview with Mr. Acheson (*Life*, 23 July 1971, p. 52). The operative passage runs thus:

> "So he [General de Gaulle] sent two small French cars, and we drove down into the garage basement of the palace and were led up through the basement past the wine closets. There were all sorts of steel doors with little eyelet holes in them, and people would look through and give a password. I had a very amusing CIA friend along with the photographs. Halfway through this, he said: "D'Artagnan, is that saber loose in the scabbard?" And I said, "Aye, Porthos." And he said: "Be on the alert. The Cardinal's men may be waiting." Finally, we were brought up into the cabinet room, where an old friend of ours, whose name was Lebel, greeted us. . . ."

[9] Elie Abel (*op. cit.*, p. 112) has a slightly different version whose primary source was almost certainly Mr. Acheson. It goes: "Then Acheson offered to show the photographs. De Gaulle swept them aside. 'A great government such as yours does not act without evidence.' "

despair that came with the realization that the evidence which we were about to present was wholly visual evidence. (As it turned out my fears were groundless.)

As Campbell and I entered, he rose from his small desk—not much larger than our photographs—and gravely shook hands. He gave me the nod to begin.

Campbell handed me the large photograph of the map of Cuba which I put before the General. Still standing, he bent over it as I began to talk about the defensive phase. I mentioned first the arrival of large numbers of Soviet personnel, quantitites of transportation, communications and electronic equipment. Next I came to the SAM's, pointing out the SAM symbol on the map. To my great comfort he at once identified the symbol and with his own finger pointed to a number of the others. I then showed him the photograph of a SAM site which he seemingly identified at once. I passed on the photograph of Santa Clara airfield, pointing out the MIG-21's. There was a reading glass which he picked up and put into the proper position, looked at the swept-wing aircraft, and indicated that this was a remarkable photograph. I quickly showed him the Komars and the surface-to-surface cruise missiles. The word "cruise" was the only technical term [which the interpreter] did not cope with instantly. He snapped a finger in annoyance and then realized that salvation lay on the graphic itself for this photograph had as an inset a diagram of the little winged missile.

I then [took up] the offensive phase, showed him the IL–28 crates being carried as deck cargo, showed him the San Julian airfield, pointed out the crates, the assembled IL–28 and the two uncrated fuselages. Again he picked up the reading glass and examined the picture carefully. I then went to MR–1 [Medium Range Ballistic Missile site called number one] at San Cristobal and the MR site at Sagua la Grande. Next came the IR [Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile] site at Guanajay. Coming back to the map again I totted up the number of confirmed sites, the number of probables plus the possibles at Remedios. I then went over our estimates of degree of readiness and gave him a worst case estimate as of the moment of speaking and another worst case as of early 1963. I discussed briefly nuclear warheads, the fact that we could not positively identify any but noted the high degree of probability that they were in Cuba and the highly suspicious storage areas being readied. I called his attention to the storage site at Guanajay. I noted our estimate of the yield

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of these warheads as two to three megatons for the MR's and three to five for the IR's. I closed with a reminder that as of early 1963 our worst case estimate could augment present Soviet first strike capabilities with missiles by some 50%.

Not once in the course of my briefing was there any hint of incredulity on the part of the General. If he was not perfectly satisfied that the pictures were scenes from Cuba and the weapons those which I asserted them to be, he gave me no inkling of doubt. Furthermore, if he had expressed doubts to Mr. Acheson and Mr. Lyon [after Campbell and I had left the room], I am sure they would have reported it. . . .

Meeting with the North Atlantic Council

During the day the station received the USIB-approved briefing note to be read to the NAC. Mr. Acheson got a copy and had read it. Meanwhile we hopefully awaited the full text of the speech which the President would deliver at midnight local time. The NAC meeting was scheduled for 10 PM. By the time I had to leave the Embassy only Part 1 of 4 had been received.

The Acting Chairman [of the North Atlantic Council] was Colonna of Italy. He introduced Mr. Acheson as needing no introduction to the group, noting that he was on a special mission for the President of the US. . . . Mr. Acheson began by briefly discussing the nature of [his] mission, read some excerpts from the portion of the President's speech that he had at hand and then indicating that he wished to read a statement, introduced me as Assistant Director, CIA, who was there to answer questions when he finished reading his prepared text. He then read the text. There were a few questions on the estimated performance of the MR's and IR's, a general question about their state of readiness, and after the meeting an aide of the German permanent representative followed us to Mr. Finletter's office to ask the estimated yield of the warheads. . . .

As per USIB instruction, I used no graphics whatever with one exception. I passed around an unclassified map. It showed what portions of North, Central, and South America the MR's and IR's could reach. Among the metropolitan areas of the US under the gun were New York, Philadelphia, the District of Columbia, Chicago, San Francisco, etc., and in this distinguished company, one found Oxford, Mississippi. It had been spotted on the map by a roguish CIA man to show Robert Kennedy, who had wondered out loud if Oxford (then

much on Mr. Kennedy's mind as the place where bitter racial controversy had enveloped the state's university campus) was within range. I never recovered the map and have often wondered how some analyst of one of the NATO intelligence services explained how Oxford, Mississippi came to be listed among the great metropolises. From the council there were no questions about the sources of our information and no questions whatever to indicate any doubt that Mr. Acheson's story was not in fact a true story. The meeting adjourned just in time for the members to hear the President's speech which began at midnight Paris time.

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The Briefing of the French Press

We returned to the Embassy by about 3:30 to find that USIB had authorized the briefing of the French Press, had supplied a briefing text and instructions with respect to the use of the graphics. John Mowinkle, the Public Affairs Officer, under instruction from the chargé called the press conference for 10:30 the next morning, Wednesday, 24 October. Mowinkle himself was not to do the briefing but was to entrust the job to an assistant who had a greater familiarity with military matters than Mowinkle himself. It was further decided, and this was entirely satisfactory with me, that I would make no appearance before the newspaper men but would confine my activities to reading the assistant in on the subject and making sure that the graphics were keyed into his spoken statement in fool-proof manner.

It will be recalled that USIB's instructions re this briefing were as follows: the briefer was to follow a USIB-approved text which was at hand. The briefer was to refer to certain stipulated graphics. The number was perhaps no more than half of the total number . . . in the kit. All place names, locational data, and numbers were to be removed from the graphics. Members of the press could study the graphics but could not reproduce them. Graphics were not to be allowed outside the Embassy building.

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In the light of these instructions I personally selected the graphics as indicated, cut off the headings at the top of the prints, removed the little box in each photograph which contained the orientation map of Cuba with its designating arrow, the classification, and where indicated obliterated locational information and numbers.

Two graphics had to be improvised. These were a map of the Western Hemisphere showing approximate ranges of the MR's and IR's (the map I had not recovered from the NAC) and a map of Cuba showing what Cuban air space was under protection of the SAM's.

I went over the briefing notes carefully, patched up a needless obscurity in one paragraph and keyed the graphics to the text.

24 October

With my breakfast arrived a copy of the International edition of the *New York Herald Tribune*. To my very considerable surprise, smack in the middle of the top half of the front page and three or four columns wide, was the photograph of the SAM site referred to in the briefing note. A few minutes later, upon arrival at the Embassy, I was informed that the whole kit of photographs had been released to the British press the night before, that they were appearing in the London papers this morning and indeed had appeared on two British TV programs last night. A few minutes later I was shown two Paris morning papers, one of which carried the SAM site above mentioned, the other, the picture of the SAM support area which I had not been authorized even to show to the French Press.

I conferred with the Chief of Station as to the best procedure and we agreed that I should call Washington for permission to release reproductions of the graphics which were to be shown to the French Press at 10:30 this morning. There was some difficulty in getting through to Washington and it was not until about 9:50 AM local time that I reached the CIA Watch Office. Ten or fifteen minutes later they called back authorizing the release if statisfactory to the chargé. He agreed to the release of four pictures. An Embassy pressman accordingly scotch-taped the four pictures in question (MR–1, IR–1, the IL–28's at San Julian and the MIG's at Santa Clara) to the floor and photographed them. Enlarged prints of these shots went to the French press.

Briefing of André Fontaine of Le Monde

André Fontaine, one of the important feature writers of *Le Monde* (France's leading afternoon paper)

had had time to hear and study the President's speech of midnight, 22 October, and to write an unsympathetic front page column on US policy toward Cuba.[10] His articles are usually signed; this one was not. The second paragraph banged into the credibility of the evidence. "One would like to be sure of the accuracy of the information" upon which the President has acted. "But unhappily, experience shows that the American intelligence services sometimes make mistakes." This set the tone. Later on he again obliquely challenged the evidence in the fourth paragraph which contains the sentence, "If the Russians have not really delivered and do not have the intention of delivering. . . ." In short, M. Fontaine was from Missouri and had rather persuasively set forth his doubts about the evidence and his views—totally unsympathetic to the US—for the edification of France's best educated and probably most conservative reading elite.

Mowinkle who knew Fontaine well was most anxious that I see [him] and go over the script and graphics with him. The [chargé] agreed. I was presented to Fontaine under a pseudo as a Department of Defense civilian temporarily in Paris. Accordingly I gave him the word.

I began by calling his attention to the fact that neither he nor I were expert enough in the PI's art to identify the terrain as Cuban or some of the weapons and sites as to what they really were. I told him that if he thought that I was about to embark upon a snow job with fabricated graphics I was prepared to call it off right there; that if he were willing to take on faith the fact this countryside was Cuban and the weapons in fact were what I said they were, we would proceed. Interestingly, he then said, "No. I am prepared to believe you because Castro himself in a speech of yesterday proclaimed that American aircraft had been violating Cuban air space. This is good enough evidence for me to believe that you have been overflying Cuba and photographing it from the air." With these formalities over, I ran through the exercise with the sanitized pictures. Almost the only question he asked was the altitude from which the pictures were taken. He presumed that this was secret. I indicated that it was indeed secret and let it go at that. I left Paris before *Le Monde*, dated 26 October, was printed.

[10] This appeared in *Le Monde* of Tuesday afternoon 23 October. For reasons best known to the publisher, the paper is dated one day ahead, thus this issue of *Le Monde* is one bearing the date 24 October 1962.

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In this issue M. Fontaine grudgingly acknowledged that the missiles were in fact in Cuba, citing that both the British government and his colleagues of the British press believed the photographs and furthermore Castro himself had lent credence to the matter by denouncing American photo reconnaissance flights as violations of Cuban air space.

William Tidwell in Ottawa

Livingston Merchant, President Kennedy's special emissary to the Canadian government, William Tidwell, the Agency officer told off to do the intelligence briefing (with the photographs), along with our chargé d'affaires, and the Agency's Chief of Station in Ottawa met at 1700 (22 October) with Prime Minister Diefenbaker and his Secretaries for External Affairs and Defense, Messrs. Green and Harkness. Mr. Merchant described the situation in Cuba and handed the Prime Minister the text of the President's speech (to be delivered in two hours). Mr. Diefenbaker read it rapidly and passed it to these two cabinet colleagues. He then asked Mr. Merchant to summarize the main points, which Mr. Merchant did, and then he read the whole speech aloud. Apparently two matters bothered the Prime Minister. One was the use of two words "dishonest" and "dishonorable" which in the draft speech were applied to Gromyko's statements to the President when the two had met on 18 October; the other was the credibility of the evidence of the missiles in Cuba. He made an abbreviated note to remind himself of the two points which read "1. *Dishonest and dishonorable*/withdrawal of/Ambassador" [and] "2. How to present proof of/threat to/UN or OAS." [11]

The first of these he straightway took up and with repetitions and some vehemence. They were unnecessary and provocative words; they might result, for example, in the Soviet Union's withdrawal of its ambassador in the United States, he thought. He hoped that they would not be used. The second he seems not to have got around to. Most likely the reason was his viewing of the photographs which

[11] Mr. Tidwell wrote a memo to the Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection which reads in part:

> 2. During the briefing session Mr. Diefenbaker made several notes as reminders to himself. At the conclusion of the briefing he tore up the notes and threw them on the floor. In the course of my security check of the room after the briefing, I picked up the fragments of his notes. They are forwarded with this memorandum for retention in the Historical Intelligence Collection.
>
> The notes read as I have rendered them above.

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Tidwell presented.[12] The three Canadians were clearly impressed and asked a range of questions which, far from indicating incredulity, were of the sort which showed a ready acceptance of the evidence. Indeed it seemed to the Americans that the photographs themselves may have had much to do with a lightening of the Prime Minister's mood, which at the beginning had been that of a worried and harassed man. At the end, he left Mr. Merchant with the impression that he would support the President and he complimented Tidwell on the quality of the intelligence briefing.

Tidwell stayed behind to give the briefing to half a dozen of the next most important officers of the Canadian government involved in the foreign affairs of the country. Like similar groups in other friendly states, they believed what they saw and they were impressed.

[12] It may be, as Mr. Tidwell himself suggests in the memo, that Mr. Diefenbaker's self-addressed query about "how to present proof of the threat to the UN or OAS" derived from his half-formulated thought to ask a group from among the eight unaligned members of the 18-nation disarmament committee to make an on-site inspection and to furnish "a full and complete understanding of what is taking place in Cuba." This thought, which he quite fully developed only a few minutes later to the Canadian House of Commons, he had not even hinted to the Americans. They noted that he had not said that he would support the President in the chosen course, but they were very considerably surprised at his presentation to the Commons.

It is perhaps noteworthy that his remarks to the Commons contained no mention of any special audience, UN, OAS, or other. Nor did his remarks to the Commons next day, when he did a little reconsidering:

> In connection with the suggestion I made last evening that a group of nations might be given the opportunity of making an on-site inspection in Cuba, lest there be any doubt about my meaning in that connection, I was not, of course, casting any doubts on the facts of the situation as outlined by the President of the United States in his television address. The government had been informed of and it believes that there is ample evidence weapons have been constructed in Cuba and exist in sufficient quantities to threaten the security of this hemisphere.
>
> The purpose I had in mind in suggesting a United Nations [his remarks of the previous day made no specific mention of the UN. The 18-nation disarmament committee did, however, have an association with the UN] on-site inspection was to be ready to put in motion steps which could be taken in the United Nations general assembly in the event of a Soviet veto, or if the Soviet Union denies the existence in Cuba of offensive ballistic missile bases. (Canada, Parliament, *House of Commons Debates*, 22 and 23 October 1962, pp. 805–6 and 821.)
>
> In the light of these utterances, it seems to me that Diefenbaker's note about convincing the UN and OAS more likely derived from a certain incredulousness which possessed him before a look at the photographs dissipated it.

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The Credibility of Photographic Evidence

As a source of information, overhead photography has always won high marks. From the nineteenth century, when daring men took cameras aloft in balloons, to our day with its more sophisticated approach, all who have worked at the intelligence calling or used its findings have recognized the extraordinary virtues of photographs taken from the air. The reception of the U-2's pictures of Cuba in 1962 was proof of more of the same.

Any viewer of an air photo is likely to bring with him some associative apparatus. For example, he has seen airfields from above and he can tell the difference between a picture of an airfield and one of of a freight yard; he may even be able to tell a parked transport airplane from a puddle jumper. Some of the non-PI viewers of the Cuban pictures had had a fairly rich experience with, say, air photos of Soviet installations in East Germany and when they saw small aircraft known to be Soviet models on Santa Clara airfield in Cuba, they could tell the difference between the MIG–17's and the delta-wing MIG–21's. When they saw a bit of the Cuban landscape marked off in the design of a perfect six-pointed star, they instantly recognized the unmistakable signature of the Soviet SAM—the second-generation surface-to-air missile. All viewers, however, took on faith or on the say-so of the purveyors that the pictures were what they claimed to be: scenes from Cuba taken a few days past.

When it came to photos of less obvious things than the aircraft and the SAM's all viewers but those indispensable middlemen, the photo-interpreters, had to take virtually everything on faith. In the big glossy prints of the surface-to-surface missile sites, the privileged but nonetheless amateur viewer could discern a number of man-made objects—some looked like long cylindrical tanks, some like oil trucks. He could also see bits of equipment parked in or about what "appeared to be no more than the clearing of a field for a farm or the basement of a house." [13] More than this even the witness who could tell one MIG from another could not possibly tell.

Of course, the PI could and did.

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[13] Quoted in exactly this context from Robert Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, p. 24.

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as they became more confident that what they thought they might be seeing was indeed an all-but-dead certainty, they were ready to take their judgment to their chief, Arthur Lundahl. When they convinced him and he convinced himself, and when he could answer President Kennedy's question "Are you sure that these are offensive missile sites?" with "Mr. President, I am as sure of this as a photointerpreter can be sure of anything . . .," and when the President, reminded of the accuracy of past interpretations, accepted this one, that was it.

By their actions Mr. Macmillan and General de Gaulle underscored this fact. As Cooper noted, Macmillan "did not spend more than a few seconds on the photographs;" and except as Mr. Acheson urged him to have a look, General de Gaulle would not have given the photographs even the "few seconds." Their credibility was not at issue: what was was that of Ambassador Bruce and Mr. Acheson and especially that of the man who had sent them, President Kennedy himself. Obviously this elite audience did not think that the President was playing games with them.

From what we know of the reaction of civil officials a notch or two below the chiefs of government, they were much the same as those of their masters. For much the same reasons Ormsby Gore (the British Ambassador in Washington), Lord Home, and Sir Burke Trend,

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Gaitskell, and Brown, and others in London, and Messrs. Green and Harkness in Ottawa accepted the photographs at face. We know nothing of the reactions of the officials in Paris and Bonn to whom de Gaulle and Adenauer confided.

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How different the response of those who spoke for others. Mr. Zuluetta, the private secretary of Mr. Macmillan, according to Cooper's testimony, was worried about how a statement of the British government in support of the American decision would go down "without incontrovertible proof of the missile build-up." Next morning the skeptical tone of the British press showed him to have been on the right track.

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The Public Affairs officer in our embassy in Paris was worried about the French press and had very much in mind those snide sentences that André Fontaine had written in *Le Monde*. Mr. Diefenbaker seemed to have been concerned about how proof of the missiles could be demonstrated to the "world." [14]

How much beseeching the press did in its own behalf and how much in behalf of the "world," is another story. The press usually beseeches

[14] The operative sentence in Mr. Diefenbaker's remarks of 22 October was: "As to the presence of these offensive weapons, the only sure way that the world can secure the facts would be through an independent inspection." (Canada, Parliament, *House of Commons Debates*, p. 806.)

most eloquently when it senses good front-page copy, and there could be no doubt about the news appeal of this story.

The difference between what public relations men asked in behalf of the press and what the press asked in behalf of its readership—the difference between this and what it got, let alone what it gave—is of course well-nigh incalculable. In the first place, the very best prints of the most important installations in Cuba (those which chronicled the presence of the long-range surface-to-surface missiles) conveyed next to nothing in themselves. If you were to use a powerful reading glass you might be sure that you perceived some things common to your range of normal experience (the context might offer some passing difficulty, but only if you thought about it), but you would have no valid appreciation of their size, let alone their ominous function. Who, for example among the uninitiated, could have identified a thing resembling a big tent as the air-conditioned structure necessary for the complicated check-out of the missiles?

Such being the case, what do you think of the chances of the British subject who first got his information from his television set, a reproductive process which had robbed the original glossy prints of at least half their definition? Where do you rate the chances of the still less fortunate Frenchman? He was introduced to the Soviet secrets in Cuba via some half-tones in his morning paper. If you had made a half-tone from the original negative, the loss of definition would probably be as severe as that via TV. Still the Frenchman had no such luck. His was the opportunity to look at half-tones made from enlargements of 35 mm shots of the glossy prints. The amateur photographer who took the shots probably used a good camera with proper lens and film, but he took them in the natural light that filtered through an embassy window, and he did not use a tripod. In these circumstances the man who saw the pictures in next morning's *Figaro*, even if he were the country's leading photointerpreter, might have had trouble telling whether the camera had been pointed down at Cuba from a high-flying aircraft or pointed up a soundly-positioned proctoscope.

No one can ever know how many of the people whose acquaintance with the Cuban pictures was limited to television and press reproductions felt that they were being had. The one thing we do know is that if there were any such people, there were not enough of them to cause the slightest political ripple. All over the world the great majority of people who knew and cared about such things must have looked at the appallingly deficient copies of the original pictures and concluded that their chiefs of government had acted on the basis of incontrovert-

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ible evidence. Those who disagreed with the course of action which the US had adopted, did so because of the risks which it involved, not because they did not believe the story that the pictures told.

Of the millions of people of many nations who saw the pictures that fourth week of October, only a handful, and these were PI's, knew exactly what it was that they were looking at. It was their testimony which convinced the high officers of their government, and from there on out the credibility of the photo evidence was established. What happened in October of 1962 had happened many times before and has happened many times since. To paraphrase once again a famous remark—never have so many taken so much on the say-so of so few.

More on probability—I

BAYES' THEOREM FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS*

Jack Zlotnick

The intelligence interest in probability theory stems from the probabilistic character of customary intelligence judgment. Intelligence analysis must usually be undertaken on the basis of incomplete evidence. Intelligence conclusions are therefore characteristically hedged by such words and phrases as "very likely," "possibly," "may," "better than even chance," and other qualifiers.

This manner of allowing for more than one possibility leaves intelligence open to the charge of acting the oracle whose prophecies seek to cover all contingencies. The apt reply to this charge is that intelligence would do poor service by overstating its knowledge. The very best that intelligence can do is to make the most of the evidence without making more of the evidence than it deserves. The best recourse is often to address the probabilities.

The professional focus on probabilities has led to some in-house research on possible intelligence applications of Bayes' Theorem. At the time of my participation in this research, I was an analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency, which sponsored the scholarship but took no position of its own on the issues under study. My personal views on these issues, as elaborated in the following pages, have no official character.

The Bayesian Approach

Bayes' Theorem in its odds-likelihood form served participants in our test program as their diagnostic rule for appraising new evidence. The odds-likelihood formulation of Bayes' Theorem is the equation

$$R = PL$$

R is the revised estimate of the odds favoring one hypothesis over another—the estimate of the odds after consideration of the latest item of evidence. P is the prior estimate of the odds—the odds before consideration of the latest item of evidence. There is no escaping some starting estimate of P. However, after the starting estimate was in

*Paper presented at the Conference on The Diagnostic Process, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 18 June 1970.

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The key to competitiveness

Information Processing

Gordon C. Oehler

This article is based on an address given to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Advanced Technology Symposium in Monterey, California, on 16 October 1989.

Today, intelligence is in transition. Trade and economic competitiveness issues are equally as important to national security as military competitiveness issues. The question becomes how can US intelligence effectively contribute to these issues, especially in the area of international competitiveness between US industry and foreign competitors.

This has been difficult for the Intelligence Community, which has had at best a checkered history in assisting US industr(b)(1)
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This becomes an increasingly vexing problem when one considers the transnational trend of businesses today. The analytical abilities of the Intelligence Community could be brought to bear on the problem, analyzing competitiveness strengths and weaknesses in the marketplace,

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A Different Work Force

This interchange helped illuminate an area to which the intelligence business may be able to contribute. The story begins with a good look at the nature of our work force. It is getting younger. That is not saying much, because we are measuring this using a sliding scale, as we get older. But it is saying something because the computer generation, which we expect to pick up the gauntlet, has been brought up differently than today's managers.

To many, this is a frightening thought. There are those in industry who feel today's young people are not motivated. Today's college graduates are better educated than their predecessors. While they are willing to work just as hard or harder than their parents' generation, their goals and the motivating influences toward these goals are different.

In October 1988, *The Wall Street Journal* ran a front-page story confirming this view.[1] It stated that young people *are* strongly motivated—to their careers, their family, their immediate supervisors, but not to salary or some overarching corporate or government objective. The bottom line was that US industry needed to adapt its business practices to their concerns.

The most interesting difference is that many of the brightest young people believe that their

[1] *The Wall Street Journal*, 26 October 1988, p. 1.

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careers are better served through mobility among assignments, rather than within one narrow career path. This is evident in CIA. Bright analysts spend about two or three years in an assignment, believe they have gotten about 90 percent out of it, and look around for a new challenge. Not necessarily outside CIA, but in a different, often unrelated job.

This is significant because probably nowhere more than in the intelligence business is institutional memory more important. It is clear that managers must somehow reconcile these apparently conflicting realities. The answer to this turns out to be the key to doing a better job in intelligence

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The solutions are doable, and they play to our strengths, both as Americans and as technologists.

The plan is fairly simple. First, understand that our best employees are apt to be with us for only a short time. Managers should not despair when a valuable person leaves. You have to get the most out of them while they are available, and always expect that they may soon depart. Because of this, we need to realize that institutional memory has to be preserved not in the form of neurons in our employees, but in the form of algorithms, magnetic domains, and silicon.

Platforms of Knowledge

We need to provide an environment where a bright young worker hits the ground running by having the accumulated knowledge needed for his job at his finger tips and the communications and processing horsepower to take efficient advantage of it. He then starts his assignment on a large platform of knowledge, builds on this during his tenure, and leaves a bigger base, so that his successor picks up where he left off.

The philosophy is simple. To put it into practice requires a little thinking about what is in this platform of knowledge. And here is where perhaps the Intelligence Community has an advantage. For example, the Intelligence Community has always been aware that its data come in various compartments. This is broken down in terms of classifications, Confidential through Top Secret, and by types of source—such as COMINT, HUMINT, and SIGINT. Each has its own handling procedures and yearly evaluations. So, we naturally have a good idea of where our information comes from and its relative worth.

Those of us who have looked into how data are used in the Intelligence Community have noticed that usefulness of data begins with its accessibility. Data at one's desk is most useful. If one has to go across the hall to a safe, its use is down about an order of magnitude. And if it is in another buildling, it is down another. This can hurt, because some of our best, most sensitive information is controlled most tightly, ensuring that it will not be used as effectively as it should be.

A guiding principal ought to be to make the acquisition of data by our employees as efficient as possible, preferably at the analyst's desk, in electrical form, with full fidelity, and within 10 seconds.

Unfortunately, we cannot meet these objectives for all data types today. But even though we do things so inefficiently, some little things we can do can make a big difference.

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Building Pyramids

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The system is but one piece in an overall plan for information processing for technical intelligence.

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(b)(3)(c) But while we have justified it as a set of S&T tools, we believe it will have broad application, once its usefulness has been demonstrated for S&T.

(b)(3)(c) an architecture for tools that is founded on the observation that the fundamental job of the analyst is to sift through large amounts of data, select a subset for further scrutiny, and produce a concise report for his consumers. This results is a data "pyramid" composed of three basic layers—data, analysis, and reporting. Computers and modern information management systems offer the potential to provide the analyst a significantly larger amount of data for his analysis.

At the bottom of the pyramid, data flow in from a wide variety of sources. Thus, the bottom layer should contain the tools to build automatically integrated, all-source data bases. Immediately above this are the tools to assist the analyst in recognizing alerts, anomalies, and trends appropriate to his analytical task. Together, these bottom two layers form the basis for the "platform of knowledge" or "institutional memory."

Sitting on top of this analytical base are the tools that allow the analyst to evaluate the alerts and trends and to organize the ideas into well-structured arguments. This, in turn, forms the base for the production of the report, assisted by such




Figure 1

production tools as integrated graphics and publishing aids. Each of these layers has been described in terms of building blocks. These have formed the basis for the acquisition of existing tools (b)(3)(c) and integrating them into this analytical environment. Where tools do not exist, it defines the requirements for R&D. Most of these blocks are being addressed (b)(3)(c)

While this may look a little like pie in the sky, 10 years ago this could not have been contemplated. Ten years from now, this will be old hat. We need to push hard now for these tools. We cannot wait for these techniques to be perfected before we start preparing data for them. In the (b)(3)(c) effort, (b)(1) The hard (b)(3)(n) part is going back to create the historical data base that is needed before the system is really useful.

Before these data are useful, they need to be in electrical form. Our priority ought to be to make sure all data passing through our hands now are saved in electrical form, even if they are not immediately retrievable in the way we would like. There is a surprising amount of data in electrical




Figure 2

form somewhere in the process, even if just in a word processing or typesetting program. However, now we essentially throw out 99 percent of all our knowledge, thus relegating it to storage forms that guarantee that it will never be part of future analysis. Putting a paper copy on our book shelf is tantamount to throwing it away. Putting it on microfiche is even worse; its quality is often so poor that it can never be OCRed.

Need for Electrical Data

There are two reasons why it is important to put information in electrical form. First, because of the changing nature of our work force, only data in electrical form stand a chance of becoming a part of our institutional memory.

Second, US researchers, on the average, have an unjustified sense of their ability to be competitive without outside help. The short way of saying this is that we suffer from a severe case of "not invented here." The Japanese make it a national priority to acquire foreign technology for domestic goals.

Recently, a US company providing translations of Japanese technical journals just threw in the towel for lack of a market. It did this despite the general perception that the Japanese are ahead of us in many areas of technology.

Cultural difference or not, US researchers will take advantage of outside developments *if* the information is made available easily and seamlessly with other information.

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Suppose you wanted to store electronically all books published in the US, which is roughly 100 books a day, averaging 250 pages each. That is only about 50 Mbytes of ASCII per day—about 5 percent of the amount of data on one compact audio disk. Even if you want to store a compressed digital image of the pages, that is less than two orders of magnitude more.

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Perhaps the greater technical challenge today is the communications. There is an erroneous belief that text processing presents only a low data rate requirement.

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remembering the schematic for how analysis will be done in the future, you can see that the primary interactions with the vast quantities of raw data will be by the computer-driven shells and inference engines that will be precorrelating and digesting the information for the analyst. And this ideally should be running at computer speeds, not at typing speeds.

But this, too, is coming along. This fits nicely into a recent proposal for a nationwide ultra-high-speed bus for technical communications.

Information Services

To get from here to where we want to go is going to take a coordinated effort from all of us. The most important thing to do right now is to stop throwing information away, even if it cannot be used effectively. For example, if the only access to some information is by paper, it may be better to save a digital copy of the paper and await further developments in optical character recognition. When that does come along, the conversion to usable ASCII text can be done in background at little cost.

The government has a big piece of the responsibility. We need to store the vast amounts of

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taxpayer-paid-for research and to make it available to the appropriate people. There are services today, such as DTIC, which save abstracts and keywords for government-funded research. These are a help. But they really are not research aids. Keywords and abstracts are relics developed for an age when computers and communications were in their infancy. We need full access to text and equations and graphics—within 10 seconds of our query.

That is the easy part. Doing the job right requires some fundamental changes in the way we gather and sell information. CD ROMs have not lived up to their potential of making a lot of information widely available. While it may only cost a few dollars to reproduce a disk, there is not a lot of low-cost data around to distribute. An encyclopedia on a disk is about $1,000 a copy. Online data bases are not cheap, either. Can you imagine having your inference engine running overnight on a problem and finding out that you have run up a $5,000 bill?

Ideally, these information services have to at least meet costs and make a little profit. And when they are used only a little, the per-use charge ends up being significant. But if these sources are used in high-speed, automatic, real research ways, the numbers of accesses should go up by orders of magnitude, and the cost per access presumably would go down by orders of magnitude. This is a bit of a chicken and egg thing. And the government may have to provide some guarantees to get it started.

When we are really serious about it, there are even more fundamental changes we could make. Probably the most radical changes suggested are a redefinition of the Library of Congress and a change in copyright laws that requires that nothing could be copyrighted unless it is provided to the copyright office in usable electrical form, with some agreement on its distribution.

Today's educators are asking why the US can have such poor science education in grade and high schools but the best graduate schools in the world? A good part of the answer lies with the importance we attach to the quality of the staffs and the fact that our graduate schools receive the best equipment available.

Now that competitiveness is a national security issue, we need to provide our employees with better information sources and processing tools. The US is the clear leader in the development of the basic technologies needed for this, namely large data storage and retrieval, communications, and the development of inference-generating analytical methodologies. If we are to regain the leadership of high-tech trade, we have to take advantage of these strengths.

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An Interview with Adm. William O. Studeman (S)

William Nolte



Editor's Note: Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) Adm. William O. Studeman, USN (Ret.), was interviewed at CIA Headquarters on 22 February by William Nolte, a member of the Editorial Board of Studies in Intelligence.

Let's begin with some background. Did you intend to have a career in intelligence when you joined the Navy?

No, not really. I was commissioned through Officers' Candidate School, which is principally a pipeline for surface officers. At OCS, I wanted to go into aviation. My family has had a long history in aviation, my father being an aviation pioneer. So, I went through preflight and flight school at Pensacola. I wore glasses at the time, but the Navy had a program both for pilots and naval flight officers. I was in training for the latter, when Washington sent down a directive saying that the people who finished first through fifth in my class and the class behind me would have to go into intelligence because there was a shortage of intelligence officers in the Navy. (U)

This upset the aviators, but I was committed to the intelligence pipeline. I began my career in 1963 as all young naval intelligence officers start off, as a specialist in air intelligence. The Navy has two officer career fields built around intelligence, one in intelligence and one in cryptology. (U)

Did most of your subsequent assignments remain in the intelligence track versus cryptology?

Right. In Navy terms, I am an intelligence officer, a "straight-stick" intelligence guy. All of my tours were Washington-based or fleet-based operational intelligence tours, including command of the Suitland Naval Operational Intelligence Center, the predecessor to the Maritime Intelligence Center. I was also Director of Long-Range Planning,

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50 USC 3024(i)
P.L. 86-36

In some small way, I like to think that this effort had a role in ending the Cold War

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> **"I was committed to the intelligence pipeline. I began my career in 1963 as all young naval intelligence officers start off, as a specialist in air intelligence."**

William Nolte works for the National Security Agency.

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> **"This Community should operate as a community; if it does, the whole will be greater than the sum of the parts."**

And from there to Director of Naval Intelligence, followed by Director of NSA. NSA must have been your first full-time "technical intelligence" assignment.

Well, naval intelligence is highly technical. The naval intelligence generalist in the Navy is brought up with the idea that most of the intelligence we deal with is technical. It is acoustic—it is SIGINT. Naval intelligence does not have much HUMINT, and much of what we have is overt. The HUMINT activities we do have in the Navy have always had to struggle to compete with technical intelligence. The cultural ethos of naval intelligence has always been technical, but within that technical framework, multidisciplinary, with emphasis on putting things together and building processes for moving that intelligence to the user. You need to have constant interactions with the user, and proximity to the customer is one of the most important dynamics of the system. (U)

So, I dealt extensively with SIGINT, SIGINT issues, and SIGINT liaison throughout my career. There really were no surprises to me when I came to NSA. What was different was getting to know the culture and the bureaucracy as a Defense agency, as a Combat Support Agency, and as part of the Intelligence Community (IC). (U)

Did the Navy's emphasis on proximity to the user influence your actions as Director of NSA and later as DDCI?

There is the sense that the SIGINT system is isolated, that it exists somewhere at Fort Meade. And to a degree, CIA has the same potential problem or at least the perception. One thing the agencies have had to deal with is the need to be better connected with their customers on the one hand and their counterparts in the IC on the other. What you always worry about is the danger that an NSA, for example, becomes a closed culture. And you have to "manage around" that perception when you come into a leadership position in an organization like NSA or CIA as an outsider. (U)

How much of a struggle was that in your NSA and DDCI positions?

It is not really that much of a struggle. I find that, if you appeal to people to reach out and consider those wider issues, they will do it. Sometimes they need to be nagged, but throughout this period the idea of community or corporateness has been so important that it could not be ignored or denied. Sometime you have to attach a "no kidding" message to this effort, but we really are required to build within the IC an analog to the jointness efforts that exist in the military. This Community should operate as a community; if it does, the whole will be greater than the sum of the parts. We are also obliged to reduce duplication. Clearly, there was a lot of duplication in the system. So, I was fortunate in being able to work in one culture at NSA and then to come over here to CIA and the Community environment to work on projects that furthered the concept of community. (U)

The analogy between the Defense community as it has tried to work out the problems of jointness and the IC is an interesting one. Where is the IC in that process, compared to a community that has been at the process for a longer period?

I think the IC has made significant progress. The orientation of the leadership has shifted substantially. Certainly by the time Bob Gates came in as DCI, there was the recognition that the Community was the most important consideration he had to manage. When he moved the Community Management Staff (CMS) here to Langley, it began to displace the CIA in its ability to capture the interest and attention of the DCI, and, to a degree, the CMS assumed greater control of the agenda of the DCI and DDCI. As CMS gained more responsibility over policy, architecture, and issues like that, it gained more access to the DCI. Director Woolsey continued in that direction, and you were able to create a viable ability to drive the Community through a Community structure, but one that was "lean and mean" enough to have to work through the other parts of the Community, not as a stand alone. (C)

Beyond the CMS, the increased visibility of the Community-based centers, the use of the National Intelligence Council as a participatory body, and even NSA's decision to bring a Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) to CIA, have all had an impact. As you recall, NSA was reluctant to establish CSGs in the Washington area because they could become bottomless pits draining off

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Certainly it would have been more common before 1991 or 1992 for an NSA officer to spend part of his or her career in the UK at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)

P.L. 86-36 (b)(3) *Is all this driving around the Beltway worth it?*

That is an interesting question from several dimensions.

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The second point is that we are burdened by the fact that the Community is spread out from Fort Meade to the new National Reconnaissance Office facility near Dulles Airport. This physical separation is a problem, because it keeps the cultures apart. As much as we thought things like secure videoconferencing would solve the problem, that really has not been case. The truly frustrating point about the problem of physical separation is that it has the effect of keeping apart organizations and cultures that are actually similar

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in character.

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That is a sentiment I've never heard expressed.

It is true. I came down here after having been through a whole set of issues at NSA, and I found the same problems. Take the glass ceiling, for example. CIA was a year behind, the two agencies took characteristically different approaches—CIA hired a contractor, NSA worked it in-house—but the conclusions were remarkably the same. In all the essentials of the dynamics at work, the two cultures represented identical "lay down" matches for each other. You could have taken the NSA report, exported it down here, and it would have fit 100 percent. But we were so far apart at that time that it never occurred to either side to compare notes. We probably could have saved the taxpayers a quarter of a million dollars. Personnel management issues, again. The nature and character of the way civilians are managed are also "lay down" matches. (C)

Among the common issues the agencies are dealing with are those associated with the implementation of quality management, the requirement to get people out of their fortresses, the needs of technologies, and the family orientation of the personnel. You can go on and on. These are at least sibling organizations, from the point of view of management challenges. (U)

Would you want to see the recognition of these similarities and the move toward jointness extend to the creation of a Foreign Intelligence Service, analogous to the Foreign Service, where people get hired into the service and then assigned to one agency or another?

No. I think an efficiency expert who does not know anything about the business areas of the agencies might suggest that. But I would not. These are distinct business areas, each of which requires core competencies that are difficult to sustain, even given the scale of the existing supporting cultures. The SIGINT and INFOSEC businesses, for example, are very complex. If you are going to discharge effectively the responsibilities associated with those businesses, or any of the other business lines in the Community, you have to establish a center of gravity. That means you have to establish accountability and coherence. Otherwise, you would find the business areas watered down by considerations that would make it difficult to keep focus on the various primary missions we are set up to deal with. It is just like corporate life: consolidation is important, but one has to recognize points of diminishing returns. These are large structures, tens of thousands of people even with downsizing, so the idea that you could package all of this effort in a single structure is an idea whose time has not arrived, if it ever will. (U)

You mentioned downsizing, and that is the environment you encountered both at NSA and as DDCI and Acting

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DCI. How serious a problem has that been for the leadership?

Let me elevate the question a level. The fundamental problem of recent years has been moving the IC from the Cold War to a different world, one that is not yet clearly defined. With that challenge up front, a whole host of issues present themselves, not least of which is "What is the world of tomorrow going to look like?" Ultimately, instruments like Presidential Decision Directive 35 will define the grounds on which intelligence has to operate. During this time, we had to deal with downsizing and reengineering issues. And we had a number of problems, especially for CIA, and even more particularly for the Clandestine Service—with Ames, the French spying issue, Guatemala, class action suits or individual suits by women in the Agency—and these greatly complicated the work of the leadership in making the transition. (U)

But that transition remained the most important objective. And I think the leadership of the intelligence agencies understood that. I certainly would like to think they understood that. We put heavy emphasis on studies and task forces to look at various aspects of the issue. By the time Jim Woolsey left, we were probably looking at upwards of 125 studies and task force efforts on various aspects of the transition problem, everything from politicization to covert action. And that is the essence of the legacy of this transition period. (U)

I believe this effort has put us in front of the rest of the Federal Government in the reinvention effort. We started downsizing before anyone else did. Only history is going to tell us whether these actions were the correct ones, but I do not think we had any alternative but to make these transitions. We've gotten out ahead on issues affecting incentives in downsizing, with ideas on civil service reform, which I think Director Deutch is going to be talking about in the near future. (U)

We had a major task in shutting down much of the Cold War architecture and determining what our future architecture was going to be. There has been an incredible richness in the issues confronting us during this period, and they all come together to define the future of intelligence. None of the rest of the Federal Government is close to doing the sort of work we've done on our future. (U)

The problems we have encountered and the transition we have been dealing with have left a negative morale effect, and that has been part of the downside. But, in the long run, I think it has been fortuitous for CIA, and with it the IC, to go through this process. At times, it has seemed like we have been hit between the running lights with a two-by-four, but maybe that has been a wake-up call. The benefit may be that we will be reformed before anybody else. We have an opportunity to use our internal work, along with the work of the Aspin-Brown Commission, IC 21, and all the other external studies, to process this work, go forward with legislation where required, and gain a renewed endorsement for American intelligence. (U)

Let's return to the endorsement issue in a bit, but it is very clear that you see all the effort and turmoil of recent years as ultimately necessary and even therapeutic.

Absolutely. You captured the essence of what I have said in a few words, and I think it is true—if we take advantage of it. If we somehow or another do not listen to the messages that are conveyed through this process, we will find ourselves falling back to our old ways. By that I mean going it alone, doing things in ways that violate the Community context, and so forth. If we do that, we will not realize our goal of creating a sum greater than its parts, and we will all lose. We need to define an alternative future for NSA, for CIA, and

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There is a strategic plan for doing that; it is another area we have worked on for over a year. But I fear that the implementation of that strategic plan is going slowly. I fear that

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There is a very significant technical dimension to that exercise, including important access issues. Again, if we do not achieve that, we are all the losers. (C)

One part of your reputation that preceded you here was your interest in management techniques and your belief that we had not incorporated management practices, especially quality management, in what we do. It will not surprise you to hear that some people do not share your enthusiasm.

I worked hard to bring quality management here, and now there are quality councils in both CIA and the CMS. These concepts need to be tailored to the culture and the business areas you are working with.

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It could have been done better, and many of the problems can be, in my view, attributed to management. Of the seven or eight issues that are at the top of
(b)(1) the agenda of
(b)(3) the implementation of quality management practices is the first. (C)

Beyond issues of internal management, there is always going to be some skepticism—in Congress, among the public—that what we do is inherently suspect. Tolerable during wartime perhaps, but less so in peacetime.

I think you are getting at the openness and demystification issue, and there is no doubt we could have done a better job articulating to the American people and others who count, including Congress, why we need a capable, robust intelligence system. What I worry about is that you cannot assume we are going to make the commitment as a nation to maintaining a strong intelligence capability for the future. World War II and the Cold War represented heyday periods, in which intelligence made extraordinary contributions. Unfortunately, we have been so closed that I do not think this contribution is appreciated by decision-makers, by historians, and by the country at large. We have an obligation to be more open—and we now operate under a directive to be more open. Openness is a difficult issue to manage, and you are always going to be struggling over where to draw the line. (U)

"Openness is a difficult issue to manage, and you are always going to be struggling over where to draw the line."

One of the things you do not want to do is be naive about how much people really know out there. The recent series of *Baltimore Sun* articles on NSA prove that, if some serious investigative reporter wants to network around and do a serious look at an agency, the reporter can ferret out more information than the system is going to be comfortable with. That said, the example points to the dilemma of having to be more open. Jim Woolsey always cautioned about the use of the term "openness," because we did not want to imply that we were fundamentally open to having people come in and just forage around. I do not think that is what we have meant by openness, but it is a difficult process to define what it means to be selectively open. It is a tricky issue. After all, this is fundamentally a "secret" business. (U)

One aspect of the endorsement issue is endorsement by oversight bodies, giving them a picture we cannot give the public at large and in effect having them vouch for us. How would you describe your experience with the oversight committees?

We all have tactical frustrations, but I am a big fan of oversight, whether it's from Congress, from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, or from within. The way I look at it is this: intelligence, in order to do its job, has to be out there at the leading edge of propriety and legality all the time. Our obligation is to penetrate targets that represent threats to the United States. To penetrate those targets, you have to be aggressive in your technology and in your operational applications. You really want and need an oversight process to protect you from yourself. With regard to resource debates, you might conclude that the interaction between Congress and the Executive Branch has wasted some taxpayer money, but the products of that interaction have been more positive than negative. In fact, dramatically positive. So I have an upbeat view of oversight. (U)

I do hope that the Brown Commission will come out with some recommendations to "thin down" our oversight burden. The number of committees to which we are accountable for various functions creates a lot of drag for the Community, using resources that could better be expended on targets. As a manger, I want to put mission

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first. I told the Brown Commission that if you told me declassification would cost $200 million per year, and if I had the option to spend that on modernized SIGINT, I would rather buy the SIGINT. (U)

We are headed toward a real investment crunch, and I would always rather buy tooth than tail. (U)

Where is that crunch going to occur?

I am worried about our lack of technology and investment in technology, about our dependence on industry for commercial off-the-shelf technology which is ultimately as available to our competitors and counterparts in other countries as it is to us. So we have to retain our internal research and engineering capabilities, and we are falling dangerously below the line in those areas, especially in SIGINT, but in every other domain as well. (S)

One of the significant issues of the last decade has been the emergence of open-source information and its impact on policymakers. Have we managed that effectively?

I do not think we have managed it at all badly. We have come to the realization that the post–Cold War world is more open and that information exists today that would not have been available earlier. The fundamental availability of information—which will only accelerate—is going to alter the context in which intelligence is produced and perceived. We have our secret sources, but we need open-source information to frame our problems and provide context, to allow us to manage collection efficiently, so we do not target our scarce resources against targets we

"I do not think we have been successful with the current administration in even being defined as being a relevant part of the national security team."

can attack through open sources. We can use open sources to cover information we produce at classified levels, and the creation of the Community Open-Source Project Office, is an important direction for us to go. Acquiring the information, creating the internet or intelink-like architectures, with push-pull capabilities, to allow intelligence producers to grab open-source information and mix it effectively with secret information—all these are crucial issues. And there are significant issues of security, the creation of adequate firewalls, and so on, associated with this effort, but these can be handled. Open source is a important trend, and the Community is going to have to adapt to that. (C)

If you had the opportunity to take on, at this stage of your career, a study to deal with any single aspect of our business that has nagged at you, what would that be?

I do not know. There are so many areas of interest, I am not sure I could pick just one.

(b)(1) 50 USC 3024(i)
(b)(3) P.L. 86-36

There are dimensions to this problem that represent important potential capabilities if we do it right. If we screw it up, the consequences are going to be just as significant. (C)

Clandestine activity is the thing that has the highest risk for embarrassment, as you have experienced.

Sure, but there are structural changes you can make to manage this. Counterintelligence is another area of interest, and it is an area we tend to take for granted. The whole issue of foreign intelligence and its coordination with law enforcement, information warfare, information security (especially as it relates to commerce and banking)—there are any number of areas you could deal with. That is what makes this business so interesting at the moment. It will mean that DCIs now and in the future will have to build on the work that has been done by some of the studies we have talked about. No matter where you turn, there are interesting issues out there. (U)

Overall, how do you think we have done in convincing Congress and others that this is a principled, competent set of agencies capable of performing their missions?

I am not trying to be political in making this statement, but I do not think we have been successful with the current administration in even being defined as being a relevant part of the national security team. And I am sure the DCIs have been frustrated by it. When you have CNN announcing that the President is meeting with his national security team and you know intelligence is not represented, that is a source of concern. (U)

That reflects the priorities of the administration, with domestic issues as first priority, economic competitiveness has been the second priority, and traditional national security

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issues have been a third priority. That is not to say that there are not issues of great concern, but intelligence has to find a role in that environment. And we cannot take it for granted that people will continue to give us the resources we need. If we can no longer bring to the table the results of successful, deep-penetration efforts that have real impact on the consumer, you are less valued, you are going to be supported at more and more marginal levels, and you are going to enter into a downward spiral. It is that spiral I fear. The lesson here is that you have to look to your first obligation, which is to penetrate targets. Everything else should be put in a secondary status. If we are not successful against the (b)(1) (b)(3) for example, we're not that useful. We are out there doing the job, but if we are not delivering against the other targets that occupy the current interests of the key decision-makers, we can get into this spiral. The challenge for the IC for tomorrow is to deal with establishing the partnerships that are going to allow us to obtain deep penetration on difficult issues. Take the relationships between NSA and CIA. If effective partnership becomes peripheral to either or both, or if it is merely the dream of a few people, it is not going to have the needed energy and focus. (S)

Over the last year, we seem to be developing a real emphasis on the hard targets, figuring, for example, that we may have a stronger role to play in reporting on (b)(1) (b)(3)

True, but be careful. The analogy is instructive. (b)(1) (b)(3)

50 USC 3024(i)
P.L. 86-36
18 USC 798

"You cannot sit at Langley or Fort Meade and just toss electronic product over the transom. You have to be doing briefings, you have to be interactive with the customer."

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But because we did not have adequate connections to some of our key customers, (b)(1) (b)(3) they did not get the warning. The prisms other US Government agenci (b)(1) (b)(3) not providing an accurate picture of what was happening. We therefore created a double crisis for ourselves. First, we warned, but the customer did not hear the warning. The customer was then late developing a response, and that response then became a liability to the administration. Second, and worse yet, they hated us even more when Congress, through its investigations, tried to determine what actually happened. It became the classic intelligence conundrum of the skunk at the garden party. The message here is that you can collect all the right information, but if you cannot connect with the customer, you have not done your job. You cannot sit at Langley or Fort Meade and just toss electronic product over the transom. You have to be doing briefings, you have to be interactive with the customer. And this is a lesson we are still learning. (S)

50 USC 3024(i)
P.L. 86-36

We have talked about a lot of ups and downs affecting intelligence in this transition period. If you were speaking to undergraduates or graduate students considering a career intelligence, would you encourage them?

Nothing is more wonderful. I spoke this morning to the National Youth Leadership Forum, a group of high school students interested in intelligence, diplomacy, and defense. I concluded my remarks by telling them there was never a day—no matter how bad things got—that I did not get up and look forward to coming to work in the business of intelligence. It is that fascinating, particularly if you step back and truly understand its importance to the security of the country. And, when you think about the nature and character of the people in the Community, nowhere in the Federal Government have I run across the skills and character, even management ability, that you find in the IC. It is a unique set of people, and I think even those of us in the business need to reflect more frequently on that. (U)

Admiral Studeman, thank you.

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An Interview with Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt (U)

"We have more spies stealing more significant secrets that have greater impact on policy decisions than at any time in our history."

(b)(3)(c)

Editor's Note: On 24 October 2000, Lloyd Salvetti, Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence and Chairman of the Editorial Board of Studies in Intelligence, *accompanied by* Studies *Editorial Board members Dawn Eilenberger and Julie Savell, met with Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt to obtain his views on some of the key issues confronting the Directorate of Operations (DO).* (U//FOUO)

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We're here to really basically tell our readership where the DO is today, and where it's going, particularly with a focus on the development of its officer corps. We'll start by asking you what are the three biggest challenges facing the DO, as well as the ones you face as the collector of HUMINT for the Intelligence Community (IC)? (U//FOUO)

I do not know that I would define it in terms of three biggest, but let me begin by saying something about what the DDO worries about on a daily basis. But I will first tell you what I do not worry about, which can help put the challenges in context. What I do not worry about is core mission. I do not worry about spotting, assessing, developing, and recruiting spies to steal secrets, because the DO has never in its 53-year history done that job better than it is doing it in the year 2000. We have more spies stealing more significant secrets that have greater impact on policy decisions than at any time in our history. That is a tribute to the men and women who are in the Directorate, and to the organizations throughout the IC with whom we work. It is a tribute to the relationships we have developed with the Directorates of Intelligence, Science and Technology, and Administration. America's espionage service is doing its job brilliantly. As the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO), I could be perceived as being prejudiced on this issue. But the results of out-of-house reviews indicate exactly the same thing. The value of HUMINT is making a huge difference. (S)

Now, what do I worry about? I worry about sustaining our successes. I worry about making absolutely certain that we have the resources essential to do the job we are being asked to do. I speak to a number of groups. I recently spoke, for example, to one of the classes for middle-level officers. And you get feedback. The vast majority said, "This is an engaged DDO who really cares about what's going on." But one person said, "Ah, there is the DO, doing what it always does. He is talking about the DDO, he is talking about dollars. They [the DO] have always mismanaged their dollars. They have no idea what they really do need, and, therefore, he is putting the burden of his success, once again, on dollars. If he has enough money, he'll get his job done." I believe the critique is wrong. We do need more funding, and we need it now. (S)

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My greatest challenges are sustaining this workforce and continuing to recruit the kind of men and women we are recruiting to do this job. Retaining that workforce once I bring them in. And I need to ensure that the people in this organization get better care than they have to date. Fifty-three years in this business and we do not treat our own people with the same sensitivity, care, and concern

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I believe that it is absolutely essential that we get away from the nonsense of saying that we have enough. We have not asked for a topline add in this organization for many years. It is time we do so. There is nothing about this business that is inexpensive. There is a great deal about it which is expensive. But, at the end of the day, my business, the human side of this business, does not cost much. I am not asking for huge dollars. But what I am asking for is enough to guarantee that I treat this workforce better than I do today and to meet operational challenges. (S)

An article in *The Washington Post* last week stated that NSA Director Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden is going to have a hard time turning around NSA without computer scientists, who are leaving in droves. Let me stop here and just substitute the words "case officer" or "operations officer" in that and put it in the context of the DO and CIA rather than NSA. The article also said that in NSA's halcyon days, computer scientist pay was in the computer industry's 75th percentile, and now it is in the 25th percentile, and that, to stop the exodus, Hayden is working on a dramatically revised compensation schedule by Fiscal Year 2003; in the meantime,

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I would also like to cite an unclassified Department of State telegram sent this month from the Director General [of the Foreign Service] to all employees at all US diplomatic and consular posts. It said that the Department is announcing a pilot program for the summer 2000 bidding cycle which would provide additional financial incentives to employees accepting a three-year assignment to one of a number of positions. I sent a note to senior leaders and to a number of others calling their attention to these two items because they are germane to the issues we face here at CIA. In the case of the State cable, I pointed out that the Department has a plan to pay service need differential to select employees at select posts, who would receive a 15-percent differential if they agree to stay at post for three years; if implemented, State officers at the posts cited would receive 15-percent more than our officers. I emphasized that we need to do more for our workforce, that we need to do it now, and that dealing with the issues of retention, quality of life, compensation, and workforce reward require immediate attention. (S)

Let me clarify something. This is not a campaign on my part because my officers are complaining. This is not because any DO officer is saying, "I need more." This is not because I have officers saying, "You're not paying me enough." It is because, as the leader of the organization, I believe it is essential that we finally face facts. In (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) for example, I have officers walking around, carrying weapons, in grave danger. I have officers throughout the world who are doing remarkable work.

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Now, let's say you're an FBI Special Agent, or a Customs officer, or a Secret Service officer. If you are doing overseas what I would say a basic case officer does, or what many of my reports officers do, you get a 25-percent flat differential on base pay. What is the difference between my officers and those officers? I have a lot of people who push back all the time, and tell me, "Well, they carry weapons." Or, "It's because they're on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week." What do you think a case officer or a reports officer anywhere in the world does? It is high time that there be enough leadership in this institution to stand up to this issue and fight for it. So, for me, that is a priority issue, a priority concern. (S)

You all know that about three years ago we implemented a plan which is designed to recruit people for the DO workfor(b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

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(b)(1)
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I want to take that plan, use it as a baseline, improve on it, and take it to its next phase. (S)

(b)(1)

And then I want to institute process-reduction programs in the DO to eliminate the nonsense that is driving my officers crazy. I want to eliminate or deal with the issue of mission creep. I want to worry about management training, because we have never done it well. We have always given it lip service. In the field of leadership training, we have some innovative programs—(b)(3)(c)—that are being run right now. I want to worry about promotion. The only way I can reward people right now is on the basis of promotion. We have got to change that. (S)

"(b)(1)"

(b)(3)(c)

I opposed pay for performance at the time it was linked to the Human Resources Oversight Council because I thought HROC was unwise. But I promote the concept of pay for performance or rewarding performance right now, but with this caveat—I do not support it if it is fundamentally a way of saving money for the institution. If pay for performance is instituted, I recommend that we include all the things you get now—steps, quality steps, you know, steps because of time in grade, and so forth—but add to the pot, make sure that it is a serious effort to reward the workforce. Then, in addition to promotions, we will have a way to reward people because they are the best and the brightest, doing the hardest work. I believe we are going to move in that direction. (S)

So promotion is something important, as is succession planning in the DO. A challenge I face is to make sure that I can identify for the DCI five or six people I believe can take my job when I leave. I do not believe we have done that very well, historically—if ever. (S)

And then support to mission. I have got some critical issues about what the DO does. "Spot, assess, develop, and recruit spies to steal secrets, run counterintelligence operations to support all of our activity and to protect this institution, and the United States Government, and run covert actions as directed by the President." That is our mission, plain and simple. My mission should not be to provide support to the core mission of this Directorate. That should be the mission of someone else. I do not want to be an accountant, a logistician, or a security officer. I want to make certain in the context of support that mission accomplishment and not efficiency is the driving force around this place. (S)

So, in the context of my offsite, I asked my line managers, my component chiefs, my Center chiefs, my staff chiefs, in consultation with their Stations, in consultations with those with whom they are working, to look at shortfalls in needed support. And what is the cost of

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not being able to get the support we need?

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Against the framework you have been describing, what are your priorities in the development of the officer corps with respect to training, skills, and assignments? What is it that you want your officer corps to be? (U//FOUO)

That's a good question. In many instances, I am going to ask the officer corps of this Directorate to go to difficult places and do difficult work. We have high standards for those we recruit, and we set high training standards for them. I have certain obligations to that corps. Once I have hired them, vetted them, and trained them, then I have to get them out to the field to do the business. We are hiring more young officers of quality than we ever have before.

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(b)(3)(c)

Most have an advanced degree. Many speak a foreign language at the 3 level. Most have good experience in the private sector. And we are continuing to look for those with military experience. The number varies, but somewhere between 20 and 40 percent of those we bring in do have previous military experience.

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"I need people who are hungry to do this business, who come in because of concern about mission. I need people whose skills include a willingness to think out of the box, a willingness to challenge conventional wisdom."

(b)(1)
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What am I looking for in skills? I need people who are hungry to do this business, who come in because of concern about mission. I need people whose skills include a willingness to think out of the box, a willingness to challenge conventional wisdom. I need skills which will allow me to do my business in every far corner of this Earth, and that means foreign language skills. I need people of the highest integrity. I need initiative. I need people who understand both what a team is and understand what individual effort is. I do not believe the profile has changed a lot from the time I was hired. (U//FOUO)

Has the workforce changed? Of course it has. That is why I brought in people as outside speakers in the DDO speaker series to look at such things as "Generation X." What does it mean for us? That is just a smart way to look at a

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workforce which is different than the workforce that I joined here in 1973. We have to deal with the fact that retention is going to be more difficult. We have to deal with the fact that a lot of the young workforce has a perspective different than the one I had when I joined. That is not good or bad. I am not passing judgment on it. I simply have to deal with it. And if I am going to lose a part of that workforce after eight or 10 years, how do I maximize their efficiency? When some of them do go, how can I retain some benefit for the national security and for this organization. How might I use them in the future?

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I do not want to run from the retention issue, but we need to deal with it. (S)

Assignments. We are in the business of recruiting spies overseas

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I have been asked by many people, "Jim, you have a terrible problem in that you do not have enough people at Headquarters to do the job. So, shouldn't you be keeping some of your back here to be desk officers after they have finished their training?" Absolutely not.

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Now, how do I know about some of those things that I have just talked about? In my business, if I did all the talking and did not listen to what people were saying, I would not be successful. The way you find the vulnerability in a potential recruit is to listen to what that potential recruit has to say. I have found that listening to the workforce—listening to their concerns—gives me far greater insight into what the challenges are for me and the DO than from any other way. In terms of making this place run more effectively, I probably learn more by listening to my workforce than by listening to many of our seniors. My seniors do not have the same responsibilities that I have. I try to meet with people from the GS-9 level and up on a regular basis in whatever forum is available. I invite some of them up here to my office on a Friday afternoon about every other week to have a beer, a soda, or a glass of wine and to talk to me. There is no set agenda. By doing that, I have found that they are concerned about such things as how to make the DO's recordkeeping and search mechanism for name traces work to the benefit of the mission, rather than to the benefit of a machine. I have also learned of concerns about the reward system—not for the dollar reason, but so that we are competitive, so that our families can have a reasonable existence. I have learned a good deal. I have urged every one of my line managers to do the same thing, if they are not doing so already. (S)

The responsibilities we have to our officer corps, all our employees, is to train them well. I do not believe in training for training's sake or that we should train people so that they can be promoted. I believe in training people to mission.

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> **Now I am also trying to provide incentives for training. I am trying to go beyond just saying it is important to demonstrating that it is important.**

First, you have to be serious about training. Second, you want it to be world class. Third, you have to reward people who do that kind of hard work for you. I have had panels come to me and say, "Here are Mary and John. They were on assignment as instructors (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) Therefore, while they are doing good work, they are not going to be promoted this time. Once they return to core mission or to line activity, they will move forward." Every time I have seen that, I have called the panel in question, or the individual who has written the comment in question, and said, "You have it all wrong." And, if there was an unfairness done, I promoted that officer on the spot. And I intend to continue to do that. Training is key to our capability. I want people who are training to be our best and our brightest—nothing else. We continue to strive to get that at

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(b)(3)(c) We owe our officer corps, the new corps, the young officer, the middle corps, or the more experienced corps, the best training we can give. Train to mission, not to promotion, or because it is the popular thing to do. Train to what we need to train to. (S)

Do your senior managers support this approach? Once it was a badge of honor in the DO to say, "I didn't take any training. I never took leadership, management, or skills training." Do you see that changing? You obviously have made a huge dollar resource investment in training. Do you see that getting imbedded in your senior leaders, that now training is an acceptable option? (S)

Absolutely. And we see people who want to go down and do it. Now I am also trying to provide incentives for training. I am trying to go beyond just saying it is important to demonstrating that it is important. For the past few years, we have always tried to send people who have been instructors (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) into the field in the right position as a way of rewarding them. But we have not always succeeded. We look very hard at that right now. I believe we have also reached the point where some of my best officers are seeking training assignments now. There is a phrase in German that translates to "the bureaucrats are eating the state." And there are plenty of bureaucrats around here. I do not like bureaucrats or bureaucracy. And I do not like things that get in the way of getting the job done.

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Can you comment on whether there is a formal role for mentoring in your planning? (U//FOUO)

One of the greatest, consistent failures of this institution, and not just in the DO, is our failure to hold firstline managers accountable for their management. Perhaps we have not trained them to manage very well. Perhaps we have not mentored them before they got to the point of becoming firstline managers. It is easy to find a way to put your arm around a junior officer, somebody who is trying to

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learn this business, and help them get there. It shouldn't be conscious. It is in the world that I live in, the world that I have grown up in, what we do in the Directorate. I make the parallel again to the way we develop an agent overseas. [redacted]

(b)(1)
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[redacted] We do not do that enough with our own officers. Now, we have mentoring programs, and they are beginning to work. I have instituted, for example, the "shadow" program for the DDO and the ADDO. I have shadows come up here who usually have come from the [redacted] cadre, the [redacted] cadre, or officers who are at the GS-13 or GS-14 level, who have never been in the DDO's office before, or who have never had an opportunity to understand what really happens up here. It is a sobering experience for all of them. We try to do it frequently. I have established some groundrules. Anything they hear in this office stays in this office. That rule has never been violated. And what I do is expose them to everything, from the most exciting operational development of the moment, to how I solve a tough personnel problem, or to what my views are regarding what the DCI did on this or that issue. I believe Hugh Turner [the ADDO] does the same thing. They walk away from here saying, "I'll be damned." I have tried to push this down to the rest of my management team. "Do the same thing. Take an officer, and let him or her see what you are doing." That is not quite mentoring, but in another way, it is. I have seen Cofer Black from CTC come up here with young officers. I have seen Africa Division come up here with officers to do that. In terms of mentoring, I have also tried to encourage my management not to come here by themselves. Every one of them has all the "face time" in the world they need with me. And it is not about "face time," I guess, but it is about learning. Bring along the officer responsible for the operation in question, and let him tell me about it. So I strongly believe in mentoring, but we do not do it very well. We have to try to do it better. (S)

(b)(3)(c)

> **"I do believe that every officer who is going to manage a major program, anyone who is going to sit in the chair as the DDO, or any other senior position, has to understand more than the way we run operations overseas."**

In the past, a lot of decisions that were made in management positions in the DO—whether it be a Branch Chief, COS, Division Chief—the primary factor has always been how well do they recruit, how well do they run operations. How much more weight are you giving to things like resource management, people management, and leadership? (U//FOUO)

Our business is about recruiting spies, so we have to give a lot of weight to the basics [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

[redacted] That is our bread and butter. We will always do it. We will always reward it, and we must reward it. But we also need to find a way to develop officers who can go beyond just the little world in which they live. I do not believe that every officer in the DO needs to have an "out of body" experience to be promoted to the Senior Intelligence Service. But I do believe that every officer who is going to manage a major program, anyone who is going to sit in the chair as the DDO, or any other senior position, has to understand more than the way we run operations overseas. It is a given that anybody who gets there is going to have that as a key skill, it seems to me. Or a key skill in the Collection Management Officer arena as a senior reports and requirements officer. But we need to give people the kind of experience of [redacted] (b)(3)(c) who was the first CIA officer assigned to the FBI to become Deputy Chief of the Terrorist Unit at the Bureau, the kind of thing I did by going to the NSC, the kinds of things that any number of officers are doing outside the DO. (S)

Let's deal with a few of the shibboleths that are out there. One is that to get promoted in the DO, it is a

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numbers game. I know that is not true, but we need to address it. (S)

No, it has been an issue. (U//FOUO)

So what does a GS-11, -12, -13 case officer need to do to get promoted? (U//FOUO)

I expect them to spot, develop, assess, and recruit agents. I expect them to handle agents well. I expect them to produce intelligence which is cogent, focused, and responsive to requirements. I expect them, even at that level, to understand fully the concepts of teamwork and of mentoring. I do not, repeat not, want them to be afraid to challenge conventional wisdom, if, for example, that wisdom is, [redacted] (b)(3)(n) [redacted] If, in fact, that's the wrong instruction, I expect them to challenge that instruction. I do not expect them to be revolutionaries. But I expect them to be thoughtful people who know their business well. I expect them to understand why they are doing certain things. What is the priority of collecting against this target rather than that target. I expect them to demonstrate consistently the highest possible integrity. We lie a lot in this business in the context of manipulating people to engage in espionage. But we will not, and we must not, lie to one another, or manipulate each other. And I believe that they need to be watched and evaluated in that context. (S)

I go to every panel. I will be going to a panel later this afternoon. I tell them that, in terms of promotion criteria, I want all our managers and mentors to look at who is doing the hard job and doing it well. I have officers who serve in [redacted] who do not do traditional work. I have officers who serve in [redacted] (b)(1) who do much different work than what you do in [redacted] (b)(3)(n) I expect people to be able to take a broad view, and also to understand that we are not in the business of running operations for operations sake. And we still do some of that. I want people to understand that if we are going to be risking an agent, a sacred risk, if we are going to be risking an operations officer, and more and more where we operate that often is the case, then we had better be doing it for a good reason. And once we do it, and once we succeed, that information has to be dealt with. (S)

I have just done something that is truly controversial in the DO. I have just challenged the concept of [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) [redacted]. I said I had had it right up to here with the fact that [redacted] (b)(3)(c) our intelligence production was coming in that way. Is that a crutch? Why are we doing that? I believe we need to worry about timeliness. We also need to worry about quality. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) [redacted] It is changing something we have done for a half-century. It does not mean we eliminate [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) It means we think. So I am going to reward somebody who thinks, and who tells me that that is also not working. (S)

I believe the greatest failing we have consistently had is the failure of leadership. The hardest thing in the world to do is to lead. The hardest thing in the world to do is to make a decision, the right decision, whether it is a popular or an unpopular decision. The hardest thing in the world to do is to consistently say your message over and over again, and not be taken off your message by whatever the exigencies of the day happen to be. If we can teach people to do that, and reward people for leading well and courageously, we will better serve the institution, and, more important, the mission. (U//FOUO)

Regarding area, language, and hard-target expertise, do you seek to give priority to that type of development? For example, do you plan to develop officers who will be skilled in the history, culture, and language of areas like Central Asia and the Middle East and who will spend their careers there—and who, when at Headquarters, will work in related branches and divisions? Would you expect such officers eventually to become Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Station? Or is it the old standard that a case officer is a case officer and can serve anywhere in the world? (S)

I want to have my cake and eat it, too. We need to be a flexible organization where we are willing for the needs of the mission, the priority of the moment, to put a Russian expert in Southeast Asia, because

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there is a surge into that area. On the other hand, *absolutely* I endorse expertise. *Absolutely* I endorse producing officers who ideally come in with some expertise in the first instance, and then nurturing it, and rewarding it. We do not do that very well. I do not believe that we do a good enough job in foreign language training. I am not going to accept, for whatever reasons, efficiency because it is voguish, because it is the Working Capital answer. I am not going to accept substandard language training. And if it is necessary for me to create my own language school to deal with the language problems I face, I will. I am going to try to get the best that I can for my officers. One officer, who worries about a part of the world in the Near East context that is very important, alerted me to some foreign language shortfalls. I have one set of statistics that says how many people I have who speak that language, and then I have the reality. And the reality is starkly different than the statistic. And it is for a variety of reasons. The instructors in this particular area are, for the most part, on contract. They are not always available. We do not pay them enough. They are willing to go elsewhere to make a little more. I cannot train my people in that hard language that way. So if I have to buy it myself, I will. It is absolutely critical that we have language expertise, and we do not have enough. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

That said, we do have a cadre of people who are gifted. I just came

“It is absolutely critical that we have language expertise, and we do not have enough.”

back from the Middle East. When I sit down and look at the Chiefs of Station that I met, and the officer corps that I met in those Stations, (b)(3)(n) I was impressed. I want experts on Russia. I want people to know Russia as it was before, and Russia as it is today. I want experts on China. I want people who know the culture, who have lived the culture, who have smelled the smells of the back streets of Beijing. So I believe in both. We have to be flexible, and you will fail if you are not. We have to reward people for the willingness to get the expertise. We need to get people into some institutions of higher learning in certain places. I just had a bunch of names come up for all the senior schools. I was not very impressed with what we were doing. Once again, we were not doing it on the basis of what was good for the person and for the mission of the institution; we were simply putting somebody in a school when we did not know what else to do with them. And we have to stop that. Not everybody, but a handful of people, my best and my brightest. If that is elitism, then it is elitism for the right reason. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) If I do not do that, I am not going to be serving the institution and the mission well. (S)

You had mentioned assigning people to the FBI, the NSC, and other key outside assignments in collaborative environments. That is the environment we are in now in the Intelligence Community. How well are you working in that more collaborative environment, given the DO's culture of secrecy and its concern about sources and methods? (U//FOUO)

We have made tremendous strides, but there is always more to do. The relationship between the FBI and the CIA is based on those kinds of interchanges, where we break down barriers, and where we challenge each other's culture. That is a sign of progress on both sides. We demonstrate how much value is added by doing it smart, whether it is in the CI arena or in the CT arena. Even in the CT arena, having those exchanges with the Bureau just makes great sense. The DO is a secretive organization in the context of protecting sources and methods. How many times have we lost sources because we have not protected them? Today, more than ever, we see things flying out the door because policymakers do not have the discipline to deal with the harsh realities of our business. As hard as they may even try, they do not understand what we do.

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One last question, and it is a leading one, but important. If there is a legacy that you leave to this Agency, the DO, and this country, what would you like it to be? (U//FOUO)

To do the job as brilliantly as I say we are doing it right now. We hold ourselves to high standards, and produce the best possible agents and intelligence. And I believe that the men and women who do this so superbly are treated with the dignity their performance deserves, that they are rewarded, not because they are demanding it, but because they deserve it. We all know what the mission is. That is why we are here. I want to make sure that those people who are carrying out the mission are cared for by those of us who are in a position to do the caring as well as we possibly can. If I can get my people a little bit more, if I can make certain that they are rewarded for what they are doing, not simply with the cute reward of "Well, since we do not have enough money to give them a bonus, we will give them a pen that says 'Directorate of Operations' on it." It is time that we start treating our workforce in the same way that workforces elsewhere in our society are being treated. To do something to give the people who do this work so brilliantly a little bit more—that is what I want my legacy to be. (S)

“I want to make sure that those people who are carrying out the mission are cared for by those of us who are in a position to do the caring as well as we possibly can.”

Thank you. (U)

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OIA's perspective

Desert Storm and the BDA Controversy

Robert D. Vickers, Jr.

During Operation Desert Storm, CIA's Office of Imagery Analysis (OIA), in support of the Directorate of Intelligence's Persian Gulf Task Force, devoted a major effort to assessments of the damage to Iraq's military and economic capabilities caused by the coalition bombing effort. Although most of this work was well received by various military and policy consumers, such was not the case with OIA's assessment of the damage caused to key units of Iraq's elite Republican Guard (RG). This battle or bomb-damage assessment (BDA) caused considerable controversy and resulted in strong misperceptions about what actually happened.

By the time the coalition bombing effort began on 15 January 1991, OIA had already done extensive analysis of potential Iraqi military targets.

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Before the conflict, OIA also did extensive analysis of Iraq's ground forces, including their order of battle.

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This analysis was distributed to a wide variety of military customers, including the DIA Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) at the Pentagon and the CENTCOM J2 in Saudi Arabia.

Once the bombing began, OIA began to do assessments of the damage to determine the impact on Iraq's overall military capabilities. These assessments were incorporated into daily sitreps and status reports and disseminated to OIA's political and military customers. The assessments were intended both to inform policymakers of the damage to Iraq's military capabilities and to assist the military in its targeting effort. At first, much attention was focused on the damage done to Iraq's strategic infrastructure, particularly its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile facilities. There was also a major effort to try to assess any damage to Iraq's mobile Scud missile launchers.

A Shift in Focus

As the damage to Iraq's strategic facilities and basic infrastructure mounted, the bombing focus shifted more to the ground forces. The RG units, particularly the one mechanized and two armored divisions which formed the strategic reserve force in the Kuwaiti theater, were key targets of this phase of the bombing effort. Intensive bombing of the RG mechanized division, which was closest to the front, began by 31 January. Heavy bombing of the two armored divisions, deployed further to the rear, began by 14 February. Military spokesmen stated that once 50 percent of the tanks and artillery in key units were destroyed, the coalition ground offensive would begin.

While CENTCOM relied heavily on the rest of the Intelligence Community to assess the bomb damage to Iraq's strategic facilities and military infrastructure, it developed its own methodology to assess the damage to Iraq's ground forces. The CENTCOM daily assessment listed the number of tanks and artillery pieces destroyed in each division as a percentage of the overall inventory in each unit. To determine what was destroyed, CENTCOM initially relied heavily on reports from the pilots themselves in their A-10 attack aircraft and reports from missions flown by F-111 aircraft equipped with video and infrared cameras.

CENTCOM needed to use pilot reports to provide the immediate BDAs necessary for mission planning. Using this methodology, CENTCOM assessed that the RG mechanized division lost 32 percent of its

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tanks and artillery by 1 February in the initial air attacks. By 12 February, the division was assessed as having lost 57 percent of its tanks and artillery.

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While high-resolution satellite imagery could not reveal all damage to tanks, OIA believed it was more reliable than pilot reports.

Conflicting Assessments

The difference between the OIA assessment and the initial CENTCOM assessment was striking. For example, while CENTCOM counted 151 tanks in the mechanized division destroyed by 5 February, OIA could detect only five. OIA coordinated its analysis with DIA, which agreed with the CIA assessment, and the results were published in a *National Intelligence Daily* (NID) article on 9 February. OIA also sent a draft of the NID to CENTCOM, and queried the accuracy of CENTCOM's methodology.

Meanwhile, CENTCOM was doing its own reassessment of bomb damage to the RG mechanized division. It used high-quality U-2 photography which took several days to process and thus was not useful for rapid BDA. As a result, it reduced the damage assessment of the division from 57 to 26 percent of its tanks and artillery destroyed. This drastic reduction led CENTCOM to the realization that the A-10 and F-111 damage reports needed to be adjusted. It began to credit only one-third of A-10 reports and one-half of the F-111 reports, resulting in much lower subsequent damage assessments.

Nevertheless, as the bombing shifted to the two RG armored divisions, the difference between the damage assessments done in Washington by OIA and those done in the field by CENTCOM continued to widen. By 12 February, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Judge Webster, and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), Richard Kerr, had become concerned with the growing differences in the CIA and CENTCOM damage assessments to the RG units. The DCI authorized a

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(b)(3)(c)

which highlighted the different CIA and CENTCOM methodologies and damage assessments. He asked, however, that CENTCOM be sent a draft of the article so the field could comment on the difference.

The response was sent by flash priority to the DCI on 21 February by the CENTCOM J2 at General Schwarzkopf's direction. It stated that "continued reassessments and less reliance on mission reports," along with "better targeting as a result of high-resolution imagery from theater assets leads us to the judgment that we may well have been substantially understating our BDA numbers since 14 February." It added that "extremely conservative figures (b)(1) do not provide a realistic basis for doing this." In other words, CENTCOM stood by its own BDA.

The DCI approved article and decided to brief the President and National Security Council personally. He did this on 21 and 22 February, respectively. Unfortunately, the different CIA and CENTCOM assessments were leaked to the press, bringing the issue to national attention.

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In terms of the conflict itself, the BDA dispute was irrelevant, because the coalition ground offensive was launched on schedule on 24 February, and the Iraqi ground forces were quickly defeated. The dispute, however, raised considerable controversy about whose BDA was more accurate.

Comparing Methodologies

Before addressing this controversy, some facts need to be established. By 24 February, at the beginning of the coalition ground assault, CENTCOM's assessment was that 425 tanks in the three RG divisions had been destroyed, 43 percent of the prewar total. The OIA assessment of 23 February was that only 145 tanks had been destroyed, about 19 percent of the prewar total.

Shortly after the cease-fire, on 1 March, a U-2 aircraft took high-quality photography of the battlefield. OIA used this photography to count the tanks in the RG units that had redeployed to face the US ground attack, and those that escaped to areas just north of

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the cease-fire line. It also counted the RG tanks remaining in the revetments they had occupied before the 24 February ground offensive. The assumption was that tanks left in revetments were destroyed or otherwise became inoperable during the air attacks, and the rest left south of the cease-fire were victims of the ground offensive.

The study yielded a count of 166 tanks destroyed by the air attacks. This represented only 21 percent of the force, compared to CENTCOM's estimate of 43 percent. The OIA study also indicated that an additional 29 percent of the RG's tanks were destroyed or abandoned during the ground offensive. Thus, nearly half of the RG tank force remained intact at the end of the conflict.

DoD Reaction

Despite the OIA study, the BDA episode produced a strong negative reaction within the US military. An initial DoD draft report on *Lessons from Intelligence Support During the Gulf War*, dated November 1991, asserted that the "Bomb Damage Assessment produced by CENTCOM tended to be more useful and accurate to the CINCENT" than CIA information from national intelligence sources. It argued that CIA's independent assessments were less accurate than those produced by DoD, and that in wartime, "such assessments must be an integral part of the overall DoD effort." It concluded that the accuracy of CENTCOM's BDA methodology was confirmed by "the rapid defeat of division after division in the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm."

The rapid defeat of Iraqi units during the coalition ground offensive, however, did not confirm the accuracy of either BDA methodology. There is no doubt that the bombing destroyed at least 20 percent of the RG's tanks and contributed to the loss of Iraqi morale and will to fight. It helped to isolate many units, cut them off from communications and resupply, and left them broken and ready to accept Saddam Hussein's initial phoney cease-fire. But it did not decimate the Iraqi tank force.CIA challenged the draft DoD report, and later drafts dropped the strong language about the inaccuracy of CIA's analysis. Nevertheless, an unfortunate consequence of the BDA controversy was a lingering misperception of the facts behind the issue.

Looking Ahead

Fortunately, the controversy is now well behind, and the CIA is moving ahead with efforts to provide even better analytic support to the US military in future crisis situations. DCI Robert Gates created a new Office of Military Affairs in early 1992 to act as a focal point for all interaction between CIA and the military. Through its efforts, CIA is providing increased intelligence support and more coordinated assessments.

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
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In short, CIA's interaction with the US military is now closer than ever, and its analytic expertise is much in demand.

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Iraqi Fiber-Optic and Coaxial Cable Lines.

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Interview with Dr. Stephen Cambone

Perspective of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (U)

"The Secretary of Defense has two obligations: to ensure that elements within the Department that are part of the Intelligence Community are responsive to the DCI [and] that combatant forces and senior Department leadership have the intelligence they need to perform their functions."

Editor's Note: On 11 March 2003, Dr. Stephen Cambone was sworn in as Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, a position created by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to focus on the challenges of intelligence gathering and interpretation in the security environment of the 21st century. Previously, Dr. Cambone served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and as Director of Research for the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He graduated from Catholic University and received his Masters and Ph.D. from the Claremont Graduate School. (U)

Dr. Cambone was interviewed in his Pentagon office on 22 August 2003 by Paul Johnson, Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, and William Nolte, a member of the Editorial Board of Studies in Intelligence. *(U)*

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Dr. Cambone, thank you very much for your time. Could you explain to our readers how and why the new position of Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence was created and what you see as your principal responsibilities? (U//FOUO)

The Department of Defense is both a major contributor to, and consumer of, the products of the Intelligence Community. It has within it a number of organizations that are critical intelligence producers and others that are important intelligence consumers. The Secretary of Defense therefore has two obligations. One is to ensure that those elements within the Department that are part of the Intelligence Community are responsive to the DCI and are providing him the kind of support he needs to perform his duties. At the same time, he must ensure that both combatant forces and senior Department leadership have the intelligence they need to perform their functions. The Secretary of Defense may be unique among Cabinet officials in that he has statutory responsibilities under both Title 10 and Title 50, so the range and scope of his responsibilities are quite large.[1] He therefore came to the conclusion that it would be desirable to have an undersecretary to help him to manage that range of responsibilities. (U//FOUO)

As you are well aware, many studies and commissions in recent years have concluded that the intelligence cycle is "out of balance," and that resources have been allocated disproportionately to new collection systems at the expense of the Community's

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[1] Title 10 of the US Code defines the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense; Title 50 defines, among other things, the national security functions and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence. (U)

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analytic base. Today, escalating intelligence requirements of military operators seem to imply an even greater increase in collection and processing capabilities. Given these, how do we keep from exacerbating this imbalance in the years to come? (U//FOUO)

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What you are pointing to is a possible shift in what has been described as a dualism between collection and analysis. (U//FOUO)

Yes, I think we need to change our thinking in important ways. That's one area, and I can only barely begin to see the glimmer of these possibilities. I don't know that I have a fully developed concept, but to the extent that we start bringing machine-based tools to bear, we may free up an awful lot of people that used to do "analysis." This also implies some important changes in the way we manage our collection. So we have to see how that evolves. (U//FOUO)

Secondly, if we do this right, we also may offload some of the ordinary tasks that go today to the analysts and shift them to the operators. I know that sends shivers up and down some spines, but for much of the intelligence collection activities that take place today, particularly at the tactical level, there is a decreasing need for an intermediary analyst. Now, as you get higher and higher in the echelons of command, to the corps and theater levels, the need for analysis increases, because these consumers are undertaking different tasks, and the interaction with other collection data to support decisionmaking becomes more complex. But the closer you get to the front, the less of that analytic activity is likely to be needed because you're more oriented toward a very specific set of operational and tactical objectives. You know what you need to see: "I need to see the other side of the hill." You know what you need to hear: "I need to hear the signals that are coming from that direction." And so forth. We're entering a very different kind of world. (U//FOUO)

Another thing we need to do is to think about processing procedures in that kind of world, which is going to be driven, as I say, in part by *what* you collect, *how* you collect it, and how people *use* it. But it's also going to be driven by the demand for *speed*. The closer you get to the military operator on the front,

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Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone (center), with interviewers William Nolte (left) and Paul Johnsen (right). (U)

the less valuable the "analysis" of data becomes if, in the process, it is delayed. Now, there are tradeoffs, of course; you can make mistakes. That's why the higher up the chain you go in command, the more analytic work you do need. These intelligence consumers are planning the step after next, and their decision cycle is a bit longer. But the guy on the front line is not in that situation. (U//FOUO)

All that is only going to free up a number of people. But there's not a bonanza of individuals there. In the end, investments must be made in people, too, and we *are* going to have to have more analysts. Both the Secretary and the DCI are committed to increasing the numbers of analysts. There's an effort to find the funds to put against it. It takes nearly as long, however, to bring about a capable analytic force as it does to bring some of these new collection assets on line. So, what's the opportunity? The opportunity is to start to marry changes in the way we do our collection, processing, distribution, and posting, even as we bring in a new cadre of analysts, and start to grow those two parts of the system together, so that when we get 10 years down the road, we in fact have an altered relationship between collection and analysis and at the same time strike the right balance between them. (U//FOUO)

In addition to improving the balance between analysts and collectors, will defense intelligence need to look at organizational arrangements? We have a multitude of all-source analytic organizations. Within DOD, analysts are distributed among DIA, the Military Services, the combatant commands' Joint Intelligence Centers, and other components. For meeting future defense intelligence priorities, is this the most efficient allocation of analytic resources? (U//FOUO)

I have asked Lt. Gen. Gerry Boykin, who is the Deputy Undersecretary for Intelligence and Warfighting Support, to address this issue. He is presently working with each of the Services to look at their requirements and activities and ask what they need to do to meet not only their Title 10 requirements but also to make their contribution to the joint fight. When I say "joint fight," I mean not just the melding of Army, Air Force, and Navy capabilities. In the end, it's an *all-capabilities* strategy that extends to the overall Intelligence Community—the full range of analytic capabilities not only for short-term tactical applications, but for longer-term strategic intelligence needs as well. (U//FOUO)

How are we going to go about this? (b)(3)

The bulk of them are where you would expect, which is in the Army. And the Army's needs are going to only get more complex in terms of their need for information related to land combat, because they're going to become essentially a combined-arms force. They're going to fly everything but large, fixed-wing aircraft, and they're going to be getting feeds from large, fixed-wing aircraft, and they're going to have to get all the information fused together. Now, back to my earlier point: Is that activity "intelligence?" Or is it "operations?" Clearly what's happening out there is that the traditional boundaries between

(b)(3): 50 U.S.C. 403-1 (i)(1) National Security Act of 1947

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intelligence and operations are blurring or just disappearing. If you're living in an information-based environment, where the action of the maneuver unit, if you will—squadron, battle group, or combat brigade—operates as an "extension of the information," then this is now a very different world than we've had before. So, while there is still an important function associated with compiling, collating, and presenting information to someone else for making decisions, there's another function which is becoming increasingly apparent, one that involves a seamless interaction of operations and information where the two become almost indistinguishable. (U//FOUO)

That brings up some really interesting challenges in the relationship between military operator and intelligence provider. Historically, military operators have been more inclined to think that "intel is costing me F-16s," or "costing me ships," or that "it's a cost against operations." But what you're describing is a broader realization that lethal things can't work without intelligence-derived information. (U//FOUO)

That's right. My judgment is that within the military we're well over the old way of thinking. I was talking with the senior Service programmers recently, and they are clear that there needs to be care and attention paid to providing that information, because they cannot function without it. They know that. The tension for us is to assure that the Services, and, by extension, the combatant

"We are in for a change in what we think defense intelligence is, and what role and function it plays."

commanders who use the Services as their component commands provide the joint capability that is the key to success in war. (U//FOUO)

But does that growing realization hold true not only for combatant commanders but for those responsible for design and acquisition, as well as analysis, of military weapons systems? (U//FOUO)

Well, you know, whether it's an aircraft or the Stryker combat vehicle, they're now all in that dual mode. And that's why I'm saying that we are in for a change in what we think defense intelligence is, and what role and function it plays. Because what they do well is increasingly an extension of the information that they're getting, and their intelligence support must be designed to make the information available, clearer, more precise, and more exact. The old mindset is that "the fight takes place, a set piece kind of battle, and then afterwards you sort of step back in with your intelligence to assess the battle damage." It's not going to happen that way anymore. It did not happen that way in Iraq. Battle- or Bomb-Damage Assessments were useful. More critical, however, was predictive intelligence—where will the enemy be, and how can I maneuver to gain an advantage and bring US battlespace dominance to bear. (U//FOUO)

As the distinction between operations and intelligence begins to blur for the military commander, we also have a challenge of getting the "tactical" information to strategic decisionmakers at the national level. They will have a critical need for what we used to think of as "tactical data," which, in the past, often remained in theater. Can the same approach support not only the information-driven operations you described, but also the information-driven decisions inside the beltway? (U//FOUO)

Charlie Allen asked you to pose that question![2] (U//FOUO)

No, Charlie didn't set us up on that. He would have given us the really tough ones. (U//FOUO)


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[2] Charlie E. Allen is Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection. (U)

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> **With better horizontal integration, the collection managers on the DCI's side and on the Secretary of Defense's side can begin to integrate their programs.**

(b)(1)

So, where am I going with all of this? If we achieve better horizontal integration, there will be a way for the collection manager on the DCI's side and the collection manager on the Secretary of Defense's side to begin to integrate their programs and find a way to match the availability of the various platforms, as a function of time and target, to yield—for either the analyst or the immediate "tactical" user—the kind of data that they're going to need. So the key is moving much closer to real-time management of collection, analytic, and distribution systems than we have today. (U//FOUO)

(b)(1)

Right. And that was a relatively limited example of what I'm talking about. Now, if you do that, if you can get that sort of system going, then the question of "what is analysis about" is very interesting. Because it's about possibly different things. You still have to do the long-range planning. But, if you get to the point where you can act quickly on the information, now you're asking yourself the question, what effect did I have? Because you are now an actor in the very intelligence picture that you were trying to understand. You are causing it to change. So it's not any longer something separate from you. You are a part of it. You're inside your own picture, because you did something . . . caused something to happen and, if you're really good, what happens is, you begin to cause to happen what you want

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to have happen. And, now, this whole business about being inside the decision cycle of your adversaries is true, because you're actually painting the picture you're seeing. And then you arrive where Gen. Jumper wants to be, that is, you're predictive.[3] Now you are actually causing to happen what best suits you and what most discomforts your adversary. (U//FOUO)

And in some cases, you're doing this with even more decisions to make. Suppose, for example, you find the communications line an enemy is using. Traditionally, you would move at once, bring the line down. Now, if they're sending back reports of "Things are terrible. The Americans are invincible," you may not want to bring that line down. (U//FOUO)

But that's all part of the planning that goes on in what's called "effects-based operations." You've got to have that in your mind as you go into it. So it seems to me we're on the verge of a huge revolution in the role for the analyst, the collector, and the manager. It's as true for the military and for the operations people inside the Agency as it's going to be, over time, for the analysts and for the political and strategic decisionmakers. (U//FOUO)

Expanding on your thought about "being inside the picture:" Most of us grew up in an intelligence environment where it was almost like having a Miranda card you read off: "Mr. Chairman, I don't make policy; we just provide information." And now as you change the picture, does that distinction go away? (U//FOUO)

"The intelligence side of the house [must] keep the consumer well informed of the effects of his operation."

Well, the intelligence people are not deciding "what picture to paint." They are assembling and relaying that picture. The leadership—the policymaker or military commander, as appropriate—decides whether "I want landscapes," or "I want portraits," or, "I want them in the Dutch style." That's their job. The intelligence side of the house is providing the running commentary, if you will, on how well they're doing. If the intelligence consumer anticipated he was painting a Van Gogh-like picture and his effort results in a Whistler, that's a problem for intelligence. It did not keep that consumer well informed of his operation's effects. (U//FOUO)

You're talking about a flow of information that is simultaneously available to a variety of distinctive intelligence consumers, whether it's Homeland Security, a law enforcement officer, or a military planner. But tactical intelligence collected by theater assets is obviously being refocused and retasked at the direction of the war fighter—the first among equals in this environment. And the concern remains: Buried in the flow of tactical information are data of no value to the military operators driving collection, but data that's critical for other consumers when it's matched up by analysts with all-source reporting. (U//FOUO)

What I think we have here is an issue of *scale*, on the one hand, and *application*, on the other. Let's compare needs of the Community to the tactical commander to illustrate. The struggle between the offense and the defense is one that plays out over a period of time. Stealing the secret that has to do with how a particular element of an adversary's air defense system might work, or his countermeasures, is really hard, and it takes a long time. So although the time sensitivity is different—the dial goes around the face of the clock more slowly for acquisition decisions than for those of the tactical command on the battlefield—both are trying to do the same thing: figure out how an adversary air defense operation works. For the acquisition consumer, we would like to be able to anticipate where that adversary's capabilities are going and put ours out ahead of his, or discourage him from heading in the direction where we don't want him to go. For the tactical commander, he needs to know the secrets to adjust his tactics, techniques, and procedures to succeed in battle. (U//FOUO)

The second factor is application. And you've made the point: A large volume of data is collected in a tactical setting, but the data don't care who applies

[3] US Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John P. Jumper. (U)

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them. They just are. So what you have are different people who have different applications for portions of the same data stream; they often serve different customers, or they have different functions. But it's all the same data, and it isn't going to change because one person is doing political analysis and another is doing economic analysis. The question is how you apply it. (U//FOUO)

In the future environment you're describing, speed of data flow is critical. Will this cause us to rethink what it means to provide for information security? (U//FOUO)

You bet. I think we have to get to a much more sophisticated notion of risk management, as opposed to the more defensive approach where you try to prevent information from escaping. It's going to escape. The way of the world is what it is. So how do you manage that risk of others learning your secrets before you learn theirs? That's the contest we're now in. One can argue that it's always been that way. True, but what's different is that we live in a world of global markets, of the easy exchange of technical, economic, and political information. The open-source-intelligence field is just littered with jewels if you know where to look and how to piece the information together. The nature of the technology that we are dealing with is not such that its characteristics can be kept very long from anyone else. The information proliferates as students travel and go from school to school, and as engineers go from one business to another. There are global conglomerates and companies. All this places us in a risk-management world; you're not in a secure, vaulted environment anymore. And to top it all off, we all live on the electronic highway. So when you put all that together, you know, it's a matter of risk management. Very hard. (U//FOUO)

"While occasionally DOD and CIA may disagree, my sense is that the level of cooperation is vastly superior to what it once was."

To the extent you're supporting different segments of the national security environment, you're working on different time constants. Speed means something different in the acquisition world than in the world of the tactical commander or the policymaker. Nevertheless, managing speed is the only way it seems to me that you can do these things, and having an approach that is continuous forward motion rather than reactive seems to me to give you more security. (U//FOUO)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Dr. Cambone, we appreciate your time and are grateful for the opportunity to communicate your views to our readers. Thank you very much. (U)

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THE CIA AND THE JOHN PATON DAVIES AFFAIR

Robert M. Hathaway

McCarthyism: even now, thirty years after the junior Senator from Wisconsin savaged the American political landscape, the word evokes images of unprincipled ambition, crude fabrications, irresponsibility, disrespect for truth or decency. But McCarthyism, that unreasoning frenzy which for a few years in the early 1950s so agitated the national psyche, was far larger than one individual. Joseph R. McCarthy lent his name to, and came to symbolize the movement, but he neither created nor controlled nor perhaps even understood it. Others, more subtle, less obviously opportunistic, contributed equally to the demoralization which for a time threatened to paralyze creative energies throughout much of the United States Government. Their tactics of intimidation and innuendo immobilized the State Department for a period in the early 1950s. Less often recognized is how narrowly the Central Intelligence Agency escaped a comparable fate.

McCarthy displayed little hesitancy in attacking the CIA when it suited his purposes, but his clumsy onslaughts did not represent the most serious danger the Agency faced in the early 1950s from senators in pursuit of suspected disloyalty. That distinction goes to Senators Pat McCarran and William Jenner, successive chairmen of the Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, who between 1951 and 1954 doggedly marshalled the full power and grandeur of the United States Senate against career Foreign Service Officer John Paton Davies, Jr. In the process, the CIA found itself sucked into the controversy, mired in a situation offering no satisfactory solution but manifest perils to Agency operations and interests.

Meeting: 16 November 1949

The affair began on 16 November 1949, when (b)(3)(c) (b)(1) Agency officers assigned to the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), (b)(3)(c) met with Davies (b)(3)(n) OPC had not yet been integrated into CIA, but occupied an anomalous position suspended between the State and Defense Departments and the Agency. Under this awkward arrangement State's Policy Planning Staff was to furnish policy guidance for specific operations; hence, the November conference with Davies.

Born in China, the son of missionaries, John Paton Davies had entered the diplomatic service in 1931 and over almost two decades had compiled a distinguished overseas record, primarily in China and the Soviet Union. Recognized as one of the Department's most knowledgeable experts on China, Davies had been rotated to Washington in 1949 and assigned to the prestigious Policy Planning Staff, headed by George F. Kennan. It was in this capacity that Davies met with (b)(3)(c)

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Even today the details of the 16 November meeting between Davies and the two OPC representatives remain in dispute. The diplomat apparently suggested that the CIA, through the use of a secure cutout, tap the expertise of six Americans of known leftist, and in several cases probably communist, political views. Davies explained that these six individuals—Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Professo[redacted] Mrs. John K. Fairbank, and Benjamin K. Schwartz—could be of value [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

Summarizing the discussion for their superiors a short time afterwards, (b)(3)(c) recalled that Davies had said that he was aware that some uninformed persons considered Fairbank and his wife communists. The diplomat had scoffed at this and insisted that they were "only very (politically) sophisticated." Davies would later deny, under oath, that he had characterized the Fairbanks in this manner.

Returning to the Agency, (b)(3)(c) relayed the gist of Davies' proposal to their OPC chief and, in a move which would have far-ranging repercussions, to security officers. And here the historian must enter into the slippery realm of motivation. It may be that the two OPC officials left the meeting at State alarmed by what they viewed as a dangerously improper suggestion on the part of Davies. If so, there is no evidence that they made any sort of protest to Davies at the time. More likely, they simply wished to ascertain Security's views on using the six, given their controversial reputations. In either case, as reports of the Davies plan passed up security channels, the tentative nature of the proposal tended to get obscured. Rather, word had it that Davies had requested full-scale clearances for employment of the six. Greatly alarmed, Security informed the DCI, Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, who reacted just as his senior security officers had. He immediately issued a directive prohibiting all operational contact with several of the more objectionable people on Davies' list and then carried word of the diplomat's proposal—personally, by one account—to J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI.

Thus began what ultimately became a three-year, four-cornered struggle involving the State and Justice Departments as well as Congress and the Agency. In retrospect, one can see that once Hillenkoetter passed information about the November conference to the FBI, the chances that an unfriendly source would get a muddled version of the story increased significantly. And of course, this is precisely what happened. McCarran's Internal Security Subcommittee eventually picked up vague rumors and developed an overpowering interest in learning as much as possible about the professional relationship between Davies and the CIA. The Agency, on the other hand, had compelling incentives to deny the Senate this information. Out of the clash of these conflicting desires came a set of managerial problems requiring senior Agency officers to balance institutional imperatives with the unique demands an open society places upon its intelligence services.

CIA objectives throughout the many months of turmoil occasioned by the Davies affair remained consistent and, in principle, straightforward, but their simultaneous fulfillment proved impossible. Essentially, Agency managers

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sought to protect the security of important covert operations; to maintain a tolerable working relationship with the State Department; to preserve CIA's reputation with Congress and the public for integrity and reliability; and to avoid establishing a precedent whereby Congress could demand operational testimony from CIA officers. On four different occasions, Agency officials believed they had successfully reconciled these goals and defused the Davies threat. Each time the rush of events undermined their hopes, forcing the CIA to fall back from optimal objectives to less satisfactory solutions, from there to rearguard tactics, and finally to a policy of cutting its losses as best it could. In the end, the Agency emerged from the episode with secret operations unveiled, covert employees exposed, and healthy working relations with other government bodies jeopardized. One wonders, in retrospect, if the Agency might not have been spared some of this had Hillenkoetter not run to Hoover. For, having raised the alarm, the CIA then found itself unable to disengage from the ensuing controversy, leaving the Agency with the mocking knowledge that its wounds may have been self-inflicted.

Difficulties for Davies

Hillenkoetter's decisive rejection of Davies' proposal effectively ended its consideration. Months passed with barely a mention of the suggested operation. In April 1950, the FBI took sworn statements concerning the November meeting from (b)(3)(c) and OPC director Frank Wisner, but demonstrated little additional interest in the matter. Sometime during the spring a newsman confided to Kennan that he had been told that Davies had attempted to infiltrate communists into CIA. Assured by Kennan that these reports were without substance, the journalist pursued the story no further. Preoccupied with issues of much graver import, Agency officers let the abortive proposal, like countless others similarly advanced and then dropped, slip into the nether world of rejected ideas.

Davies, meanwhile, was experiencing difficulties from other quarters, arising from the one blot on his otherwise admirable record. In November 1945, Major General Patrick J. Hurley, American Ambassador to China, had suddenly resigned amidst widely publicized accusations against Davies and a number of the other Foreign Service officers in China. Davies, the volatile Hurley charged, in reporting that the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek was corrupt, unpopular, and out of touch with the Chinese populace, had indicated undue sympathy toward Chiang's rivals, the communists led by Mao Tse-tung. Worse yet, Hurley continued, Davies and other career diplomats had used their official positions to undermine Chiang and had sabotaged the American policy of promoting a stable non-communist government in China.

Never proved, these allegations nonetheless found ready devotees among Americans unwilling to believe that Chiang's ultimate defeat might have been self-induced. Those who accepted the essential validity of Hurley's accusations set out to demonstrate that communist penetration and influence in the Executive Branch had significantly contributed to the dismaying outcome of the Chinese civil war. The State Department in particular provided a tempting target for those who would free the government of the scourge of

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internal subversion, and Davies was only one of a number of Far Eastern experts under fire even before the outbreak of the Korean War. Finally, in June 1951, one week after promoting him to Class 1 Foreign Service Officer, the State Department suspended Davies pending investigation of the recurring charges voiced by Chiang's admirers in the American Congress, McCarran and Jenner among them. A month later, the department announced that its Loyalty-Security Board had cleared the diplomat of all accusations and returned him to active duty.

Such a finding was guaranteed to enflame critics of the Truman administration's China policy. By this time staff aides to Senator McCarran had picked up rumors of Davies' 1949 meeting with (b)(3)(c) Robert Morris, the subcommittee counsel, later confided that these leaks had come from State Department officials made uneasy by the FBI inquiries that had followed Hillenkoetter's complaints to Hoover. On 3 August 1951, McCarran's Internal Security Subcommittee asked Wisner to appear before it to testify about his knowledge of Davies' proposal to utilize the six Americans of suspect political views. Suddenly, nearly two years after the initial conference at State, the matter had become public. A new and threatening chapter in the affair was about to begin.

To Testify or Not to Testify

The subcommittee's request presented General W. Bedell Smith, who had replaced Hillenkoetter as DCI in late 1950, with a tricky problem. There was, first of all, the matter of security. Should Wisner testify, this might lead to senatorial inquiries as to who attended the November conference with (b)(3)(c) Davies. Because both were then engaged in sensitive (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) operations the surfacing of their names could have (b)(3)(n) serious adverse consequences. Moreover, an informal understanding had been established that no CIA official other than the Director or his designated representative should testify before congressional committees on operational matters. To allow Wisner, (b)(3)(c) to violate this rule would set a precedent that might subsequently come back to haunt the Agency.

On the other hand, McCarran, as chairman of the full Judiciary Committee, had been extremely helpful to the Agency in matters relating to both appropriations (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) Because an irritated McCarran could cause the Agency considerable (b)(3)(n) discomfort, prudence dictated a cooperative attitude toward the subcommittee's request. CIA should not put itself in a position with either the Congress or the public of appearing to duck an issue of this sort, Legislative Counsel Walter Pforzheimer warned. The Agency must maintain the rapport it had established on the Hill, CIA's public affairs officer added, and not jeopardize its reputation for integrity.

Thus, faced with the subcommittee's request for Wisner's testimony, the Agency's initial response was to forestall a formal appearance. General Smith instructed Pforzheimer to tell the subcommittee that if he, Smith, had been DCI in 1949, he might well have authorized action along the lines proposed by

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Davies.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

Above all, the DCI emphasized to his staff, CIA must elicit a promise from McCarran that none of Wisner's subordinates would be called before the subcommittee, and that it would raise no questions about Agency operations.

Complicating Smith's choices further was the stance assumed by the State Department. Davies was hampered in his defense, State's legal adviser argued in a stormy meeting with the DCI, by the fact that he was forbidden to discuss the 1949 conference with the McCarran subcommittee because of the security requirements surrounding OPC operations. The government owed Davies protection for placing himself in this position, he continued. Should matters come to a showdown between sacrificing Davies and imperiling the security of OPC operations, there would be little question: the Department and the Secretary would stand by Davies. Upon hearing that State would endanger an important operation which had taken months to set up for the protection of a single Foreign Service officer, no matter how capable, Smith, in the words of one closely involved in the affair, "exploded." No doubt the priorities inherent in the State Department position seemed skewed to one accustomed to the military tradition of subordinating the individual to the group. But State was unbending, thereby adding one more hazard to a question already treacherous enough.

Conscious of these considerations, and directed by Smith to get Wisner excused from testifying, Pforzheimer arranged for Morris, the subcommittee counsel, to come to CIA on 8 August for an informal meeting. The conference got off to an inauspicious start when Wisner, already exasperated by what he considered the subcommittee's harassment of Davies, offended Morris, a casual acquaintance of many years' standing, by his frosty formality. To make matters worse, Wisner, who had not even heard of the Davies proposal until months after it had been advanced and dropped, obviously had only sketchy hearsay knowledge of the 1949 meeting. His incomplete and sometimes misleading responses served to heighten Morris' suspicions. Thus, what had originated as a sincere effort to explain the CIA's position resulted instead in raising further doubts about both Davies' plan and the Agency's integrity in the mind of this key congressional staff member.

Davies himself testified before the subcommittee on 8 August and again on the 10th, refusing to reveal details of his proposed operation and fostering the impression among members of the committee that he had something to hide. Meanwhile, an internal search of CIA records had unearthed a (b)(3)(c) memorandum which added considerably to the Agency's knowledge of the facts surrounding Davies' suggestion. Wisner learned additional details by interviewing (b)(3)(c) For the first time, CIA officials came to possess the information they needed in order to defend themselves and their organization from congressional suspicions. Armed with this newly-discovered knowledge,

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Pforzheimer and Carlisle H. Humelsine, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration and the official in charge of the State Department's loyalty program, called upon McCarran and Homer Ferguson, the ranking Republican on the Internal Security Subcommittee, on 15 August. Pforzheimer and Humelsine made the point that Davies had been correct in refusing to discuss with the subcommittee the 16 November meeting since it was classified Top Secret. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) Repeating the Director's observation that proposals such as that made by Davies were not improper, Pforzheimer informed the Senators that the DCI had spoken highly of Davies, whom Smith had known while serving as American Ambasssador in Moscow, and possessed no doubts about his loyalties. Both Pforzheimer and Humelsine left the meeting encouraged, believing McCarran and Ferguson were inclined to let the matter rest. A serious threat, so it appeared, had died aborning.

But two months later, random chance intervened. In October 1951, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) that Morris had requested that he appear before the Internal Security Subcommittee to relate his version of the 16 November 1949 conference.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

Already convinced that Davies had committed perjury during his August testimony, Morris saw no reason why (b)(3)(c) could not safely be called upon to testify. In this manner did capricious fortune undo in a minute the hard work of Pforzheimer and Humelsine.

Threatened Relationship

Legislative Counsel Pforzheimer, upon learning of Morris' request, was (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) simultaneously alarmed, embarrassed, and incensed. OPC had led him to believe that This consideration is what had induced McCarran and Ferguson to drop their investigation in August. Now, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) Pforzheimer's reliability, if not his honesty, had been called into question, threatening to undermine the relationship of trust and candor he had established with McCarran and Morris over the years. Without this reputation for straight dealing, CIA would stand defenseless before suspicious congressional inquisitors.

Of even more immediate concern, Morris' demand to have (b)(3)(c) testimony reopened all the troubling problems thought to have been successfully contained in August. A complete disclosure by (b)(3)(c) of the Davies

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incident would not only establish an unfortunate precedent for CIA, but would contradict the position the Agency had previously taken in substantiating Davies' refusal to testify. Furthermore, (b)(3)(c) appearance before the subcommittee might necessitate a later court appearance, with the attendant security implications. At the very least, cooperating with Morris would create a serious breach in CIA's relations with the Department of State.

Again, equally compelling arguments supported complying with Morris' request. The prospects of antagonizing senators of the stature of McCarran and Ferguson pleased no one in CIA. Moreover, as Pforzheimer pointed out, the Agency "could be muddied by the inference that it is deliberately attempting to shield Davies." And even this might not be the end of it. The subcommittee members, Pforzheimer warned, "may be sufficiently irritated to make public all of the facts in the Davies controversy with resultant damage to CIA security. It is known that they feel deeply about the Davies matter, to the point that they feel his presence in the Department of State is more damaging to our national interest than any revelations they might make on CIA."

Senior Agency officials gathered in the DCI's office on 17 October to weigh the alternatives. Once again, they ea(b)(3)(c)d that the preferable course was to persuade McCarran to excuse (b)(3)(c) from testifying. Smith directed Pforzheimer [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)
Morris and McCarran in order to establish CIA's good faith. The Legislative Counsel was then to make the case for (b)(3)(c) not being required to appear. If the subcommittee persisted, (b)(3)(c) should acknowledge that Davies had made the recommendations in question, since this was already a matter of record. He was not to go into the circumstances surrounding the suggestion, as this would necessarily involve discussing information still classified.

Informed of the DCI's position, State's Humelsine angrily accused the CIA of throwing Davies to the wolves. One could not separate the unclassified features of the Davies affair from the classified aspects, he protested. Pleading tha(b)(3)(c) be restricted in his explanations in the same manner as Davies had been, he insisted that CIA stand, as he put it, "on all or nothing at all."

Pforzheimer then looked up Morris. Explaining CIA's position, he argued [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)
Next seeking out McCarran, Pforzheimer found the Senator quite sympathetic and somewhat embarrassed that he had forgotten his pledge of 15 August not to call for (b)(3)(c) testimony. McCarran then directed Morris to cancel (b)(3)(c) appearance and indicated to Pforzheimer that he wished to confer with CIA representatives to review the whole affair before doing anything more on the Davies matter. Reporting back to Smith, Pforzheimer noted that CIA need take no further steps unless McCarran requested a briefing. For the second time in barely two months, the Legislative Counsel concluded, a potentially damaging situation had been averted.

And again, the problem would not go away. By early February 1952, word reached the CIA that the subcommittee was once more thinking of callin(b)(3)(c) to testify. Pforzheimer returned for another attempt at

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convincing Morris that such action would be ill advised, but this time with little effect. On 13 February, (b)(3)(c) received a subpoena ordering him to appear before a closed session of the Internal Security Subcommittee two days later. An agitated Humelsine again urged CIA to instruct (b)(3)(c) not to testify. The Agency explained to him that the subcommittee already possessed the report (b)(3)(c) had given the FBI nearly two years earlier; to refuse to discuss matters about which the subcommittee was already informed would leave the Agency in an indefensible position. Rebuffed by CIA, Humelsine then insisted that the White House be consulted. On the afternoon of 14 February, he, Wisner, and Lawrence Houston, CIA's General Counsel, met with the President's legal adviser, Charles Murphy. Humelsine made an impassioned plea for the President to issue an executive directive forbidding (b)(3)(c) in the interests of national security, from testifying. Murphy, on the other hand, saw no reason to involve Truman in the controversy and declined to carry State's request to the President.

(b)(3)(c) Appearance

Thus, on the morning of 15 February 1952, (b)(3)(c) appeared in executive session before the Internal Security Subcommittee to answer the Senators' questions about the November 1949 meeting with Davies. Before appearing he had been instructed by Wisner and Houston to testify only on the sketchy factual details he had previously given the FBI. Above all, he was to refuse to divulge information involving operations. Stuart Hedden, CIA Inspector General, had then cross-examined (b)(3)(c) to impress upon him the line of demarcation between permissible testimony and matters which should not be discussed. So prepared, (b)(3)(c) entered the subcommittee chambers. CIA had lost the first round.

At the noontime recess, (b)(3)(c) had some more bad news. The subcommittee wanted him to go over the same ground again that afternoon, this time in open session. Moreover, Morris had somehow obtained (b)(3)(c) name. Pforzheimer and General Counsel Houston, doubly alarmed by these revelations, hurried to find the subcommittee counsel. Again, they reviewed the security aspects of the situation, emphasizing the importance of keeping (b)(3)(c) name out of the proceedings. They then attended the open session to monitor the extent to which sensitive information was revealed. The 1949 conversation with Davies was brought fully into the record, together with repeated references to CIA and OPC, although [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) After the sessic(b)(3)(c) refused to talk with the press and departed immediately [redacted]

Over the next several days Agency officers tried to assess the amount of damage Agency interests had incurred. The DCI, attempting to head off further subcommittee proceedings, sent word to Morris that if he felt compelled to involve the Agency in a public fashion further, Smith would be forced to issue a statement in reply. Such a declaration would observe that although CIA did not know what Davies specifically intended by his proposal, it was necessary for the Agency, due to the nature of its functions and duties,

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to consider the views, recommendations, and advice of people with all shades of political beliefs, and from time to time to utilize all types of people. Undeterred, McCarran forwarded transcripts of (b)(3)(c) testimony to the Department of Justice, along with a request for advice as to possible perjury charges.

But if CIA officers hoped this would satisfy the subcommittee's need for action, they were quickly disabused of such an idea. Within a week, word got back to the Agency that Morris had contacted (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) Investigation soon disclosed the distressing news that the subcommittee counsel had written (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) asking him to confirm (b)(3)(c) testimony concerning the 1949 conference with Davies. To Agency officials, this appeared in direct violation of the pledge Morris and Senator Ferguson had given at the time (b)(3)(c) testified to protect (b)(3)(c) connection with CIA. Finding that Ferguson was similarly vexed at not having been consulted in advance of this action did little to assuage Agency worries. Apparently Morris had acted upon instructions from McCarran, who was incensed to learn that Davies was to be assigned a new and highly responsible position in Germany and had convinced himself that the State Department would not take action against its Foreign Service officer unless forced to do so by the Senate.

Houston and Pforzheimer discussed the matter several times over the following days with McCarran, Ferguson, Morris, and J. G. Sourwine, counsel to the full Judiciary Committee. Each time their indications of alarm that information of this sort had been sent through the regular mails met the now unreassuring reply that the subcommittee had no intention of implicating (b)(3)(c) publicly. Hoping at least to determine whether the letter had been tampered with prior to reaching (b)(3)(c) Agency technicians asked to examine the envelope in which it arrived. This, too, came to naught, for (b)(3)(c) had destroyed the envelope upon its receipt.

Finally, after a week of CIA appeals, Pforzheimer was able to report that he had reached a new modus vivendi with Sourwine and Morris. All misunderstandings about security in the Davies case had been eliminated, the Legislative Counsel observed. The congressional staffers had assured him that Agency security concerns would be paramount in their future transactions. Furthermore, they had no intention of forwarding (b)(3)(c) reply to the Department of Justice for use in any perjury proceedings against Davies. Their only purpose in requesting a deposition from (b)(3)(c) was to insure that (b)(3)(c) testimony was not subject to attack. As they assumed (b)(3)(c) would support (b)(3)(c) they would not need to make public use of his statement. So assured, Agency officers relaxed a bit and allowed themselves to hope that they had escaped with most operations still intact.

An Opened Envelope

Congressional suspicions, however, had become too inflated for such a tidy resolution to the affair. Weeks passed without word from (b)(3)(c) Whispers on Capitol Hill suggested that the Agency had ordered its employee

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to delay his response. CIA, Sourwine intimated, had come completely under the domination of a State Department intent upon thwarting the subcommittee. Finally an envelope [redacted] arrived [redacted] Certain that it held [redacted] affidavit for the McCarran subcommittee, and aware of congressional irritation at the lengthy delay already incurred, Houston opened the envelope. As he expected, it contained the missing reply. But when Pforzheimer carried the letter to the Hill, he was greeted with frosty innuendoes about interfering with the United States mails. Trying to expedite matters, Houston had instead fostered veiled accusations that CIA had tried to doctor the text of [redacted] document. Such were the passions building around the case. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

On 10 June 1952, committee counsel Sourwine informed Pforzheimer that McCarran planned to meet the following morning with Assistant Attorney General James M. McInerney to discuss [redacted] statement and a possible perjury case against Davies. Pforzheimer quickly reminded Sourwine of his pledge not to make [redacted] name public or to use the [redacted] affidavit in any legal proceedings. But in reporting the next day on McCarran's meeting with McInerney, Sourwine informed the CIA Legislative Counsel that the Senator had remarked that while State would probably go to any lengths to protect Davies, McCarran was similarly prepared to go to any lengths to obtain Davies' dismissal. McInerney then asked, Sourwine continued, if this included utilizing [redacted] testimony. McCarran had replied that he would indeed be willing to do so.

Nor was this all. Sourwine also indicated that the subcommittee knew of [redacted]

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Compartmentation, so essential to many Agency activities, had lured the CIA into still further danger.

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Tentative Bargain

Back in Washington McCarran's administrative assistant advised Pforzheimer that "things were getting rough" in the Davies matter. So warned, Pforzheimer arranged to meet on 24 June with McCarran and Sourwine. Again he went over the consequences to CIA operations should [redacted] But he found the Senator more convinced than ever that Davies' 1949 proposal was part of a nefarious plot to subvert the CIA. The subcommittee, McCarran confided, had a sound perjury case against the diplomat. McCarran went on to complain that Pforzheimer was asking him to "connive" in "treasonable action." If Agency security were so important, he continued, then it was up to the CIA to force the State Department to act. A few words more were sufficient to hammer out a tentative bargain: the subcommittee would suppress legal action against Davies providing the Agency persuaded State to move him to a post less sensitive than his current one in Germany. McCarran would withhold action for a short time pending word of the outcome of CIA's representations to the State Department. Once more it appeared that a way had been found to terminate the messy business.

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Wisner and Inspector General Hedden met with Humelsine and one of his deputies on 30 June and there presented in the strongest possible terms the case for reassigning Davies. [redacted]

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But this time it was State's turn to balk. Humelsine reported the Agency position to David K. E. Bruce, who in Dean Acheson's absence was Acting Secretary of State. Bruce ruled that if the Internal Security Subcommittee possessed sufficient information to indict Davies, it should do so; but in the interim, State would stand by its man. Davies would not be transferred simply to placate McCarran. Hedden replied that he hoped that the State Department would at least intercede with the Attorney General to head off any presentation to a grand jury.

Although McCarran and some of his colleagues had by this time progressed beyond the point where any "deal" was possible. On 2 July 1952, while the CIA and the State Department were still negotiating about the possibility of relocating Davies, the subcommittee released its report on the Institute of Pacific Relations. Included was a 4½-page summary of the Davies case, complete with a staff memorandum forwarded to the Justice Department in February that detailed the apparent contradictions between the Davies and (b)(3)(c) testimony. The report stated categorically that Davies had lied in denying that he had recommended that CIA use certain individuals having communist connections, and recommended that the Justice Department submit to a grand jury the question of whether the diplomat had perjured himself. The historian can only wonder at McCarran's intentions eight days earlier in promising Pforzheimer to delay action until the Agency had had an opportunity to persuade State to reassign Davies.

A threat to CIA security now arose from a new direction. Justice, prodded by the McCarran subcommittee report, asked the Agency to open its files for inspection by the FBI. The State Department, receiving a similar request, quickly complied, but Agency officers, although realizing that their refusal would be unfavorably compared to State's cooperation, concluded that yielding in this manner would pose unacceptable risks. Repeated FBI requests to interview Kermit Roosevelt and (b)(3)(c) OPC officials who had conferred with Davies three weeks before the 16 November meeting, also had to be denied in the interests of security and on the grounds that neither had any independent knowledge of the case. Gradually the conviction grew among senior Agency figures that the Justice Department was seeking to saddle them with responsibility for Justice's failure to proceed against Davies. Assistant Attorney General McInerney's office had concluded that the evidence submitted by the McCarran subcommittee simply did not justify legal action, but realized such a ruling was certain to draw congressional ire. If the CIA could be portrayed as the agency that was withholding vital information, Justice would be off the hook.

Apprehensions about their personal vulnerability flourished among some of the Agency officers most closely involved in the affair. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

By early July both (b)(3)(c) were discussing the feasibility of employing legal counsel. Reports circulated that General William

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Donovan, the legendary head of OSS, might accept the case without charge. To still some of the rumors, the Agency informed (b)(3)(c) that it would secure a lawyer for them at CIA expense.

Libel Suit Testimony

For the next several months it was possible to hope that such extreme measures would not be necessary, for the controversy slipped from the headlines amidst the news of the nominating conventions and the beginning of the presidential campaign. Then Smith inadvertently touched off a new furor in September while testifying in federal court in a libel suit brought by Senator McCarthy against Senator William Benton. McCarthy had worked Davies' name, immaterial though it was, into the proceedings, leading Smith to declare that he still considered Davies a "very loyal and capable officer." But this judgment was lost in the uproar occasioned by the DCI's offhand admission that he believed the CIA contained communists. He immediately denied knowing of any but added that simple prudence dictated that he operate on the assumption that the Agency had been penetrated. He would soon discover that not everyone was prepared to let him wriggle out of his careless statement so easily.

Less than two weeks later, the McCarran subcommittee published the hearings held during its investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Included was the verbatim transcript of Davies' executive session testimony in August 1951. While still omittin(b)(3)(c) name, the record allowed outsiders a closer look into Agency operations than anyone in CIA desired. Then on 11 October 1952, the subcommittee announced that it had recently asked the Justice Department to review the Davies case again. Drawing attention to Smith's recent statement concerning possible communist infiltration of the CIA, the subcommittee observed that it had in the past acceded to the argument that CIA interests might be adversely affected by full disclosure of the evidence in the Davies case. But now, it continued, Smith's startling admission had drastically weakened the force of this argument. "In our judgment," the subcommittee concluded, "the national security issue involved outweighs the narrow interest of any one particular agency."

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Meanwhile, official proceedings in the John Paton Davies case continued. On 17 October, the State Department's Loyalty-Security Board issued the besieged diplomat another favorable review. Two weeks later, the President's Loyalty Review Board calle(b)(3)(c) to repeat his testimony concerning the

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1949 conference with Davies. Smith was summoned as well. Noting that he and Davies had worked together in Moscow, the DCI averred that neither by word nor action had the Foreign Service officer given any reason to look upon him in any way other than as a loyal, able public servant. In mid-December this panel, too, announced that it had found "no reasonable doubt" about the loyalty of Davies, and therefore endorsed the favorable recommendation of State's board. But it ominously added: "It is not within the province of the Loyalty Review Board to approve or disapprove of the wisdom or judgment of Mr. Davies as a Foreign Service Officer and we do not purport to do so."

Most Painful Aspect

For CIA the new year of 1953 brought not a fresh start, but further trials. The President-elect, General Eisenhower, had nominated DCI Smith for the number two position in the State Department. McCarran, sensing that this was his last opportunity to obtain testimony from the Agency on the Davies matter, quickly moved to place a hold on Smith's nomination. Under the rules of senatorial courtesy, this block had to be honored until McCarran lifted it, something the Senator let be known would not occur until he had received satisfaction on the Davies affair. CIA thus entered into the most painful aspect of what had been all along a painful affair.

Beginning on 13 January 1953, the McCarran subcommittee conducted an exhaustive eleven-day round of hearings. Smith, Wisner, (b)(3)(c) Houston, Pforzheimer, and a number of other Agency officers all received subpoenas, as did Kennan, Humelsine, and Admiral Hillenkoetter. These January hearings were unprecedented, and would remain so for another two decades. Never in the Agency's first quarter century, even in the aftermath of the U-2 incident and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, would so many CIA officials be hauled before a congressional committee in such a confrontational atmosphere. Old Agency hands repeatedly use the word "traumatic" to describe the demand that they discuss on-going operations with those outside the intelligence business. For a brief moment the crazed excitement of the McCarthy years threatened to cripple the CIA as it had the State Department.

A strategy session among senior Agency officers generated the decision that when the subpoenas were delivered, "service should be accepted and testimony given in the full spirit of cooperation." The ensuing days, however, brought rough moments which belie this air of amiability. (b)(3)(c) reported that the subcommittee's questioning was far more thorough and searching than it had been during his original testimony. Houston was again quizzed about his actions (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) Wisner was asked if he had consulted with anyone outside CIA about the submission of evidence in the case. Momentarily forgetting the White House meeting with Charles Murphy a year earlier, when Humelsine had attempted to secure a presidential order forbidding (b)(3)(c) to testify before the subcommittee, Wisner replied in the negative. Reminded of the conference during a recess, he then tried to amend his statement, leading to renewed suspicions that he was not being fully candid with the subcommittee.

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At one point in the proceedings McCarran noticed that Pforzheimer was following the testimony while referring to a batch of documents in his lap. Inquiring about these papers, the Senator was informed that they were diary entries and office memoranda compiled by the Legislative Counsel. "Put them in the record," McCarran ordered, sweeping aside Pforzheimer's objections that these were privileged records. An emergency call to the DCI avoided an ugly confrontation, for Smith, no doubt weary of the entire affair and desiring only to resolve the matter expeditiously, quickly authorized the unusual step of allowing Pforzheimer to hand the required materials over to the subcommittee. Never before had the Agency been forced to open its files in this manner, nor would it do so again for twenty years.

Smith's concession proved, as he later told Pforzheimer, "a blessing in disguise." Once the subcommittee had looked through the documents, Agency officers noticed an immediate and "remarkable" change in the tenor of the hearings insofar as CIA was involved. The confrontational atmosphere disappeared as McCarran and his colleagues came to appreciate that the Agency had been dealing forthrightly with them from the beginning. The requisitioned records established CIA bona fides in a way that oral testimony never could have. Shortly after receiving the Pforzheimer files, McCarran withdrew his hold on the Smith nomination, which then sailed with ease through the Senate. Moreover, the integrity of the Agency's relationship with McCarran and his staff was reestablished and fortified.

But not without a price, for during the hearings the Agency had been forced to lay itself bare in a manner without parallel, setting forth internal communications, operational plans, and tradecraft secrets in profuse detail. If the ultimate outcome was not as destructive to Agency interests as many had feared, the process nonetheless left an offensive aftertaste among CIA personnel. A new wariness, a faint sense of trust betrayed, crept into Agency thinking about its ties with Congress.

Designed to Draw a Noose

More immediately, the subcommittee closed its hearings by voting unanimously to ask the Justice Department to reconsider whether Davies should not be indicted for perjury. Agency officers were hardly surprised; early in the proceeding (b)(3)(c) had reported that his only definite reaction after being interrogated was a feeling that the whole affair "seemed designed to draw a noose around Mr. Davies." Davies' transfer to Lima in May 1953 did nothing to dampen these intentions, despite the fact that his reassignment was widely seen as a demotion meant to remove him from the public scrutiny that his sensitive position in Bonn brought him. With the conclusion of the January hearings, CIA's direct involvement in the case became less frequent, although McCarran continued to skirmish with the State and Justice Departments with some degree of regularity.

From time to time, Agency officers received reminders that the affair still held dangers for CIA. On 30 July 1953, the subcommittee directed that a transcript of the Top Secret hearings be forwarded for editing by the new

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DCI, Allen Dulles, in case it became necessary to make the record public. After reviewing the bulky manuscript, the Agency wrote Senator William E. Jenner, who had replaced Democrat McCarran as chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee in the wake of the Republican victories the previous November, that the amount of testimony dealing with sensitive information pertaining to intelligence sources and methods was too extensive for routine editing. As a consequence, CIA hoped that public disclosure could be avoided. In September, DDCI Charles P. Cabell authorized turning the entire unexpurgated record over to the Department of State for use in its new security investigation of Davies, while noting the Agency's regret over further dissemination of this highly classified material. A short time later, Dulles approved a similar transfer to the Justice Department. In each instance, Agency officers bemoaned the risks implicit in permitting wider access to CIA secrets but felt themselves powerless to prevent it.

Inevitably, additional revelations trickled into the public domain. In August the Internal Security Subcommittee released a new report entitled "Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments," which included a transcript of (b)(3)(c) 1950 affidavit to the FBI. In November, Senator McCarthy delivered a widely discussed address critical of the Eisenhower Administration for not firing Davies. McCarthy noted that the McCarran subcommittee had asked the Department of Justice to indict Davies "because he lied under oath about his activities in trying—listen to this—in trying to put communists and espionage agents in key spots in the Central Intelligence Agency." A front-page article in the *New York Times* two days later discussed the Senator's charges and, in the process, brought them to the attention of people who would never have dreamed of reading a McCarthy speech.

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Nor did this stop the hemorrhage of heretofore undisclosed information. On 9 December the *Times* carried another page one story, complete with a headline featuring the codeword "Tawny Pipit," identified as Davies' original designation for psychological warfare operations against the Chinese. The article quoted extensively from (b)(3)(c) testimony before the subcommittee. Two days later, *U.S. News and World Report* devoted 19 pages to what it called, in a cover headline, "The Strange Case of John P. Davies."

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Finally, to complete this flood of public speculation and comment, George Kennan a few days later wrote a letter to the *Times* protesting the treatment accorded Davies and observing that his forced departure from governmental service "would be a serious loss to the public interest."

Meanwhile, new dangers loomed on the horizon. The Justice Department renewed its request to interview Kermit Roosevelt, despite the Agency's earlier refusal. More alarmingly, the Internal Security Subcommittee returned to the idea first broached the previous July of publishing an edited version of the

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voluminous January 1953 hearings. Such a threat, if carried out, would represent the most damaging blow yet to Agency interests. The subcommittee testimony still contained a great deal of extremely sensitive material.

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Yet, over and above these arguments, wrote an alarmed Agency officer, "there remains the ever present thought that if CIA can be hauled up to testify before these Congressional Committees, and that such testimony, even though given in Top Secret Executive Session, would be subject to unlimited publication, or even edited publication," this could not fail to shake confidence in the integrity of the Agency's files and in its ability to protect its confidential information. This would be true particularly in regard to the Agency's relationships with foreign intelligence services. "The entire principle of operating a secret intelligence organization is involved in this point," this official warned.

Fortunately for CIA, the onrush of events made release of this testimony unnecessary. In March 1954, shortly after the Justice Department announced that the evidence did not warrant grand jury proceedings against Davies, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles requested that a special Security Hearing Board reconsider the case. The panel's hearings meandered through the summer, necessitating yet another round of testimony from Smith, (b)(3)(c) Davies, and others. In August the board recommended Davies' dismissal, not for disloyalty, but for having demonstrated "a lack of judgment, discretion, and reliability." On 5 November 1954, Secretary of State Dulles concurred in this recommendation. Career Foreign Service Officer John Paton Davies was fired. And with Davies' departure went much of the threat from Congress that had dogged CIA officials for nearly five years.

Lasting Damages

But Davies' discharge did not erase the damages the Agency had sustained during the long siege.

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Agency operations and activities had been subjected to minute investigation by outsiders with little appreciation of the realities of running an intelligence service. The Agency's ability to work in tandem with State had been seriously jeopardized, while for a bit the respect and trust CIA had carefully cultivated on the Hill had been threatened. To one degree or another, CIA projects, procedures, personnel, and policies had all been compromised.

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This unhappy outcome had not resulted from deliberate unfriendliness on the part of the McCarran subcommittee. McCarran himself had given ample proof in the past of his support for the Agency, and his actions even during this affair did not reflect outright hostility toward CIA, although he did distrust Wisner and Houston. On several occasions, he and his aides worked with the Agency to accommodate its unique requirements. (b)(3)(c) appearance before the subcommittee was delayed several times at CIA's request, [redacted] Moreover, the subcommittee, despite its threats to go public, sat on the Top Secret hearings of January 1953 for nearly two years without releasing them. But neither was McCarran, increasingly convinced of Davies' perfidy, prepared to allow his amiability with CIA to keep him from ferreting out disloyalty. CIA had the misfortune to get caught in the middle, between a Senator determined to drive Davies from government service and a State Department almost as determined to protect one of its own.

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Lessons

In reviewing this affair from the safety of thirty years, one cannot avoid being struck by the dangers inherent in the compartmentation which an intelligence organization necessarily requires. Wisner was poorly informed in his original meeting with Morris because reports of the 16 November conference had passed through OPC security rather than operational channels. As a consequence, the subcommittee counsel came away from his talk with Wisner convinced the Agency officer was lying and had something to hide. Similarly, OPC's failure to inform Pforzheimer [redacted] placed the Legislative Counsel in an untenable position with McCarran and Ferguson [redacted] Bu without a doubt, OPC's failure to clear matters with the Agency's legislative liaison people [redacted] provides the most damning illustration of the hazards offered by compartmentation. As essential as secure compartmentation is to an intelligence service, these episodes emphasize the need for insuring that some centralized coordination takes place as well.

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The Davies affair also provides a disconcerting example of how small incidents, each unimportant in itself, can snowball into major problems. Wisner was perhaps unnecessarily cool toward Morris, who came to believe the Agency was being less than fully candid with the subcommittee. [redacted] Smith made an impolitic but nonetheless reasonable remark that he had to assume the CIA harbored communists. Testifying in January 1953, Wisner momentarily forgot a meeting in the White House a year earlier. Although none of these unfortunate occurrences was of any great significance, each compounded those before it, crescendoing into a controversy out of all proportion to the cause. Even acknowledging that these incidents could be expected to trigger congressional reaction, one still marvels that they combined to present CIA with a full-scale credibility problem with several of the subcommittee members.

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The historian reflecting on these matters returns again and again to the fickle role played by chance in this whole business. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) Perhaps an element of poetic justice was at work here. It was CIA, after all, that had initially raised the alarm about Davies' loyalties. Later, when Agency officers desperately wished the issue would disappear, fate itself, so it seemed, conspired to thwart CIA desires.

Finally, the John Paton Davies affair reminds us how difficult it is, even under the best of circumstances, to reconcile the needs of a secret intelligence organization with the values and practices of a democracy. The American system of checks and balances guarantees built-in tensions between the Executive and Legislative branches. Added to these is the traditional American suspicion of power exercised clandestinely. As a result, the anomaly of a secret agency in an open society presents Congressmen of all political and ideological hues—those with the best of motives and those with something other than fully admirable intentions—with a well-nigh irresistible temptation to probe into CIA affairs. More than that, it demands that they do so.

As for the matter of Davies' actual guilt or innocence, this essay has made no judgment (although the author does possess convictions on the subject). What is noteworthy for our purposes is that the episode handed the CIA a set of managerial problems which for a time threatened to undermine its entire intelligence mission. In the end the Agency survived, thanks in large measure to a reputation for straight dealing and an ability to make concessions with grace once they had become unavoidable. But something had been sacrificed as well. Having lived through the trauma of a congressional investigation, Agency officers could no longer approach the Hill with the same sense of partnership, of shared purposes, that had prevailed during the initial years of CIA's history. Subsequent events would demonstrate that neither the Agency nor the Congress nor the nation was well served by this loss.

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The Nicaraguan military buildup

Photo Intelligence and Public Persuasion

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In late 1981, President Reagan and his senior policymakers assigned a high-level national priority to Nigaragua because they feared the spread of the Sandinista revolution throughout Central America and because they were disturbed by the growth of Soviet and Cuban security ties to Nicaragua. The common denominator underlying these concerns was the Soviet-sponsored military buildup of the Sandinistas. In trying to form a nationwide consensus on US policy toward the Sandinistas, the President, during his first six years in office, conducted a public relations offensive that included the release of the contents of defector reports and press conferences given by Salvadoran and Nicaraguan defectors. Most often, however, the administration used photo intelligence to portray the situation in Nicaragua. From March 1982 through May 1988, the Reagan administration released a series of aerial reconnaissance photographs depicting military developments in Nicaragua.

Using Declassified Photos

The first and perhaps most dramatic use of declassified material took place at the State Department on 9 March 1982, when CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman and DIA Deputy Director John Hughes presented a photographic briefing on the Sandinista military buildup.[1] A year later, on 23 March 1983, the President took his case to the public using declassified reconnaissance photographs. Before a national television audience, he talked about the Soviet Union's military threat and its efforts to project power in the Caribbean. To illustrate the growing Soviet influence in the region, the President showed four declassified intelligence photographs, one of which was of Managua's Sandino Airfield.[2] Throughout the remainder of the administration's term of office, the release of additional classified photos was presented through a series of unclassified State and Defense Department publications. These background papers were produced at least once a year from 1983 through 1987.[3] Together, they covered various aspects of the political and military developments in Central America and the Caribbean. They included over 60 declassified aerial reconnaissance photographs of military-related areas in Nicaragua and neighboring El Salvador. In May 1988, four additional reconnaissance photographs of recent military developments in Nicaragua were declassified and made available to *The New York Times*.[4]

[1] Adm. Bobby Inman and John Hughes, "Evidence of Military Buildup in Nicaragua," statement at the State Department, Washington, D.C., 9 March 1982; "U.S. Offers Photos of Bases to Prove Nicaragua Threat," *The New York Times*, 10 March 1982, p. A18; "Taking Aim at Nicaragua," *Newsweek*, 22 March 1982, pp. 22-29.

[2] "President's Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense," *The New York Times*, 24 March 1983, p. A20.

[3] These publications included: *Background Paper: Central America* (May 1983); *Background Paper: Nicaragua's Military Buildup and Support for Central American Subversion* (July 1984); *The Soviet-Cuba Connection in Central America and the Caribbean* (March 1985); *The Sandinista Military Buildup (May 1985); The Challenge to Democracy in Central America* (June 1986); and *The Sandinista Military Buildup: An Update* (October 1987).

[4] Robert Pear, "Sandinistas Said to Prepare an Attack," *The New York Times*, 25 May 1988, p. A3.

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Assessing the Results

If success in using declassified photographic intelligence as a tool of public persuasion is measured by the subsequent achievement of a consensus on a policy initiative, then the Reagan administration's efforts regarding its policy on Nicaragua would be seen as a failure. In most cases, however, the equation is not that simple. In policymaking circles, where intelligence is routinely received and digested, intelligence information rarely is the sole determining factor in shaping a policy line. This also holds true among members of Congress and the American people. But intelligence information does have a bearing on the formation of the policy ideas and opinions held by those outside the policymaking circles. In some instances, declassified information will have a major impact in consensus building. In most cases, it will at least raise the public's awareness on the substance of the policy and create a foundation for an enlightened debate. Furthermore, within the context of a serious national debate, hard data, such as photographic intelligence, can add credibility to an argument as doubts and questions emerge during the course of the debate.

The conclusiveness and persuasiveness of the data contained in the collection of reconnaissance photographs released by the Reagan administration varied according to the intelligence topics. The photographs directly related to the military buildup in Nicaragua provided solid evidence. While the interpretation of overhead photography can be a somewhat esoteric discipline, the selection of the photographs released and the manner in which they were presented made them understandable to the untrained eye. Annotations were added to point out significant items, and ground-level prints of military equipment were frequently used to provide a better visual perspective of the same equipment seen in the overhead view. The photographs not directly related to the military buildup—Salvadoran rebel training and logistic bases, and Nicaraguan prisons—were less persuasive. In these cases, the interpretation and complete understanding of the significant points contained in the graphics required additional information from other sources. This data was either not provided or was subject to question because of the undetermined reliability of the sources. When the photography was directed at hard military targets in Nicaragua, it did prove to be fairly persuasive.

Seeking Smoking Guns

To justify its concerns about the situation in Nicaragua, the administration had to prove that the nature of the military buildup there threatened the hemispheric interests of the US and its Central American allies. This could be done by clearly illustrating that the buildup was exceeding any legitimate defensive needs and that, as part of the newly established Soviet-Nicaraguan military relationship, the USSR had begun to use or, at least had plans to use, Nicaragua as a base of military operations in the hemispere. In this context, the relevance of the photographic intelligence to the administration's fundamental policy concerns varied. The images of such areas as radar sites and air defense sites could hardly be viewed as threatening to Nicaragua's neighbors. On the other hand, the construction of new army garrisons and military depots, the improvement of airfields, and the acquisition of new military equipment could be seen as tipping the regional balance of power in Nicaragua's favor. The one element of the buildup that would have clearly demonstrated the threatening nature of the Sandinistas' program would have been an air force equipped with jet fighter-bombers. Despite the many references to the Sandinista acquisition of Soviet MiG fighters, the administration could only show improved airfields capable of handling fighter-bomber aircraft.

The administration faced a similar situation in addressing the Soviet threat. The photographic evidence clearly revealed that the airfield under construction at Punte Huete near Managua was going to be a military airbase. Although the facilities at Punte Huete did indicate that it could handle any aircraft in the Soviet arsenal, the administration could not graphically support its warnings regarding potential Soviet air operations out of Nicaragua.

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There was no smoking gun in the photographic evidence released by the Reagan administration. The various graphics accurately created a visual story of what was actually happening in Nicaragua, a slow, methodical military buildup supported and influenced by Cuba and the Soviet Union. In that respect, the photo intelligence was relevant and supported the administration's basic assertions and its fundamental concerns regarding a widespread military buildup in Nicaragua. This evidence, however, could not back up some of the worst-case scenarios that had frequently been part of the Reagan administration's foreign policy rhetoric.

Protecting Security

The declassified photographs contained a wealth of information on military activity in Nicaragua. In releasing this intelligence, however, the administration neither revealed specific sources and methods nor compromised collection operations. Many public accounts asserted that the sources of the reconnaissance photographs were the U-2 and the SR-71 "spy planes."[5] The administration, however, never specifically identified the platform from which the photographs were taken. On at least one occasion, administration officials had debated the release of satellite photographs of developments in Nicaragua

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A Measured Reaction

The Sandinista government had been aware of reconnaissance flights over its territory, and it filed protests against US violations of Nicaraguan airspace. According to the data released by the Reagan administration, however, the Sandinistas took no action to prevent such overflights by acquiring and deploying high-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Furthermore, the Nicaraguan military, at least as far as the declassified reconnaissance revealed, instituted no camouflage or concealment and deception measures to cover its actions. Years after the first photographs were declassified, the administration was still able to release new evidence that confirmed the ongoing construction of military facilities and the acquisition of new military equipment. The extent to which the US, through its aerial collection efforts against Nicaragua, was able to obtain a picture of the miltary buildup had apparently not been affected by the intelligence disclosures.

An Important Contribution

The release of aerial reconnaissance photographs on developments in Nicaragua did have an impact on the overall foreign policy debate. Identifying that impact is essential in understanding what can realistically be expected when intelligence is used as a tool in public persuasion. In the case of US policy on Nicaragua, the debate revolved around the way in which the US should address the changes taking place in Central America. The reconnaissance photography could confirm the military buildup and, to a lesser degree, could reveal the threat. It could not, however, persuade those who advocated a diplomatic approach to approve the use of force either directly by the US or indirectly by the Contras. The crux of the administration's difficulty was its inability to form a consensus that military pressure was the only effective option in confronting the Sandinista revolution. This was part of the policy debate where declassified intelligence had limited persuasiveness.

The photography supported many of the administration's charges and, when combined with data obtained from other sources, provided a detailed picture of ongoing events in Nicaragua. The release of this intelligence fostered an environment where the national debate was not limited to emotional pleas or ideological pronouncements but was broadened to include a discussion of the evidence. In that regard, the role of photo intelligence in the policy process was significant.

[5] For example, see "High-Tech Spycraft," *Newsweek*, 22 March 1982, p. 29; and "Peeking in on Managua," *Newsweek*, 19 November 1984, p. 46.

[6] Philip Taubman, "Intelligence Aides Debated Reagan's Show of Satellite Photos," *The New York Times*, 24 March 1983, p. A22.

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The Views of Ambassador Herman J. Cohen

Jack Davis

"Ambassador Cohen's positive and open approach to relations with analysts worked well for him; overall, he felt well served by the support he received."

Over the past several years, CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) has been engaged in a critical self-examination of its goals and practices regarding the analytic support provided to key policy officials. In the words of former Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) Douglas MacEachin, the DI "needs to go back to the basic questions of what we do and how we do it." His short answer: the needs of the policymaker have to be "the driving factor in intelligence production."[1] In this context, the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence has been sponsoring a series of interviews on intelligence-policy relations with prominent officials who served during the administration of President George Bush. *In terms of their policymaking needs, what worked, what did not, and why.*

An article presenting the views of Amb. Robert Blackwill regarding his service on the NSC staff was published in the summer 1994 issue of *Studies in Intelligence.*[2] The views of Amb. Paul Wolfowitz, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, were published in an article in the spring 1995 edition of *Studies.*[3] This article reports the views of Amb. Herman J. Cohen from the perspective of his service as Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, 1989-93. It is based on a series of interviews I conducted during August 1994.

Each set of interviews in the first instance represents the views and practices of an individual policy official, who brings to the discussion a distinctive set of experiences and expectations regarding the world of intelligence. Each official, moreover, faced special circumstances while in office: the nature of the post, of the account, and of the community of analytic and policymaking specialists.

That said, the interviews of Ambassadors Blackwill, Cohen, and Wolfowitz point to several common themes:

- Experienced policy officials base their relations with intelligence analysts on professional self-interest—the need for effective support to meet demanding agendas.

- What constitutes effective support—what provides value added—varies considerably with the level of engagement of individual policy officials on an issue. Thus, policymakers actively managing an issue may find instructive detailed coverage that officials with passing interest do not. Alternatively, directly engaged officials may find little value in general coverage intended for a broad audience.

- Direct engagement not only increases the clarity of the policymaker's guidance to analysts but also increases the insights of the former into the kinds of professional support the latter can provide. At times, then, taking the measure of the analyst's expertise brings additional questions and tasking to the policymaker's mind.

Ambassador Cohen's positive and open approach to relations with

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analysts worked well for him; overall, he felt well served by the support he received.The analysts relished the opportunities he generated to provide support and the recognition he gave for jobs well done:

- Ambassador Cohen relied, more than most of his counterparts, upon reading analysts' self-initiated publications as a means of staying on top of his wide-ranging agenda. While he frequently expressed appreciation for help on such front-burner issues as prospects for change in South Africa, he just as regularly encouraged analysts working on secondary issues for which he was also responsible.

- Ambassador Cohen respected the expertise and disinterested views of analysts, and he made sure these were represented in person at interagency policy meetings.

- He appreciated analysts who made judgments that went beyond the hard evidence and took account of general expertise, history, and "intuition." And he felt well served when such judgments challenged his own. In his words, "analysts are supposed to analyze."

When asked what he would do differently in another tour of policymaking duty, Ambassador Cohen said he would "get to know the individual analysts better, so that he could put their considerable expertise to still greater advantage."

Curriculum Vita

Herman J. "Hank" Cohen's State Department career ran from 1955 to 1986. Most of his postings overseas and in Washington centered on Africa. He served as Director for Central African Affairs during 1969-74, and as Ambassador to the Republics of Senegal and The Gambia during 1977-80. Ambassador Cohen observed that in his overseas postings he got to know a good number of officers working for CIA's Directorate of Operations, some of whom he kept in contact with when he later served in policymaking positions in Washington.

From 1980 to 1984, he was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR). This was his first continuing relationship with intelligence analysts, in INR, the DI, the National Intelligence Council, and elsewhere.

He met on a weekly basis with the DDI and a high-ranking official from the Defense Intelligence Agency to discuss Intelligence Community affairs—resources, collection, plans, and coordination. He recalls that at these meetings DDI Robert Gates would regularly signal his intention of sending DI analysts to serve in the regional and functional policy bureaus at State. Cohen quipped that he was "never sure whether this was a promise of help to the bureaus—or a threat to take over for INR."

Ambassador Cohen was Senior Director for Africa on the NSC Staff and Special Assistant to the President from January 1987 to January 1989. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Africa for nearly all of the Bush administration and in the early months of the administration of President Clinton (April 1989-April 1993). As Assistant Secretary, he was the principal US negotiator in attempts to resolve conflicts in Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sudan. He also helped set the terms of engagement for the United States in encouragement of direct negotiations between blacks and whites for historic political changes in South Africa.

Ambassador Cohen now is Senior Adviser to the Global Coalition for Africa, a North-South policy forum.

Using Intelligence To Get the Job Done

The literature on intelligence and policymaking, going back at least to Sherman Kent's 1949 work on *Strategic Intelligence,* regularly makes the point that effective ties do not automatically fall into place but usually require initiative and persistence by the analytic component.[4] Titles of articles published in *Studies in Intelligence* elaborate the point: "The Intelligence-Policy Tangle"; "Intelligence Rams and Policy Lions"; "Dealing with Intelligence-Policy Disconnects"; "Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence Producers"; "Bridging the Intelligence-Policy Divide."[5]

Ambassador Cohen's performance as Assistant Secretary for Africa was either an exception to or requires reexamination of the rule that the relationship is unnatural and troubled. He organized his day to maximize his use of intelligence analysis to help him get his job done. He encouraged the analysts to believe their support was needed, and he greeted their papers and their briefings with the

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expectation that he would profit from them.

In part, his positive approach reflected his extended service as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in INR. He referred to INR as "family, just down the hall." In part, it reflected the nature of the African community of intelligence and policy professionals. African hands tend to cooperate, he observed, "because of the shared insecurity of working on the lowest priority [US foreign] policy account."

But in large measure it reflected Ambassador Cohen's sense of professional self-interest. Intelligence analysts in INR, in the DI, and elsewhere could deliver kinds of support that policy desk officers in the Africa Bureau could not. Analysts tended to have "more time to think." And they also "approached issues differently" because of their country expertise and, equally important, their special knowledge of economic and military affairs.

In many ways, Assistant Secretary Cohen was the *senior analyst on Africa* in the US Government. He understood and trusted the analysts' processes. He commented, for example, that he did not as a rule read embassy cables as they came in, because analysts did a good job of summarizing them in their daily publications.

As Assistant Secretary, Ambassador Cohen began his day by going over important overnight traffic and the daily publications—(from his point of view, principally the *State Department Summary* but also CIA's *National Intelligence Daily*) (NID)—brought to his office by an INR officer. This usually involved 30 minutes of looking at the "hot stuff." On the basis of this intelligence, he would schedule meetings for later in the day and task the staff of the Africa Bureau.

Then he had his morning staff meeting with his deputy assistant secretaries to exchange views on the intelligence traffic and dailies. While INR was represented at his more broadly based weekly meetings, it did not participate in his morning staff meetings. As commentary on the nature of policymaking these days, Ambassador Cohen observed that a Public Affairs Officer did attend.

After his morning staff meeting, he usually set aside time for reading intelligence analysis, both articles he had tasked INR to do or commissioned others in the Intelligence Community to do, and unsolicited assessments, mostly from the Africa Division of the DI's Office of African and Latin American Analysis. From time to time, he set aside a period in the afternoon to discuss tasking for analysis with INR or to receive a specialized substantive briefing from analysts from INR or elsewhere in the Intelligence Community.

Ambassador Cohen judged that his reading regime was time well spent. Whether he invested 30 minutes in an in-depth DI study or 5 minutes in one of the shorter articles in the Africa Division's biweekly *Africa Review*, he garnered the information and insights he needed to do his job. On many issues, he knew of no more efficient way of staying informed.

Guidance Through Feedback

Ambassador Cohen observed that when he served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Africa on the NSC Staff, it seemed appropriate to make a direct input into the DI production planning process. The NSC Staff and the DI "seemed to be part of the same camp" and somehow apart from INR and other departmental intelligence units. Thus, he met regularly with managers of the DI's African analysis to suggest research papers and memorandums he would like to see undertaken.

Such direct intervention in the DI planning and production processes seemed to him inappropriate as Assistant Secretary. But his practice of frequent written commentary in response to the DI's self-initiated production, he observed, was intended to have some impact on planning.

Ambassador Cohen said he believes in feedback, in part because he himself welcomes recognition for a job well done. On major accounts, such as South Africa, he expressed his appreciation in writing time and time again:

- *Your typescript on the ANC [African National Congress] was first rate. As we in AF [State's Africa Bureau] try to come to grips with the unprecedented events in South Africa, the need for tight analysis of the black opposition's views will be increasingly critical to policy formulation.* (12 March 1990)

- *[Your research report "South Africa Grapples with Government*

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Overtures"] was very useful.... I am particularly impressed by the thorough manner you demonstrate in putting together the many bits and pieces of available intelligence. (5 June 1990)

Ambassador Cohen was also appreciative of DI coverage of the many African accounts that were not front-burner issues. He cited as an example the Central African Republic (CAR), on which he had periodic exchanges with his French counterpart. The articles that appeared from time to time in *Africa Review* on developments and prospects for the CAR helped him stay at the ready for these exchanges. He let the authors and their managers in the DI know this, because he wanted such coverage to continue.

He stated that "the more esoteric the subject, the more I felt written recognition was needed to keep it coming." This practice was exemplified by a note he wrote to the senior INR Africanist about a DI article on a country with a population of 400,000 and little in the way of resources:

- *The Cape Verde article in... "*Africa Review*" is a role model for* my *needs. I hardly read anything on Cape Verde (and a lot of others). This piece gave a concise update on essential political and economic issues.* (17 March 1992)

Ambassador Cohen acknowledged with a nod and a smile the interviewer's observation that his notes as Assistant Secretary indicating he read every issue of *Africa Review* "from cover to cover" helped the publication survive periodic efforts to abolish it on the grounds it was not an effective use of analysts' time.

For similar reasons, Ambassador Cohen found considerable value in DI reports on "arcane aspects" of economic and military affairs in African countries. Simply put, there was no other efficient way for him to gain access to these subjects in the detail that he sought. In one message to DI managers he called for more coverage in *Africa Review* of military issues in states experiencing civil violence.

Ambassador Cohen also expressed his high regard for the biographic reports of the DI's Office of Leadership Analysis (LDA). When he served on the NSC Staff, he would telephone LDA's African managers with his requests, and found the unit "very responsive." When he became Assistant Secretary, though, he relied on staff support to generate biographies relating to visits, negotiations, and other undertakings.

The NID and NIEs

Ambassador Cohen found NID coverage of Africa "thin and superficial." Mostly, when an African issue reached the threshold for publication in the NID, it involved a matter on which he was already directly engaged, and he personally gained little from what often was a summary of "yesterday's events."

In contrast, he found the interagency process that produced National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and National Intelligence Council Memorandums of value in ascertaining Intelligence Community views and in using such views to manage the policymaking process. At times, he commissioned estimative papers through INR. On South Africa in particular, Intelligence Community products served well in persuading the policymaking community, during 1990, that prospects for significant negotiations on political reform were promising.

Ambassador Cohen admitted at times he got engaged in the estimative process at the edges of the traditional separation between intelligence and policymaking mandates. INR would come to him with its substantive disagreements with existing drafts. He was asked where he stood on the issues in dispute, and how hard INR should fight to protect State's position.

Analysts at the Policymaking Table

Ambassador Cohen would arrange, through INR, to start off all interagency policy meetings that he chaired with an intelligence briefing. Often a team of analysts would participate, with DI analysts covering political developments and their DIA counterparts covering military subjects.

The goal here was to lay out what was known and what was assumed about the situation under discussion as objectively and authoritatively as possible. This discouraged the policy participants from tabling their own "ground truth" to spin the policy outcome of the meeting. In effect, the policy officials either had to challenge the intelligence analysts in the room or to accept their assessment of events and prospects.

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Analysts Should Analyze

Ambassador Cohen noted that the DI review process tended to result in a corporate and depersonalized product, certainly as compared with INR's more outspoken analytic style. "You knew which analyst stood behind INR articles, but as a rule you could not identify an individual's voice in DI articles."

He assumed that the DI review process, in its commitment to authoritativeness as well as corporate responsibility, tended to discourage lines of analysis that could not be well documented. In other terms, as he perceived it, formal DI publications relied too much on reporting and sources and not enough on extended argumentation and individual judgment.

"Analysts are supposed to analyze." As someone well informed on Africa, he was able to recognize when an analyst brought to bear history, general expertise, analogy, and "intuition." It was his responsibility as a policymaker to decide when and how much to rely on such judgments, but he certainly benefited in managing his agenda by having access to analysts' interpretative and predictive judgments.

Ambassador Cohen admitted that as an analyst of African affairs he did not relish having to admit that his own judgments needed correction. But he knew his success depended on working with sound premises. Thus, he needed and wanted to gain access to analysts' views that contradicted or went beyond his own. He cited, as an example, an effort to get serious peace talks started in a war-torn African country. His judgment about what was needed to bring the rebel forces to the table was much less elaborate than what the analysts believed was needed. "The analysts were right."

He assumed that the DI review process, in its commitment to authoritativeness as well as corporate responsibility, tended to discourage lines of analysis that could not be well documented.

Tactical and Customized Analysis

Ambassador Cohen felt both comfortable and well served in using INR as his agent for orchestrating intelligence activities on his behalf. INR, again, was "family," "down the hall," and "part of his daily life."

Besides, INR was aware of its resource limitations, and, in Ambassador Cohen's view, did not hesitate to get analysts from other agencies involved when they were the best ones to deliver the needed services. It was in this context that he noted the small size and cooperative nature of the African intelligence and policy communities in Washington.

As a State Department official, Ambassador Cohen did not think it appropriate to task the DI's African specialists directly, or to engage with them substantively on a routine basis over the telephone or in his office. He believed, however, he benefited indirectly from the frequent personal contact of others at State.

Not only INR analysts but also officers in his Africa Bureau were in almost daily contact with DI analysts on substantive and agenda matters. Ambassador Cohen met weekly with DO representatives, another indirect avenue for a DI input. When told that DI managers indicated that they regularly contributed to work done for him by State's Policy Planning Staff as well as INR, he accepted that as the way things were supposed to work.

South Africa as an Example

Ambassador Cohen cited intelligence support for a shift in US policy toward South Africa, in conjunction with the runup to dramatic political change in that country, as an example of the system working extremely well.

Community analysts, especially DI analysts, were quick to see a window of opportunity for political change with the shift in generations of white political leaders symbolized by the coming to power of F. W. de Klerk as President of the Republic in September 1989. Ambassador Cohen himself had reservations about talk of the end of apartheid, because he had heard it from predecessor South African leaders. In typescripts and NIEs, the analysts made a convincing case regarding meaningful prospects for change. This, and the word he was getting from respected South Africans directly and through excellent human-source intelligence, changed his views from skeptical to hopeful.

As it turned out, the new generation of white South African leaders in

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their fifties were "for real" when they talked about reform, in a way that the older generation of leaders they replaced never was. Ambassador Cohen made use of an impressive volume of first-rate collection and analysis to help turn US policy from its previous measured hostility to white South African leaders to even-handed encouragement of both whites and blacks to stay the course in their often fractious direct negotiations.

Using the DI's Special Expertise

Ambassador Cohen made clear that he was impressed by DI analysts with whom he got to interact on a one-on-one basis. He benefited from the range of their knowledge about their accounts and their readiness to engage with him on assumptions and forecasts.

But, for the most part, he felt he did not get to know the DI analysts the way he did the INR group and Agency DO officers. DI analysts were "far away" and "not part of my daily life." However useful he found the contents, the "bland" and corporate character of DI formal publications made it difficult for him to take the measure of individual analysts.

Ambassador Cohen accepted invitations to visit CIA Headquarters a couple of times each year. After having lunch with a small group of managers, he met with 25 or more analysts in a conference room. He enjoyed these exchanges, but there were too many analysts present to take their individual measure.

He cited two instances in which he benefited considerably from the special expertise of DI analysts:

- In frustration, he once told INR that he "just did not understand the military situation in Angola." INR arranged for a briefing in his office by a DI analyst who specialized in the subject. Ambassador Cohen was surprised to find out that an analyst was working full time on military affairs in Angola, impressed by the analyst's command of the subject (assumptions as well as information), and got into much more specialized lines of questioning than he had originally intended.

- In another instance, at a policy meeting regarding a crisis in Zaire, a DI analyst who had served in that country as an intelligence officer overseas "took command" of the proceedings with his "fabulous" base of information and analysis. In fact, he pulled the meeting to what Ambassador Cohen saw as an unorthodox but unanimously approved summary of the situation and outlook. Ambassador Cohen subsequently arranged for the analyst to accompany him on exchanges with French and Belgian officials of the situation in Zaire.

When informed that a couple of DI analysts believed he had not made as much use of their expertise as they would have liked, Ambassador Cohen asked for more information on the matter. I reported that the analysts had produced their own memorandums, contributed to NIEs and INR drafts, and briefed members of the Africa Bureau. But the analysts had never been engaged personally with him. They greatly respected his command of the issues at hand, and they would have welcomed his probing questions.

Ambassador Cohen concluded that, if he were again appointed to a comparable policymaking position, he would arrange for a series of informal exchanges to take the measure of experts in the DI and elsewhere in the Intelligence Community. Policymakers, like analysts, are "prisoners of the intelligence we collect." The more the policymaker knows about the capabilities of analysts, the more help he can get to meet the challenges of his office.

NOTES

1. "The Tradecraft of Analysis: Challenge and Change in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence" (1 August 1994).
2. "A Policymaker's Perspective on Intelligence Anlaysis."
3. "Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence-Policy Relations."
4. *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (1949), pp. 180ff.
5. The issues of *Studies*, in order: summer 1984, fall 1986, summer 1989, summer 1992, fall 1993.

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Commentary on "The Decline of the National Reconnaissance Office (U)"[1]

NRO Leadership Replies (U)

Dennis Fitzgerald

Robert Kohler's article on the decline of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) that appeared in *Studies in Intelligence* (Vol. 46, No. 2, 2002) contends that the NRO is currently "a shadow of its former self" and explores what might be done to improve "the dissolving relationship between the NRO and the CIA." The NRO that Mr. Kohler knew—"its former self"—was one composed of separate design bureaus known as Programs A, B, and C, which competed with each other. He judges that co-locating these organizations and then combining them into functional directorates, or "INTs," in January 1993 was chiefly responsible for a decline in the NRO's ability to innovate. Although his article provides an interesting historical perspective, I have to take issue with a number of his observations, conclusions, and proposed remedies. (U//FOUO)

"Although Mr. Kohler advances some good arguments, his proposed solution would not restore the creative competition that he asserts is missing in today's NRO."

Mr. Kohler contends that the disestablishment of Programs A, B, and C was a mistake because it eliminated the creative technical competition that existed among these NRO offices. His proposed solution would assign all overhead programs "in continuation" to the military component of the NRO, and all advanced system and technology efforts, along with all new programs of high risk, advanced technology, or tight security, to the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Development and Engineering. Both of these activities would remain under the supervision of the Director of NRO (D/NRO). Although Mr. Kohler advances some good arguments, his proposed solution would not restore the creative competition that he asserts is missing in today's NRO. (U//FOUO)

What Mr. Kohler describes as a design competition mainly between Programs A and B was in reality a competition among the major aerospace companies that supported Programs A and B. The NRO program offices guided the systems engineering, secured the funding, and sold the ideas to the Executive and Legislative Branches. But the real engineering breakthroughs did not occur within the government program offices; they occurred at the contractor facilities. These contractors, albeit in fewer numbers because of consolidations, still support the NRO today. The innovation that existed 20 years ago is still there, but the ability of the NRO to tap into this creativity has been reduced due to the funding reductions of the 1990s. (U//FOUO)

Mr. Kohler claims that the NRO today is a "shadow of its former self" because its expertise in systems engineering has drastically eroded. In January of 2001, we spent several days reviewing the state of systems engineering in the NRO with Mr. Kohler, which included briefings by most of the systems engineers in each of the functional directorates. Afterward, he concluded that our systems engineering at the "INT" level was fine. At his suggestion, we did create an NRO Deputy Director for

Dennis Fitzgerald is Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (U)

This article is U//FOUO.

[1] See Robert J. Kohler, "One Officer's Perspective: The Decline of the National Reconnaissance Office," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2002, pp. 13-20. (U)

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Systems Engineering and filled it with a highly respected CIA Senior Intelligence Service officer. We are continuing to emphasize the hiring of systems engineers. (U//FOUO)

This brings me to an interesting point concerning personnel in the NRO. Civilian and military personnel assigned to the NRO today are smarter about space and engineering in general, than at any other time in our history. But they also are less experienced. This results from several conditions that Mr. Kohler identifies: First, civilian employment declined significantly because of downsizing during the 1990s. Second, military personnel regrettably can no longer spend a career in the NRO—or in the "white" space world for that matter. The need to re-establish "space careers" is one of the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission. It is an issue that each of the military services is beginning to address. (U//FOUO)

Mr. Kohler also raises an issue that I deal with frequently: former NRO senior managers' nostalgia for the much simpler past. That is, if we could just return to the way things were at the NRO when they left government, then many of the perceived problems afflicting the NRO today would disappear. (U//FOUO)

All organizations change and evolve to meet new conditions. Let me compare the environment of Mr. Kohler's NRO in the 1970s and 1980s to the one that we found ourselves in during the period roughly from 1990 to 11 September 2001. He left the NRO in the mid-eighties during an era that I will refer to as Technology Driven, as opposed to the last twelve years, which I will call the Peace Dividend era. (U//FOUO)

> **"Neither of these demanding requirements forums existed when Mr. Kohler was in the NRO."**

In the Technology Driven era, roughly 1970 to 1990, NRO space systems were based primarily on what technology would permit, rather than on the formal requirements process that drives space system development today. That approach led to charges of "NRO arrogance" and accusations of imposing technological solutions that went beyond what the customers wanted or needed. In the Peace Dividend world, you must have the imprimatur of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council on the military side, and a nod from the Mission Requirements Board on the Intelligence side, *before* you can have any hope of going forward with a request for funding from Congress. Neither of these demanding requirements forums existed when Mr. Kohler was in the NRO. In fact, the two intelligence oversight committees in Congress, the HPSCI and the SSCI, had barely gotten started when he left the NRO. Today, our customers and their needs are thoroughly discussed, accepted, and vetted again in Congress before we proceed with a major acquisition decision. (U//FOUO)

The last few years of Mr. Kohler's government service coincided with the peak of the Reagan build-up of the early 1980s, during which intelligence in general, and the NRO in particular, were lavishly funded. By contrast, funding during the Peace Dividend years was severely constrained—the demand was for the same intelligence, but at less cost. Everything we have done in the NRO over the past twelve years—up to 11 September 2001—has been directed toward cutting costs. This has been accomplished by reducing the types of overhead systems that we build, maintaining the capability of our systems but building fewer of them, consolidating ground stations, and paring the cost of operations and maintenance. (U//FOUO)

Mr. Kohler claims that during his service at the NRO, new acquisitions were mostly accomplished on time and within budget. By "within budget," I believe he means what we told Congress a program would cost, not what we wrote a contract for with our industrial partners. This is indeed true because it was our practice at that time to take what a contractor bid and add a margin of 20 to 30 percent. This practice was halted in 1995 when Congress found that the NRO had accumulated excess forward funding of $3.7 billion. (U//FOUO)

Besides costing the NRO Director and Deputy Director their jobs, the excess forward funding debacle had several other long-term consequences to which Mr. Kohler refers. First, it gave rise to a vastly expanded and more powerful Resource, Oversight, and Management (ROM) function. Our congressional overseers absolutely insisted on a single, credible financial management system. Second, we began budgeting for programs using "average" or "most likely" costs, rather than just putting large

[2] The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization—known as the Rumsfeld Commission, or the Space Commission—published its report in January 2001. (U)

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margins on contractor estimates. This insured that forward funding surpluses were not built into our budgets, but it required Independent Cost Estimates (ICE). Mr. Kohler refers to the ICE process as flawed. I disagree. The NRO ICE process is the most sophisticated, the most refined estimating tool for space systems that exists anywhere. The problems that arise with ICE have more to do with how its results are utilized than with the tool itself. (U//FOUO)

Mr. Kohler also believes that the NRO Acquisition Manual, and the Directive 7 process for initiating major contract actions instead of using DCI authorities, are props that allow managers to make decisions that they are unqualified to make. I disagree and I suspect that he would also if he sat through a Directive 7 meeting. Directive 7 simply arranges information in an orderly fashion, like a checklist, which permits everyone to decide with confidence that a major procurement is ready to proceed to the next stage. All those in the Intelligence Community and DoD who think that they have a stake in the procurement are invited to state their views. Rather than compensating for weak program managers, Directive 7 makes decisions more difficult because more constituencies must be heard and accommodated. The best engineering decisions are the ones debated in public; the worst ones are the deals made in back rooms—and the very worst are the ones hidden from scrutiny under the cloak of security. (U//FOUO)

During the Technology Driven era, the Intelligence Community and the primarily civilian National Command Authorities were the major consumers of NRO systems products. The major consumers today are the US military services. Today's reality is that most of the intelligence that the NRO collects on a daily basis is in direct support of combat operations. The performance of NRO systems has been spectacular in terms of preventing the loss of lives, directing the fire of weapons systems with unprecedented accuracy, and locating enemy positions, all the while providing a synoptic understanding of the battle space. The military has become a huge consumer of NRO resources and dollars, dollars that arguably otherwise might be spent on developing the next generation of intelligence space systems. (U//FOUO)

> **"Everything we have done in the NRO over the past twelve years—up to 11 September 2001—has been directed toward cutting costs."**

Moreover, during the Technology Driven era, when a failure occurred in development, launch, or on-orbit performance of space systems, our government overseers generally accepted that the NRO "had reached too far" or that the problem resulted from "the nature of research and development." Today, when a failure or the potential for a gap in coverage occurs, the response is: "Who do we fire?" Day-to-day combatant support, so dependent on NRO systems, allows no room for failure. (U//FOUO)

During the previous era, as Mr. Kohler observes, program managers indeed were kings. They controlled costs, schedules, and performance, and had the ability to trade those variables, without seeking permission, to make their programs work. That program managers have reduced freedom to make such trades today has nothing to do with the consolidation of the NRO. It is exclusively the product of much greater oversight by congressional committees, the Community Management Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C³I Staff, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the Mission Requirements Board. (U//FOUO)

Finally, Mr. Kohler asserts that the current crop of experienced SIS officers at the NRO is retiring, which is true. But his contention that no replacements with comparable talent and dedication are being actively developed is both untrue and demeaning to the young senior officers who serve in the NRO today. They work on requirements-driven and cost-constrained overhead technical collection systems in an environment characterized by public openness and intense oversight by Congress. In the Peace Dividend era, I believe that they are producing superior intelligence under conditions that Mr. Kohler and his contemporaries never experienced. (U//FOUO)

Let me close by commenting that Mr. Kohler seems to be conflicted in terms of whether he is trying to fix the NRO or to restore the Office of Development and Engineering, the CIA presence in the NRO, to its former glory. The disestablishment of Programs A, B, and C was painful for the many veterans of those organizations. But that is now ten years behind us. The new NRO is functioning as the reorganization intended it to, with the D/NRO firmly in charge of day-to-day decisions and operations. We have had four D/NROs whose relations with

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both the DCI and the Secretary of Defense have been open and highly productive. The reorganization, centralization, and creation of the "INT" structure have significantly reduced duplication and costs. Instead of doing non-recurring developments many times and buying in quantities of a few, we do non-recurring developments once and buy in quantities of many. (U//FOUO)

Many of us miss the enthusiasm, dedication, and accomplishments of Programs A, B, and C, but those days are behind us. The NRO's current integration of military and civilian personnel from many agencies is a replication of the "centers" model that exists in CIA and throughout the Intelligence Community. Time-tested team partnering with industry continues to provide successful research and development in the design and production of overhead space systems that has always been, and will continue to be, the hallmark of the NRO. (U//FOUO)

The NRO appreciates the input of Mr. Kohler. We are striving to provide the nation with the best space-based reconnaissance capabilities to meet the changing national security demands of the 21st century. Although I recognize that our future successes are built on the foundation laid by Mr. Kohler and his contemporaries, the best days for this organization lie ahead. (U//FOUO)

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A bird in the hand . . .

HARDWARE AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

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INTRODUCTION

The process of assessing the capabilities of modern foreign weapons systems historically has been one of deduction: analysts use an incomplete set of discrete kinds of information to form the basis for a rational judgment concerning the range, payload, speed, and additional vital characteristics of a missile, aircraft, submarine, or other implement of destruction.

Most of the available facts which contribute to this process do so only indirectly. Take, for instance, the application of telemetry data. These data must first be processed to identify the quantities being monitored, and then calibrated before they can be used in weapons analysis. This in itself is an estimative process requiring certain assumptions. The connection between the resultant data and the weapon performance requires further assumptions.

Other important contributors to weapons analysis include photography, radar tracking, COMINT, and ELINT. None of these can be relied upon directly to provide systems performance information. But each can provide some insights which, taken together, lead to performance estimates.

There is a way, however, to obtain direct information on a weapon, and that is to get one. How high and fast can a new aircraft fly?—encourage delivery by a defector. What is the performance of an antiaircraft missile?—buy one through a third party. How well are submarines constructed?—grapple one up from the depths of the ocean. Easier said then done, of course, but there have been some impressive hardware successes over the years. And many have yielded important intelligence information, sometimes at relatively modest cost, and sometimes at great cost and risk. Hardware, available only relatively late in a weapon program, cannot match the timeliness of COMINT, telemetry, and other data. But hardware does provide a base for comparing the results of deductive analysis, and at times also provides certain unique insights.

One of the most spectacular examples of hardware collection is the Glomar Explorer adventure—Project AZORIAN. This program has been described in detail in *Studies* (Volume 24, Number 5) and addressed at some length in numerous newspaper articles during the 1974-1975 period. The cost was high and the risk was substantial, but the potential payoff was deemed worth both the cost and the risk. There have been, however, many less glamorous and less publicized projects which have contributed markedly to our understanding of foreign weapons. A few of these are described herewith, by the people who have been closely associated with them.

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Both men and ships
live in an unstable environment,
are subject to subtle and diverse pressures
and want to have their merits
understood rather than their
faults found out.

Joseph Conrad
The Mirror of the Sea

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines intelligence as "the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations." Intelligence is also defined as "information concerning an enemy or possible enemy or an area." We who deal in intelligence in its second sense are charged with providing "intelligence consumers" with information necessary for intelligent decision making. We have important intelligence consumers who deal in technical esoterica. This type of intelligence often has strong impact on technical decision making. Its effect can ripple upward through scientific and engineering channels to influence national policy.

Our technical customers sometimes view the information we provide with skepticism, especially if it presents "new or trying situations." Much has been said, though less has been written, about "N.I.H.", the "not invented here" attitude which takes as a given the technical superiority of the United States in all areas. This is not an all pervasive attitude; but it is much easier to convince the skeptic of the truth of intelligence analysis showing significant foreign technical achievements if there is hardware in hand, hardware which can be examined, tested, and evaluated in the cold light of science.

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In this case there has been an additional plus. There is an engineering truism that you are half-way to a solution when you know that, in fact, there is one. And you are three-quarters there when you know how a competitor solved the problem. (b)(1) fabrications is providing the U.S. research and development community with

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These two examples in this specialized field, in which I served as a technical analyst for over six years, highlight to me some fundamentals of intelligence analysis:

- One can build an air-tight case on the basis of indirect and collateral information. Yet there will be those who doubt the results.
- Skeptics cannot argue with material evidence. To end all doubts one must "hit them with the submarine."
- Information is our most important product. This includes the technology arena as well as that of the policy maker.

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
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SOVIET SOLID STATE ELECTRONICS

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One of my former professors, a dedicated theoretician, regularly cautioned young theoretical aspirants that, no matter how brilliant their theory, it would never stand alone like the results of a well planned and properly executed laboratory experiment. Correspondingly, the "hands-on" examination of Soviet solid state electronic components—particularly the more advanced components such as microcircuits—dispels questions as to whether such Soviet devices exist, and permits the determination of fabrication techniques, performance, and quality of the devices more effectively than trying to learn about them from published data or reports from scientific and technical conferences.

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With regard to dispelling disbelief, a significant portion of the intelligence information that Department of Defense personnel alluded to in their early writings stressing the need for a very-high-speed-integrated-circuit (VHSIC) development program was the "hands-on" examination of Soviet microcircuits. These were of a greater complexity than we previously believed existed.

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* Hybrid—a microcircuit where discretes such as transistors and diodes are mounted on a ceramic substrate, mechanically interconnected and then packaged.

** Monolithic microcircuits or integrated circuits (ICs) are devices where discretes and their interconnects are etched by photolithographic techniques on a single crystal silicon chip and then packaged.


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HARDWARE FROM SPACE

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Technical intelligence analysis is generally based on esoteric, as well as mundane, data types. The analysis of Soviet spacecraft includes tracking and telemetry data, photography, optics, (b)(1) electronic, and communications intelligence. The questions asked are: what does the satellite do, and

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how well does it do it? Unlike analysis of, say, missile systems, where the missile's function usually is known, spacecraft analysis is highly dependent on data interpretation, analytical skills, luck, and "warm feelings". Skeptics believe the crystal ball is our main analytical tool.

It is not very often in intelligence analysis, and especially in the analysis of Soviet spacecraft, that we are able to prove not only our analytical findings, but also to test our analytical techniques.

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SOVIET INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT

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The Western world's understanding usually lags by many years the development of typical new Soviet weapons. During the conceptualizing and early R&D periods, there is little available in the way of data upon which to base intelligence judgments. But as the years go by, and prototype testing is conducted, followed by full system tests, deployment, troop training activity, and operational status, we gain access to a growing body of data to analyze. Normally our estimates of weapon capabilities also grow better, eventually reaching a plateau, an upper limit. How well we ultimately understand system performance—that is, how far from "ground truth" we are—depends both on our analytical skills and on the data available. Hardware exploitation can substantially raise our level of understanding. But hardware is not usually available until routine testing has begun, so that the benefits come in the mid- to late-life of a weapon. Denial of conventional data, on the other hand, can seriously degrade our understanding, particularly in the early years of a weapon cycle. Hardware exploitation can, in many instances, alleviate the adverse effects of data denial. Timeliness is, of course, as important for intelligence estimates as accuracy. In the case of weapons threat assessment, a major customer is the US weapons development community. The kinds, capabilities, and numbers of new US weapons depend in part on the direction of the Soviet weapons programs. The sooner US designers have this information, the more effective and realistic will be their efforts. We consequently cannot expect the loss of conventional data sources to be fully replaced by

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hardware collection and exploitation, because the former become available much earlier in the development cycle than do the latter. Hardware serves to improve the accuracy of our estimates, rather than the timeliness. Thus, foreign hardware can be used to influence the details of US weapons—for example, armor, electronic countermeasures, warhead size—but not the weapon concept.

While the direct military threat from the Soviet Union is the most important target of the Intelligence Community, other results of intelligence analysis are also important and significant. One of these—technology transfer—is uniquely enhanced by hardware exploitation. Technology transfer can, of course, work both ways. The Soviets acquire and use US technology, but we also can gain from understanding Soviet technology and practices. The acquisition and exploitation of Soviet cruise missile hardware in the late 1960's and early 1970's provided examples of technology transfer in both directions.


Double Reverse Technology

In the late 1950's, laboratories at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology were engaged in research and development of a military application servomechanism to deliver a high force quickly and accurately. The device which evolved from this research was a hydraulically powered actuator with a novel control concept called "force compensation". This concept was a means to overcome the inertia associated with high force devices which must respond quickly to autopilot demand. The researchers at MIT were successful with their design, but could not perfect it for mass production because of the critical requirement for fabrication under extremely close manufacturing tolerances necessary to prevent high frequency vibrations (chatter) during operation. The associated high cost of manufacturing was not considered practical, and the project was brought to a close. The design results of the MIT project were published in an unclassified research report.

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A critique of military analysis

Learning from Master Sun

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The quality of finished intelligence on Third World military forces is again an issue of concern. Before the Persian Gulf war in 1991, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) commissioned an internal review of the training afforded analysts who report on the military forces of Third World countries. During the Gulf crisis, considerable discussion focused on assessments of Iraqi order of battle in the Kuwaiti theater of operations, Iraqi capabilities relative to coalition forces, and Baghdad's probable military strategy. Subsequent post-mortems gave high marks to the military intelligence support, but debates raged over battle-damage assessment methodologies and the degree to which national intelligence agencies should support theater military commanders.

Meanwhile, postwar reassessments of Baghdad's conventional and unconventional weapons inventories and programs have fueled concerns about other potential Third World military threats, now highlighted by declining interest in Cold War military issues. As a result, policymakers, Congress, and senior intelligence officials are adjusting the amount of resources and attention given to Third World military threats. While these debates force us to evaluate the accuracy, clarity, and timeliness of our products to determine how well we produce military intelligence, we should also take the opportunity to revisit how we perform this vital function.

Sun Tzu: Greater and Lesser Matters

The writings of Sun Tzu provide a useful point of departure to measure the research papers and intelligence assessments produced in the DI which are intended to be tailored to the needs of national-level policymakers. Sun Tzu's writings originally were intended to educate and advise such leaders in the fundamentals of warfare. They are particularly appropriate for evaluating our work because they focus on issues related to grand strategy, as well as the operational and tactical concerns of the uniformed military. Their importance and timeliness have been widely recognized and incorporated into the texts of contemporary military scholars and war colleges. Samuel B. Griffiths, for example, favorably compares Master Sun to more familiar modern military thinkers, such as Clausewitz, and notes his continuing importance:

> Sun Tzu attempted to establish a realistic basis for a rational appraisal of relative power. His perception that mental, moral, physical and circumstantial factors operate in war demonstrates remarkable acuity. Few military writers, including those most esteemed in the West, have stated this proposition as clearly as Sun Tzu some 2,300 years ago. Although Sun Tzu may not have been the first to realize that armed force is the ultimate arbiter of interstate conflicts, he was the first to put the physical clash in proper perspective.[1]

Sun Tzu's criteria for evaluating military forces provide a useful framework for analyzing contemporary military trends and events. They begin with five "matters"—morale, generalship, terrain, weather, and doctrine—that Sun Tzu recommended be deliberated in the highest councils. Only if superiority in these matters was clearly indicated did he recommend discussion of five other issues—numerical strength, quality of troops, discipline, equity in the administration of rewards and punishments, and training—all of which he considered to be of lesser importance.

Applying these criteria to the war in the Gulf, for example, one might have been less surprised by the overwhelming victory of the coalition forces. Before

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the war, Sun Tzu might have argued in order of importance:

- That after nearly a decade of war with Iran and with poor military leadership, the Iraqi Army was far weaker than its numbers and arsenal suggested.
- That the terrain and weather favored doctrines emphasizing air power and highly mobile ground forces over static defenses backed by reserves.
- That highly skilled and better trained coalition troops and pilots would have easily bested their Iraqi adversaries.

If Sun Tzu were alive today to sample of our research papers, intelligence assessments, and reference aids, he would probably have a mixed opinion of our military analyses.[2] He would be pleased that each paper on Third World militaries published in the last four years typically addressed or at least mentioned five to seven of his criteria. While it is impossible to say that a magic number of these issues should be covered in a single paper—some might appropriately focus on just one—it probably is fair to say that most of our national intelligence hardcovers should cover a fair number. Which ones, however, is an issue of greater importance, and the Great Master would be displeased with how often we ignored the five "matters" and focused heavily on the lesser indices of military capability. A review of these criteria, in his order of importance, illustrates our strengths and weaknesses.

Higher Matters

Morale, the first and most important of Sun Tzu's criteria, is addressed in slightly less than half of our papers. These include papers that evaluate morale within the uniformed ranks as well as civilian support for military establishments and operations in Third World countries. Sun Tzu's use of the term in the latter sense was most recently reflected in

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With morale mentioned in half of our papers, it is difficult to tell whether the glass is half full or half empty, but the importance Sun Tzu placed on this issue suggests we should do more. The biggest deterrent to focusing on morale within the ranks is the difficulty in measuring it and the consequences of wrongly believing that it is low among the armies of potential adversaries.

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Assessing civilian morale is equally difficult in countries with vigorous internal police. The anecdotal grumblings about shortages of public services, food, and consumer goods in wartime economies are seldom convincing.

Generalship is given about the same amount of coverage in our papers. We write about military leaders and leadership slightly less than half the time.

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Terrain is examined about 20 percent of the time, most often in papers that examine detailed operational issues:

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Again, this shortfall is partly educational, but it is to a greater extent bureaucratic. Most military analysts have academic backgrounds in political science and history, not geography, a bias probably reinforced by the preferred disciplines of their managers. Our cartographers and geographers inhabit completely different niches in our organizational structure and have limited contact with military analysts, who believe they only need the former to make maps. And the maps probably suffice in the eyes of many analysts and managers, who intuitively doubt that policymakers would be interested or should be informed, for example, that the sand in a particular desert will not support wheeled armored vehicles.

Even fewer have focused attention on the **weather**. A rare reference to the effects of weather on military capabilities,

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The rarity of such remarks is somewhat surprising, in view of the attention given to US air operations that were disrupted by inclement weather. By implication, foreign military forces and operations seem to enjoy an immunity to atmospheric disturbances, such as the sandstorms in the Iranian desert that helped abort the hostage rescue operation in 1980, and, more recently, the bad weather that temporarily curtailed the bombing campaign against Iraq.

In contrast, what Sun Tzu referred to as **doctrine**—the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradation of officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure—was covered in two thirds of DI military analyses. The typical paper gives the reader at least background information on the organization of foreign military services, and some, such as provide an in-depth look at personnel strength, organization, equipment inventories, and the chain of command of an entire military, down to the battalion level. Others, such as focus on the structure and composition of key military units.

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The weakness in our coverage of doctrine is that we focus heavily on combat units, paying scant attention to logistic questions, which Sun Tzu grouped under the heading of doctrine. References to logistic issues, in fact, seldom venture beyond the phrase "shortage of spare parts." Several papers that examine two critical Third World regions are notable exceptions to this trend:

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While such papers do not provide a complete estimate of the force deployments in either of these critical regions, unlike other papers that try such ambitious assessments, they take a necessary hard look beyond frontline combat deployments.

Lesser Issues

By and large, DI analyses of Third World military forces emphasize factors that Sun Tzu regarded as matters of lesser importance, beginning with the **number of troops** and weapons, which appears in virtually all DI research papers and intelligence assessments surveyed. Whether considering national force structures, individual services, or specific units, we take great pains to give policymakers an accurate count of enemy or friendly forces. In some cases, as in (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) military postures are assessed in light of standing forces, reserves, commitments elsewhere, mobilization schedules, and combat-readiness rates. Such papers take static order-of-battle data and adjust them to provide readers with more realistic present and projected opposing force ratios. Other papers, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) such as take a "forces analysis" approach to assessing the capabilities of a national military service, determining whether its existing or projected order of battle, as qualified by other factors, could achieve sufficient "mass" for successful operations, in this case (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

In addition to the "forces analysis" approach that begins with order-of-battle data, several other factors emphasize the data richness of our analyses. Our reliance on imagery, for example, sometimes dictates that numbers take center stage: we count what we can (b)(1) as in (b)(3)(c)

Other times, accurate data is what the policymaker wants the most. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) Cultural and educational biases also help explain our emphasis on numbers—not surprising in a society where statistics cover the sports and business sections of the paper and where behavioral methods courses can be substituted for foreign language requirements toward college degrees. More important, data on men and arms bolsters the image of objectivity and precision in our analyses, qualities that we prize as an institution. "Numbers do not lie" probably is believed more often than "lies, damned lies, and statistics" for reasons mentioned above. Presenting "just the facts" also saves us the trouble and risk of relying on the more elusive criteria of morale, generalship, and the effects of terrain and weather in evaluating foreign military forces.

Two thirds of the time, DI military analysts modify their estimates of manpower and weaponry by assessing the **quality** of the individuals and arms in Third World military forces. Discussions of quality of manpower are regularly included in assessments of air, ground, and irregular units such as militias:

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Quality of arms receives as much, if not more attention.

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Such papers sometimes make use of well-developed methodologies, including measures of effectiveness, that push our analyses toward seemingly pristine quantitative judgments about technology and away from looking at the quality of troops, which, like morale, is a more difficult target. It is much easier to measure the capabilities of T-72 tanks, even different variants of T-72 tanks, than it is to evaluate the soldiers who operate them.

Two factors related to the quality of troops, **discipline and the administration of rewards and punishments,** are considered less than 20 percent of the time,

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A wider coverage across all Third World regions is given to **training,** Sun Tzu's final criteria for evaluating military forces. Slightly more than half of our papers mention or stress its importance. One of the better examples is

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More typically, training is addressed toward the end of papers as a secondary topic.

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Training probably has received, at best, a satisfactory amount of attention. Although one of Sun Tzu's lesser criteria, training has become more important with the introduction of higher and higher levels of technology on the battlefield. Moreover, it is an issue that requires even more attention as shrinking defense budgets and force structures push Third World militaries toward fewer but better weapons that require more intensive training.

Looking Ahead

One explanation for the overall emphasis in our papers on Sun Tzu's lesser matters, and a caution that it is a trend likely to continue, is what we might call the "peacetime" demands of military intelligence. National-level policymakers interested in Third World militaries often only need a thumbnail sketch of a particular country's armed forces that can be summarized in tables on weapons inventories and national-level deployment maps using icons of armored vehicles, soldiers, ships, and aircraft. Those with a keener interest are often thinking about security assistance. Like any budgetary issue, this assistance is best addressed with intelligence that emphasizes equipment and training needs of our friends based, in part, on the arsenals and capabilities of potential adversaries. And in negotiating the appropriate level of assistance and other forms of military cooperation with foreign counterparts, these same policymakers are more likely to want to know more about their counterparts' personal attributes than about their military acumen.

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Higher matters come to the fore when US or allied forces enter a potential or real "wartime" situation. Suddenly, the morale of opposing and allied forces, military skills of their generals, the specific terrain and weather, and more detailed knowledge of deployment patterns and logistic capabilities become more important. Unfortunately, when such crises arise, there is usually little time to research and analyze these factors, particularly in Third World regions. It is important to note that the Persian Gulf crisis was forgiving in this regard, given the five months of lead time before the coalition offensive, and the expertise on Iraq that had been built up during Baghdad's long war with Iran. The Intelligence Community as a whole generally has spent far less time and effort on Third World military analysis than it has on understanding US-Soviet strategic and NATO-Warsaw Pact theater forces.

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(b)(3)(n) This suggests areas where we can and should strengthen our analyses

As noted above, our analyses too often emphasize how large numbers of troops are organized and armed (but not how they are supplied). Less attention is paid to how well they are motivated and trained, and even less to how well they are led. By and large, we leave policymakers with the image of robotic military forces *fighting on a level playing field on a sunny day.* To correct these impressions, we need to:

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- Factor in key terrain features and weather patterns that would affect operations. In many cases this would go a long way toward explaining deployment patterns and avenues of advance, anticipating how Third World forces might try to maneuver before and during a conflict.

- Analyze how well Third World militaries maneuver in training exercises, peacetime deployments, and military operations and how the element of surprise might effect this and other criteria.

With these correctives in mind, we should not lose sight of the fact that the collective body of DI military analyses contains useful approaches to handling all of these issues. This could be particularly important in looking at traditionally stable areas of Europe and the former Soviet Union in the post-Cold War era. Freed from the constraints of Soviet control and the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, new governments, national military forces, local militia, and insurgents will probably become increasingly similar to militaries in the Third World. The flavor of this transformation and one analytic approach can be found in

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NOTES

1. From *The Art of War*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith; Oxford University Press; 1963; p. 34.

2. This essay is based on a review of more than 50 hardcovers on Third World military forces produced in the DI between 1988 and 1991. Papers that focused exclusively on conventional arms transfers or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were not surveyed.

3. The writings of more modern theorists, including Clausewitz, Jomini, and Douhet, form the basis of our "forces analysis" concept, which begins with order-of-battle data and goes on to analyze operations and to project capabilities. Although many senior military analysts hold "forces analysis" to

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be the central core of our analytic capabilities, our papers also show a skewed treatment of the principles of war that have been distilled from the writings of these leading modern military theorists. We spend more time describing and analyzing military objectives, offensive potential, ability to mass forces, and unity of command problems (interservice rivalries), than considering how well Third World forces handle simultaneous threats (economy of force), maintain security, achieve surprise, or maneuver on the battlefield. Moreover, we are far more inclined to analyze individual Third World air forces than armies, despite the conventional wisdom that ground forces ultimately determine the outcome of wars between Third World countries.

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The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c)

> **"The PFIAB's primary mission is to advise the President on the performance of US intelligence and to make recommendations regarding how intelligence activities can be improved."**

(b)(3)(c) served in the Directorate of Intelligence.

(b)(3)(c)

Many Intelligence Community (IC) professionals evidently are unfamiliar with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and its role and mission in shaping US intelligence. But this small and somewhat inconspicuous board, with its direct access to the President, has a long and illustrious history of molding, guiding, and, in particular, improving US foreign intelligence activities. (b)(3)(n)

The PFIAB's Mandate

The PFIAB's primary mission is to advise the President on the performance of US intelligence and to make recommendations regarding how intelligence activities can be improved. Specifically, the current Executive Order (EO) establishing the PFIAB directs it to "assess the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection, of analysis and estimates, and of counterintelligence and other intelligence activities."[1] Toward this end, the PFIAB is authorized to review "the performance of all agencies of the Federal Government that are engaged in the collection, evaluation, or production of intelligence or the execution of intelligence policy" as well as "the adequacy of management, personnel, and organizations in the intelligence agencies."[2] (b)(3)(n)

Although the current EO differs slightly from previous ones, this essentially is the historical mission of the PFIAB. From its formation in 1956, the PFIAB has been charged principally with enhancing "the security of the United States and the conduct of its foreign affairs by furthering the availability of intelligence of the highest order."[3] A *nonpartisan* board of experts from outside the government, constituted within the Executive Office of the President[4] and answering directly to the President himself, the PFIAB has been able to maintain its position as an independent and unbiased expert voice on matters relating to the conduct, organization, and management of intelligence activities. (b)(3)(n)

Contrary to many commentators' claims, before the current EO, the PFIAB never had a "watchdog" role of monitoring and overseeing the IC for illegal or questionable activities. Rather, the PFIAB's focus has always primarily been the improvement of intelligence activities. Even under the current EO, which established the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) as a standing committee of the PFIAB, the IOB and the PFIAB operate largely as separate entities, with PFIAB maintaining its traditional focus on identifying deficiencies and recommending improvements in intelligence activities. (b)(3)(n)

The Board's Composition

Under the current EO, the PFIAB is composed of no more than 16 members, including the chair and vice chair. The PFIAB's size has varied somewhat during its 40-year history, ranging from five members during the Bush administration to 22 members during the Reagan

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PFIAB Chairs	
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.	1956-63
Clark H. Clifford	1963–68
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.)	1968–70
Adm. George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.)	1970–76
Leo Cherne	1976–77
Ambassador Anne Armstrong	1982–90
The Honorable John G. Tower	1990–91
Adm. Bobby Inman, USN (Ret.) (Acting)	1991–93
Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., USN (Ret.)	1993–94
The Honorable Les Aspin	1994–95
The Honorable Warren Rudman (Acting)	1995–96
The Honorable Thomas S. Foley	1996–Present

administration. Throughout its existance, however, the Board has remained a small body. President Clinton's PFIAB originally consisted of 12 members, although he appointed four additional members in early 1996 to reach the current 16-person Board. (b)(3)(n)

By EO, the PFIAB members are to be "trustworthy and distinguished citizens outside the government who are qualified on the basis of achievement, experience, and independence."[5] Generally, the members are a diverse mix of prominent business executives, academics, lawyers, former diplomats and government officials, and retired military officers. As has been the practice during most of PFIAB's history, members, including the chair and vice chair, are not paid for their services, receiving only transportation expenses and per diem during PFIAB meetings.[6] (b)(3)(n)

The Board convenes in regular session for two days every other month. The entire Board or subsets of the membership also meet periodically as required for Board business. To support the Board's work, particularly during periods between regular Board meetings, the PFIAB has a full-time staff. The staff historically has been a varied mix of political appointees, active-duty military, and civil servants from the IC and the Department of Defense. Currently, the acting executive director of the staff is seconded from CIA, one assistant director is seconded from the National Reconnaissance Office, and the other assistant director (who is also Counsel to the IOB) is on loan from the US Army. There also is a special assistant, an administrative officer, and an administrative assistant on the staff. (b)(3)(n)

Reports to the President

The principal mechanism that the PFIAB uses to execute its mission is through aperiodic reports to the President. Under EO, the PFIAB has to report to the President no less than semiannually; historically, the reports have been much more frequent.[7] These reports to the President fall into three broad categories:

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The President periodically designates topics for PFIAB study as he sees issues arise. The frequency of such Presidentially directed studies has varied over time, although some of the PFIAB's most important and influential reports were prepared at Presidential direction. Alternately, the PFIAB's members may independently elect to conduct reviews and prepare reports on issues that they believe are important. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and other intelligence agency heads also may identify issues for the PFIAB

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and request that the Board prepare reports on those issues; the Board has the discretion to decide whether it conducts reviews on issues suggested by the Community. (b)(3)(n)

In preparing a report to the President, the PFIAB members and staff conduct dozens—sometimes even hundreds—of interviews with key officials among both intelligence consumers and intelligence producers. Among consumers, the PFIAB frequently interviews members of the National Security Council staff, officials of the Departments of State and Defense, military officers, and officials of other Cabinet departments. The PFIAB, moreover, also interacts with the entire IC, not only senior intelligence officials, but also with individual analysts and case officers, program managers and engineers for technical systems, and midlevel managers; and PFIAB members and staff frequently pay personal visits to intelligence facilities. (b)(3)(n)

The PFIAB's reviews have frequently included in-depth evaluations of programs, technologies, and systems, drawing on the deep and varied expertise of the Board members. By EO, Federal departments and agencies are required to "provide the PFIAB with access to all information that the PFIAB deems necessary to carry out its responsibilities."[8] The PFIAB, in turn, is required to afford all necessary protection to that information, and the Board maintains secure spaces for discussions and storage. Throughout its history, the PFIAB has maintained an enviable record for protecting and preventing unauthorized disclosure of classified information provided to the Board. (b)(3)(n)

"Throughout its history, the PFIAB has maintained an enviable record for protecting and preventing unauthorized disclosure of classified information provided to the Board."

The information obtained during these interviews and reviews is then analyzed, and the Board prepares a report detailing its findings and making specific recommendations for any changes or improvements. The reports are sent directly to the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Senior Director of the National Security Council for Intelligence Programs. Formal submission of a report has often been followed by meetings between the PFIAB members and the President or the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. After the White House has completed its review of the report, and, with the President's permission, reports are also usually provided to the DCI and any other involved intelligence or executive branch official. (b)(3)(n)

Frequently, the PFIAB examines more discrete issues not warranting a formal report to the President. In these cases, the PFIAB's findings and recommendations are often communicated to the President through a letter. The PFIAB is also authorized by EO to advise and make recommendations directly to the DCI and all Federal agencies involved in intelligence activities, and the Board has often used this mechanism to work with the IC on issues not requiring direct Presidential involvemer(b)(3)(n)

Eisenhower to Ford

On 8 February 1956, President Eisenhower created the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities—the predecessor to today's PFIAB—"to enhance the security of the United States and the conduct of its foreign affairs by furthering the availability of intelligence of the highest order."[9] The Board was established based in large part on the recommendations of the second Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (the "second Hoover Commission"), which had recommended that the President appoint a committee of private citizens to examine and report on US foreign intelligence activities.[10] The Eisenhower Board's first chairman was Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the namesake of the annual PFIAB Killian Award.[11] (b)(3)(n)

One of the Eisenhower Board's most important accomplishments was the pivotal role that the Board played in the establishment of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), the forerunner to the current National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB). The Board pushed for the USIB to better integrate the IC and to coordinate the allocation of resources throughout the Community. The Eisenhower Board also played a role

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Although President Kennedy immediately recognized the need for a board like the PFIAB, he did not

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> **President Carter is the only President since 1956 who elected not to use an advisory group like the PFIAB on intelligence matters.**

immediately name a successor to the Eisenhower Board following his inauguration. But, in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs operation, President Kennedy issued a new EO creating the PFIAB as a replacement for the Eisenhower Board of Consultants, retaining essentially the same mission as the previous board.[12] Recommendations of the Kennedy Board led to

(b)(5)

an area of longstanding PFIAB activism. (b)(3)(n)

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Following Kennedy's assassination, President Johnson retained the Kennedy PFIAB, and he issued two letters expressing his desire that the Board continue under the Kennedy EO.[13] The Johnson Board's most notable accomplishment was

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President Nixon issued a new EO regarding the Board on assuming office, but again made few changes in its role and mission.[14] Later, President Nixon also tasked the PFIAB

(b)(5)

President Ford initially retained Nixon's Board upon assuming office, but later he expanded the Board from 10 to 17 members. President Ford said he saw the expansion as necessary because of the increasing complexity of intelligence activities and the diversity of new security challenges facing the United States.[17] (b)(3)(n)

The Ford Board's most notable contribution to US intelligence was its central role in the famous "A Team–B Team" competitive analysis exercise. Through its reviews, the PFIAB had concluded that IC National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were underestimating the progress of Soviet strategic weapons programs. As a result, then PFIAB Chairman Adm. George Anderson wrote President Ford proposing a "competitive analysis" of the intelligence data. The proposal was opposed by DCI William Colby, but Colby eventually agreed to a PFIAB proposal for a CIA review of the track record of NIEs. That review so clearly documented the failings of Soviet strategic NIEs that, in April 1976, DCI George Bush (who succeeded Colby) agreed to the competitive analysis exercise for NIE 11-3/8. This exercise not only had a profound and lasting effect on NIEs and subsequent US defense spending, but it also has recently been resurrected as a model for resolving the ongoing disputes over the NIE on the ballistic missile threat to the United States.

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In part as a result of the Church and Pike hearings and the ensuing revelations, the Ford Board also studied

(b)(5)

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...olition

President Carter is the only President since 1956 who elected not to use an advisory group like the PFIAB on intelligence matters. Following his election, he decided the Board was unnecessary, stating that the National Security Council, the IC, the newly formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the then-planned House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence "can now [sic] effectively review and assess foreign intelligence activities." As a result, in May 1977, he issued an EO abolishing the PFIAB.[18] (b)(3)(n)

The Reagan Years

Following the election of President Reagan in 1980, numerous voices, both within the administration and

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outside the government—including the Association of Former Intelligence Officers—argued for the reestablishment of the PFIAB.[19] President Reagan responded by issuing a new EO in October 1981 resurrecting the PFIAB. Like previous Presidents, in reestablishing the Board, President Reagan emphasized that the PFIAB's mission was part of his "commitment to revitalize and strengthen our intelligence capabilities," and he charged the Board to "assist the Director of Central Intelligence and the entire Intelligence Community in achieving increased effectiveness."[20] With time, the Reagan Board eventually grew to 22 members (the largest in the PFIAB's history), although President Reagan issued an EO reducing the Board's size to 18 in 1985.[21] During the eight years of the Reagan administration, as well as the first year of the Bush administration, the PFIAB was exceptionally active, and its work led to numerous significant changes and enhancements in the IC. (b)(3)(n)

(b)(5)
(b)(3)(n)

"One of the PFIAB's most important studies . . . was an independent assessment of the Soviet "war scare" of the late 1970s and early 1980s . . ."

Another important study was the investigation of the defection of CIA officer Edward Lee Howard. Directed by the President, the PFIAB investigation of this major security breach led to significant changes in CIA hiring, screening, and training practices and to improvements in CIA–FBI liaison, particularly on personnel security issues. (b)(3)(n)

In 1982, the Reagan Board also began a long period of PFIAB activism on the security of US embassies abroad. The results of the Board's efforts in this area included the reduction of foreign nationals in embassies abroad (b)(1)

The Board's recommendations on enforcement of reciprocity in US-Soviet diplomatic representation would also become official US Government policy. (b)(3)(n)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)
(b)(3)(n)

The Bush Years

On assuming office, President Bush did not change any of President Reagan's EOs establishing the PFIAB. He also retained the Reagan Board for slightly more than the first year of his administration. Then, in early 1990, President Bush appointed his own PFIAB. The Bush PFIAB—although significantly smaller in size than the Reagan Board—continued the PFIAB's long tradition of contribution, in no small part due to its impressive membership, which included the just–departed Secretary of Defense and the DCI. During its tenure, the Bush Board submitted formal reports (b)(5) to the President, and, with the President's personal encouragement to identify and study subjects independently, the Bush Board conducted numerous other reviews that did not result in formal reports. (b)(3)(n)

One of the most significant reports to the President during the Bush years was the 1991 report

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(b)(5)
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two major reports to the President

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Bush's Board also played a pivotal role

(b)(5)
(b)(3)(n)

The Clinton Years

President Clinton issued a new EO on the PFIAB, although he made little change in the mission or structure of the PFIAB, other than the consolidation of the IOB into the PFIAB.[23] Clinton's PFIAB, despite several disruptions—particularly the death of former Chairman Les Aspin—has continued the tradition of serving the President by striving to improve intelligence. Reflecting the changes on the international scene and the nature of US involvement overseas, the Clinton Board has submitted

The IOB

Unlike the PFIAB, the IOB—previously known as the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB)—is specifically charged with oversight and review of intelligence activities for any which are unlawful or contrary to EO or Presidential Directive. The IOB Report to the President on US intelligence activities in Guatemala in the 1980s and early 1990s[24] marked the first time any report from either the IOB or PFIAB has ever been released to the public. Under the current EO, the IOB is a standing committee of the PFIAB, composed of four of the PFIAB members designated by the chair. To maintain the objectivity of both the IOB and the PFIAB, however, the two continue to function as separate entities. (b)(3)(n)

President Ford created the IOB in 1976, after the Church and Pike Committee hearings into alleged wrongdoings by intelligence agencies.[25] The IOB originally was completely separate from the PFIAB. Although the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (the "Rockefeller Commission") had recommended in 1975 that the PFIAB's mandate be extended to include oversight of the CIA for improper or illegal activities, President Ford opted to create this separate body for oversight. The IOB was specifically charged with policing the intelligence agencies for any activities which violated law, EO, or Presidential Directive and with considering reports from the IC Inspectors General on illegal activities in the Community. The IOB's membership has often been drawn from the PFIAB, although it maintained a separate entity until this administration. In addition, during the Carter administration, when there was no PFIAB, the IOB continued to perform its oversight functions. (b)(3)(n)

The PFIAB's Future

As the reports in 1996 on reform of the IC demonstrate,[26] there is a widespread perception that US intelligence needs to be reformed and revamped. Regardless of any changes in the Community's structure, there is no doubt that the world has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and the IC is adapting to those changes. The PFIAB is uniquely suited to guide and inform these reforms and changes. The Board enjoys direct access to the President and his advisers, and—unlike many of the groups advocating changes in intelligence—it has the ability to review the entire range of activities regardless of sensitivity or classification. Perhaps just as important, the PFIAB exists primarily to improve intelligence, not to denigrate or attack it. As a low-profile, nonpartisan board of outside experts, the PFIAB is devoid of the ulterior motives to attack publicly the CIA and the IC. The PFIAB's

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position also makes it much less susceptable to the bureaucratic agendas and other nonobjective imperatives that often plague internal Community reform efforts. (b)(3)(n)

The Board is one of the most valuable mechanisms in the United States to ensure that intelligence continues "to enhance the security the United States and the conduct of its foreign affairs." All IC professionals should be aware in their dealings with the Board of the role of the PFIAB has in improving intelligence

(b)(3)(n)

The Current PFIAB

The Honorable Thomas S. Foley is Chairman of the PFIAB. He was Speaker of the House of Representatives during the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses, and he served as a Representative from Washington state from 1965 to 1994. He is a partner in a Washington law firm.

The Honorable Warren B. Rudman serves as Vice Chairman of PFIAB. Mr. Rudman was a United States Senator for the state of New Hampshire from 1980 to 1992, and he served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). He is also a partner in a Washington law firm.

Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., USAF (Ret.) served as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Director of the National Security Agency (1973-77), and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the IC. He also served as Vice President of the California Institute of Technology and Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. General Allen is the sole remaining alumnus of President Bush's PFIAB. He is also a member of the IOB.

Zoe Baird is an attorney and is a Senior Research Affiliate and a Senior Visiting Scholar at Yale Law School. She formerlly was Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the Aetna Life & Casualty Company, a counselor and senior staff executive of General Electric, an Associate Counsel to President Jimmy Carter, and a partner in a Washington law firm.

Richard L. Bloch is Chairman of the Board of the Columbus Realty Trust, President of Pinon Farm in Sante Fe, New Mexico, and serves on the boards of directors of several other corporations and charities.

Ann Z. Caracristi is a retired professional intelligence officer and 40-year veteran of the National Security Agency, where she served as Deputy Director from 1980 to 1982. She is also a member of the DCI/Secretary of Defense Joint Security Commission, and she chaired the DCI Task Force on intelligence training. Ms. Caracristi is a member of the IOB.

Dr. Sidney D. Drell is a professor of physics at Stanford University and is Deputy Director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center. He is also Adjunct Professor at Carnegie Mellon University, a Director of the Arms Control Association, and former President of the American Physical Society. Since 1960, he has advised the US Government on national-security-related scientific and technical issues.

The Honorable Thomas F. Eagleton is a retired United States Senator for Missouri, serving in the Senate from 1968 to 1987. He served on both the SSCI and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He is a partner in a St. Louis law firm and a University Professor of Public Affairs at Washington University.

James Hamilton is an attorney and partner in a Washington law firm. He formerly served as Assistant Chief Counsel to the SSCI (1973-74) and as Chairman of the District of Columbia Bar's Legal Ethics Committee and New Rules of Professional Conduct Education Committee.

Anthony S. Harrington is an attorney and a partner in a Washington law firm. He previously served as General Counsel to the Democratic National Committee and the 1992 Clinton/Gore campaign. He is a founding Director of the Center for Democracy, and he formerly served as Assistant Dean of the Duke Law School. Mr. Harrington is Chairman of the IOB.

Dr. Robert J. Hermann was formerly a professional intelligence officer and is Senior Vice President for Science and Technology of the United Technologies Corporation. In government, Dr. Hermann served as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (1979-1981), as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for C4I, and as a senior official of the National Security Agency.

Harold W. Pote is a businessman, and he is a founding partner in the investment firm, The Beacon Group. He is also a trustee of Drexel University. He formerly was CEO of a major regional bank, and he has been involved in business development in Russia and in real estate

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investments. Mr. Pote is a member of the IOB.

Lois D. Rice is a Guest Scholar in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution. She formerly was Senior Vice President for Government Affairs of Control Data Corporation, and Vice President of the College Board. She also serves on the boards of directors of numerous corporations.

Stanley S. Shuman is Executive Vice President, Managing Director, and member of the Executive Committee of a major New York investment banking firm. He is the longest sitting private member of the Financial Control Board of the City of New York.

Maurice Sonnenberg is an international consultant on industrial development, trade, and finance. He is the former Chairman of the Democratic House and Senate Council and the Democratic Leadership Council, and he has served in numerous advisory positions to the US Government on foreign policy issues, including as a member of President Carter's Export Council. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

(b)(5)

Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret.) was Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from 1970 to 1974. He was the youngest four-star admiral in US naval history and was the youngest CNO. He also served as Commander of US Naval Forces, Vietnam, from 1968 to 1970. He is president of a private consulting firm, and he serves on numerous boards of directors of major corporations and charitable organizations.

NOTES

1. EO 12863, 13 September 1993. (b)(3)(n)
2. Ibid.
3. EO 10656, 8 February 1956. (b)(3)(n)
4. Although PFIAB administration and budgetary matters handled by the National Security Council, the PFIAB is independent of the NSC. (b)(3)(n)
5. EO 12863, 13 September 1993. (b)(3)(n)
6. This has been the practice through much of PFIAB's history, except during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, when members also received a consultant's fee of $100 per day. (b)(3)(n)
7. For example, the Bush PFIAB submitted separate reports to the President, and numerous other letters and special reviews from 1990 to 1993. (b)(3)(n)
8. EO 12863, 13 September 1993. (b)(3)(n)
9. EO 10656, 8 February 1956. (b)(3)(n)
10. Report of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, May 1995. (b)(3)(n)
11. The Killian Award is given annually by the PFIAB to a working-level individual or group in the IC "for excellence in performance of foreign intelligence activities of particulary crucial importance to the national security of the United States." Nominations for awards are solicated and accepted from the consumers of intelligence. (b)(3)(n)
12. EO 10938, 4 May 1961. (b)(3)(n)
13. Presidential Memorandum, "The U.S. Foreign Intelligence Effort," 1 May 1968 (U); Presidential Memorandum, " Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States," 19 October 1965. (b)(3)(n)
14. EO 11460, 20 March 1969. (b)(3)(n)
15. Presidential Memorandum, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," 24 March 1969. (b)(3)(n)
16. Statement by President Nixon, 14 March 1969. (b)(3)(n)
17. Statement by President Ford, 11 March 1976. (b)(3)(n)
18. EO 11984, 4 May 1977; Statement by President Carter, 5 May 1977. (b)(3)(n)
19. EO 12331, 20 October 1981. Reagan later issued EO 12357, 28 October 1985, which fixed the membership size and term of appointment. (b)(3)(n)
20. Presidential Memorandum "United States Intelligence Activities and Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 28 May 1982. (b)(3)(n)
21. EO 12537, 28 October 1985. (b)(3)(n)
22. See *Studies in Intelligence*: "The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations" (Vol. 39, No. 4). (b)(3)(n)
23. EO 12863, 13 September 1993. (b)(3)(n)
24. IOB, "Report on the Guatemala Review," 28 June 1996. (b)(3)(n)
25. EO 11905, 18 February 1976. (b)(3)(n)
26. The most notable of these include the Report of the Commission on Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (the "Aspin-Brown Commission"), the HSPSCI's IC21 report, and independent reports by the Twentieth Century Fund and the Council on Foreign Relations. (b)(3)(n)

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An Interview With William P. Crowell, Deputy Director, NSA

William Nolte

"I believe the partnership between CIA and NSA can work. It requires commitment at the top of the organizations and buy-in at the bottom of both organizations. I don't think that's been achieved yet, but it is absolutely essential to both agencies."



William P. Crowell

Editor's Note: Mr. Crowell was interviewed at National Security Agency Headquarters at Fort Meade on 25 August 1995 by William Nolte, a member of the Editorial Board of Studies in Intelligence.

Let's start with some background—how you got into intelligence and your career at NSA.

I was recruited out of college, which makes me like the majority of the professionals at NSA. It was something of a personal thing. I was so intrigued by the test NSA administered, I said ro myself, "Any organization that can create a test like that must be an interesting place to work." And so I decided to have the interview. I've never been disappointed, at least not for long. (U)

And you have worked in private industry. ...

I left here and went to a high-tech corporation, working in four areas: imagery (where I got my chance to learn the imagery field); low observables; mathematics research; and command and control systems. I started a business line that broadened their intelligence interests beyond imagery into other areas, including signals intelligence. (U)

But you're not, at least in formal terms, what one would consider a technical person.

No one believes you ever have a life before you come to work at NSA, but I did. I worked for a communications company that had two major lines of work. One was designing and developing commercial communications—radio communications systems and multiuser systems. And the second thing they did was to build listening devices and other equipment for private investigators. In 1957, it was still legal. (U)

I think the thing that is missed about my background is that I used my prior technical experience to my advantage while at NSA. In particular, more than anything, I wanted to do computer work, so in almost every assignment I've had here I was the person bringing in information technology or expanding the use of technology. I've been writing software since the early 1970s in a range of fields, including signals analysis and others, and I've never lost that interest. I still spend 12 or 15 hours every month maintaining my programming skills. (U)

Everyone was so quick to predict that the post-1945 period would be the "atomic age" but missed the coming significance of the computer, which, one

William Nolte works for the National Security Agency.

(b)(3)(c)

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50 USC 3024(i)
18 USC 798
P.L. 86-36

can argue, has proven a far more influential technology.

I had a conversation recently with the head of one of the largest of the computer corporations, and it was not until the 1950s that we began to develop a viable commercial computer industry. They had grudgingly and reluctantly modified some of their equipment so we could do computing at NSA. (U)

Can you identify two or three areas of greatest concern—make-or-break-it issues—as you look to the future of the Community?

Let's center in on information systems and their impact on the two missions of this Agency, protecting US information systems and exploiting foreign information systems. One of the biggest challenges we face is balancing the two, particularly because what we do in the Defense Department and in other areas of the US Government can influence the commercial marketplace. The systems or techniques that we develop have the capacity to come back on us in the form of increasingly sophisticated target systems. So that's one challenge I think is more than a little significant. How to draw a policy to balance those two issues is extremely important to our continued success—on both sides. (U)

The second issue is that information systems are becoming increasingly complex. For example, most communications engineers believe that it's a lot easier to ensure an error-free transmission over modern networks if there is an equal number of 0s and 1s in the communication string. And, therefore, they almost all, after taking lots and lots of channels, and packing them together in time or frequency, and compressing and otherwise manipulating everything in ways that are complex and hard to undo, add randomization in order to get an equal distribution of 0s and 1s. And randomization looks a lot much like encryption, unless you know the way it was randomized. So, it's the complexity of all the different layers of modern information systems—whether it's the information layer, the compression layer, or the signal technology layer, or the randomization layer—that together present a real challenge to the SIGINTer. What you're saying is "undo all of this," and it's exceedingly difficult. (U)

Let me add to all that the third biggest challenge facing us, and that is volume. And I could just end the sentence there and everything is said. But let me just put it in terms that NSA Director Admiral McConnell uses in testimony

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

That gives you some idea of the daunting challenge volume presents, forcing us to look for new technologies. (C)

You don't have to go too far into the public literature to find people saying "volume wins," that the challenge to NSA and its counterparts around the world is going to be overwhelming.

Volume will never win, the reason being that volume is not the only way the world is constructed. The "pipeline" that goes from city x to city y is primarily traffic going between the two cities or going through them en route to some final destination. If you are interested in the communications from th(b)(1) (b)(3) always focus on the pathway between that place and the nearest switch. If you're interested in wireless communications, you can always get close enough to the communications you're interested in that you can "narrow out" a lot of the other volume. And so volume is not the only ingredient; you also have time and space discriminators. Secondly, technologies for dealing with volume are being developed as rapidly as the new information systems are because, guess what, the rest of the world also has to deal with the volume problem. (C)

If you don't believe that, go surfing the Web, with something you absolutely want to find, with no Web Search tools. You'll find out why someone developed Web Search tools. (U)

One can probably find predictions of the impossibility of codebreaking going back into the 1920s.

In the 1950s, when microwave and other point-to-point communications systems were being developed, it was absolutely said that NSA would go out of business. But, as a result of those communications systems, more modern means of collection were invented. When satellite communications came along in the 1960s, we developed ways of sorting through the enormous volumes of communications, dishes on the ground capable of intercepting those

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signals, and so on. So, in my view, virtually every communications system that has appeared on the scene, while presenting challenges, at the same time offers extremely exciting possibilities. (U)

Do these challenges require different relationships within the Intelligence Community?

The new information systems do not allow NSA to conduct its mission from a great distance from the target and in a totally passive manner. Therefore, the partnerships we have, let's say first with the military services, because of the need to mix tactical access with national capabilities, must become closer. Secondly, (b)(1) (b)(3) This is absolutely essential. There's no backing away from that, no matter how the supporting (or "nonsupporting") bureaucracies may feel about it. (C)

Do you occasionally feel resistance?

I've spent the last five years trying to tamp down that resistance, with some limited success. But I'm persistent. (U)

But the argument would be, to give it its due, that we have to put extraordinary emphasis on protection of our information, and this of necessity limits how we share and how much we share.

I believe that's an outmoded way of thinking. It's outmoded for several reasons. First, the partnerships I mentioned are essential. You can't succeed without them. And, if you can't find a way to share the information essential to the partnership, then you ought to be prepared to sign up to go out of business. Second, the successes you may be trying to protect, the important sources and methods, have always been and will always be short-lived. You may be able to extend their life somewhat by closing the circle to absolute minimums, but you'll also restrict usefulness. And you'll also restrict the opportunity to be successful the next time, when you're facing one of those inevitable changes. (U)

When you were deputy director for operations [at NSA], you coined the phrase "SIGINT that counts," touching on what you were just saying. To acquire information, process it, and then hold onto it in such a way that it's not useful is not much of a public service, is it?

I have two great fears for the future of the SIGINT system, and I challenge the system as much as I can to react to and mitigate my fears. The first fear is that we will collect what is easy to collect and pretend it satisfies our customers, instead of going after the hard-to-get (politically or technically) information they really need. The second fear is that we'll get the information and then go back to the old days of "tossing it over the transom," as Admiral Studeman used to say, or sending it to the customer and saying "Well, I finished my job. They got it." We need to realize that we have an obligation to make sure that customers get the information, that they understand it, and that they use it. (U)

Pearl Harbor can be described as a cryptanalytic success but a cryptologic failure, in that the ultimatum message was read in time but the information got to the commanders several hours after the attack. That's a terrible but vivid model.

It's absolutely an important message for us to have learned. The other message, one that comes later, and from other wars as well, is that we don't always know what the person at the other end needs. If we rely exclusively on our picks of what to send them, as opposed to relying on their ability to ask us questions or even go through our databases to find what's important to them, we'll probably fail. (U)

Are you comfortable with a system in which the customer judges the success or failure of NSA?

I've always been comfortable with that, as long as the customer is judging success within their area of interest. I don't think we should ask the Commerce Department to judge our ability to support military operations, nor do I think we should ask the military to judge our ability to support economic policy. But, yes, even if we didn't realize it, customers have been making those judgments and affecting our budgets all along. (U)

More so, now?

But more now, particularly since the demise of the Soviet Union. With that event came the drawdown of resources, the shift of priorities, and shifts in thinking about essentiality of intelligence. (U)

Aside from the volume issue, one of the things you must hear—from the academic community, and the press, for example—is that we're experiencing a shift in the value of information. Presidents will be reacting to open-source information, on the Internet or on CNN, and that the relative value of covertly acquired information declines.

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I'm not particularly interested, if I may call myself a consumer of intelligence, and I think I am, in things that have already happened. I'm interested in two sets of things: those that will affect my future choices; and those aren't all going to come from open sources. Second, I'm interested in those things that haven't happened yet because they're in planning. I don't think all the important information about critical, developing events are going to appear in the open. (U)

I also think one of the things we try to do too often is to pit one information source or one intelligence source against another, as if it would be possible for us to "pick a winner" and do away with all the other sources. (U)

If you are content to see only the exteriors of buildings and the exteriors of missiles and tanks, then imagery will serve all of your needs, as long as you know where to look. But if you want to know what's inside the building or have some doubt where mobile assets are going to be, you'd better have some robust intelligence sources like SIGINT and HUMINT that can give you that kind of information. So, the truth of the matter is that, even though as a Community we often don't accept this, we need each other. Imagery needs SIGINT and HUMINT to know where to look. (b)(1) (b)(3) There are so many synergies in intelligence sources that we are doing ourselves and our consumers a disservice by "picking the best." I think, in that sense, open source is nothing more than another source of information which you'd better be aware of in order to obtain the maximum efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence system. But you'd better not put all of your eggs in that basket. (S)

Has the Community been successful in making the case, before Congress, among others, that we have provided information of value commensurate with our costs?

I think that at this moment NSA and the Community in general have strong stock with Congress. But there are areas of weakness we need to shore up. These range from Ames and Guatemala to our ability to cooperate. (U)

DCI Deutch has reaffirmed his support for a policy of openness. How have we been doing with that?

Recently, we've done better. Obviously, the VENONA releases were quite significant, moving in the direction of recognizing when a story can be told. And that's essential. We're not going to become irresponsible. But we are going to become more responsible for being positive in our ability to recognize when stories can be released. What is often forgotten when we talk about protecting sources and methods is why we're charged to do that. Having spent the public's money to develop certain capabilities, the public expects us to maintain those capabilities as viable, as long as we possibly can, and to release those capabilities only when they no longer serve an intelligence purpose. That's an economic issue, but we often turn it into a passionate issue of different proportions. (U)

Not only do we have to change that attitude, because of the recent executive order on declassification, but, and this is a very strongly held personal position, we owe it to the American people to contribute to history what the Intelligence Community has done, once sources and methods are no longer an issue. (U)

VENONA is a classic example of how we can tell the story and convince the public that intelligence, at least historically, had an impact on the direction of the country; on the direction of the world, for that matter. (U)

On VENONA, there was a cost to the United States of retaining that information, in that many Americans grew up believing there was no Soviet spy effort.

As you know, I was involved with VENONA 20 or 25 years ago. It was one story I believed would have to be told one day. It will never end the debate, but now it's in the hands of the historians to make the judgment, not us. (U)

Let's talk about the creation of a National Imagery Agency. What can NSA provide in the way of lessons learned?

Both Admiral McConnell and I have tried to be extremely helpful and balanced in our presentations, discussing the realities of the SIGINT stovepipe as a model for the NIA. (U)

The realities are we don't own everything. And, of course, everyone who wants to reorganize the Community into a new stovepipe wants to own everything, because control makes it a lot easier to get on with things. But the real strength of NSA is technical leadership and technical direction over the many people who

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are engaged in SIGINT, including many whose budgets are determined outside the Consolidated Cryptologic Program— (b)(1) (b)(3) I think the imagery problem has to be solved in a similar way. They'll need to decide what the technical issues are and who decides them. What are the resource issues and who will decide those? (S)

Is it fair to ask what pitfalls you've warned about?

There are some large pitfalls, with regard to the relationship between a National Imagery Agency and the organic resources within the military services, the picture-taking aircraft and so on. How do you balance the need for services dependent on those resources with national needs to ensure that there exists interoperability and compatibility between systems? That will be a very tricky area, as it has been for SIGINT for a long time. Not yet solved! (C)

The second area we've cautioned them about is when does an image become "intelligence," as opposed to "imagery intelligence?" How do you judge when someone is doing imagery intelligence as opposed to all-source analysis? We know how tricky that one is. (U)

That raises the question of the stovepipes and the bridges across them.

The term stovepipe is unfortunate. What we are talking about is various sets of professional and technical expertise. And we're talking about building a system of systems, one of which is a SIGINT system that has all of the necessary ingredients of training and development and science that has to do with SIGINT. It's obviously best to put all of that into one organization where it can be nurtured. The same is true of imagery and of HUMINT. You don't want signals intelligence officers out walking the streets collecting human intelligence. They don't have the training or the background. (U)

Where do you build the bridges of cooperation and teamwork? My view is at every level across the stovepipes, instead of trying to build them on top of the organizations. You look for teaming opportunities, whether in the collection arena or in the analytic arena. We need to share technology, we need to share information, and we need to share policies. (U)

You want to encourage people to develop their strengths in a given field, but not to act in ignorance of other fields, correct?

Exactly. That's why the bridges have to be built at virtually every level across the stovepipes. You can't just build them on top. You can't have the DDI at CIA and the equivalents at NSA and DIA as the places where the bridges are built, because what you get is three stovepipes with a plank on top. (U)

When you look to the future and the need for technical leadership, what are your concerns?

My greatest concern is that our current state of downsizing is such we have not had the ability to do any hiring. We will hire 89 people this year. The most we project for the near future is 100 to 200 each year. That is irresponsible but unavoidable under our current authorities. (C)

Based on current projections, that will not turn around for the next five years. And we have not been hiring large numbers for the last four years. So, it could be as long as a nine-year hiatus with only about 1,200-1,500 people having come on board during that entire decade. (C)

At what point does this become damaging?

It's already beginning to have negative effects. Obviously, people coming in from colleges and universities, while not able to tackle our hardest problems, are more up to date on the latest technologies and are able to bring whole new ways of looking at things to our problems. (U)

Back to the main question. Neither NSA nor CIA will ever get people out of colleges and universities—or business, for that matter—that are sufficiently trained or seasoned in this business. We'll always have to invest in specialized training and development. In that regard, I think NSA's strength is our professionalization system, which codifies that training in identifiable directions.

As you look at problems you've dealt with over the last four or five years, how pleased are you with the progress made in transition?

That depends on where you sit. Some people outside the intelligence business may feel we've accomplished a lot, with few tools and little flexibility in making resource decisions. I'm personally disappointed at how long it's taking. Most people within the agency are stunned by

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how quickly this is occurring and would like to see parts of the process slow down. (U)

Why am I disappointed in the pace? We are drawing down, we have ever fewer resources. It is no longer possible to push decisions off into the future without it costing a great deal in the way of a continuing resource burden. If you keep open a site that is producing but which you know is no longer part of your future, it can cost, over five years, anywhere from

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

that time. The earlier you make the decision to bank on the future at some present cost, the better off you are. That's what led me as DDO to make decisions resulting in the closure of 17 sites, with the decisions made in less than a year. We've decided to close three or four more since then. (C)

It would not be hard to find critics of those decisions.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Any last thoughts?

One of the things I'll throw in is that I had the opportunity to work at CIA in the Directorate of Operations early in my career, and I have spent a great deal of my time in the intervening years working closely with the DO and the Directorate of Science and Technology. As a result of those experiences and based on my analysis of what we face in the future, I believe the partnership between CIA and NSA can work. It requires commitment at the top of the organizations and buy-in at the bottom of both organizations. I don't think that's been achieved yet, but it is absolutely essential to both agencies. (U)

Thank you.

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Fun with a computer

NPIC, Amiga, and Videotape

(b)(3)(c)

The National Photographic Interpretation Center's (NPIC) TV studio, which is part of the (b)(3)(c) produces special and *ad hoc* video projects. Its primary responsibility, however, is to produce the daily *NPIC Video Executive Summary*.

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During the first six months of this year, the PEG studio averaged more than of finished videotape per month.

(b)(3)(c)

When the production of the *Summary* began more than five years ago, maps and annotations were prepared manually. Each day, a scriptwriter would carefully balance a small red dot on the end of a X-acto knife and then try to stick that dot onto a base map to indicate the location of a city or installation to be featured in the (b)(3)(c) *Summary*. Those paper maps were not designed for TV production, but they were the only ones available. After "dotting" several maps for each day's production, the maps were put on a board with magnets and videotaped into the *Summary*. Place names and other annotations had to be typed each day on the character generator, even though many of the same names would be used over again; we soon discovered that spelling wasn't one of our strong suits. A lot of time was wasted in preproduction, a lot of little red dots were used, and the file of paper maps became unwieldy. Obviously, something different was called for.

We thought a computer could help us solve our video graphics problems, but we wondered if our requirements were unrealistic. We did not have the luxury of a full-time, dedicated operator or artist, and only two of us had any graphics or computer background. The computer had to be easy enough to use so that everyone—engineers, scriptwriters, and production managers—would be able to retrieve and build a half-dozen maps or graphics in less than a couple of hours. The system would also have to be inexpensive and have little or no maintenance overhead. We did not have a big budget, so we were tempted to buy the system with petty cash.

Enter Amiga (b)(3)(c)

We bought our first Commodore Amiga in 1987 for less than including software. The system worked right out of the box, and we have been creating TV graphics with it ever since. The cost over the past four years has been less than for three workstations, software, additional memory, digitizers, genlocks, hard drives, and extra floppy disk drives. We have not paid a cent for maintenance or repair, although we have worn out two mouse controls. Everyone is our studio uses the Amiga. Familiarization training takes less than two hours.

The Amiga has enabled us to build a file of hundreds of maps suitable for TV production. This usually means the maps have fewer annotations, colors, and other small details. (Typical base

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maps, operational navigation charts, and world aeronautical charts have too much information for proper viewing on a TV screen.) Original maps are either traced or digitized into the Amiga and then redrawn and annotated to meet our production requirements and standards. City and target names are stored as "brushes"— elements that can be moved independently of the background, allowing us to custom annotate the maps needed for that day's script. In addition, we use icons to accent or emphasize locations on the maps, and they are also drawn as brushes. The icons are saved in appropriate subject-matter files or drawers.

Map drawing and icon building enhanced our videos, but we learned that these tasks could be somewhat mundane. To do something different, we began using animation sequences in our special productions, and recently we have gotten into three-dimensional—or x, y, z—animation. Using animation, we built, operated, and blew up an RBMK 1000 nuclear reactor in our Chernobyl videotape, and we fired a few missiles and sank a Yankee submarine in the Measurement and Signature Intelligence program.

In one special program, *Tracking Snowstorm—The Buran Launch*, Amiga graphics and animations were used from the opening title to the closing credits. The program detailed the exploitation efforts of NPIC and the Office of Imagery Analysis in following the development of, and preparations for, the first launch of the Soviet shuttle system.

The beginning of the program included a short, but comprehensive, comparison of the US and Soviet shuttle systems. Computer graphics played a critical role in succinctly comparing features of the two systems. With Amiga graphics we built and launched both shuttle systems and showed a side-by-side comparison of both orbiters. What we were able to explain clearly with computer graphics in three to four minutes would have taken 10 to 15 minutes using photographs and charts.

The program featured an account of how analysts, by exploiting overhead imagery, followed the progress of the Buran program for more than a year. Computer graphics were used to point out details in many of the overhead images.


Looking Ahead

With new software and some third-party hardware, we will be taking our Amigas into the

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Computer animation is used to show the Soviet and US space shuttles.

future. We are experimenting with photo enhancement and colorization of black-and-white ground photography. Future Executive Summaries will include "Turnerized" ground photos.

We are also experimenting with new software that allows us to generate and animate titles and text. One of the Amigas is connected on line with our control console, so we can use the computer to draw and annotate directly onto a video image.

In another application, we are beginning to store our ground photos and collateral images in an optical disk system. Amigas will be used to create the data base for this file, and they will also be used to control the optical disk recorder and player during search and retrieval.

The versatile Amiga could be used in building an audio file of linguists pronouncing foreign words and phrases so that our narrators can reference the file for proper pronunciations. The Amiga already has stereo sound capabilities, and it would take an investment of only about $200 to try this application.

Other possibilities include sound effects and music, ray tracing, fractal processing, and a bar code reading system for controlling our videotapes. We are also looking into interactive video and artificial intelligence for training and exploitation applications. And we may be getting into a UNIX operating environment that will be available for the Amiga in 1991.

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Glossary of Video Terms

bridgeboard	A device that allows the Amiga to run IBM software.
digitizer	A device used to capture and store images by converting them into pizels. (See pixels.)
flicker fixer	A device that doubles the scan rate of a monitor, thus eliminating scan lines and the "flicker" effect in high-resolution images.
fractal	A mathematical formula used with computers to generate patterns that at one time were thought to be random.
genlock	A device used to synchronize two or more video images so that they may be used on the same screen at the same time.
icon	A picture representation; a graphic image or symbol used to refer to an object.
pixels	A group of rectangular or square dots that make up a digital image.
ray tracing	A method of computer drawing that accounts for all light sources, transparencies, and reflections in a scene when rendering an object.
Turnerized	Slang. The method of electronically colorizing black-and-white movies as popularized by Ted Turner, president of the Turner Broadcasting Corporation.
UNIX	An operating system used in Sun and NeXT computers.
x, y, z	The lines of projection in three-dimensional space: height, width, and depth. In aviation, movements around these lines are called heading, pitch, and bank.

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The Evolution of US Government Restrictions on Using and Exporting Encryption Technologies (U)

Michael Schwartzbeck

"In the last year, several academic, commercial, and free speech advocates have seriously jeopardized the US Government's legal right to control encryption."

Michael Schwartzbeck is at the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

Encryption technology has long been an important and closely guarded tool for military, diplomatic, and government missions. Nations depend on encryption to communicate private information across the world and through "enemy" territory; without encryption, any nation's most valued secrets are easily compromised. History books attest to the value the Allies placed on the broken German and Japanese encryption systems during World War II. It is with this sense of worth that the United States guards its encryption capabilities and it efforts to decrypt other countries' communications. For decades, the US Government has monopolized encryption and decryption efforts, capabilities, and research. In recent years, however, the information revolution has begun to challenge this monopoly with some success. In the last year, several academic, commercial, and free speech advocates have seriously jeopardized the US Government's legal right to control encryption.

An Early Challenge

On 24 October 1952, President Truman signed a top secret presidential memorandum[1] that consolidated many of the service and national cryptological functions into the National Security Agency (NSA). Since then, NSA has been tasked with protecting and advancing America's cryptologic capabilities. For decades, NSA has had several mechanisms designed to limit the public discussion of cryptologic research. One such method was to embrace corporate and educational research labs and think tanks through organizations such as the National Security Agency Scientific Advisory Board (NSASAB).

Through the NSASAB, senior NSA scientists historically met with leading industry and university mathematicians and scientists to discuss the cryptologic applications of emerging theories in science and technology.[2] While NSA officials had a true interest in attracting the brightest thinkers in the United States, they also used the NSASAB as a tool to bring cryptology's leading thinkers into association with NSA and thus be able to classify their work, which then removed it from the public vision and the eyes of foreign cryptological services.

Another similar project was the creation in 1958 of the Communications Research Division (CRD) within the Institute for Defense Analysis. The CRD was a private, independent think tank dedicated to helping NSA solve advanced cryptologic problems. Co-located at Princeton University's John von Neumann Hall and a site near the Pentagon, the CRD has been led by such cryptological lumi(b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) a professor of mathematics at Cornell University; (b)(3)(c) a mathematician with both the Sandia Corporation and the University of Illinois; and [(b)(3)(c) the chairman of the University of Chicago's mathematics department.

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
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The CRD regularly welcomed the nation's brightest thinkers. Their work at CRD was heavily classified, however, and no CRD research has ever been published in the open press.[3]

The union of compartmented postgraduate research and NSA sponsorship was disrupted in the late 1960s by the introduction into the university environment of affordable computer technology and corporate financial interests. During that time, IBM board chairman Thomas Watson, Jr., set up a cryptology research group that developed a cipher (codenamed Lucifer) for use in a cash-dispensing system that IBM had been developing.[4] At first, the Lucifer cipher was not very sophisticated, but, with the help of Carl Meyer, a German-born electrical engineer with a doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania, IBM retooled the cipher a number of times; in 1974, it was ready for the market. This cipher had a key that was 128 bits long, significantly longer than the keys of any other publicly developed encryption programs available to the public at the time.[5]

This incredibly long cipher key led many to believe that the Lucifer code would be truly unbreakable, even by NSA's standards. For the first time in its history, NSA's decryption capabilities were seriously threatened by public research, and the agency quickly moved to rectify the situation.

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“For the first time in its history, NSA's decryption capabilities were seriously threatened by public research, and the agency quickly moved to rectify the situation.”

This action effectively demonstrated that "strong" cryptography was still controlled by the government and not available for public sector use. Unfortunately for NSA, this did not solve their problem. The NSA/IBM key-length agreement was widely publicized, and many public researchers felt that the NSA was unfairly stifling their work for secretive, and possibly ulterior, reasons. Many protests were lodged, and a variety of public cryptographic research groups emerged throughout educational and corporate centers in response.

The Information Revolution and Changing Contexts

This disagreement between Intelligence Community (IC) cryptographers and public researchers simmered until the late 1980s, when the information revolution first began to be felt. As interconnectivity and computer technology began to increase exponentially, the Internet began to grow in popularity, and telecommunications, business practices, and international political realities changed dramatically. New issues developed concerning the Global and National Information Infrastructures, global electronic commerce, legal jurisdictions, and intelligence requirements, including:[6]

- *US defense and intelligence needs evolved.* There has been considerable debate on the IC's roles, missions, and resources. Public perception of government needs changed with greater interests in counternarcotics, terrorism, transnationalism, and economic issues.

- *Encryption needs proliferated, especially for nongovernment and nonmilitary purposes.* Businesses and individuals created legitimate needs for "strong" encryption. Increasing needs for an electronic means to transfer funds, send and receive data, and conduct commerce over intra- and internets led to a greater need for strong encryption.

- *Expertise in encryption was no longer found only in the military and in the government.* Computer software and hardware firms and academic institutions began producing high-quality encryption codes. Many businesses exist for the sole purpose of creating strong encryption for business purposes.

- *Encryption capabilities became dependent on computer software and hardware.* This led to a greater union between encryption and industry, with all sectors being transformed by the growth of computer technologies.

- *Strong cryptography became widely available.* Both inside the United States and abroad, encryption software has come to be widely marketed.[7] Even if no US-originated cryptography products are ever exported, it will still proliferate worldwide.

- *The information revolution changed business practices, concepts of government sovereignty, and the way the*

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world is viewed. To a significant degree, the trust that most citizens placed in their governments and their willingness to defer to government authority are gone.

- *Computers are now viewed as contributing significantly to the expansion of personal freedoms such as free speech.* Many see encryption as a critically important method of protecting personal privacy on computer networks. Many also use computer networks extensively for their private business and personal communications needs.

- *Traditional definitions of intellectual property became questionable.* Information no longer has to be printed or made available through newsstands, bookshops, and libraries to be widely circulated.

- *"Product cycles" in computer software, hardware, and telecommunications industries became considerably shorter than government "policy cycles."* Timelines for research, development, production, and marketing of new technologies are much shorter than timelines for government's implementation of new policies. Ponderous government approaches are seen as increasingly illogical and unwarranted.

These issues led public and government cryptoanalysts to feel a need to revisit the issue of government control of cryptography. The Clinton administration understood the changing role of cryptography and tried to address these issues early on. Its first attempt came in April 1993 with the "Clipper chip." The chip was to be installed in all US-produced computers, and it depended on a key escrow[8] account that would allow the government to hold copies of every key in use by the public, so it could decrypt any message it felt necessary. Even though the administration promised strict control of the decryption keys,[9] including storage and warehousing by a disinterested third party, privacy groups complained of an Orwellian plot. AT&T was the only major corporation to sign up for the chip, in a move that its management discovered to be a tremendous error. The Clipper chip was recognized as a failure that would never be accepted by corporate America, and the Clinton administration stopped pushing it.

Next, the Clinton administration suggested that the encryption industry adopt the NSA-approved Digital Encryption Standard (DES) and Digital Signature Standard (DSS)[10] for its encryption needs. The administration wanted DES and DSS to be the standard, all-purpose encryption programs for all public and corporate needs. The largest encryption keys that DES and DSS could use were 56 bits long, and critics complained that 56-bit keys were not strong enough. Besides, critics argued that for NSA to endorse any code, it had to be able to decrypt it on a regular basis. Again, NSA was portrayed as "Big Brother."

Exportation Issue Reveals a Need For Change

The major changes in technology and encryption were illustrated by one US software encryption company when it decided to export its strong encryption code internationally. RSA Data Security was founded in 1979 by three scientists at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who had created and patented a strong encryption program. For a long time, their code was too complex for available computer technologies. By 1987, however, the computer industry had caught up to RSA and the company began signing contracts with Lotus, Motorola, Apple, and others. But their biggest controversy came in 1991,[11] when RSA Data Security tried to market its program to Microsoft, which then wanted to integrate the code into its programs to be marketed at home and abroad.

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RSA landed the contract with Microsoft. MasterCard, Visa, and other large financial institutions later announced specifications for Internet financial transactions based on RSA encryption.

This proliferation of RSA's strong code was disconcerting to NSA's cryptoanalysts. NSA feared that if this program was made commercially available and widely disseminated, it would no longer be able to collect, analyze, and produce communications intelligence.[12]

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NSA felt that if the people it targets were to get this software, they could communicate electronically without any fear being monitored.

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The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 and the International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR), revised 1992,[13] severely restrict US companies from exporting

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any and all military and intelligence-related technologies. During the Cold War, most aspects of encryption technology, including the hardware, software, and the mathematical algorithms on which cryptography is based, were classified as military technologies and placed on AECA's "Munitions List." This same list is used to prohibit the export of tanks, fighter jets, and aircraft carriers.

The Department of State had statutory responsibility for administering the AECA and ITAR regulations, which it managed through the Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC). Any US corporation wishing to export a technology on the AECA Munitions List was required to submit an export license application to the ODTC, which would then pass the application to the government agency best qualified to decide whether the technology should be exportable or not. ODTC always passed encryption export applications to NSA for review, and any code too strong was denied an export license.

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The Clinton administration was adamant that US companies would not be allowed to export strong encryption.[14]

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Bidzos realized that there was a simple way to skirt the export limitation laws.

Both the AECA and the ITAR are US laws, and, as such, they only pertain only to US companies. Bidzos went to Japan and established a Japanese subsidiary, Nihon RSA.[15] Nihon RSA qualified as a distinct Japanese company, subject only to Japanese law, and Bidzos was able to do whatever he wanted with his strong encryption technologies.[16] Knowing that his encryption technology was a desired commodity, he shopped it around the Japanese marketplace. He promptly struck a deal to produce encryption chips for Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

"The Clinton administration was adamant that US companies would not be allowed to export strong encryption."

Others Enter the Exportation Fray

At about the same time NSA and the Clinton administration were losing the battle with RSA and Jim Bidzos, several other public sector cryptographers were beginning to find success in propagating strong cryptography. In the early 1990s, a cryptographer named Philip Zimmerman created PGP (for Pretty Good Protection), data-encryption software that scrambles e-mail messages. PGP is a strong encryption program; 1,024-bit keys are common in this program.[17] Because PGP is a strong program, it fell under AECA and ITAR export control guidelines. Before the US Government could place controls on it, however, the PGP software appeared on the Internet as shareware.[18] Placing PGP on the Internet made it available worldwide to anybody with a computer and a modem,[19] so it had in effect been exported without the prior approval of the US State Department.

Although several other encryption programs were already available on the Internet, users from around the world began downloading PGP; the program became very popular and well respected among Internet users. The US Department of Justice was not pleased with the disregard for US export regulations, and it decided to prosecute Philip Zimmerman. Unfortunately for the Department's case, it could not link Zimmerman to the software website on the Internet, and, in 1996, Zimmerman was acquitted of any wrongdoing.[20] This court case was viewed by many as a major victory for the public use and availability of strong encryption.

Another case occurred in February 1995, when the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) sued the US Government on behalf of Daniel Bernstein. The EFF charged that the Federal government was violating Bernstein's First Amendment rights by stifling the research he did as a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley in strong cryptography. As with the PGP case, Bernstein was trying to publish his research papers and place his encryption software, known as Snuffle 5.0, on the Internet, and the government was citing his disregard for AECA and ITAR regulations. In January 1997, Judge Marilyn Patel ruled in favor of Bernstein,[21] on the grounds that AECA and ITAR violated the free-speech guarantees of the Constitution.

Before long, three separate bills were on the floor of Congress, each guaranteeing the right of Americans to use or sell any encryption they wanted domestically and eliminating export controls on any free or mass-market commercial encryption programs.[22] These separate bills were

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introduced by Senator Conrad Burns, Representative Bob Goodlatte, and Senator Patrick Leahy; the Goodlatte and Leahy bills would have also made it a Federal crime to use encryption to conceal the commission of a felony. Senator Robert Dole co-sponsored the Senate bills, charging that "the administration's big brother proposal will literally destroy America's computer industry."[23] Leahy stated, "These bills are pro-privacy, pro-jobs, and pro-business." While none of these bills became law, they did attract the attention of the media. Government control of strong cryptography quickly became a controversial and popular topic in the media.

Players and the Issues

By this time, each of the major interest groups in this debate had come out with compelling arguments for their own cases and similarly strong arguments denouncing opposing viewpoints.[24] The groups can be summarized as follows:

- *NSA cryptoanalysts.* NSA's stake in this argument has been its desire to continue to be able to carry out its primary mission. NSA analysts have stated that the proliferation of strong encryption has severely degraded their ability to collect intelligence, (b)(1) Sophisticated nonstate actors, such as terrorist cells and drug cartels, will be even harder to track.

- *Public researchers.* This group's main arguments have been the preservation of free speech and the right to continue to do scholarly research. The US courts have shown that the free speech argument has some validity.

> **"The lines of battle were generally drawn with NSA and law enforcement officials on one side and public researchers and corporate investors on the other."**

- *Corporate investors.* Investors have been looking for a way to ensure that electronic money transactions can be done with a high degree of confidence. Without strong encryption, consumers will not place their trust in electronic transfers, and systems like the Internet will never reach their business potential.

- *Law enforcement officials.* If strong encryption becomes available to the world's criminals, this group will not be able to gather evidence and track criminals to prevent crimes; this group also fears that its ability to fulfill its duties will be degraded, with serious impact on public safety.

The lines of battle were generally drawn with NSA and law enforcement officials on one side and public researchers and corporate investors on the other. Public researchers and corporate investors complained that the US Government was still operating with a Cold War mentality, despite the fact that Cold War paradigms have been replaced; they claimed that any organization as secretive and manipulative as NSA had no place in a free and democratic society. In their eyes, US citizens should have the right to communicate privately, without any fear of government eavesdropping, and they believe free and private speech can only be guaranteed with strong encryption. Bruce Scheier, director of the International Association for Cryptographic Research, also pointed out that, "The ability to publish is required in any vibrant academic discipline."[25]

Business leaders emphasized that electronic financial transactions will only be reliable and safe from tampering when strong encryption is used. And encryption software writers complained about the business opportunities they were missing: the estimated US data encryption market grew from $384 million in 1991 to $946 million in 1996. Worldwide totals are believed to have been $695 million in 1991 and $1.8 billion in 1996.[26] The software industry estimated that, if export controls were removed, US companies could sell as much as $60 billion a year[27] in encryption hardware and software by 2000.

On the other hand, law enforcement concerns generally paralleled NSA's in that strong encryption would give wrongdoers impenetrable communications that would allow them to operate undetected. As more strong encryption programs become available, more groups will acquire and use encryption, and, even if the US Government is able to crack those codes, it will be at a much greater expense, particularly in costs of computer time.[28] Many in the government have also felt that the "free and private speech" argument was disingenuous; as retired Vice Admiral McConnell, vice president of Booz-Allen & Hamilton and former NSA director, charged, "Those who argue in this arena usually have an agenda. Often when they are arguing one set of conditions, they will be using the privacy argument when what they are really trying to do is sell software encryption."[29]

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The National Research Council Report

By now, the Clinton administration realized that its encryption policies were not effective and were not addressing the pertinent issues of the debate. Its Clipper chip had failed, its DES and DSS encryption standards were similarly unsuccessful, and the exportation rules were disliked and increasingly ineffective in stopping the spread of strong encryption. President Clinton responded by tasking the National Research Council to do a study on the various arguments for and against US export controls on strong cryptography. The 20 members of the panel represented a wide variety of interests, and they included Kenneth Dam of the University of Chicago Law School, Bruce McConnell of the Office of Budget and Management, former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, former deputy director of NSA Ann Caracristi, and Council on Foreign Relations President Leslie Gelb.[30] Their 500-page report, "Cryptography's Role In Securing the Information Society," or CRISIS,[31] was finished in June 1996, and it was highly critical of the Clinton administration's position.

The report concluded that using arms control laws to regulate encryption "is not adequate to support the information security requirements of an information society."[32] The authors also believed that the broad outlines of a national cryptography policy could be analyzed in an unclassified environment and that export control restrictions should be "progressively relaxed but not eliminated." The panel also noted that the plan to introduce escrowed encryption keys was not without merit, but that it was "relatively untried and entails its own potential risks."[33]

The panel's consensus was that "widespread commercial and private use cryptography is inevitable in the long run and...its advantages, on balance, outweigh its disadvantages."[34] One benefit of adopting this policy, the panel noted, is that US companies could start putting much stronger encryption programs in their software, which would allow US citizens to have an increased standard of cryptographic protection. The panel's final conclusion was that government encryption policies should be examined in the same light as other US economic regulations.

The Administration Moves

The administration did not take long to respond to the National Research Council's recommendations. On 15 November 1996, President Clinton released Executive Order 13206: "Administration of Export Controls on Encryption Products." In this Executive Order, Clinton followed many of the recommendations of the CRISIS report; most important, he took cryptographic hardware, software, and technologies off of the AECA Munitions List and placed them under the statutory responsibility of the US Department of Commerce. Specifically, management of encryption fell under the regulations guiding "dual-use" (both military and civilian) commodities outlined in the Export Administration Act of 1979.[35] This move greatly eased the government controls on public use and exportation of strong crypotography. The only major requirement for exportation was a key escrow system. The resulting differences in the old and new encryption policy are listed below:[36]

<u>"Clipper Chip" Era Policy</u> (February 1994)

- *Hardware implementation:* Clipper chip required in each piece of US software.
- *Algorithm classification:* Secret.
- *Maximum key length:* 40-bits.
- *Decryption keys held by:* US Government.
- *Decryption keys held:* For all crypto, both domestic or internationally exported.
- *Keys available to:* Law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
- Exported strong crypto requires key recovery.
- No limit on domestic use of cryptography.

<u>Newer, Revised Policy</u>
(October 1996)

- *Algorithm classification:* Unclassified.
- *Maximum key length:* Unlimited, if keys are recoverable when requested.
- *Decryption keys held by:* Corporate third parties following government guidelines.
- *Decryption keys held:* Only for exported crypto with keys 56 bits or longer.
- *Keys available to:* Law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

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- Exported strong crypto requires key recovery.
- No limit on domestic use of cryptography.

This major shift in policy was met with increased enthusiasm from the public sector as well as the government. Vice President Gore said, "This initiative will make it easier for Americans to use stronger encryption products—whether at home or abroad."[37] Robert Holleyman, President of the Business Software Alliance, was also impressed, calling the plan "forward progress."[38] Stephen Walker, CEO of Trusted Information Systems, likened the policy change to "imagining during the Cold War that the Berlin Wall would fall."[39] A few others were not so impressed: Senator Conrad Burns stated, "This debate is not over by any stretch of the imagination."[40]

Encryption Key Recovery

Although some public researchers and corporate investors were still leery of the key escrow mandate, most of the groups involved in this debate accepted the escrow requirement, which was one of President Clinton's major requirements for this easing of encryption regulations. The administration has given industry a two-year grace period, at the end of which there will need to be a viable key recovery system in place and operating. Many large companies have backed the escrow system; Dorothy Denning, a cryptography expert from Georgetown University, lauded it as a useful way to recover keys "necessary to unscramble important data left by a deceased, departed, or unethical employee."[41] That the escrow accounts would be held by a trusted third party in the corporate world eased many of the "Big Brother is watching" concerns. More important, keys will only be given to the US Government in response to warrants or court orders. To show its support, IBM has teamed up with Apple, Digital, Groupe Bull, Hewlett-Packard, NCR, Sun, Trusted Information Systems, and even RSA Data Security[42] to develop an interoperable key-recovery industry standard. RSA's James Bidzos conceded, "We are seeing the market move to emergency access [of keys]."[43] Soon after, America Online, Compaq, Motorola, Novell, Northern Telecom, and 29 others joined in escrow discussions, which has strengthened the industry alliance.[44]

Detractors of the key escrow system are led by Victor Parra, president and CEO of the 550-member Electronic Messaging Association (EMA). Parra is frustrated that keys have to be held by third parties; he feels that employees of the user company are the only key holders that can really be trusted. Parra notes that e-mail and Internet transactions will tend to be limited to domestic firms, because international trading partners will be uneasy with a third party having escrow access. EMA has also noted that the two-hour limit to turn over requested keys is unreasonable, and many software makers have agreed that encryption software prices will rise as a result of escrow requirements.[45]

Escrow Goes International

William Reinsch, the Undersecretary for Export Administration at the US Department of Commerce, wants the policy to move beyond US borders and create a worldwide standard for key escrow. Reinsch theorizes that, if escrow becomes pervasive and institutionalized in international commerce, terrorists and criminals will be forced to submit to key recovery systems.[46] This would also help prevent US companies from relocating overseas to avoid current US escrow requirements.

The European Commission is considering an encryption industry standard for key recovery similar to the one proposed by the Clinton administration, and, if implemented, all codes used throughout Europe would require a trusted third party to hold a copy of the key. IBM supports the new US and European escrow proposals; to those US firms that oppose the move, they state, "We would prefer that they take a more global focus."[47] Another group, a consortium called Eurobit-ITAC-ITI-JEIDA, comprised of major Canadian, European, Japanese, and US business firms, has called for the harmonization of regulations on the export, import, re-export, and use of cryptography. Their goal is to develop a set of principles that, "reach consensus on issues which need to be treated at the worldwide level."[48]

International support does seem to be growing. Representatives from the nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) backed the concept of key recovery systems[49] during a January 1997 conference. The OECD emphasized that information security is an international matter because information systems cross national boundaries. At a separate RSA Data Security-sponsored conference, David Aaron, US Special

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Envoy to the OECD, stated that important US allies support President Clinton's position that governments should be able to recover encryption keys when necessary. He also added that he had discussed cryptography issues with representatives of France, the UK, Germany, Belgium, and Canada.

The Future of Strong Encryption

The Clinton administration has made a serious, if belated, effort to meet the evolving encryption needs of US citizens and industries. It was quick to notice and act on the outdated Cold War standards of Department of Defense control on encryption technologies and algorithms. After several false starts, the administration has produced a policy that goes a long way toward meeting the requirements of four diverse and often diametrically opposed groups: public researchers, corporate investors, law enforcement officials, and intelligence analysts.

The US Government, and NSA in particular, would like to return to the Cold War era of complete government control over strong cryptography and skillful manipulation of the research and corporate communities. But strong encryption has proliferated beyond US Government control. A failure to make any concessions to the changing times would have been disastrous for the Clinton administration's relationship with US business and free speech communities. It would also have crippled US software encryption companies trying to compete with overseas companies not shackled by restrictive regulations. And, even if the administration could keep strong encryption out of US industry, it would still proliferate; other nations around the world are just as likely to create strong codes.

So, acknowledging that strong encryption regulations needed to be addressed, the administration took the safest possible route by initiating a series of limited reforms aimed at pleasing all parties while continuing to meet intelligence and security needs. The Clipper chip, DES, DSS, and the key escrow system were each successive attempts to produce a policy that would meet the burgeoning needs of US business and free speech communities without forgetting the critical requirements of the law enforcement and intelligence communities.

What is next? Obviously, an international resolution on the control and management of encryption technologies is a desirable goal, if not a lofty one. Critics of the Clinton administration are right in noting that sophisticated criminals and terrorists will not use the encryption systems that require key escrow registration. If an international referendum requires all encryption systems and users to register their keys, however, then criminals and terrorists will be forced into the escrow system. A worldwide key escrow system will not be put into place quickly, but with serious effort it may be attainable, and it is a worthwhile goal. The proliferation of strong encryption is already beyond control, but perhaps the continued monitoring of criminals and terrorists is not.

NOTES

1. James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace: Inside The National Security Agency, America's Most Secret Intelligence Organization* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 80.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 430-433.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 434-435.

5. A passage from *The Puzzle Palace* (p. 438) accurately relates the importance of the length of a key to a code's strength:

   "How long it takes to break a code depends on the length of the key. For a 56-bit key, the number of possible combinations would be about 70 quadrillion. By using a computer with a million special-purpose chips, capable of testing 2 trillion possible keys per second, the entire range of keys could be searched in 70,000 seconds—or less than 20 hours [with most solutions found within 10 hours]....

   Then there is the matter of cost. According to two Stanford scientists, the chips themselves could be produced for about $10.00 each, or $10 million altogether...[the entire computer] could be built for about $20 million.... The daily operating cost would be about $10,000 a day, meaning that each solution would cost about $5,000.

   [With the 128-bit key,] the results would have been dramatically different. As opposed to the moderate $5,000 price tag, each solution would cost an unimaginable $200 septillion, or $200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,."

   The general principle is that the longer the length of the key, measured in bits, the more difficult it is to crack the code.

6. Stuart J. D. Schwartzstein, "Export Controls On Encryption Technologies," *SAIS Review,* (winter 1996), pp. 17-21.

7. For a review of several commercially available encryption software pro-

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grams see: Jay Munro, "Psst! Keep A Secret?" *PC Magazine* 15, (17 December 1996), pp. 45-50.

8. An encryption key "unlocks" or decrypts a coded message.

9. Steve Levy, "Scared Bitless," *Newsweek* 127, (10 June 1996), p. 50.

10. David Stipp, "Techno-Hero or Public Enemy?" *Fortune* 134, (11 November 1996), pp. 178-180.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 180-182.

13. Schwartzstein, pp. 15-16.

14. Ivars Peterson, "Boosting Cryptography's Role in Security," *Science News* 149, (8 June 1996), p. 357.

15. Tim Beardsley, "For Your Eyes Only?" *Scientific American* 275, (September 1996), p. 44.

16. The US Department of Justice confirmed this loophole by choosing not to prosecute Bidzos.

17. David L. Wilson, "Pretty Good Privacy: Software Is a Popular tool for Encrypting Messages," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 43, (13 September 1996), pp. A28-A29.

18. Shareware is software openly available on the Internet for public use at no cost.

19. PGP is still available on the Internet at <<http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp.html>>

20. Wilson, "Pretty Good Privacy...," p. A28.

21. David L. Wilson, Karla Haworth, and Andrew Mytelka, "Federal Judge Strikes Down Government Restrictions On Computer encryption," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 43, (10 January 1997), p. A24.

22. Rick Henderson, "Know The Code," *Reason 28,* (June 1996), p. 16.

23. Levy, p. 50.

24. Robert K. Acherman, "Security Balances Needs of Privacy, Law Enforcement," *Signal* 51, (February 1997), p. 23.

25. Wilson, Haworth, and Mytelka, p. A24.

26. Schwartzstein, p. 14.

27. Henderson, p. 16.

28. Schwartzstein, p. 26.

29. Acherman, p. 23.

30. Elizabeth Koch, "Confronting A Crisis: Clipping Clinton's Encryption Policies," *Reason* 28, (November 1996), p. 22.

31. This report can be found on the Internet at http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/crisis.

32. Koch, p. 22.

33. Peterson, p. 357.

34. Levy, p. 50.

35. Schwartzstein, p. 16.

36. Gary H. Anthes, "Feds Ease Crypto Rules, But With a 'Key' Catch," *Computerworld* 30, (7 October 1966), p. 32.

37. Anthes, "Feds Ease...," p. 32.

38. *Ibid.* p. 32.

39. John Carey, "Big Breakthrough–or Big Brother?" *Business Week* 3502, (18 November 1996), pp. 88-90.

40. *Ibid,* pp. *88-90.*

41. Anthes, *"Feds Ease...,"* p. 32.

42. Lynda Radosevich, "HP Pushes Encryption Scheme," *Infoworld* 18, (25 November 1966), p. 9.

43. Carey, p. 90.

44. Matthew Woolacott, "Vendors Coalesce on Encryption," *Infoworld* 18, (23/30 December 1966), p. 39.

45. Barb Cole, "Encryption Conniption," *Computerworld* 31, (6 January 1997), p. 3.

46. Gary H. Anthes, "Encryption Policies Still Under Fire," *Computerworld* 30, (9 December 1996), p. 74.

47. Graeme Browning, "Another Federal Code to Crack," *National Journal* 29, (11 January 1997), p. 89.

48. Schwartzstein, p. 30.

49. John Markoff, "A Consensus Is Sought On Coding," *The New York Times,* (29 January 1997), p. D-19.

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PFIAB's role

Strengthening Counterintelligence

Nina J. Stewart and Mary Griggs

This article originally appeared in longer form in the July 1991 issue of Counterintelligence Trends, *which is published by CIA's Counterintelligence Center. It has been modified slightly to reflect current realities more accurately.*

The serene setting of the Oval Office was in marked contrast with the discussion occurring within. "This rises to the level of a national scandal!," thundered the voice of the normally quiet-spoken Attorney General William French Smith as he leaned forward to face President Reagan and jabbed his forefinger into the air to emphasize his point.

And so it was. Smith's exclamation had followed Professor James Q. Wilson's descriptive account of the successful Cuban double-agent program that had humiliated the CIA, the FBI, and the US military intelligence services for over 25 years. Both Wilson and Smith were members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It was December 1988, and they had just completed a year-long study of counterintelligence (CI) in the CIA, a review prompted in part by the endless parade of US clandestine operations exposed in Castro's 11-segment TV miniseries.

Mr. Smith had alluded to what was a real "national scandal:" because Castro had controlled the majority of America's stable of "Cuban intelligence assets" for decades, the Cubans had been able to manipulate most of the foreign intelligence the US received from those assets. This, in turn, drew collective shudders from policy and intelligence officials who, since the Bay of Pigs, had made judgments based on information gleaned from these compromised clandestine operations. Equally serious, it also called into question the viability of some intelligence and CI collection operations elsewhere in the world. When accounting for expenditures made in such areas as agent salaries, safehouses, and communications, the amount of US dollars forfeited in this program was enormous. The affair went to the heart of the Board's *raison d'etre*: advising the President of the quality of US intelligence he receives.

The Cuban case is only one incident in a long list of CI studies the Board has reported to the President during its 35-year history. In fact, while specific problems involving all intelligence disciplines have found their way into PFIAB's files, perhaps none have captured as much of the Board's sustained attention in the last 10 years as those involving CI issues.[1]

Background

In 1956, President Eisenhower established the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. It was created by Executive Order in response to the Hoover Commission Report relating to the intelligence activities of the government. The eight members of the original Board, chaired by Dr. James Killian, President of M.I.T., were appointed on the basis of "ability, experience, and knowledge of matters relating to the national defense and security . . ."

At first, President Kennedy reportedly was not enamored of the Board concept, believing it to be an impediment to an activist foreign policy. His opinion changed dramatically, however, immediately following the Bay of Pigs incident. He established the

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Board under the current name, but with its previous mission, in May of 1961, and he became its biggest supporter. Each President named members to succeeding PFIABs until 1977, when Jimmy Carter abolished the Board.[2]

President Reagan promised in his political platform to reestablish the PFIAB, which he did under the chairmanship of Anne Armstrong in 1981. The current membership was appointed by President Bush in July 1990, using the existing Executive Order 12537.

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While PFIAB is not a Congressionally mandated organization, seven Presidents have believed in the value of having prestigious, independent "outsiders" conduct objective reviews to improve the "quality and effectiveness of intelligence available to the US." The Board's lack of institutional ties avoids the danger of having an organizational stake in a particular issue; thus, it does not assume an advocacy role for a particular intelligence agency. Presidents have perceived the Board as a reviewer and adviser in a positive way, one that identifies and proposes new and more efficient means of obtaining essential foreign intelligence.

The PFIAB is not a "watchdog" organization, although several proposals over the decades by the Congress and the Executive have solicited such a function. PFIAB's purpose is to serve as a stimulus, not a policeman.[3] Thus, most Boards have tried to avoid substituting their knowledge for those of the professionals regarding specific operations and covert actions. Instead, they have tended to concentrate on systemic deficiencies, often those that require Presidential action to break a logjam. While some retrospective inquiries have been conducted, these studies have been more than just a "what-went-wrong" exercise.[4] The focus has been on making appropriate changes to avoid past mistakes and provide better intelligence in future endeavors.

The Board's recommendations in the CI arena are captured in three general themes:

- Pooled talent is far more successful than single-agency efforts (Mission and Organization).
- Accountability is necessary to ensure the success of programs (Good Leadership).
- There is no substitute for proper training and incentives (Motivation).

Gaming the Adversary

James Q. Wilson, in his book, *Bureaucracies*, describes what happens when there is a mismatch between an organization's structure and the mission to be performed:

- Tasks that are not part of the culture will not be attended to with the same energy and resources as are devoted to tasks that are part of it.
- Organizations in which two or more cultures struggle for supremacy will experience serious conflict as defenders of one seek to dominate representatives of the others.
- Organizations will resist taking on new tasks that seem incompatible with their dominant culture.

No department or agency can claim CI as its primary mission, despite various assertions of owning a "lead" role. Consequently, CI will always be another, and lesser, branch of an agency's mission tree. One need only travel to the FBI's domestic field offices or the CIA's stations overseas to see the truth in this. Unheralded in success, pilloried in failure, an officer assigned to the CI field encounters little reward in the traditional sense from one's own agency.

To further complicate the matter, responsibilities for CI are split among various agencies, creating keen competition for the right to perform the work. As Harold Seidman noted in *Politics, Position, and Power*:

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> The quest for coordination is the twentieth-century equivalent of the medieval search for the philosopher's stone... If only we can find the right formula for coordination, we can reconcile the irreconcilable, harmonize competing and wholly divergent interests, overcome irrationalities in our government structures, and make hard policy choices to which no one will dissent.

Seidman's cynicism is too often well founded, but there is no alternative. Consequently, a team approach, from the senior to the lowest levels, has been long recognized as essential to countering foreign intelligence efforts against the US. Organizational "fix-it" theories abound: some advocate a CI "czar," while others promote a true interagency "center," and still more encourage the status quo with improved coordination.

Reasonable individuals can argue the merits of these and other organizational structures, but participation is an ingredient common to all. Indeed, the CIA and FBI cultures and methods of operating, when combined, have proven repeatedly to be successful and effective in certain circumstances. It was with these precedents in mind, and with the whole-hearted urg-

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The following year, the Board returned to the CIA/FBI issue. In the Board's 1986 *Report to the President on the Edward Lee Howard Case*, a failure on the part of the CIA and the FBI to work together effectively was found to be a major stumbling block. Howard had shown clear signs of developing into a serious "security" problem for the Agency while he was assigned to his sensitive position in the CIA's Soviet Division—years before Yurchenko alerted the US to Howard's treason. His personality flaws were manifested in far more telling and bizarre ways following his dismissal from the Agency. Yet, the

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Such obvious proposals to coordinate better may seem simplistic, but they are the hardest to implement, even long after the notorious infighting that occurred in the era of Angleton and Hoover.[6] Despite some good joint investigations and recent excellent coordination on operational activities, many longer-range joint programs have yet to achieve the goals envisioned for them years before. Bureaucratic barriers have been slow to fall, and well-intentioned efforts have often lacked sustained, individual attention up and down the chain of command. For example, partly as a result of senior personnel changes, FBI officials seemed essentially unaware (or uncaring) of their man assigned to a joint program overseas, a development that apparently suited some CIA officials, who viewed the interloper suspiciously from the start.

In some joint programs, misunderstandings occurred when agencies created a mismatch between the level of officer assigned and the job to be performed. In even more cases, comparable disparities arose when agency officials failed to identify the "right" personalities to fit certain positions—a necessary element to overcome the "culture shock" of a new environment. In other instances, questions arose regarding the "proper capabilities mix" for various positions. The nearly universal predisposition of managers and personnel specialists for "out-of-sight, out-of-mind" behavior has caused detailees to be viewed unfavorably at promotion time. And instilling a team

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approach among organizational cultures—expanding the paradigms—has proven the most difficult proposal of all.

We do not intend to imply here that all interagency efforts have been unsuccessful, for some have been extremely effective. One case in point, where the necessary ingredients of seniority, personality, competence, incentives, mission, and position—were mixed together successfully was the FBI assignment to head State's CI Office in 1987. It was, by both agencies' standards, a hit.[7] We further hazard the generalization that interagency coordination flows more easily in the non-operational area, such as the conducting of joint training exercises and seminars, where people from different organizational cultures come together only for a few days or weeks. However, with the more permanent and tricky operational sharing arrangements, and where bureaucratic turf is at issue, the light at the end of the tunnel flickers dimly.[8]

Confused Responsibilities

In the realm of diplomatic security, the light has often seemed doused. In the past, bureaucratic turf-fighting has reigned supreme between the Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Director of Central Intelligence's Security Evaluation Office (now called the Center for Security Evaluation). This situation has its roots in the US Marine spy scandal in Moscow:

> It was a Christmas party, the eggnog was flowing, and the embassy employees were relieved to be away from their routine duties for awhile. A young Marine [redacted] whispered that he would like to speak privately with him for a few moments. After they had disengaged themselves from the partygoers, Sgt. Clayton Lonetree branded December 1986 as a Christmas [redacted] would never forget: Lonetree confessed that he had been spying for the Soviets since his assignment to the US Embassy in Moscow. With that initial admission, Sgt. Lonetree's activities while assigned to the US embassies in Moscow and Vienna were scrutinized under the microscopic eye of the intelligence community. In addition, the worldwide Marine Security Guard program and the overall status issue of embassy security were called into question.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

In April 1987, still under the glare of the publicity of the investigations of the Marine Security Guard Program, the President directed his PFIAB through NSDD 268 to "develop recommendations" that would improve the current "process and policies" to "protect classified information and facilities" in US missions abroad.[9] In its 1987

(b)(1)

(b)(5)

Why create two separate, powerful organizations to compete in conducting security abroad? The answer is not contained within the report, but it may be inferred from Professor Wilson's concept of mission incompatibility: the State Department's culture of diplomacy was believed inharmonious with that of security; by raising the organizational level of security within the State Department, a degree of autonomy and independence might be gained. On the other hand, such organizational reapportionment would probably be resisted by the diplomatic corps; a DCI organization more likely would bring leverage and "jointness," albeit in the form of fierce competition.[10]

Despite years of policy interest in the security of our embassies, several substantial organizational changes within agencies to confront better the problems, and numerous executive and legislative recommendations for improvement, some lessons are hard to learn. The recent fire in the US Embassy in Moscow, the fourth

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such incident in the last 15 years, again caught some embassy tenants unprepared. Unescorted KGB "firemen" rifled unlocked safe drawers in sensitive areas of the embassy. Demonstrating their own prowess at learning lessons, the "firemen" stuffed their bulky suits with classified material and slipped away unchallenged from the burning building.

Where the Buck Stops

(b)(5)

Of all the recommendations of the report, this was one of the more controversial. Senior Directorate of Operations(DO) managers worried about applying a judgment to past work performed, believing that 20/20 hindsight would always reveal what might have been veiled in the mist of the moment. The potential for overzealous punishment was considered unacceptable.

(b)(1)

An accountability process can be cathartic.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Getting the Goods

Because CI is not the main function of any one agency, how does one attract, train, and reward officers who perform CI? The Board's approach has been a call for the institutional protection of the function, a greatly expanded training program, and evaluation of promotion precepts and assignment standards. In the first instance, the DCI's actions in creating a center went some way towards institutionalizing and protecting the CI function within the CIA.[12] Likewise, FBI Director Sessions's active leadership of the National Advisory Group/Counterintelligence has helped bring important CI issues to the fore at senior levels. Interagency training has gained a foothold in the community with the creation of several levels of training courses now provided by CIA, FBI and DoD.

Despite such progress, the rewards associated with CI service remain elusive enough to continue to pose significant problems in retaining personnel. In the CIA, for example, the difficulty in enticing experienced case officers to serve in the CIC indicates that CI service still is neither required nor rewarded adequately. And the steady turnover of its analytic corps is an equally telling testament to the problem of separation anxiety—namely, the perceived career damage that ensues when analysts are away for one or two years from the Directorate of Intelligence "nest." Lack of an adequate career and grade structure for many CI officers within DoD continues to fuel demoralization, which is in itself aggravated by the rapidly declining force structure and the push to "do more with less."

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In final tribute, we note that (b)(5) a number of unsung, much maligned heroes, who needed no training courses, lessons in accountability, outside advisers, or visits to group outreach retreats to help them perform their jobs.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

However, there was no defector at that time to validate the officer's suspicions, and he endured a torrent of dissent from his superiors and colleagues. After receiving a highly unfavorable performance evaluation (in fact, so low as to be grounds for dismissal), the embittered officer retired. Both officers in these cases were later given awards for their performance, after the PFIAB exposed their plight. Each agency can point to its own share of such cases.

Looking Ahead

The mission and methodology of CI will continue to evolve as the geopolitical landscape defines the face of our enemies and the secrets to be kept. We have no overarching insights into the colors of this scene that have not been enumerated before.[13] We are certain, however, that the management issues governing CI are basic, known, and incontrovertible.

Many agencies have already adopted the concept of "corporate management," which encourages worker participation to achieve a customer-focused quality. These are commendable trends, but we worry about the tendency within declining budgets to organizational fratricide, and the lemming-like tendency to protect "things" quantifiable instead of talent immeasurable. This applies equally to the policy community; it has its own responsibility to protect the CI function.

For CI to be effective, there has to be a clear sense of mission and a blending of talent, clean lines of authority and good leadership that stands accountable, and a proper training and incentives program to nurture and encourage expertise.

NOTES

1. The Reagan Board devoted considerable effort in studying CI issues and related topics. Current Acting Chairman of the PFIAB, Admiral B.R. Inman, holds a high interest in CI, having spent the last several years as a member of the Advisory Panel to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by Eli Jacobs, and researching ways to make improvements in the laws governing CI. In discussing the Board's reports, we have elected to use the term "CI" loosely, in its broadest context.

2. Carter reportedly believed initially that the Board was unnecessary because of other existing checks and balances. Towards the end of his administration, however, there was considerable talk of reconstituting the Board.

3. Other organizations and institutions have the "policing" role of oversight of the intelligence community: the President's Intelligence Oversight Board; the statutory Inspector General; and the Intelligence Committees of Congress, to name a few.

4. Presidents have made clear the Board's access "to the full extent permitted by applicable law to all information necessary to carry out its duties in the possession of any agency in the federal government."

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5. There is some question of whether such notification then by the CIA to the FBI about Howard would have made a difference in the outcome. The Bureau needs "specific and articulate facts" before it can pursue the kind of intensive evidentiary investigation—such as wiretaps and surveillance—often necessary for prosecution. For example, in the Glenn Souther case, the FBI did not have enough information (b)(7)(e) (b)(7)(e) questioned Souther and asked him to take polygraph examination. Lacking surveillance, Souther fled the country.

6. Interagency backbiting, unfortunately, has not been limited to behind the scenes. The hemorrhage of revelatory scandals in a decade of journalistic endeavors perpetuates the game of one-upmanship and further weakens an already fragile set of relationships.

7. Lamentably, this unique match was not institutionalized, and the effort failed in more recent years. No FBI agent is now assigned to State's CI Office, in any position.

8. We make this generalization, despite the formalization of the CI Operations Board, which has had some success in breaking down organizational barriers in the operational arena.

9. In the same directive, the President also asked the Board to "conduct a review of all available information to determine the suitability of our new Embassy in Moscow as a secure environment in which to conduct classified activity."

10. Both recommendations were acted upon, but in ways different than the Board intended. This in itself is another chapter. However, cooperation between the State and DCI organizations has improved steadily.

11. The DO did, however, implement a number of commendable changes to its promotion (b)(1) precepts, and tr(b)(3)(n) classes.

12. (b)(5) advocating a separate career cadre in a new directorate within the CIA so as to remove it administratively from the DO. As part of the "ticket punching" of mid-level case officers, (b)(5) rotational assignments from the DO to the new CI organization. Additionally, we note that the community has perceived the CIC as an interagency "center" in name only. Its focus is on supporting CIA operations, first and foremost.

13. (b)(5) In the intervening months since this article was first drafted, we note that all CI agencies have tried to adjust to new geopolitical realities. For example, the FBI adopted its National Security Threat List, which focuses upon new "threat concepts" and nontraditional adversaries, as well as upon the remaining few traditional hostile intelligence services.

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Intelligence and the Rise of Judicial Intervention

Frederic F. Manget

In effect, the judicial review of issues touching on intelligence matters has developed into a system of oversight.

"*Perhaps the best way to give you a conception of our power and emplacement here is to note the state and national laws that we are ready to bend, break, violate, and/or ignore. False information is given out routinely on Florida papers of incorporation; tax returns fudge the real sources of investment in our proprietaries; false flight plans are filed daily with the FAA; and we truck weapons and explosives over Florida highways, thereby violating the Munitions Act and the Firearms Act, not to speak of what we do to our old friends Customs, Immigration, Treasury, and the Neutrality Act. . . . As I write, I can feel your outrage. It is not that they are doing all that—perhaps it is necessary, you will say—but why . . . are you all this excited about it?*"

Norman Mailer, *Harlot's Ghost*

It is actually not such an exercise in glorious outlawry as all that. But the belief is widely held beyond the Beltway, in the heartland of the country and even in New York, that the intelligence agencies of the US Government are not subject to laws and the authority of judges. No television cop show, adventure movie, or conspiracy book in two decades has left out characters who are sinister intelligence officials beyond the law's reach.

The reality, however, is that the Federal judiciary now examines a wide range of intelligence activities under a number of laws, including the Constitution. To decide particular issues under the law, Federal judges and their cleared clerks and other staff are shown material classified at the highest levels. There is no requirement that Federal judges be granted security clearances—their access to classified information is an automatic aspect of their status. Their supporting staffs have to be vetted, but court employees are usually granted all clearances that they need to assist effectively the judiciary in resolving legal issues before the courts.

Judges currently interpret the laws that affect national security to reach compromises necessary to reconcile the open world of American jurisprudence and the closed world of intelligence operations. They have now been doing it long enough to enable practitioners in the field to reach a number of conclusions. In effect, the judicial review of issues touching on intelligence matters has developed into a system of oversight.

FI, CI, and CA

Intelligence has several components. The authoritative statutory definition of intelligence is in Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and includes both foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Foreign intelligence means information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons. Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or

Frederic F. Manget works in the DCI area. He retains a fully footnoted copy of this article.

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elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.

Covert action is also often lumped with intelligence because historically such activity has been carried out by parts of the Intelligence Community agencies, most notably by CIA. Covert action is now defined as activity of the US Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the US Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but not including traditional foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, or military activities.

Official Accountability

The term "oversight" describes a system of accountability in which those vested with the executive authority in an organization have their actions reviewed, sometimes in advance, by an independent group that has the power to check those actions. In corporations, the board of directors exercises oversight. In democratic governments, the classic model of oversight is that of the legislative branches, conducted through the use of committee subpoena powers and the authority to appropriate funds for the executive branches. Legislative oversight is unlimited, by contrast with the model of judicial oversight described here, which is limited.

Legislative oversight is policy related, as opposed to judicial oversight and its concern with legal questions. And legislative oversight tends toward



But a rule of thumb for a simple country lawyer is that when you have to go and explain to someone important what you have been doing and why, that is oversight, regardless of its source. Today, Intelligence Community lawyers often do just that.



micromanagement of executive decisions, where judicial oversight is more deferential. But a rule of thumb for a simple country lawyer is that when you have to go and explain to someone important what you have been doing and why, that is oversight, regardless of its source. Today, Intelligence Community lawyers often do just that. But it has not always been that way.

Past Practices

Until the mid-1970s, judges had little to say about intelligence. Because intelligence activities are almost always related to foreign affairs, skittish judges avoided jurisdiction over most intelligence controversies under the political question doctrine, which allocates the resolution of national security disputes to the two political branches of the government. This doctrine was buttressed by the need to have a concrete case or controversy before judges, rather than an abstract foreign policy debate, because of the limited jurisdiction of Federal courts. The doctrine was further developed in the Federal Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit by then Judge Scalia, who wrote that courts should exercise considerable restraint in granting any petitions for equitable relief in foreign affairs controversies.

In addition, American intelligence organizations have historically had limited internal security functions, if any. Before CIA's creation, most intelligence activity was conducted by the military departments. In 1947, the National Security Act expressly declined to give CIA any law enforcement authority: ". . . except that the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions";—a prohibition that exists in the same form today. Without the immediate and direct impact that police activity has on citizens, there were few instances where intelligence activities became issues in Federal cases.

There is even a historical hint of an argument that, to the extent that intelligence activities are concerned with the security of the state, they are inherent to any sovereign's authority under a higher law of self-preservation and not subject to normal judicial review. Justice Sutherland found powers inherent in sovereignty to be extra-constitutional in his dicta in the *Curtiss-Wright* case.

Even that good democrat Thomas Jefferson wrote to a friend, "A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless *one* of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not *the highest* (emphasis in original). The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country, by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are

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enjoying them with us: thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means . . . . " This sense that somehow secret intelligence activities were governed by a higher law of self-preservation no doubt added to the Federal judiciary's reluctance to exert its limited jurisdiction in such areas.

Increasing Scrutiny

In the 1970s this reluctance began to dwindle, driven by a number of causes. After the Watergate affair, the activities of the executive branch came under a growing and skeptical scrutiny by the press, the public, and Congress. This scrutiny blossomed into the Church and Pike Committee investigations of CIA, as well as the Rockefeller Commission report on CIA activities.

The Federal judiciary was following right behind, in part due to a natural extension of the judicial activism that began in the 1960s. The expansion of due process rights of criminal defendants meant that judges would examine in ever-increasing detail the actions of the government in prosecutions. The American tendency to treat international problems as subject to cure by legal process became even more pronounced, and the Intelligence Community found itself increasingly involved in counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and nonproliferation activities of the law enforcement agencies of the US Government.

The other cause was simply the increasing number of statutes that Congress passed dealing with CIA and the Intelligence Community. The more statutes there are on a particular subject, the more judicial review of the subject there will be. For example, in the late 1970s, Congress began to pass annual authorization bills for the Intelligence Community which generally contained permanent statutory provisions, a practice that continues today.

"When Congress passes laws to prevail in disagreements in foreign affairs, more judicial review will occur. De Tocqueville was right—all disputes in the United States inevitably end up in court."

Congress Weighs In

Congressional inroads on all types of executive branch foreign affairs powers also increased in the 1970s. The constitutional foreign affairs powers shared by the executive and legislative branches wax and wane, but it seems clear that Congress began to reassert its role in international relations at that time.

The War Powers Resolution and the series of Boland Amendments restricting aid to the Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s were statutory attempts by Congress to force policy positions on a reluctant executive branch. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment required notification of oversight committees about covert actions. When Congress passes laws to prevail in disagreements in foreign affairs, more judicial review will occur. De Tocqueville was right—all disputes in the United States inevitably end up in court.

The result is the current system of judicial oversight of intelligence. By 1980, then Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti could write that, "Although there may continue to be some confusion about how the law applies to a particular matter, there is no longer any doubt that intelligence activities are subject to definable legal standards." It is not nearly so comprehensive as legislative oversight, because Federal courts still have jurisdiction limited by statute and constitution. But it does exist in effective and powerful ways that go far beyond the conventional wisdom that national security is a cloak hiding intelligence activities from the Federal judiciary.

Criminal Law

Federal judges are required to examine the conduct of the government when it becomes a litigated issue in a criminal prosecution, and almost every case involves at least one such issue. Intelligence activities are no exception. What makes those activities so different is that they almost always require secrecy to be effective and to maintain their value to US policymakers.

The need for secrecy clashes directly with conventional US trial procedures in which most of the efforts on both sides of a case go into developing the pretrial phase called discovery. As a result, Federal judges review and decide a number of issues that regularly arise in areas where democratic societies would instinctively say that governmental secrecy is bad. The pattern has developed that judges review intelligence information when protection of its

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secrecy could affect traditional notions of a fair trial.

For example, it would be manifestly unfair if the government could, without sanctions, withhold secret intelligence information from defendants that would otherwise be disclosed under rules of criminal procedure. In fact, under both Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 relating to discovery and the *Brady* and *Giglio* cases, Federal prosecutors are required to turn over certain materials to the defense, regardless of their secrecy.

For a number of years, judges fashioned their own procedures to balance competing interests. In the *Kampiles* case, the defendant was charged with selling to the Russians a manual about the operation of the KH-11 spy satellite. The trial court did not allow classified information to be introduced at trial. The court issued a protective order after closed proceedings in which the Government presented evidence of the sensitive document that was passed to the Soviet Union, and of the FBI's counterintelligence investigation into the document's disappearance. The court of appeals upheld the espionage conviction based upon the defendant's confession that he had met with and sold a classified document to a Soviet intelligence officer and upon sufficient other evidence to corroborate the reliability of the defendant's confession.

CIPA

The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) was passed in 1980 to avoid ad hoc treatment of the

“Judges are called upon to balance the need of the government to protect intelligence information and the rights of a defendant to a fair trial. This is an area in which democratic societies would want judicial scrutiny of governmental assertions of national security equities, in order to preserve constitutional due process guarantees.”

issues and to establish detailed procedures for handling such classified information in criminal trials. It was a response to the problem of greymail, in which defendants threatened to reveal classified information unless prosecutions were dropped or curtailed. Before passage of CIPA, the government had to guess the extent of possible damage from such disclosures because there were no methods by which classified information could be evaluated in advance of public discovery and evidentiary rulings by the courts.

Under CIPA, classified information can be reviewed under the regular criminal procedures for discovery and admissibility of evidence before the information is publicly disclosed. Judges are allowed to determine issues presented to them both *in camera* (nonpublicly, in chambers) and *ex parte* (presented by only one side, without the presence of the other party).

Under CIPA, the defendant is allowed to discover classified information and to offer it in evidence to the extent it is necessary to a fair trial and allowed by normal criminal procedures. The government is allowed to minimize the classified information at risk of public disclosure by offering unclassified summaries or substitutions for the sensitive materials. Judges are called upon to balance the need of the government to protect intelligence information and the rights of a defendant to a fair trial. This is an area in which democratic societies would want judicial scrutiny of governmental assertions of national security equities, in order to preserve constitutional due process guarantees.

Looking at Surveillance

Judges also scrutinize intelligence activities in areas involving surveillance. Because of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, intelligence collection also is reviewed under standards applied to search warrants. The Federal judiciary has been reviewing surveillance in the context of suppression of evidence hearings for many years. For example, the issue of electronic surveillance was considered in 1928 in the Supreme Court case of *Olmstead,* which held that the government could conduct such surveillance without a criminal search warrant. In 1967 the Supreme Court overturned *Olmstead,* and the government began to follow specially tailored search warrant procedures for electronic surveillance.

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FISA

In 1978 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was passed to establish a secure forum in which the government could obtain what is essentially a search warrant to conduct electronic surveillance within the United States of persons who are agents of foreign powers. FISA requires that applications for such orders approving electronic surveillance include detailed information about the targets, what facts justify the belief that the targets are agents of foreign powers, and the means of conducting the surveillance.

Applications are heard and either denied or granted by a special court composed of seven Federal district court judges designated by the Chief Justice of the United States. There is a three-member court of review to hear appeals of denials of applications.

Thus, judges conduct extensive review of foreign-intelligence-related electronic surveillance operations before their inception. Intrusive collection techniques make this area especially sensitive, and their review by Federal judges is important to reconciling them with Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. In the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, the FISA procedures were expanded to apply to physical searches.

Pleading Government Authorization

In another area, judges review secret intelligence activities in the context of whether defendants were authorized by an intelligence agency to do the very actions on which the criminal charges are based. Under rules of criminal procedure, defendants are required to notify the government if they intend to raise a defense of government authorization. The government is required to respond to such assertions, either admitting or denying them.

Should there be any merit to the defense, the defendant is allowed to put on evidence and to have the judge decide issues that arise in litigating the defense. This satisfies the notion that it would be unfair to defendants, who could have been authorized to carry out some clandestine activity, if they could not bring such secret information before the court.

For example, in the case of *United States v. Rewald,* the defendant was convicted of numerous counts of bilking investors in a Ponzi scheme. Rewald maintained that CIA had told him to spend extravagantly the money of investors in order to cultivate relationships with foreign potentates and wealthy businessmen who would be useful intelligence sources. The opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel that reviewed the convictions characterized Rewald's argument as his principal defense in the case, and in fact Rewald did have some minor contact with local CIA personnel, volunteering information from his international business travels and providing light backstopping cover for a few CIA employees.

Rewald sought the production of hundreds of classified CIA documents and propounded more than 1,700 interrogatories, but after reviewing responsive records and answers, the trial court excluded most of the classified information as simply not relevant under evidentiary standards. The Ninth Circuit panel noted that, "This court has examined each and every classified document filed by Rewald in this appeal." It subsequently upheld the District Court's exclusion of the classified information at issue.

In two more recent criminal cases—the prosecutions of Christopher Drougoul in the BNL affair and in the Teledyne case related to Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardoen—press accounts have noted that the judges in both cases heard arguments from the defendants that sensitive intelligence and foreign policy information should be disclosed in those prosecutions as part of the defense cases. The press accounts further state that in both cases the judges disagreed, and, after reviewing the information at issue, ruled against the defendants.

The significance is not that the defendants lost their arguments, but that they had the opportunity to litigate them before a Federal judge. The Department of Justice does not prosecute defendants while the Intelligence Community denies them the information they need to have a fair trial. Who decides what a fair trial requires? An independent Federal judge, appointed for life, who reviews the secrets.

Civil Law

Criminal law has the most direct and dramatic impact on individual citizens, but civil law also requires judicial intervention in numerous

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cases where intelligence activities, and the secrecy surrounding them, become issues. Private civil litigants may demand that the government produce intelligence information under the laws requiring disclosure of agency records unless they are specifically exempted. Individual civil plaintiffs may bring tort actions against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act based on allegations that secret intelligence activities caused compensible damages. Private litigants may sue each other for any of the myriad civil causes of action that exist in litigious America, and demand from the government information relating to intelligence activities in order to support their cases.

In all such instances, Federal judges act as the arbiters of government assertions of special equities relating to intelligence that affect the litigation. Private civil litigants may not win their arguments that such equities should be discounted in their favor, but they can make their arguments to a Federal judge.

For example, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act, there are exceptions to the mandatory disclosure provisions that allow classified information and intelligence sources and methods to be kept secret. Courts defer extensively to the executive branch on what information falls within those exceptions, but there is still a rigorous review of such material. CIA prepares public indexes (called *Vaughn* indexes, after the case endorsing them) describing records withheld under the sensitive information exceptions that are reviewed by the courts.

“Private litigants may sue each other for any of the myriad civil causes of action that exist in litigious America, and demand from the government information relating to intelligence activities in order to support their cases.”

If those public indexes are not sufficient for a judge to decide whether an exception applies, classified *Vaughn* indexes are shown to the judge *ex parte* and *in camera*. If a classified index is still not sufficient, then the withheld materials themselves can be shown to the judge.

Other FOIA Requests

The *Knight* case illustrates this extensive process. The plaintiff filed an FOIA request for all information in CIA's possession relating to the 1980s sinking of the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior* in the harbor in Auckland, New Zealand, by the French external intelligence service. CIA declined to produce any such records, and the plaintiff filed a suit to force disclosure. Both public and classified indexes were prepared by CIA, and, when they were deemed by the court to be insufficient for a decision in the case, all responsive documents were shown in unredacted form to the trial judge in her chambers. Her decision was in favor of the government, and it was affirmed on appeal.

Historian Alan Fitzgibbon litigated another FOIA request to CIA and the FBI for materials on the disappearance of Jesus de Galindez, a Basque exile and a critic of the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic who was last seen outside a New York City subway station in 1956. The case was litigated from 1979 to 1990, and, during the process, the district court conducted extensive *in camera* reviews of the material at issue. That pattern has been repeated in numerous other cases.

Thus, in areas where Federal laws mandate disclosure of US government information, Federal judges review claims of exemptions based on sensitive intelligence equities.

State Secrets Privilege

Federal courts also have jurisdiction over civil cases ranging from negligence claims against the government to disputes between persons domiciled in different states. In such cases, litigants often subpoena or otherwise demand discovery of sensitive intelligence-related information. The government resists such demands by asserting the state secrets privilege under the authority of *U.S. v. Reynolds*, a Supreme Court case that allowed the government to deny disclosure of national security secrets. Other statutory privileges also protect intelligence sources and methods. Judicial review of US Government affidavits that assert the state secrets privilege is regularly used to resolve disputed issues of privilege.

In *Halkin v. Helms*, former Vietnam war protesters sued officials of various Federal intelligence agencies

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alleging violation of plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory rights. Specifically, they alleged that the National Security Agency (NSA) conducted warrantless interceptions of their international wire, cable, and telephone communications at the request of other Federal defendants. The government asserted the state secrets privilege to prevent disclosure of whether the international communications of the plaintiffs were in fact acquired by NSA and disseminated to other Federal agencies.

The trial court considered three *in camera* affidavits and the *in camera* testimony of the Deputy Director of NSA, and the case was ultimately dismissed at the appellate level based on the assertion of the privilege. The plaintiffs had their day in court. They lost the case, but they had the full attention of both trial and appellate Federal court judges on the assertion of governmental secrecy.

Allegations of Abuse

Federal courts also adjudicate the substance of legal claims brought by private citizens alleging abusive governmental actions. For example, in *Birnbaum v. United States,* a suit was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act by individuals whose letters to and from the Soviet Union were opened and photocopied by CIA in a mail-opening program that operated between 1953 and 1973. Plaintiffs were awarded $1,000 each in damages, and the award was upheld on appeal.

In *Doe v. Gates,* a CIA employee litigated the issue of alleged discrimination against him based on his homosexuality. Doe raised two constitutional claims—whether his firing violated the Fifth Amendment equal protection or deprivation of property without compensation clauses. He was heard at every Federal court level, including the US Supreme Court. The judicial review even included limited evidentiary review pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment. (The case has been litigated for years and is not yet final, but the government is expected to prevail).

"When individual rights are affected, Federal courts have not been reluctant to assert oversight and require Intelligence Community agencies to visit the courthouse and explain what they are doing."

In two more recent cases, the chance of losing litigation over alleged gender-based discrimination led the parties to settle claims with one female officer in the CIA's Directorate of Operations (the "Jane Doe Thompson Case") and with a class of female operations officers in CIA. The settlements made moot a full judicial review of all government actions, but both sides clearly believed that judicial review would occur.

The First Amendment

Federal judges also look at First Amendment protections of freedom of speech and the press as they relate to intelligence. One context is the contract for nondisclosure of classified information that employees, contractors, and others sign when they are granted access to sensitive information by agencies of the Intelligence Community. The contract requires prepublication review of non-official writings by the government in order to protect sensitive information. That is a prior restraint on publication which was challenged in two separate lawsuits by former CIA employees Victor Marchetti and Frank Snepp. After extensive appellate review, the contract restrictions on freedom of speech were held reasonable and constitutional. It is clear that Federal courts will entertain claims of First Amendment violations from Intelligence Community employees, and will examine the claims closely.

For example, in 1981 a former CIA officer named McGehee submitted an article to CIA for prepublication review pursuant to a secrecy agreement he had signed in 1952, when he joined the Agency. The article asserted that the CIA had mounted a campaign of deceit to persuade the world that the "revolt of the poor natives against a ruthless US-backed oligarchy" in El Salvador was really "a Soviet/Cuban/Bulgarian/ Vietnamese/ PLO/Ethiopian/Nicaraguan/International Terrorism challenge to the United States." McGehee offered a few examples of CIA operations to support his assertion; some were deemed classified by the Agency, and permission to publish those portions of the article was denied.

McGehee sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that the CIA prepublication and classification procedures violated the First Amendment. He lost, but the DC Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "We must

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accordingly establish a standard for judicial review of the CIA classification decision that affords proper respect to the individual rights at stake while recognizing the CIA's technical expertise and practical familiarity with the ramifications of sensitive information. We conclude that reviewing courts should conduct a *de novo* review of the classification decision, while giving deference to reasoned and detailed CIA explanations of that classification decision." When individual rights are affected, Federal courts have not been reluctant to assert oversight and require Intelligence Community agencies to visit the courthouse and explain what they are doing.

The second context involving the First Amendment is government attempts to restrain publication of intelligence information by the press. When *The Pentagon Papers* were leaked to the news media in 1971, the attempt to enjoin publication resulted in the Supreme Court case of *New York Times v. U.S.* Because of the number of individual opinions in the case, the holding is somewhat confusing. Nonetheless, it seems clear that an injunction against press publication of intelligence information will not only be difficult to obtain but also will subject any petition for such relief to strict scrutiny by the Federal courts.

Conclusions

The exposure of Federal judges to intelligence activities leads to a number of conclusions. One is that judicial oversight operates to an extent overlooked in the debate over who is watching the Intelligence Community. Judicial oversight is limited compared to unlimited Congressional oversight. Judicial oversight deals with legal issues, as opposed to policy issues. Judges are deferential to the executive branch in intelligence matters, something not often true of Congress. But judges do act as arbiters of governmental secrecy in a powerful way.

“Nothing concentrates the mind and dampens excess so wonderfully as the imminent prospect of explaining one's actions to a Federal judge.”

The basic conundrum for intelligence is that it requires secrecy to be effective, but government secrecy in a Western liberal democracy is generally undesirable. Government secrecy can destroy the legitimacy of government institutions. It can cripple accountability of public servants and politicians. It can hide abuses of fundamental rights of citizens. In fact, secret government tends to excess.

In the United States, Federal judges counterbalance the swing toward such excess. In those areas most important to particular rights of citizens, they act as arbiters of governmental secrecy. The Federal judiciary ameliorates the problems of government secrecy by providing a secure forum for review of intelligence activities under a number of laws, as surrogates for the public.

The developing history of judicial review of intelligence activities shows that it occurs in those areas where government secrecy and the need for swift executive action conflict with well-established legal principles of individual rights: an accused's right to a fair criminal trial; freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; rights of privacy; freedom of speech and the press.

Judges thus get involved where an informed citizenry would instinctively want judicial review of secret intelligence activities. The involvement of the Federal judiciary is limited but salutary in its effect on executive branch actions. Nothing concentrates the mind and dampens excess so wonderfully as the imminent prospect of explaining one's actions to a Federal judge.

The Constitution's great genius in this area is a system of government that reconciles the nation's needs for order and defense from foreign aggression with fundamental individual rights that are directly affected by intelligence activities. Those nations currently devising statutory charters and legislative oversight of their foreign intelligence services might do well to include an independent judiciary in their blueprints. Federal judges are the essential third part of the oversight system in the United States, matching requirements of the laws to intelligence activities and watching the watchers.

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Leon Theremin—CIA Nemesis

Benjamin B. Fischer

"Theremin [was] a Russian 'Thomas Edison,' whose paradoxical life reflected the contradictions and convolutions of the East-West conflict."

Much of the history of the Cold War remains hidden in classified archives. From time to time, however, stories emerge that cause us to stop and think about what a strange epoch it was. One of the most intriguing revelations to come to light concerns Leon Theremin, a Russian "Thomas Edison" whose paradoxical life reflected the contradictions and convolutions of the East-West conflict. Theremin traveled from priviledged Kremlin circles to the Gulag and back again, and, during a ten-year sojourn in the United States, hobnobbed with the rich and famous and made and lost fortunes while spying for Stalin. Americans believe that creativity demands freedom, yet Theremin did some of his best scientific work while imprisoned by one of the most repressive regimes of the 20th century. This brilliant scientist crossed paths with the CIA more than once—to our detriment. He appears in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's novel, *The First Circle*, as Pryanchikov, an engineer ordered to build a sophisticated voice encryption system. In real life, Theremin's story proved stranger than fiction. (U)

Benjamin B. Fischer serves on the CIA History Staff.

(b)(3)(c)

Behind the Eagle's Beak (U)

Moscow, 4 July 1945: While hosting the traditional American national day festivities, Ambassador Averell Harriman received a delegation of Soviet Pioneers, a youth group much like the Boy Scouts. As an expression of friendship between wartime allies, the Pioneers presented the envoy with a replica of the Great Seal of the United States of America. The Seal was made from a rare Russian wood and was hand-carved by a leading artisan. (U)

Hidden inside, behind the beak of the American eagle, was an unusual eavesdropping device. It had no wires, no conventional microphone, and no batteries—in short, nothing that would reveal its presence through conventional methods of detection.[1]

The United States did not discover the device for another seven years and did not officially reveal its discovery until 1960. (U)

[1] For accounts of the Great Seal bugging, see Tom Mangold, *Cold Warrior—James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 256-257; David Wise, *Molehunt: The Secret Search for Traitors That Shattered the CIA* (New York: Random House, 1992), p. 14; and Albert Glinsky, *Theremin: Ether Music and Espionage* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), pp. 259-260, 271-274, 304, 335, and 338. (U)

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The Great Seal that hung in Spaso House, the residence of the American Ambassador in Moscow, with the location of the bug superimposed. (U)

Discovery and Disclosure (U)

Although some details have leaked out, the full story of the discovery of the sophisticated device remains in classified files.[*] Harriman had the seal hung in his study on the second floor of Spaso House, his residence in Moscow, which had once been the palatial home of a wealthy merchant. The bug—or cavity resonator, to use its technical name—remained there, like the proverbial fly on the wall, picking up

> **"In the fall of 1951, (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) ."**

sensitive information during the dark days of the early Cold War. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, who succeeded Harriman as ambassador and was later appointed Director of Central Intelligence, had the Seal removed, repaired, and cleaned in time for an official visit by Secretary of State George C. Marshall; Smith and Marshall discussed US policy toward the USSR within range of the hidden listening device. (U)

In the fall of 1951, (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) The State Department dispatched a technical security team to "sweep" for listening devices—it literally took apart Kennan's office. Nothing was found. (C)

Subsequently, a technical security specialist nau(b)(3)(c) arrived to continue the search. was convinced that there was a listening device in Spaso House, not Kennan's office in the Embassy building several blocks away. He decided to begin his search there (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

He quickly pinpointed the place on the wall where the Seal was mounted. He and the personnel officer then dismantled the wall behind the Seal down to the basic construction. They found nothing, confirming that a single bug was inside the Seal itself. (C)

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(c) to the US Naval Research Laboratory, where, on orders from President Harry Truman, technicians analyzed the cavity resonator. The President's concern is clear from a memorandum that he sent to the National Security Council in September 1952:

> *The Secretary of State has informed me regarding the listening device discovered*

[*] Information on the discovery of the Soviet bug is drawn from a memorandum (b)(3)(c) from Office of Security [US Department of State], to (b)(3)(c) "Narrative Report on Cavity Resonator Discovery," 24 October 1968. A copy of this memorandum is available from the CIA History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. (C)

[*] The acronym KGB (Committee for State Security) is used throughout this article, although the Soviet secret police were known as the MGB (Ministry of State Security) and other names until 1954. (U)

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
> **The genius of the Soviet bug was its simplicity.**

recently in one of the buildings housing some of our diplomatic personnel in Moscow. Appropriate technical research has been initiated with respect to this device with a view to developing detection and counteraction devices.

In view of the security problems posed by the existence of this device, I want the two Internal Security Committees of the Council, in collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency and other interested agencies, to examine jointly these security implications and to insure that appropriate countermeasures are put into effect, both immediately and in the light of the above-mentioned technical research.

I wish to be kept advised through your office of the work of the Committees on this problem, including any recommendations for action required by me.[5] *(C)*

The genius of the Soviet bug was its simplicity. In effect, it was a microphone in the form of a resonating chamber with a flexible front wall that acted as a diaphragm, altering the dimensions of the chamber when struck by sound waves.[6] Soviet intelligence activated the device with an ultra-high frequency signal beamed from a van parked outside Spaso House(b)(3)(c)_____ the CIA officer assigned to analyze the device, explained it by saying: "Technically it was a passive device... [with] an infinite life expectancy."[7] After analyzing the cavity resonator, US technicians built a device to activate it. The activating mechanism was then sent to the US Embassy in Moscow to test for additional secretly placed cavity resonators. None were found. (C)



The cavity resonator hidden inside the Great Seal had no wires, no conventional microphone, and no batteries. (Diagram from: H. Keith Melton, *The Ultimate Spy Book*. (New York: DK Publishing, Inc., 1996). (U)

Someone leaked part of the story of the discovery of the sophisticated bug to the now defunct *Washington Evening Star* in 1953—"The Russians have become the world's experts in creation of such electronic devices," the *Star* exclaimed.[7] Nonetheless, the United States kept the cavity resonator under official wraps until May 1960. At that point, Henry Cabot Lodge, US Ambassador to the United Nations, unveiled a replica of the device with the Great Seal before the General Assembly to counter a Soviet propaganda barrage after the shootdown of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers. (U)

Alarms Go Off (U)

Lodge's performance gave the American public its first glimpse into the secret world of electronic intelligence gathering. The disclosure heightened concern that America lagged behind the Russians, a perception that was not confined to the public-at-large. (U)

[5] Letter to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, archived at the Harry S. Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files. (U)

[6] The description of how the cavity resonator worked is drawn from Glinsky, pp. 259-260. The results of FBI and US Naval Research Laboratory analysis are found in: FBI Laboratory, "Drawing and Photographs, Russian Resonant Cavity Microphone," no date [possibly December 1952]. Copy available from the CIA History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. (S)

[7] Wise, p. 14. (U)
[7] Constantine Brown, "Secret Ears in U.S. Embassy," *Evening Star*, 20 March 1953, p. A-9. (U)

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> **"The Soviet device seemed to confirm that the CIA was being beaten in the espionage technology race."**

A 1957 CIA Inspector General's report stated flatly that the Moscow discovery "had set off a chain reaction, the effects of which are still being felt."[8] In the demimonde of the CIA–KGB spy war, the psychological impact was akin to the launching of Sputnik a few months later. The Soviet device confirmed—or seemed to confirm—that the CIA was being beaten in the espionage technology race. As one intelligence expert noted years later, the Soviets had reached a "level previously thought to be impossible," while CIA audio equipment "relied upon commercial law enforcement equipment and antiquated World War II telephone-company listening devices."[9] (S)



U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge displaying the Great Seal to the General Assembly, May 1960. (U)

CIA data on Soviet eavesdropping capabilities and techniques were seriously deficient. The cavity resonator was ingenious—it took quite a while to figure out how it worked and even longer to duplicate and improve upon it. The fact that the CIA, as well as the State Department and the military intelligence services, had discovered numerous *conventional* listening devices was no succor. Senior officials were concerned—almost panicked—that many more of the sophisticated devices were in use. (S)

Information on Soviet audio systems was not only sparse, but also dispersed among many offices. Technical countermeasures became an urgent national security matter requiring White House-level attention and a new national policy. The perceived threat was so serious that, in December 1956, the National Security Council created the Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Counter Measures to coordinate technical countermeasures for the entire Intelligence Community.[10] A CIA deputy director for security was assigned to it.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
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(b)(3)(n)

Soviet Faust (U)

What the CIA did not know—and would not learn until near the end of the Cold War—was that the Moscow bug that triggered such anxiety in Washington was the handiwork of an

[8] *Inspector General's Survey of the Technical Service Staff*, April 1957, Volume I, p. 177. Records of the Office of the Inspector General, Job 62-01094R, Box 2. (S)
[9] H. Keith Melton, *CIA Special Weapons & Equipment: Spy Devices of the Cold War* (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc, 1993), p. 6. (U)
[10] *Inspector General's Survey of the Technical Service Staff*, pp. 178–179. (S)
[11] *Ibid.* (U)
[12] *Ibid.* (S)

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aristocratic genius named Leon Theremin.[13] Theremin was born Lev Sergeyevich Termin in St. Petersburg in 1896 into a family of nobles descended from French Huguenots who had immigrated to Russia in the 18th century.[14] He was a child prodigy and experimented with electricity, then still in its infancy, before entering college. He graduated on the eve of World War I, served in a radio battalion of the Imperial Army, and, despite his origins, embraced the Bolshevik Revolution. In turn, it apparently embraced him. Communism, Theremin believed, was the wave of the future because it would use technology to achieve social and economic progress. He often quoted Lenin's famous dictum that communism was Soviet political power plus electrification of the entire country. Lenin apparently recognized Theremin's gifts and heralded him as a "proletarian" genius, noble origins notwithstanding. (U)

"The Moscow bug that triggered such anxiety in Washington was the handiwork of an aristocratic genius named Leon Theremin."

Theremin's name was not unknown in America; indeed he lived in New York from 1927 to 1938, where he mixed easily with Gotham's artistic, scientific, and corporate elites. His New York notoriety derived from his many inventions, but he was best known as the pioneer of electronic music. He was the inventor of the "theremin," the eponymous instrument that many consider the grandfather of all modern electronically made music. (U)

Theremin had invented the "etherphone," as his instrument was first called, in 1919, while he was still an undergraduate studying physics. Lenin requested a demonstration in 1922, and Theremin put on a show for him in the Kremlin.[15] In 1927, the inventor was permitted to leave the USSR and take his show on the road, first to Berlin and then to other European capitals, before he arrived in New York City for a ten-year stay. He put on sold-out concerts at the Royal Albert Hall in London, the Paris Opera House, and Carnegie Hall in New York City. Theremin hoped to revolutionize the performance of classical music—his 1928 concert at Carnegie Hall featuring ten theremins made him the toast of the town. (U)

The novelty of the instrument turned the music world on its ear. "Surely," *New York Times* music critic Janet Maslin wrote, "the theremin is the weirdest of all musical instruments."[16] It looked like a portable podium, not unlike those in many conference rooms, with a horizontal loop on one side and a vertical antenna on top. It was played by moving one's hands in the air around the antennas. One hand was used to control the pitch, and the other to control the volume. (U)

The theremin briefly appeared to have brighter commercial prospects than radio, which was just coming into widespread use. In 1929, Radio Corporation of America (RCA) president David Sarnoff purchased the patent to the theremin with the intention of selling one to every American household that could afford one. The instrument,

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[13] Information in this and subsequent paragraphs on the details of Theremin's life are based on: Bulat M. Galeyev, "Soviet Faust in the Country of the Yellow Devil," website http://he.net/~enternet/teci/faust/faust.htm, accessed 15 April 2002; Bulat M. Galeyev, "Light and Shadows of a Great Life: In Commemoration of the One-Hundredth Anniversary of the Birth of Leon Theremin, Pioneer of Electronic Art," website http://mitpress2.mit.edu/e-journals/Leonardo/isast/journal/journal96/LMJ6/galeyevintro.html, accessed 24 January 2002; and Glinsky, *op. cit.* Galeyev, a Russian musicologist, and Glinsky, an American musicologist, are the leading experts on, and biographers of Theremin. Overall, a bibliography of works on Theremin would run to dozens of books and hundreds of articles. (U)

[14] Theremin anglicized his name after moving to New York in 1927. (U)

[15] He also demonstrated his inventions for Stalin. In 1927, Theremin was called to the Kremlin to show his latest invention, a television set with 100 lines of resolution on a five-foot-square screen. It took the Radio Corporation of America until 1931 to design a screen with greater resolution. (U)

[16] Janet Maslin, "Beyond the Theremin," *The New York Times*, 8 September 1995, p. 8-C. (U)

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however, eventually flopped. It was difficult to play, expensive to produce, and never caught on with either musicians or the public. (U)

The decade that Theremin spent in New York was fittingly one of prodigious technical achievement and repeated business failure. He continued working on his electronic musical instruments and made numerous contacts in the business and artistic worlds. Theremin had a practical side and a nose for things that could make him money in America. He created an electronic crib alarm after the infant son of Charles and Anne Lindbergh was kidnapped. The US Bureau of Prisons hired him to build the world's first metal detector at Alcatraz. That invention did not work properly, and Theremin lost his contract, pushing him over the brink into bankruptcy. All told, several small fortunes passed through his hands. (U)

Theremin eventually settled into a kind of lab-cum-salon in a townhouse on Manhattan's West 54th Street owned by a wealthy patron. There he devised a multitude of devices that must have seemed like pure science fiction, including electronic lighting shows, an electronic dance platform, and even a prototype color television system. Artists, musicians, composers, dancers, and choreographers all beat a path to his door, seeking to fuse art with science in the dawning of a new technological age. (U)

All this while, however, Theremin was leading a double life. As he revealed for the first time in 1988 in a series of articles in *Moscow News*—revelations made possible by Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost*—the brilliant inventor was a Soviet spy.[17] Jan Berzin, the founder and chief of the GRU (Soviet military intelligence), had recruited him and then sent him to Berlin and other European capitals to establish his cover story and make contacts. (U)

Theremin was already up in years when he began telling his story. His memory was not always sound, and he told different versions on separate occasions. His main mission, apparently, had been to obtain scientific and military intelligence from his contacts and to assess whether, in a future European conflict, the United Sates would be neutral, an ally, or a foe of the Soviet Union. Theremin told his Russian biographer in the 1980s that he had been the GRU *rezident* (chief of station) in New York and compared himself to Richard Sorge, the famous Soviet illegal whose statue stands in Moscow and whose face once adorned Soviet postage stamps.[18] With his American biographers, Theremin was more modest. He disclaimed any major espionage success (thus denying damage to American interests). As an example, he cited a requirement to find out the diameter of a military aircraft muffler, observing that such matters had bored him. (U)

Theremin almost certainly was too modest—or too reticent. He hobnobbed with the cultural and artistic elite of New York and had wealthy patrons. His circle of acquaintances encompassed people with names like Rockefeller, Dupont, Morgan, and Ford. His contacts also included an obscure Army lieutenant colonel named Dwight D. Eisenhower and an Army major named Leslie Groves, who later managed the Manhattan Project. (U)

It seems likely that Theremin, who was often in debt despite the millions his inventions earned, may have used some of his money to support Soviet intelligence operations.[19] He incorporated one of his spin-off companies in Panama, using it to cover a GRU network that targeted the US military presence in the Canal Zone. He also laundered money for Amtorg, the Soviet state foreign trade company that provided cover for espionage and the Comintern's efforts to foment revolution in the West and in the Third World. (U)

This, unfortunately, is the sum and substance of what we know about Theremin's covert life in America, and even these

[17] Glinsky, pp. 320-334. (U)
[18] Galeyev, "Soviet Faust in the Country of the Yellow Devil." (U)
[19] Glinsky, pp. 95-97. (U)

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bits of information are at times contradictory and incoherent. Theremin's Russian biographer called him the Soviet Faust, an allusion to Goethe's famous character who makes a deal with Mephistopheles in order to achieve worldly success. In Theremin's case, he made a deal with Soviet intelligence in order to pursue his research interests. As we shall see, he extended this "deal" even after returning to the Soviet Union, turning his considerable talents against the United States and becoming the CIA's nemesis. (U)

Surviving the *Gulag* (U)

In September 1938, ten years after arriving on American shores, Theremin, with GRU help, boarded a Soviet vessel as a crew member, under an assumed name and identity, and set sail for home. For many years, his friends in New York believed that he had been kidnapped by Stalin's secret police. But, as he told his Russian biographer in 1995, the decision to leave was his own—he believed that the Motherland would soon be at war and felt a duty to return.[20] Probably contributing to Theremin's decision was the fact that he was just one step ahead of the INS, the IRS, the Labor Department, and a host of business partners and patrons—all of whom for various reasons would have liked to see him in jail or at least before a judge and jury. (U)

"In 1939, Theremin was arrested in Moscow, the penalty in those paranoid times for having lived abroad."

By fleeing New York, however, Theremin jumped from the frying pan into the fire. In March 1939, he was arrested in Moscow, the penalty in those paranoid times for having lived abroad. He was charged with espionage and membership in a "fascist" organization—a generic charge—and sentenced to six years in Soviet prison camps. Ironically, the Great Terror of 1937-1938 was winding down; had Theremin waited a little longer, he might not have been arrested. He was sent to Magadan, a gold-mining camp above the Arctic Circle in the Kolyma region, where temperatures fell to –94 degrees (F). A term at Magadan was in effect a death sentence. (U)

Theremin's genius saved him. Within a few months, Stalin's henchman and secret police chief, Lavrenty Beria, ordered Theremin removed from the camp and brought back to Moscow. Beria ran the Soviet Union's atomic research program and had an eye for scientific talent. He assigned Theremin to Central Design Bureau Number 29 of the Central State Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute.[21] Theremin worked on aviation instruments in Moscow until the bureau was relocated beyond the Urals to Omsk and then to Sverdlovsk, following the German invasion of June 1941. (U)

The Design Bureau was an example of a unique Stalinist institution known as a *sharashka*. Called "Islands of Paradise" in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*, *sharashkas* were minimum security facilities with bearable living conditions that held some of the best educated and most brilliant Soviet scientists, engineers, and technicians. Many Soviet advances in space, military, and intelligence technology derived from the efforts of the faceless *zeks*, as the inmates were called. (U)

As the war wound down, Theremin was returned to Moscow again and assigned to a *sharashka* at Kuchino, near Moscow, which specialized in radio electronics and measuring devices. While there, he designed a beacon that was used to locate missing submarines and aircraft, as well as to locate supplies dropped clandestinely behind enemy lines. Theremin also served as the lead scientist on the M-803 vocoder, an analog speech encipherment system. (C)

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[20] Galeyev, "Light and Shadows of a Great Life." (U)

[21] For details of Theremin's work at the Institute, see Glinsky, pp. 230-236, 238-242, and 259. (U)

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It was at this time that Theremin, on direct orders from Beria, designed the infamous cavity resonating microphone that found its way into the Great Seal of the United States at Spaso House. A Soviet intelligence officer who manned the listening post near the US Embassy claimed that "For a long time, our country was able to get specific and very important information, which gave us certain advantages in prediction and performance of world politics in the difficult period of the Cold War."[32] (U)

In 1947, Beria also ordered Theremin to develop a wireless audio surveillance device. The result was a pioneering feat codenamed BURAN ("Snowstorm").[33] It directed an infrared beam at window glass, where it focused on what Theremin called the "zone of optimum resonance," picking up sound waves and reflecting them back to an interferometer and photo element. BURAN was resistant to interception and jamming and almost impossible to detect. Beria used it first against the chancery of the US Embassy and later against the French and British missions in Moscow.

> **"Missing the order and pure research opportunities of [his life in detention], Theremin asked the KGB to hire him as a 'free' research scientist."**


With Theremin's knowledge and assistance, he also used it against Stalin at a time when the dictator's paranoia seemed poised to engulf the USSR in a new major domestic upheaval or a nuclear war. As a souvenir, Theremin kept tapes of Stalin's ravings.[34] (U)

While still a prisoner, Theremin received a Stalin Prize, which was awarded anonymously for an unidentified contribution to Soviet intelligence (possibly BURAN). The Soviet dictator, a fan of Theremin's, personally upgraded the prize from class II to class I. The prize carried an award of approximately $20,000 (worth about ten times that amount today), a furnished apartment, and even maid service. (U)

Little is known about Theremin's life from 1947, when he was released, until the mid-1960s. Even his Russian biographer failed to pry details from him. He tried to rebuild his life and return to his inventions. He found freedom difficult, however. Missing the order and pure research opportunities of the *sharashka*, he asked the KGB to hire him as a "free" research scientist. Theremin spent the next 20 years working in what the Soviets called "mailboxes," secret facilities known only by their postal box numbers.[35] Theremin's very

[32] Glinsky, p. 260. (U)

[33] Ibid., pp. 321, 355, and 388. (U)



Close-up of the stem and diaphragm of a cavity resonator. (S)

[34] Galeyev, "Light and Shadows of a Great Life." (U)

[35] Galinsky, pp. 256-265, 270, and 300. (U)

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existence was a state secret. He was not allowed to contact relatives or friends. He was always accompanied by bodyguards and often worked on sensitive projects under armed guard. (U)

Resurfacing (U)

At some point in the early 1960s, like millions of other "repressed persons" (the Soviet legal term), Theremin was officially absolved of past crimes and "rehabilitated." In 1964, he began working in the Moscow Acoustic Tape and Recording Department of the Moscow State Tchaikovsky Conservatory. He remained there until 1971, when he lost his position for continuing his work in electronic music, deemed too modern for Soviet socialist esthetics. He spent the final 20 years of his life working as a "grade six mechanic" in the Acoustics Department of Moscow Lomonosov University. (U)

America's rediscovery of Theremin began with a chance encounter in April 1967—Harold Schonberg, chief music critic for the *New York Times*, spotted Theremin at the Moscow Conservatory. For Theremin's former friends in New York, this was the first sign of life since 1938. For years rumors had circulated that he had been executed in 1945 or shortly thereafter. Theremin, for his part, was unaware of the revival of American interest in his life, his work, and his music machine, due in part to the theremin's use in popular science-fiction and suspense films.[26] His reputation had also been burnished by the serious attention being paid to electronic music as a result of the Moog synthesizer.[27] In Moscow, Theremin gave Schonberg a tour of the small lab that he had set up and displayed some of his latest inventions. Schonberg wrote a flattering article that was widely read among aficionados.[28] (U)



Two trips [abroad] paved the way for a triumphal return to America in 1991, where Theremin had become an icon of sorts.

For years after the encounter, Western academics and artists invited Theremin to the West, but Soviet authorities—afraid perhaps of the secrets he still held—refused to let him leave. Finally, in 1988, *Moscow News* ran a three-part series about him, mentioning among other things his espionage in America, the secret Stalin Prize, and BURAN.[29] A year later, Theremin was allowed to attend an experimental music festival organized by UNESCO in Bourges, France. In 1990, he was a guest performer at the Electronic Music Festival in Stockholm. These two trips paved the way for a triumphal return to America in 1991, where Theremin had become an icon of sorts. He took part in a three-day seminar at Stanford and then returned to New York to visit his old haunts and those of his friends who were still alive. Theremin's reputation was also growing inside Russia. In 1992, the Theremin Center for electronic music at the Moscow Conservatory opened. (U)

In 1993, American filmmaker Steven Martin produced a feature length documentary entitled *Theremin: An Electronic Odyssey*. He used footage he shot in 1991 in New York and an interview with Theremin in Moscow a year later. The film first aired on the BBC in March 1993, just two days before Theremin died at age 97. It was also shown at the 1995 New York Film Festival, and eventually won the Filmmaker's Trophy at the Sundance Film Festival in 2000. In March 1995, the Kennedy Center's

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[26] Because of the eerie sounds that the theremin produced—one critic said it sounded like a violin being played under water—it became popular with Hollywood film composers, who used it to produce sound tracks for such movies as *The Day the Earth Stood Still*, *The Thing*, and *Spellbound*. One can even see a theremin in operation in Jerry Lewis's comedy *The Delicate Delinquent*. Later, the Beach Boys rekindled interest in the theremin by using it in *Good Vibrations*, their only million-selling single. (U)

[27] Inventor Robert Moog had built theremins in high school and college. He wrote the introduction to Theremin's American biography and was largely responsible for keeping interest in the Russian inventor alive in the United States. (U)

[28] Harold C. Schonberg, "Music: Leon Theremin," *New York Times*, 26 April 1967, p. 40. (U)

[29] Glinsky, pp. 320-334. (U)

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American Film Institute Theater organized a showing of Hollywood films whose soundtracks used theremins. These were fitting tributes, since the Russian genius's invention had far more impact on the movie industry than on haute culture. Over time, Martin's film played to large audiences in the United States, Europe, and Japan, creating interest in Theremin and leading to the establishment of an international club for enthusiasts. (U)

American composer and musicologist Albert Glinsky published *Theremin: Ether Music and Espionage*, the best and most comprehensive biography of the inventor, in 2000. The book was based on the author's prize-winning 1992 Ph.D. dissertation at New York University. The bibliography of books and articles about Theremin and his creations continues to grow. There are dozens of websites devoted to him, and Theremin tee-shirts are sold on the Internet. (U)

Payback (U)

Adulation from the music world aside, Theremin's genius caused significant problems for US intelligence over the years. In addition to spawning a series of sophisticated audio devices used against the United States worldwide, Theremin's bug in the Great Seal played an inadvertent but key role in the CIA's internal molehunt of the 1960s and 1970s that demoralized the clandestine service and disrupted operations. KGB defector Anatoly Golitsyn made the link in 1961. Golitsyn warned the Agency of a mole named "Sasha," who was of Slavic origin, had spent several years in Germany, and had a name that began with "k" and ended in "ski." The defector claimed that the mole was a CIA officer who had been assigned to analyze the cavity resonating microphone found in Spaso House. (U)

"Theremin's bug in the Great Seal played an inadvertent role in the CIA's internal molehunt of the 1960s and 1970s, which demoralized the clandestine service."

A subsequent investigation led to Peter Karlow, an up and coming operations officer who headed the panel charged with analyzing the Soviet audio device. An Office of Strategic Services (OSS) veteran who had lost a leg during World War II, Karlow had a technical orientation and was in line to head the Agency's Technical Services Division. His life was turned upside down by Golitzyn's accusation.[30] In January 1962, at the Agency's request, the FBI put Karlow under electronic and physical surveillance for a year. When nothing turned up, the Bureau dropped the case, with the concurrence of the CIA's Office of Security. James Angleton of the Agency's Counterintelligence Staff, however, refused to accept Karlow's innocence. Karlow was forced to resign in September 1963 without ever knowing that he was mole suspect number one. Years later, he was one of several previously discredited CIA officers who received back pay, pensions, and compensation, as well as, in Karlow's case, the Career Intelligence Medal.[31] (U)

Given the damage done directly and indirectly, the Intelligence Community can take at least some satisfaction from the fact that the sophisticated cavity resonator technology was subsequently turned back against its Soviet perpetrators.[32] Until the Theremin bug was found in Spaso House, CIA technical experts had denigrated Soviet intelligence's technical capabilities. Set back on their heels by the discovery of the device, senior Agency

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[30] This account of Karlow's tribulations is based on Mangold, pp. 254-257, 266, 273, and 356; and Wise, Chapter 2. (U)

[31] Years later, the CIA determined that there was a "Sasha," but that he was a Russian émigré who had worked as a contract employee in West Germany before opening an art gallery in Alexandria, Virginia. He was not the source of information on the audio surveillance device. The culprit in this case was George Blake, a KGB mole inside British intelligence. (U)

[32] The story of how Theremin's technology was turned around comes from an interview of former CIA officer [redacted] (b)(3)(c) [redacted] Tape and transcript are available from the CIA History Staff Oral History Project. (S)

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officials [redacted]

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[33] Dulles knew the [redacted] who fought in the anti-Nazi underground, from his OSS days. (U)

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> **Theremin's story should give pause to those who assume that scientific achievement requires political freedom.**

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Theremin in Perspective (U)

Taking a broad view, Theremin remains a fascinating character not the least because he managed to bridge two dramatically divided worlds. As his American biographer put it:

> *[Theremin's story] is nothing less than a metaphor for the divergence of communism and capitalism, totalitarianism and freedom, luxury and drudgery, hope and hopelessness. His life was a microcosm of these dueling scenarios and he spent most of his nearly one hundred years shuttling back forth between them.*[34] (U)

Interestingly, for all of his brilliance, Theremin chose the Soviet system over the American way of life. He elected to return to the Motherland in 1938, volunteered to work for the Soviet government after his release from detention, and declined petitions to emigrate late in life. He campaigned for admission to the Communist Party for many years, finally receiving his party card just weeks before the August 1991 attempted coup that undid the Soviet empire. "I promised Lenin I would," he explained to a Russian friend who questioned his reasons.[35] Theremin's story should give pause to those who assume that scientific achievement requires political freedom or that the benefits of the Western way of life exert a compelling attraction on the rest of the world. (U)

[34] Glinsky, pp. 6-7. (U)
[35] Bulat M. Galeyev, "Light and Shadows of a Great Life." (U)

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Proud to serve

The Defense Courier Service

Vincent E. Sescoe

The early morning sky was dark outside the cockpit of the US C-141B Starlifter, but the Suez Canal, 35,000 feet below, was clearly defined by twinkling village lights on both banks. Air-traffic controllers, speaking in accents that reflected former English and French hegemony in the area, cleared the huge aircraft through one air sector to another as it sped toward Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. This mission of the Defense Courier Service (DCS), the 10th in a series nicknamed Project "Desert Sun," was about four hours from successful delivery of its sensitive cargo. It was 7 January 1990, barely 10 days before the start of the Persian Gulf War.

Significant contributions by some of the unheralded elements of the American and Allied forces which participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm are slowly coming to light. One such unit is the DCS, a joint-service Department of Defense (DoD) component responsible for the secure transportation and control of highly sensitive and time-critical material requiring escort by courier. Most histories of the Gulf War will pay tribute to the Pentagon and US Central Command (USCENTCOM) strategists and the tactical brilliance of various commanders of air, sea and land combat units, but the contributions and the dedication to the men and women of the DCS should not be overlooked.

A Long History

The US has enjoyed secure courier service since the first days of the republic. Shortly after General Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown in October 1781, Benjamin Franklin, then American Minister to France, received an official dispatch proclaiming the victory. In those days, American ship captains and other trusted American travelers, serving as "Bearers of Dispatches," assisted a small group of American foreign service officers by carrying sealed packages of mail abroad.

This method of moving classified mail overseas continued with few modifications until 1918, when the War Department established the Military Postal Express Service (MPES) with 70 Army officers and enlisted men. Although terminated for budgetary reasons in Fiscal Year 1933, President Roosevelt, who supported the MPES concept, reinstated the courier service two years later. During the early days of World War II, the Army Courier Service, operating under the Adjutant General, used officers to move Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential material between the War Department and various theaters of operation. An enlisted service was established in May 1942, probably because of manpower shortages. In addition to the Army Courier Service, the Navy operated a service known as the Officer Messenger Mail Service, and the Army Air Corps established an element called the Air Courier Service to move cryptographic materials. Frequently, couriers from all three services flew the same routes together.

Consolidation and Change

The separate military courier services were not consolidated until the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the creation of the joint-service Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS) in January 1953. The ARFCOS charter was revised seven times during the next three decades. In 1985, in the aftermath of the John Walker espionage case, DoD charged the Stilwell Commission to review all security policies and practices. The commission recommended sweeping changes for ARFCOS that unified the command structure, centralized resource management, created a focal point for policy matters, and placed the new courier service within the DoD transportation community. The DCS, which replaced ARFCOS, was officially established on 30 September 1987.

Today, DCS receives policy direction from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence; executive agency support

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from the Air Force; operational oversight from the US Transportation Command; and other support from the Air Mobility Command, formerly the Military Airlift Command.

How it Works

Largely unknown to the public, DCS and the Department of State's Diplomatic Courier Service are the two principal US Government agencies chartered to escort classified material. DCS serves about 7,000 customers, including DoD components; CIA and other federal agencies; NATO; US allies; and authorized government contractors. In maintaining a worldwide network of courier routes, DCS works closely with State, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe/Allied Command Europe courier service, and the British Defense Postal and Courier Service.

DCS Headquarters is at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. The service is comprised of 438 Army, Navy and Air Force military and civilian personnel. They are located at 37 courier stations in 15 states and US territories, as well as in 15 other nations. Regional responsibility is divided into North America East, North America West, the Pacific, and the Europe/Mediterranean areas.

DCS couriers move materials authorized by the DCS charter, including cryptographic systems and materials, communications security systems and components, perishable national intelligence, and other classified material, all of which require accountability and strict control. Once entrusted to DCS, the crates, pouches and pallets of classified material are moved using military and commercial aircraft, small air-charter services, overnight express carriers, and ground vehicles. DCS even delivers to US naval vessels at sea.

Regardless of the mode of transportation, all DCS-managed material is under the continuous escort and surveillance of two couriers. The two-courier system provides additional security, and it permits the couriers to doublecheck the 10 million pounds of classified material they move annually to ensure against misdeliveries and other errors. Also, when DCS couriers are stuck on distant flightlines due to last minute flight-schedule changes, the two-courier system allows one courier to relax.

Meeting the Challenge

The Gulf War provided the DCS with its first major contingency deployment test. Eight days after Iraqi Forces moved into Kuwait, a seven-man DCS station was sent to Riyadh for deployment with USCENTCOM elements. Another DCS unit was sent to Manama, Bahrain.

Because of the close working relationship between DCS and the Department of State, which allows either agency to transport much of the other's materials depending on destination, parallel channels of movement and cooperation were extended to this critical region. When a limit was placed on the volume of diplomatic cargo permitted into the region, DCS stepped in and continued the delivery of vital diplomatic and military material which formed the basis for early political and strategic decisions.

The DCS station in Riyadh became the end unit for a system that provided essential command, control, and intelligence material to the allied forces in the Gulf area. Responsive support from DCS was made more difficult by the shroud of secrecy covering the vast Allied deployment: communications were strained, unit locations were often vague, and deployment timetables were seldom forecast. Nonetheless, the DCS unit in Riyadh acquitted itself admirably.

In December 1990, General Norman Schwartzkopf, Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM, tasked the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to provide critical imagery of the Middle Eastern theater of operations on a daily basis. To meet this requirement, DIA collected and processed the necessary imagery, securely packaged the Top Secret product, and delivered it to the DCS Station in Baltimore, Maryland, where DCS dispatched two couriers to Riyadh via a combination of commercial and military aircraft. Desert Sun missions began three days before Christmas 1990, and they resulted in on-site delivery within 36 hours, well under the deadline.

Weeks later, after diplomatic negotiations had failed, the largest contingent of military aircraft in the history of airpower began attacks against Iraq. Programmed with target data handcarried to USCENTCOM by DCS, US and Allied aircraft hit command and

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control facilities; plants producing weapons of mass destruction; key military production facilities; bridges, airfields and naval installations; telecommunications sites; and other targets of strategic value. The DCS role during the days before the ground offensive was critical to the outcome of the war.

Delivering the Goods

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Once hostilities started, however, only combat-ready couriers were allowed to enter the theater of operations. Undaunted by Scud missile attacks, other enemy fire, and shifting frontlines, the DCS used C-141Bs, C-130s, C-2s, C-3As. C-12s and C-21s to deliver over 1 million pounds of material, including over 200,000 pounds of joint communications codes, to over 300 Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine units. With the cessation of hostilities, Project Desert Sun was terminated, but not before 86 Washington-to-Riyadh missions had been flown with the involvement of 238 military and civilian couriers.

Whatever their mission, the dedicated men and women of the DCS live up to their motto, "The nation's couriers—proud to serve."

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Moscow's Response to US Plans for Missile Defense (b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c)

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

—George Santayana, 1905

"The times and the characteristics of US missile defense plans have changed, but the Russian state of mind has not."

The Bush administration's stated intent to review all missile defense options and move forward with deployment ensures that this issue will remain a major concern to Russia and an analytic challenge for the Intelligence Community (IC). Analysts today focus on reading between the lines of Moscow's politically charged rhetoric against US missile defense plans just as they did when trying to assess the Soviet reaction to the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). US policymakers want to know what Russia might do militarily in response to US missile defense plans, what the political implications would be if the United States deployed such a system, and whether Russian threats to withdraw from arms control treaties to protest US actions are credible.

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are analysts in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence.

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Evolution in US Programs (b)(3)(n)

Attempting to address US vulnerability to a Soviet missile strike, President Reagan announced what came to be known as SDI on 23 March 1983. He called for "a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles." (b)(3)(n)

In contrast, Defense Secretary Cohen announced in January 1999 that the United States would increase funding for a limited missile defense system in light of the growing certainty of emerging long-range missile threats from "rogue states." He stressed that no deployment decision had been made at the time, but that the US would work to amend the 1972 ABM Treaty, if necessary, to allow for the possibility of such deployment. President Bill Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act on 23 July 1999, which called for deploying a territorial ballistic missile defense system as soon as technically feasible. (b)(3)(n)

Moscow's Fears (b)(3)(n)

Moscow's belief that US ballistic missile defenses threaten its ability to deter attacks by the United States has persisted, despite the change in US missile defense architecture from the robust SDI to the more limited NMD. IC products from the 1980s pointed out Moscow's fear of the "potentially far-reaching consequences [of SDI] for Soviet strategy, planning, and force structure." Today, Moscow continues to perceive US plans for even a limited

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missile defense system as undermining its strategic retaliatory capability.

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Moscow is concerned that its declining strategic nuclear forces could no longer survive a first strike with enough missiles left to overcome US missile defenses, undermining its ability to deter a US attack. (b)(3)(n)

Rising concern in Russia over US global military preeminence has made Moscow all the more wary of US missile defense intentions. Despite the scaling down of the US missile defense program, the Russians cite expanding NATO membership and Western actions in the Balkans as "evidence" that they cannot trust the United States to keep a missile defense system "limited." Moscow uses such actions to buttress the suspicion that NMD was really aimed at negating the Russian missile threat. (b)(3)(n)

Russia's Military Optio (b)(3)(n)

In response to SDI, Moscow threatened a variety of military countermeasures in lieu of developing a parallel missile defense system. A 1983 National Intelligence Council (NIC) report concluded that the Soviets probably perceived that they could take a number of military steps to improve their bargaining position before SDI was deployed or to counter such a system if it were put in place.[1] If the United States went forward with

> **"The Russians cite expanding NATO membership and Western actions in the Balkans as 'evidence' that they cannot trust the United States to keep a missile defense system 'limited.'"**

SDI, the IC judged that the Soviet military would most likely deploy more ballistic missile defense penetration aids, improve missile technology, and increase the number of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on its missiles. (b)(3)(n)

In addition, the report predicted that Soviet development of a new intercontinental heavy bomber, the Blackjack, which was to be armed with long-range cruise missiles, would receive higher priority.

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then-General Secretary Yuri Andropov had considered such options as increasing the number of missiles, reinforcing missile silos to increase their survivability, using decoys on missiles to make intercepts more difficult, developing and deploying underwater missiles that would not be affected by the space-based missile shield, and using a "forgotten division" concept, whereby Moscow would secretly forward deploy an SS-20 intermediate range missile unit only to allow it to be "discovered" and bargained away in SDI negotiations.[2] (b)(3)(n)

The Soviets did, in fact, take steps to bolster their military in response to the Reagan initiative, but they were handicapped by their declining economy. In 1987, CIA's former Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA) wrote that "Concern over SDI has caused [the Soviet Union] to refocus some research and development efforts and to increase funding for some research with potential application to advanced [ballistic missile defense] or countermeasures," but "the Soviets have not yet initiated major new weapons procurement programs in response." SOVA noted that Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev was faced with demands to fund military responses to SDI at the same time he was "trying to reverse two decades of declining economic growth." SOVA judged that: "For anything beyond a quite limited response, the Soviets' public claims that they could counter SDI quickly and cheaply understate the severity of the trade-offs they would have to make in responding to SDI. Indeed, some Soviets have expressed concern that the cost of deploying advanced strategic defenses while modernizing and expanding offensive forces would be prohibitive." (b)(3)(n)

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[1] "Possible Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense Initiative," NIC M 83-10017, 12 September 1983. (b)(3)(n)

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"Severe resource constraints cast doubts on Moscow's claims."

Today, Russia appears to be dusting off familiar military threats in its response to US missile defense planning. In February 2001, then-Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev threatened the resumption of "three mighty programs [begun during the SDI era] to counteract asymmetrically the national missile defense of the United States."[3] Moscow's most commonly threatened response, however, is the addition of more reentry vehicles to the SS-27 ICBM, a system designed specifically with anti-missile-defense missions in mind,

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Once again, however, severe resource constraints cast doubts on Moscow's claims. Moscow has only one-tenth the defense resources that it had 12 years ago, and its conflict in Chechnya and badly needed conventional forces modernization cut substantially into that meager allocation. The Soviets may have considered developing their own national ballistic missile defense capability in response to SDI—possibly for greater bargaining leverage, according to IC analysts of the day—but Russian officials admit that the country cannot afford such an effort now. The nearest Russia has come to threatening a symmetric response is Air Force Commander Anatoly Kornukov's claim in February 2001 that Russia would consider upgrading its aging missile defense system around Moscow if the US deployed NMD.[4] The interceptors for this system, however, already are beyond their service warranties and probably will require replacement by 2007, regardless of US plans. (b)(3)(n)

Non-Military Strategies (b)(3)(n)

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union sought to increase pressure on Washington by intensifying the concerns of US allies over SDI. In 1983, the NIC assessed that the Soviets would rely principally on a concerted political and diplomatic effort, first to force the US to drop its missile defense plans, or, failing that, to negotiate them away. The IC concluded that Soviet political and diplomatic efforts would include a "targeted peace offensive, aimed at exerting domestic political pressure in the United States and NATO countries to forego...or at least to postpone" SDI plans.[5] The NIC's 1986 Special National Intelligence Estimate further judged that Moscow had focused on "generating Allied, domestic, and Congressional opposition to...the SDI program." The IC expected the Soviets to use a variety of international for (b)(3)(n)

"offer publicly" strategic arms reduction concessions in return for slowing or halting ballistic missile defenses. If Moscow were faced with a shift in the balance of power, the IC judged that the Soviets would consider options such as a "last-ditch effort to stop SDI deployment through arms control." (b)(3)(n)

Today, Russia continues to try to drive a wedge between the United States and the rest of the world on the missile defense issue, proposing multilateral "constructive" alternatives to US plans for a territorial defense, such as a Global Control System to enhance missile nonproliferation efforts and a joint Russian-European nonstrategic missile defense system to address what Moscow says is the real threat—theater missiles. Moscow also has proposed dramatic arms control reductions—President Vladimir Putin has offered to reduce Russian strategic nuclear forces to 1,500 warheads or lower, provided that the ABM Treaty is maintained. (b)(3)(n)

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[3] "Russia Says US Antimissile Plan Means An Arms Race," *The New York Times*, 6 February 2001. (b)(3)(n)

[4] *Itar Tass*, in English, 6 February 2001, CEP20010206000086

[5] See "Possible Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense Initiative," NIC M 83-10017, 12 September 1983. (b)(3)(n)

[6] For a sampling of Russian views, see Yevgeny Myasnikov, "High Precision Weapons and the Strategic Balance," Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, November 2000, WAX20010320000472; Vladimir Yakovlev, "Duma Discussion of START II." *Interfax*, 11 April 2000, CEP20000411000245; and Vladimir Putin, "Russia Does Not Need New Arms Race," *Interfax*, 14 April 2000, CEP20000414000099. (b)(3)(n)

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Then and Now (b)(3)(n)

What the Soviets Said About SDI (b)(3)(n)

...All attempts at achieving military superiority over the USSR are futile. The Soviet Union will never allow them to succeed. It will never be caught defenseless by any threat. Let there be no mistake about this in Washington. It is time they stopped devising one option after another in the search for the best ways of unleashing nuclear war in the hope of winning it. Engaging in this is not just irresponsible; it is insane.

—General Secretary Yuri Andropov
March 1983

If the (ABM Treaty) were to lapse for any reason, the foundation on which talks between the sides on nuclear arms limitation could be based and conducted would disappear. This would effectively mean the collapse of talks and an uncontrolled arms race for decades.

—Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev
Chief of the Soviet General Staff
June 1985

The simplest of the active measures to overwhelm SDI would be a simple increase in the number of Soviet strategic missiles to a level assuring penetration of the American spaceshield.

—Maj. Gen. Ivan I. Anureyev,
former professor, Soviet General Staff Academy
March 1987

What the Russians Have Said About US Missile Defense Plans (b)(3)(n)

The price may be very high—in the event of an official US decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty Russia will be forced to consider the scenario whereby it may abandon its commitments not only under the START Treaty but also under the treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF), the signing of which was stipulated by the legal and military parameters of the START I - ABM process.

—President Vladimir Putin
June 2000

If the United States writes off the 1972 ABM Treaty, then it will virtually be to blame for wrecking the nuclear arms limitation process. A threat will hang over all the treaties that have been signed or are in preparation. I am talking about START I and II and the consultations on START III. Russia and the United States will become unpredictable to each other. We will pull out entirely from all inspection measures and will permit no one access to our weapons. Russia will not know what is happening in the United States. The Americans will not be informed about what is happening in Russia.

On the purely military plane we will find countermeasures. About 20 measures are being considered which Russia might take without a substantial increase in expenditure... I will point out that the history of weapons provides grounds for declaring that the shield is always weaker than the sword...

—Maj. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev
Commander, Strategic Rocket Forces
October 1999

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
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The Consequences of Permissive Neglect

James B. Bruce

It is "obvious and inarguable" that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.

US Supreme Court in Haig v. Agee (1981)



The problem [of unauthorized disclosures] is worse now than ever before, given the scope and seriousness of leaks coupled with the power of electronic dissemination and search engines.

Intelligence requires secrets. And secrecy is under assault. The future of US intelligence effectiveness depends to a very significant degree on keeping its secrets about collection sources and methods and analytical techniques. When secrecy is breached, foreign targets of US intelligence—such as adversary countries and terrorists—learn about, and then often develop countermeasures to, US intelligence techniques and operations. As a result, the effectiveness of intelligence declines, to the detriment of the national security policymakers and warfighters, and the citizenry that it is meant to serve.

The US press is an open vault of classified information on US intelligence collection sources and methods. This has been true for years. But the problem is worse now than ever before, given the scope and seriousness of leaks coupled with the power of electronic dissemination and search engines. The principal sources of intelligence information for US newspapers, magazines, television, books, and the Internet are unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Press leaks reveal, individually and cumulatively, much about how secret intelligence works. And, by implication, how to defeat it.

This significant issue—the unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence—has been extraordinarily resistant to correctives. It will never be solved without a frontal assault on many levels, and an essential one is US law. This article addresses key legal issues in gaining better control over unauthorized disclosures that appear in the press. It advocates a range of legal solutions that have not been tried before, some of which are controversial. The views expressed here are my own.[1]

Importantly, I would not hold these views had I not come to them from the vantage point of 20 years in the intelligence business, and particularly my last seven with the Foreign Denial and Deception Committee. This committee represents an interagency effort to understand how foreign adversaries learn about, then try to defeat, our secret intelligence collection activities. I have come to appreciate that unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence pose a serious, seemingly intractable, problem for US national security. The Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, made the point during an interview, that unauthorized disclosures "have become one of the biggest threats to the survival of US Intelligence."[2] A skeptical public can rightly question whether the DCI might not be exaggerating the

James B. Bruce is Vice Chairman of the DCI Foreign Denial and Deception Committee.

[1] Although some may still disagree with portions of the arguments presented here, this article has benefited greatly from valuable suggestions provided by Valerie Bruce, John Norton Moore, George Jameson, George Clarke, Larry Gershwin, Mark Monahan, and Penny Martin.

[2] *USA Today*, 11 October 2000, p. 15A.

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seriousness of the problem. Unfortunately, he is not, and no intelligence specialist who is knowledgeable about the damage caused by leaks would disagree.

This presents an important anomaly in public discourse: Nearly all of the compelling evidence in support of the argument that leaks are causing serious damage is available only in the classified domain. It thus seems daunting to make a persuasive public case for legal correctives to address unauthorized disclosures when so little of the evidence for it can be discussed publicly. Proponents for better laws—it will soon become clear why I am one of these—sometimes feel that this is not a fair fight. Freedom-of-the-press advocates and professional journalists exert disproportionate influence on this debate, at least when compared to advocates of criminal penalties for the leaking and publishing of sensitive classified intelligence. But I have come to believe that First Amendment objections to criminal penalties for disclosing classified *intelligence* now demand a more critical reconsideration than we have given them to date.[3] Once we get over this hurdle, it will be more of a fair fight, a more reasoned debate.

[3] The scope of my concern with classified information here extends only to *intelligence*, which encompasses intelligence *information, activities, operations, sources, and methods*. I exclude from my purview other kinds of classified information, such as military (e.g., war plans and weapons systems) and diplomatic secrets, not because they are unimportant, but because I believe that intelligence increasingly requires a distinct legal identity.

> **“It is a myth, too commonly held outside the Intelligence Community, that leaks really do not do much harm.”**

The Seriousness of Unauthorized Disclosures

> *Any sources and methods of intelligence will remain guarded in secret. My administration will not talk about how we gather intelligence, if we gather intelligence, and what the intelligence says. That's for the protection of the American people.*
>
> President George W. Bush, following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.[4]

It is a myth, too commonly held outside the Intelligence Community (IC), that leaks really do not do much harm. The genealogy of this erroneous view traces to the publication of *The Pentagon Papers* in 1971. After much government carping about all the damage that those Top Secret revelations in the press would do to US national security, few today would claim that any damage was done at all. And I am unaware of any that was done to intelligence. *The Pentagon Papers* flap took us off the scent. The view that leaks are harmless is further nourished by other popular myths that the government over-classifies everything—including intelligence—and classifies way too much. This seduction has become a creed among uncleared, anti-secrecy proponents. But this, too, at least in regard to intelligence, I would argue, is wrong.

[4] *New York Times*, 14 September 2001, p. 18.

A recent classified study of media leaks has convincingly shown that leaks *do* cause a great deal of harm to intelligence effectiveness against priority national security issues, including terrorism. This is principally because the press has become a major source for sensitive information for our adversaries about US intelligence—what it knows, what it does, and how it does it. Unfortunately, serious leaks of US intelligence cumulatively provide substantial information to foreign adversaries. At CIA alone, since 1995 there have been hundreds of investigations of potential media leaks of Agency information, and a significant number of these have been referred to the Department of Justice for follow-up action. Leaks that have damaged the National Security Agency's (NSA) signals intelligence sources and methods also number in the hundreds in recent years; dozens of these cases have also been referred to Justice. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) has experienced roughly a hundred leaks just since 2000 that have damaged US imagery collection effectiveness. Many dozens of leaks on the activities and programs of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) have also helped foreign adversaries develop countermeasures to spaceborne collection operations. DIA and the military services, too, have suffered collection losses as a result of media leaks.

It is impossible to measure the damage done to US intelligence through these leaks, but knowledgeable specialists assess the cumulative impact as truly significant. Some losses are permanent and irreversible; others can be

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recovered, though sometimes only partially, and with the expenditure of substantial resources that could well be spent elsewhere.

While leaks of classified information are often intended to influence or inform US audiences, foreign intelligence services and terrorists are close and voracious readers of the US press. They are keenly alert to revelations of US classified information. For example, a former Russian military intelligence officer wrote:

> **Classified intelligence disclosed in the press is the effective equivalent of intelligence gathered through foreign espionage.**

> *I was amazed—and Moscow was very appreciative—at how many times I found very sensitive information in American newspapers. In my view, Americans tend to care more about scooping their competition than about national security, which made my job easier.*[5]

I call this the *Lunev Axiom*: Classified intelligence disclosed in the press is the effective equivalent of intelligence gathered through foreign espionage. Importantly, more than just Russian intelligence officers understand this. Key adversaries of the United States, such as China and al-Qaida, derive a significant amount of their information on the United States and US intelligence from the media, including the Internet. What we need to

[5] Stanislav Lunev, *Through the Eyes of the Enemy* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1998), p. 185.

Reported Examples of Intelligence Losses due to Press Leaks

Soviet ICBM testing, 1958. A *New York Times* story on 31 January 1958 reported that the United States was able to monitor the eight-hour countdown broadcasts for Soviet missile launches from Tyuratam (now Baykonur), Kazakhstan, which provided enough lead time to dispatch US aircraft to observe the splashdowns and, thus, collect data used to estimate the accuracy of the intercontinental ballistic missiles. Following publication of the article, Moscow cut the countdown broadcasts to four hours, too little time for US aircraft to reach the landing area. Occurring in the midst of the missile gap controversy, the publication of the press item left President Eisenhower livid, according to Wayne Jackson in *Allen Welsh Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence* (July 1973, declassified history, Volume IV, pp. 29-31, in Record Group 263, National Archives). According to the same source, some intelligence was lost forever, and, to recoup the remainder, the US Air Force had to rebuild an Alaskan airfield at a cost of millions of dollars.

Politburo conversations, 1971. In a 16 September 1971 column in *The Washington Post*, Jack Anderson wrote that US intelligence was successfully intercepting telephone conversations from limousines used by members of the Soviet Politburo in Moscow. In his book, *For the President's Eyes Only* (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1966, p. 359), British historian Christopher Andrew says that this US collection program producing highly sensitive information ended abruptly after Anderson's revelations.

Soviet submarine, 1975. The *Los Angeles Times* published a story on 7 February 1975 that the CIA had mounted an operation to recover a sunken Soviet submarine from the Pacific Ocean floor. The *New York Times* ran with its own version the next day. After this story broke, Jack Anderson further publicized the secret operation on national television on 18 March. In his memoir, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (London: Hutchinson, 1978, pp. 413-418), former DCI William Colby wrote: "There was not a chance that we could send the *Glomar* [*Explorer*] out again on an intelligence project without risking the lives of our crew and inciting a major international incident. . . . The *Glomar* project stopped because it was exposed."

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understand are the legal implications of this key principle.

How Leaks Hurt

The Intelligence Community faces improved foreign countermeasures as adversaries use leaks to expand their understanding of US intelligence. In the mid-1990s, for example, dozens of press articles covered the issue of whether Chinese M-11 missiles had been covertly transferred to Pakistan. If missiles had been acquired, Pakistan could be found in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to which it was a signatory. Under the National Defense Authorization Act, US law mandates sanctions against proven MTCR violators.

Reports in the Washington press claimed that US intelligence had indeed found missiles in Pakistan, but that the information, apparently, was not solid enough to trigger sanctions. Based on numerous leaks, readers of both *The Washington Times* and *The Washington Post* learned that intelligence had failed to convince the Department of State of the missiles' existence. "Spy satellites," the press announced, were unable to "confirm" the presence of such missiles. The message from the press coverage was, in effect, that any nation—such as Pakistan or other signatories to the MTCR who sought to circumvent its terms—could avert US sanctions if they neutralized intelligence by shielding missiles from satellite observation. These articles not only suggested to Pakistan and China that some key denial measures were succeeding, but also spelled out specific countermeasures that other potential violators could take to prevent US intelligence from satisfying the standards needed for sanctions.

US imaging capabilities are a favorite press topic. An example is leaked intelligence about India's nuclear program in the mid-1990s. Unauthorized disclosures about issues such as this have revealed to our adversaries, directly and indirectly, unique elements that underpin our analytic tradecraft. Thoughtful manipulation by adversaries, as well as friends, of such knowledge exposed in the press impairs our ability to provide policymakers with timely intelligence before they are taken by surprise—as happened when the Intelligence Community failed to warn of the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998.[6]

In addition, effective intelligence depends on cooperative relationships with friendly governments and individuals who trust the United States to protect their confidences. Press disclosures can—and sometimes do—undermine these relationships, making both governments and individuals reluctant to share information, thereby inhibiting intelligence support crucial to informed policymaking, counterterrorist efforts, and, when necessary, military operations.

In 1998, for example, newspaper reports provided lengthy coverage of UNSCOM, the UN Special Commission charged with inspecting Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities following the Gulf war. These reports were widely cited in subsequent worldwide media coverage. Although the articles contained many inaccuracies, information in them interfered with the US government's ability to aggressively pursue its policy on Iraqi weapons inspections. Other serious leaks clearly have degraded Washington's ability to obtain intelligence on Iraq. Damaging press disclosures based on imagery-derived intelligence on Iraq have included the movement of missile systems, the construction of a new command and control network, and the dispersal of WMD equipment following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.

Terrorists feed on leaks. Through their investigations into whether the 9/11 attacks resulted from intelligence failure, Congress and the special Commission will learn that important intelligence collection capabilities against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida were lost in the several years preceding September 2001. With the concurrence of NSA, the White House officially released just one of these. As press spokesman Ari Fleischer explained:

> *And let me give you a specific example why, in our democracy and in our open system, it is vital that certain information remain secret. In 1998, for example, as a result of an inappropriate leak of NSA information, it was revealed about NSA being able to listen to Osama bin Laden on his satellite phone. As a result of the disclosure, he stopped using it. As a result of the public disclosure, the United States was denied the opportunity to monitor and gain information that could have been very valuable for protecting our country.*[7]

[6] In the case of India's nuclear program, damaging press leaks disclosed sources and methods beyond the data revealed to New Delhi in the official demarches delivered in 1995 and 1996.

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What the public cannot easily know, because the overwhelming bulk of this intelligence must necessarily remain classified, is that the bin Laden example cited here is just *the tip of the iceberg*. In recent years, all intelligence agencies—CIA, NSA, NIMA, NRO, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, to cite just the larger ones—have lost important collection capabilities, including against high-value terrorist targets. These losses have impaired human operations, signals intelligence, and imagery collection. And they have deprived analysts and policymakers of critical information, unavailable elsewhere, that they should have had.

Weak Enforcement

> *The seriousness of the [unauthorized disclosures] issue has outpaced the capacity of extant administrative and law enforcement mechanisms to address the problem effectively.*
>
> Attorney General John Ashcroft[8]

Logic and facts reveal a highly inverse correlation between law enforcement and leaks: the less the enforcement, the greater the leaks of classified information—and probably the other way around as well. A statistical approach is impossible, however, because there has been only a single example of any prosecution for an intelligence leak—Navy analyst Samuel Loring Morison in 1985. The glaring absence of criminal penalties for leaking and publishing classified intelligence establishes a law

[7] White House press statement, 20 June 2002.
[8] Letter to the Speaker of the House in compliance with Section 310 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 15 October 2002, p. 4.

"Since present anti-leak laws are not enforced and virtually unenforceable, they are useless."

enforcement climate of utter indifference—actually permissive neglect. The unofficial message seems to be: Leak all you want, and no matter how much, or how serious, nothing will happen to you.

Perversely, for perpetrators there seem to be only *benefits* to leaking, rather than penalties. Anonymous government officials seek to skew public debate in their favor by selectively leaking intelligence that supports their favored policy positions. Journalists and book publishers can gain policy influence, brandishing relevant intelligence that their opponents may not have seen and cannot easily refute—at least not in the press, without more leaks. But also, over time, journalists and writers can gain public renown and recognition—better newspaper, magazine, and book sales—as well as bigger incomes and profits, merely by exploiting the classified materials that law-breaking government officials provide to them. This unholy alliance works exceedingly well as long as the legal climate remains indifferent to it.

Laws on Leaks

Is leaking classified intelligence against the law? Probably—but you would not know it from the prosecutions data: Morison, as noted, has been the only person convicted, and he was pardoned as President Clinton was leaving office. President Clinton also vetoed the "Shelby Amendment," an anti-leaks law written into the FY2001 Intelligence Authorization Act.

It is precisely the legal ambiguity of leaking that is the heart of this problem. Certainly there are laws against it—chiefly the 1917 espionage law (Title 18 US Code §§ 793 (d)-(e) and 798) and the narrower Intelligence Identities Protection Act (Title 50 USC § 421). One could devote a whole legal seminar to what is wrong with these laws—and I urge legal experts to address this. But suffice it here to offer a non-lawyer's view that a law that is almost never enforced is either unneeded or useless. I contend that effective anti-leaks laws are urgently needed—but since the present ones are not enforced and virtually unenforceable, they are useless. Worse, consistent conspicuous failure to enforce these laws actually *encourages* the very crimes that they proscribe.

This problem is not new. The "Willard Report" (after its chairman Richard K. Willard, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General) drew an unsettling conclusion two decades ago:

> *In summary, past experience with leak investigations has been largely unsuccessful and uniformly frustrating for all concerned .... This whole system has been so ineffectual as to perpetuate the notion that the government can do nothing to stop the leaks.*[9]

[9] *Report of the Interdepartmental Group on Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information*, 31 March 1982, prepared for the President.

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Legal correctives proposed in the Willard Report resulted in draft legislation in 1984. Although supported by the Office of Management and Budget and the Reagan Administration, the Intelligence Community later withdrew the legislation due to a perceived lack of support.

Twelve years later, responding to a request from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB) completed another study and reported no discernible change in the government's ability to control leaks. The 1996 report explained the continuing failure as a result of two key factors:

- A lack of political will to deal firmly and consistently with unauthorized executive branch and Congressional leakers.
- The use of unauthorized disclosures as a vehicle to influence policy.[10]

Given the palpable history of failure to protect classified intelligence information from press disclosures—and given the epidemic proportions of leaks and the deleterious consequences they wreak in countermeasures that reduce the effectiveness of US collection—it is fair to question why past failed approaches should be expected to work today. They will not.

There has never been a general criminal penalty for unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence. Although intelligence leaks technically can be prosecuted

[10] NACIPB, *Report to the NSC on Unauthorized Media Leak Disclosures*, March 1996, p. D3.

"Should journalists have legal accountability? Absolutely."

under the espionage statutes (18 USC §§ 793 and 798), only the single case, *US v. Morison*, ever has been. Given that literally *thousands* of press leaks have occurred in recent years—many serious and virtually all without legal penalty—it is clear that current laws do not provide an effective deterrent to leakers or to the journalists and their media outlets that knowingly publish classified intelligence.

Federal law enforcement officers would probably agree that bad laws are hard to enforce. A penetrating critique of what passes for anti-leak laws is provided in a comprehensive Note in the June 1985 *Virginia Law Review* by Eric Ballou and Kyle McSlarrow. Although written before the Morison prosecution, the chief points remain as valid today as when written. A key passage highlights the responsibility of Congress:

> *The disjointed array of statutes shows that Congress does not have a comprehensive scheme to deal with the problem of leaks. The existing statutes either prohibit those disclosures with a specific intent to harm the United States or to advantage a foreign nation, or they apply only to a few narrowly defined categories of disclosures. The specific intent statutes do not apply to information leaks because of their high culpability standard. Those statutes are more appropriate to the problem of classic espionage. As a result, persons who leak [classified] information to further public debate may do so with impunity, as long as the information they disclose is not protected by one of the more narrowly directed statutes. A second infirmity of the specific intent statutes is that they only protect information relating to the national defense. These statutes do not cover diplomatic secrets, nonmilitary technology, and other nonmilitary secrets that affect the country's security. The more narrowly directed statutes, although protecting some of this information, nonetheless constitute an incomplete solution to the problem of leaks. Congress has ignored large categories of information that should not be disclosed with impunity. In summary, Congress has not constructed a principled and consistent scheme of criminal sanctions to punish the disclosure of vital government secrets. Moreover, persons who leak government secrets are but one side of the problem; the government must also pursue remedies against those who publish secrets. Like the disclosure provisions, however, the statutes relevant to the publication of government secrets are vaguely drafted and incomplete.*[11]

[11] Eric E. Ballou and Kyle E. McSlarrow, "Plugging the Leak: A Case for Legislative Resolution of the Conflict between Demands of Secrecy and the Need for an Open Government," *Virginia Law Review*, June 1985, p. 5. See also Michael Hurt, "Leaking National Security Secrets: Effects on Security and Measures to Mitigate," *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Volume VIII, Issue 4, Autumn 2001; and Harold Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, "The Espionage Statutes and the Publication of Defense Information," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 73, No. 5 (May 1973), pp. 929-1087.

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A Call for New Laws

Given the intractable nature of controlling leaks, we need to try remedies that have not been tried before. I defer to the drafting skills of competent attorneys to translate any promising ideas here into workable legislation. My suggestions are grouped into three categories: Write new laws. Amend old ones. And enforce them all—new and old.

Given the fact that many thousands of leaks of classified intelligence in recent years have seriously damaged intelligence effectiveness, thereby jeopardizing the nation's security—and that existing penalties provide no effective deterrent to leaking—we urgently need a comprehensive anti-leaks statute to empower law enforcement and investigators to better protect intelligence. A new law should:

- Unambiguously criminalize unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence.
- Hold government leakers accountable for providing classified intelligence to persons who do not have authorized access to that information, irrespective of intent; *and* hold unauthorized recipients accountable for publishing information that they know to be classified.
- Distinctly define "intelligence information"—including substantive content, activities, operations, and sources and methods—as distinguished from "defense information," creating a discrete protected category for intelligence that does not require proof that it is related to military defense.

> **"We need to try remedies that have not been tried before."**

- Provide better protection to especially sensitive and highly classified intelligence information in trials and other judicial proceedings than is presently afforded through the Classified Information Procedures Act.

Congress can ensure that such legislation is drafted in a manner that is consistent with constitutional requirements.

In addition, a separate new law should be crafted to provide the same protection to technical sensors deployed on any platform (space, air, land, sea) that is now afforded to human operations. Such a law would constitute a technical counterpart to the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (50 USC § 421).

Accountability

Should journalists have legal accountability? Absolutely, in my view. Few would dispute that the first line of enforcement must be drawn to include government officials who unlawfully steal and disclose classified intelligence. Like citizens everywhere, government officers have different opinions on the propriety of holding journalists legally accountable for what they publish. Still, I believe that to be fully effective, a worthy law should also hold uncleared publicists—i.e., journalists, writers, publishing companies, media networks, and Web sites that traffic in classified information—accountable for intelligence disclosures. Specifically, media representatives should be held responsible for publicizing intelligence information—thus, making it available to terrorists and other US adversaries—that they know to be classified. Whether journalists understand it or not—and many probably do not—the public exposure of significant intelligence often damages intelligence effectiveness by compromising valuable US sources and methods. Journalists should also be held responsible under present criminal statutes for unlawful possession of classified documents when they have them.

Legal accountability for journalists is necessary because declassification authority is assigned *by law* exclusively to government officials, elected and appointed, through lawful procedures. Journalists who publish classified intelligence arrogate to themselves an authority legally vested in government that they do not by right possess. In publishing classified intelligence, no journalist can convincingly claim the constitutional right to do so. Any journalist's First Amendment right to publish information does not appear to—and should not—extend to disclosing lawfully classified intelligence information. In any case, a constitutional claim of right-to-publish classified intelligence remains to be established.

A close reading of Title 18 USC § 798 (sometimes referred to as the SIGINT statute) and 50 USC § 421 (the Intelligence Identities Protection Act) shows that journalists are *already* legally accountable for publishing leaked classified intelligence. But since no one has ever been prosecuted under these statutes, they remain unenforced and yet to be tested in the courts.

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Like government officials, journalists also exercise a public trust. But they exercise it without any apparent legal accountability for violating the public trust when they reveal the nation's secrets. This is wrong. Legal accountability for journalists is especially needed in the absence of an enforceable code of ethics for journalist conduct.

The overwhelming majority of journalists do not publish classified information, and some recognize the ethical implications of compromising sensitive intelligence sources and methods.[12] But a few egregious offenders traffic heavily in classified intelligence. In one example, Steven Aftergood, director of the Federation of the American Scientists' anti-secrecy project, has written that: "Over the past couple of years, Mr. Gertz [of the *Washington Times*] has written more stories based on classified government documents than you can shake a stick at, infuriating Clinton Administration officials and making a mockery of official classification policy." Aftergood also repeats a quote from Gertz that ran in the conservative *Weekly Standard*: "We believe in stories that make you say 'holy shit' when you read them," the columnist boasted.[13] The complete lack of accountability of such journalists for costly compromises of information that jeopardize the nation's security must change under the force of law.

[12] See David Ignatius, "When Does Blowing Secrets Cross the Line?" *The Washington Post*, 2 July, 2000; and Ed Offley, "We are Aiding Osama bin Laden," *Defense Watch*, 24 September, 2001.
[13] Steven Aftergood, *Secrecy in Government Bulletin*, No. 64, January 1997, p. 1.

First Amendment Issues

Constitutional experts will address First Amendment implications of any proposed laws that may be interpreted to constrain freedom of the press. Importantly, the Supreme Court has not recognized an absolute right of publication. But neither has it made clear its conception of acceptable restrictions. Still, I believe that holding publishers of classified intelligence legally accountable under carefully drawn legislation would not be proscribed by the First Amendment.

Constitutional arguments will have to address First Amendment issues from a variety of angles:

- The government's exclusive authority to classify—and de-classify—government information is firmly established in law.
- Congress's willingness to regulate publications disclosing intelligence where the potential for serious harm exists is already established in the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA, 50 USC § 421), and in the SIGINT statute (18 USC § 798) as well.[14]
- One leaker (a government employee, not a journalist) has been convicted of providing classified information to the press, and this decision was upheld on appeal.[15]
- Publishing classified intelligence has not been established as a constitutionally protected right.
- A compelling argument can be made for extending the *harm principle* (see below) to protecting classified intelligence from press exposure when the nation's security is jeopardized as a consequence. For example, the media's assistance (unwitting, to be sure) to the terrorists who planned and conducted the attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 provides a vivid example of harm to intelligence that deserved better protection than we now afford it.[16]

[14] Ballou and McSlarrow, p. 7.
[15] *US v. Morison*, 844 F. 2d 1057, 4th Circuit, cert denied, 488 US 908, 1988.

Of course, the inherent tension between First Amendment rights and the government's interest in protecting national security is dynamic, and may never be solved "once and for all." But the current balance so favors First Amendment rights that compelling constitutional interests involving national security can be superseded. Here we should entertain redressing a potential constitutional imbalance by reconsidering a time-tested democratic principle first developed by the preeminent philosopher of liberty, John Stuart Mill:

> *. . . the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.*[17]

Under the "harm principle"—for example, yelling "FIRE!" in a crowded theater when there is no fire—a variety of exceptions to free speech are well established in

[16] The compelling example identified by Ari Fleischer (see page 42) is far from an isolated case. Numerous others in the classified literature show damage to counterterrorist capabilities in all collection disciplines, particularly SIGINT and HUMINT.
[17] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, 1859.

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American law, such as obscenity, defamation, breach of peace, and "fighting words." To this list we should add: "the compromise of US intelligence required in the service of the nation's security."

Improving Existing Laws

Referring to the conclusion of the 1996 report of the National Counterintelligence Policy Board, if we lack the political will to write a new law—and I am convinced that lack of will is our chief obstacle here—then I urge that we amend our present, defective laws to help us curtail the loss of present and future US intelligence capabilities.

First, we should amend the 1917 espionage statute (18 USC § 793) to establish a distinct legal identity for intelligence information, activities, operations, and sources and methods—apart from national defense. Since a considerable number of intelligence activities can be argued as unconnected to national defense, stricter definition would remove the need to satisfy an additional prosecutorial burden. We should also ease the burden of intent or "willfulness" standards, requiring only that the government show that classified intelligence information was publicly disclosed. I would restrict any "intent" burden only to establishing a leaker's intent to knowingly *disclose* classified intelligence instead of the higher culpability bar of establishing intended *damage* to the nation.

Second, we should amend the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (50 USC § 421) to remove the burden of establishing "patterns" of disclosures, since some singular disclosures are so serious, perhaps resulting in loss of life, that legal

"We should treat government leakers and their collaborating journalists as subject to the same laws that apply to spies."

penalties for exposing sensitive agents who risk their lives to help the United States and its allies must be clearly established. The intent standard should also be relaxed because agent identities can be revealed to discerning readers (such as foreign intelligence services or terrorist organizations) through merely descriptive information even when actual names are withheld. And, unless we craft a new law to accomplish this, I would broaden the scope of this narrow statute that now covers only human operations to also apply to technical collection activity, including from spaceborne sensors.

Third, we should amend 18 USC § 794 to include non-state actors such as terrorist organizations, along with "foreign governments or agents thereof" as is currently written, and soften the intent burden analogous to the amended § 793 above.

Finally, we would need to amend the Classified Information Procedures Act to afford much greater protection during investigative and judicial proceedings for highly sensitive compartmented information, which, when leaked, may not even be investigated or officially reported for prosecution. This legal timidity results from an understandable government incentive to avoid calling further attention to a particularly sensitive activity or capability. The US government has shown a debilitating reluctance to pursue legal remedies for the most serious leaks partly because subsequent courtroom publicity of sensitive information subverts its first objective of protecting such information from further disclosures.

Strengthening Enforcement

> *Until those who, without authority, reveal classified information are deterred by the real prospect of productive investigations and strict application of appropriate penalties, they will have no reason to stop their harmful actions.*
>
> Attorney General John Ashcroft[18]

Better enforcement will also require real political will—surely more than we have seen since *US v. Morison*. Where to begin? First, acknowledge the Lunev Axiom: Recognize that government leakers and the journalists who publish the classified materials they provide do the equivalent work of spies. Even if their motives differ, the effects can be the same. Through press leaks, unauthorized disclosures can be every bit as damaging as espionage because of the focused exploitation of the US press by adversaries. If leakers and journalists were caught providing some of this classified information clandestinely to a foreign power, they could, and some probably would, be prosecuted for espionage. But if published in the press—where leaked sensitive information becomes available to *all* foreign governments and terrorists, not just one—leakers and journalists alike derive effective immunity from prosecution under a government that lacks the will to enforce its laws.

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[18] Letter to the Speaker of the House in compliance with Section 310 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 15 October 2002, p. 5.

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Let me state this categorically: Adversarial foreign countries and terrorists rely heavily on the US press to acquire sensitive information about intelligence in order to deploy countermeasures against it. Since such disclosures can have the same effect as espionage, we should treat government leakers and their collaborating journalists as subject to the same laws that apply to spies whose work is more clandestine, but sometimes no more damaging. While the espionage statutes are, for the most part, seriously flawed in their applicability to leaks, for the present they are all that we have. Also, to date, neither leaker nor publisher has been taken to account under laws specifically designed to protect against damaging disclosures of sensitive signals or human intelligence. We should thus begin by trying to enforce the three pertinent laws now on the books: 18 USC § 793 against leakers; 18 USC § 798 against leakers and publishers of classified SIGINT information; and 50 USC § 421 against leakers and publishers who expose HUMINT sources.

We should also enforce 18 USC § 794 against leakers and publishers of classified intelligence whose disclosures injure the United States and advantage foreign nations just as surely as any spies' disclosures that are provided clandestinely. Further, we should empanel grand juries to determine criminal offenses for serious unauthorized disclosures, and compel journalists under *Branzburg v. Hayes* (408 US 665, 1972) to identify their lawbreaking government sources of classified intelligence. In addition, we should subpoena—in the course of legal proceedings to recover stolen government property—classified intelligence documents that we believe are in

"If we continue to be encumbered by a failure of will, our present climate of permissive neglect will become one of pernicious neglect."

the possession of government leakers or journalists, and thus outside the normal physical protections that the US government provides to sensitive classified intelligence information. Government officials, journalists, and publishers who are found to be in possession of documentary classified intelligence should also be prosecuted under 18 USC § 641 for possession of stolen government property.

We need to recognize that sensitive intelligence information is classified by this government for good reasons—precisely because its protection really *is* essential to the security of the nation. But the legal protections we afford it are woefully insufficient, and not nearly as good as those we provide to other government or government-protected information—such as banking, agricultural, and census data, and even crop estimates and insider trading for securities—whose acquisition by foreign adversaries and terrorists would not make any difference at all.

Consequences of Not Acting

"If the law supposed that," said Mr. Bumble, "the law is an ass."

Charles Dickens, *Oliver Twist*

The consequences of legal inaction are high—perhaps higher than we should ask the American citizen to bear. Years of inaction, indifference, and permissive neglect are taking an enormous toll on US intelligence capabilities. And the toll is higher still since 11 September 2001. Intelligence leaks do serious and often irreversible damage to our sensitive collection capabilities. By publicly unveiling unique and often fragile collection capabilities through leaks, the media actively *help* our adversaries to weaken US intelligence. These disclosures offer valuable insights—at no cost to our enemies—into possible errors in their assessments of how well or poorly US intelligence works against them, as well as useful feedback on how well they succeed or fail in countering US intelligence. This kind of feedback also increases the risk of foreign manipulation of our intelligence for deception operations.

Unless comprehensive measures *with teeth* are taken to identify and hold leakers and their publishing collaborators accountable for the significant, often irreversible, damage that they inflict on vital US intelligence capabilities, the damage will continue unabated. Conceivably, without some legally effective corrective action, the situation could even worsen, leading to intelligence on significant national security issues that is less accurate, complete, and timely than it would be without foreign countermeasures made possible by unauthorized disclosures. Warning of surprise attacks against the United States by terrorists or other hostile adversaries could be further degraded. Moreover, multi-billion-dollar collection programs could become less cost-effective than they would otherwise be if foreign adversaries were not learning, through unauthorized disclosures, how to neutralize such programs.

The alternative is *better* intelligence capabilities for the United States. This can result through *no added*

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costs by merely better protecting the sources and methods we now have and those that are in the pipeline. Stemming press leaks will afford significantly better protection. Better laws—and enforcement of these laws—will make this possible. If we continue to be encumbered by a failure of will, our present climate of permissive neglect will become one of pernicious neglect.

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Advice for New Analysts

Intelligence Lessons From Pearl Harbor (U)

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In early August 2000, the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis took [redacted] new analysts in the pilot running of its (b)(3)(c) Career Analyst Program (CAP) to a little-known location in Hawaii, known locally as Kahuku Point. The visit was part of a weeklong TDY by the class that included meetings with a number of Pacific Area Command (PACOM) personnel, including the CINC, Admiral Blair. [redacted] (b)(3)(c) [redacted] The purpose of the trip was to give new analysts the opportunity to learn firsthand about how US military commands perform their missions; what command intelligence needs are; how the Agency provides support to the military; how [redacted]

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[redacted] Directorate of Intelligence (DI) officers play a key role in support for military operations; and how technical collection and communication sites are critical to intelligence analysis. It also allowed them to visit places of significance in the history of intelligence. (U)

> **"Opana is important in the history of American technology and in the history of US intelligence."**

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Opana is important in the history of American technology and in the history of US intelligence. The site is listed in Hawaii's State Register of Historical Places, the National Register of Historical Places, and it has been designated a National Historic Landmark. On 23 February 2000, a plaque was dedicated at the nearby Turtle Bay resort identifying Opana as the site of an electrical engineering milestone. It then joined a select list of milestones similarly recognized by the 350,000-member American Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers that includes Volta's electrical battery invented in 1799; the 1861 transcontinental telegraph; Hidetsugu Yagi's short antenna invented in 1924; and the first wearable car-

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diac pacemaker developed in 1957-58. (U)

On 7 December 1941, Opana became the first place where the United States used radar successfully to detect and track unknown aircraft. At 0702 on that day, two privates in the the US Army Signal Corps manning the new, mobile SCR-270B radar spotted 183 aircraft some 137 miles north of Oahu—the extreme range of the infant radar. The planes had just taken off from six Japanese aircraft carriers; 53 minutes later, they began the attack on Pearl Harbor. (U)

Anyone only generally familiar with the well-documented history of the attack on Pearl Harbor[3] knows that the inability of the Opana radar to provide an alert that Sunday morning cannot be singled out as the most important intelligence failure. There were other earlier occasions, arguably more significant, when American vigilance was inadequate. Nonetheless, the 0702 sighting of the first wave of Japanese aircraft was *the last* real opportunity US intelligence had to alert the fleet and airfields in Hawaii. An alert at the last moment might have allowed US forces to inflict some damage on the attackers, and some vessels and facilities might have sustained less severe damage. Moreover, the attack itself might not have occurred. Admiral Nagumo, commander of the Japanese strike force, had orders to call off the attack and preserve Japan's vital aircraft carriers and pilots if the Americans were found to be on alert and ready. (U)

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What happened at Opana reflected the weaknesses of US intelligence work in its infancy. The mistakes at Opana reflected persistent problems in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. It would be wrong to assume that these mistakes could not happen again because we now work in a more highly technical and well-developed intelligence environment. (U)

Key Lessons

The Opana story contains a number of lessons that today's intelligence officers would do well to remember. The first lesson is that connectivity is crucial. In August 1941, when the US Army deployed SCR-270B radars at six sites covering the entire circumference of Oahu to provide early warning, little provision was made for how those sites would report their intelligence for subsequent analysis and dissemination to operational forces. Radio communication from Opana back to bases on the south side of Oahu was unreliable because of the mountainous terrain and climate. (U)

Tests in November determined that direct radio contact with fighters in the air was difficult and often limited to a 5-mile range. The Aircraft Warning Service (AWS), a new organization created by the Signal Corps to run the radar sites, therefore fell back on a single commercial phone line laid between each of the radar sites and an AWS Information Center that was set up at Fort Shafter. Commercial phones of the day required a switchboard operator to actually link a caller with his destination. The Information Center was similarly linked by commercial line to one critical intelligence consumer—the Army Air Force Operations Center at Hickam Airfield two miles or so away. This operations center in turn was linked by commercial lines to other airfields on the island, and also to the Operations Office of the US Navy's 14th Naval District. Each operations center then had local links using runners, phones, or radios to the actual aircraft and ships that might do something with a warning of unknown aircraft. (U)

This daisy chain of connectivity meant that the highest technology intelligence collectors of the day—the SCR 270B radars—had the flimsiest of systems for delivering their reports to key users. There was no dedicated system to disseminate reporting that needed to be time sensitive on some occasions. When Privates Joe Lockard and George Elliott detected the unknown aircraft at 0702 on 7 December, the evidence suggests that between 5 and 15 minutes were expended simply trying to get through to the AWS Information Center at Fort

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Shafter. The Center did not try to make any phone calls to other sites that needed warning; if it had, similar connectivity problems probably would have prevented any significant action in response to warning. (U)

Today, operations centers around the entire Intelligence Community (IC) are linked by reliable, dedicated lines. But there remains the question of how well connected we are to key customers and users of intelligence in Washington and in the field. It has only been in the last decade that we have developed teams of briefers and other officers to deliver intelligence to policymaking agencies in a timely fashion. Moreover, a fair amount of our other work is still delivered in pouches via courier systems, or as former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates once said, "A 19th century-delivery system carrying 20th century-quality analysis, derived from 21st century-collection systems." (U)

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"The absence of centralized collation and analysis of intelligence, either in Hawaii or Washington, was a key reason why the Opana radar warning was ignored."

Impact of Bureaucratic Conflicts

A major reason why connectivity was a problem in 1941 involved the unwillingness of organizations to cooperate in streamlining the information-sharing process. There was no joint command in Hawaii encompassing both Army and Navy because there was no Defense Department. There was no JICPAC in Hawaii or CIA in Washington to receive all key intelligence directly and then disseminate it to their respective consumers. The layers of phone lines that Opana reporting relied on would have been reduced by at least half if such consolidated command and intelligence arrangements had existed. (U)

These shortcomings were due essentially to the pride and carefully guarded independence of the military services and their opposition to any element that might oversee or demand access to their information. The Office of the Coordinator of Information, the precursor of the CIA created by President Roosevelt in June 1941 to try to bring some order to the intelligence sent to him, was limited in what it could collect, analyze, or receive from other departmental intelligence services. (U)

The absence of centralized collation and analysis of intelligence, either in Hawaii or Washington, was a key reason why the Opana radar warning was ignored. A centralized intelligence analysis capability would have had many pieces of information in the hours leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. The scattered information included reports from the FBI, intercepts of Japanese diplomatic traffic, and action reports from US Navy ships and aircraft.

Bureaucratic problems of a more mundane nature also degraded the warning from Opana. In the US Army in Hawaii, a turf battle between the Signal Corps and the Hawaiian Interceptor Command was going on over control of the AWS and its radar sites. The development of a more effective system for using radar information depended in part on moving the AWS from a training to an operational status. On 7 December, four months after initial deployment, the sites were still in a training mode, under the initial control of the local Signal Corps commander. The commander of the Hawaiian Interceptor Command in November argued that the AWS was ready to become operational under his control, but the Signal Corps commander did not want to give up control. They engaged in a battle of memos to Army Commander Short in the week before the attack on Pearl Harbor. (U)

This turf battle had a significant effect on Opana's performance. One link of the weak, daisy-chain of connectivity remained in place. The Signal Corps kept operating

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the radar sites as a "training only" function on reduced hours. And the turf battle prevented the introduction of expertise from the Air Corps on how to identify unknown aircraft, create linkages to US aircraft operations that actually could act on radar sightings, and allow some attention to the "identify friend or foe" problem that posed a challenge to early radar-tracking efforts. Ironically, the first move toward Signal Corps-Air Corps cooperation began on 3 December, when Lt. Kermit Tyler, an officer in training with the Interceptor Command, was assigned to the AWS Information Center at Fort Shafter. His orders were to explore how to build a liaison with the Signal Corps operation. To learn the ropes, he pulled his first stand-alone watch as a duty officer on what was expected to be a quiet Sunday morning on 7 December. (U)

Today, operations centers and analytic units in Washington and Hawaii and advanced communications systems increase the likelihood that vital information would be available on a timely basis. Although there is a substantial amount of cooperation occurs among the CIA and other IC agencies, all experienced intelligence professionals can still cite recent examples of information or finished analysis that has not flowed in a timely manner, if at all, across the IC. Sometimes concerns about information security are the reason; other times, it reflects a habit of not cooperating and sharing, reinforced by the lack of good connectivity. (U)

Murky Guidance to Intelligence Officers

On 26 November 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull rejected Japan's last demand for US acquiescence in Tokyo's expansionist ambitions in China and Indochina. Simultaneously, US decrypts of Japanese diplomatic messages told Washington that Tokyo saw time running out rapidly on a peaceful outcome if the United States rejected Japan's entreaties. Recognizing the seriousness of the US diplomatic move, both the Navy and Army commanders in Washington sent out on 27 November separate alert messages to all US commanders in the Pacific. This action should have provided unambiguous warning of war, but it did not. The messages sent via each service's channels were not identical, and, when compared in Hawaii by Admiral Kimmel and General Short, did not have the intended effect. It is instructive to compare the verbatim texts. The Navy Department dispatch stated:

> *This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of the naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in War Plan 46 [The Navy's war plan]. Inform district and army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. (U)*

The Army Department dispatch stated:

> *Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat, not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat, not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five [the Army's war plan] so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. (U)*

Both Colonel Bratton and Admiral Turner, the Army and Navy chiefs of intelligence in Washington, testified to the subsequent Congressional investigation of Pearl Harbor that they thought these warnings would lead to a full alert of forces in Hawaii and the Philippines. But the ambiguity as to the nature of the threat and inconsis-

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tencies in the tone of the two dispatches bedeviled Kimmel and Short. (U)

Despite Turner's stated belief that the message would lead to active patrolling and deployment of major fleet elements outside Pearl Harbor at all times, Kimmel saw the message's focus on Southeast Asia as relieving him from any immediate obligation. Strong evidently was confused by the Army message, which was much harder to interpret than its Navy counterpart. He seized on the guidance not to alarm the local population and not to disseminate the risk of war concern to others as the key aspect because it was consistent with his previous concern about an initial threat from Japanese sabotage against his installations. The net effect of these ambiguities was that neither field commander in Hawaii, after consulting with each other, saw any need to strengthen Army-Navy sharing of intelligence and operational alert plans. Both testified that they assumed the other was putting into effect readiness levels to guard against threats that each believed, on the basis of the warning messages from Washington, were of more immediate concern to the other! (U)

The lack of impact of this fuzzy warning from Washington on the overall readiness and intelligence watchfulness of the Hawaiian commands specifically contributed to the Opana intelligence failure. On 28 November, General Short responded to the warning from Washington by ordering the AWS to adjust its training hours from 0630-1130 to 0400-0700. He did so because he correctly anticipated that the maximum danger of air

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attack was around dawn. To obey the warning's caution to avoid raising local alarm and to limit dissemination of the warning to essential officers, however, Short gave no reason for the change in operating time to the Signal Corps. Because the Signal Corps operators previously had expressed concern about growing wear and tear on the new equipment, all assumed that General Short was responding to that concern by reducing operating hours. (U)

For the next two weeks, the operators were happy to begin work earlier and depart sooner. On 7 December, the eight enlisted personnel in the AWS Information Center with experience since August in plotting and assessing radar reports left for home at 0700, and the officer in charge left two minutes later. This episode shows how unclear directions provided by senior leaders can degrade the performance of intelligence and create risks of failure. This will be particularly true for intelligence reports and analysis in the new and more decentralized environment.

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Specificity and Accuracy in Intelligence Reports

Fortunately, the Opana radar site did not shut down immediately at 0700, as ordered. Opana was the only one of six radar sites still on line after that time because Private Elliott wanted a bit more practice working the oscilloscope. Thus, at 0702, he detected what he and his co-operator described as "something completely out of the ordinary on the screen," an enormous mass of more than 50 planes approaching from the north 137 miles out. (U)

After connectivity with the Information Center was achieved, a few more minutes of delay occurred as the switchboard operator, impressed by the description provided from Opana, looked for someone at the closing Information Center. Lieutenant Tyler was located, and he got on the phone. The Opana privates provided the inexperienced Tyler with the distance, the general direction of flight, and their characterization of the sighting as "the biggest sighting ever seen." Two fatal errors of intelligence reporting had just occurred:

- The specific azimuth of flight apparently was not provided.
- The estimate by the privates of a mass of more than 50 planes was not given. (U)

Intelligence collectors who fail to note and report the specifics of what they have obtained may deny analysts and policymakers critical information that will help construct a mosaic, when combined with other sources. Ambiguously

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phrased reporting that fails to provide available details or fudges what in fact may be unknown will create increased dangers of misinterpretation by analysts. Analysts who do not make clear to policymakers to what is known, what is unknown, and what is judged to be the case will create equivalent dangers of policy missteps. And that is what happened at Pearl Harbor. (U)

Overreliance on Mindsets

Lieutenant Tyler was not a trained intelligence officer or functioning in that capacity. He was the low-level decisionmaker on the spot who had to make the call for the Hawaiian Interceptor Command and, by extension, for the entire US Army Command in Hawaii. He made two key mistakes that clinched the certainty of failure, mistakes that Richards Heuer in his recent book on the *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* has helped make clear. As Heuer points out, all analysts facing an ambiguous and complex reality have to create hypotheses and construct working assumptions he calls mindsets to make sense of new information. (U

Tyler viewed the ambiguous information from Opana through the lens of a mindset that he testified had come into being only that morning on the way to work. He had listened to some Hawaiian music on the way in, and he recalled that, according to a friend who was a bomber pilot, the station played this music all night whenever B-17s flew from the mainland to Hawaii, acting as a beam for the navigators. Tyler also apparently recalled hearing that

“To reduce the danger of a mindset failure, analysts have to admit what they do not know and where their own expertise may fall short.”

some B-17s were expected from the mainland that day—in fact a flight of six B-17s was arriving just as the Japanese attack began, and several were shot down as they tried to land. (U)

Based on this mindset, Tyler told the Opana radar operators to forget it, without even telling them why. Lockhard and Elliott nevertheless continued tracking the Japanese aircraft until they were 30 miles from Oahu because it was a "fine problem." According to one estimate, 45 minutes of warning for the US Army and 30 minutes of warning for the Navy at Pearl Harbor were lost as a result of Tyler's order to "forget it." (U)

Tyler's mindset may have reflected at least in part his overall inexperience and unfamiliarity with radar. His assumption that the detection had to be the B-17s was based solely on a few recently obtained tidbits of information. He also failed to recognize the ambiguity of the report he had received from Opana; he later testified that had he known that the radar had detected 50 or more planes, he would have reached a different conclusion. That question, however, apparently was never asked of the radar site. The actual azimuth of the oncoming Japanese attack would also have appeared inconsistent with the B-17 hypothesis, if it had been plotted. The probability of alternative explanations to the B-17 hypothesis would have increased if such analysis had been pursued more aggressively. In Tyler's defense, orders from higher command had not suggested any need for more vigilance, and the plotter staff had left for the day. (U)

To reduce the danger of a mindset failure, analysts have to admit what they do not know and where their own expertise may fall short. Tyler had limited experience and expertise to make the call that he did, and he should have tried to consult with either higher authority for guidance or with other experts at the Hickam Field Ops Center. Alternative views from people with other perspectives, knowledge, or experience should always be sought when a tough, important judgment has to be made. Part of the Sherman Kent School's mission is to help its officers study and develop skill in using rigorous techniques of analysis that reduce the chances for such failure. (U)

Perils of Complacency

The Army and Navy high command had sent alert orders to Hawaii three times before the 27 November warning, when the danger of war with Japan appeared to increase. The first was on 17 June 1940, as France fell to Hitler, and Japan was encouraged by Germany to take French Indochina and other parts of Southeast Asia held by the greatly weakened British. The second was on 25 July 1941, after Germany forced Vichy France to allow Japan to occupy Indochina, and Tokyo appeared ready to take additional aggressive action

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against Russia or against other parts of Southeast Asia. The last was on 16 October 1941, when the Prince Konoye cabinet fell in Tokyo after failing to negotiate a relaxation of the US oil and scrap iron embargo, opening the way for a more militarist leadership to take control. (U)

The warnings received in Hawaii from Washington were similar in gravity to the one sent on 27 November, albeit not quite as stark. Alert actions taken by our forces in Hawaii on each successive occasion, however, tended to decline in their thoroughness. And, of course, no attack had come after the first three alerts. (U)

At the level of intelligence assessment, after the successful British surprise attack on 12 November 1940 against Italian battleships in Taranto harbor using obsolete Swordfish torpedo bombers, the commander of the Pacific fleet, Admiral Richardson, commissioned a study by his intelligence chief, Rear Admiral Bloch, that was completed in January 1941. Remarkably, it was entitled "Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of Local Defense Forces To Meet Surprise Attacks." The study, which in modern intelligence parlance was a combination "red team" and "net assessment" study, listed air bombing and air torpedo attacks from planes launched off several Japanese carriers as the major threat and described a Japanese attack plan that was eerily similar to what transpired. (C)

While the study sparked intensive discussion and debate in Washington and stimulated recommendations on ways to strengthen the fleet's position, little happened, and the study was forgotten. But the preparation of the controversial report, along with Admiral Richardson's continued opposition to the permanent deployment of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, displeased President Roosevelt and contributed to the decision to replace Richardson in January 1941 with Admiral Kimmel as fleet commander, one year earlier than Richardson's tour was due to end. The fundamental debate over when a vulnerable deterrent may become a tempting target was lost in the shuffle. (U)

Complacency will erode the impact of even the most significant intelligence, and if that happens, as was partially the case at Pearl Harbor, the costs can be very high. Every intelligence professional should start with that as the most personal lesson of Opana. (U)

We took the new analysts to Opana to help etch this and other enduring lessons from that site into their thinking, thereby increasing the odds that CIA's next generation of intelligence professionals will be able to detect and avoid the kinds of problems that made any warning on 7 December 1941 impossible. (U)

NOTE

1. The background details in this article are drawn from Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962); and Gordon Prange, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1981).

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The Strategic Use of Open-Source Information

John Gannon

"Open-source information now dominates the universe of the intelligence analyst, a fact that is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future."

John Gannon is a retired CIA officer whose last assignment was Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

This article is unclassified in its entirety.

The Intelligence Community (IC) is well known as an espionage service. Much less well known is the fact that it is one of the world's biggest information-based businesses, collecting and analyzing open-source information. Open source has long been a high IC priority. Today open-source information has become a major challenge to the IC. The IC response to the challenge is very much a dynamic work-in-progress.

Open-source information is not what it used to be. Ten years ago, "open source" generally meant information from foreign newspapers and the electronic media, which was collected mostly by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Open source was "frosting on the cake" of intelligence material dominated by signals, imagery, and human-source clandestine collection.

Today, open source has expanded well beyond "frosting" and comprises a large part of the cake itself. It has become indispensable to the production of authoritative analysis. It increasingly contains the best information to answer some of the most important questions posed to the Community. Media reports now are just a small piece of the open-source pie, which comprises a vast array of documents and reports publicly retrievable but often difficult to find in today's high volume, high-speed information flow. Open sources provide vital information for the policymakers, whom the IC serves. Accessing, collecting, and analyzing open-source information, in short, is a multi-faceted challenge that can only be met with a multi-front response or strategy.

This article examines three aspects of the open-source challenge/response dynamic: its critical importance; how the IC is using technology to help the analyst cope with the information glut; and the need for interaction with the private sector.

Critical Importance of Open Source

The world for the IC analyst has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. A decade ago *global coverage* largely meant a comprehensive strategy to collect against and analyze the Soviet Union—the IC's single strategic threat. Today, *global coverage* entails the responsibility to assess diverse, complex, and dispersed threats around the world. In additional to traditional intelligence concerns—such as the future of Russia and China, political turmoil in Indonesia, and civil conflicts in Africa—the new environment features many nontraditional missions. The IC now provides intelligence about peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, sanctions monitoring, information warfare, and combating international organized crime, as well as placing greater emphasis on such transnational issues as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and counterproliferation. Many of these missions are

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operationally focused, requiring growing proportions of the analytic and collection work force to function in an *ad hoc* crisis mode.

Open-source information now dominates the universe of the intelligence analyst, a fact that is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. The revolution in information technology and telecommunications has fundamentally transformed the globe that the IC covers, the services that it provides to consumers, and the workplace in which its people function.

- Information abounds. A growing volume of open-source material is relevant to intelligence needs. Closed societies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have opened up, and reliable information now is widely available. Fifteen years ago, information on the Balkans was scarce, foreign newspapers took weeks to arrive at an analyst's desk, and policymakers were willing to wait days or even weeks for a paper on the issues.

- Today everything moves faster, and people are better informed. The revolution in information technology has vastly increased the volume and speed of the information flow across the globe and across computer screens. Technology makes analysts more efficient, but it also increases the demand from consumers. Intelligence requirements tend to be sharper and more time sensitive. Analysts often receive newspaper and media reports before the people in the countries where the reports are generated and intelligence consumers will not tolerate waiting days for a response.

"Automated analysis tools—data mining and retrieval techniques—provide significant opportunities to help solve the information overload problem."

- Governments have less and less capacity to control information flows. International organized crime groups, terrorists, narcotraffickers, and weapons proliferators are taking advantage of the new technologies, bypassing governments or seeking to undermine them when governments try to block their illegal activities. Chances are these criminal networks will be using laptop computers, establishing their own websites, and using sophisticated encryption. In the years ahead, these enhanced capabilities will raise the profile of transnational issues that are already putting heavy demands on intelligence collection and analysis.

Dealing with the Information Glut

The enhanced *speed* of communication is a distinct advantage in today's world where intelligence analysts are as comfortable in cyberspace as in the office space of top consumers. The Washington-based analyst can send a message and get a response from a post in a remote country faster than it used to take to exchange notes by pneumatic tube with counterparts in the same building.

The expanding *volume* of open-source information, however, presents a greater challenge. During the Cold War, the job of the IC was to piece together bits of secret information. Each piece of raw intelligence was a carefully acquired golden nugget. Today, the IC is still mining for information but facing an avalanche from both open-source and classified collection systems.

Technology is a major part of the answer to the magnitude of the open-source challenge, but it is no substitute for the other essential component: skilled people. The IC must invest more in technology to provide the analytic tools needed to assess and exploit the vast amount of information available, and it must invest more in people, whose expertise is crucial for prioritizing, interpreting, and analyzing this information. The greater the volume of information to assess, the stronger must be the expertise to evaluate it.

The number of sources and the overall amount of data to which an analyst has access make the process of finding precise information or hidden clues extremely difficult. How can the analyst know where to start looking? What data might be relevant and what should be ignored? When intelligence analysts query databases, they need to know how to ask the questions in a way that will get useful answers, and they need analytic tools to help them extract the right data. Automated analysis tools—data mining

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and retrieval techniques—provide significant opportunities to help solve the information overload problem.

Cognitive analytic tools are under development in both the private sector and the government to facilitate management of the information glut, enhancing the IC's ability to filter, search, and prioritize potentially overwhelming volumes of information.

- *Clustering* lets analysts exploit the most useful data sets first, helping the IC perform its warning function. Clustering is particularly helpful when the volume of information, as with open source, makes it difficult to recognize meaningful patterns and relationships.
- *Link analysis* helps to establish relationships between a known problem and unknown actors and detect patterns of activities that warrant particular attention.
- *Time-series analysis* can enable analysts to track actions over time so that unusual patterns of activity can be identified.
- *Visualization* allows analysts to see complex data—including link and time-series analysis—laid out in new and varied formats that promote analytic insight.
- *Automated database population* is designed to free analysts from the tedious and time-consuming function of manually inputting information into databases, reducing the potential for errors and inconsistencies.

"FBIS is developing a single, open-source 'portal'...to be accessible from desktops and expected to be fully operational by 2002."

One of the strongest and most consistent needs of IC analysts is to search and exploit both classified and unclassified information from a single workstation. The Community is working on this and on ways to standardize information and tag it using metadata—or reference information—to make it easier to search, structure, and enter information into databases.

FBIS is developing a single, open-source "portal" that will organize and cross-reference FBIS products, information that FBIS has collected via the Internet as well as other multimedia material.

- The portal, to be accessible from desktops and expected to be fully operational by 2002, will provide analysts with a one-stop shop for all open-source intelligence, whether collected by FBIS or not.
- Material on the portal will be indexed, archived, and accessible via a powerful, easy-to-use search engine.

Enhancing IC Cooperation

Collaborative tools offer a critical opportunity for enhanced cooperation among the IC's 13 agencies, DCI centers, the National Intelligence Council, and literally hundreds of collection and analysis offices. The problem of sharing data among such a large number of organizations is immense, in particular because different agencies have different security standards. Each organization has private intelligence holdings that are extraordinarily sensitive. The IC has to resolve the issue of multilevel security and need-to-know concerns by developing robust and flexible communities of interest using collaborative tools.

New tools are needed to enhance cooperation in two areas:

- Collaboration in the production process to increase speed and accuracy.
- Expertise-based collaboration—to enable a team of analysts to work on a project for several weeks or months.

Several collaborative tools currently available or soon to be deployed include the capability to share both textual and graphic information in real time. These new tools will allow analysts to discuss contentious analytic issues; share information like maps, imagery, and database information; and coordinate draft assessments. This would all be done on line, from their own workspaces, resulting in substantial savings of time and effort over current practices. Future requirements emphasize broad deployment of collaborative tools, relying on mature commercial off-the-shelf platforms performing to standards that allow interoperability across the IC.

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Another important aspect of enhanced collaboration is distributed knowledge. The IC will never have a database that contains all information available to all organizations, due to the individual missions of each organization. The ability to share major holdings of multiple agencies and to present an integrated view to the analyst's desktop, however, is critical and possible—but no easy task!

Finally, the IC has some challenges that few private sector organizations face. It deals, for example, extensively in foreign languages—lots of them. FBIS translates and disseminates information in many languages. Automated translation tools are getting better but still do not function adequately. The IC remains heavily dependent on trained linguists.

Working With the Private Sector

The information technology (IT) relationship between the US Government and industry has undergone a dramatic transformation in recent years. By itself, the IC simply cannot stay ahead of the technological curve and it knows it. Today, government no longer dominates research and development (R&D) and the information marketplace—the private sector does. The IT industry's R&D is focused primarily on commercial applications; the IC's requirements increasingly will have to be satisfied by products developed for commercial use. The IC needs to develop close and enduring partnerships in the commercial world to benefit from both the private sector's continuing

"The ability to share major holdings of multiple agencies and to present an integrated view to the analyst's desktop is critical and possible—but no easy task!"

pursuit of new technology and its best practices in dealing with the open-source challenge.

In 50 years, the IC has gone from large, stationary mainframes with a handful of dumb workstations to portable multi-service devices that will communicate, compute, and run offices. This represents a dramatic leveling of information costs and affects the way the IC does its work. In many ways, however, the Community still thinks and organizes itself with immobile information systems. It is continuing to invest great amounts in stationary hardware systems, while many of its targets—terrorists, narcotraffickers, and organized crime syndicates—are becoming increasingly mobile in their operations. Perhaps private industry will come up with ways to liberate analysts from their cubicles, while at the same time ensuring the security of their work.

The CIA has developed two organizations to build and sustain outside partnerships: the Office of Advanced Intelligence Tools (AIT) and In-Q-Tel.

- In 1997, CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology and its Directorate of Intelligence collaborated in the formation of AIT. The office works inside CIA with analysts to determine their needs and outside CIA with vendors to identify state-of-the-art cognitive and collaborative tools.

- CIA launched In-Q-Tel in 1999 as a nonprofit corporation designed to bring together the best of the academic, business, and private research worlds to exploit new and emerging information technologies.[1] Its mission is twofold: first, to accept strategic problems and develop a "portfolio" of innovative IT solutions, ranging from exploration to demonstration; and, second, to fuel private research, development, and application of information technologies of strategic national interest for the benefit of all partners.

In-Q-Tel is not designed to conduct research itself; rather, it will orchestrate the work of numerous partner organizations working in teams. In-Q-Tel's initial projects focus on four interrelated intelligence challenges:

- *Agency use of the Internet*, particularly Internet search and privacy issues.

- *Information security*, a crosscutting issue that permeates all organizational functions. In-Q-Tel will engage information security from the perspectives of hardening and intrusion detection; monitoring and profiling of

[1] The new corporation was first launched in February 1999 as In-Q-It, but changed its name to In-Q-Tel in December 1999 to prevent confusion with the financial software giant Intuit. "In-Tel" is self-explanatory, while the "Q" stands for technical innovation—derived from the James Bond character who developed Bond's spy gear.

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information use and misuse; and network and data protection.

- *Analytic data processing capabilities*, including geospatial and multimedia data fusion/integration, all source analysis, and computer data forensics.

- *Distributed information technology infrastructure*, to facilitate data dispersal to multiple organizations/agencies anywhere in the world.

The IC leadership recognizes that partnerships with outside technical and academic experts, as well as vendors, are essential to enabling us to stay on top of the information technology curve. Among analysts, the attitude and behavior toward the outside world is slowly changing, but the IC needs to provide more incentives for analysts to get out from behind their desks to engage with substantive experts and other outside sources of useful—and increasingly critical—information that cannot be captured by clandestine collectors or traditional open-source collectors

"By itself, the Intelligence Community simply cannot stay ahead of the technological curve and it knows it."

such as FBIS. This is an imperative, not an option. It has been said that, "Opportunities are like sunrises. If you wait too long, you miss them." The IC cannot afford to miss today's opportunities because it is too inwardly focused. It does not intend to do so.

Conclusion

For most of its history, the Intelligence Community has operated as an industrial enterprise, with compartmentation as a key operating metaphor. In the process, a set of impressive organizations has been created; however, they are now being overtaken by events. In the post-industrial world pervaded by information technology, networks defeat hierarchies, and agility becomes a prerequisite for organizational success. Even with the impressive gains of the past few years, dealing with the open-source challenge will necessarily be a work-in-progress for some time to come. Open source is not a traditional collection challenge, and there is no single solution. Meeting the challenge requires a multi-front strategy, and it will take time for the IC to get this right.

The IC recognizes that it can succeed only if it exploits the changes taking place in the information revolution and in information industries. The Community always will have security concerns but cannot allow them to deter it from taking advantage of the opportunities inherent in the emerging environment.

The leadership has committed the IC to a corporate strategy that will leverage the best practices and resources of the whole government and the private sector to provide the President and US policymakers the information advantage they need.

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Intelligence Support

Into Politics With John F. Kennedy

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Editor's Note: This article is drawn from the draft of an historical study (b)(3)(c) *entitled* Getting To Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates From 1952 to 1992.

> **"In 1960, the CIA and its programs for the first time became involved in the political campaign, sometimes within public view and sometimes behind the scenes."**

The CIA's early relationship with presidential candidate John Kennedy could hardly have been more different from the one it had established eight years earlier with Dwight Eisenhower. In 1952, the Agency's briefings in the pre-election period had been undertaken by working-level officials who, for the most part, delivered current intelligence summaries in written form. With few exceptions, the material had stayed away from policy issues. In 1960, by contrast, the briefings were handled personally by the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, and included extended discussions of sensitive matters.

In 1960, the CIA and its programs for the first time became involved in the political campaign, sometimes within public view and sometimes behind the scenes. Issues arose relating to the need for, and the protection of, the US Government's intelligence capabilities, specific intelligence collection programs such as the U-2 aircraft overflights, and substantive analytic findings related to Soviet economic and strategic capabilities. Charges were made regarding the allegedly selective use of intelligence information by the White House and the Agency, and CIA for the first time faced the question of what obligation it might have to brief a presidential candidate on a major covert action program.

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The Presidential Debates

Many of these issues were on display during the presidential debates, held for the first time in 1960. During the first debate in Chicago on 26 September, the focus was exclusively on domestic issues. In the second debate on 7 October in Washington, the candidates quickly became enmeshed in a discussion of Kennedy's earlier statement that the United States should have apologized to the Soviets for the incident in which Francis Gary Powers's U-2 was downed over Russia. In attacking Kennedy, Vice President Richard Nixon said, "We all remember Pearl Harbor. We lost 3,000 American lives. We cannot afford an intelligence gap. And I just want to make my position absolutely clear with regard to getting intelligence information. I don't intend to see to it that the United States is ever in a position where, while we are negotiating with the Soviet Union, that we discontinue our intelligence effort, and I don't intend ever to express regrets to Mr. Khrushchev or anybody else...."[1]

From the point of view of intelligence analysts, the third debate on 13 October, featuring Kennedy from New York and Nixon from Los Angeles, was of interest because Kennedy cited the DCI regarding one way in which the Soviets were catching up with the United States: "The economic growth of the Soviet Union is greater than ours. Mr. Dulles has suggested it is from two to three times as great as ours."[2] In that debate and in the fourth and

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final encounter in New York on 21 October, Kennedy pursued the theme of the Soviets surpassing the United States economically and militarily.

Perhaps the most memorable issue raised in the 1960 debates—one with an obvious intelligence angle—was the alleged missile gap. Kennedy charged that the Soviets had "made a breakthrough in missiles, and by 1961, 1962, and 1963 they will be outnumbering us in missiles. I'm not as confident as he [Nixon] is that we will be the strongest military power by 1963." Kennedy added, "I believe the Soviet Union is first in outer space. We have made more shots but the size of their rocket thrust and all the rest. You yourself said to Khrushchev, you may be ahead of us in rocket thrust but we're ahead of you in color television, in your famous discussion in the kitchen. I think that color television is not as important as rocket thrust."[3]

During three of the debates, Nixon attacked Kennedy for his lack of willingness to defend Quemoy and Matsu, the small islands off China. The extensive discussion of the Quemoy-Matsu issue did not create any direct problem for the CIA, but indirectly it caused a great commotion regarding Cuba that involved both candidates, the White House, and the Agency.

Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., later described the relationship of these China and Cuba issues and the sequence of events in *A Thousand Days*. He wrote, "The Kennedy staff, seeking to take the offensive after his supposed soft position on Quemoy and Matsu, put out the provocative

I think that Senator Kennedy's policies and recommendations for the handling of the Castro regime are probably the most dangerously irresponsible recommendations that he has made during the course of this campaign.

statement about strengthening the Cuban fighters for freedom."[4] The controversial press release, crafted late one evening in the Biltmore Hotel in New York City by speechwriter Richard Goodwin, said, "We must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista, democratic, anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro." According to Goodwin, the policy statement was not shown to the sleeping Kennedy because of the late hour; it was the only public statement of the campaign not approved by the candidate.[5]

The ill-considered statement on Cuba received wide press play and was immediately attacked. *The New York Times* the next day ran the story as the lead item on the front page with the headline: "Kennedy Asks Aid for Cuban Rebels To Defeat Castro, Urges Support of Exiles and Fighters for Freedom." James Reston wrote in the *Times* that "Senator Kennedy [has] made what is probably his worst blunder of the campaign."[6]

Coming the day before the fourth presidential debate, the statement from the Kennedy camp put Nixon in what he found to be an extraordinarily awkward position. Many years later Nixon wrote in his memoirs, "I knew that Kennedy had received a CIA briefing on the administration's Cuba policy and assumed that he knew, as I did, that a plan to aid the Cuban exiles was already under way on a top secret basis. His statement jeopardized the project, which could succeed only if it were supported and implemented secretly."[7]

Throughout the campaign the two candidates had engaged in a spirited exchange about whether the Eisenhower administration had "lost" Cuba, and Nixon knew that the issue would be revived in the final debate, which was to be devoted solely to foreign affairs. Nixon has written that, in order to protect the security of the planned operation, he "had no choice but to take a completely opposite stand and attack Kennedy's advocacy of open intervention." And he did attack, saying, "I think that Senator Kennedy's policies and recommendations for the handling of the Castro regime are probably the most dangerously irresponsible recommendations that he has made during the course of this campaign."[8]

Former Kennedy advisers have underscored over the years that the statement on Cuba was released without Kennedy's knowledge by staffers ignorant of the covert action planning under way at the time and was crafted solely to ensure that Kennedy would not again be put on the defensive about Communist expansionism. These same advisers differ among themselves, however,

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on the key question of whether Kennedy himself knew of the covert action plans. Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen said in 1993, "I am certain that at the time of the debates Kennedy had no knowledge of the planned operation. His reference to more assertive action regarding Cuba was put in by one of my assistants to give him something to say."[9]

The assistant was Richard Goodwin, and his memory is quite different. Goodwin asserts that, "As a presidential candidate, he [Kennedy] had received secret briefings by the CIA, some of which revealed that we were training a force of Cuban exiles for a possible invasion of the Cuban mainland."[10] Goodwin and Sorensen have both made clear that they did not attend any CIA briefings.

The US Government's planning for a covert action program intended to undermine Castro had been approved by President Eisenhower in March of 1960 and was in progress throughout the period of the presidential campaign. The question of when and to what extent Kennedy—or any presidential candidate—would be informed was important to CIA because it raised the delicate question of informing individuals outside the normally small restricted circle in CIA, the Congress, and the executive branch of ongoing covert action deliberations.

In 1960 this was uncharted territory. Subsequently, the Agency's practice came to be one of delaying briefings even on established covert action programs, as well as on sensitive technical and human source collection programs, until after the election, when it would be clear who would be president. This meant denying such briefings to presidential candidates, creating the obvious risk that they would inadvertently make statements during the campaign that would embarrass themselves and the Agency, or—more important—complicate the future execution of a US foreign policy.

The outgoing Eisenhower administration was fully aware that covert action planning on Cuba was a political bombshell well before the matter came to a head in October. Following one of Allen Dulles's briefings of the National Security Council in early August, for example, the Vice President pulled the DCI aside to ask him whether Kennedy and his running mate, Senator Lyndon Johnson, were being provided information on covert action, specifically that related to Cuba. Dulles gave a carefully crafted answer to the effect that Kennedy was being told a little but not too much. According to former Agency officials familiar with the exchange, Nixon reacted strongly to Dulles's reply, saying, "Don't tell him anything. That could be dangerous."[11]

In his own account of these events, published in 1962, Nixon charged that Kennedy, prior to the election of 1960, had knowledge of covert action planning "for the eventual purpose of supporting an invasion of Cuba itself."[12] This charge prompted a formal press release from the White House on 20 March 1962 denying that Kennedy had been told of any plans for "supporting an invasion of Cuba" before the election. The White House denial was supported by Dulles, by then a former DCI, who explained that Nixon's comments were apparently based on a misunderstanding of what was included in the briefings he had given Kennedy.

Pre-Election Briefings

As early as 30 March 1960, Edward P. Morgan of the American Broadcasting Company used the occasion of a presidential press conference to ask Eisenhower if the presidential nominees to be selected in the summer would be given high-level intelligence briefings. At that early date the DCI had not yet raised the subject with the President, but Eisenhower did not hesitate, saying, "We always do that. They did it for me in 1952 and I did it in 1956, as quick as the nominees are named they begin to get it."[13] Indeed, on 18 July, Eisenhower sent telegrams to the Democratic nominees offering them briefings by the CIA. Undoubtedly recalling his own difficult exchange with President Truman eight years earlier, Eisenhower included in his telegram a paragraph saying, "Because of the secret character of the information that would be furnished you, it would be exclusively for your personal knowledge. Otherwise, however, the receipt of such information would impose no restriction on full and free discussion."[14]

Senator John F. Kennedy, the Democratic presidential nominee, immediately accepted the offer, and the first intelligence briefing was held five days later, on Saturday, 23 July. The briefing of Kennedy was held at his vacation home in

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Hyannisport, Massachusetts, and was conducted by the DCI alone in a session that lasted approximately two and a quarter hours. Senator Lyndon Johnson, as vice presidential nominee, was briefed at his ranch in Texas on 28 July, also by Dulles.

In that first round of briefings the DCI put heavy emphasis on Soviet issues, including Soviet progress in strategic delivery capabilities, missiles, and bombers, and discussed the nuclear testing issue. He also reviewed Soviet statements on Berlin and Sino-Soviet cooperation. Dulles went over the latest intelligence on the Formosa-China situation; Middle East politics, including events in Iran and regarding the French problem in Algeria; the crisis in the Congo; and Cuba. The briefing of Johnson differed from that of Kennedy only because Johnson was also interested in discussing Mexico.[15]

Dulles recorded that both were interested in developments that might arise during the campaign, especially in Berlin, Cuba, and the Congo. Kennedy asked Dulles's opinion about the likelihood of an early Chinese attack on the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits and inquired about the status of the nuclear testing conference. Johnson, in addition to his interest in Mexican and Caribbean matters, asked about Soviet missile developments, reflecting his position as Chairman of the Senate Preparedness Committee.

At the conclusion of the first briefing, Kennedy stated that in subsequent briefings he wanted to have worldwide wrap-ups, but, as a result of scheduling difficulties, the second and only other pre-election session was delayed almost two months. To his surprise, Dulles received a telephone call from a member of the Kennedy staff about 9 p.m. on Saturday night, 17 September, while dining with friends in Georgetown. The DCI was asked if he could meet with the Senator on Monday morning, 19 September, at the Kennedy home in Georgetown.[16]

“Available CIA records do not confirm that Dulles briefed Kennedy on the status of Cuban covert action planning in either of the two sessions held before the 1960 election.”

When the DCI arrived for the hastily arranged briefing, he found Kennedy in a series of discussions with Senator Albert Gore, Sr., and various other people, including Prince Sadruddin Khan, uncle of the Aga Khan. After the other visitors departed, the DCI had approximately 30 minutes with Kennedy to give him an update on world trouble spots. Dulles's memorandum for the record notes that the two discussed Cuba, the Congo, Berlin, Laos, Jordan, Syria, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Soviet space program.

During the second briefing, Kennedy was interested in learning what Khrushchev's objectives would be in his coming visit to the UN and what the Agency believed the Soviet leader was likely to say or do. In addition, the Senator wanted to be alerted to any critical areas that CIA thought might blow up over the next six or seven weeks before the election. Dulles apparently took no specific action at the time in response to this latter request.

More than a month later, with the election looming, Robert Kennedy contacted Acting DCI Gen. Charles Cabell to repeat the request for information on possible trouble spots. This led to a response within 24 hours. On 2 November, Cabell personally traveled to California, where Kennedy was campaigning, to deliver a memorandum that discussed a number of possible crisis areas. These included the Soviets' October Revolution anniversary, Sino-Soviet developments, tensions in Berlin and the Taiwan Straits, possible Chinese nuclear tests, a Soviet space spectacular, the French-Algerian impasse, events in Southeast Asia, King Hussein's delicate position in the Middle East, the unsettled situation in the Congo, and possible action by Cuba against Guantanamo Naval Base. In this review, the Agency cautioned that in fact "we do not estimate any of them are likely to occur prior to 8 November."[17]

Available CIA records do not confirm that Dulles briefed Kennedy on the status of Cuban covert action planning in either of the two sessions held before the 1960 election. In fact, the DCI's memorandums for the record regarding the sessions in July and September mention Cuba only as one of many trouble spots around the world. Taken alone, this would suggest that their discussion concerned what was going on in Cuba rather than what the United States was planning to do about it.

One internal CIA memorandum of 15 November 1960 discussing an

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anticipated postelection briefing mentions that "The following draft material is much more detailed and operational than that prepared for the candidates in July."[18] This formulation suggests that the message on Cuba Dulles conveyed in July was at least a bit "operational," even if not detailed. Such an inference would be consistent with Dulles's answer to Nixon's question in early August that he had told Kennedy, in effect, a little but not too much.

When Dulles met with Kennedy in July (their only meeting before the exchange between Dulles and Nixon in early August), the planning on Cuba and the limited operational activities that were under way related almost wholly to propaganda and political action. The paramilitary planning at that point envisaged the deployment of extremely small, two- or three-man guerrilla units. Contingency planning within the Agency for more forceful action intensified over the next several months, but the idea of a conventional assault by Cuban exile forces was not put before the interagency Special Group until 3 November. At that time, it was rejected.

The Missile Gap

In the two pre-election briefings in 1960, the most challenging issue the DCI is known to have discussed at length was that of growing Soviet strategic capabilities. Without intending to do so, Dulles had created a considerable political problem for himself by giving a number of public speeches drawing attention to growing Soviet capabilities and the question of what the US response ought to be. He had highlighted the USSR's progress in basic science, training large numbers of scientists, and research and development efforts as well as its obvious achievements in building spacecraft and missiles.

In early 1960 the United States was aware of Soviet missile tests from Tyuratam but did not know if any Soviet missiles had been deployed. In the search for deployed missiles, among other priority missions, U-2 aircraft had been flown over the Soviet union since July 1956. On 1 may 1960, Gary Powers was shot down. In the United States, the West Virginia primary election campaign was at its peak; there was no doubt that the U-2 incident would figure in the impending general election campaign.

In his formal memorandums for the record, Dulles did not provide much detail regarding exchanges he may have had with Kennedy about the U-2 incident. He did note that the Senator, in the September briefing, had asked him about a book by Maj. Gen. John Medaris, entitled *Countdown for Decision*. The book had criticized the US Government for its failure to have replaced the U-2 with a more sophisticated aircraft or satellite reconnaissance system that would not have been vulnerable.

In a memorandum sent on 25 September to Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, the staff secretary of the White House, Dulles recorded that both Kennedy and Johnson had separately inquired about intelligence techniques or capabilities to replace the U-2.[19] For security reasons, Dulles was clearly uneasy about these questions and noted that he had replied only in a general way, indicating that research and development work on advanced aircraft and satellites was progressing "with reasonably satisfactory prospects." Dulles added, "Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I shall not give any more detailed briefings on this subject." In fact, the first US satellite reconnaissance system was being used in an experimental way in the late summer of 1960; launch had occurred in August. Analysis of the imagery that was acquired—buttressed by other intelligence reporting—began to indicate the extent (or lack of it) of Soviet deployments in December 1960, just after the election.

During the pre-election period, Dulles was also in an awkward position owing to a minor dispute or misunderstanding between the White House and the Kennedy team about whether the Senator should receive a briefing from Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates. In the interest of fairness to each candidate, Eisenhower wanted Kennedy to receive general overview briefings on the world situation from the CIA, and these were being provided. On the other hand, the President initially declined the Kennedy team's request that he receive a briefing from the Secretary of Defense. By the end of August, however, the White House had changed its mind and approved a briefing by Gates.

Dulles had weighed in with the White House on at least two occasions, including once with Eisenhower personally, to urge that Gates brief Kennedy. The DCI knew that he would be courting political trouble if he answered what had been Kennedy's first question: "Where do

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we ourselves stand in the missile race?" As he had done on innumerable occasions in Congressional appearances, Dulles insisted that the Defense Department "was the competent authority on this question."

The White House was uneasy that Kennedy would hear several versions of the story concerning Soviet strategic capabilities. Democrats on the Preparedness Committee, led by the uniquely well-informed Senator Stuart Symington, were attacking the White House by claiming the Soviets were outdistancing the United States. Gates had been trying to play down the issue, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Air Force Gen. Nathan Twining, was espousing the more alarmist views of the Air Force. As DCI, Dulles had been charged with pulling together a collective view of this intractable collection and analytic problem, but everyone, including Eisenhower, knew the Agency did not have the firm intelligence information or bureaucratic clout to do so.[20]

In responding to Kennedy's questions about Soviet strategic capabilities, Dulles did not improvise. On this critical and technical subject he stuck very closely to the findings laid out in numerous National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). From 1957 to 1960, the Intelligence Community published from two to four NIEs annually evaluating Soviet progress on space and ballistic missile programs. In December 1957 the Community had published one of its most ominous Estimates, referring to the Soviets' "crash program." That Estimate had projected that the USSR sometime during calendar year 1959 would

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probably have its first operational capability with 10 prototype ICBMs.[21] The same Estimate projected that the Soviet Union probably would have "an operational capability with 100 ICBMs about one year after its first operational capability date, and with 500 ICBMs two, or at most, three years (i.e., 1963) after first operational capability date."

By early 1960, the Community as a whole was using somewhat more moderate language to discuss likely Soviet missile capabilities, but nevertheless it published early that year three separate Estimates whose findings were sufficiently alarmist to fuel the missile gap debate. The bottom line of an Estimate published in February was especially important because it came as close as the US Intelligence Community ever did to a net assessment. The Estimate stated, "Our analysis leads us to believe that, if the US military posture develops as presently planned, the USSR will in 1961 have its most favorable opportunity to gain a decided military, political, and psychological advantage over the United States by the rapid deployment of operational ICBMs."[22] The February Estimate went on to observe that the Soviet ICBM program did not appear to be a crash program but was designed to provide a substantial ICBM capability at an early date. A separate Estimate, also published in February, stated flatly: "The single-most-important development affecting the structure of Soviet military power during the period of this estimate will be the buildup of an ICBM force. Long-range missiles will enable the USSR to overcome its inferiority to the US in nuclear strategic attack capability, as it was unable to do with bomber aircraft."[23]

In terms of the political debate on the issue, an even larger problem was posed by the Air Force conclusion that leaders of the Soviet union were endeavoring to attain a decisive military superiority over the United States. This superiority, the Air Force assessed, would enable the USSR "to launch such devastating attacks against the US that at the cost of acceptable levels of damage to themselves, the United States as a world power would cease to exist." This ominous Air Force view was repeated in several Estimates published during the period. It was shared widely with the Congress and leaked to the press.

The findings of these Estimates were having a significant impact on the White House, the Congress, and the voters. In the words of Howard Stoertz, a senior CIA officer who often accompanied Dulles to his briefings of the Congress and the NSC, "Our findings were sufficiently scary that those who wanted a new administration to be elected were finding support in our Estimates."[24]

One interesting index of the impact of this intelligence was provided by former President Gerald Ford in September 1993. Responding to an open-ended question about whether

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he remembered occasions when intelligence findings had created particular policy dilemmas, Ford volunteered, "Mostly I remember the period from 1953 to 1964, when I was on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that provided the CIA's budget. Allen Dulles and others from the CIA would come in and paint the most scary picture possible about what the Soviet Union would do to us. We were going to be second rate; the Soviets were going to be Number One. I didn't believe all that propaganda."[25]

The same material that was briefed to the House was provided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and, therefore, to one of its most prominent junior members, John Kennedy. Kennedy made effective use of this intelligence in the campaign to the discomfort of the CIA, the White House, and Vice President Nixon, the Republican candidate. Goodpaster remembers that the politics of the issue became sufficiently awkward that Eisenhower sent him to the Agency to meet personally with Dulles and Symington to get to the bottom of the problem. Stoertz remembers well that "Allen Dulles had us prepare a chart to prove we had not cooked the books for the election."

Postelection Briefing on Cuba

Once Kennedy had won the election, CIA felt free to provide him a systematic briefing on the Agency's covert action programs worldwide, and—most important—to inform him in detail about the deliberations under way on Cuba. This took place at the Kennedy residence in Palm Beach,

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Florida, on 18 November, some 10 days after the vote. Reflecting the importance and sensitivity of the subject, there were two high-level briefers: Dulles, whom, along with J. Edgar Hoover, Kennedy had announced he would keep on as DCI the day following the election (his first appointments); and Richard Bissell, the Agency's Deputy Director for Plans (operations). Like Dulles, Bissell knew Kennedy from the Washington social scene and, in his own case, from a shared New England background.

In discussing the briefing more than 30 years later, Bissell recalled that "Allen and I felt great pressure to inform the new President. The [Cuba] operation had acquired a considerable momentum and could not just be turned off and on. We settled outside on the terrace at a table, and I gave him an abbreviated but fairly complete briefing on the state of the operation. I went on at least 30 minutes, maybe 45. I was fairly detailed in outlining the plan of what we hoped would happen."[26]

A review of the briefing papers used by Dulles and Bissell suggests that they give Kennedy a careful overview of the Cuba plans as they existed in mid-November 1960. Their review included an explanation of the Presidential authorization for the Agency to undertake planning that Eisenhower had signed on 17 March. The briefing described the political action initiatives already under way in which the Agency was providing support to various anti-Castro groups and individuals inside and outside Cuba. They described the propaganda operation in place at the time, including the preparation of publications and ongoing radio broadcasts aimed at weakening Castro's rule. The latter included broadcasts from Swan Island, which years later came to play a prominent role in the Agency's activities directed against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

The briefing of 18 November occurred in the midst of a fundamental review, in Washington, of the scope of the paramilitary aspects of the anti-Castro program. At that time, everything was in flux. Nothing had been decided, let alone finally approved. In these circumstances, Dulles and Bissell planned to brief Kennedy carefully on a range of possible paramilitary operations. The first option envisaged the development and support of dissident groups by the Agency's Cuban assets to undertake guerrilla action against the regime within Cuba. A group of instructors had been trained who would, in time, oversee the instruction of up to 500 additional men. The two briefers were to describe the radio and flight training being provided Cuban pilots. The role of a few small groups recently placed inside Cuba and the airdrops of supplies and equipment that had been

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made and were planned also were to be discussed.

The second potential phase of the paramilitary plan was a combined sea-air assault by the trained Cuban exiles. The assault would be coordinated with the general guerrilla activity. This undertaking would attempt to establish a close-in staging base for future operations. A last phase, should it be needed, would be an air assault on the Havana area with guerrilla forces in Cuba moving on the ground into the capital area. mention was to be made of a contingency plan for overt US military intervention which would include the use of Agency assets.

Bissell remembers emphasizing particularly the plans for the possible movement of exile ground and air forces to Cuba both by sea and by air. He recalls that he "put a lot of emphasis on the timing aspects, and the numbers [of men and equipment] involved." Dulles and Bissell intended to inform Kennedy that it did not appear that guerrilla actions alone would be successful in sparking a successful revolt against the regime. It is unclear whether they intended to brief the President-elect of the even more downbeat assessment expressed by some in the Agency by mid-November that even an invading force of exile Cubans would be unsuccessful without direct US involvement.

Press accounts of the briefing of Kennedy in Palm Beach indicate that it went on for two hours and 40 minutes. Bissell remembers that throughout the extended session the President-elect "was almost entirely a listener—although a very good listener. Kennedy had a number of questions that grew out of the briefing, but he had no prepared list of questions ahead of time."

"We made it clear to him that from this time on any information he desired was at his immediate disposal and would be willingly given."

Available CIA records do not suggest that Kennedy volunteered any opinion regarding the wisdom, or lack thereof, of the plans presented to him. Nothing in the documentation suggests that he either authorized the operation or urged restraint. To the contrary, Dulles stated in a memorandum sent to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the President's Special Adviser on Military Affairs, on 1 June 1961 that "the purpose of the briefing was not to solicit the President-elect's approval or disapproval of the program but merely to acquaint him of its existence.[27] This implies that Dulles had not previously informed Kennedy of the plans.

As Bissell put it, "We were in an absolutely untenable position until the new President knew what was going on, but we avoided seeking a yea or nay." He added that "Kennedy was favorably interested, but extremely careful to avoid a commitment, express or implied. We didn't get any negative reaction—I was interested above all in his studious neutrality. Allen Dulles and I talked about the Kennedy reaction after the fact. We had the same impression—on the whole Kennedy's attitude was favorable." This shared impression cleared the way for continued Agency planning for what ultimately became the Bay of Pigs operation.

Other Covert Programs

Dulles intended to have the briefing of the President-elect in Palm Beach cover worldwide intelligence operations, of which Cuba was only one. His records indicate he wanted to establish that the Agency was fully supportive of the new President. "We made it clear to him that from this time on any information he desired was at his immediate disposal and would be willingly given."[28] In fact, Dulles was also working hard to solidify his personal standing with Kennedy. Senior Agency officers undoubtedly had mixed feelings when Dulles announced at a special staff meeting on 10 November that "all liaison with the new administration by CIA would be conducted by the Director."[29]

According to handwritten notes prepared by Bissell, he and Dulles also were prepared to brief Kennedy on a variety of issues, large and small.[30] For example, one planned topic was the question of clearances. While the President would be told that he possessed all clearances automatically, he should be advised of what was involved in providing special compartmented clearances that would enable his staff to receive intercepted communications and other sensitive material. Dulles also intended to discuss with Kennedy the legal basis for CIA's worldwide special operations. On the substantive side, in addition to Cuba, Dulles was prepared to brief Kennedy on operations in

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Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere in Central America. Agency activities in Tibet were also a discrete agenda item.

The majority of the items to be raised did not address specific countries or regions. Rather, Dulles planned a thematic discussion of Agency propaganda and political action programs, with illustrative successes from around the world. Dulles was primed to provide examples of where the Agency had succeeded in reducing the power of Communist parties abroad and in supporting the growth of constructive opposition parties. In a review of what was, at that time, still recent history, Dulles intended to inform Kennedy of CIA actions related to coups in Guatemala, Laos, and South Vietnam.

Regarding technical collection, Dulles was undoubtedly relieved to be able to discuss with Kennedy more fully the progress that had been made with aircraft and satellite systems to replace the U-2. The DCI's notes suggest he intended to discuss the existing U-2 program and two follow-on programs. One was the SR-71 aircraft, then under development, and the other the first imaging satellite, a film-return system.

Thirty years after the fact, there is no way to know with certainty how much of the material Dulles and Bissell prepared was actually discussed with Kennedy. Bissell remembers that the bulk of the time he and Dulles spent with Kennedy in Palm Beach was used to discuss Cuba. After that discussion, Bissell remembers that "Allen Dulles and John Kennedy drifted off to the end of the terrace and talked for some time about matters having nothing to do with Cuba." Bissell recalls that their conversation lasted at least 15 but certainly no more than 30 minutes. When shown several pages of his own handwritten notes concerning the issues the two had intended to raise, Bissell laughed and asserted that, "Nobody had time to cover everything that is on this list at any time prior to inauguration."

Records of the Eisenhower White House suggest that Dulles discussed, or at least was authorized to discuss, only a narrow agenda with the President-elect at the Palm Beach meeting. On 17 November, the day before Dulles traveled to Florida, Goodpaster recorded that he had informed the President that he had discussed the agenda with the CIA Director and with Gen. Wilton Persons, the White House Chief of Staff. Goodpaster had informed Dulles that CIA operations were to be disclosed to Kennedy only as specifically approved on a case-by-case basis by President Eisenhower. Goodpaster's memorandum confirms Eisenhower had approved Dulles's plan to inform Kennedy of operations relating to Cuba as well as to "certain reconnaissance satellite operations of a covert nature." No other subjects were specifically approved.[31]

Dulles's notes state not only that Eisenhower authorized the Palm Beach briefing but also that the briefing was given at his suggestion and that it covered "worldwide intelligence operations." Bissell recalls that the scheduling of the briefing came up rather quickly. To his knowledge, Dulles received no guidance or suggestion from the White House on what the subject matter should be.

In discussing the politics of these briefings in 1993, Goodpaster remembered clearly the conflicting views the President and others in the White House had about them. On one hand, some of Eisenhower's pre-election reservations had evaporated by mid-November. He had issued a directive that, because Kennedy was to be the next president, "We must help him in any way we can." On the other hand, Goodpaster also remembers that Eisenhower had some uneasiness about how far Dulles should and would go in his discussions. The President believed ongoing deliberations involving him and his advisers should remain confidential, and worried about the inherent problems of protecting that confidentiality while at the same time briefing Kennedy fully.

Goodpaster's records indicate he discussed with the President and Senior Staff Assistant Gordon Gray the "special problem" of Dulles's continued attendance at NSC meetings, once he had been designated by Kennedy to serve in the next administration. Goodpaster informed Dulles that, while the President wanted him to continue to attend NSC meetings, the proceedings of those sessions were not to be disclosed outside the NSC room. According to the records, he had the impression "Mr. Dulles had not understood that this matter was a delicate one." In 1993 Goodpaster reiterated that "There was a feeling that all this had to be explained pretty carefully to Allen Dulles."

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Soon after his inauguration on 28 January 1961, Kennedy did receive a full briefing on the planned Cuban operation.

The Mystery Briefing of Late November

A number of books and articles written about the Bay of Pigs contain the assertion that Kennedy was informed in detail of the planned operation and gave his approval in a briefing by Dulles in late November 1960. A review of the chronology of these publications suggests that most authors picked up this piece of information from the widely read account of events contained in Schlesinger's *A Thousand Days*. Schlesinger opened Chapter 10, entitled "The Bay of Pigs," with the statement that "On November 29, 1960, 12 days after he had heard about the Cuban project, the President-elect received from Allen Dulles a detailed briefing on CIA's new military conception. Kennedy listened with attention, then told Dulles to carry the work forward."[32]

If this briefing occurred, it would be by far the most important in the series Kennedy received. This would place on the President-elect an earlier and more direct responsibility for the development of the operation than would otherwise be justified. In fact, however, the meeting with Kennedy on 29 November appears not to have occurred at all. Available CIA records contain no mention of such a briefing. Dulles's personal desk calendar shows that he had a full day, with 10 different appointments running from 9:00 a.m. to 5:45 p.m., none of which were with the President-elect. It would be most extraordinary if the Director's calendar or other CIA records failed to note a meeting of the DCI with the President-elect.

Similarly, there is nothing in information available about Kennedy's activities to indicate that he met with Dulles that day. *The New York Times* of 30 November reported that "The Senator worked at home throughout the day [of 29 November] leaving only to visit his wife Jacqueline and son John F. Jr. in Georgetown University Hospital." The newspapers also reported that Kennedy had met at home that day with prospective Cabinet appointee Chester Bowles, and with Terry Sanford, the latter visiting to recommend Luther Hodges for a cabinet position. Other visitors to the Kennedy home in Georgetown included his father, Joseph P. Kennedy, Edward Foley of the Inaugural Committee, and Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico.[33]

In thinking back on the briefings Kennedy received on the controversial Cuban operation, Ted Sorensen, his speechwriter and confidant, recalls, "President Kennedy did tell me, much later, that he had been briefed on the operation by the CIA while he was President-elect. CIA told him in some detail what they had in mind and why. That was the Palm Beach briefing." Sorensen doubted that Kennedy received a more detailed briefing by Dulles on 29 November, adding "I saw him every single day, and we discussed the whole range of policy matters—the foreign issues as well as 500 domestic ones."

Schlesinger was amused that he may have described a critical briefing that appears not to have occurred. In a letter to the author in 1993, he recommended that the original draft manuscript of his *A Thousand Days* be reviewed to ascertain whether the controversial assertion was footnoted. "If nothing turns up I must take Rick's way out," he wrote, referring to the character in "Casablanca" played by Humphrey Bogart. "Bogart: 'I came to Casablanca for the waters.' Claude Raines: 'What waters? We're in the desert.' Bogart: 'I was misinformed.'"[34]

An important meeting concerning the Cuba operation in fact was held on 29 November at the White House at 11:00 a.m. with the President—Eisenhower—in the chair. The President-elect was not included. Schlesinger and other authors, writing a few years after the fact, had obviously learned that on that date "the President" was briefed on Cuba and, being oriented to President Kennedy, assumed that it was he who was involved. Indeed, the meeting of 29 November was an important one. On that date Eisenhower underscored that he wanted to continue active planning for the project. Eisenhower was pushing ahead vigorously; Kennedy was not yet responsible in any degree.

Soon after his inauguration on 28 January 1961, Kennedy did receive a full briefing on the planned Cuban operation. At that meeting the new President authorized the Agency to continue its preparations and asked that the paramilitary aspects of the plan be provided to the Joint Chiefs for their analysis. Even in late January, however,

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Kennedy withheld specific approval for an invasion, with or without direct US involvement.

Kennedy Visits CIA

One unique aspect of Kennedy's familiarization with the CIA was the President-elect's decision to visit CIA Headquarters during the transition period. He was initially scheduled to visit the Agency's South Building, at 2430 E Street in downtown Washington, on 16 December. In preparation for the visit, Dulles asked Huntington Sheldon, the Director of Current Intelligence, to prepare a book for the DCI containing material he and senior Agency officials should use in discussions with Kennedy.

The ambitious agenda that was prepared for the visit envisaged presentations by the DCI and eight other senior officers.[35] Briefings were prepared on the Agency's mission, organization, and budget, and on the legal basis for its activities. Dulles and others would describe the Agency's relationship with the Congress the functions of such organizations as the Watch Committee and the President's Board of Consultants and the functions of the several agencies that comprised the Intelligence Community. The Assistant Director for National Estimates would describe the estimates process and brief one specific paper, a recently published "Estimate of the World Situation."

The chiefs of the Agency's key directorates were primed to explain their roles and activities. The Clandestine Service portion of the briefing included a description of clandestine intelligence collection and the covert action functions. In the latter discussion, the chief of operations was to update "Cuban operations since the Palm Beach briefing."

Owing to scheduling difficulties, Kennedy was unable to visit the Agency on 16 December. The visit was delayed until after the inauguration and finally occurred on Thursday, 26 January 1961. Dulles's desk calendar notes that the briefings were to run from 2:40 p.m. to 4:10 p.m. In reality, they had to be abbreviated considerably, much to the consternation of the participants, because an unintended opportunity came to the President's attention.

For reasons having nothing to do with Kennedy's visit, the Agency, a few weeks before, had put together an attractive exhibit of materials relating to the history of intelligence that was located just inside the entrance of South Building. A number of exhibits were displayed under a sign that read, "These letters loaned courtesy of the Houghton Library of Harvard University." The newly elected Harvard man immediately noticed the reference to his alma mater. He stopped and read thoroughly the entire case of historical materials, much to the chagrin of Dulles and other waiting CIA executives.

Kennedy was already frustrated at press leaks from his new administration and therefore was especially taken with one of the letters in the display case. Written by General Washington to Colonel Elias Dayton in July 1777, that letter included the observation that "The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged—all that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in Most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated...." Kennedy asked Dulles if he could have a copy of the letter, which was sent promptly. The President wrote the CIA Director thanking him and the creator of the exhibit, Walter Pforzheimer, saying "The letter is both a fine momento of my visit with you and a continuing reminder of the role of intelligence in national policy."[36]

The President's Intelligence Checklist

Within days of his election, President Kennedy sent word to the White House that he would like to receive daily briefings on the same material that was being furnished to President Eisenhower.[37] The request from Kennedy came by way of one of his assistants for transition matters, Washington attorney Clark Clifford. Eisenhower approved the passage of this material to Kennedy on 17 November, the eve of Dulles's trip to Florida. There is no record that Dulles discussed this matter with Kennedy the next day, however, and some weeks were to go by before there was any organized followup.

When Kennedy visited CIA Headquarters after his inauguration, Sheldon described the current intelligence products that were available to him. Kennedy reiterated that he wanted to read the publications and designated his military aide, Brig. Gen. Chester Clifton, who was

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present at the meeting, to receive the material. Clifton had taken over Goodpaster's role providing daily briefings to the new President, although Goodpaster continued to serve in the White House for a few weeks to help with the transition.

For the first few months of the Kennedy administration, Agency officers each morning would deliver CIA's *Current Intelligence Bulletin* to Clifton, sometimes highlighting the most important items and staying to answer any questions he had. Clifton would then take the material to the President, dutifully reporting back his questions or comments if there were any. Unfortunately, the intelligence report was part of a large package of material Kennedy received each day and was often not read. This left the new President less well informed than he thought he was, a situation that was soon driven home to him during his unfortunate encounter with Soviet Premier Khruschev in Vienna.

From the start of the Kennedy administration, Dulles had few opportunities to present intelligence directly to the President. In large part this was because Kennedy did not hold regularly scheduled NSC meetings as Eisenhower and Truman had. In addition, however, there was a problem of personal chemistry and a generational gap between the new President and the CIA Director. Agency veterans at the time had the feeling that Dulles may have been patronizing to Kennedy in his early briefings and thus was not warmly welcomed to the White House.[38] Along the same lines, Sorensen remembers Kennedy "was not very impressed with Dulles's briefings. He

“Agency veterans at the time had the feeling that Dulles may have been patronizing to Kennedy in his early briefings and thus was not warmly welcomed to the White House.”

did not think they were in much depth or told him anything he could not read in the newspapers." In these awkward circumstances, Dulles's practice was to prepare written memorandums for the President on items that he deemed to be of particular significance, delivering them personally when possible. He also made personal deliveries when he wanted to bring certain important NIEs to the President's attention.

The fiasco at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, reinforced by Kennedy's frustration with the meeting with Khruschev in early June, changed everything. Clifton informed Sheldon that the President was reluctant to continue receiving intelligence in the normal way. Clifton suggested that the Agency would have to come up with some entirely different way of presenting its information if it were to regain the President's confidence. He volunteered that there was no point in the DCI discussing the matter directly with the President as that would be counterproductive. Dulles reacted to this unfortunate turn of events in a calm manner, conceivably foreseeing that the President's disappointment with the Agency would lead to his own removal.

In fact, in November 1961 Dulles was to be replaced by John McCone, who served Kennedy as DCI for almost two years. In the early part of this period McCone succeeded in rebuilding the Agency's relationship with Kennedy. McCone saw Kennedy frequently, and the President—more than any other before or since—would telephone even lower level Agency officers for information or assistance. Interestingly, McCone's prescience in alerting the President to the possibility that the Soviets would place missiles in Cuba backfired for him personally. Although he was right when most others were wrong, the President did not like McCone's public references to this fact, and their relationship cooled noticeably.

Below the level of the DCI, the Agency in mid-1961 took pains to reestablish its relationship with the President. Sheldon and other managers of the Office of Current Intelligence—working with Clifton but without the knowledge of their superiors either at the white House or the Agency—undertook to create a new publication. The group came up with a format for a publication designed exclusively for the President that would be called the *President's Intelligence Checklist*. Longtime current intelligence specialist Richard Lehman worked up a dry run of the proposed *Checklist* which Sheldon took to Clifton for his perusal and approval. Clifton was pleased with the document, in part because it contained no classification restrictions, and the items presented were short and snappy.

The first issue of the new publication was published on Saturday, 17 June. It was delivered to Clifton, who took it to the President at his country

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home near Middleburg, Virginia. The first *Checklist* was a small book of seven pages, measuring 8 1/2 by 8 inches, that contained 14 items of two sentences each with a half-dozen longer notes and a few maps. Agency managers spent a nervous weekend; they were immensely relieved the following Monday morning, to hear Clifton's "go ahead—so far, so good."

It quickly became clear that the President was reading the *Checklist* and issuing instructions to various officials based on what he was reading. The President not infrequently asked to see source materials, estimates bearing on items that attracted his attention, texts of speeches by foreign leaders, and occasional Agency publications providing additional details and explanations. Within a few months, the Secretaries of State and Defense asked to see what the President was reading. In December, six months after publication had begun, Clifton passed the word to the Agency that those two Cabinet members should be added to the subscriber list.

Although an Agency officer did not sit with the President while he read the *Checklist*, Clifton was careful to pass back to the Agency the President's reactions and questions. CIA officials regarded the new system as the best channel the Agency had ever had to a President. In particular, the relationship with Kennedy was judged to be a distinct improvement over the more formal relationship with Eisenhower.

Editors of the *Checklist* were especially heartened in September 1963, when Clifton passed the word that the President was delighted with the

"CIA officials regarded the new system as the best channel the Agency had ever had to a President."

book. The following month Clifton shared with his Agency contacts a comment made by Secretary Rusk that he found the *Checklist* "a damned useful document." On one memorable occasion in October 1963, Clifton, Bundy, and the Agency's briefing officer were huddled in the basement of the West Wing going over the *Checklist* when President Kennedy called down asking where they were and when they were going to bring it to him.

The *Checklist* was published daily for two and one-half years. Clearly, it captured the attention and served the interests of the President. Ironically, the publication, created to respond to the President's deep disillusionment with CIA, would prove to be the forerunner of the *President's Daily Brief*, the publication that has now served successive presidents for 33 years.

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NOTES

1. *The New York Times*, 8 October 1960, p. 10.
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3. *Ibid.*, 22 October 1960, pp. 8, 9.
4. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days*. Boston; Houghton Mifflin; 1965), p. 225.
5. Richard Goodwin, *Remembering America*. Boston; Little, Brown and Co.; 1988; p. 125.
6. *The New York Times*, 23 October 1960, p. E10.
7. Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*. New York; Grosset and Dunlap; 1978; p. 220.
8. *The New York Times*, 22 October 1960, p. 9.
9. Theodore Sorensen, telephone interview with the author, 19 May 1993. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Sorensen's comments come from this interview.
10. Goodwin, *Remembering America*, p. 125.
11. Knight McMahan, interview by the author in Hanover, NH, 18 April 1993.
12. Richard Nixon, *Six Crises*. New York; Doubleday and Co.; 1962; p. 354.
13. Dwight Eisenhower, in comments recorded by Allen Dulles, Memorandum for the President, 9 July 1960.
14. Dwight Eisenhower telegrams to John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 1960, p. 582.
15. Allen Dulles, Memorandum for the President, 3 August 1960.
16. Allen Dulles, Memorandum for the Record, 21 September 1960.
17. CIA, untitled list of significant developments in response to Kennedy's request; no date.

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18. CIA, "Draft Cuban Operational Briefing: President-Elect," 15 November 1960.

19. Allen Dulles, Memorandum for Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, 25 September 1960.

20. Andrew Goodpaster, interview by the author in Washington, DC, 26 September 1993. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Goodpaster's observations come from this interview.

21. Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-10-57, "The Soviet ICBM Program - Conclusions," 10 December 1957, pp. 1, 2.

22. National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-8-59, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack through Mid-1964," 9 February 1960, p. 2.

23. National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-4-59, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959-1964," 9 February 1960, p. 4.

24. Howard Stoertz, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 27 September 1993.

25. Gerald Ford, interview by the author in Beaver Creek, Colorado, 8 September 1993.

26. Richard Bissell, interview by the author in Farmington, Connecticut, 17 April 1993.

27. Allen Dulles, Memorandum for Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 1 June 1961.

28. Allen Dulles, "My Answer on the Bay of Pigs," unpublished draft, October 1965.

29. Lyman Kirkpatrick, Diary, 10 November 1960.

30. Richard Bissell, untitled and undated notes for briefing President-elect Kennedy.

31. Andrew Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 17 November 1960.

32. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 233.

33. *The New York Times*, 30 November 1960, pp. 1, 30.

34. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., letter to the author, 23 June 1993.

35. CIA, "Agenda for President-elect," 16 December 1960.

36. John Kennedy letter to Allen Dulles, 10 February 1961.

37. Goodpaster, Memorandum for Record, 17 November 1960.

38. Richard Lehman, interview by the author in McLean, Virginia, 10 March 1993.

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Honoring the Founder of CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology

Robert J. Kohler, R. James Woolsey, an(b)(3)(c)

Editor's Note: In a ceremony at CIA Headquarters on 13 December 1994, Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey presented the R. V. Jones Intelligence Award to Dr. Albert D. "Bud" Wheelon. The DCI established this award in 1993 to honor individuals whose career accomplishments are in the best tradition of the renowned British physicist, Reginald Victor Jones—scientific acumen, applied with art, in the cause of freedom. The first award was presented to Professor Jones in October 1993.

As one of the nation's missile and space pioneers, Dr. Wheelon's contributions to science and technology and their applications to national security are legendary—from the creation of the Directorate of Science and Technology at CIA to the recognition of the application of space systems as the logical next step to collect intelligence from denied areas. He also served on numerous high-level boards, including the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. As a result of his work at the Agency and throughout his career, Dr. Wheelon has reshaped the world of modern intelligence.

Robert J. Kohler is Executive Vice President and General Manager, TRW Avionics and Surveillance Group. **R. James Woolsey** served as Director of Central Intelligence. (b)(3)(c) is a senior scientist in the Directorate of Science and Technology.

Following are remarks made at the ceremony by Robert J. Kohler, R. James Woolsey, ar(b)(3)(c)

Robert J. Kohler

DCI Woolsey, Dr. Jones, Dr. Wheelon:

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to offer some comments in honor of Dr. Albert D. "Bud" Wheelon as he receives the R. V. Jones Intelligence Award. I have known Bud Wheelon for many years as a professional colleague, as a sage adviser and confidant, and as a trusted friend. That long relationship has given me some unique and insightful perspectives into the character and accomplishments of this man to whom the Director Central Intelligence so fittingly pays tribute today.

When we hear the word "legend" used to characterize a person, or an accomplishment described as "legendary," it is often in a sports context, usually indicating feats and accomplishments that are so outsized, so remarkable, and so unusual that they defy casual description. Lou Gehrig's record of consecutive baseball games played, Hank Aaron's home run tally, Jim Brown's rushing records, and so on. Those accomplishments were so noteworthy because they took place under rigorous and challenging circumstances and were very much in the public eye. But there are other legends, whose skills and achievements are unparalleled, where the stakes are of the most vital significance, but who have played in arenas that are outside the public's view. Bud Wheelon, whose career has taken him within the most secret recesses of US intelligence, is one such legend, and bestowing the R. V. Jones Intelligence Award is an affirmation of the importance and significance of his life's work, not only to advance and improve our national intelligence endeavor through science but also through technology.

A review of Dr. Wheelon's background before he entered government service gives, as we used to say in the imagery business, a good "indication and warning" of the extraordinary career that was to follow. He received a bachelor's degree from Stanford University in 1949 and a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1952. He taught for a few years at MIT and in 1953 took a position with the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation. For the next nine years, he served as one of the nation's space and missile pioneers, helping to develop guidance systems for long-range ballistic missiles and performing original research on radio-wave propagation and fluid flow. Thanks in large measure to his insights, the United States finally cracked some very tough problems of interpreting data from foreign missile systems.

His efforts in the private sector brought him to the government's attention, and, in 1962, Bud Wheelon

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was recruited by DCI John McCone to come to work for CIA. He arrived in time to play a significant role in the Cuban missile crisis, serving as the Chairman of the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee during that perilous period of Cold War history. The importance of his committee's work during the crisis is well illustrated in the recently declassified *"CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis."*

In 1963, in the aftermath of missile crisis, Director McCone decided to reorganize the CIA's separate and uncoordinated science and technology efforts. He decided to form those into a single unit called the Directorate of Science and Technology, and, to serve as the director of that organization, he chose Bud Wheelon. At the time, Dr. Wheelon was 34. His youth made him an enigma to many in the Agency, particularly the Deputy Director for Plans (what is now the Deputy Director for Operations). Invited to speak to the leadership of the DDP, the new Deputy Director of Science and Technology slipped into the crowded conference room unrecognized and went to the head of the table. The DDP, noticing the young "whipper-snapper" in the place of prominence, started to tell him to move off, only to realize at the last moment that this might be the new DDS&T!

I think it is worth taking note of the circumstances, both geopolitical and technological, under which Dr. Wheelon took command of the new directorate. The Cold War had just passed through one of its most threatening confrontations in the Cuban missile crisis, and the "long, twilight struggle" never seemed so gloomy or interminable. The Soviet landmass, even with several years of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, was still largely a dark cipher, unknown and forbidding.

"He brought to the job of DDS&T the intelligence, energy, and drive needed to propel that directorate to the forefront of US Intelligence, establishing scientific data collection and analysis systems that were employed successfully throughout the Cold War era."

At the same time, years of research and development by the government and aerospace and other companies in the private sector into the new technologies of rocketry, satellites, and a host of related fields were beginning to bear tangible fruit. That extraordinary scientific cooperation, executed mostly under the most secretive conditions, had produced the technology to allow for the reliable collection of unique and vital satellite intelligence from the sanctuary of outer space. But the understanding and appreciation of that progress within the bureaucracy had not kept pace with the advance of science, and the full capabilities of the new technologies were not being exploited.

I can only imagine what was in the mind of the young Bud Wheelon, faced with the daunting task of organizing a system to exploit those new and growing capabilities to address the challenges posed by the ominous Soviet threat. Perhaps his thoughts were akin to those expressed by the protagonist in Edgar Allen Poe's poem, *The Raven*:

> *Deep into that darkness peering,*
> *long I stood there wondering, fearing,*
>
> *Doubting, dreaming dreams no*
> *mortal ever dared to dream before.*

Whether or not Bud Wheelon was a dreamer only he can say, but, at the very least, it is clear he had a vision of how the scientific and technical skills of the CIA should be organized and managed. Moreover, he was a man of action, and, at that moment in history, decisive action was required. He brought to the job of DDS&T the intelligence, energy, and drive needed to propel that directorate to the forefront of US Intelligence, establishing scientific data collection and analysis systems that were employed successfully throughout the Cold War era. This was truly a remarkable achievement. There was a tremendous breadth of technical disciplines involved in organizing the new directorate: the Office of Scientific Intelligence, a unit that had been part of the Directorate of Intelligence concerned with basic scientific research conducted by foreign countries; the Data Processing Staff, a computer services group; the Office of ELINT, an electronic intelligence unit that had been part of the Clandestine Service; the Development Projects Division, the Clandestine Service unit that had been responsible for developing the U-2, SR-71, and other overhead reconnaissance systems; the Office of Research and Development, a unit

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charged with employing new technologies in the intelligence cycle; and the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center, a group established to monitor foreign missile and space programs.

From that cacophony of separate organizations and activities, Dr. Wheelon brought coherence and management discipline. Most important were the guiding principles he established for the organization. Those principles, to push the state of the art in technology and to instill institutionalized program management, are still the cornerstones of the DS&T. Some of his additional legacies included exacting technical qualifications for personnel, high standards of quality for technical programs and analysis and reporting, and rigorous scientific and technical integrity throughout the directorate. And he was a "hands-on" manager. Once, during a visit to the Nevada test range where the follow-on aircraft to the U-2 was being developed (now known as the SR-71 Blackbird), he commandeered a ride in the back seat of a trainer prototype. DCI McCone, who was not keen on having top managers risk their lives, on hearing about the ride nearly fired him!

Dr. Wheelon did not merely shuffle the organization charts, however. The usefulness of the U-2 airborne reconnaissance program was reaching an end, and new solutions to the dilemma of intelligence gathering over denied areas were needed. He could see that there was a convergence of new and developing intelligence technologies and an urgent requirement for reliable and comprehensive intelligence collection. Thus, Dr. Wheelon

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became one of the earliest proponents of using outer space as the venue of the future for intelligence collection. He also strongly believed in and worked tirelessly to include CIA participation in space-based collection endeavors, a view that was not always universally shared. It was his persistence and vision that led to the creation of a joint Air Force, Navy, and CIA organization to manage the new collection programs, what we now call the National Reconnaissance Office.

We often take for granted the things to which we are accustomed, like being able to walk in almost any room, flick a switch, and expect instant illumination. We typically forget the vast infrastructure and technology which makes those capabilities possible, and we also sometimes forget that those capabilities were not predestined. Such is very much the case with the NRO—the incredibly responsive and productive collection systems of the past, present, and future are based on the structure that Bud Wheelon created 30 years ago, and, without his leadership and tenacity, it would not have happened. Looking back, many in the Community now believe that it was this "odd" mixture of organizations, with no track record of cooperation or coordination, that was the vital ingredient in the successes of the NRO.

Bud Wheelon's tenure at CIA was only a prologue to a subsequent superlative record of scientific and technical leadership and accomplishment. In 1966 he began a career with the Hughes Aircraft Corporation, rising from Vice President of Engineering to become the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer in 1987. It is surely no coincidence that during his tenure Hughes became the preeminent supplier of communications satellites in the world. He also continued to give generously of his time and attention to the government arena, serving as a member of the Defense Science Board from 1968 to 1976, as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1983 to 1988, and as a member of the special Presidential Commission to investigate the space shuttle Challenger accident. He has continued to the present to give selflessly of his time and wisdom to NASA and elements of the national security community.

For all of these accomplishments, we honor Dr. Wheelon here today. But in doing so, I think we also honor something else: Bud Wheelon is one of those rare individuals that comes to serve as an archetype for the people and organizations of his generation. In honoring Dr. Wheelon for his achievements, we also pay tribute to the entire

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scientific and technical intelligence community for which he is a model. That community has been the single-most vital, productive, and reliable component of US intelligence from the earliest stages of the Cold War, across the decades of global threat and challenge to our national security, to the present day and beyond.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) and covert action have received more attention, both good and ill, over the years in the media, the entertainment industry, and in the popular imagination than has technical intelligence collection. Can you see making a spy movie about signal processors, radio-wave propagation, or photo interpretation? Yet, those were some of the vital technical skills and capabilities which constituted the nervous system of the United States and the American military as we needed to flex our muscles around the world.

I think we should also remind ourselves that it was the United States, with preeminent technical intelligence capabilities, that won the Cold War, and not the Soviet Union, which many will argue was predominant in the field of HUMINT. The Soviets thoroughly penetrated the governments, militaries, businesses, and intelligence services in almost every Western nation they faced, including the United States. Yet even with all those HUMINT resources and successful penetrations, they lost the struggle. Certainly, we had our share of successful HUMINT operations during the Cold War, but our clear competitive advantage as an intelligence service was in the area of technical intelligence systems.

“Certainly, we had our share of successful HUMINT operations during the Cold War, but our clear competitive advantage as an intelligence service was in the area of technical intelligence systems.”

And what was that advantage? Constellations of satellites and other intelligence collection systems with truly astonishing technical capabilities, far surpassing the best efforts of our Cold War opponents, and far beyond the technical grasp of any other nation. We used that advantage, and the prodigious amounts of information it provided, to leverage our political, economic, and military strategies and tactics to achieve a successful outcome to the greatest moral struggle of our age.

Bud Wheelon was an exemplar of the system that produced those extraordinary technical capabilities, a system composed of tens of thousands of dedicated and vigilant men and women, both inside and outside of government, who have served their country from the shadows of anonymity. As we pay tribute to Dr. Wheelon, we also acknowledge the debt we owe to the others who are part of that special endeavor. And as we look to the future and make decisions about how to apportion our intelligence resources and efforts, we must remember this recent history. There is and will continue to be a critical need for scientific and technical intelligence collection. If we ignore or neglect those historically vital intelligence capabilities, then we invite the national security reverses and disasters that the Intelligence Community was formed to avoid.

Walter Lippmann once said that “the final test of a leader is that he leaves behind him in other men the conviction and the will to carry on. . . . The genius of a good leader is to leave behind him a situation which common sense, without the grace of genius, can deal with successfully.” Dr. Wheelon, you certainly left a legacy at CIA of “conviction and the will to carry on,” as the subsequent years of successful technology and programs will attest. As for the genius part, let us say that your departure left an intellectual vacuum that was never adequately filled, and those of us who followed you have striven to find the “common sense” to deal with the challenges we faced.

This recognition of your outstanding contributions to our nation’s security, the R. V. Jones Intelligence Award, could not be more deserved or appropriate. Your rock-solid integrity, rigorous intellectual discipline, and passion for excellence established the standards of performance by which subsequent generations of intelligence officers have been measured. The most eloquent testimony to your career achievements is in the award citation: “Scientific acumen, applied with art, in the cause of freedom.”

In closing, the most fitting epilogue I can think to offer is to echo the words of former DCI Judge William Webster used in speaking at another awards ceremony honoring Bud: “If there had been no Bud Wheelon ready and willing to serve, surely we would have had to invent one.”

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Bud, on behalf of all of us, particularly those who served in the DS&T which you created, thank you for all you have done, and congratulations.

R. James Woolsey

Dr. Wheelon; Cicely (wife); Cynthia (daughter); Eric (grandson); Professor Jones; Congresswoman Seastr(b)(3)(c)_____whom I particularly thank for her excellent work putting all of this together; distinguished guests; friends.

A year ago I inaugurated the R. V. Jones Intelligence Award to honor individuals whose career accomplishments are in the best tradition of Reginald Jones. The R. V. Jones Award carries the inscription: "Scientific acumen, applied with art, in the cause of freedom"—a formulation on which I collaborated with Professor Jones. It is essentially shorthand for honoring those who—by their scientific and technical ingenuity and ability and leadership, and where called for frankly by their stubbornness and by their guile—have served greatly the cause of human freedom through intelligence.


I am delighted that Professor Jones can be here this year to participate in this award ceremony as well. The British Government recently awarded him the "Order of the Companions of Honour" for "Services to Science," one of the most prestigious awards in the United Kingdom, and further recognition of his extraordinary contributions.

Three great, global wars dominated this century. Two dominated the lives of many of us assembled in this room today—World War II against Fascism, and the Cold War against Communism. Today, both have been relegated to the attention of historians.

Although our enemies in these last two wars came under different names, they shared one thing in common—an appetite for tyranny, and with it the conviction that man could be broken down and "scientifically" remade into a new image. Millions suffered and died because of Fascism and Communism. But these enemies of liberty eventually failed. They failed, not in the first instance because we had superior technology or military might. The totalitarians' technical and military prowess was initially substantial. They ultimately failed because they did not count on the resiliency of the human spirit, especially the creativity of free men and women defending free societies. They failed because they did not count on the ingenuity, persistence, and dedication of, for example, Reginald Jones, and of the man we are honoring here today, Bud Wheelon. The totalitarians failed in using science to remake mankind; instead, free societies formed by the efforts of these two men and others who have followed them used science, applied with art, to defend freedom successfully.

Today, we honor a man whom I would call the Reginald Jones of his generation. Both Professor Jones and Dr. Wheelon were called on at a young age to develop and deepen the links between science and intelligence at critical periods in their nations' histories. Both struggled against entrenched and often unyielding bureaucracies, both built effective teams that brought about staggering innovations, and both had a major hand in winning a world war—one hot, one cold.

You have already heard Bob Kohler pay tribute to Dr. Wheelon and his work, so let me highlight a few of his accomplishments on behalf of a grateful nation.



Dr. Albert D. Wheelon, DCI R. James Woolsey, and Prof. Reginald V. Jones

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> **"The national reconnaissance systems which the Untied States now has, which are truly jewels in our crown, all stem, in my judgment, from the creative work that Bud Wheelon did in the sixties."**

When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik on 4 October 1957, the world of intelligence was introduced to Bud Wheelon. President Eisenhower wanted an impartial look at information gleaned from U-2 photography to determine the nature and extent of the threat posed by the Soviet launch. He asked Dr. George Kistiakowsky, his science adviser, to form a panel of experts. Dr. Wheelon played a key role in this "comparative evaluation" which showed the United States far ahead in weapons research and in deployment of strategic weapons. The "bomber gap," the "missile gap," the "science gap," and other public fears and anxieties raised by Sputnik, at least at that time, were myths. Kistiakowsky summed up the work of the panel best when he said: "We were looking for a body and only found a skeleton."

Yet Bud Wheelon and his colleagues knew that intelligence information often represents a snapshot in time, and the pictures that emerged in the decades to come were to tell the unfolding story of the buildup of Soviet military and strategic capabilities. The panel, which had been convened after Sputnik, had ended its work. The need to monitor the pace, the direction, and the magnitude of Soviet capabilities continued, as did the need for Dr. Wheelon and his work.

Five years after Sputnik alarmed the nation, the American people sat before their television sets and listened to President Kennedy announce the American quarantine of Cuba. Soviet missiles were en route. Dr. Wheelon, who joined the CIA in 1962, threw himself into the work of intelligence collection and evaluation as Director of the Office of Scientific Intelligence. He chaired the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, which provided CIA Director McCone with critical intelligence on the Cuban missile sites. He played a pivotal role in the analysis for President Kennedy and his advisers during those crucial "thirteen days."

A year after the Cuban missile crisis, Director John McCone asked Dr. Wheelon, then only 34, to lead a new directorate at the CIA dedicated to science and technology. He took that office, but only on the condition that all scientific endeavors at CIA had to be consolidated under his new directorate. Having secured that commitment from Director McCone, he then set out to do what all who know him expected of him—he infused the directorate with vision, scientific expertise, and leadership. And he propelled it into the forefront of collection and analysis against the Soviet Union.

Let no one underestimate the magnitude of the challenge that Bud Wheelon faced in those years. Assembling and running a directorate dedicated to the fusion of science and technology with intelligence required a deep understanding of an enormous breadth of technical disciplines, and the ability to channel that expertise—from research and development to operations, and data collection to intelligence assessments. He established the principles for the new Directorate of Science and Technology that have guided our work to this day—to push state-of-the-art technology; to emphasize strong technical skills; and to maintain rigorous standards for scientific programs, for analysis, and for reporting.

The men and women whom Dr. Wheelon assembled had to know what technology was available, and how it could be harnessed. They had to know how, when, and where to tap into the nation's best scientific minds and resources. When called on to help penetrate the intentions or assess the capabilities of America's adversaries, these individuals accepted their tasks not only as challenges to overcome, but also as opportunities to explore.

Dr. Wheelon played a key role in creating this country's national reconnaissance programs. In addition to his early work on U-2 photography, he facilitated the development of the Mach-3 aircraft that led to the deployment of the SR-71. When the usefulness of the early airborne reconnaissance systems began to wane, Bud Wheelon was one of the first proponents of space as the venue for intelligence collection. He devised a number of satellite systems to provide critical intelligence, from early warning to monitoring arms control agreements and many other purposes. His vision, scientific expertise, and

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creativity enabled him to lay the groundwork for the innovative systems that continue to allow the United States to retain the global scientific intelligence advantage that it has today. As Secretary of Defense Perry put it: "The national reconnaissance systems which the Untied States now has, which are truly jewels in our crown, all stem, in my judgment, from the creative work that Bud Wheelon did in the sixties."

Dr. Wheelon left CIA in 1966 to join Hughes Aircraft as Vice President of Engineering, and, by 1987, he was CEO and Chairman of the Board. But he continued providing us with his counsel and wisdom, including serving for five years on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In a letter to Dr. Wheelon last year, the President singled out his "visionary" work as exemplifying "the benefits that can be reaped from a true partnership between government and industry."

And what of the directorate that he left behind? Dr. Wheelon fashioned the nation's most successful intelligence, engineering, and scientific organization. Before the end of the sixties, the Agency's youngest directorate dreamed up, engineered, built, and deployed collection systems that are the envy of all other nations of the world. The value of his work, which began during the Cold War, has outlived that conflict. Long after the final pieces of the Berlin Wall are consigned to museum displays around the globe, the systems and programs that Bud Wheelon helped to establish will continue to do what they have been designed to do—provide continuing vigilance, early warning, and support to the President, to the military commanders, and to the diplomats, and they will continue to provide security for America and its friends.

“Dr. Wheelon respected the timeless principles of scientific intelligence—know and respect your enemy's abilities, be both intellectually audacious and a team player, and never forget that espionage and science are partners, not rivals.”

Whenever our arms control negotiators sat down at the negotiating table, whenever our military forces were deployed to deter war or to fight, the systems that Bud Wheelon, his colleagues, and his successors developed have been there as silent and indispensable allies. Three years ago these systems combined to give our commanders in the Saudi desert the location of Iraqi forces with unprecedented accuracy. They all worked together with such systems as AWACS, J-Stars, airborne radars, global positioning satellites, and with our well-trained military forces to ensure victory. Just two months ago, some of these systems were instrumental in helping us identify the latest Iraqi provocation, Saddam's deployment of two elite Republican Guard Divisions along with their logistics and ammunition racing to the Kuwaiti border.

Dr. Wheelon has never forgotten that science is the tool, security is the objective—both for the nation and for our ideals. As Professor Jones did before him, Dr. Wheelon respected the timeless principles of scientific intelligence—know and respect your enemy's abilities, be both intellectually audacious and a team player, and never forget that espionage and science are partners, not rivals.

First, know and respect your enemy's abilities, and the importance of avoiding both the pitfall of habitual anxiety and that of overconfidence. Bud Wheelon appreciated and respected the capabilities of Soviet technology, from Sputnik to the SS-18 missile. He understood both Soviet strengths and weaknesses. And he never failed to put himself in his adversaries' shoes—to understand better how they would handle technological challenges, whether it entailed missile guidance or space systems.

Second, be both audacious and a team player. Bud Wheelon lived by never fearing to stake out a position which may be unpopular or generate heated opposition. But, in so doing, he never gave up trying to bring others along so that the appropriate action could be taken. As Reginald Jones once put it: "The test of good intelligence service in war is not merely that you were right; it is that you persuaded an operational or research staff to take the correct countermeasures."

Third, the partnership of espionage and science. The most sophisticated technological breakthroughs will not obviate the need for classic espionage. Satellites can pinpoint hostile military moves, but spies can uncover hostile military intentions. Technology can uncover strategic capabilities, but human sources can uncover political machinations. Like

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Reginald Jones, Bud Wheelon knew that intelligence officers are like archeologists—assembling chards or fragments of information from many different sources, including satellite photographs, signals intercepts, and spies, and drawing the appropriate conclusions. Unlike archeologists, however, time is often the enemy of analysis. In a world where it is no longer enough to anticipate what your adversary will do, but who your next adversary will be, the right call is cold comfort if it is made too late.

And, finally, a few words about Bud Wheelon, the man. His colleagues have viewed him as a leader of people, and as a master of systems. As one colleague put it: "No one before or after Bud paralleled his work."

But I must tell you that these kinds of accolades come with other descriptions—headstrong, determined, candid, not afraid to break crockery. Winston Churchill once told Reginald Jones that: "You don't have to be polite, you just have to be right." Bud Wheelon worked hard to be both, but he placed a premium on getting it right—and insisted that others do the same. It is only when people are willing to challenge conventional wisdom and get it right that the great strengths from our democracy—our inquisitiveness, our creativity, our imagination—can bear fruit. There was nothing preordained or automatic about the outcome of the Cold War. It took people who were not afraid to raise awkward questions and not afraid to take risks.

Dr. Wheelon exemplified these strengths in his life's work. Justice Louis Brandeis once said: "If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold." Bud Wheelon's mind was bold, his vision clear, and his courage resolute.

"Bud Wheelon, like Reginald Jones, has proven that intelligence can be conducted successfully while hewing to democratic principles and practices, to our commitment to freedom, and to our sense of fair play and trust."

The second point about Bud Wheelon the man is related to the willingness to question, explore, and take risks. When we serve in these jobs, we all have to keep in mind not only what is expected of us as intelligence officers, but also as Americans. As Americans, we are not comfortable being a nation of informants, nor are we accustomed to being regimented bureaucratically or programmed "scientifically." We cherish our freedoms—indeed, if we did not, we could not possibly succeed in defending and advancing these ideals. In his landmark book, *Democracy in America*, de Tocqueville expressed skepticism that democracy would permit the necessary skills to conduct foreign policy. In spite of his overall superb batting average, on this point de Tocqueville was too pessimistic. Bud Wheelon, like Reginald Jones, has proven that intelligence can be conducted successfully while hewing to democratic principles and practices, to our commitment to freedom, and to our sense of fair play and trust. Men like Reginald Jones and Bud Wheelon have shown that being clever in the use of technology and intelligence does not mean that we should elevate technology to the position of being our boss. Technology must remain the servant of man's free spirit, not his master.

Over the past six months, members of the CIA family have heard me lay out initiatives to strengthen management accountability, personnel security, and counterintelligence. I have done so because these steps were obviously needed. But I am equally determined to preserve an environment which fosters the free interplay of ideas. If we harbor suspicions every time a colleague shows an inquisitive mind, we will not be able to infuse our work with creativity and vision. We must not violate the rules of security, or fail in upholding the standards of accountability. But we must operate in and foster an environment of free, intellectual inquiry—as Reginald Jones did and Bud Wheelon did.

And, finally, intelligence now more than ever has a crucial role to play for the United States in this post-Cold War world. Indeed, the role of intelligence has never been more important in helping the President avoid and manage crises and in supporting today's smaller military forces. Last fall we worked around the clock to support the President and his advisers to help resolve three critical foreign policy issues that came to a head in October—providing critical intelligence to military commanders at the Pentagon, at sea, and on the ground in Haiti; supporting our negotiators grappling with North Korea's nuclear program; providing strategic and tactical warning

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of Saddam's ambitions in his military deployments to the Kuwaiti border. The planning and restructuring of our intelligence capability to collect and analyze imagery, electronic signals, and human intelligence is paying off. The systems that we are buying and the people we are training are adapting quickly and flexibly to this potpourri of new and demanding post-Cold War challenges. And our response to the three crises in October is the model for how intelligence is contributing to the national security of the United States. I would add that the ideas, the principles, the approach to problems, and, in some cases, the systems themselves created by both Reginald Jones and Bud Wheelon were very much with us in October.

As we pay tribute to Bud Wheelon today, I am reminded of Edwin Land, eminent photo scientist and inventor of the Polaroid camera, whose personal credo was: "to select things that are manifestly important and nearly impossible." To Land, discoveries were often made by some individual "who has freed himself from a way of thinking that is held by friends and associates who may be more intelligent, better educated, better disciplined, but who may not have mastered the art of a fresh, clean look at the old, old knowledge." This credo exemplifies Bud Wheelon's career, his accomplishments, and his legacy to us. On behalf of the Intelligence Community and the members of the CIA family, I would urge all of us to help ensure that Dr. Wheelon's career will inspire us to keep several things always in mind. We must maintain the right kind of intellectual environment and the adequate resources to

...the organization created, motivated, and shaped by Bud Wheelon developed many other technologies, *not* used to fight a war, but to help mankind in many civilian applications, often in medical science.

support it. The environment and the resources must allow the ideas to flourish to enable our officers and analysts to take a "fresh, clean look" at the world and at ourselves and at our work, and to continue to demonstrate to the world the best of what it means to be an intelligence officer working in the cause of liberty and freedom.

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How appropriate that Bud Wheelon be the first recipient of the R.V. Jones Award following Jones himself. The world today mirrors in a sense what the world was like when Dr. Wheelon came to the Agency. The late 1950s and early 1960s were turbulent times in the world with the launch of Sputnik, the Bay of Pigs, and our questions about the Soviet strategic threat and even our own abilities to respond. It was an epoch of change, just as we are experiencing today, and it required unprecedented leadership in areas new and untested in intelligence: the application of science and technology and Bud Wheelon was the man with the clear vision and stubborn insistence to pull together an organization—founded on research—to strengthen the Agency's capabilities by creating, organizing, and exploiting new resources of science and technology. He joined institutional, academic, and industrial research to our own mission-oriented research.

Naturally, the Agency was very focused on the Cold War and Soviet strategic threat. Our leaders, especially Dr. Wheelon, likely did not imagine the incredible legacy that they would leave behind as they pushed to develop breakthrough technologies to apply to intelligence efforts in fighting the Cold War.

Many of those accomplishments were successful in fighting the Cold War, but the untold story is that the organization created, motivated, and shaped by Bud Wheelon developed many other technologies, *not* used to fight a war, but to help mankind in many civilian applications, often in medical science. A few examples should illustrate how technology developed for national security purposes also can be applied to civilian problems. As taxpayers, it is rewarding to learn of cases where we get "two for the price of one."

We often become inured to breakthroughs in science and technology and yawn as another comes across the screen of the evening news. But, what if that headline on the 6 p.m. news read "Improved capabilities to diagnose breast cancer developed at CIA, details at 11?." Or, "New computer chip burning up information superhighway pioneered at CIA, following sports." Certainly, we would all stay tuned until 11. I would like to give you the "story at 11" in the next few minutes.

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At this time, lot of attention is being paid to the Intelligence Community-sponsored research originally applied to image and signal processing for satellite imagery analysis being transferred to the medical community and applied to assist radiologists in detecting breast cancer. The techniques align digital imagery and then process results to detect automatically change in images taken over time. These results are particularly significant for diagnosis of cancer in women under 50, where diagnosis is much more difficult. One radiologist estimates that applying these techniques could reduce the number of deaths occurring from breast cancer by 30 percent.

Another "small highlight" transferred to the medical community was the R&D work in the 1960s which led to the patent on the lithium-iodide battery, the dominant chemistry used for heart pacemaker batteries in the 1970s and 1980s.

Results of successful S&T research also include efforts to predict medical problems, in addition to solving them. Under the auspices of the State Department we managed the development of a model for predicting the spread and demographic impact of the AIDS epidemic. This model's original algorithms were a core breakthrough which led to the development of a stand-alone population model. The same techniques can be applied to model any other disease. The AIDS model also has been used by the World Health Organization and the UN.

Leaving the medical domain, we find examples of S&T research contributing to the processing and analysis of

“Research in improved data extraction, automatic database generation, machine translation and information retrieval—in multiple languages—have been major efforts supported by interagency groups, often led by S&T officers, and, in several cases, have led to commercial products.”

vast amounts of information which the Agency collects daily. Research in improved data extraction, automatic database generation, machine translation and information retrieval—in multiple languages—have been major efforts supported by interagency groups, often led by S&T officers, and, in several cases, have led to commercial products. How else will the analyst or policymaker get the right amount of information in the form he wants on his desk when he needs it?

The forerunner of the Pentium chip came into being because of some visionary officers in the S&T who believed in a radical concept—the RISC processor— worked with industry in the early 1980s to see that it got a fair chance—and now look where we are.

There are may other examples of S&T accomplishments currently benefitting the civilian population. Some of them include tools used by urban planners and law enforcement agencies to visualize scenes on the ground in 3D and then insert buildings or plan routes for hostage rescues. Another tool concerned with facial recognition recently led the Immigration and Naturalization Service to identify and arrest a convicted rapist. Other law enforcement agencies also are eager to use this technology.

No discussion of S&T achievements would be complete without mention of how our world will benefit from overhead reconnaissance systems. They have helped us map many regions of the world and can logically be envisioned as playing a role in relief support to natural and man-made disasters. They also will be important in helping us monitor and preserve our environment. All this is possible because of technology developed to fight the Cold War.

In founding the DS&T, Bud Wheelon did more than create an organization to build wizardry. He gave an ethos, principles, and methodology to guide the S&T in managing the technology being developed for intelligence requirements. He taught his officers and managers, and he demanded accountability. He introduced and insisted on sound program-management principles which are the cornerstone of the S&T today. The responsibilities given an officer, the accountability which he accepted, and the program-management principles he applied gave and still give any S&T officer the confidence to step up to almost any challenge of developing and managing technology that makes a difference in intelligence.

S&T research is applied and pays off in many ways. It is not just the scientist in the white lab coat; often, it is that off-the-wall idea which needs fertile ground to grow and be nurtured.

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In other cases, it is our operational requirements which force us to push the development of a technology which industry would not find commercially viable—but we need it sooner than they would develop it. In some instances, someone must take the risk, and we support that. Even failure teaches us which road *not* to take.

With the Cold War behind us, the requirements for ground-breaking research, new approaches to problems, and the willingness to take chances and risk failure all endure.

Dr. Wheelon's vision, intelligence, creativity, innovation, and tenacity are characteristics we still need in our leaders and officers today.

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A Case Study

Persuading a President: Jimmy Carter and American Troops in Korea (U)

Joe Wood

Editor's Note: Since 1987, the Central Intelligence Agency has funded a program with the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, on Intelligence and Policy. Under this program, which is managed by CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, the Kennedy School conducts seminars and develops case studies that help illuminate issues related to the use of intelligence by policymakers. This case was written in 1996 for Professors Ernest May and Philip Zelikow.

"Carter was determined to put greater emphasis on America's commitment to the protection of human rights, and he sharply criticized the apparent past policy of backing any dictator that promised to fight Communism."

On 23 June 1976, Jimmy Carter, candidate for President of the United States, stepped before a gathering in New York sponsored by the Foreign Policy Association. He was ready to deliver his campaign's major statement on the policies he would pursue around the world if he was elected in November. The carefully prepared speech was vetted by Carter's campaign advisers on foreign policy, led by a Columbia University professor and former State Department official, Zbigniew Brzezinski. The address "foreshadowed many of [Carter's] actions and concerns as President." [1] It included a promise to reverse 26 years of US policy and "withdraw our ground forces from South Korea on a phased basis over a time span to be determined after consultation with both South Korea and Japan." The mutual defense treaty and commitment of American airpower might stay, but US troops should go home. Carter had first made this promise right after declaring his candidacy, in an interview with *Washington Post* editors in January 1975, and he had kept repeating it.

Though Brzezinski later described the origins of Carter's promise as a "mystery not yet unraveled," [2] South Korea was not popular in America in 1976. It had been ruled for 15 years by an autocrat, Park Chung Hee, who dealt ruthlessly and, at times, bloodily, with popular dissent. Park had been ruling by martial law since 1972, and his intelligence agency had kidnapped opposition leader Kim Dae Jung. At least Kim was only in prison; other opposition figures had been killed under mysterious circumstances. Carter was determined to put greater emphasis on America's commitment to the protection of human rights, and he sharply criticized the apparent past policy of backing any dictator that promised to fight Communism. So the next sentence in Carter's June 1976 speech, after his promise to withdraw American ground forces from South Korea, condemned the South Korean Government's "repugnant" oppression of internal dissent. To make matters worse, in the fall of 1976, the South Korean Government was directly implicated in a Washington scandal, dubbed "Koreagate" by the press, involving the bribery of members of Congress in order to win favorable treatment for South Korean interests. In the wake of Koreagate, few politicians rose to defend the Seoul regime.

At the end of June 1950, North Korean tanks and troops, guided by Soviet operational plans and acting with the endorsement of both Stalin

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and China's new Communist leader, Mao Zedong, streamed southward across the 38th parallel that had divided the two Korean states. The Truman administration had responded in three ways. Washington committed American ground forces to repel the North Korean attack, backed by a UN resolution. It also ordered its ships to sail between Taiwan and mainland China in order to thwart a feared invasion by China across the Taiwan straits, a commitment later codified into a Mutual Defense Treaty signed with Taiwan. And Washington ordered more military assistance to the French forces in Indochina fighting the nationalist and Communist rebels led by Ho Chi Minh.

As President Carter took office, all three commitments were being undone. America's military commitment in Indochina had been extinguished in 1975, along with the South Vietnamese state. Carter and Brzezinski planned to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty and break formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to normalize relations with mainland China. Finally, Carter entered office determined to keep his promise to withdraw the 42,000 American troops then deployed in South Korea guarding a cease-fire line that marked the gains of three years of battle against North Korean, Chinese, and some Soviet forces, fighting that had cost more than 33,000 American lives. Though Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, worried about the campaign promise, Carter had repeated it in a press conference after the election and remained firm. When Vice President Mondale made the first administration visit to East Asia in February 1977, Carter instructed him to only inform the alarmed Japanese of the new President's decision on withdrawing troops, and not to entertain the possibility of reversing the decision. [3] Of course, the White House was not heedless of the continuing danger of an attack from North Korea, still ruled by the same man—Kim Il-sung—who had ordered the 1950 invasion. But the White House judgment turned on a crucial presumption: South Korea could now defend itself without American ground forces. This particular presumption was also an issue that engaged the attention of the intelligence agencies of the US Government.



Few analysts worked on Korea, and those who did had little intelligence data on which to base any judgments.



Intelligence Estimates on Korea: 1970-77

In 1979, the US Intelligence Community (IC) generally agreed that North and South Korean forces appeared to stand in rough balance, with neither side able to attack the other successfully.[4] This estimate helped the Nixon administration decide to withdraw one-third of the 60,000 US troops then in place in South Korea, as part of the Nixon Doctrine to encourage self-sufficiency in defense in developing nations. Most government intelligence analysts agreed that, based on whatever information they could gather, US troops were not essential to the military balance in Korea. Moreover, the South's higher population was thought to put it in good stead for long-run economic competition with the North, and thus in a good position to defend itself without American help. [5]

That is what the analysts thought, to the extent they considered the situation in Korea. But they had not thought about Korea very much. According to Evelyn Colbert, the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for East Asia [6] from 1974 until March 1977, US intelligence resources in the early 1970s were focused on Vietnam to the exclusion of other Asian nations such as Korea. Few analysts worked on Korea, and those who did had little intelligence data on which to base any judgments. [7] Increasing the collection effort would not make a huge difference because North Korea was perhaps the toughest of all targets for American military intelligence: it was an entirely closed society, defectors and travelers were few and far between, and its Army was known to deploy forces in ways that revealed little to outside observers. [8] Added to all this was a transfer of responsibility for determination of the Korean order of battle [9] from the disbanded Army Pacific Command to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the mid-1970s, during which some organizational confusion was inevitable. [10]

The result, according to one former senior defense intelligence officer, was that the IC generally took the 1970 estimates and drew a line forward in time at a constant rate of growth in order to arrive at the present year's estimate for North Korean forces. The experts were pretty settled in their conviction that North Korea was not a serious threat. [11] Those who remembered the Korean war would not necessarily contradict this view, because they would recall that the war had destroyed most of the North Korean

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Army and in its last years had been fought mainly against the Chinese. Now that Carter and Brzezinski were placing an extraordinarily high priority on normalizing relations with the Chinese, was there any real threat from the anachronistic North Korean regime?

In the intelligence agencies, complacency began to erode in 1974. Economic analysts noticed that substantial amounts of North Korean economic production, such as concrete and steel, could not be accounted for unless they were being used for undetected defense purposes. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the IC shifted some assets from Indochina to assess the situation in North Korea, and the linear projections from a presumed base of past strength which had prevailed for half a decade began to seem low. [12]

At about the same time, John Armstrong, an Army officer with experience in Southeast Asia and credentials as a China specialist, was in the midst of an extensive review of the intelligence information that had formed the basis for US estimates of the North Korean order of battle. Armstrong was assigned in 1974 to the Army's Special Research Detachment (SRD) at the National Security Agency. SRD was an unusual office with direct access to the head of Army intelligence: part of SRD's function was to serve as a think tank of sorts and a place the Army could go for judgments involving intelligence matters. The environment was unstructured; the management encouraged freewheeling explorations and creativity. Direct access to top levels of Army intelligence meant that feedback was quick and meaningful, contributing to high morale, even enthusiasm, among SRD's analysts. [13]

Armstrong was not especially enthusiastic, however, about his initial SRD task. The Army leadership realized that Korea was not receiving much attention from the IC and turned to SRD to determine if problems might exist in current estimates, especially in the military orders of battle. Armstrong knew, like most analysts, that Korea was a backwater for the IC, and he resisted the assignment. But the Army prevailed, and Armstrong embarked on what would eventually become more than three years of "basic, dirty-hands intelligence work."

The nature of SRD allowed Armstrong to focus on one subject intensively for as long as necessary to complete comprehensive analyses. He dug out several years' worth of original source material used in estimating the Korean order of battle. As Armstrong discussed his work with other analysts, he found a general belief that the Korean estimates were poor, but there was little bureaucratic interest in correcting them. Others in the Community were surprised that Armstrong would have the time for so much pure research on a topic of such low priority.

In late 1975, after about one year of concentrated effort, Armstrong, who had by then left the military and become a relatively junior (GS-12) civil servant in the Pentagon, circulated the first installment of his study. He concluded that North Korean tank forces were about 80 percent larger than previously estimated. He also found an entire tank division (about 270 tanks and 100 armored personnel carriers) within 100 kilometers of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas. Armstrong got little initial reaction from those in Washington whom he briefed on his findings, but Army officers in Korea were very interested.

Armstrong then went to the CIA and DIA offices responsible for Korea to propose a joint venture for a one-year project to try to bound the North Korean Army's size, setting plausible maximum and minimum totals. The CIA analysts seemed interested but too pressed by other matters to focus such effort for a sustained period; only a few were looking at Korea. Armstrong went back to the Army and persuaded them to give him the dedicated services of six analysts. This team turned to the area of artillery and, for 14 months, "nailed down every gun in the country." Using Armstrong's method of reviewing all-source information for several years back and examining all sources simultaneously, they worked out an estimate, formerly documented at the regimental level, down to the level of individual gun batteries. Again, the team concluded that North Korea had much greater strength in artillery than previously thought. [14]

In late 1976, Gen. John Vessey assumed command of US and UN forces in Korea. Vessey heard Armstrong's armor estimate presentation in September 1976 before leaving the United States, and he later testified that "this study impressed me with the innovative intelligence techniques which were applied." [15] In January 1977, Vessey, after another Armstrong briefing, sent a message to various leaders in the defense intelligence community calling for heightened efforts in order-of-battle estimates and, more critically at that juncture, on the problem of judging how much warning the United States might have before a possible

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North Korean attack.[16] Washington was becoming more receptive. Throughout 1975 and 1976, the general thrust of Armstrong's assessments was confirmed by other intelligence agencies, while more danger signals appeared. North Korean tunnels under the DMZ had been discovered in 1974 and 1975.[17] A CIA study argued that the firepower in North Korean divisions had grown.[18] Assessments of North Korean military strength were revised upward.

According to Colbert, by the end of the Ford administration the IC consensus was that the North Koreans were militarily superior to the South.[19] The generally accepted numbers put North Korea ahead of South Korea in almost all types of equipment: North Korea was thought to lead in tanks by a ratio of 1.5:1, and in artillery and armored personnel carriers by 1.9:1. Only in personnel was South Korea assessed as superior, with 560,000 troops as compared to North Korea's 450,000.[20] More important, the character of North Korean forces appeared more offensively oriented than before, and all these trends had been moving in this direction since 1970.

Carter Tries To Implement His Promise

Carter's promise to withdraw US troops from Korea had been repeated time and again.[21] Carter knew what he had said, and he meant it. The campaign promise began to become policy when it was reiterated during the Carter transition. Vance told his Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Richard Holbrooke, that the formal policy review could consider different rates of withdrawal, but the

"Carter's promise to withdraw US troops from Korea had been repeated time and again. Carter knew what he had said, and he meant it."

option of canceling the withdrawal was not on the table.[22] Carter himself announced in March 1977 that all ground forces were to be withdrawn in four or five years. American tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea would also be withdrawn. It was left to a White House spokesman to add that the withdrawal would be carried out carefully so as not to upset the military balance on the Korean Peninsula.[23]

In June, the administration reiterated the four-to-five-year timetable for the pullout of American ground combat troops, emphasizing that American airpower and America's security commitments to South Korea would continue. It was also announced that South Korea would be compensated with a package of increased military aid and credits.[24] Defenders of Carter's plan argued that they were just extending the logic and the so-called Nixon Doctrine of letting Asians defend themselves. Also, American troops would no longer be hostages to possible provocative acts by South Korea's Park Chung Hee. An official explained that, "the President cannot evade the choice of going to war or not because our Air Force will still be there. But he will not be forced into committing ground troops without the support of the Congress and the public." Privately, however, a Presidential Review Memorandum on defense planning was arguing that, "Once the US land forces are out of Korea, the United States has transformed its presence in Asia from a land-based posture to an offshore posture. This...provides the United States flexibility to determine at the time whether it should or should not get involved in a local war."[25]

The American move also was a reaction to South Korea's domestic politics. It signaled the erosion of US backing for Park Chung Hee and his repressive policies, thereby conceivably inviting worried South Korean officers to stage a coup.[26]

The IC was certainly aware of the juxtaposition between Carter's pledge and its revised and more worrisome estimates about North Korean military strength. After Carter won the Democratic nomination in 1976, he asked Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Bush for CIA briefings on topics of priority. Colbert and her fellow NIOs proposed through Bush that Carter listen to the latest assessments on Korea, but Carter never chose that topic for a briefing. After Carter won the general election, Colbert sent a memo to Ford's outgoing National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft noting the substantial increases in recent estimates of North Korean strength and the upward trends in the North's military capability since 1970; the memo drew no response from transition personnel.[27] Reportedly, on Bush's last day as DCI (weeks into the Carter administration), he sent Carter another memo saying the President was wrong in his judgments on the basis for the withdrawal.[28]

Still, some experts both inside and outside the US Government thought that, with its robust economy, South Korea would be able to make up for US withdrawal by increasing its mili-

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tary budget. The drawdown during the Nixon administration had been accompanied by a US pledge to aid in a five-year $1.5 billion modernization of the South Korean armed forces. It was also understood that, coupled with Carter's plan announced in June, there would be a generous military aid package, which was initially set at over $800 million of military equipment and nearly $300 million in arms credits, as well as a promise to increase the US Air Force presence by at least a squadron of 12 F-4 fighters.[29]

Furthermore, of the 42,000 Army personnel in Korea, only about 15,000 were combat soldiers in the US 2d Infantry Division. As compared with South Korea's Army of more than 500,000, the American numbers seemed tiny. With Carter facing budget shortfalls and runaway inflation, removing an Army division from Korea would save money, especially if it was eliminated rather than relocated. Certainly the fear of having the division disbanded may have galvanized Army resistance to the withdrawal plan.[30] The general climate of opinion was more influenced, though, by a widely circulated Congressional Budget Office report confirming an even military balance in Korea, apparently relying on older data.[31] A relevant official at the White House's Office of Management and Budget recalls that in early 1977, even though some estimates discussed a North Korean buildup, intelligence and defense representatives at interagency meetings would not say conclusively that South Korea was unable to stop a North Korean attack north of Seoul without American assistance on the ground. Absent such an assertion, the revised estimates drew only a "so what?" from the budget watchdogs.[32]

“The JCS favored a much longer phasing out of troops if a withdrawal had to occur.”

Within the State Department, Vance's deputies were split. Philip Habib, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, felt South Korea was "in a position to pick up more of the action" of its own defense, and the US forces remaining after the withdrawal (aircraft and some Army support troops) would provide a sufficient deterrent. For Habib, though, the withdrawal was "not a fundamental issue," and it attracted little of his time and energy.[33] But at the next level down, Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, worried less about calculations of the military balance than about the overall political context in which the withdrawal would occur. After the collapse of South Vietnam, American confidence was low and its stature as a Pacific power was threatened. Holbrooke (whom some remember as an advocate of withdrawal early in the process who later distanced himself from the decision) saw the major flaw of the withdrawal policy implementation as the failure to anticipate its impact as a symbol to other countries in the region. US policy for the Far East in the Carter years would face numerous challenges, including movement toward normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, reassurance for Taiwan after that normalization, base negotiations with the Philippines, and shoring up the security relationship with Japan. Holbrooke saw the withdrawal as objectionable to all these countries because it would be perceived as a measure of declining American commitment in the region, when in fact America's interests and opportunities there were potentially greater than ever before.[34]

Brzezinski recalls little support for the withdrawal among the defense and foreign policy community, even in early 1977. Brzezinski himself says he was not consulted before Carter's pledge, and he was initially indifferent to the idea. Once in office, the question in his mind quickly became how to appear to withdraw just enough to meet Carter's commitment without damaging security on the Peninsula.[35] Michael Armacost, who handled Japanese and Korean issues on the NSC staff and later as a deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Carter administration, agrees that most decisionmakers had reservations about the withdrawal at the outset, but none felt strongly enough about the issue to take on the new President's program.[36] Some in the policy community blamed Brzezinski for not actively opposing the withdrawal in interagency meetings; others, including Brzezinski, claim that his support was intended only to protect the President and to find a way to fulfill Carter's pledge in form without damaging the substance of the American presence.[37]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly opposed the withdrawal at first, fearing both its effect on the military balance and the lack of political resolve it might signal to North Korea. The net effect, they reasoned, could be dangerous for deterrence. The JCS favored a much longer phasing out of troops if a withdrawal had to occur. They ultimately supported the four- to five-year withdrawal plan as imposing a "higher but acceptable" risk if accompanied by

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substantial US military aid and equipment transfers.[38] But, when asked by Congressmen what military rationale the JCS had been given for the withdrawal by the administration, they consistently answered, "None."[39]

One early, adamant, and consistent opponent of the troop pullout was General Vessey. Vessey was "unalterably opposed" to Carter's decision; he asked to see Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in January 1977, just after Carter's inauguration, to explain the risks he saw inherent in a US withdrawal. Vessey told Brown that the US ground forces were essential to the military balance on the Peninsula and that removing them would be especially damaging to Korean morale as well as to broader American foreign policy objectives in the region. Brown was sufficiently persuaded by Vessey's views, and he arranged for the general to see the President immediately. Carter listened carefully to Vessey and indicated that, contrary to press speculation, no final decision on a withdrawal had been taken. Carter added that no such final decision would be made before he talked with Vessey again. A little over a month later, Carter's announcement that the troop withdrawal was now American policy "came [to Vessey] as a shock."[40]

Vessey recalls hearing from a senior Pentagon civilian official, Morton Abramowitz, that the policy was an announced Presidential decision to be carried out faithfully by the Defense Department. Abramowitz, however, was typical of those who publicly supported the President but privately opposed the withdrawal. He told Mondale, while the Vice President was traveling to Japan in February 1977, that "we can't withdraw." Mondale seemed amused, and he reminded Abramowitz that he and Carter had recently won an election, and they indeed could withdraw American troops if they wished.[41]

"Turner sensed in the CIA an attitude that the withdrawal policy presented dangerous risks."

The IC did make the military trends in Korea evident in the intelligence annex to the policy review document for Asia, Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 13. Colbert and other analysts who worked on the annex recall that it concluded North Korea was superior or well ahead in many areas of armament.[42] A later Congressional report noted that the annex "indicated the static balance had shifted in favor of the North."[43] The annex went further than most intelligence estimates in that it explored some areas of what is usually considered "net assessment," pointing to growing doubts about South Korea's ability to repel an attack from the North without US troops; the PRM as a whole, however, toed the administration line and concluded that the South could mount an effective defense just with American air, naval, and logistic support.[44]

Adm. Stansfield Turner, a classmate of Carter's at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, took over as DCI in March 1977. PRM-123 was one of his first problems. Turner knew of the President's commitment to withdrawal, and he initially supported the policy. He gave the annex considerable attention and sent it back to the analysts for several revisions. Turner, new to his role, sought changes to make the annex less oriented toward equipment numbers or "bean counts" and more revealing of true war-fighting capability. For example, Turner recalls that the table on naval equipment included some North Korean ships that were of little combat utility and did not highlight South Korea's real naval strength.[45]

Some annex authors who worked under Turner felt that, when the annex turned into a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Turner "slashed away at the draft...with offensive, not relevant remarks." Some felt the new DCI was politicizing the intelligence process.[46] Turner attributes these reactions to his own inexperience in supervising the NIEs that would go out with his signature. Moreover, Turner sensed in the CIA an attitude that the withdrawal policy presented dangerous risks. But he felt that, while South Korea "did not have a piece of cake on its hands," the risk of withdrawal was not alarming. To Turner, the policy represented a political decision. Administration decision makers understood the risks involved and had judged them to be acceptable.[47]

Nevertheless, several IC officials believed that intelligence that ran contrary to the withdrawal policy was "not well received" by Carter's early appointees at Defense and State. In one early NSC meeting, the PRM-13 annex, in particular, drew fire from budget officials, who argued that it was "out of order" because it had not been coordinated throughout the IC (the annex was thus upgraded to an NIE). Turner ultimately accepted the basic conclusions of the annex in NIE form, although some elements of military

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intelligence added footnotes that challenged Turner's revisions.[48]

Reaction to the Withdrawal Policy: 1977-78

Almost as soon as it was announced, Carter's withdrawal policy ran into public difficulty at home and abroad. South Korea opposed the withdrawal in every available forum. Korea had been badly shaken by the American loss in Vietnam, where Korean troops had also fought. One reporter wrote that, "the spectacle of Americans scrambling off the roof of their Embassy in Saigon (leaving the entire South Korean Embassy staff behind) induced a mood of pessimism unparalleled since the Korean war."[49] Korean officials stressed the trends which American intelligence had noticed indicating the North's buildup, adding that their own intelligence estimates were even more disturbing. They emphasized the deterrent role of the American presence, pointing out the dire consequences of the last American pullout in the late 1940s. They argued that Kim Il Sung clearly intended to reunify the Peninsula on his own terms, using military force if possible (an evaluation shared by some in the American IC), and that the United States would be abandoning a loyal ally with unfavorable, possibly disastrous, strategic results in the region. Some officials hinted darkly that South Korea might have to develop nuclear weapons to compensate for the lack of American troops.[50] Even dissidents such as Kim Dae Jung rallied to the government's side in encouraging the United States to leave ground troops in place. Dissident groups held protests to argue that withdrawal would invite war and increase fears that would make an end to martial law and a turn toward democracy less likely.[51]

Japan had publicly expressed skepticism toward the withdrawal before Carter took office and responded by promising consultations before the policy was finalized. Carter continually stressed that American security commitments would be unchanged by the withdrawal.[52] But the Japanese were offended when Mondale arrived in February 1977 with news of the forthcoming decision. They correctly felt this approach constituted notification rather than the promised consultation.[53] The Japanese had long supported an American troop presence in both their own country and Korea, and they feared that American withdrawal from Korea might be the next stage in a general American drawdown in the region that would open the way for greater Soviet or Chinese influence. Carter and Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda met in Washington in March and issued a joint communiqué agreeing that the withdrawal would "not endanger peace" in Korea and reiterating American determination to maintain security in the region.[54] But, in private, the Japanese continued to express doubts about the withdrawal, while being careful not to attack Carter in public.

The Japanese had an unexpected ally in the People's Republic of China. Kim Il-sung had long tried to play China and the Soviet Union against one another to maximize economic and military assistance. As early as 1975, the Chinese had quietly let American diplomats and visitors know that, propaganda decrying American "imperialism" notwithstanding, they were not unhappy with the American presence in Korea, given its constraining effect on Soviet activity there.[55] The Chinese privately continued to sound this theme after Carter entered office.

In Congress, the reactions to the withdrawal policy were mixed. On the one hand, influential members of the Senate and House opposed the withdrawal. On the other, many in Congress were disinclined to support South Korea in any manner because of the Koreagate influence-peddling scandal. In late 1977, anger at South Korea peaked. Some even speculated that not only would Congress support withdrawal but also that Carter's proposal to compensate South Korea with American weapons and other military aid would not pass.[56] Certain blocs in Congress were more adamant than Carter on human rights, and these favored aid cutoffs and troop reductions in order to punish the Park regime. Opposition to the compensatory aid package linked those who were against any withdrawal (and therefore the compensation for it) and those who were against any aid at all to Park's government in Seoul. Influential members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Forces Committee opposed the withdrawal, including Democratic Senators Nunn and Glenn, and Republican Senators Percy, Baker, and Javits. These men took forceful positions in meetings with administration officials.[57] Senator Percy warned Holbrooke that he would "forge a united Republican opposition to the withdrawals."[58] The Senate as a whole refused to endorse the policy in June 1977 and asked the President to seek Congressional approval for the withdrawal.[59] Senator Glenn in particular traveled and researched the issue extensively in 1977 and prepared a report in cooperation with former Democratic presidential candidate Senator Hubert Humphrey. The report was published in January 1978, shortly

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after Humphrey's death, and it emphasized that the shifting military balance in Korea demanded a continued American presence. The Humphrey-Glenn assessment of the military balance was pessimistic:

> *When measured by firepower only, the balance has shifted from rough parity in 1970 to a definite advantage for the North in 1977....[Given the projected 1977-82 Force Improvement Package, including US Army equipment transfers during withdrawal], even if North Korea acquires only enough equipment to modernize its current inventory, it will still have a numerical advantage over South Korea in all key categories except APCs and SAM launchers by 1982. US analysts, however, do not expect North Korean armament to level off. Rather, they anticipate continued buildup in all major categories, except fighter aircraft and antiaircraft guns.* [60]

The House Armed Services Committee conducted its own investigation of the withdrawal question, and the Democratic majority also concluded that "the North Koreans possess the capability of attacking the South with a minimum of warning, and that the US 2nd Infantry Division is needed for an adequate defense." [61]

The public debate was inflamed in May 1977, when General Vessey's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. John Singlaub, told *Washington Post* reporter John Saar that, "If we withdraw our ground forces on the schedule suggested, it will lead to war."[62] Singlaub, chief of staff to General Vessey in Korea, also said that recent intelligence findings revealed a much stronger North Korea; he was concerned that administration officials were basing the withdrawal on outdated data.[63] Singlaub was immediately recalled by President Carter, who saw a direct challenge to his authority reminiscent of MacArthur's dealings Truman. Singlaub insisted that his remarks should have been off the record and that he meant no disrespect, and Carter transferred him. But the House committee invited Singlaub to testify, and he repeated his argument, referring to Armstrong's studies and adding that his views were not unique among Army leaders, especially those in the field.[64] Secretary of Defense Brown responded that the withdrawal as planned would not endanger South Korean security.[65]

"In midsummer 1977, Carter reacted to the growing criticism by sending Secretary of Defense Brown to Seoul to revise the withdrawal schedule."

In midsummer 1977, Carter reacted to the growing criticism by sending Secretary of Defense Brown to Seoul to revise the withdrawal schedule, leaving more troops in place until the last year of the pullout.[66] By April 1978, as the withdrawal was scheduled to begin, Carter, sensing that the compensatory aid package was in deep trouble, announced that only one battalion of the three scheduled to leave Korea in 1978 would come home.[67] Unmoved, the House Armed Services Committee amended the defense budget authorization bill to prohibit any substantial cutback in US Army presence in Korea until a permanent peace settlement replaced the 1953 armistice.[68] Secretary Brown assured Congress that the withdrawal would be carried out only if the military situation in Korea warranted it.[69] This was no change in his position; he had said that the military situation allowed for a withdrawal. But it left a convenient door open for a reversal of the policy if the critics of it inside the administration had become uneasy about the decision to withdraw. According to Evelyn Colbert, who had returned to the State Department from her NIO position in March 1977, the general level of belief in the seriousness of North Korea's military potential rose over this period.[70] In December 1977, the State Department published a report to Congress that accepted the long-term military buildup of North Korea and the North's "sizable advantage" over the South's Army, but the report maintained that South Korean security would not be harmed by the American withdrawal if it were accompanied by military aid.[71] In February 1978, Secretary Brown testified that North Korea was "seen to have a definite advantage in tanks, artillery, and antiaircraft guns and a 2:1 advantage in aircraft."[72] The politically charged quality of the issue, the Singlaub affair, and consistent pressure from Vessey and other military leaders had converged to transform the judgment of North Korean military superiority from a dissident expert's view into the conventional wisdom prevailing through most of the government by early 1978.

The budget arguments, which initially seemed to support the withdrawal, also lost force as it became clear that the 2d Infantry Division would have to be relocated, not disbanded. Also, for officials such as Holbrooke, Armacost, and

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DIA had taken a large cut in analysts due to Vietnam, and Korea had been neglected.

Abramowitz, the political costs of the policy in Asia seemed to mount. These three met regularly as members of the "East Asia Informal," together with Donald Gregg of the CIA and others. To this group, the policy was developing in an "ad hoc" fashion, "sprung on our allies" without consideration of its impact on other foreign policy objectives. They thought the withdrawal was "bereft of strategic purpose." While the men were aware of the military trends on the Peninsula, they were less alarmed over the military threat than the political costs abroad. One member of the "Informal" recalled that Vessey's position was "not taken too seriously."[73]

Yet by early 1978, there was "little difference of views among agencies" in the negative evaluation of the policy on political or military grounds, or both. Brzezinski continued to support the withdrawal at some interagency meetings, often the only person to do so. He explains that he was just trying to keep the President from having to override the unanimous view of his advisers.[74] Nathaniel Thayer, who took over as NIO for East Asia after Colbert, recalls thinking that, "Brzezinski did not quite know what to do with the issue. Everyone below was telling him the withdrawal was crazy."[75]

Brzezinski recalls recognizing that there was "very little disagreement within the system that the withdrawal was an unwise idea." Like others, he was reading intelligence reports on the North's military buildup and hearing of the political costs of the policy. Brzezinski, however, sent Carter a memo in December 1977 warning that the US position in Asia seemed to be unraveling and urging Carter to press for "the preservation of the integrity of the Korean troop withdrawal."[76] By 1978, Carter had been forced to retreat from several foreign policy initiatives, including demilitarization of the Indian Ocean and deep cuts in strategic nuclear arms. Carter and Brzezinski had a "frank conversation" over the problems of the withdrawal at least once in 1978. Carter was still determined to salvage the withdrawal over the resistance of the bureaucracy, and Brzezinski continued to seek a formula that would fulfill Carter's campaign pledge.[77]

The Army's 1978 Study

After Armstrong had completed his tank and artillery studies, the next logical step was to work on infantry. For North Korea, this would be an extremely difficult problem. Infantry units had little equipment associated with them, and troops were difficult to count.[78] But the results of the earlier studies suggested that the effort required could be worthwhile. General Vessey certainly agreed. After working through the implications of Armstrong's artillery study, Vessey pressed the deficiencies directly with Air Force Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, the new DIA director, when Tighe visited Korea on an orientation tour. After hearing Armstrong's conclusions on the magnitude of the information void, Vessey followed up in January 1978 with a message to Tighe and others in defense intelligence detailing the problems in putting together a good estimate of the North Korean order of battle and suggested that national leaders were "being misinformed by...overly conservative assessments of [North Korean Army] strength," and requesting a major effort to correct the problems. One recipient described the message as a "barnburner."[79] The same month, DIA held a routine conference in preparation for a joint Korea-US intelligence meeting. The conference heard reports of changes in North Korean military dispositions and of increased activity near the DMZ. These patterns, combined with Vessey's message, started a DIA investigation.[80] The Army gave Armstrong more resources to continue his infantry work.[81]

According to General Tighe, DIA's product on North Korea before 1978 was "skimpy and totally inadequate." Tighe, whom some thought to be a strong candidate eventually to become DCI, had firsthand experience as a user of DIA's estimates when he served as J-2 (chief intelligence officer) to Pacific Command from 1972 to 1974. DIA had taken a large cut in analysts due to Vietnam, and Korea had been neglected. Korea was getting analysis as good as that for any other small region, but the work was "very sloppy" and clearly lacked sufficient resources. There were organizational problems throughout the agency as well: Tighe recalls there was "a general resistance to youth and new ways, [with] lots of tired people who were ill-equipped to spread out from the Soviet Union."[82] DIA's reputation among its consumers within the Defense Department was no better. A former member of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) described DIA during this period as a "stodgy bureaucracy. If you wanted innovative work, DIA was the last place you'd go."[83]

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DIA, then, recognized the order-of-battle problems pointed out by Vessey, but it was not in a position to respond quickly to correct them. Armstrong and the SRD, however, were already well into a pilot study of North Korean infantry by January 1978, and they pushed ahead with the strong support of Vessey and the Army's own senior intelligence officers in Washington.[84] Moreover, because this was a ground force question in a theater dominated by the Army, there was a certain logic in the Army's taking the lead even though DIA had formal responsibility for estimating the North Korean order of battle. Armstrong continued to develop his methodology of putting all-source analysts together with other specialists to find signatures for infantry units. Given the paucity of clear-cut evidence of numbers and organizational structure in the North's Army, this approach was thought to be highly innovative and uniquely able to solve the difficult problems of assessing North Korea.[85]

Armstrong's team began by focusing on one key region of North Korea to search for infantry, and in May 1978 they published their first dramatic findings. Armstrong claimed to find three divisions and one brigade in this single region that were not part of the US order-of-battle estimate. When Armstrong wrote up these results, he noted his new methodology and suggested that this finding was the "tip of the iceberg." Armstrong briefed his study "all over town" in Washington and created a stir at the middle-management level of the IC.[86] The results, if they were borne out and extended to other regions in the North, could clearly have an impact on Carter's withdrawal efforts and would thus be controversial among policymakers.

About four days after Armstrong sent out his results, he was leaving for the golf course to enjoy his first day off in months when his telephone rang. Admiral Turner, the DCI, wanted to hear Armstrong's briefing the next day. Armstrong immediately jumped well up his chain of command and obtained the approval of the Army's top intelligence officers. After all, the results had been out for nearly a week, so briefing the DCI should not surprise anyone. Besides, the senior national intelligence official wanted the story, and they had to respond.[87] Armstrong briefed Turner the next day, and what followed is a legend in some analytic circles. Turner reportedly saw Defense Secretary Brown that night at a party and asked Brown about the situation in Korea. Brown was surprised, as he had not heard the briefing. The next day at work, Brown supposedly called Tighe to ask why the DIA director had not told Brown of Armstrong's findings and why the Army study was necessary at all if DIA was doing its job on the order of battle.[88]

Armstrong briefed Tighe and his deputy a few days later. Tighe does not recall being angry or surprised by Brown's original questions on the report, but several attendees at the briefing from both the Army and DIA disagree.[89] Tighe asked several questions of Armstrong, seeking proof that the units Armstrong had found were not part of an elaborate shell game of deception (the degree of Tighe's displayed skepticism varies depending on who is retelling the story). In the end, Tighe complimented Armstrong and assured him of complete DIA cooperation.[90] Soon after, Tighe himself briefed the JCS, chaired by Air Force Gen. David Jones, who was quietly fighting the troop withdrawal within the bureaucracy.

Armstrong's Army superiors sensed a truly major intelligence event in the making, and they trusted Armstrong as an extremely hard worker and a creative analyst. Armstrong asked for a team of 30 to 40 analysts to be assembled in Washington; Armstrong would select the team members from the Army's most experienced Korea analysts all over the world. Such a program would require by-name requests for personnel (a prohibited practice in the Army at the time) and would take analysts away from their permanent jobs for nearly five months. The major general in charge of Army intelligence, John Rolya, took Armstrong to explain the plan to the Army Vice Chief of Staff. When the Vice Chief seemed doubtful, the general commented on the seriousness of the situation and on his faith in Armstrong; to make his point clear, he threatened to resign. Although the Vice Chief hinted that the resignation might be accepted, the next day Armstrong was told to start getting his team together.[91]

Armstrong's team worked from June through October, putting in 80-hour weeks in a review of all available material on the North Korean armed forces for several years back, and, in some cases, as far back as the Korean war. Absent an immediate crisis, putting together a 35-person team with such "high-density expertise" on Korea and the willingness to work so intensively for several months was possible only in a military service. DIA and CIA were charged with validating the Army's work, but, even with additional resources from their own agencies, these shops were hard pressed to keep up.[92]

The Army leadership followed Armstrong's progress closely, and General Tighe treated it as "subject number

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one" for DIA, though this was a time of growing concern about Soviet worldwide political and military behavior as well as an active period in US-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations.[93] Tighe also established a Korea Consultative Group to improve Community coordination, which he put under his Army deputy to assuage Army fears of interservice rivalry.[94] But coordination quickly became a problem and analytic arguments were laced with bitter personal rivalry.

Armstrong believed that DIA, embarrassed by his earlier findings, had a stake in discrediting his team. He felt that he had to answer numerous irrelevant questions propagated by DIA for the purpose of slowing, or even damaging, the Army effort and that DIA was misleading the Community in the process. His team was also relatively junior, which raised eyebrows regarding its credibility and forced Armstrong to respond (Armstrong himself had been promoted but was only a GS-13).[95] Others in the Community, watching from outside the Army or DIA, agree that DIA's questions often seemed "idiotic" and perhaps designed to hold up progress, although these could be attributed to a lack of familiarity with the material or to miscommunication.[96] Thayer, the NIO, also sensed some "footdragging" at DIA. He was initially told the validation would take a year and a half. Again, this slowness could be traced either to ill will or to bureaucratic sluggishness.[97]

Although Tighe recalls accepting early on that the order of battle would require substantial upward revisions, others who read DIA products over the summer of 1978 noticed that the agency was slow to incorporate Armstrong's findings. Former members of ONA, part of the civilian-run Office of the Secretary of Defense, saw that, while Armstrong's workers were reporting major troop-level increases, DIA was assuring Pentagon officials the numbers would not change by more than 10 percent.[98] ONA decided to perform its own study on Korea, and the Army numbers seemed to be credible and dangerous (an opinion they passed directly to Secretary Brown). One ONA staffer could not understand how DIA could remain so "skeptical and critical" of Armstrong's study when that study was "more comprehensive than any similar effort [he had] seen."[99]

DIA's perspective was very different. Tighe knew this issue was extremely sensitive politically, and he demanded high standards of evidence in all analysis. According to Alan MacDougall, a senior analyst in DIA's Korea branch, Tighe's policy was to say nothing "unless we could defend it to the death."[100] Lt. Col. Harry Tear, the Army officer who headed the Korea branch and led the DIA validation effort, knew "Tighe did not want this overblown." Tighe insisted on conclusive proof for the new findings and felt that one refutation of any part of the study by a Congressional or White House staffer would endanger the entire effort. Tighe was closely involved in "quality control" of Tear's work and insisted on "the fastest pace possible consistent with accuracy and the need for conclusive proof."[101] According to Alan MacDougall, Tighe determined "to put his imprimatur on any Department of Defense Korea estimate" and felt he "had to assert DIA's primacy" as the legitimate lead organization for defense intelligence.[102]

Like General Tighe, Armstrong anticipated his study would receive severe scrutiny because of Carter's withdrawal commitment, and he planned ways to ensure the accuracy and viability of his findings. He also realized the Army would be viewed highly skeptically as a source of new numbers on Korea, given the institutional interests at stake. Armstrong set out to make his methodology and results "visually impressive to an observer of any experience level."[103] Those who watched Armstrong's team were "amazed" at the extraordinary depth of the study and the lengths to which they went to document their findings.[104] A DIA officer called Armstrong's effort the "most vigorous scutwork" based on "incredible detail."

Nevertheless, working with considerably fewer people, DIA analysts thought that Armstrong was slow to provide the material they needed for their validation. MacDougall felt that Armstrong's work was "sloppy" at times and that Armstrong demanded high standards of others while he allowed himself shortcuts.[105] Tear was skeptical of Armstrong's much-touted methodology of identifying units; Tear thought it "was good for marketing but overly simplistic."[106] Armstrong's method also required its customers to "take a lot on faith," because he was putting together strands of information to connect dispersed units into larger organizational elements. These connections were "not easy to feel or touch."[107] With such doubts in mind and Tighe's instructions to pursue conclusive evidence, the DIA analysts proceeded cautiously on the validation. Armstrong, in turn, took the slow pace as proof that DIA was attempting to undermine his effort.

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DIA analysts also felt the Army leadership's interest in the study had as much to do with the potential loss of a four-star command in Korea as with a search for an accurate order of battle. This institutional interest was, they theorized, what really drove the Army's seemingly frenetic pace. Tear, himself an Army officer, found himself caught between his DIA position and the Army; former "green-suit" colleagues refused to acknowledge his presence at meetings.

Everyone interviewed, from the Army, DIA, or elsewhere, agreed that Armstrong was an exceptionally capable analyst with enormous energy and, unusual for an analyst, a flair for showmanship in briefing. He was tremendously self-confident and driven by his work, and he enjoyed strong personal relationships with a number of the Army's top brass and with Vessey in particular. He was also a talented manager of large projects. These qualities were the stuff of his initial successes and his high standing in the Army, and they allowed him to garner such superior resources for his summer 1978 study. But these characteristics were accompanied, in the opinion of some observers, by a low tolerance for views different from his own; one observer described his "fatal flaw" as a "king-sized ego."[108] Armstrong could be "confrontational," leading some senior officials at DIA to avoid dealing with him directly.[109] His willingness to "advertise widely" his products further annoyed some analysts. Stansfield Turner, although he does not remember Armstrong by name, noted in his diary, "My skepticism on this estimate [is] probably from [the] briefer's [having] too much self-assurance and salesmanship."

The coordination procedure became very personal and bitter. Participants at the working level uniformly recall the episode as the "nastiest" in their careers. DIA analysts came to resent deeply what they saw as Armstrong's arrogance, and Armstrong resented their questioning his every conclusion. Accusations of lying and other unethical behavior were traded.[110] MacDougall saw his subordinates begin to seek to disprove Armstrong's work just to cut him down to size. But both sides insist that the upper levels of their own agencies remained aloof from the personality conflicts, yet immersed in the results of the studies. Indeed, Tighe remembers trying to convince some of his analysts that Armstrong's work was in fact a new and better departure from traditional techniques.

It fell to the CIA's Korea office, in its Directorate of Intelligence, to arbitrate disputes, a function that it generally performed effectively. DIA analysts felt the Army had co-opted the CIA team.[111] CIA analysts recall a close but questioning relationship with the Army group. The CIA team also felt that DIA seemed to want the two agencies to join forces against the Army, a situation CIA carefully avoided.

By October, the Army results were in, and they were impressive. According to press and Congressional accounts, Armstrong's team concluded that the real size of the North Korean Army was at least 550,000 to 600,000, perhaps a one-third increase from the previous estimate of 450,000. Armstrong reported these were only the troops they definitely could identify; more were likely present in the North's forces. More important, the number of ground maneuver divisions jumped from 28 to 41. Most crucially, the forces appeared to be deployed nearer the DMZ than previously thought and in such a configuration to suggest offensive intent. Additional tanks and artillery had been found, and the late-1978 estimate on tanks was 35 percent higher than the 1977 estimate while artillery and armored personnel carriers were up by 20 percent (the 1977 figures had partially accommodated Armstrong's earlier findings).[112] Armstrong and others were careful to point out that these increases were the result of steady growth throughout the decade that was only now being detected, not from a sudden surge in North Korean acquisition.

The New Estimates Find an Audience

After his May briefing from Armstrong and as the studies proceeded over the summer of 1978, DCI Turner remained skeptical of the Army's work. Turner felt "skewered" by the new estimate. Only partly aware of the battles taking place at the analytic level between DIA and the Army, he was bothered that no one seemed to be looking critically at Armstrong's method. The whole estimate was based on a series of sequential steps of deduction, and no one was pointing to uncertainties in assumptions about numbers of troops or arms per division. Turner would like to have seen "different estimates of those variables to show this [assessment] was not a point solution and to give some range of possible outcomes. No one understood the [concept of] probabilities or uncertainties." Turner had insisted on the CIA and DIA validation efforts, and he discussed several times with Secretary Brown his concerns that the "double checks...were not very thorough." Turner was also

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bothered that he lacked the time he felt he needed to plunge into the material himself.[113]

CIA analysts credit Turner with pushing for a fair, unbiased estimate with all the details accurate; all were aware of the importance of the issue. If Turner felt insufficiently versed in the details of the validation, his analysts recall that he was closely involved and asked specific questions about the evidence for each North Korean unit discovered in the study. During 1978, Turner's skepticism receded as a CIA study confirmed the Army results within 8 to 10 percent, and Turner himself began to brief the new results to national leaders. Brzezinski recalls that Turner came in "with a serious intelligence report with serious implications" for the withdrawal, but Carter showed little reaction.[114]

According to Brzezinski, by late 1978 and early 1979, Carter was less concerned with the details of the Korean military balance than with other troubled foreign policy commitments. He took the intelligence seriously, but only up to a point: the new studies did not reveal an imminent attack. Brzezinski was convinced that a budding strategic relationship with China was the key to creating what he called a Carter Doctrine in Asia.[115] Early 1979 promised a major battle with Congress over the Carter administration's plan to withdraw from the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan and to break off relations with Taipei, a plan that Brzezinski persuaded Carter to place ahead of any other major action on foreign policy in Congress during 1979—even the SALT II US-Soviet arms control treaty (a fateful choice, because SALT II ultimately could not be ratified in 1980, during the Iran hostage crisis and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).

> **"Only Brzezinski, among the President's senior advisers, continued to favor the withdrawals."**

Carter had long been hearing from both the military and the civilian bureaucracy that the troop withdrawal from Korea was a bad idea, and the pullout had gone through many setbacks and delays. Only 3,500 to 4,000 soldiers had been withdrawn by the end of 1978, and much of that number represented only attrition achieved by not replacing personnel as normal rotations ended.[116] Secretary of State Vance recalled that "Each time Harold Brown and I tried to raise the subject with the President, we found him adamant. Only Brzezinski, among the President's senior advisers, continued to favor the withdrawals. Luckily, the depth of the disagreement within the executive branch never became public, although there were a few flurries."[117]

If the White House was preoccupied or unmoved, military leaders took the new study as further evidence that US troops were needed for deterrence. Vessey and JCS Chairman Gen. David Jones both added the dramatic new numbers to their arguments.[118]

Members of the East Asia Informal, concerned with the political implications of the withdrawal, recall their skepticism on hearing of the Army study. One felt the new numbers might be "hoked up" to help the Army forestall the withdrawal.[119] Another imagined how the study would affect the pullout but saw little change to the "dynamics of the situation." Nevertheless, these men were happy to have the new estimate as another tool with which to fight the withdrawal. Some immediately saw the news as the possible justification for a Carter reversal; the estimate would provide a face-saving means for Carter to account for relaxing his campaign commitment.[120] In public, however, they continued to speak as if the withdrawal were a foregone conclusion. In a December 1978 speech in New York, Holbrooke described the phased pullout plan and spoke glowingly of future US–South Korean relations.[121] Whatever he may have said in the privacy of the East Asia Informal, Holbrooke gave no hint of it in public.

In January 1979, the essential thrust of the Army study was leaked to *The Army Times* and quickly picked up by other major newspapers. The report renewed the public controversy over the withdrawal. They also brought into the open some skepticism that the Army estimate was biased to help preserve the four-star command in Korea, an attitude strengthened by the fact that the relevation came in a newspaper with close but unofficial ties to the Army and with no track record of investigative journalism involving classified data. But insiders noticed the dual signal being emitted when *The New York Times* correspondent could write that, "White House officials said that the study was unlikely to affect the pace of the American withdrawal, but some said privately they were disturbed that Mr. Carter's decision had appatently been made on the basis of inadequate intelligence."[122]

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Carter immediately ordered CIA and DIA to examine the study, a project they had already undertaken. The combined results would come together in a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) in the spring of 1979.

Shortly after the *The Army Times* story, Senators Nunn, Glenn, Byrd, and Hart completed a 13-month study of the US defense posture in the Pacific and submitted their report to Senator Stennis, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. This "Pacific Study Group" included the most respected Senate experts on defense from the President's own party and covered a wide spectrum of political leanings. The report included the new numbers on the North Korean Army and flatly recommended halting the troop withdrawal. The report concluded:

> *The reassessment casts grave doubts upon the validity of earlier judgments about the nature and stability of the Korean military balance that formed the basis of the administration's decision in 1977 to withdraw US ground troops from Korea. Moreover, the present plans for withdrawal will cost the United States between $1.5 and 2.5 billion without reducing the probability of immediate US combat involvement in a future Korean conflict.*[123]

The results of the report were reviewed at a White House lunch in the cabinet room with Carter, Secretaries Brown and Vance, and the Senators. Each Senator, including Hart who had earlier been open to the policy, indicated he could not support the withdrawal.[124] Carter thus faced opposition from the military and the bureaucracy and what amounted to a revolt within his own party in Congress.

The results of the SNIE were largely a foregone conclusion.[125] Armstrong's findings were essentially confirmed. Most policymakers agree that the outcome for the policy was also a foregone conclusion, even before the end of 1978. The cumulative reaction of key advisers, Congress, the military, and the bureaucracy left Carter isolated, and the political costs of that isolation made the policy untenable. According to Holbrooke, "If the bean counting had gone the other way, we still would have found a reason to suspend the withdrawal."

But the new assessment was clearly a factor. It made enough of an impression on Secretary of State Vance that he devoted a paragraph to the estimate in his memoirs, concluding that, as a result of the estimate leaking to the press, "the President was not happy, feeling that his hand was being forced," which Vance thought was true.[126] In April 1979, the JCS formally recommended the pullout be "suspended" pending another review of the Korean military balance in 1981.[127] Carter delayed making any final decision.

Carter still did not like hearing of the necessity for suspension as he traveled to Korea in July 1979 after a G-7 economic summit in Tokyo. His advisers recognized the President's sensitivity and sent word to President Park not to raise the issue with Carter in their first meeting. Park ignored the warnings, perhaps feeling that the security of his country took precedence over Carter's reluctance to discuss his Korean policy. Park made the withdrawal his first topic, arguing against it for 45 minutes. Vance recalls feeling "the temperature in the room drop as Park continued. . . . Sitting between the President and Harold Brown, I could feel the contained anger of the President, but there was nothing to be done but let the drama play itself out."[128] Carter then talked privately with Park on human rights issues and then, back in his limousine, turned on his advisers.

Carter was furious. The motorcade stood stalled for blocks extending from the Ambassador's residence as Carter "unburdened himself" (Vance's phrase). Carter felt isolated, opposed by all his advisers except Brzezinski. He threatened to announce a decision then and there to press ahead with the withdrawal. His advisers tried to calm him. Brown and Vance joined the American Ambassador to Seoul, William Gleysteen, "in pointing out the vast difficulties that we faced in carrying out the policy as originally announced and the benefits that would accrue from its suspension, especially in light of the new intelligence figures."[129]

As Carter rested, Vance and his aides let their Korean hosts know of Carter's anger. That evening, the Carters were entertained by a delightful Korean chorus that included in its repertoire "Sweet Georgia Brown," and Carter was visibly more relaxed.[130] A few weeks later, back in Washington, Carter decided to suspend the troop withdrawals. The written White House statement accepted the JCS recommendation that the withdrawal was suspended until 1981, "when the timing and pace of further troop cuts in Korea [would] be reexamined." In the President's statement, the first of the three reasons offered for the new

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decision was "recent studies by the Intelligence Community."[131]

Three months later, in October 1979, Park Chung Hee was assassinated at a private dinner by his own chief of intelligence. America moved an aircraft carrier closer to Korea, signaling the North not to take advantage of the change of power in the South.[132] Thirteen months later, Ronald Reagan was elected President. The 1981 review of the withdrawal suspension passed virtually unnoticed. Reagan subsequently appointed General Vessey to be JCS Chairman.

Ten years after *The Army Times* leaked the results of Armstrong's 1978 study, *The Washington Post* reported in January 1989 that, after extensive review, American intelligence had just raised its estimate of North Korean ground forces from 750,000 to 930,000. The results were attributed to "improved methods of estimation."[133] In 1995, the 2d Infantry Division remained in a South Korea under democratic rule, part of a contingent of more than 33,000 American troops. American tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from South Korea in 1992 as part of a global, unilateral initiative from President Bush to retire these anachronistic weapons. Yet the US troop presence endures, even being temporarily reinforced in 1994 during an international crisis triggered by revelations that the North had been conducting a clandestine and illegal program to build nuclear weapons. And Jimmy Carter returned to Korea. But that is another story.

NOTES

1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser* 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, rev. ed., 1985), p. 7.
2. Interview with Brzezinski, Washington, DC, 24 February 1989.
3. Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 128.
4. Interview with Evelyn Cobert, Washington, DC, 23 February 1989.
5. *Ibid.*
6. NIOs are the senior intelligence experts in their regional or functional specialties. They arbitrate IC disputes on issues within their areas and act as liaisons between policymakers and analysts.
7. Colbert.
8. Interview with John Armstrong, Washington, DC, 9 February 1989.
9. An order of battle is a systemic tabulation of numbers and locations of personnel and equipment for a given nation or military unit. They are usually divided functionally into ground, naval, and air orders of battle.
10. Interview with Dick Nelson, Washington, DC, 9 February 1989.
11. Interview with former senior DIA official, Washington, DC, 10 February 1989.
12. Colbert interview.
13. Armstrong. SRD had direct access both to the Commander of INTSCOM, the Intelligence and Security Command, and to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, or ACSI, the Army's senior intelligence officer in the structure at that time.
14. Armstrong.
15. Testimony of Gen. John Vessey, *Impact of Intelligence Reassessment on Withdrawal of US Troops from Korea,* Hearings, Investigations Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 21 June and 17 July 1979, p. 64.
16. Vessey testimony and interview, Gen. John Vessey, Washington, DC, 21 March 1989.
17. Russell Spurr, "Fingers on the Trigger," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* 4 July 1975, p. 28.
18. Interview with CIA analyst, Washington, DC, 9 February 1989.
19. Colbert.
20. All numbers here taken from testimony of Rep. Les Aspin, *Impact of Intelligence Assessment,* pp. 5-6.
21. US Senate, Humphrey-Glenn Report, *US Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea,* Report to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9 January 1978.
22. Vance, *Hard Choices,* p. 128.
23. Richard Halloran, "Carter Sees Pullout From Korea by 1982," *The New York Times,* 10 March 1977, p. 9.
24. *The New York Times,* 6 June 1977.
25. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "PRM-10 and the Korean Pullout," *The Washington Post,* 7 September 1977.
26. Richard Halloran, "A Partial US Pullout from South Korea Now Seems Inevitable," *The New York Times,* 27 February 1977; see also the analysis by Don Oberdorfer in *The Washington Post,* 12 June 1977, p. A15.

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27. Colbert.

28. Senior DIA official.

29. *The New York Times*, 23 February 1978; *The Washington Post*, 22 April 1978.

30. Interview with Henry Shaw (senior official at the Office of Management and Budget under Carter), 21 February 1989.

31. *The New York Times*, 19 May 1977, p. A4.

32. Shaw.

33. Interview with Philip Habib, 23 April 1989.

34. Interview with Richard Holbrooke, 13 April 1989.

35. Brzezinski.

36. Interview with Armacost, Washington, DC, 20 March 1989.

37. Brzezinski.

38. *The New York Times*, 14 July 1977, p. 7.

39. Vessey testimony and interview.

40. Vessey.

41. Holbrooke. Confirmed in interview with Morton Abramowitz, Washington, DC, 14 April 1989.

42. Colbert.

43. Humphrey–Glenn Report, p. 20.

44. Colbert.

45. Interviews with Stansfield Turner, 20 February and 3 March 1989.

46. Former senior intelligence official.

47. Turner.

48. Colbert.

49. Spurr, "*Fingers on the Trigger.*"

50. *The Washington Post*, 27 May 1977, p. 1.

51. *The Washington Post*, 27 May 1977, p. 8.

52. *The New York Times*, 10 December 1976.

53. Holbrooke.

54. *The New York Times*, 5 April 1977.

55. Jack Anderson and Les Whitten. *The Washington Post*, 24 February 1976.

56. *The Washington Post*, 26 October 1977.

57. Holbrooke.

58. Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 129.

59. *The New York Times*, 18 June 1977, p. 4.

60. Humphrey–Glenn report, p. 47.

61. House Armed Services Committee, Investigations Subcommittee Report, *Review of the Policy Decision to Withdraw United States Ground Forces from Korea*, 26 April 1978, pp. 3, 8-9.

62. *The Washington Post*, 19 May 1977, p. A14.

63. *Ibid.*

64. *The Washington Star*, 25 May 1977, p. 1.

65. *The New York Times*, 23 May 1977.

66. *The New York Times*, 27 July 1977, p. 1.

67. *The New York Times*, 22 April 1978, p. 1.

68. *The New York Times*, 27 April 1978, p. 6.

69. *The New York Times*, 27 July 1978, p.7.

70. Colbert.

71. *The New York Times*, 13 December 1977, p. 4.

72. *The New York Times*, 19 February 1978, p. 3.

73. Abramowitz, Armacost, Holbrooke.

74. Brzezinski.

75. Interview with Thayer, 14 April 1989.

76. Brzezinski to the President, Weekly memo #39, US Position in Asia, 9 December 1977, abstracted in Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, Annex II, p. 560.

77. Brzezinski.

78. Armstrong.

79. Vessey testimony; Armstrong.

80. Interview with Gen. Eugene Tighe, San Diego, 31 March 1989.

81. Armstrong.

82. Tighe.

83. Interview with Barry Watts, 10 February 1989.

84. Armstrong; Vessey testimony.

85. Armstrong and others.

86. Armstrong.

87. Armstrong.

88. Several analysts offered consistent versions of this story. Turner does not recall the incident, but he

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thinks it plausible. Tighe thinks the party elements are plausible, but he does not recall details.

89. Eyewitness descriptions of Tighe at the briefing, from Army and DIA officials, include "livid", and "clearly hot." Tighe's reaction during and after the briefing was described, again from both Army and DIA sources, as "all hell broke loose."

90. Tighe, Armstrong.

91. Armstrong.

92. Interview with Alan MacDougall, Washington, DC, 9 February 1989.

93. Tighe and interview with Gen. Ed Thompson, Kennebunkport, 27 March 1989.

94. Tighe plays down such rivalry in retrospect, but several analysts recall it was a concern at the time.

95. Armstrong.

96. CIA analyst; Colbert.

97. Thayer.

98. Armstrong; also Nelson; also interview with Andrew Marshall, Washington, DC, 24 February 1989.

99. Nelson.

100. MacDougall.

101. Interview with Harry Tear, 23 April 1989.

102. Senior DIA official.

103. Armstrong.

104. Nelson; CIA analyst.

105. MacDougall.

106. Tear.

107. Turner; senior DIA official.

108. Senior DIA official.

109. Tear, MacDougall.

110. MacDougall.

111. MacDougall.

112. The exact numbers vary among the open reports. These figures are taken from *The New York Times*, 21 January 1979, p. 15. See also *The Army Times*, 8 January 1979, p. 1; *The Washington Post*, 4 January 1979, p. 1; and, most comprehensively, Rep. Aspin's testimony before the HASC Investigations Subcommittee, which gives the final figure as 37 divisions.

113. Turner.

114. Brzezinski.

115. Brzezinski to the President, Weekly memo #75, "Our Asian Policy—or the Making of a Carter Doctrine," 13 October 1978, abstracted in Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, Annex II, p. 563. This memo does not mention Korea, or even Japan. Brzezinski's singleminded focus on China prompted Carter, though he was the policy's sponsor, to note on the memo: "Zbig—you have a tendency to exalt PRC issue."

116. *The Washington Post*, 4 January 1979, p. 1.

117. Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 129.

118. Holbrooke.

119. Abramowitz, Armacost, Holbrooke.

120. Thayer.

121. *Department of State Bulletin*, February 1979.

122. Richard Burt, "New Study Raises Estimate of North Korean Army Strength," *The New York Times*, 4 January 1979.

123. US Senate, *Report of the Pacific Study Group to the Committee on Armed Services*, 23 January 1979.

124. Holbrooke.

125. CIA analyst; Armstrong. DIA did not complete its review by the time the SNIE was published, but its objections at that point were small.

126. Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 129.

127. *The New York Times*, 18 July 1979, p. A4.

128. Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 129.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

130. Holbrooke; Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 130.

131. *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1979, p. 37; *The New York Times*, 21 July 1979, p. 3.

132. *The New York Times*, 27 October 1979, p. 1.

133. *The Washington Post*, 26 January 1989, p. A20.

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The Transition to President Johnson

John Helgerson

Editor's Note: This article is drawn from an historical study prepared by the author entitled Getting To Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1992, *which is being published by CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence.*

The transition to President Johnson was abrupt for the US Intelligence Community as it was for the rest of the country. In some respects, it was also as uncertain. Johnson had received a number of intelligence briefings as Chairman of the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, and later as Senate Majority leader. He had met on one occasion with Allen Dulles in July 1960 while a vice-presidential candidate, but neither Dulles nor his successor, John McCone, had paid much attention to keeping Johnson informed during the intervening years.

Johnson, in turn, had paid little attention to the products of the Intelligence Community while he was Vice President. Each day his office received the Agency's *Current Intelligence Bulletin*, a widely distributed product that contained less sensitive and less highly classified information than was included in the *President's Intelligence Checklist*. Although the *Checklist* at the end of the Kennedy presidency was being sent also to the Secretaries of Defense and State and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Johnson was unaware of its existence. For reasons undoubtedly growing out of the earlier political rivalry between Kennedy and Johnson, McGeorge Bundy's deputy, Bromley Smith, early in the Kennedy presidency had ordered that "under no circumstances should the *Checklist* be given to Johnson."[1]

> **"In reality, there was nothing usual or regular about the DCI's involvement in a morning briefing, but McCone obviously believed he needed to take an extraordinary initiative to establish a relationship with the new President."**

On Saturday morning, 23 November 1963, the day following Kennedy's assassination, DCI John McCone instructed his Executive Assistant, Walter Elder, to telephone Johnson's secretary and inform her that he would be at the White House at 9:00 a.m. as usual to give the President the regular morning intelligence briefing.[2] In reality, there was nothing usual or regular about the DCI's involvement in a morning briefing, but McCone obviously believed he needed to take an extraordinary initiative to establish a relationship with the new President.

McCone was waiting in Bundy's office in the basement of the West Wing when the President entered at approximately 9:15. Johnson had been an infrequent visitor to those quarters, which also include the White House Situation Room, but he was forced to come there for the meeting because Kennedy's office had not yet been cleared out. R. J. Smith, CIA's Director of Current Intelligence, was present and talked briefly with Johnson in Bundy's outer office, writing later that "he looked massive, rumpled, and worried."[3]

A Good Start

Despite the irregular and strained nature of the circumstances, McCone accomplished his mission during that first meeting with President Johnson. The President

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expressed his confidence in McCone, who, in turn, reassured the new President that he and the Agency stood ready to support him in every way. McCone introduced the President to the *Checklist* and reviewed with him the unspectacular substantive items in the publication that day. Johnson had few questions during their 15-minute session, but he did agree that McCone should brief him personally each morning, at least for the next several days. The President asked that the Director bring any urgent matters to his attention at any time, day or night.

The *Checklist* shown to Johnson on that first occasion was a bulky publication containing five unusually long items and six additional notes. R. J. Smith explained to Bromley Smith that the Agency tried to provide, as unobtrusively as possible, a bit of extra background for Johnson. Bromley Smith approved the strategy but added that he hoped the Agency would not be too obvious in its tutorials. In his memoirs, Johnson wrote of his relief to discover "on that sad November morning" that the international front was peaceful and that there was nothing in the material McCone brought to him that required an immediate decision.[4]

McCone met with Johnson almost every day for a two- to three-week period, briefing him on virtually all the world's trouble spots. At these meetings, the President urged the director to ensure that CIA was providing the FBI all information and support appropriate to its investigation of the background of President Kennedy's assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. McCone in turn provided Johnson information available in CIA files on Oswald.

McCone also used these opportunities to inform the President of a variety of CIA covert action and technical collection programs, including the successful effort to build what became known as the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft to augment the U-2. McCone brought the President up to date on the status of the program (by that time a number of aircraft had been built) and to brief him on an exchange that McCone had with President Kennedy about the advisability of surfacing the program publicly. Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara had urged Kennedy to make a public announcement of the aircraft's existence, and Kennedy was inclined to do so. Upon hearing a discussion of the political and security issues involved, however, Johnson decided to postpone any public announcement of the program, at least until the following spring (in fact, the President revealed the existence of the aircraft at a press conference in February 1964). In the meantime, he ordered McCone to get as many aircraft produced and deployed to the operating site as possible.

Vietnam

The most significant issue Johnson and McCone discussed during this period undoubtedly was Vietnam. McCone was straightforward in providing the Agency's analysis of the course of war there. Initially, this won him points with the new President, who had not favored certain of the steps taken in Vietnam by his predecessor, but it was to lead ultimately to a falling out between McCone and Johnson.

On 24 November, two days after Kennedy's assassination, Johnson met at 3:00 p.m. in the Executive Office Building with Rusk, McNamara, George Ball, Bundy, McCone, and Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge. According to McCone, Lodge informed the group that the United States had not been involved in the recent coup against President Diem.[5] In fact, Lodge had instructed that South Vietnamese generals be made aware that the US Government had lost confidence in Diem and was kept aware of the events before and during the coup on 1 November. During the course of the military takeover, Diem was captured and then killed.

Lodge maintained that the population of South Vietnam was happy as a result of the coup, showing the group some pictures of crowds in Saigon. Lodge argued that the change in government had been an improvement and that he was hopeful about the course of the war, expecting "marked progress" by February or March 1964. He also stated, without elaboration, that there were indications that North Vietnam might be interested in some unspecified arrangements that would be satisfactory to the United States. McCone wrote in his memorandum for the record that Lodge's statements were "optimistic, hopeful, and left the President with the impression that we were on the road to victory."

McCone registered with the group a much more pessimistic CIA assessment. He cited the continuing increase in Viet Cong activity over the previous month, predicting additional sustained guerrilla pressures. The Director pointed out that the South Vietnamese military was having considerable trouble organizing

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the government and was receiving little help from civilian leaders, who seemed to be staying on the sidelines. McCone said the Intelligence Community could not give an optimistic appraisal of the future.

Johnson stated that he approached the situation in Vietnam with misgivings and was anxious about voices in the Congress calling on the United States to get out. He was particularly doubtful that the United States had taken the right course in upsetting the Diem regime, although he recognized it was a fait accompli with which he would have to live. The President included in his remarks some harsh criticisms about the divisions within US ranks about the conduct of the war. He made clear that he wanted to replace several key figures in the US country team in Saigon and dictated that he "wanted no more divisions of opinion, no more bickering, and any person that did not conform to policy should be removed."

Asking for Advice

When McCone saw the President on the following days for their discussions of the daily *Checklist*, the President regularly raised the question of Vietnam. Despite his comments about differences of opinion, he appeared to appreciate the fact that McCone's assessment did not correspond to what he was hearing from others. The President repeatedly asked for the Director's appraisal of the situation, but the continuing exchange between the two ultimately proved troublesome for the Director. In large part, this was because Johnson sought McCone's advice on the sensitive issue of who should "run the show" in South Vietnam and discussed his thoughts on possible impending personnel changes among his advisers and ambassadors.

Johnson remarked to McCone that, although he appreciated the work the DCI was doing in intelligence, he did not want him to confine himself to that role. The President invited the Director to come to him personally with suggestions for courses of action on policy that McCone thought wise, even if his ideas were not consistent with the advice others were providing. Johnson mentioned specifically that he was not satisfied with the advice he was receiving on nuclear testing, Cuba, and South Vietnam. Regarding the latter, the President again questioned McCone about the real future in South Vietnam, underscoring his desire for an "objective appraisal." The President specifically asked for any recommendations that the DCI might have for modifying Vietnam policy.

Johnson's confiding in McCone during the first two weeks of his presidency clearly flattered the CIA Director but also put him in an awkward position with other key players in the government, as well as with his obligation as DCI to provide objective intelligence assessments. Within months, events were to reveal that McCone probably took the President more literally than he should have. The Director's candor in providing advice to the President eventually led to a strained relationship.

The Cuba Problem

The President was not so completely preoccupied with Vietnam that he did not remember to focus on another enduring problem—the Castro regime in Cuba. Within a week of becoming President, he asked McCone how effective US policy was regarding Cuba and what the CIA projected to be the future of that country. Johnson was especially interested in the effectiveness of the economic embargo of Cuba and wanted to know what the Agency planned to do to dispose of Castro.

The President said he did not want any repetition of "the fiasco of 1961," but he felt the Cuban situation was one with which the United States could not live and regarding which the CIA needed to propose a more aggressive strategy. Johnson informed McCone that he looked to the CIA for firm recommendations.

Meetings and Briefings

Initially, it was unclear whether Johnson would return to a system of regular NSC meetings or continue the more casual Kennedy approach. There was, therefore, much interest in the NSC meeting that the President called for 5 December 1963. At that meeting, McCone was to brief the group on the Soviet military and economic situation. He prepared thoroughly for this first NSC meeting with the new President, bringing one assistant, Clinton Conger, and a number of large briefing charts to the meeting.

To McCone's surprise, Johnson had invited to the meeting the chairmen and ranking minority members of the leading Congressional committees. The Director accommodated this novel approach by quickly briefing the Congressional leaders on the

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
fact of, and restrictions related to, communications intercepts, which were to be mentioned during the briefing. Just as the meeting began, however, there was another surprise when the President gave a nod and in came his White House photographer. McCone was aghast as the photographer began shooting pictures left and right. He turned around with a start to confirm that Conger had managed to turn over a map of Soviet ICBM sites before the first pictures were taken of that end of the room.

In the subsequent months, it was to become clear that Johnson was no more enamored of weekly NSC meetings than Kennedy had been. When such meetings were held, however, they normally began with an intelligence briefing presented by McCone.

Eroding Confidence

With few formal NSC meetings, thus providing few opportunities for formal CIA briefings, much of the Agency's relationship with the new President came to rest on the briefings McCone was providing Johnson privately. Unfortunately, these soon became a casualty of the differences emerging between the two men regarding Vietnam.

The momentum of McCone's contacts with Johnson was interrupted by a trip the Director took in December 1963 to review the Vietnamese situation. It was his second trip to Saigon since becoming DCI, and McCone was discouraged by what he found. His pessimism led him to be skeptical of proposals McNamara had made for an extended program of clandestine raids against North



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Vietnam in early 1964. During a subsequent trip to Vietnam in March 1964, McCone's reservations deepened, and he concluded that the war effort, even with McNamara's enhancements, was not succeeding.

McCone recommended to the President a six-point program to reverse the deteriorating situation. It was a program that would involve escalation significantly beyond anything considered by McNamara and Johnson. Johnson refused to accept the DCI's recommendations. As the President came to side with McNamara's approach to the conduct of the war, he became increasingly impatient with McCone and with the continuing differences between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. By the end of March 1964, Johnson clearly had lost confidence in McCone and interest in his regular intelligence updates. In the succeeding months McCone attempted periodically to restart his briefings of the President, at least on an occasional basis, but Johnson turned him aside.

In June 1964, the Director informed the President for the first time that he would like to resign as soon as Johnson had decided on a successor.[6] Despite his growing disenchantment with McCone, Johnson insisted that he remain in his post until after the presidential election in November 1964.

Evolution to the President's Daily Brief


Providing the *Checklist* to President Kennedy had worked so well that CIA naturally hoped the arrangement would continue with Johnson, but this was not to be. In his first weeks as President, Johnson read the *Checklist* and seemed interested in discussing its contents during his meetings with McCone. After those meetings stopped, however, Johnson tended not to read the daily publication.

Observing that Johnson was no longer reading the *Checklist*, Brig. Gen. Chester Clifton (who had stayed on from the Kennedy Administration as military aide to the President) proposed the idea of a twice-weekly intelligence report. CIA managers thought this strategy was worth a try. In truth, they thought that anything that would catch the President's eye was worth a try; several formats were offered during this period. They had been dismayed by Bromley Smith's assessment that Johnson was probably disinclined to read the *Checklist* because he regarded it as Kennedy's publication. He was still smarting because he had not been permitted to receive it as Vice President.

On 9 January, the first issue of the semiweekly *President's Intelligence Review* was taken to Clifton at the White House. The next morning Clifton called current intelligence specialist Richard Lehman at CIA to report that he had shown the new publication to the President at breakfast and it had "worked like a charm." At the end of January, Clifton again made a point of seeking Johnson's reaction to the *Intelligence Review*. The President observed at

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The new *President's Daily Brief* designed specifically for President Johnson... obviously appealed to the President.

that point that he found it a valuable supplement to the intelligence briefings he received and wanted the publication to continue without change.

Although the President read primarily the semiweekly review, his staff requested that the *Checklist* continue to be published on a daily basis to enable them to answer the President's frequent spur-of-the-moment questions. With the President not reading the *Checklist* most days, McCone decided he would expand its readership; he obtained permission to send it to four additional officials in the State Department, two more in Defense and in the Joint Chiefs, and to the offices of the Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney General.

The practice of producing two Presidential intelligence publications worked well through the election year of 1964. The President typically read the *Review* on the return leg of campaign trips, and his staff felt well supported with the daily *Checklist*. As the election neared, however, Secretary of State Rusk expressed to McCone his concern about the security of the *Checklist* as a result of its expanded dissemination. Rusk was worried about possible leaks regarding sensitive policy issues during the campaign. The DCI was more concerned about the basic question of whether it made any sense to publish a "Presidential" *Checklist* when the President himself almost never read it, but agreed something should be done.

Meanwhile, during the 1964 electoral campaign Johnson's opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater, set a precedent by declining to receive intelligence briefings. In July, after consulting with the President, McCone had telephoned Goldwater to offer customary briefings. According to Elder, Goldwater replied only that he would consider it. Within hours, an assistant called to decline, explaining that the Senator appreciated the offer but felt he had all the information he needed to conduct his campaign. McCone, reflecting a frustration he and Johnson shared, mused "he probably does; the Air Force tells him everything he wants to know."

Responding to the concerns of the Secretary of State and the DCI about the circulation of the *Checklist*, R. J. Smith proposed that the most graceful way for the Agency to drop a number of the readers of the *Checklist* would be to discontinue the publication and produce a new one. Smith observed that the Agency would maximize the likelihood that Johnson would accept a new publication and read it regularly if it were produced to conform as much as possible to his work habits. Because Johnson did much of his reading at night, in bed, Smith recommended that the publication be published and delivered in the late afternoon as the *Review* had been, rather than in the morning like the *Checklist*. Smith's proposal was accepted, and after the election both the *Checklist* and the *Review* were dropped.

Gaining Acceptance

The new *President's Daily Brief* (PDB) designed specifically for President Johnson, was delivered to the White House on 1 December. Its fresh appearance obviously appealed to the President. His assistant, Jack Valenti, sent the first issue back to Bundy with word that the President read it, liked it, and wanted it continued. Quite apart from the packaging of the current intelligence, President Johnson, like other presidents, was becoming a closer reader of the daily products as he became increasingly enmeshed in foreign policy matters. By mid-February 1965, for example, he was reading not only the PDB but also CIA's daily Vietnam situation report. Bromley Smith insisted it be delivered at 8:00 a.m. each day so that it could be sent to the President early.

In early 1965, Johnson agreed that the time had come for McCone to return to the private sector. That understanding undoubtedly was furthered by a letter the Director delivered to Johnson on 2 April in which the Director argued against an expanded land war in Vietnam and concluded that US bombing was ineffective.[7] By coincidence, the day that McCone passed the directorship of CIA to his successor, Adm. William Raborn—28 April—was also the day US Marines landed in the Dominican Republic to deal with the crisis there. It was during the Dominican crisis that word was received that the PDB had taken firm root in the White House. Presidential spokesman Bill Moyers said on 21 May, approximately six months after the PDB had been launched, that the President read it "avidly."

The PDB process that was in place in early 1965 continued more or less unchanged throughout the Johnson Administration. CIA did not receive from Johnson the steady presidential

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feedback that it had received from Kennedy. The Agency knew, however, that the President was reading the PDB regularly, and Johnson's aides, usually Bromley Smith, were consistently helpful in passing back the President's reactions, criticisms, and requests. The only significant change made in the PDB process came when the President again reversed himself and indicated he wanted to receive the PDB early in the morning rather than in the evening. He had decided that he wanted to see the PDB at 6:30 a.m., before he began reading the morning newspapers.

Those newspapers later provided conclusive evidence that the publication was reaching the President. Agency personnel were surprised one morning to see a photograph in the papers showing the President and Mrs. Johnson sitting in the White House in dressing gowns. Mrs. Johnson was holding their first grandson while the President was reading a copy of the *President's Daily Brief.*

NOTES

1. Richard Lehman. Interview by the author in McLean, Va., 10 March 1993.
2. Walter Elder. Interview by the author in McLean, Va., 21 April 1993.
3. R. J. Smith. *The Unknown CIA*; Washington; Pergamon-Brassy's; 1989; p.163.
4. Lyndon Johnson. *The Vantage Point*; New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston; 1971; p.22.
5. John McCone, Memorandum for the Record, "South Vietnam Situation," 25 November 1961.
6. Elder interview, 21 April 1993.
7. *Ibid.*

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Intelligence Production During The Helms Regime (b)(3)(c)

Russell Jack Smith

Editor's Note: The following article originally appeared as a chapter in the biography of Richard Helms that was published by CIA's History Staff in 1993. The author abridged it for Studies in Intelligence.

When Richard Helms became DCI on 30 June 1966, he took command of a mature, smoothly functioning organization for producing finished intelligence. Most of this intelligence was disseminated to the President and his foreign policy advisers in one of two ways: through formal National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), or in various publications of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), ranging from daily periodicals such as *The President's Daily Brief* to long-range, in-depth studies of political, economic, and strategic developments worldwide. (b)(3)(c)

Then as now, these two forms of production were not mutually exclusive in either subject or scope. For example, in dealing with the primary preoccupation of the period, the Vietnam war, Helms used both methods to provide intelligence support for the planning and implementation of policy. NIEs, usually thought to be broad in scope, on occasion addressed short-range, contingent matters, while DI memorandums undertook the analysis of long-range trends. (b)(3)(c)

By June 1966, the Office of National Estimates (ONE) was in its 16th year and had become entrenched by personnel and procedures that dated back to the Eisenhower administration. Under the leadership of Sherman Kent, ONE consisted of a board of senior officers and a staff of 25 generalists. ONE followed a routinized procedure for producing NIEs. The staff prepared a draft, based in part on contributions from intelligence analysts in the Departments of State and Defense. The board then reviewed, amended, and approved it and sent it to be coordinated word for word with the other departments. The draft was forwarded to the DCI for approval and finally presented to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB)—a senior panel of representatives from the various intelligence agencies—for coordination, final approval, and distribution. The process normally took weeks, but at special request could be reduced to days or even hours (b)(3)(c)

By the mid-1960s subjects of the NIEs had become fixed by custom established during the Eisenhower administration, when NIEs were often prepared as annexes to policy papers for the National Security Council (NSC). Some NIEs, particularly those dealing with the USSR, were done annually; others every two or three years. By 1966, ONE was producing about 60 NIEs annually, of which about 75 percent were programmed in advance and 25 percent dealt with emergent conditio (b)(3)(c)

Richard Helms's career to this point had been exclusively in the Directorate of Plans (now designated the Directorate of Operations), and there was concern that he might, like Allen Dulles, give estimates secondary ranking in his priorities. But from the outset Helms took an active interest in the quality and timeliness of NIEs. At his second chairing of

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Russell Jack Smith served as Deputy Director for Intelligence during Richard Helms's tenure as DCI.

(b)(3)(c)

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USIB, he complemented ONE on the timeliness of NIE 14.3-66, "*North Vietnam's Military Potential for Fighting in South Vietnam*," noting that this subject was of maximum interest to policy people at the moment.[1] At a subsequent meeting he marked on how well a recent Panama estimate had held up during a White House discuss(b)(3)(c)

DCI Helms valued NIEs primarily for their timeliness. Their usual long leadtimes did not always make estimates emerge at the moment they were urgently needed. He constantly struggled to minimize this problem. Once, he told ONE that a paper on Jordan was too urgently needed to permit normal coordination procedure.[2] Later, he prodded Kent to expedite NIE 11-8-67, "*Soviet Advanced Weapons Systems*," because Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had requested its early delivery.[3] The relative sluggishness and inflexibility of the NIE production process caused Helms in his later years to turn more to other modes of production and communication.(b)(3)(c)

Within the DI, research and analytic skill had matured by 1966 to a level that gave CIA acknowledged preeminence in intelligence production. In the early years of the Agency, this had not been true, and coordination with the intelligence units of State and Defense had often improved papers. This shift in the balance of analytic expertise, combined with the quick, pointed response of CIA internal production, led Helms to turn increasingly to CIA papers to meet White House and NSC nee(b)(3)(c)

The DI served as the primary spokesman for the Agency. As the production workhorse of CIA, the DI produced an array of publications ranging from daily periodicals to encyclopedic country surveys. Within the DI, the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) played the major role in production. Other producing offices were Economic Research (OER), Strategic Research (OSR), and Basic and Geographic Intelligence (OBGI).(b)(3)(c)

By 1966, the Vietnam war had become a major US undertaking, and CIA intelligence production pertaining to key issues in the conflict became crucial. Most CIA reporting and analysis was considerably less positive than the prevailing views of President Johnson and the administration. Early in Helms's tenure, a study was done in response to a request from Secretary McNamara for an estimate of North Vietnamese will to continue fighting. Titled "*The Will to Persist*," the study came to the pessimistic conclusion that US efforts in Vietnam as currently planned were not likely to deter the North Vietnamese nor slacken their effort in the foreseeable future. Despite this unwelcome message, Johnson commended the memorandum as a "first-rate job" and requested Helms to brief three key senators—Mansfield, Fulbright, and Russell—on its contents. Helms later concluded that the study failed to alter any senatorial positions: Fulbright vociferously maintained the struggle was a civil war; Mansfield was noncommittal but thought the study "thorough and objective"; and Russell said he shared the study's conclusions.[4] (b)(3)(c)

In this same period, McNamara requested the DDI to undertake analysis of the effectiveness of ROLLING THUNDER, the US bombing program over North Vietnam. Although first-class competence in logistics existed in OER, this was a remarkable request for a Secretary of Defense to make of a civilian agency, and I felt obliged to ask McNamara whether he wished to have the study coordinated with the Pentagon. "No," he said, "I already know what the Air Force believes. I want to know what your smart guys think." (b)(3)(c)

Like the study on Vietnamese morale, the ROLLING THUNDER memorandum arrived at a pessimistic conclusion: CIA logistics analysis demonstrated that ROLLING THUNDER was not significant in slowing the flow of men and materiel into South Vietnam. McNamara was so impressed with the quality of the analysis that he asked the ROLLING THUNDER assessment be repeated on a quarterly basis. Successor studies continued, with Helms's backing, to declare unflinchingly that ROLLING THUNDER was failing in its objective, ultimately judging that the North Vietnamese had succeeded in the teeth of the bombing program to improve their ability to move materiel south by five times.(b)(3)(c)

In September 1967, CIA analysts produced another highly controversial study on the war in Indochina—this time a sensitive, tightly held memorandum written by John W. Huizenga, chairman of the Board of National Estimates, and titled "*Implications of an Unfavorable Outcome in Vietnam.*" This study spelled out the view dominant among CIA analysts that a US–South Vietnamese defeat did not necessarily mean a collapse of the rest of non-Communist Southeast Asia. In taking this position, Huizenga was both maintaining a long-held Agency position and challenging the so-called domino theory.(b)(3)(c)

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"The sharpest controversy over a Vietnam issue arose over the differences between the military, especially the command in Saigon, and CIA over the strength of the enemy force."

The sharpest controversy over a Vietnam issue arose over the differences between the military, especially the command in Saigon, and CIA over the strength of the enemy force. This came to a head in 1967 during the preparation of an estimate, SNIE 14.3-67, "*Capabilities of the Vietnam Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam.*" The sources of the differences in judgment were many and complex, and they included differing interpretations of equivocal evidence, varying definitions of enemy organizational structure and order-of-battle categories, and differing concepts of the war itself. Such controversies were not new, but it was unprecedented for a civilian, Washington-based intelligence unit to take issue with an American army fighting in the field over the size and composition of the enemy forces that army faced. By tradition, assessing the enemy's order of battle was a strictly military responsibility.(b)(3)(c)

DI analysts had wrestled with military analysts for months before the preparation of SNIE 14.3-67. Helms had been made aware of the controversy at the outset of his tenure. Two weeks after becoming DCI, he ordered CIA components to review and improve their procedure for maintaining Vietnam statistics.[5] Six months later, he urged great care in producing figures on Vietnam.[6] But the controversy continued, and in June 1967, Helms directed the DDI to sort out and rationalize differences between CIA and DIA on the number of defections and recruits in Vietnam, one of the points of disagreement.[7] (b)(3)(c)

By July 1976, the disagreement was full blown and seemingly irreconcilable. It centered around the number of non-main-force units (that is, guerrillas, people's militia, part-time combatants). The military's estimate was roughly half as large as CIA's. The DDI based its estimates of non-main-force strength largely on the work of Samuel Adams, who sifted figures from a large volume of low-grade material, such as interrogations of prisoners of war.[8] (b)(3)(c)

In early July 1967, Helms ordered SNIE 14.3-67 withdrawn from USIB consideration and remanded for further work.[9] The controversy between Washington and Saigon remained unresolved for the rest of July and much of August. A new draft of the SNIE emerged again with the wide-open split retained. Helms felt that a split of this dimension was not useful. He ordered the draft withdrawn from USIB once again and ordered work to be suspended while a team of analysts went to Saigon to make one more attempt to find agreement with MACV. George Carver, DCI Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, headed a team of CIA and DIA analysts(b)(3)(c)

The Saigon discussions—"pretty warm and pretty bloody," in Carver's words—disclosed that much of the disagreement derived from differing concepts about Vietnamese military organizations. As Carver later explained, "The Vietnamese simply do not wire together their structure the way we do." There also were differences over nomenclature. To CIA analysts, a guerrilla was any person engaged in part-time military activity. To MACV analysts, a guerrilla was a person in a military unit subordinate to a provincial or regional committee. Added to that, "spongy" evidence, especially that based on POW interrogations, offered varying interpretations.[10] (b)(3)(c)

Progress toward agreement was slow. There was little disagreement on main-force numbers, but the irregular numbers remained in dispute, with the CIA holding to a number nearly double that of MACV. At this point, Carver proposed to Helms that he meet privately with Gen. William Westmoreland, commander of MACV, and offer a compromise formulation. Helms instructed Carver to proceed according to his own best judgment. (b)(3)(c)

In a private session, Carver proposed that the estimate should break the order of battle into three parts. First, for main-force units where there was little dispute, a single figure would be given. Second, for those ancillary components for which there was some hard evidence but not enough to support a single figure, a range of numbers would be used, such as "between 20 thousand and 40 thousand." Finally, those components for which the evidence was too soft to provide an agreed figure would be described in words, not numbers. Westmoreland bought this proposal, and agreement on strength figures for SNIE 14.3-67 had finally been reached. (b)(3)(c)

The dispute between CIA and MACV had been so protracted that much of official Washington was aware of it. President Johnson,

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impatient, asked Carver, "Can't you people get together? You're all dealing with the same pool of evidence, aren't you?" But the dispute was not an idle bureaucratic rumpus. The differing numbers supported different views of the state of the war. MACV's numbers suggested that progress had been made, while CIA's numbers indicated that a large manpower pool remained untouched. Despite presidential impatience, Helms received no pressure from any source to conform to the military's estimates, As Helms explains, "Johnson, and McNamara particularly, had confidence in what we were trying to do."[11] Even so, Helms felt a strong obligation to arrive at an agreed figure the White House and the Secretary of Defense could use for fighting the war. The Westmoreland-Carver compromise, which Helms endorsed, brought that agreement. (b)(3)(c)

In retrospect, it seems that it would have been simplistic and intellectually dishonest to insist that the higher CIA figure for irregular forces was carved in granite, based as it was on flimsy evidence and a complex methodology. As to a suggestion that Helms trimmed his judgment on the matter, Carver says, "I never knew him to trim on a judgment, and certainly ... never did he direct me to trim. (b)(3)(c)

The publication of SNIE 14.3-67 marked the end of a battle but not the end of the war. During active discussions between CIA and DIA in March 1968, CIA maintained the position that in the quasipolitical war in Vietnam it was essential to base enemy strength estimates on "the organized opposition," as Carver dubbed it, as opposed to classic order-of-battle numbers. MACV continued to oppose the higher numbers for irregular units, and it was only after a change of administration and numerous sharp exchanges that consensus was reached. In July 1970, Helms instructed me to send a memorandum with the agreed numbers to Henry Kissinger with a copy flagged for President Nixon.[13] (b)(3)(c)

Another sharp disagreement between CIA and MACV on a Vietnam-related issue occurred regarding Cambodia. In July the White House called for improved intelligence collection on Vietnam and Cambodia.[14] Helms pushed for intensified efforts to shore up the "flimsiness" of the Agency's intelligence on these two countries.[15] White House discontent with the Agency's performance came to a head over the issue of the amount of war materiel moving through Sihanoukville into South Vietnam. The OER analysts who had done superb work on ROLLING THUNDER were now working on the Sihanoukville problem and, once again, CIA and MACV went head to head. As with the Vietnam irregular numbers problem, the intelligence reports available were of poor quality. Guided in part by the judgment that the flow down the Ho Chi Minh Trail was approximately sizable enough to account for the enemy materiel in South Vietnam, DI analysts arrived at a tonnage figure for Sihanoukville approximately half MACV's figure. (b)(3)(c)

Helms had been aware of the controversy which had begun during the last year of the Johnson administration. Both Carver and I had been instructed to make special efforts during visits to Saigon to find common ground with MACV. We discovered that the military analysts were using materials identical with those in Washington and that those analysts were modest to the point of being tentative about their high figure. The CIA leadership therefore decided that the OER figure was the best that could be established from such inferior materials. (b)(3)(c)

The matter remained in this st(b)(1) until (b)(3)(c) warehouse records listing Communist shipments received. These records showed that tonnage flowing into Sihanoukville and thence into South Vietnam was twice that of the CIA figure, or about that predicted by the MA(b)(1) analysts. I reported this new (b)(3)(n) to Helms in late July 1970 and pointed out that this brought into question the CIA tonnage estimates for Sihanoukville. OER immediately revised its figures, incorporating the new reports, and Helms delivered the new study to Kissinger, together with an explanation of the analytic methodology applied. (b)(3)(c)

It was an acutely embarrassing moment for the DCI, and the entire episode served to reinforce the negative impression the Nixon administration held of CIA analysis. To Nixon, Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Laird, it seemed CIA had made a negative assessment of ROLLING THUNDER, and now had only belatedly agreed with administration's view of the importance of Sihanoukville. The tendentiousness

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of this pattern seemed obvious to political figures who were prone to regard anyone outside the White House coterie as partisan. In the atmosphere of the early 1970s, this demonstration of CIA fallibility became an indictment of CIA integrity. (b)(3)(c)

Throughout this episode, Helms kept his confidence in the objectivity and competence of his analysts. No reprimands were made for poor performance. The integrity of OER analysts was amply demonstrated by their immediate and complete about-face when solid evidence came to hand. Helms speaks of the episode philosophically:

> *Obviously, I was not pleased about Sihanoukville.... But you've got to take the good with the bad. Anyone who goes into the intelligence business, I think, goes into it with a recognition that God did not give prescience to human beings....And therefore you've got to assume that you're going to make a lot of bad calls, particularly if you have courage and really reach out there.*[16] (b)(3)(c)

Nonetheless, the damage was lasting. As Carver comments, Helms "was vulnerable because in any future major controversy where he really held the line, he would vulnerable to: "Yes, but that's what you said about Sihanoukville."[17] (b)(3)(c)

Throughout his tenure, Helms involved himself with a steady stream of NIEs on sensitive matters. In April 1967, he emphasized to USIB members that US base rights overseas were currently of great interest to the administration.[18] In October, he applauded the timely completion of NIE 11-8-67, "*Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack*," characterizing it "a very good paper and important document."[19] That same month, he referred to NIE 31-67, "*India's Domestic Prospects*," as highly useful for the PL-490 (Food for Peace) discussions then in progress and ordered prompt distribution to the Secretary of Agriculture and other officials.[20] He also commended NIE 80/90, "*Potential for Revolution in South America*," for its clear, lively language and its wide range of consensus on a subject so broad[21] and praised NIE 13-9-68, "*Short-Term Outlook in Communist China*" as a good job on a difficult problem."[22] (b)(3)(c)

It was Helms's persistent tendency to judge estimates by their responsiveness to the current concerns of top-level officials while the Board of National Estimates concentrated on preprogrammed estimates. With their long preparation times, estimates often dealt with issues of only secondary concern to policy people. Among the 60 or so estimates produced each year, there would inevitable be a number of only perfunctory interest to top echelons. The Board felt that its papers could play a satisfactory role in the support of US policy at several levels of the process, beginning with the individual bureaus in the Department of State. Helms was content that such support should continue, but he strongly believed that the most important job for national estimates was to provide timely illumination of problems for top people making key decisions. Here was where maximum impact and the greatest service could be provided:

> *I tried to give the President, the Vice President, and the Cabinet the impression that the Agency was there to be useful, to be of service, to be helpful. I did my damnedest, as a result of demands placed on the Agency ...to see to it they were carried out and that the Agency put its best foot forward and the papers produced in a timely fashion... this is what we were in business for, and we were going to do this the best we could.*[23] (b)(3)(c)

From the beginning, Helms established a pattern of alerting senior officers at his daily morning meetings of the issues on the minds of the President and members of the NSC. He repeatedly requested the DDI, ONE, or DDS&T to prepare studies to meet urgent needs. Once, he advised ONE that the White House felt keen concern over Soviet intentions regarding disarmament and requested a paper on the subject. Another time, he urged that attention be focused on the likely situation in Southeast Asia after the war's conclusion. These efforts by Helms to seek out the current and emergent concerns of key people peaked during the final 18 months of the Johnson administration, when Helms received unprecedented access to the White House inner circle. During the Nixon administration, this trend declined steadily despite Helms's best efforts to maintain it. (b)(3)(c)

Nixon White House and CIA relations, never entirely amicable, became extremely testy during an episode that occurred in September 1969 involving a difference of judgment between CIA and the Pentagon over the capabilities of a new Soviet ICBM, designated the SS-9. In 1969, the Nixon administration was

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seeking public and Congressional support for the development and deployment of an antiballistic missile defense system, the Safeguard ABM. (b)(3)(c)

To provide a rationale for the multimillion-dollar ABM system, Secretary of Defense Laird and the Pentagon seized on the development of the SS-9 as a superweapon, claiming that its triple warheads were multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). This weapon, MIRV equipped, they claimed, would be able to destroy the bulk of the US Minuteman ICBM force in one strike, thus demonstrating a Soviet intention and program to develop a first-strike capability. A US ABM system was needed to meet this challenge. (b)(3)(c)

CIA flatly disagreed with the Pentagon assessment of the SS-9. Agency analysts held that test-derived data showed the SS-9 to have only *unguided* multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) and therefore lacked the capability to strike dispersed targets simultaneously, contrary to the Pentagon's claim. Based on this and other considerations, the Board of National Estimates held to its position of several years standing that the USSR was not seeking a first-strike capability. The CIA argument was based on three points: achieving a first-strike capability would impose prohibitive costs; militarily, the task was so difficult as to be almost impossible to achieve; and, finally, Soviet leaders must recognize that the United States would match their efforts step by step and thwart their objective. (b)(3)(c)

In March 1969, I alerted the DCI that Laird's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee attributed capabilities to the SS-9 that CIA data indicated it did not have.[24] Helms pointed out that the strategic threat had become a hot public issue and ordered a review of past NIEs on the subject and a new look at how the CIA view of the SS-9 had been established.[2] (b)(3)(c)

As tension continued to mount, Helms told his top command in June that CIA officers were being accused of undercutting Laird's pro-ABM position on the Georgetown cocktail circuit. Helms ordered his deputies to ensure that no CIA officer took a public position, pro or con, on the ABM issue. He also instructed them not to become permanently convinced of the validity of their own judgment but to examine new evidence thoroughly. (b)(3)(c)

By June 1969, a new paper addressing SS-9 capabilities was presented to USIB after stormy sessions during coordination created by Laird's firm line on the Soviet buildup. The paper emerged from the USIB meeting laced with dissenting footnotes. The next day, DDCI Robert Cushman, a Nixon appointee, was called to the White House "to explain" the CIA position on the SS-9.[27] Next, Kissinger asked that the officers directly responsible for the CIA position meet with him to discuss it. Helms sent Chairman of the Board Abbot Smith and me to the White House, where Kissinger requested a reordering of the paper and more evidence on the MRV-MIRV issue.[28] Smith rewrote the paper, as requested, but he did not change the CIA position on the MIRV issue or the first-strike question. Despite White House pressure and Laird's angry frustration, Helms gave the paper full backing. (b)(3)(c)

The controversy simmered through the summer of 1969. Helms told his officers that "responsible quarters" were charging CIA with built-in bias but made it clear it was not his view.[29] Then Kissinger's office requested that distribution of the revised memorandum be delayed.[30] Meanwhile, frustrated by CIA's refusal to accept that the SS-9 was MIRV equipped, Laird adopted the position that, even if separately unguided, the triple warheads would fall in a predictable pattern which he called a "footprint." In a national broadcast, he claimed these footprints could be plotted in such a way as to destroy completely a Minuteman field. Such rationalizations led DDS&T Carl Duckett to refer to Pentagon analysts as "the inventors."[31] (b)(3)(c)

The final chapter of this dispute occurred in September 1969, when the annual estimate on "*Soviet Strategic Attack Forces*," NIE 11-8-69, came under review. This time, having been defeated on the MIRV claim, the Pentagon speculated on another invention, a complex retargeting-after-firing scheme which CIA analysts considered beyond Soviet or even US technical capabilities. Then Laird sent to Helms written comments on NIE 11-8, concentrating his fire on the Soviet first-strike issue which had been stated in condensed form in a single paragraph but was no more than the longstanding CIA position on the question. (b)(3)(c)

In addition, a Pentagon official privately passed the word to Helms that the CIA view ran contrary to positions taken publicly by the Secretary of Defense. At the USIB meeting of 4 September, Helms withdrew the questioned paragraph from the estimate.

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> **The Nixon administration was really the first one in which intelligence was just another form of politics.**

Thomas Hughes, the State Department intelligence director, reintroduced the paragraph as a dissenting footnote.(b)(3)(c)

Helms's handling of this troublesome episode raises the question whether he had forfeited his right as the top US intelligence officer to speak out on intelligence issues without fear of favor. Without question, the episode was unprecedented. Never before had a Cabinet officer intervened to the point of direct confrontation with a DCI. Even in the paranoid atmosphere of the Nixon administration, where loyal dissent equated with political betrayal, Laird's action was an invasion of an area where CIA estimators had fully as much right to a judgment as Laird. One of the prime purposes of the NIEs on Soviet advanced weapon systems had been to examine Soviet strategic doctrine for those systems.(b)(3)(c)

As John Huizenga, ONE Board member observed, "It wasn't artificial language ginned up for this particular controversy. It was entirely in accord with the sort of thing that had been written about Soviet force planning, what motives guided them and so on, as in any other estimate."[32] But to Laird this was not merely an intelligence judgment with a right to exist independently of a contrary policy decision. He could accept no contrary view of his Soviet first-strike claim, not even in a top secret intelligence paper with a distribution limited to official circl(b)(3)(c)

Some of these considerations may seem clearer in retrospect than they did at the time to Helms, who was subjected to pointed and sustained criticism from the President, the NSC adviser, and the Secretary of Defense. Helms had held staunchly to the Agency's view on these questions for six months, despite intense fire. He had yielded only to the direct request by the Secretary of Defense that an offending paragraph be removed. From Helms's recollections, it becomes clear that to him the matter never became a matter of principle involving the jurisdiction of the DCI. For him, the removal of the paragraph was merely part of the process of producing an NIE: "USIB contributed to the process—the estimates staff, individuals in the White House, ... I really don't see an issue here." As for the immediate issue of a Soviet first-strike capability:

> *I don't think there was any reason for me necessarily to assume that all eternal wisdom was vested in the Agency and whatever they said had to be right and what anybody else said was "political pressure." It didn't make any sense to me at all. So I believe that on that occasion and maybe two or three others I insisted that certain adjustments be made in order to accommodate other points of view in Washington.*(b)(3)(c)

Helms believed that the Agency's primary task was to provide the President and the NSC with sound intelligence information and analysis. To accomplish this, the Agency had to retain its credibility. CIA estimates could not get through to their audience if their judgments were deemed biased or partisan. To remain credible, to retain access to the minds of the administration he was serving, Helms decided to remove a paragraph that undercut one of that administration's main policy initiatives. From his point of view, that action was consistent with his understanding that a DCI should hear all competing views and present to the President and the NSC the best judgment that could be formed in that light.(b)(3)(c)

Not everyone agreed. ONE Board Chairman Abbot Smith said it was "The one and only time a politician caused us to change part of a finished estimate."[35] But he still was reluctant to blame Helms and admires his overall record on NIEs. He recalled, "I protested a little. I didn't protest as much as I might have or should. Perhaps I should have resigned." The paragraph itself was not that important, he explained, because its statement was repeated elsewhere in the estimate. It was deleted, "But I didn't blame him at all. Why should he oppose the Secretary of Defense?"[36] Nevertheless, he regarded the episode as symptomatic:

> *I look upon that almost as a turning point.... The Nixon administration was really the first one in which intelligence was just another form of politics. And that was bound to be disastrous, and I think it was disastrous.*[37](b)(3)(c)

John Huizenga, Abbot Smith's successor, agrees that this episode set a bad precedent. "It was symptomatic of a tendency that developed more strongly later to view the efforts of the Agency on this kind of subject matter as not reliable and lacking in intellectual integrity."[38] But Huizenga is even more reluctant than

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Smith to criticize Helms's handling of the affair. "I suppose by the time the affair has reached that sort of crunch where the Secretary of Defense is demanding the removal of language, it's a little late in the game to try and handle the matter so as to avoid confrontational attitudes.[39] In the last analysis, he accepts Helms's view that it was preferable to yield in order to retain Agency credibility for future issues. He credits Helms with acting in accord with honest conviction and a concept of doing what was best for the Agency(b)(3)(c)

But, after reviewing the circumstances, it seems clear the incident had a greater impact upon ONE than Helms realized at the time. He regarded yielding to Laird's insistence as neither damaging to CIA prestige nor establishing a bad precedent. But his two chief lieutenants in ONE did, even though they understood the political situation and the bind he was in.(b)(3)(c)

In the aftermath of the controversy, Kissinger requested that all future NIEs on Soviet advanced weapon systems present in full detail the data and evidence underlying the judgments. The resulting estimates were lengthy, technical, and minutely detailed. In effect, Kissinger and the NSC staff had wrestled from ONE the role it had previously played in monitoring Soviet strategic activities. In any event, the White House was pleased with the new-style estimate, and in March 1971 Helms received from President Nixon a letter of commendation regarding NIE 11-8-71(b)(3)(c)

During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the most highly prized publication for gaining access to the White House was *The President's Daily Brief* (PDB), a short (10-12 page) summary of intelligence from all sources. The PDB was created in response to President Kennedy's request for a "checklist" of significant overnight intelligence. With a circulation of about 10 copies, it was designed to Kennedy's taste both in style and time of delivery, between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. daily. The publication was changed by the President's request as often as once a week. It created a unique line of communication directly from CIA to the President, with frequent "feedback" from him personally, and was duly cherished by the Agenc(b)(3)(c)

With his keen interest in serving CIA information promptly and directly to top leadership, Helms saw the PDB as both valuable and risky. The OCI writers and editors had been encouraged to make the PDB interpretive as well as factual. This meant that a publication speaking as the voice of CIA was reaching the President's ear directly, in effect taking positions on key issues on behalf of the DCI. Confident he could help keep the PDB focused on the President's main concerns, Helms directed that the publication be delivered to him in draft before going to press. Although President Johnson was content with the form of the PDB as he inherited it, he requested that it be delivered at the end of the business day. Reportedly, he read it in bed after the evening news on TV. (b)(3)(c)

It became apparent soon after the Nixon administration took office that the President was not reading the PDB. Helms sent me in my capacity as the DDI to discuss with Kissinger what changes could be made, whether in format, scope, or timing, that would make the publication useful to the President. I met in Kissinger's basement office with Kissinger and Attorney General John Mitchell, a Nixon confident and adviser who chanced to be prese(b)(3)(c)

The problem with the publication, Mitchell said, is that it mixes facts and interpretation (the style requested by President Kennedy). "The President is a lawyer," said Mitchell, "and a lawyer wants facts." I subsequently ordered OCI to separate facts and comment, reserving all comment until after the facts had been stated. There was no evidence that this change had any effect on the President's reading habit(b)(3)(c)

The principle vehicle for putting forth Agency judgments on major developments was the CIA Intelligence Memorandum. These studies varied in length from two or three pages to several hundred and were used chiefly for dealing with important issues when the Agency's information and analysis had special pertinence. As it became increasingly difficult to reach coordinated judgments in the NIEs, especially on issues relating to Vietnam, there was a growing trend toward turning to the CIA Intelligence Memorandums for expressing Agency view(b)(3)(c)

President Johnson had placed considerable confidence in DCI Helms's judgment ever since the Agency's triumphant handling of the six-day Arab-Israeli war, predicting both its duration and its outcome. Nonetheless, he did not always accept the information or analysis Helms provided. The Vietnam war demonstrates this many tim(b)(3)(c)

Another such instance occurred in August 1968 in relation to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. DI analysts had been watching closely the growing tension, and OSR, under

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...Helms found it useful on many occasions to present Agency intelligence in person in order to deliver it in timely fashion to the right officials.

Bruce Clarke, observed in late July that the maneuvers of the Red Army in Eastern Europe were swinging in steadily widening circles. On one of those swings, OSR analysts indicated, the Soviet forces might suddenly take a straight line toward Czechoslovakia(b)(3)(c)

At the time, no solid evidence suggested that the USSR had made a decision to use force against Czech dissent. Before meeting with Johnson's Tuesday lunch group one August day, Helms checked with OCI chief Richard Lehman for a last-minute update on the situation. The only new item available was a UPI press report that the Soviet Politburo, usually on vacation in August, was meeting in the Kremlin. Believing that such an extraordinary meeting might involve a major decision, possibly in relation to Czechoslovakia, Helms decided to warn the President that the Soviets were probably about to cross the Czech border with armed force.(b)(3)(c)

Johnson rejected this warning summarily. "Oh, no, I don't think you're right about that. They're talking about us." Helms checked out this mysterious comment with a presidential assistant and learned that in the works was an imminent joint Washington-Moscow announcement of a forthcoming conference on arms control, one that might involve a Moscow trip by Johnson. Helms insisted to the assistant, who had taken minutes of the meeting, that his comments on the Soviets invading Czechoslovakia be recorded. "They're in there," he was assu(b)(3)(c)

Reports came into Headquarters that evening that the invasion had begun. Helms was notified that an emergency NSC meeting would convene in a few hours. At the meeting, as Helms later observed, approximately two minutes were devoted to discussion of the invasion and the ensuring hour spent on "figuring out how to kill the joint announcement" planned for the next day. "In other words, how they were going to tidy up a package that had just dropped on the floor."[41] To Helms's recollection, no one remembered to thank him for having given warning eight hours earlier of an impending Soviet invasion(b)(3)(c)

As the Czech crisis indicates, producing sound information and analysis was only half the job. CIA publications did their part, but Helms found it useful on many occasions to present Agency intelligence in person in order to deliver it in timely fashion to the right officials. He possessed a mind that dealt quickly with complex substantive issues, spoke easily and with confidence, and conveyed no-nonsense assurance of sincerity and objectivity. These skills enable the DCI to bring CIA information and judgment to highly placed officials who might not otherwise have been reached at all.(b)(3)(c)

In particular, Helms relied heavily on informal meetings with Cabinet members for the discussion of substantive intelligence matters. During the Johnson administration, he strove to maintain close relations with the Department of Defense, where the issues of Soviet strategic capabilities and the Vietnam war were of major concern. McNamara received a steady stream of CIA periodicals and memorandums, but in addition he felt a need for face-to-face sessions where he could ask questions and probe judgment(b)(3)(c)

Helms supplemented his own meetings with the Secretary of Defense by assigning George Carver to meet regularly with him. A routine evolved where Carver met with McNamara once a week for between 20 minutes and an hour and a half. McNamara found this custom so useful he recommended it to Clark Clifford, his successor. Clifford retained the procedure with Carver and recommended it in turn to his successor, Melvin Laird.(b)(3)(c)

After the high points of close access and rapport with President Johnson and the deterioration of the DCI-President relationship with President Nixon, Helms continued as best he could to provide CIA intelligence support to the White House. The final two years of his tenure were free of major disputes with the Nixon administration. The NSC staff had established channels and procedures to its satisfaction for the receipt of CIA intelligence production. Having remodeled Soviet advanced weapons NIEs to his specification, following the SS-9 dispute, Kissinger insisted that estimates contain optional analyses and exhaustive displays of the evidence underlying each judgment. This was supposed to apply to CIA memorandums as well, and Helms directed that Agency papers be tailored accordingly(b)(3)(c)

In his years as DCI, Helms endured several rough passages where the

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Agency's role as objective gatherer and reporter of intelligence came into direct opposition with administration judgments and policies. Amidst the intense disputes of the Johnson and Nixon years, CIA's contribution could easily have become irrelevant. Helms believed that the Agency's relevance and survival depended upon his ability to maintain its role in policy support, and he struggled to keep CIA production responsive to the arbitrary demands of the White House(b)(3)(c)

The atmosphere of distrust that pervaded the Nixon White House made this task more difficult. Helms had to be careful not to seem biased or committed to positions antithetical to the administration. When obliged by such circumstance to compromise, Helms made the greater good of the Agency his first priority(b)(3)(c)

NOTES

1. USIB minutes, 7 July 1966.
2. USIB minutes, 17 November 1966.
3. Morning Meeting Minutes, 13 October 1967.
4. DCI Chrono file, 21 August 1966.
5. Morning Meeting Minutes, 13 July 1966.
6. Morning Meeting Minutes, 12 January 1967.
7. Morning Meeting Minutes, 13 June 1967.
8. (b)(3)(n)
9. (b)(3)(n)
9. Morning Meeting Minutes, 1967.
10. (b)(3)(n)
11. (b)(3)(n)
12. (b)(3)(n)
13. Morning Meeting Minutes, 6 July 1970.
14. Morning Meeting Minutes, 10 September 1969.
15. Morning Meeting Minutes, 12 May 1970.
16. (b)(3)(n)
17. (b)(3)(n)
18. USIB Minutes, 13 April 1967.
19. USIB Minutes, 26 October 1967.
20. USIB Minutes, 12 October 1967.
21. USIB Minutes, 28 March 1968.
22. USIB Minutes, 23 May 1968.
23. (b)(3)(n)
24. Morning Meeting Minutes, 21 March 1969.
25. Morning Meeting Minutes, 4 April 1969.
26. Morning Meeting Minutes, 4 June 1969.
27. Morning Meeting Minutes, 13 June 1969.
28. Abbott Smith memorandum cited in Church Committee Report, Book I, p. 78.
29. Morning Meeting Minutes, 20 June 1969.
30. Morning Meeting Minutes, 30 June 1969.
31. It is significant to note that the CIA position held throughout this stormy episode that the USSR did not have a MIRV in 1969 and would be technologically incapable of producing one before 1974 was borne out when the Soviets tested their first MIRV in 1974.
32. (b)(3)(n)
33. Church Committee, Book I, P. 79.
34. *Ibid.*
35. (b)(3)(n)
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*
38. (b)(3)(n)
39. *Ibid.*
40. Morning Meeting Minutes, 11 March 1971.
41. (b)(3)(n)

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Meeting A Collection Challenge

Unconventional (b)(1) History (S)

Kenneth A. Kress

> **"The development of unconventional (b)(1) imaging is one example of how intelligence needs and technology struggled to come together and eventually produced important new capabilities."**

Kenneth A. Kress is the senior scientist of the CIA's Office of Research and Development.

(b)(3)(c)

Technical information, ranging from satellite images to samples of chemical effluents, provides important intelligence. Applications of technology for intelligence require dedicated effort, some good luck, and generous slices of time to develop. The path from discovery of a new technical collection technique to the production of intelligence is often usually long and difficult. This is true because of the ever-changing needs of intelligence, evolving opportunities proffered by technology advances, and omnipresent resistance to accept new approaches. The development of unconventi(b)(1) imaging is one example of how intelligence needs and technology struggled to come together and eventually produced important new capabilities. The following story shows how intelligence organizations often at first resist but then embrace new technology to solve problems. (U)

Intelligence issues wax and wane. Nuclear proliferation became a hot issue after the Soviets joined the nuclear club in 1949. For the first time, the United States itself seriously faced the threat of nuclear weapons. In 1951, the Atomic Energy Commission formally reviewed the possibility of clandestine infiltration of nuclear weapons into the United States.[1] The threat was deemed unlikely because the weapons in 1951 were large and difficult to make and deliver. Nevertheless, the official concern about nuclear proliferation had begun. (U)

Expanding Nuclear Club

During the next two decades, the United Kingdom and then France and China joined the nuclear club. Small, rogue nations seemed a long way from being a nuclear threat. Attention was given to countering the Soviet nuclear capabilities by ensuring US nuclear capabilities were superior. The threat from other nations also seemed to be diminished because proliferation activities were mostly observable. Nuclear tests were done on top of the ground and in the atmosphere. These activities could be observed by various means such as imagery of test preparations, seismic detection of the explosions, and environmental samples of fallout after the tests. Eventually, the launching of the VELA satellites, which detect energy from a nuclear test anywhere on the surface of the earth, further increased the confidence that proliferation would be detected. (U)

After India tested a nuclear weapon in 1974, concern about nuclear proliferation was reinvigorated. The test unequivocally showed that the status of the Indian nuclear weapons program was surprisingly advanced. This test was done underground and, consequently, difficult to detect or distinguish from natural events. Underground nuclear tests with 150 kilotons of explosive yield or greater were detectable with the extant seismic network, but the Indian test was well below the limit. Furthermore, because the Indian test was underground, it shielded observation from the VELA satellites and eliminated

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> **The promise of all-weather, day-and-night, worldwide imagery was a seductive challenge for the Air Force.**

environmental fallout. Intelligence had new collection challenges. (U)

In the late 1970s, the Carter administration raised sensitivities to expanding nuclear proliferation. Popular literature[2], books,[3] and government studies[4] all concluded that the knowledge to build a weapon was widely available. Indeed, it was only the lack of access to special nuclear materials that prevented many nations from building a nuclear arsenal. Diplomatic activity such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty was pushed and intelligence interest increased. (U)

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Monitoring the Threat

The Intelligence Community was tasked to monitor the nuclear threats worldwide, including small, clandestine underground tests. In response, the Office of Research and Development (ORD) of CIA created a modest R&D program focused on

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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

DONOVAN IN PERSPECTIVE

William M. Henhoeffer

OSS was the most wonderful place to be young! We young ones had everything—belief, enthusiasm, opportunity, victory. Life rushed on in excitement and in confidence that we were a special group of colleagues with an important mission for our country.[*]

By 1 January 1983, centenary of the birth of the Agency's founder and chief of the OSS, the interested reader would find four full-length books about him. Corey Ford's *Donovan of OSS* was published in Boston in 1970 and London the following year. Thomas F. Troy's *Donovan and the CIA* was issued in 1981 by the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence and later that year by a commercial publisher in Frederick, Maryland. Two more works appeared in 1982: Richard Dunlop's *Donovan:—America's Master Spy* and Anthony Cave Brown's *The Last Hero:—Wild Bill Donovan*, published by Rand McNally and Times Books, respectively. With over 2,100 pages of text and four points of view at hand, it is possible for a reader not only to be caught in a maze of intelligence specialists' arguments, complex yet almost always interesting, but also, more broadly, to begin to measure the man's place within the context of American and twentieth century history. This essay is cast mainly on that general level.

Leadership: Positive and Negative Aspects

All four authors emphasize Donovan's leadership qualities, and particularly what they regard as positive results of that leadership. They praise his ability to evoke strong loyalty from his subordinates. They tell us he could inspire an employee with the feeling of working for him personally at a vital task. This message has been amply supported in several recollections of people directly associated with Donovan: Lawrence R. Houston's review of the Dunlop book published in the Washington *Times* in November 1982 was a case in point; so were the vigorously stated, upbeat comments of three OSS veterans—Louise Bushnell, Virginia Stewart, and Elizabeth McIntosh—to Headquarters personnel last spring; and Ernest Cuneo's more recent presentation to Agency military reservists added other interesting atmospherics.

[*] Former OSS member Caroline Bland, quoted in Dunlop, p. 307.

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These encomia to Donovan's qualities of leadership are liable to arouse in today's Agency employees a sense of relative deprivation. Some of the informal standards he set are still observed: the willingness of Agency managers to work on occasion without full financial compensation, and their tendency to shun some of the "perks" routinely demanded by their counterparts elsewhere in the federal government, reflect Donovan's own professional lifestyle. But in other ways we have changed greatly since the OSS period, and although changes were bound to occur, they have not all been improvements. The layers of bureaucracy within the organization are more numerous and less permeable. We sense the need for conferences on ethics and intelligence, and perhaps even for an ethical code for our profession, whereas his character seemed to imbue the entire OSS with something approaching an ethical consensus. The Donovan style also encouraged among the rank and file of his organization an exceptionally strong concern for the welfare of other employees. OSS under him seemed to have been a true company of colleagues.

Before lamenting too long on the golden days of the past, we should reflect on certain negative consequences of this imposing personality. All four books on Donovan show that his leadership sometimes had an adverse impact on the internal management of OSS. All four allude to a brief "palace revolution" that came to a head in February 1944, in which some of his subordinates demanded that he either travel less, or delegate more authority to his immediate subordinates, or both. Donovan, we are told, angrily rejected their recommendations and continued to rule as before.

The second negative consequence of Donovan's charismatic personality was that it sharpened the bureaucratic rivalries in which OSS (and its predecessor group the Coordinator of Information) inevitably found itself. As one of his aides recorded privately, Donovan, with all his honesty and expertise, was also "so aggressive, so scattered, so provocative" that "he excites anger." According to Ernie Cuneo, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt encouraged bureaucratic competition throughout his administration by setting up organizations with overlapping responsibilities. Donovan relished this type of challenge, and although the four authors tend to blame his rivals more than him for the use of unfair tactics, it is clear that he was eager and resourceful in "conducting ungentlemanly warfare" (Dunlop's term).

J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, emerges from these four books as a villain, whose enduring enmity toward Donovan seemed greater than his dedication to the national interest. But Donovan sometimes crossed into territory clearly Hoover's responsibility, and not by accident. It is difficult to justify Donovan's authorization for his agency to break into an embassy on US territory, without even consulting the Bureau. Moreover, as long as the Bureau was assigned responsibility for collecting intelligence in Latin America, Donovan should have respected that demarcation if only to preserve the quality of what purported to be intelligence. From today's vantage point, one concludes that the national interest would have been better served if Donovan had vetted with the FBI, for its evaluation, the "top secret" information his people had obtained from Mexican communist and left-wing labor leaders on the possible presence of "one thousand" or more

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Japanese agents and covert Japanese "bases" on the Baja Peninsula. To do so, however, would have alerted Hoover to Donovan's bureaucratic transgression, and so Donovan passed the report directly to FDR.

In his relations with the US military establishment Donovan sometimes chose confrontation where a more prudent official would have sought cooperation. He decided, evidently on his own initiative, to make a top secret film report on the Pearl Harbor attack in order to find out who had been at fault. According to Dunlop he "ignored the Army and Navy's opposition" in the matter. The field photo team he sent to Hawaii was, in various ways, "brash and arrogant." Moreover, despite Secretary of War Stimson's insistence that he see the film before it was released, the head of Donovan's photographic unit tried to smuggle a large portion of the film to Donovan to be shown to FDR. The Navy managed to confiscate the film and lock it up in a vault. In retrospect, who can blame the Navy?

Pranks and Provocations

Donovan's shenanigans (the word is used advisedly) against his military rivals were sometimes provoked by them, and sometimes by him. Dunlop recounts the story of a dinner party where an admiral remarked that Donovan's organization was "a Tinker Toy outfit, spying on spies." We have Donovan's word for it, presumably, that the admiral actually did bait him that way; it is hard to imagine the admiral himself confessing to such a tactless comment, or to the aftermath. In any case Donovan rose to the bait by suggesting that his outfit "could get your secret files and blow up your ammunition dump." The admiral, of course, laughed at the suggestion. A few minutes later, Dunlop records,

> Donovan excused himself from the table, presumably to go to the washroom. He telephoned his headquarters and within an hour several high-ranking Navy officers showed up at the Navy Building demanding to see the admiral. The sentry saluted and said the admiral was not in.
>
> "Then," said one, "we'll wait in his office."
>
> Once inside the officers went to work.
>
> One, a safecracker, opened the safe and removed its top secret contents. Then the party left and drove to the ammunition dump, where they dressed down the officer of the day for not demanding their security clearances at the gate. When the OD left in relief, they planted dummy dynamite tubes. They sent the admiral's top secret files and a report on their activities to Donovan at the dinner party. As the party was breaking up, Donovan handed the admiral his files without comment, and explained where he could find the dummy charges at the ammunition dump. (p. 348)

Donovan was not above using meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to impress the military in unusually creative ways. Dunlop tells us of the "Hedy Lamarr" fireworks device, contrived by Stanley Lovell, the chief of OSS

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Research and Development, to create a distraction for an OSS spy trying to avoid capture. All the spy had to do was pull a tiny wire loop and the device initiated the roar of a falling bomb. Donovan took Lovell to a JCS meeting, mentioned the device to his audience and moved on to other subjects. Lovell, as prearranged, pulled the ring and dropped Hedy into a metal wastebasket. "Two- and three-star generals rushed for the door as a mighty roar ended Hedy's performance."

Dunlop's book is replete with anecdotes like these, and the other three authors provide several more. Many of Donovan's pranks led to more serious consequences, but the basic point is the same: if you happened to be on Donovan's side in these episodes, or can assume that allegiance vicariously now, Donovan emerges as an exceptionally brave and clever man who deserved your loyalty. No wonder the morale in OSS was high. Yet it also should be possible to understand the resentment Donovan's peers came to feel toward him, and the seriousness of his aide's observation that "he excites anger."

Moreover, from the vantage point of a contemporary historian, there is much to be lamented in these stories. In his review of the Troy book, Notre Dame history professor Bernard Norling summarizes the bureaucratic rivalries affecting Donovan in this way:

> Some forty different agencies, all of them involved in intelligence gathering in *some* way, defended their turf from the threat of encroachment with remarkable imagination and a tenacity that would have excited a bulldog. There were endless hearings, innumerable drafts and redrafts of proposals, interminable squabbles about the definitions of words, continuous efforts to either reduce or scatter the functions of OSS, endless rumors, "inspired" leaks to friendly newspapers, fierce infighting about who should be directed by whom, and resort to that final refuge of the badgered bureaucrat, additional studies.

Norling finds the bureaucratic wrangling with Donovan at the center to have been "squalid" and "appalling"—one of those aspects of World War II which should cause one to wonder what the other side was like if our side was winning. Norling has a point.

OSS Achievements, Positive and Negative

Bureaucratic wrangling notwithstanding, Donovan and the OSS did contribute to the winning of World War II, but historians are by no means certain how much. OSS intelligence activities as such are outside the scope of Troy's book. Corey Ford and Dunlop let the British provide the bottom line. Ford records that in 1966 Admiral Louis Mountbatten told OSS veterans that he doubted "whether any one person contributed more to the ultimate victory of the Allies than Bill Donovan." In the foreword to Dunlop's biography the wartime head of British intelligence in the US, Sir William Stephenson ("Intrepid"), pronounces Donovan "one of the most signficant men of our century" but shows polite reservation about the organization he headed. He

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salutes the fact that by the end of the war "Donovan's OSS was comparable quantitatively with the combined efforts of British Intelligence and Special Operations Executive" and then adds that "qualitatively too, much of OSS's work was without doubt of first-class importance by any standard." That is not damning the OSS with faint praise, but the praise is cautious.

Stephenson's verdict on OSS, nevertheless, is considerably more flattering than the one offered by David Kahn in his review of the Troy, Dunlop, and Cave Brown books (Washington 19 December 1982). Kahn is of course entitled to his opinion, but he greatly confuses anyone who has read the books (he confused this reader anyway) by claiming that two of the authors support that opinion. Kahn puts it this way:

> Neither Cave Brown nor Dunlop assesses the overall contribution of OSS to the war effort. The reason may be that it could not have been very great. OSS had only a handful of agents in Germany, as Joseph Persico made clear in *Piercing the Reich*, and they reported mainly low-level intelligence; neither Cave Brown nor Dunlop go into this. OSS had no agents in Japan or her captured areas.

The trouble is that Cave Brown devotes an entire chapter to an overall assessment—"Farewell the Tranquil Mind"—in which the language, in this reader's judgment, is as thoughtfully chosen and gracefully expressed as the title. Dunlop, true enough, does not offer an assessment but, as indicated above, Stephenson's preface provides a kind of summation. Regarding the "handful of agents" in Germany, whatever Persico may have thought about their number and effectiveness, it is clear that Cave Brown and Dunlop did not ignore the subject or trivialize the effort. Dunlop records that Donovan "sent more than 200 agents into Germany between September 1944 and VE Day" (p. 454). Cave Brown describes OSS penetration operations in Germany as "very large scale" and, as his treatment of Allen Dulles' efforts indicates, he considers that some were high-level. OSS, as Dunlop in particular illustrates, had numerous agents operating behind Japanese lines.

Kahn's definition of "significant" seems to be limited to the achievements in cryptanalysis which contributed to major naval and air victories such as Midway. No doubt Donovan would have accomplished more had he succeeded in adding that to his organization's capabilities. But Cave Brown surely does not dismiss OSS accomplishments as trivial. Whereas Kahn states that "the spy was of no more importance in intelligence than the foot soldier was in combat during the battle of technologies that was World War II," Cave Brown implies in his "Farewell the Tranquil Mind" chapter that (a) World War II was more than a "battle of technologies" and (b) the spy was no *less* important in intelligence than the foot soldier was in combat. Cave Brown declares that the number of decorations earned by OSS personnel for gallantry and proficiency—on the average of one for every eight employees—constitutes in itself "a tangible, remarkable achievement to the OSS's performance," and goes on to pay a special tribute to Donovan for accomplishing so much at so little cost in casualties:

> Despite the magnitude of the worldwide effort engaged in by the OSS, Donovan lost fewer men killed, wounded, and captured in its

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> five years than he had lost on an average week in the trenches during the campaign season of 1918. In all, 143 men and women, excluding subagents, were killed in action, and about 300 men and women were wounded or captured while on active service. Yet the damage Donovan did to the enemy in World War II was far greater than that in World War I. And here was another important demonstration of Donovan's theories: An outpouring of blood was not always necessary in order to cause the enemy severe damage. Two examples will suffice to show what is meant: The OGs who took part in Noah's Ark in Greece suffered no more than 25 dead and wounded (and none was captured). On the other hand, they paralyzed large formations of the Wehrmacht for more than eighteen months and killed or wounded at least 1,400 of the enemy. In Switzerland Dulles's information that the Germans' missile experiments had reached an advanced stage produced a devastating attack by the Royal Air Force. In turn, that attack delayed German production of operational missiles, thereby saving hundreds, if not thousands, of lives and many acres of human dwellings.

Cave Brown and Dunlop list several other OSS successes, only a few of which are acknowledged by Kahn (and those are belittled). OSS operations in France achieved more than the disruption of the rail movement of one SS division and more than the provision of fine and detailed positive intelligence on southern France; they helped to ignite the uprisings coinciding with the Allied invasion of France. Kahn also disputes Cave Brown's case for OSS's indirect role in ensuring the success of D-Day. Cave Brown's argument, spelled out at considerable length, is that OSS operations in Hungary and the Balkans tied down German divisions there long enough to prevent timely reinforcement of German defenses in Normandy. If the argument is accepted as valid then OSS must be considered to have played a role fairly comparable in its strategic consequences to the role of cryptanalysis cited by Kahn in the Battle of Midway. Kahn will have none of this. He disputes Cave Brown's contention that an OSS operation in Hungary helped to persuade Hitler of the need to occupy that country. The OSS team sent to Hungary parachuted in on 13 March 1944 and, according to Kahn, the war diary of the German high command shows that the order to occupy was issued the day before. But he misses the main elements in the story; what Cave Brown says is that the whole process of secret negotiations of several months duration between OSS and representatives of the Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian governments, designed to remove those countries from the Axis camp, became known to Hitler well before the initiation of the tactical phases of the operations (e.g. parachuting of an OSS team into Hungary). Cave Brown contends that these OSS intelligence defeats—and collectively, in his judgment, they constituted OSS's greatest failure of the war—nevertheless served to convince Hitler that the Allies intended to invade Europe from the south. "Once that idea was implanted," says Cave Brown, "there was nothing any of Hitler's military advisers could do to eradicate it."

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To Win by Losing

The lesson continues to be relevant to our profession in helping us to judge what we do in its proper context. What can be considered in strict, narrow terms as an operational failure may in the long run help to produce a strategic triumph. This may occur not only in clandestine or covert operations but also in other aspects of intelligence, especially intelligence analysis. The kindest fate of certain intelligence estimates may be that they are ultimately proven wrong because the dire message reached an intelligence consumer in time for policy action which otherwise would not have occurred. It is not always possible, of course, for those who exerted themselves to make the operation succeed, or the estimate correct, to understand matters that way. It is not always true that their superiors are wise enough to do so either.

Returning to our reflections on the Hungarian/Balkan operational failure, one wonders how wise Donovan and others were in judging it. The thought arises that perhaps he might have realized well in advance that the operations had been compromised but allowed them to go forward precisely in order to further the broader, strategic objective. He had some warnings, Cave Brown tells us, through Allen Dulles in Bern, that the Nazis might be aware of the operations, and he might also have been alerted by sources outside OSS (e.g. the so-called ISOS material). At one point Cave Brown expresses bewilderment that Donovan put the Hungarian project—Project Sparrow—on hold in view of these warnings and then, for reasons that do not immediately seem compelling, allowed it to proceed.

In the fictional world of John LeCarre the hypothesis that Donovan, in effect, intended the operation to fail but deliberately refrained from communicating as much to the OSS men directly involved would be plausible. In the real world, the reader would need far more evidence than these books on Donovan provide that such duplicity actually occurred. More likely Donovan himself became personally committed to carrying out the operation no matter what the odds. As Peter Wyden demonstrates in his *The Bay of Pigs*, it becomes increasingly difficult psychologically to halt an important operation once it is set in train, and increasingly easy to ignore positive intelligence pointing toward the likelihood that the operation will fail. If that is the way it happened in Donovan's case, he would not be the last high-ranking Western intelligence official to be caught in such a net.

Just as an intelligence failure can sometimes help produce a policy success, an apparent intelligence success can sometimes help induce adverse consequences later. The testimony that Cave Brown and to some extent Corey Ford and Dunlop provide concerning OSS relations with the Soviet intelligence services is worth some reflection. At one stage of the war, for example, FDR authorized Donovan to make direct contact with Fitin of the NKVD, and largely through the impact of Donovan's forceful personality, Fitin tentatively agreed to Donovan's terms for intelligence collaboration. Score one for US intelligence. But the very success of Donovan's approach permitted J. Edgar Hoover to warn FDR of the danger of Soviet penetration, and aroused the suspicions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well. Donovan was thereupon ordered to break off the negotiations. The effect of this abrupt change of direction can

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only have greatly increased Soviet suspicions about their putative ally, and thereby further strained an already uneasy partnership.

Nearer the end of the war OSS began to target the Soviets. One such effort, as described by Cave Brown, was Casey Jones, which Donovan planned in August 1944 and executed early the next spring. Paired with another operation, Ground Hog, and carried out jointly with the British, it was designed to "use the postwar confusion to get photo coverage of all Central and Western Europe, Scandinavia, and North Africa." Ground Hog was aimed at collecting "geological data of military interest." The questionable aspects arise from the fact that this project was begun *during* the war; that it gave priority to those areas occupied by US and British forces that were scheduled to be turned over to the Soviets; that parts of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, and all Soviet-occupied parts of Germany were photomapped; that Casey Jones involved about 16 squadrons of US and British heavy bombers modified for aerial photography; that while some of these aircraft carried their true markings, others apparently were unmarked; and that the purpose of this project was not candidly discussed with the Soviets.

All of this must have gone down well in Washington at the time. It could be portrayed as a successful large-scale operation with no casualties. It would serve as a resolute rebuff to those who were always ready to accuse OSS of being soft on the commies. It would also serve as a good start on a postwar national intelligence service. After all, with all this important data in hand bearing on likely problems of strategic policy interest, who could doubt that a centralized organization ought to be established to preside over this vast body of newly acquired material? Zbigniew Brzezinski once remarked in *Encounter* magazine that "power not only serves policy, it tempts it." A demonstrated intelligence capability like Casey Jones becomes an argument for perpetuating that capability.

But what were the Soviets supposed to think about all this? As Cave Brown points out, they were eventually privy to some cryptic State Department requests for permission to photomap Berlin, Vienna, and Prague—but nothing about Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria nor the rest of Soviet-occupied parts of Germany. Their own spies in Britain and the US may have ferreted out some of the unadvertised goals of Casey Jones. But how were they to dismiss the likelihood that these overflights represented contingency planning for military operations against them, and the possibility that among this vast assemblage of aircraft there might be some capable of a nuclear attack—a capability the Soviets already knew that the US and Britain possessed? Cave Brown details how the Soviets both protested these encroachments of their air space and ordered their fighters on occasion to shoot at the US and British intruders. Several shooting incidents occurred prior to VE Day.

He concludes that "there can be little doubt that these operations were among the factors that caused great tensions between the Russian and Western Allies during the last weeks of the war." The judgment seems almost too mild. Let us step back a bit. In the 1950s, those of us being academically trained in international relations were told by our professors and read in our textbooks

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that all the duplicity and double dealing among the Allies during World War II and the early postwar period were the fault of the Soviet Union. Our side played it straight. Finally, in belated response to these repeated Soviet unilateral, unprovoked acts of bellicosity and espionage we began to bolster our military strength, and direct our intelligence capabilities against the Soviets. It has been hard to shake that version of history from our minds. The revisionist explanations in the late 1960s and 1970s did not make much impression because they all seemed too strident and ill-informed. Now, after reading Cave Brown's testimony presented as part of a sophisticated, thoroughly researched appraisal of the foundation of the modern American espionage establishment, we are finally compelled to revise somewhat that comfortable assumption about the origins of the Cold War.

Cave Brown's relatively calm verdict on Casey Jones contrasts with his appraisal of two examples of unilateral OSS activity within areas of British jurisdiction. Both occurred in 1945. One involved the initiation of positive intelligence collection in countries due to receive their independence, notably India and Burma. Cave Brown describes this program as "palpably the committing of espionage against a friendly power." The other required attaching to the court of King Peter II of Yugoslavia, who was benefitting from British financial support and protection in London, an OSS agent who would report independently on Peter's steadily dimming prospects for regaining his throne. Cave Brown terms this operation a "clear breach" of Anglo-American agreements not to "spy on each other." Moreover, the fact that "an act of espionage against America's leading ally" had been "sanctioned in Washington" meant that "the Grand Alliance had disintegrated and that the brilliant American comradeship of arms . . . was now at an end. Whether it was to be revived or not would remain to be seen."

Arguably Cave Brown has made too much of these two operations. They were rather modest in scale—no squadrons of bombers on photomapping missions—and were not directed at Britain itself. Moreover, the British intelligence authorities knew that the US government had looked on with generally benign neglect when the British unilaterally gathered intelligence and conducted various operations on US territory. No one should get excited about it now, but does anyone believe that the apparatus Stephenson admits to having administered in this country—"the British secret and covert organizations, all nine of them," the communications division "handling more than a million message groups a day," and so forth—was concerned solely with liaison or joint Anglo-US operations? Yet the sensitivity shown by Cave Brown, loyal subject of the Commonwealth, to the two unilateral OSS operations in the British sphere of influence is useful in underscoring how even any Soviet officials who were inclined to be friendly toward the US and Britain in 1945 must have regarded Casey Jones. Casey Jones, this writer therefore argues, was an intelligence success that contributed something to the makings of a serious strategic failure.

Representative of the Opposition

> Donovan exercises controlling influence over Knox, strong influence over Stimson, friendly advisory influence over President and

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> Hull. . . . Being a Republican, a Catholic and of Irish descent, he has a following of the strongest opposition to the Administration. . . . There is no doubt that we can achieve infinitely more through Donovan than through any other individual. (Quoted in Corey Ford, p.99)

So wrote the Director of British Naval Intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief, UK Mediterranean Fleet in 1940. He was urging the British admiral to welcome the man sent by FDR to see if the British could hold out against a German attack and whether, therefore, the US should begin to shed its professed neutrality and begin to supply material aid. Donovan concluded that the answer to both questions ought to be yes, thereby contradicting the view strongly advocated by the US Ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy. As a result the British obtained 50 destroyers from the US through Lend-Lease, and the US moved inexorably toward war against Germany on the side of Britain.

Professor John Lukacs of LaSalle College used to tell his history classes that the most important single fact of the first half of the Twentieth Century was that the Americans and British spoke English. He would then remind his students that great consequences can ensue from the presence of a single individual. The vote taken in the United States shortly after the Revolution to make German the official language—the country contained nearly as many of German stock as of British Isles descent at that time and the sentiment ran strong to divorce the new nation from the old master culturally as well as politically—failed by one vote. Suppose that voter had not been there. . . .

Similarly, if Donovan had not been on the scene, who else could have provided testimony of sufficient weight to override our own Ambassador's opposition to Anglo-American military partnership against Hitler? For the crucial element in Kennedy's disdainful attitude was based not on an objective assessment of British military capabilities, but on the emotional bias of an Irish Catholic American against all things English.*

Under those circumstances it was important that an equally prominent Irish Catholic American was available to speak up for the Englishmen, and contradict the Kennedy counsel. Moreover, as a Republican he was able to help neutralize the isolationist wing of that party. Other prominent Republicans were sympathetic to the British (Wendell Wilkie, for example, pledged not to oppose FDR on this issue in the 1940 presidential campaign), so that in this regard Donovan did not stand alone. But in being able and willing to contest the strong isolationist currents within two parallel constituencies, the Irish Catholic (overwhelmingly Democratic) and the Republican (overwhelmingly Protestant), Donovan was unique.

Lawrence Houston, in his Washington *Times* review of the Dunlop book, is troubled by the "impression" conveyed by Dunlop that "Donovan, almost single-handed, turned the American public from isolation to intervention

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* "I hate all of those goddamned Englishmen from Churchill down," he told an American while he was still Ambassador. Quoted in David E. Koskoff, *Joseph F. Kennedy: A Life and Times* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1974).

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against the Germans in World War II." Houston counters this by citing a 1952 book coauthored by William Langer, Donovan's head of Research and Analysis, *The Challenge to Isolation*, which contains only four references to Donovan, "none of them showing him in a major role."

To this objection one must respond that Houston is correct in understanding Dunlop's message, but then Corey Ford conveys the same "impression," and it is supported by influential British spokesmen such as the above quoted Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Director of British Naval Intelligence, and Stephenson. Secondly, the Langer book concerns mainly Republican Party isolationism, and does not take seriously the importance of anti-British sentiment within ethnic groups. Langer's strength—one of the reasons he was so useful as head of Research and Analysis—was his ability to interpret the broad currents of world history as understood in traditional terms. The 1952 work appeared when US history was also being told in rather traditional terms, which tended to slight the role of minorities. The role of Irish Catholicism in complicating the course of US history was not addressed by mainstream historians of that period; to them one's Irish Catholic heritage was something to be outgrown, like acne.

Corey Ford, Dunlop, and Cave Brown have thus provided a needed corrective in emphasizing that Donovan did not outgrow it, and that at a crucial juncture of US and world history Donovan's role was enhanced by it. Corey Ford and Dunlop show, moreover, that Donovan suffered discrimination in his occasional forays into politics from those who were anti-Irish and anti-Catholic, and also, ironically, from Irish Catholics who accused him of selling out that heritage. Some Irish Catholics spread rumors that Donovan was not a good Catholic. These rumors have proved sufficiently pervasive over the years to have been transformed into the assertion (e.g. in Joseph O'Grady's *How the Irish Became Americans*) book that Donovan was Protestant.

On occasions other than the Lend Lease episode Donovan tried to use his Irish Catholic background to help the British. Dunlop tells us of Donovan's March 1941 trip to Dublin undertaken "at the request of Roosevelt and Churchill." At that time the threat of German invasion of the British Isles, possibly preceded by invasion of Ireland, had receded, but it still seemed critical, from the British point of view, that the Irish Free State allow Great Britain to use its ports to counter German submarines. Donovan tried unsuccessfully to induce the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Eamon de Valera to make that commitment to the Allied cause. The luncheon meeting attended by Donovan, de Valera, and the head of the Catholic Church in Ireland did not pass pleasantly. As Dunlop put it: "Donovan was incensed when the prelate remarked that he did not see much difference between a Nazi victory and British dominion, and he blistered the churchmen with his opinion of the anti-British myopia shown by some Irish."

Only a distinguished Irish Catholic American could have delivered such a dressing down. Dunlop records that Churchill was pleased with Donovan's trip to Dublin and well he should have been. For at a minumum Donovan's position must have shaken de Valera's certainty that the vast Irish American

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hinterland was behind his aggressively anti-British neutrality. For the rest of the war de Valera's neutrality tilted toward the Allies—for example, downed German fliers were interned for the duration of the war, whereas downed US and British fliers were promptly released. Had the Irish cardinal's view of neutrality gone unrefuted, the story might have ended differently.

Dunlop also illustrates how Donovan and the OSS suffered in the Washington bureaucratic infighting from accusations that they were too pro-British. When Donovan's proposal to continue the OSS function after the war was leaked to the media, the "leakees", principally the Chicago *Tribune*, were those who consistently pandered to anti-British sentiments among their consumers.

Roots

Cave Brown offers a perspective on Donovan's Irish Catholic background that differs markedly from what is said in Corey Ford and Dunlop, though he agrees with them that it forms an important part of Donovan's political biography. On this aspect of Donovan, Cave Brown's judgments seem to have been formed with a carelessness quite untypical of the rest of his book. To wit:

Item: He underplays the fact that Donovan's grandparents came from one of the areas of Ireland hardest hit by the Famine. Joseph Kennedy's grandparents came from Ireland at the same time. The perceived legacy of that experience was very strong and long lasting; a high ranking US officer of recent memory was known to remark to friends that he had bad teeth because the British had starved his grandfather in the Famine. The passage across the Atlantic in "coffin ships" intensified the bitter memory. Cave Brown is ludicrously inaccurate in suggesting that because the Donovans traveled on ships of British registry their accommodations must have been superior to those provided by other countries. Terry Coleman *(Passage to America)* is only one of several historians who have compared those accommodations, unfavorably, to those afforded African slaves.

Item: Having failed to appreciate how strong feelings about the Famine would persist in any family that survived it, Cave Brown lurches to the opposite extreme by professing to find a "Fenian" element in the Donovan household when Donovan was growing up. "Fenian" properly connotes an active participant in a conspiracy to destroy British rule in Ireland by armed force. It is surely stretching that term to apply it to the Donovan family. True, young Donovan recited poems by James Clarence Mangan, who longed to lead "the brilliant Irish hosts" into battle, and the enemy Mangan envisioned was the "old Saxon foe." It is likely, also, that the newly arrived Irish immigrants who visited the Donovan household in the 1880s and 1890s found that enmity toward England was not discouraged by the country of their adoption. (British Isles immigrants were, in fact, required to swear on their preprinted citizenship certificates that they renounced allegiance to not only every foreign potentate, but especially the "QUEEN OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND"—an oath to which this writer's County Derry grandfather, for example, subscribed with evident joy.) But Donovan's brother Vincent, as

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quoted by Corey Ford, surely had it right in suggesting that his brother's "dream of leading an Irish regiment into battle" had been fulfilled when he would "command the bravest of them all, the Fighting Irish of New York's 69"—for the US, not for Ireland, and as Britain's ally, not her enemy.*

Item: Having ascribed à "Fenian" family environment to Donovan, Cave Brown is somewhat at a loss to explain how Donovan and the British got along so well together when they first met during World War I. Cave Brown's solution has been to offer as a plausible scenario (on pp. 30-35 of his book and in remarks made in January 1983 on a local TV station) that British intelligence recruited Donovan to spy on the Germans during World War I and then essentially put his name in the files until Stephenson re-activated him, so to speak, in 1940. Troy has taken out after Cave Brown in his newsletter (*Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene*, February 1983), arguing that Cave Brown has greatly misconstrued a passage in Troy's book. Troy says the absolute minimum about Donovan's Irish Catholic background in that book, no doubt because he does not consider it germane to his story of bureaucratic warfare—though arguably some of the vigor with which Donovan pursued these battles, and perhaps much of the protectiveness and personal attention he displayed toward his own rank-and-file, were typical of what one might expect of a latter-day Celtic chieftain. In any case Troy realizes that to label Donovan as a British spy, without conclusive proof, is to slander Donovan as an American and as an Irish Catholic.

Item: Having allowed for the strong possibility that Donovan had worked for British intelligence prior to World War II, Cave Brown seems surprised at Donovan's lack of docility toward the British during the war. He invokes the authority of certain unnamed British officials that Donovan continued to display certain "Fenian" tendencies during the war. Cave Brown presumably is referring to those occasions when Donovan objected to attempts by the British to control all OSS intelligence activities in the European Theater of Operations. Ed Sayle, curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, called to this writer's attention a memorandum from Donovan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which he observed, *inter alia*, that the British had developed "the habit of control" over other countries' intelligence services in physical proximity to theirs "through their relations with refugee governments and refugee intelligence services." But, as Donovan stressed, "we are not a refugee government." Sayle's comment is that Donovan's argument was not the emotional outpouring of one's ethnic ancestral juices, but the properly reasoned statement of an American patriot. Perhaps; but this writer would wager that some Britons at the time might have judged otherwise, and that the Irish Catholic in Donovan made his pencil bite into the paper as he drafted those words. In any case, Donovan showed himself here and on other occasions to be anything but a British agent. He was at most what some Russians refer to

* Even as a boy, Dunlop records, Donovan was willing to side with a "narrow back" if he thought that boy was being unfairly bullied. "Narrow back"—still used in some Irish Catholic neighborhoods—neatly encapsulates a set of ethnic, religious, and class distinctions, referring primarily to a Protestant of British Isles descent who has inherited affluence. Donovan, in other words, had learned at an early age to judge situations objectively and act on those convictions.

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as a *doveritel'naya svyaz'*—an influential person in one country who has come to believe that the national interests of his or her country usually coincide with those of another country, and therefore might be counted on to give favorable consideration to a request for assistance. Donovan's relationship with the British was of that kind. And the argument itself—"we are not a refugee government"—was worth making, not just to deal with the immediate problem, but for the longer term good relationship between the intelligence services of the US and Britain.

The Last Hero?

Except for the foregoing, Cave Brown is generous to Donovan in his overall evaluation of the man himself and the organization he created. It is as appropriate for him to quote Eisenhower's tribute to Donovan as "the last hero" as it is petty for David Kahn to dispute the appellation. One would hope that more Americans might achieve as much for their country as Donovan did, but one comes away from these four books with doubts about that. The world has become so complex and compartmentalized that it is difficult for any one individual to distinguish oneself as much as Donovan, in personal bravery, intellectual advancement, and broad political and military influence, or to have such achievements as widely acclaimed in positive terms. As a nation, moreover, we have grown more suspicious of would-be heroes, even though sometimes we regret that we are so cynical. In some sense, then, the epitaph in the old language of Donovan's grandparents does apply: *Ni bheidh a leitheidi aris ann.* "We shall not look upon their like again."

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Required reading

Books About the Stasi

Ben Fischer

Two years after German unification, the history of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) has yet to be written. Books and articles on the Ministry for State Ministry for State Security (MfS), however, continued to roll off the presses in 1990 and 1991. One reason is the fascination with the Stasi. Also, the history of East Germany and the Stasi are so entwined that one cannot discuss the former without reference to the latter.

The StUG Deadline

But there is a more practical reason. Many of the Stasi books, including the ones under review, had to be published *before* 2 January 1992 and could not have been written after that date. That is when Germany's Stasi Documents Law *(Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz, or StUG)* went into effect, prohibiting private possession or use of MfS records. The only legal repository of such records is a commission appointed by the German government to control some 6 million files stored mainly in the former MfS headquarters in Berlin.

Researchers will have limited access to the Stasi files and no access to files on foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or terrorism. These books are important, therefore, because they summarize most of what we will ever know about the MfS.

A Dominant Force

The Stasi was the preeminent factor in shaping—or deforming—the East German state. The Stasi controlled virtually every sphere of public and private life.

Das Ende eines Geheimdienstes Oder: Wie lebendig ist die Stasi? [The End of an Intelligence Service Or: How Active is the Stasi?]. By Ann Worst. LinksDruck, Berlin; 1991; 283 pp.

Das Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit Anatomie des Mielke-Imperium [The Ministry for State Security Anatomy of Mielke's Empire]. By David Gill and Ulrich Schroeter. Rowohlt, Berlin; 1991; 527 pp.

Stasi intern Macht und Banalitaet [Inside the Stasi Power and Banality]. Edited by the Leipzig Citizens Committee for Dismantling the MfS/AfNS. Forum Verlag, Leipzig; 1991; 375 pp.

Stasi und kein Ende Die Personen und Fakten [No End to the Stasi The Persons and Facts]. By Manfred Schell and Werner Kalinka. Die Welt/Ullstein Verlag, Bonn; 1990; 421 pp.

In eigenem Auftrag Bekenntnisse und einsichten [On My Own Assignment Revelations and Insights]. By Markus Wolf. Schneekluth, Munich; 1990; 366 pp.

Das unheimliche Erbe Die Spionage-abteilung der Stasi [The Sinister Legacy The Stasi Intelligence Department]. By Rita Sellrenny and Thilo Weichert. Forum Verlag, Leipzig; 1991; 269 pp.

Wolf's West-Spione: Ein Insider Report [Wolf's Western Agents: An Insider Report]. By Peter Richter und Klaus Roesler. Elefanten Press, Berlin; 1992; 190 pp.

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The Stasi also penetrated West Germany from top to bottom. The foreign intelligence service (HVA) under Markus Wolf had thousands of agents in government ministries, the security services, business and industry, the media, and the education system.

The MfS SIGINT directorate monitored tens of thousands—perhaps 40,000 to 60,000—of telephones and entered electronic data bases, including secure but unencrypted ones, using cellular "clone-phones" and charging the calls and computer time to Bonn. There were few private conversations and even fewer secrets in Bonn.

Frustrated Victims

Some Germans are calling for *Aufarbeitung* of the "sinister" Stasi legacy—a psychological term that means coming to terms with a troubled past. The StUG both helps and hinders that process. Stasi victims can see their 201 files, but they are otherwise restricted in seeking justice. As the books by Worst and Gill/Schroeter show, in the hectic days of 1989 and 1990 the MfS succeeded in destroying most agent files or at least making it difficult to identify agents.

Former Stasi officers hired on contract by the post-communist coalition government and deep-cover operatives infiltrated the citizens' committees that seized the files. The activists tried to save and expose everything. The former Stasi officers, aided and abetted by the government, fought a rearguard action. They persuaded the citizens' committees to destroy all computer tapes, diskettes, and platens, the fastest and most direct way to search agents' names. Then they selectively destroyed the most incriminating files and the manual index in the Central Archives, leaving behind mostly "victim" rather than "agent" files.

Thus the victims, even if they can identify their former tormentors, cannot "prove" anything. Moreover, in some cases the Stasi switched agents' and victims' files, thereby creating additional confusion and undermining confidence in the files' reliability.

The StUG was a compromise between those who wanted to destroy the Stasi files and those who wanted to declare the MfS a criminal organization and prosecute everyone who worked for it. The German Government itself is ambivalent. It was compelled on moral grounds to grant Stasi victims access to their own files. It also wants to use the files, as the StUG permits, to vet former GDR citizens for public-service positions and security clearances, as well as give the security services access to information on intelligence, counterintelligence, and terrorism.

But Bonn opposes broad access to the files because of its continuing embarrassment over successful MfS/HVA operations in West Germany. Some editorial writers have used the Stasi relevations to raise broader questions about the need for security and intelligence services in the Cold War's aftermath.

Planning Ahead

Worst and Schell/Kalinka show that State Security Minister Erich Mielke made contingency plans for a political collapse as early as 1986. He issued a "survival order" calling for measures to save files and deploy deep-cover officers in a kind of staybehind effort. HVA documents reprinted in the Selitrenny/Weichert book show that the HVA followed suit. In 1986 it began microfilming its archives, ostensibly for "historical reasons," and it accelerated the storing of data on agents and foreign intelligence officers in an electronic counterintelligence data base in Moscow.

Miekle understood that Gorbachev's rise implied the decline of the last Stalinist regime in East Europe. He also knew that East Berlin's worst nightmare—a Soviet sellout as part of the general settlement with the West—had become a distinct possibility.

When the end came in 1989 and 1990, it came with a vengeance. Citizens in East Berlin and 14 other *Bezirk* (district) capitals, angry over reports of systemic file destruction, marched on Stasi headquarters. These groups all published memoirs, but the best one is *Stasi intern,* which was compiled by the

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Leipzig citizens' committee. It explains Stasi surveillance, telephone monitoring, and mail censorship operations in great detail, and it includes pages of illuminating photos.

Bizarre Behavior

More than the other books, it gives insight into the Stasi mentality. The MfS, for example, developed a forensic theory that each person has a unique body odor. Stasi officers gained surreptitious entry to the homes of East German citizens and foreign diplomats to collect odor samples that were preserved in glass jars for later use with tracking dogs. The Leipzig group discovered that the Stasi had one jar for every member of the large local dissident community.

The Stasi patrolled public restrooms looking for political graffiti. They photographed it, measured it, analyzed it, and submitted official reports to the commanding general. The Stasi also had video coverage of selected public toilets and of virtually every bathroom and toilet in hotels and inns catering to foreign tourists. It also recruited restroom attendants to spy on tourists. Worst's book includes a long and extensive agent-vetting report on one such attendant who was recruited to spy on foreigners.

Few Files

Most HVA files disappeared. Some were destroyed, and others were sent to Moscow. HVA officers persuaded the activists that their files held vital state secrets that, if revealed, could "send American agents to the electric chair."

The only existing collection of HVA documents is the one Schitrenny and Weichert found in Leipzig. The HVA had its largest residency there to target the many foreign tourists, students, and businessmen visiting East Germany's most cosmopolitan city. The book has some real nuggets. For example, the authors found a case officer's notebook with a list of all West German high-tech firms penetrated by HVA agents.

Some Assessments

Spymaster Markus Wolf and two of his former case officers, Peter Richter and Klaus Roelser, believe that the HVA was the world's best foreign intelligence service. Wolf brags that he made the West "transparent" and prevented NATO from launching a surprise attack on the Warsaw Pact. He claims, with some justification, that the HVA helped build the East Germany economy by procuring Western technology and equipment. Richter and Roesler assert that by the 1980s even the KGB acknowledged HVA prowess and gave it license to run offensive operations against the CIA.

But these claims lack perspective. The HVA was not a full-service intelligence organization running worldwide operations. It fought a primarily civil war on German territory, where it had the advantage of proximity, common language and culture, area knowledge, and multiple points of access to an open society.

Nevertheless, the MfS, like the KGB, was one of the best. Its feats with agents, agents of influence, active measures, and S&T collection already form part of the lore of Cold War intelligence history. Its accomplishments, however, merely helped to delay the day when communism finally went down history's drain.

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August 1990: Survivors of the raid on Vemork. Author Claus Helberg is seated at the far left.

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Creating Covert Warriors

The Japanese Army's Nakano School, 1938-45

Stephen C. Mercado

The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) established in 1938 an institution to train personnel in clandestine operations. The Nakano School produced some 3,000 intelligence officers in seven years. Its graduates assumed a wide variety of duties. Some joined the Army General Staff (AGS) in Tokyo as analysts. Others conducted numerous operations in China and Southeast Asia, including the "liberation" of Burma. As the war's tide turned against Japan, the school opened a branch center dedicated to producing commandos and concentrated its training on guerrilla tactics.

The school's graduates, originally expected to gather intelligence throughout the world on long-term assignments, were then ordered to lead popular guerrilla bands as part of the anticipated final battle for the Japanese home islands. The Nakano School's last commandant ordered all documentary evidence of the school destroyed and dismissed its members when Japan surrendered in August 1945.

Upgrading Covert Capabilities

Imperial Japan by late 1937 was waging war in China and preparing to fight one or more of the major powers. The Japanese Empire had been on a collision course with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States since 1931, when the IJA seized Manchuria as a forward base against Soviet Russia. Tokyo recognized the resulting puppet state of Manchukuo the following year. Japan, seeking to blunt the growing Nationalist Chinese challenge to its grip on Manchuria and interests throughout China, moved after fighting first broke out near the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking (Beijing) in July 1937 to resolve the issue on the battlefield.

Army officers in Japan were taking steps to upgrade clandestine capabilities. In November 1937 the IJA expanded its covert warfare weapons program, moving its 9th Technical Laboratory from Tokyo to nearby Noborito. The same month saw the birth of 8th Section (Clandestine) in AGS 2nd Bureau (Intelligence).[1] The next logical step was to create a center to train the personnel needed to conduct the operations devised in 8th Section and use the special devices developed at the Noborito Laboratory.

In December 1937 the War Ministry's Military Administration Bureau formed a preparatory committee to establish a covert operations training center. Before joining the committee, Lt. Col. Iwakuro Hideo,[2] a tireless advocate of intelligence, had written a memo calling for a training center as part of a program to build a more "scientific" basis for Army clandestine operations. The facility he envisioned would instruct candidates in intelligence gathering, counterintelligence (CI), covert warfare, and propaganda.[3] Joining him was Lt. Col. Akikusa Shun, an expert on Russia who had cut his teeth on covert activities as an intelligence officer in Japan's Siberian intervention of 1918-22. Lt. Col. Fukumoto Ryuji, a third member, was a CI veteran of the Kempeitai military police.

In an army notorious for "operations first" thinking that slighted intelligence, the three officers were remarkable. Iwakuro, assigned to the Japanese Embassy in Washington in the months before the attack against Pearl Harbor, gathered intelligence and conducted operations related to the negotiations between Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Amb. Nomura Kichisaburo.[4] Following Japan's invasion of Southeast Asia, Iwakuro, as chief of his own clandestine organ, directed covert operations to overthrow British rule in India.[5]

Akikusa had joined the committee soon after working for nearly four years in the IJA's Harbin Tokumu Kikan (Special Services Organ), which oversaw the Army's anti-Soviet operations throughout Manchukuo.[6] He would become the Nakano School's first commandant. Fukumoto would serve as his deputy and right-hand man.[7]

The three men had to overcome the initial opposition of all but a few IJA officers. Lt. Col. Usui Shigeki, chief of 2nd Bureau's Russia Section, was one of their few backers.[8] Other intelligence officers worried the plan would end the system of overseas Army attachés directly reporting intelligence to them.[9]

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Rigid career progression also posed an obstacle. Most Army intelligence officers moved through a set course: the IJA War College, initial posting to AGS, overseas study, military attaché or deputy attaché, clandestine organ chief, and 2nd Bureau section and branch chief. As commissioned officers, they were also expected at some point to command a battalion or regiment. Willing neither to promote regular officers serving overseas in long-term clandestine assignments nor to use civilians, the IJA turned to its reserve officer pool.[10]

Opening the School

Iwakuro, Akikusa, and Fukumoto worked throughout early 1938 to sell their proposal to top War Ministry and AGS officials. In July, 19 reserve officers became the first class of the training center, operating in a rented building of a women's patriotic organization in Tokyo. The school then moved in March 1939 to the western suburb of Nakano. In August 1940 the center was formally inaugurated as an IJA school. Known in Tokyo as the Rear Service Personnel Training Center, the Nakano School took the covername of Eastern Unit 33.[11]

From the start, the Nakano School housed two competing outlooks. Iwakuro, Akikusa, and Fukumoto saw the center applying the latest tools and techniques of clandestine operations to train professional intelligence officers.

But joining Akikusa and Fukumoto as the third-ranking officer was Maj. Ito Samata, an officer of a decidedly more "spiritualist" cast.

“Reflecting its scientific vision, the Nakano School trained its students to speak foreign languages, break codes, wear disguises, infiltrate, use firearms, handle explosives, operate automobiles and aircraft, and use guerrilla tactics.”

The rational Akikusa saw Emperor Hirohito as an ordinary man rather than the "living god" depicted in government propaganda. Ito, however, was a descendant of the "revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians" nativists who had opened Japan to contact with the West in the mid-19th century. The nativists had been more interested in learning the secrets of modern technology than in embracing its underlying spirit of reason and democracy.[12]

Reflecting its scientific vision, the Nakano School trained its students to speak foreign languages, break codes, wear disguises, infiltrate, use firearms, handle explosives, operate automobiles and aircraft, and use guerrilla tactics.[13] The Inada Factory, a small campus facility run by Lt. Col. Inada Yuichi, developed devices for clandestine operations. Many instructors came from AGS 2nd Bureau's Russia and Clandestine sections.[14] Members of the Noborito Laboratory also visited to offer guidance in the covert warfare devices they were developing, including pistols disguised as cigarette lighters, incendiary bricks, explosives made to resemble coal, miniature cameras mounted in briefcases and lighters, delayed-fuse tear gas, poison gas, and other special weapons.[15]

Akikusa, known for his ease in mixing with Westerners, would at times take students to the top-class Imperial Hotel for meals to hone their social skills before placing them overseas. He also encouraged them to learn through self-initiative. The students, sporting civilian clothes and haircuts, were free in the evenings to go out on the town and even stay out overnight.

For the school's "textbook," Akikusa turned to the secret operations reports of Col. Akashi Motojiro from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Akashi supplied funds and arms to Lenin's Bolsheviks and other anti-Tsarist movements of all stripes throughout Europe in an effort to check reinforcements to the battlefront in Manchuria by undermining Moscow. The Japanese equated his actions as equivalent to three army divisions.[16]

Major Ito, a skilled swordsman rumored to have cut down more than 80 guerrillas and spies in Manchuria during the IJA's takeover in 1931, had first opposed creating the Nakano School. Once appointed to oversee the training there, however, he dedicated himself to drilling into its students a "spiritual" education. The campus featured halls where students honed their skills at traditional fencing (kendo) and such martial arts as aikido. Ninja masters were invited to impart their ancient secrets. Instructors drummed into students the spirit of endurance against all hardships to execute their missions.[17] Lt. Onoda Hiro, one Nakano School graduate, displayed

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in the extreme the effects of his schooling, surrendering in the Philippines only in 1974.[18] Sgt. Sakai Kiyoshi, a graduate who appeared on the remote island of Yaeyama near Taiwan late in the war as a schoolteacher named Yamashita Torao, spent his evenings there teaching the children kendo and exhorting the islanders not to fear death.[19]

The school's clash between reason and spirit resulted in early casualties on both sides. Ito, who believed Great Britain was manipulating to its own advantage the fighting between Japan and China, decided to instigate an anti-British campaign. He conspired with two members of the Nakano School's first class to seize Great Britain's consulate in Kobe, force the officials to confess to British meddling, and find documents to prove that Japan's liberal statesmen and business leaders had been bought. Ironically, a member of the first class from Akikusa's faction detected the plot.

The Kempeitai in January 1940 arrested Ito and his followers in Kobe. The IJA quietly put Ito on the reserve list and sent the other plotters on overseas assignments in order to keep the affair quiet. Akikusa, although not involved in the plotting, took responsibility as commandant by resigning in March.[20]

Working in Intelligence

The Nakano School's first class graduated in July 1939.[21] AGS 2nd Bureau's Russia Section had first promoted the Nakano School as a source of recruits for its operations.

"Once Japan decided to strike south against the United States and European colonies in Southeast Asia, the Nakano School's graduates worked in a number of operations to "liberate" Asia."

But the graduates were sent throughout the world to gather intelligence against all Japan's hypothetical enemies. The first class thus operated in Hawaii, the Philippines, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, India, and China as well as the Manchukuo-Soviet border and Europe.[22] The officers posed as newspaper reporters, Chinese citizens, Buddhist priests, trading company employees, diplomats, servants, and sailors.[23]

Nakano School officers also worked as analysts throughout AGS 2nd Bureau. Three officers withdrawn from their covert assignments in the Western Hemisphere and India at the onset of the war assumed new duties following US and British developments in 6th Section (USA, Britain).[24] Maj. Hata Masanobu, a graduate of the school's second class, served in the bureau's Russia Section.[25] Other graduates served in other parts of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ), in Tokyo and as staff intelligence officers in the field armies.

"Liberating" Asia

Once Japan decided to strike south against the United States and European colonies in Southeast Asia, the Nakano School's graduates worked in a number of operations to "liberate" Asia. One of the most famous clandestine groups involved was the Minami Kikan (Southern Organ). The organization was established in February 1941 under the command of Col. Suzuki Kenji, who had first entered Burma in June 1940 to gather intelligence as a Japanese reporter named Minami Masuyo.[26]

Most IJA members of the Minami Kikan—which also included Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) officers, Japanese civilians with experience in Southeast Asia, and Burmese activists—were Nakano School graduates. One such officer, Capt. Kawashima Takenobu, was Colonel Suzuki's "right-hand man" in the organ, according to Nakano School classmate and fellow organ member Lt. Izumiya Tatsuro.[27] In the months leading to the war, the organ was training Burmese operatives, including postwar Burmese strongman Gen. Ne Win, in occupied China's Hainan Island and collecting foreign weapons for the Burmese to lead an armed uprising against British rule. Nakano School members worked in Hainan, Guangdong, and the organ's headquarters in Thailand to lay the groundwork.

Japan's surprise attack against Great Britain in December 1941 drastically changed the operation. The Minami organ responded by establishing the Burma Independence Army (BIA) that month in Bangkok. Such Nakano School graduates as Lt. Izumiya Tatsuro then trained and led BIA units into Burma under the overall command of Lt. Gen. Iida Shojiro's 15th Army. With the conquest of Burma, the BIA grew from its initial 200 Burmese recruited in

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Thailand to 100,000. The Burmese welcomed as liberators the Japanese and the 2,000-strong BIA unit that marched into Rangoon.[28]

In another operation, Nakano School officers constituted the core of the Fujiwara Kikan (Fujiwara Organ). In September 1941 Maj. Fujiwara Iwaichi, a staff officer in AGS 2nd Bureau's Clandestine Section, established his organization to enlist the support of anti-British activists among colonial Malaya's Indians, Malays, and Chinese to facilitate Japan's invasion of the peninsula. He first took his half-dozen Nakano School graduates and other members to Bangkok.[29]

Fujiwara went as a Foreign Ministry official. The others entered Thailand as government officials, traders, and even a hotel bellboy. They contacted members of the Indian Independence League and other anti-British activists to prepare fifth-column activities. The organization, then called the F Kikan ("F" standing for Fujiwara, friendship, and freedom) participated in the IJA's campaign for Singapore under Lt. Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki's 25th Army.

The Nakano School graduates worked with other members to persuade Indian officers and soldiers in the British Army to surrender. Fujiwara's organization then turned them and others detained after the fall of Singapore into the Indian National Army (INA). Nakano School officers remained core members in the expanded efforts to wrest India from British rule under the successor organs led by Iwakuro—

"The Nakano School thus constituted an important element in the military-industrial complex Japan was assembling to fight the final campaign in the home islands."

Fujiwara's replacement—and then by Maj. Gen. Yamamoto Hayashi.[30]

Turning To Guerrilla Warfare

The war's outbreak so soon after the Nakano School's first class had graduated reduced its field of operations from the entire world to Japanese-occupied areas in Asia. The accelerating tempo of the Allied counterassault led the IJA to abandon all training but instruction in guerrilla tactics. The Nakano School's mission was to produce operatives who would wreak havoc behind enemy lines in the Southern Front and, in the end, lead the Japanese people in a guerrilla war in the final battle for the home islands.

The Nakano School opened its Futamata Branch for guerilla warfare in 1944. The foreign-language classes and other training unrelated to guerrilla tactics were gone. The training period was reduced from two years to six and then three months.[31] A central communications unit was established within IGHQ to coordinate the activities of commandos working behind enemy lines and communicate intelligence.[32] In this later period, over 2,000 graduates were assigned to outposts in the Southern Front or throughout Japan, generally in their home prefectures, to organize guerrilla units.

The Nakano School was an essential part of the IJA's plans for the final defense of Japan, as indicated by the withdrawal of the main facility from suburban Nakano to Tomioka, Gunma Prefecture, in 1945. The new location, further inland among the mountains, offered greater protection than the Tokyo area. More important, the school was close to the vast underground IGHQ under construction in neighboring Matsushiro, Nagano Prefecture. The Noborito Laboratory had also withdrawn to Nagano, as had such key weapons manufacturers as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Toshiba.[33]

The Nakano School thus constituted an important element in the military-industrial complex Japan was assembling to fight the final campaign in the home islands. The government exhorted the entire population to fight to the death. Even military leaders considering surrender demanded the opportunity to deal a major blow to the invading US forces before negotiating an end to the war.

The End of the School

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima on 6 August, the Soviet invasion of Manchukuo and Japan's northern islands on 9 August, and the destruction of Nagasaki by an atomic bomb the same day precipitated Japan's surrender without the climactic battle for which the IJA had been preparing. Emperor Hirohito's recorded

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speech declaring an end to the war was broadcast on 15 August.

Four days earlier, the IJA had ordered Maj. Gen. Yamamoto Hayashi, the last commandant, to begin burning documents and making other preparations to close the Nakano School. On 15 August, Yamamoto assembled the school's members to listen to the broadcast. Afterwards, he ordered the torching of the campus Shinto shrine, led the assembled members in a final singing of the school song, and then dismissed them. The Nakano School had closed its doors after only seven years.[34]

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6. Hata, Ikuhiko. *Showashi No Gunjintachi* (Military Men of Showa History). Tokyo: Bungei Shunju; 1989; pp. 313-15.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 317.

8. Usui later assumed command of AGS 2nd Bureau's 8th Section (Clandestine). See Kinoshita, p. 195.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 194-99.

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19. Ishihara, Masaie. *Mo Hitotsu No Okinawa Sen* (Another Account of the Battle for Okinawa). Naha: Okinawa Bunko; 1992; p. 50.

20. Hata, *Gunjin*, pp. 317-21.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 321.

22. Hori, Eizo. *Daihonei Sanbo No Joho Senki* (An IGHQ Staff Officer's Record of Intelligence Warfare). Tokyo: Bungei Shunju; 1989; p. 77, and Matsushima, p. 5.

23. Matsushima, p. 5

24. Hori, p. 77.

25. Hata, *Showa*, p. 114.

26. Izumiya, Tatsuro. *The Minami Organ*. Translated by U Tun Aung Chain. Rangoon: Universities Press; 1981; p. 14.

27. *Ibid.*, forward.

28. Imai, p. 221, and Izumiya, pp. 168-70.

29. Fujiwara, Iwaichi. *F Kikan: Japanese Army Operations in Southeast Asia During WWII*. Translated by Akashi Yoji. Hong Kong: Heinemann's Asia; 1983; p. 11, and Imai, p. 232.

30. Imai, p. 254.

31. Onoda, pp. 31-32.

32. Hata, *Showa*, p. 152.

33. Kinoshita, p. 312.

34. Arisue, pp. 114-16.

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Intelligence Support for Richard M. Nixon (U)

John Helgerson

*Editor's Note: This article is drawn from "*Getting To Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1992,*" which has been published by CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence.*

During his eight years as Vice President in the 1950s, Richard Nixon had broad exposure to the activities of the civilian US Intelligence Community. He was aware that the CIA had briefed the presidential candidates in every election since 1952 and undoubtedly harbored mixed feelings about the way the process had worked in 1960. Nixon believed that his narrow defeat by John Kennedy had been caused, in part, by the actions and inactions of the intelligence agencies. This familiarity with the Intelligence Community's capabilities and practices made him willing, at the outset of his new campaign for the presidency in 1968, to accept briefings from CIA Director Richard Helms. It also led him to decline to receive routine briefings from lower-level officers, opening the way for Henry Kissinger, his National Security Adviser, to play a central and expanding role.

"Nixon's familiarity with the Intelligence Community's capabilities and practices made him willing, at the outset of his new campaign for the presidency in 1968, to accept briefings from CIA Director Richard Helms."

Nixon won the Republican Party nomination on 8 August 1968. Two days later the nominee and his running mate, Governor Spiro Agnew of Maryland, flew to Texas to hear a "general review of the international situation" from outgoing President Lyndon Johnson and his key foreign policy advisers. In addition to the President, the group included Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Cyrus Vance (the number-two negotiator in the Vietnam peace talks in Paris), and DCI Helms. The President welcomed the Republican candidates with a tour of his ranch in an open convertible, but, when the time came for the substantive briefing, he made only a few introductory remarks and then gave the floor to the CIA Director.

Helms's memorandum for the record indicates that he focused on the handful of international developments that were at a critical stage during the late summer of 1968, including the confrontation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, events in the Middle East, and the military situation in Vietnam.[1] The Director also discussed Cuba, including Castro's support for revolutionary efforts in Latin America, and events in the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Following Helms's briefing, Vance continued with a review of developments in the Paris peace negotiations that included details of the private talks under way between the United States and North Vietnam.

Helms recorded that Nixon and Agnew were interested, in particular, in the effects of the Soviet-Czechoslovak confrontation on Poland and Yugoslavia. He also noted that they were surprised to hear that the North Vietnamese were demanding that the Saigon government negotiate directly with the Communist shadow administration in South Vietnam, the National Liberation Front. During the course of the briefing, Nixon directed a number of policy questions to Rusk. The Republican candidate made clear he had no intention of saying or doing

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anything that would complicate the job of the United States negotiators in Paris.

Looking back on his first briefing of candidate Nixon 25 years after the fact, Helms recalled that, in his view, it was not a particularly well organized or useful session.[2] After his own 15-minute overview of key worldwide developments, he recalled, the politicians' instincts took over for the balance of the discussion in the sitting room at the LBJ ranch and during the one-hour lunch that followed. Johnson was on a liquid diet, recovering from a bout of diverticulitis, so he was free to do all the talking while the others enjoyed a meal of steak and corn on the cob. Helms recalled with some amusement that the President of five years and the candidate, with his eight years of vice-presidential experience, each wanted to demonstrate to the other his mastery of foreign affairs.

Nixon appears to have been pleased with the session; he later wrote positively in his memoirs about the "full-scale intelligence briefings ordered by Johnson for each of the nominees."[3] The session concluded with the President's assurance to Nixon that he could call on Rusk or Helms for any additional information he might require.

As it happened, the discussion in Texas on 10 August was the only briefing Nixon was to receive in the pre-election period. That session had focused entirely on the facts of developments abroad and the status of negotiations in which the United States was involved. Unlike the situation that had developed in 1960, there was in the August briefing—and in the whole campaign in 1968—no effort by anyone to make a political issue of the Intelligence Community's programs or analyses. A key factor that helped ensure that did not happen was Helms's strict constructionist view of the CIA Director's job. He was determined to stick to the facts and avoid involvement in policy discussions, unlike his predecessors Allen Dulles and John McCone.

"Helms was aided in his determination to avoid any politicization of intelligence in 1968 by the fact that there were no presidential debates that year."

Helms was aided in his determination to avoid any politicization of intelligence in 1968 by the fact that there were no presidential debates that year. Although there had been one debate during the primaries (between Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy), once the nominations were final Nixon concluded that he could avoid debating his opponent, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, just as Johnson had declined to debate Goldwater in 1964. Nixon's judgment was buttressed by the results of polls showing, as early as the first week in September, that he was leading Humphrey by a substantial margin, which he was able to retain throughout the campaign.

After a postelection vacation in Key Biscayne, Florida, President-elect Nixon and his wife returned to New York City on Monday, 11 November, stopping en route in Washington for lunch with the President and an impromptu afternoon of discussions with the President and his foreign affairs aides. In addition to the President, Rusk, and Helms, this time the group included Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Earl Wheeler, and National Security Adviser Walt Rostow. Helms remembers that the afternoon meeting in the Cabinet room suffered from the short notice and complete lack of preparation. There was only a desultory exchange on substantive issues, inasmuch as "nobody knew what was wanted or expected."

Invigorated by his election and vacation, the President-elect was struck by the very different mood of the other participants as they concentrated on Vietnam.[4] He recalled that those assembled seemed very nearly worn out from dealing with the prolonged crisis and "had no new approaches to recommend to me." Nixon said he saw the war etched on the faces around him and found them relieved to be able to turn the morass over to someone else. He recorded that they emphasized to him that the United States must see the war through to a successful conclusion and that a negotiated settlement that looked like a defeat would have a devastating impact on US allies and friends in Asia and around the world.

From Helms's point of view, the meeting on 11 November was significant for a reason unrelated to the discussion of Vietnam. Helms remembers that Johnson asked him to stay on for a private talk after the session adjourned. At that time, Johnson told Helms that Nixon had twice asked about him (Helms). Johnson said he told Nixon that he

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"had no idea how Helms had voted, but that his was a merit appointment."

Johnson's kindness in recommending Helms to the Nixon administration may have resulted from a lingering embarrassment over the way he had treated Helms at an earlier point. In 1965, Johnson had passed over Helms to appoint VAdm. William Raborn, Jr., as DCI. At the time, Johnson informed Helms that, although he had heard good things about him, "you are not well enough known in this town," meaning Capitol Hill. But Johnson went on to tell Helms that he "should attend every meeting Raborn did."

The Director's only other meeting with Nixon during the transition period occurred later the same week when he was summoned to New York City on Friday, 15 November. Helms entered the Nixon suite on the 39th floor of the Pierre Hotel at 1:30 p.m. to find the President-elect conversing with adviser John Mitchell, who was to become Attorney General. With virtually no preliminaries, Nixon indicated that he would like Helms to stay on as DCI. The public announcement would come some time later.

Supporting Nixon's Team in New York City[5]

Discussions between Johnson and Helms resulted in a decision that CIA should make available to the President-elect in New York City the same daily intelligence information being provided to the outgoing President in Washington. Helms assigned the task of providing this assistance to R. J. Smith, the Agency's Deputy Director for Intelligence. As a first step, he asked Smith to confer with Nixon's chief aide, former advertising executive Robert Haldeman.

Joined by Howard Osborn, CIA's Director of Security, and Richard Lehman, Deputy Chief of the Office of Current Intelligence, Smith went to New York on the morning of 12 November.[6] Smith showed Haldeman a sample of the intelligence publications the Agency proposed to make available to Nixon—*The President's Daily Brief* (PDB), the *Central Intelligence Bulletin* (CIB), the daily *Situation in Vietnam*, the *Weekly Review*, and selected memorandums. In turn, Haldeman asked that the Agency initiate special intelligence security clearances for a number of staff members, including Richard Allen and Martin Anderson. They had been the President-elect's advisers on foreign affairs during the campaign and were to continue to advise him during the transition period.

It was agreed that CIA should establish in a secure area a reading room to which members of the Nixon staff could come for security indoctrination and to read classified documents. Space was not available in the Pierre, so it was decided to locate the Agency's outpost, dubbed "DDI–New York," in the basement of the Nixon Campaign Headquarters at 450 Park Avenue, six blocks from the office of the President-elect. This site, formerly the world headquarters of the North American Missionary Alliance and soon to be demolished, was chosen because it seemed unlikely to attract attention from the press and the public. Allen's office was also in the building.

Paul Corscadden, an 11-year veteran of the Agency's Office of Current Intelligence, was designated officer in charge. Kenneth Rosen, an intelligence officer who had served in the White House Situation Room under President Johnson and worked a year as a special assistant to McGeorge Bundy, was second in command. Corscadden and Rosen moved into the Statler-Hilton Hotel at 7th Avenue and 33rd Street for the duration of the transition period. Because of the expense of living in New York and the representational nature of the assignment, the Executive Director of CIA waived the standard per diem limitation and allowed each of them up to $30 per day.

The area selected to house the Agency's facility required extensive renovation, which, magically, was accomplished by CIA's Office of Logistics in 72 hours, including one weekend. The construction activity did not go unnoticed by other occupants of the building. Reports soon circulated that the Secret Service, the FBI, or some other sensitive, top secret government agency had moved in and would, among other things, assume responsibility for the physical security of all the President-elect's staff offices and the protection of his family. The CIA Office of Security had decided not to identify the operation as Agency-sponsored but, rather, to allow anyone who learned of its existence to draw whatever conclusions they chose. This decision, reasonable on the face of things, led to unexpected consequences. Before long, Nixon staff secretaries were calling to ask that someone "behind the Black Door" investigate the disappearance of office supplies or solve the mystery of a purloined television set. On another occasion, the supervisor of

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the staff mailroom demanded that one of the Agency communicators "taste" and immediately remove from the mailroom a crate of canned hams sent to the President-elect as a Christmas gift.

Those who were curious about what was housed behind that Black Door enjoyed the unwitting support of the municipal health authorities. Occupants of nearby buildings along Park Avenue had complained of an infestation of black rats that had established colonies in the ground around the brightly lighted Christmas trees festooning the avenue from 59th Street to Grand Central Station. Within hours, health inspectors poured through all the nearby buildings. A team came to the door of the Agency facility, demanding admission. They were turned away with the assurance that there were no rats inside.

Beginning on 19 November, intelligence publications were wired to New York on a daily basis. The *Situation in Vietnam* report arrived the evening of its publication in Washington; the PDB came soon after 5:00 a.m. each morning. Nixon staff members who had access to the intelligence publications came to the facility at their convenience. A reading table contained all of each day's publications, along with appropriate National Intelligence Estimates, special memorandums, intelligence handbooks, and various graphic aids. Of the key staffers, Allen and Anderson visited most often.

Corscadden and Rosen delivered each day a complete set of publications in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Only—The President-elect" to Rose Mary Woods in Nixon's office. Woods had been granted the proper clearances, and the Agency had installed a safe in her office for the secure storage of classified materials. Initially it was thought that she probably would return the publications after two or three days, during which time the President-elect would have had the opportunity to read at least a current issue of the PDB.

For the first 10 days of the operation, only intelligence analyses prepared for the outgoing administration were made available to the President-elect's staff. It soon became apparent, however, that the needs of the incoming administration did not coincide in every detail with those of the Johnson administration. To meet the emerging special needs of the new team, the Office of Current Intelligence on 29 November compiled the first "Nixon Special," an "Eyes Only" intelligence memorandum based upon sensitive intelligence information that the Agency knew would be of interest to Nixon. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service soon afterward provided an additional service by transmitting directly to New York from its field bureaus foreign press and radio articles pertaining to the incoming administration.

The Key Player: Henry Kissinger

The appointment of Harvard Professor Henry Kissinger as Assistant for National Security Affairs was announced by the President-elect at a news conference on 2 December. By prior arrangement with DDI Smith, who had telephoned him from Washington the morning of Nixon's announcement, Kissinger came to the Agency facility on Park Avenue for a briefing that same afternoon.[7] He was shown current issues of all the intelligence publications available in the facility and was told what had been delivered to the Pierre for the President-elect since the Agency support operation began. Kissinger was assured that the CIA was prepared to provide full support to him and the rest of the incoming administration.

During that first session, Kissinger expressed appreciation for the Agency's willingness to assist him and for the support it had so far provided the incoming administration. He promised to arrange his schedule to allow 15 minutes per day to read the intelligence publications. He also accepted a proposal that Corscadden and Rosen undertake during off-duty hours to advise him of any critical world developments requiring the attention of the President-elect. This precautionary arrangement had earlier been accepted by Allen and Anderson as well as Haldeman.

Kissinger asked for time to become familiar with Nixon's reading habits and daily routine before advising the Agency of any recommendations he might have for changes. He did say—in what foreshadowed Nixon's style and his own, in the White House—that it had been made clear to him that the President-elect had no intention of reading anything that had not first been perused and perhaps summarized by one of his senior staff. Kissinger said he did not know what had happened to issues of the PDB already entrusted to Rose Mary Woods but that, without his prior approval, future deliveries would not reach the President-elect. Two days later, Kissinger underscored that the Agency should not provide intelligence support to anyone at the Pierre other than the President-elect and himself; Mr. Haldeman and others from the campaign might have access

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to classified publications after they had arrived in Washington, but they would have no need for them before that time.

Kissinger reacted none too favorably to the first few issues of the PDB that he read. At one time, he expressed a preference for the CIB with its more complete text and greater detail. He complained that the prose in the PDB was too often elliptical and that the selection of topics was too random and lacked the continuity necessary for the uninitiated reader. Kissinger's points were well taken. The PDB was uniquely tailored to the needs of the outgoing administration–just as its predecessor had been shaped to the reading preferences of President Kennedy. Moreover, its authors could assume that President Johnson and his advisers were familiar with the background of the subjects covered each day. Nixon and Kissinger, however deep their background and however well read, lacked detailed familiarity with many of the ongoing, current issues addressed in the PDB.

This situation had been anticipated by the Agency, because it had come up in all prior transitions. The Office of Current Intelligence had already begun to devise a new version of the PDB for Nixon and his aides. Considerably expanded in length, the new brief had been circulated for comment to the DCI, DDI, and others of the Agency's principal officers. With their concurrence, it was decided to send the new PDB to New York. Kissinger approved its format and style at a meeting on the evening of 6 December. Thus, the Agency began to publish, in effect, two PDBs. The substance was the same, but the publication given to



Kissinger complained that the prose in the PDB was too often elliptical and that the selection of topics was too random and lacked the continuity necessary for the uninitiated reader.



Johnson was significantly more concise than that given Nixon.

To no one's surprise, it proved impossible to schedule briefings with Kissinger on a daily basis; he was seen frequently but unpredictably. His assistant, Lawrence Eagleburger of the Department of State, was seen every day and was notably more appreciative of the assistance he was provided.

On 9 December, Kissinger told Corscadden that he had been asked to brief the President-elect's "senior staff" and would need inputs for a 30-minute session on the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the state of US-Chinese relations, the US-USSR strategic arms balance, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He asked especially for "tidbits, local color ... things which will make these people think they're getting the inside story but which, if leaked, will not compromise or embarrass me or the President-elect or the United States Government." He promised to come to Park Avenue soon to review the drafts.

On the afternoon of 11 December, Kissinger paid his second visit to the basement suite on Park Avenue, arriving with Eagleburger. It was evident that the two had discussed the format Kissinger preferred even before he had seen the materials prepared by the Agency. Eagleburger's assignment was to redraft CIA's contribution. After scanning the briefing book and posing one or two questions about de Gaulle's nuclear program, Kissinger asked for still more material on Berlin, the problem of Nigeria's breakaway state of Biafra, the strategic arms balance, NATO, the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia, and the prospects for a meeting in Warsaw of Chinese and American representatives. Kissinger delegated to Eagleburger responsibility for preparing "drafts" for his consideration the next evening in Washington, when the President-elect proposed to unveil his Cabinet during a nationwide television broadcast from the Shoreham Hotel in Washington. Eagleburger worked in the basement at Park Avenue until 3:00 a.m., returned to the Pierre for a brief rest, and then assumed the job of redrafting and editing the briefing Kissinger was to give.

Eagleburger's task was complicated by the fact that, except for Woods, none of the Nixon clerical staff, including Kissinger's secretary, had yet been granted special intelligence security clearances. Corscadden arranged to have Eagleburger's preliminary text typed by the Agency secretary assigned to DDI–NY and to have it taken to the Pierre. Eagleburger was then driven to LaGuardia Airport for his flight to Washington. CIA officers met Eagleburger at National Airport and took him to an improvised two-room office at the Shoreham Hotel. They remained with Eagleburger for much of the night of 12 December, calling on the Agency's analytic resources to provide substantive backup through the Duty Officer in the Operations Center.[8]

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During his late-evening television appearance, the President-elect disclosed that he and his Cabinet-to-be and top advisers would spend the following day, Friday, 13 December, in conference. One of the highlights of their all-day session would be an intelligence briefing by Kissinger. Agency officers received no direct feedback on the substantive discussions held on 13 December. They were interested that Kissinger, in their next meeting, directed that Attorney General–designate Mitchell receive the PDB and all other reports in which he expressed any interest. Before long, Mitchell was being briefed on a daily basis and proved to be "very helpful as a window into what Nixon wanted."[9]

In mid-December, Kissinger also directed that no National Intelligence Estimates were to go to the President-elect. Somewhat sharply, he explained that no one department or agency of the government would be permitted to present its views directly to Nixon to the disadvantage of any other. Corscadden pointed out that a National Intelligence Estimate was the product of the Intelligence Community as a whole, that it was issued in the name of the United States Intelligence Board, and could not be considered "parochial." This rejoinder had no appreciable effect.

Toward the end of December, Kissinger began to meet more regularly with Corscadden and Rosen. By then, Kissinger was able to read only the PDB with any regularity; DDI–NY was responsible for calling to his attention "critical items" in other publications. The balance of the 15-minute "daily" session was devoted to a capsule review of crucial international situations the new administration was likely to face during its first few months in office—"stressing the significance, not the facts"—and to discussion of whatever papers Kissinger had requested of the Agency. He directed that memorandums prepared for Nixon should contain a "statement of the problem and an assessment of its significance," as well as a summary.

Kissinger's reading of an estimate on Soviet strategic attack forces led him to ask for an oral briefing on the US-Soviet strategic balance. After consulting with his military aide, Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, and with Eagleburger, Kissinger decided that the J-3 section of the Joint Chiefs should take the lead. CIA's Deputy Director for Science and Technology and Director of Strategic Research were also invited to participate in the briefing, which was held on Saturday, 21 December. In addition to Kissinger, Mitchell, Eagleburger, and Goodpaster were present.

This was the most formal briefing Kissinger received during the transition; unfortunately, it did not go well. The J-3 team that had traveled from Washington to conduct the briefing used only the "high side" numbers regarding Soviet capabilities in preparing their text and graphics. This prompted the CIA experts present to try to supplement the briefing and question some of its conclusions. In the discussion that followed, Kissinger, Goodpaster, and, finally, Mitchell asked evermore probing questions, to the obvious chagrin of the briefers. Kissinger and Mitchell both made clear after the fact that they were not satisfied.

The issue of possible direct State Department involvement in the support process in New York arose as a result of a PDB item on coup reports in a certain country. Kissinger asked about US contingency plans if a coup occurred. When the Agency officers replied that they were not normally privy to such contingency planning, Kissinger turned to Eagleburger and insisted that a representative of the Department of State attend the morning briefing sessions. Eagleburger discussed the idea with CIA, but nothing came of it. Years later, describing how the system worked, Eagleburger recalled that he "occasionally called on the State Department to send specific written materials—I was from State, after all—but the Agency team was all we needed right there."[10]

As Kissinger became more and more active toward the end of December, his probing questions and his insatiable demands for assessments of the significance of isolated developments—even those in the low order of probability—meant that far more speculative, estimative analysis was required. This led CIA to the strategy of having its substantive officers prepare detailed backup pieces to complement the topics covered each day in the PDB. These reports provided the generalists who briefed Kissinger with additional information with which to field his queries.

Mindful of Kissinger's repeated requests for "problem papers," special briefings on emergent crises likely to confront the new administration during its first months in office, and "must reading" before Inauguration Day, the Agency in late December began appending to the PDB a series of special papers focused on critical issues. For more than 18 months, the PDB, at President Johnson's request, had carried special annexes on Vietnam and on

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North Vietnamese reflections on the US political scene. Kissinger decided that the annexes need not be sent to the President-elect and should not be published after Inauguration Day. The new "problem papers" were designed in part, therefore, to replace the Vietnam annexes in the New York edition of the PDB, which was by now being tailored for the incoming administration.

In the remaining days of the operation, Kissinger read the "problem papers" on such subjects as access to Berlin, the Communist troop buildup in South Vietnam, the military balance between the two Koreas, and the French economic situation. For each of these subjects, CIA analysts with the appropriate expertise traveled to New York to accompany the regular briefers. Especially in the cases of Vietnam and Korea, Kissinger had numerous questions. He wanted to know the Agency's past track record in estimates on the subject at hand and pressed the analysts for "your personal opinions."

On 6 January, Kissinger, who initially became Nixon's National Security Adviser, turned to the question of intelligence support on Inauguration Day and thereafter. By this time, Nixon had expressed his intention to hold regular staff meetings with his key advisers at 9:00 a.m. or 9:30 a.m. each morning. Kissinger surmised that he would brief the President for 30 minutes each morning, immediately following these staff conferences. He did not want to give Nixon anything he and his National Security Council staff had not had time to mull over and was anxious to "preview" intelligence reporting each evening, with an eye to meeting the Chief Executive early the next day.

"The support operation mounted in New York constituted the most elaborate system yet designed to provide intelligence to a President-elect."

Kissinger proposed that the DCI change the publication time for the PDB from early morning to late afternoon, releasing the publication to him in the evening and to the President the following morning. This change, Kissinger admitted, would introduce a lag of 12 hours in the reporting time, but he was not disturbed that the PDB would be less current; he was more concerned that he have time to prepare his own comments on anything the President would see.

With Inauguration Day less than a week away, the Agency proposed to introduce to the President-elect and Kissinger an entirely new PDB—redesigned to meet Kissinger's specifications for a briefing paper tailored to Nixon's preferences. This new publication was to consist of three sections—Major Developments, Other Important Developments, and occasional annexes—all double-spaced and printed on legal-size paper bound at the top.

The first section, Major Developments, was to be subdivided into sections on Vietnam, the Middle East, Soviet Affairs, and Europe. This was not a static listing. As developments warranted, some areas could be dropped, others added. The second section, Other Important Developments, was intended to highlight problems which—though not yet critical—could in time engage US policy interests. The annexes were to fulfill the same role as the "problem papers" that were appended to the PDB sent to New York during the early part of January. Kissinger approved the new format on 15 January.

Nixon Remains Aloof

The support operation mounted in New York constituted the most elaborate system yet designed to provide intelligence to a President-elect. Ironically, Nixon's aloof style resulted in a situation where the Agency had no direct contact with him. Until mid-December, for example, Agency officers were uncertain whether he had been reading the PDB or the other publications deposited each morning with his secretary. On 18 December, Eagleburger confided that Nixon had informed Kissinger that Woods had been "stockpiling" the unopened envelopes containing the PDB, CIB, and memorandums on Vietnam. Nixon had asked Kissinger to send someone upstairs to retrieve these envelopes so that Kissinger could review the collection and decide whether there was anything in it that the President-elect should read. The question had been answered: Mr. Nixon had read no Agency publications during the first month of the New York operation.

Eagleburger observes that Nixon's handling of the intelligence material was a result of his management style rather than any disinterest in foreign developments. In fact, he says, "Nixon was very interested—but it was just him and Henry. That's why you didn't brief him directly." Eagleburger did not see Nixon either—

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briefings of the President-elect were the prerogative of Kissinger alone.

Other accounts, however, confirm more directly that Nixon's refusal to receive intelligence briefings personally stemmed from negative attitudes about the CIA that went well beyond an aloof and formal management style. Goodpaster, who worked with the transition staff to help organize the national security apparatus, remembers discussing with Nixon how the Eisenhower team had handled intelligence support. Goodpaster says Nixon "acknowledged the importance of intelligence, but also commented that when you needed it, it often wasn't there."[11]

Discouraging as it was to CIA officers not to have personal contact with Nixon, a great deal of Agency material did reach the President-elect through Kissinger's daily briefings. According to Eagleburger, "Henry made heavy use of the CIA material. I remember especially Korea and other Asian issues. Henry would go in and go over the material with Nixon; documents would be left behind that Nixon would read." Rosen remembers how pleased the Agency team was when it would occasionally receive back from Kissinger copies of the PDB initialed by Nixon, confirming that at least some of the material was being read.[12]

Throughout the two months of the operation in New York, there was some uneasiness among Agency managers because Kissinger levied heavy demands for analytic work in the President's name, and Eagleburger levied similarly heavy demands in Kissinger's name. Without direct access to the principal consumer, it was always unclear how much of this material was really wanted or read by Nixon himself. For the most part, however, it did not matter. CIA took pride in serving those who clearly would be the key foreign policy aides to the new president.

On one occasion the ambiguity about who was really speaking for whom was especially worrisome. A few days before the inauguration, Kissinger called Helms in Washington with a discouraging message. He said that the CIA Director, following the inauguration, should brief the National Security Council on intelligence matters at the opening of its meetings but should then leave the meetings before the policy discussions. This scenario was represented by Kissinger as Nixon's, but Helms knew it was a ridiculous idea. Long experience had shown him that policymakers, during the course of their deliberations, frequently needed to turn to the representative of the Intelligence Community for factual updates.

Two days following the inauguration, the first NSC meeting was held. At the outset, Nixon invited the attendees to stay for lunch following the meeting. With this encouragement, Helms stayed through the meeting and lunch. And with the precedent established, he simply stayed throughout all subsequent NSC meetings. The scenario earlier raised by Kissinger never surfaced again.

CIA's direct access to Nixon was limited to the briefings by the Agency's directors—Richard Helms, James Schlesinger, and, finally, William Colby—at meetings of the National Security Council. In an interview in 1982, Helms offered a graphic account of how difficult those meetings could be, especially during the early period of the Nixon presidency:

> *From the very beginning of the Nixon administration, Nixon was criticizing Agency estimates, estimates done back when he was Vice President. What he knew about estimates in the intervening years I don't know. But he would constantly, in National Security Council meetings, pick on the Agency for not having properly judged what the Soviets were going to do with various kinds of weaponry. And obviously, he was being selective, but he would make remarks about this and say this obviously had to be sharpened up. The Agency had to understand it was to do a better job and so on. And I haven't the slightest doubt that Nixon's carping affected Kissinger, who after all was his national security adviser.*
>
> *Despite this challenge to the estimates, the analysis and so forth of the Agency, the fundamental fact remains that if the things had not been read, if people were not paying attention to them there never would have been the challenge. So I don't think anybody needs to feel bad about a rocky period in the Agency's history. It was bound to be a rocky period with Richard Nixon as President, given the fact that he held the Agency responsible for his defeat in 1960. And he never forgot that, and he had a barb out for the Agency all the time because he really believed, and I think he believes to this day, that that "missile gap" question was*

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the responsibility of the Agency and that it did him in.[13]

When he was elected President in 1968, Nixon could hardly have imagined how the collection capabilities of the US Intelligence Community had improved since the end of his term as Vice President eight years before. At the time he had left that office, several years of U-2 flights had given the United States an invaluable look at the Soviet Union. But the flights had been intermittent and covered only a portion of Soviet territory. As a result, the United States in 1960 was still dealing in conjecture about possible deployed Soviet strategic systems, albeit informed conjecture. In 1968, it was dealing in facts. It was never clear that the cynical President appreciated what had changed.

As the years passed, the NSC forum was less and less fruitful. Colby remembers that "Nixon didn't operate well in meetings—he liked to make decisions on the basis of written material. When you did brief him on something, he looked like his mind was on other things—he may have been thinking about Watergate, I guess."[14] Colby wrote in his memoirs that none of Nixon's three DCIs saw him outside formal or ceremonial meetings. "I remember only one private conversation with him; it occurred when he phoned to ask what was happening in China, and I provided a quick summary off the top of my head."[15]

Throughout the Nixon presidency, the PDB was delivered by courier to Kissinger's office. Kissinger each day delivered to the President a package of material that included the PDB along with material from the State Department, the White House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs, and others. Nixon would keep the material on his desk, reading it at his convenience throughout the day. Feedback to the Agency typically was provided by Kissinger directly to the DCI.

Colby's initiative was to afford CIA unprecedented direct and daily access to the President when Ford moved into the Oval Office.

A Closer Relationship With Ford[16]

In the late spring of 1974, when it was becoming apparent that Nixon would not survive the Watergate scandal, the DCI saw a responsibility and an opportunity.[17] William Colby, who had been appointed Director in September 1973, decided that CIA should help the new Vice President, Gerald Ford, prepare for his likely elevation to the Presidency. Colby's initiative was to afford CIA unprecedented direct and daily access to the President when Ford moved into the Oval Office.

Colby modestly recounts that his decision to provide full intelligence support to Ford "had as much to do with good preparation in case something happened to the President—any president—as it did with Nixon's problems with Watergate." Colby remembers his belief at the time that "we should get the PDB to the Vice President so that he would know everything the President knew. We didn't want another situation like when Truman was unaware of the Manhattan Project."

Whatever his mix of motives, Colby invited the Vice President to visit CIA Headquarters. Ford came, on 12 June 1974, and was given wide-ranging briefings on intelligence operations and assessments. In response to Ford's request, Colby agreed to send him the PDB, in addition to the *National Intelligence Daily* he had been receiving. An Agency current intelligence specialist, David Peterson, was assigned to provide continuing intelligence support to the Vice President.

Ford accepted a suggestion that the PDB be brought to him directly, acknowledging that this would be the most secure way to receive the sensitive document. He specified that he would like to see it early each morning, preferably as his first appointment. Beginning 1 July, that became the regular routing, one that was altered only occasionally by such diversions as a Vice Presidential breakfast with the President or a speaking engagement out of town. On a few occasions, Ford was seen at his Alexandria home before he flew off to keep such an engagement. Always a gracious host, he brewed and served instant coffee.

Ford came to the vice-presidency an informed consumer of the products of the Intelligence Community. He notes that he "had become familiar with CIA first as a member of the Intelligence Subcommittee on Appropriations and later in other roles, including Minority Leader. I knew Colby from my days in Congress."[18] This familiarity, particularly with Colby personally, was to provide the Agency at least a temporary buffer in some difficult times to come.

When Nixon resigned and Ford was sworn in as President on 9 August

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1974, Agency officers were uncertain whether the briefings would continue. It seemed probable that Kissinger would intervene and terminate the sessions, substituting some other arrangement. (He was described later as "furious" when he learned of the CIA briefing routine, of which he had not been informed.) The uncertainty was short-lived; that evening Ford passed the word that he wanted his usual briefing the next morning at the White House.

NOTES

1. Richard Helms, Memorandum for the Record, "Briefing of Former Vice President Nixon and Governor Agnew," 12 August 1968.

2. Interview of Richard Helms by the author in Washington, DC, 16 March 1993. Subsequent comments of Helms come also from this interview.

3. Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York; Grosset and Dunlap; 1978), p. 316. Nixon's Democratic opponent in 1968, Hubert Humphrey, routinely received intelligence reports by virtue of being the incumbent Vice President. Two other candidates also received intelligence briefings in that unusual year: former Alabama Governor George Wallace on 26 July; and Georgia Governor Lester Maddox on 21 August. Helms and others briefed each of these candidates in Rusk's office, generally on the same array of subjects they had covered with Nixon. Very brief accounts of these sessions can be found in Helms's Memorandums for the Record: "Briefing of Former Governor George C. Wallace," 26 July 1968; and "Briefing of Governor Lester Maddox," 22 August 1968.

4. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, p. 336.

5. The material that follows regarding the Agency's activities in New York City draws very heavily on the classified writings of the late Paul H. Corscadden; he is in effect the author of this section.

6. They had planned to fly, but a heavy snowfall intervened, and the three men traveled by train instead, arriving at Pennsylvania Station in the storm-struck metropolis at the onset of the evening rush hour. They were provided a police escort to take them through the badly snarled traffic to the Central Park area and the Pierre Hotel.

7. A more detailed discussion of Smith's exchange with Kissinger can be found in his memoirs, *The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency* (Washington; Pergamon-Brassey's; 1980), pp. 201-203.

8. The CIA officers involved in this exercise were delighted later in the month when Kissinger sent Helms a letter of thanks for their extraordinary efforts.

9. Interview of Richard Lehman by the author in McLean, Virginia, 10 March 1993.

10. Telephone interview of Lawrence Eagleburger by the author, 1 November 1993. Other comments by Eagleburger come also from this interview.

11. Telephone interview of Andrew Goodpaster by the author, 17 November 1993.

12. Interview of Kenneth Rosen by the author in McLean, Virginia, 22 March 1993.

13. Interview of Richard Helms by R. Jack Smith, Washington, DC, 21 April 1982.

14. Interview of William Colby by the author in Washington, DC, 7 April 1993. Unless otherwise noted, subsequent comments by Colby also come from this interview.

15. William Colby and Peter Forbath, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York; Simon and Schuster; 1978), p. 373.

16. The material that follows regarding the Agency's support of President Ford was in large part drafted by David A. Peterson.

17. In the election campaign of 1972, there had been no special intelligence briefings. Nixon, as the incumbent president, continued to receive the PDB. His Democratic opponent, Senator George McGovern, at one point had agreed (against the counsel of his advisers) to receive an intelligence briefing from Kissinger. The CIA was to follow up with regular briefings. Unfortunately, the political crisis involving McGovern's running mate, Senator Thomas Eagleton, forced the cancellation of the Kissinger briefing, and it proved impossible to reschedule either that briefing or the others that were to follow.

18. Interview of Gerald Ford by the author in Beaver Creek, Colorado, 8 September 1993.

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Origins of a Special Relationship

CIA Liaison With the British Intelligence Community, 1942-56

Cleveland C. Cram

"Despite the close cooperation and agreement on operating ground rules, disagreements did arise, especially about OSS operations into occupied Europe from Britain."

Ah, those first OSS arrivals in London! How well I remember them arriving like jeune filles en fleur *straight from a finishing school, all fresh and innocent, to start work in our frowsty old intelligence brothel. All too soon they were ravished and corrupted, becoming indistinguishable from seasoned pros who had been in the game for a quarter century or more.*

Malcolm Muggeridge
Wartime SIS Officer

The liaison relationship of CIA with the British intelligence community began with the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942 and the arrival in Great Britain of OSS personnel shortly thereafter. The OSS contingents were soon in contact with various elements of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)—often also called MI6—as well as MI5 (the British Security Service), the Special Operations Executive (SOE), and somewhat later with Bletchley Park, where the cryptographic work was done. One of the most important OSS elements, X-2, or the counterintelligence section, was immediately integrated with Section V of SIS and was made privy to a part of the ULTRA system (ISK and ISOS) that dealt solely with the breakouts from the German intelligence organs.

In June and July 1942, Col. William Donovan, Chief of OSS, and Gen. Sir Stewart Menzies, Chief of SIS, made an agreement for the "interchange of all information of every character which might be of mutual interest." The first chief of OSS in Britain was Col. David K. E. Bruce.

New York and London

Early in World War II the British had enlarged their Passport Control Office in New York (in reality the SIS main station in America) by the addition of numerous personnel to promote propaganda on Britain's behalf in the United States, as well as to conduct liaison with various US Government agencies, principally the FBI. In 1942 the office in New York was designated as British Security Coordination (BSC) and placed under the command of Sir William Stephenson, a Canadian World War I hero. Stephenson and Donovan were close friends and allies, and both enjoyed access to the highest levels of their respective governments. Stephenson, on the instruction of Churchill and Menzies, did everything possible to assist the fledgling American intelligence service. At its height, the BSC had about 200 personnel in the United States, while the OSS peaked at something over 2,000 in the United Kingdom.

Despite BSC's size and clout plus the presence of the able Stephenson, the focal point of the liaison tended as the war progressed to be in London. Training for eventual OSS operations in Europe was done there, the counterintelligence units were merged partially in a Joint War Room in the famous Ryder Street

Cleveland C. Cram served in the Directorate of Operations.

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premises, and OSS personnel and teams were increasingly dispatched from the United Kingdom to North Africa, Italy, and other points in Europe. Despite the close cooperation and agreement on operating ground rules, disagreements did arise, especially about OSS operations into occupied Europe from Britain. The outstanding diplomatic skills of Colonel Bruce, however, resolved them all amicably. After D-Day the problem largely evaporated as OSS units moved from Britain and North Africa into France to join military units in the great push northeastward toward Nazi Germany.

Postwar Developments

In the summer of 1944, Colonel Bruce left London for France along with a growing number of other OSS personnel as operations shifted to the Continent. This exodus accelerated with the end of the European war, and, by Japan's surrender, it was a minor flood. Despite the protests of Donovan and others, President Truman dissolved the OSS on 1 October 1945.

With the end of OSS, the Research and Analysis Branch was transferred to the State Department and the espionage and counterintelligence branches became known as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) under the War Department. By the end of 1945 what was left of SSU in Britain was centered in London and was under the command of a young Lt. Cdr. Winston M. Scott, (b)(3)(c)

"With the abolition of OSS, it appeared to SIS there was no real service left in Washington with whom to conduct liaison except the FBI."

Scott's greatly diminished SSU station in London numbered probably no more than about (b)(3)(c) including the communications unit, but in January 1946 it was vastly larger than the SIS equivalent in Washington. There were several reasons for this:

- The new postwar Labor government in Britain immediately slashed the SIS budget in line with its own priorities and in keeping with its belief an era of world peace had arrived.
- General Menzies and the British Government in general believed the American intelligence service had expired with the abolition of OSS and viewed SSU as strictly a "winding up" operation.
- Menzies himself probably viewed the end of OSS as a blessing (toward the end of the war OSS had been unseemly anti-British in Southeast Asia), and he and others in SIS were prepared to let the Anglo-American intelligence relationship expire.

Furthermore, an agreement between SIS and the US Government called for the dissolution of BSC upon the Japanese surrender. With the abolition of OSS, it appeared to SIS there was no real service left in Washington with whom to conduct liaison except the FBI. Therefore, the sole remaining SIS officer, Peter Dwyer, aided by his female assistant, a Canadian lady named Geraldine Dack, were accredited for intelligence purposes to the FBI only.

CIG and CIA

The euphoric view that world peace had come with the surrender of Japan was rapidly evaporating in the reality of menacing actions by the Soviets everywhere in Europe. President Truman, having earlier rejected Donovan's plan for a centralized intelligence agency, in January 1946 created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). Six months later, SSU was merged into CIG, and soon after it became known as the Office of Special Operations (OSO). In September 1947 CIG became the CIA under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947.

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Winston M. Scott, who was born in 1909, was a mathematician with degrees from the University of Alabama and a doctorate from Michigan. He put himself through college playing professional baseball during his summer vacations. After Pearl Harbor, he became a special agent for the FBI but left in January 1944 to join OSS. Because of his FBI experience, he was immediately assigned to X-2, the counterintelligence arm of OSS.

After being commissioned in the Navy and trained in X-2, he was sent to London, arriving in June 1944. He was immediately put into the MI5 training course for two months, after which he was assigned to the German desk in the SIS/OSS Joint War Room. He remained head of the German desk until he became head of X-2. In December 1945, Col. John Bross, who had been named Chief of Station London for SSU, departed London for the United States. Scott was named his successor. After Scott had been promoted to head of the German desk in X-2, he did not move over to Germany or opt for demobilization. The reason it now seems clear is that Scott had developed a strong romantic attachment to an Anglo-Irish girl whom he eventually would marry. So Scott, with his small SSU staff, hunkered down and awaited developments.

Because of Scott's early training by MI5 and his long association with the Joint War Room, Scott enjoyed close personal and professional relations with key people in both British services. The fact that he could take these people to the US Embassy dining room for steak dinners and could provide considerable amounts of alcoholic spirits from the Embassy commissary made Scott a useful man to know in intelligence circles in dreary, rationed, postwar England. By October 1946, SSU field personnel were transferred to OSO/CIG.

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A Note On Sources

Such OSS/SSU files as are available at the National Archives are in a chaotic state. The personnel and administrative files appear missing and may have been destroyed. For this work some books proved helpful: Anthony Cave Brown's *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan*; David K.E. Bruce's memoir *The OSS Against Hitler*; William Casey's *The Secret War Against Hitler*; Robin Winks's *Cloak and Gown*; H. Montgomery Hyde's *The Quiet Canadian*; and Nigel West's *The Friends: Britain's Post-War Intelligence Organizations.* Dr. Ray Cline's *Secrets, Spies and Scholars* was helpful for the early London station organization on the DI side.

Interviews were done with a number of CIA officers,

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The CIA archives are not of much help because much of the early material

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ne is true for much of the early communications relating to policy.

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LETTER to the editor (U)

The Agency would appear for years to have been doing itself—and a few of its aging or deceased former staffers—a disservice by sponsoring and releasing allegations that it failed to provide any warning of, or to report out indications of, Chinese preparations for intervention in the Korean war. I would guess that the various authors failed, or were unable, to examine all the published intelligence disseminated by the Agency in 1950; that those who reviewed and those who released these histories were themselves unfamiliar with the record; that the wrong people were interviewed; or that the wrong questions were asked.

I recently read John Helgerson's thorough *Studies* article, "Truman and Eisenhower: Launching the Process." Unfortunately, I found a gap in his coverage of the Korean war period involved. He may not have examined the whole record. He talked to the right people, but he evidently failed to ask the right questions. He did not note that each week we wrote and delivered to the White House for President Truman a summary of indications of further hostile action, a summary the President had requested of the DCI.

Bertie Knapp, in her comprehensive volume, *The Central Intelligence Agency: The First Thirty Years*, also overlooked, or, rather, mischaracterized the role of this publication prepared during the first five months of the war for the personal attention of the President.

As one of those involved, indeed, completely absorbed, in that effort, I am impelled to fill out the record as best I can. Without the relevant documents, however, I have to base my recitation on recollection, before memory fades further.

Perhaps a week or so after the North Korean invasion, President Truman asked the DCI for a weekly summary of "indications." Somehow, perhaps because we had the only regular access to special intelligence, the request came down to General Division of the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), forerunner of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). In General Division, J. J. Hitchcock ("J. J."), head of its EE/USSR branch, had a sideline: Agency support for the Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) and the development of a methodology for the detection and pursuit of indications of hostile preparations. He had a two-man staff for this purpose. With the Korean war, he was able to beef this up into an Indications Branch of some nine analysts and three secretaries, in an Economic Section, a Military Section (the minuscule forerunner of the Office of Strategic Research of the DI), and a Political Section (my empire). This branch was made responsible for meeting President Truman's request.

We had no precise instructions, and, without guidance from above, we developed our own objectives: a global survey, focusing all but exclusively on indications of any widening of the war, particularly direct Soviet or Chinese military intervention, and on the emergence of crises the Soviets might create or exploit anywhere to the detriment of the United States and its war effort. It was not a polished or highly edited document, because time was always short. Nor were there grandiloquent conclusions. We were trying to call attention to what we regarded as indications or likely indications.

The first Situation Summary (the "Sitsum") was hand-delivered to Jimmy Lay, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on a Friday morning, a day and a half after we received the request. With it went a "lap map," which we understood the President kept in his desk from one week to the next. It was typed in three copies: the original for the President—delivered to the NSC by the senior writer/editor; a carbon for the DCI, delivered generally after the President's copy; and a carbon for our files. This was the pattern for the first five months. Later, after General Smith was firmly established as DCI, he elected to deliver it himself during a weekly session he had with the President. Perhaps after the turn of the year, the President began asking that more recipients be added—most of the Cabinet members, some on a "read-while-the courier-waits" basis. And then we managed to get the publication printed.

We did our damnedest, often on a seven-day-week basis, to meet what we regarded as a serious responsibility.

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It was not easy. We had a difficult time getting collateral (other than special intelligence) information. General MacArthur's Far East Command (FECOM) sat on much information; the reports officers of CIA's Directorate for Plans (DDP, precursor of the DO) were most reluctant to tell us anything about their reports; and State and military cables got to us only when others were finished with them (I seem to recall that many arrived in the Agency in one copy—and office copiers were still a thing of the future). While, as I recollect, service intelligence agencies were asked by the DCI to contribute to our summary, we were not overwhelmed by contributions. Moreover, the maharajahs of ORE (regional division chiefs equivalent to today's DI Office chiefs) were suspicious of us and seemed to want only that we would go away.

At some point, the division chiefs began reviewing our draft the night before final typing and White House delivery. On one occasion, when serving as the senior writer/editor, I was faced with their recommendation that I remove what I recall as nearly a page of "Chinese indications." (One remark: "Tom, I could have written that in my rocking chair back home in Virginia.") Overwhelmed by their seniority, I removed it. But, after they left, my backbone stiffened, and I restored the offending material while my boss, Knight McMahan, chief of General Division, ORE, looked on in silent support.

Nonetheless, we were blazing a trail by putting out the first "all-source" periodic intelligence publication in town. So far as I know, it was the first one incorporating both collateral and special intelligence; during and after World War II, the two were carefully kept divorced, although special intelligence publications would take advantage of the findings of collateral intelligence. It was in that sense the forerunner of the new Agency daily born in early 1951, the dry runs of which were done in our shop. Most important, I believe we reported out most of the indications we recognized as such, and we were particularly bothered by what we saw as possible/probable/potential indications of Chinese preparations.

On or near 14 October 1950, as best I can recall, the IAC Watch Committee held a special meeting next door to our office:

- The Watch Committee was the first community approach to a coordinated warning instrumentality, a concept devised by J. J. Hitchcock as a means of helping, if not simply enabling, the Agency and the community to deal with critical or potentially critical information of an indications nature.

- J. J.'s search for such a concept had been requested by Knight McMahan, after ORE (which kept no order-of-battle records) had demonstrated its inability to deal with special intelligence we had received on a hot day in May 1948 indicating the arrival in East Germany of several hundred Soviet Mig-15s, a deployment later appreciated as a prelude to the Berlin blockade.

- The Watch Committee concept was blessed by the IAC (predecessor to USIB and thus to the NFIB) in (I think) 1949. Its first sessions, meeting monthly under a CIA chairman (J. J. Hitchcock, I believe), appear to have been overlooked by historians, probably because it was not a high-status, highly formal body. Recently, however, I was startled to find in Christopher Andrew's book, *For the President's Eyes Only*, a quote from the minutes of the April 1950 Watch Committee meeting reporting that Army intelligence would look into a report alleging preparations for a June invasion of South Korea. While Andrew reported the lack of an Army response, he did not include any further data on the Watch Committee. Nor did he report what I recall as an Army memo forwarded to the Committee chairman after the invasion of South Korea denying that the Army had undertaken any such charge.

- Later, beginning in 1951 with General Smith as DCI, the Committee underwent a series of command and community changes and became a formal community organization.

The mid-October Watch Committee meeting considered a piece of special intelligence indicating that the North Korean Government, by then ensconced in Manchuria, was in the throes of, or was being affected by, a major decision—nature unspecified. The Committee wrestled with this for hours. (I did not sit in because I was busy putting together the Sitsum for the week). Finally, it concluded that the Chinese had decided to, or were about to, intervene. I cannot remember the exact language, but this was the guts of it. If I am not mistaken, we learned later that Chinese forces crossed the Yalu on or about 14 October.

The Watch Committee report was delivered to the White House and to

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the DCI and was reported in our Sitsum. (A week or so later, J. J. Hitchcock told me he had encountered DDCI William H. Jackson somewhere and had been twitted over the Watch conclusion—"went too far," "was off base," and so forth). In succeeding Sitsums, until FECOM began acknowledging the large-scale Chinese presence, we had to report that we had not yet received information on actual Chinese intervention, but we did not back away from the conclusion.

Later, we heard that the Sitsum record had been useful in whatever passed for a postmortem in those days. During the autumn of 1950, we had no direct signs about the nature of the principal reader's reaction to our efforts. But I recall one possibility. One Friday, after I had delivered the Sitsum to the NSC (J. J. Hitchcock was out with a prolonged illness and I was filling in), I had left the office to run an errand, car radio on. A news broadcast reported that President Truman either had made or had issued a statement warning the Chinese Communists against intervention. I remember thinking that perhaps we had scored. But this was only my presumption.

A few months ago, however, I saw a somewhat stronger suggestion that we had been getting through. The summer 1976 edition of *Studies in Intelligence* carried the text of farewell remarks by DDCI Lieutenant General Walters. General Walters had gone along with Averill Harriman to the mid-October 1950 Wake Island meeting between President Truman and General MacArthur. The following is excerpted from General Walters's description of that meeting as it appeared in *Studies*:

> *. . . I noticed that he [MacArthur] didn't salute him. Ten years later, I asked Mr. Truman whether he'd noticed this, and halfway into the question he said, "That he didn't salute me? You're damned right I noticed that he didn't." He [MacArthur] did not believe the Chinese were coming into the war. Mr. Truman said, "All our indications are that they are." He said, "No, they are not. This is the hour of our strength, not of our weakness. . . ."*

Thomas J. Patton

Thomas J. Patton served in the Directorate of Intelligence.

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12-00000 STUDIES Approved for Release: 2014/09/10 C06122510

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

BAY OF PIGS, by *Peter Wyden*. Simon and Schuster, New York 1979. 352 pp.

In the history of the early Kennedy years, the Central Intelligence Agency, and in the lives of those involved, the Bay of Pigs was only an episode—but what an episode! Camelot's escutcheon was blotted and covert action failed in a blast of publicity at a time when revelation was exceptional rather than, as recently, routine. The career of the genial spymaster Allen Dulles dwindled to an ungraceful end; his heir apparent, the brilliant intelligence innovator Richard Bissell, was banished to corporate hinterlands.

In the wake of the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs a modest wave of literature about the event was generated. Most of it was useful, some was quite good, and all of it was fragmentary. Haynes Johnson's excellent *The Bay of Pigs* in 1962, for instance, was largely the version of the story as related by Cuban exiles.

Now there is a definitive work: *Bay of Pigs*, by Peter Wyden. It is difficult to anticipate a future study which will add much to this account. A Book-of-the-Month Club main selection, the work will reach a popular audience, and it contains enough fresh material to make it a basic reference for scholars and political scientists. Wyden, a professional journalist, has mined the trove of information available under the Freedom of Information Act. But what makes the difference is that he has managed to interview nearly all surviving, senior participants, including retired CIA loyalists who would not, or could not, speak out before. (Apparently he did not talk to Howard Hunt, although he does draw on Hunt's subjective *Give Us This Day*; and the Pentagon colonel seconded to the Agency for military planning refused to see him.) In Havana Wyden interviewed Cuban veterans, among them the ultimate anti-CIA critic, Fidel Castro. This access to new primary sources has been meshed with several years of diligent investigative plodding. The result is a clear view of the Bay of Pigs, in the past only partially discernible through the haze of half-history.

The primary reason—first among many—that the operation was in jeopardy early on was the injudicious escalation from guerrilla warfare to military invasion approved or tolerated by Bay of Pigs planners. None of us who were involved—from CIA, the Kennedy White House, the Pentagon—can or should be exonerated from blame. But a retrospective scrutiny of the failure must focus on what went on in the minds of two remarkable men, John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Richard Bissell. In the case of the former president, Wyden believes that Kennedy approved the operation because he was a new, action-oriented leader disinclined to question a military venture endorsed by Eisenhower, the man who won World War II for the Allies. He speculates that Kennedy received poor counsel from his White House advisors because they were the victims of what Wyden calls "assumed consensus," a bureaucratic malady akin to groupthink. His arguments are convincing.

The author is less successful when he attempts to illuminate the character of Richard Bissell and to explain his actions. Wyden leaves this reader with the impression that he is not really sure *what* he thinks about Bissell. Perhaps the enigma of Richard Bissell's mind will never be fully resolved by any writer, even one of us who knew him well.

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Wyden tends to believe that the Bay of Pigs operation would have gone awry even if President Kennedy had not canceled the D-Day air strike. Who can be sure, now? But one observer saw the lack of support to the exiles as vital: Fidel Castro, when asked why the Americans failed, replied, "They had no air support."

The sourest note in Wyden's book is his final sentence, his conclusion: It can happen again.

I doubt it, not in our lifetimes, anyway.

Bay of Pigs, despite some hard knocks it gives CIA, is as objective an account of the ill-fated operation as the intelligence community can expect (the shrillness of Book-of-the-Month Club blurbs and Wyden's talk-show appearances must be attributed to the exigencies of promotion). And, *Bay of Pigs* is, on balance, good history and good reading.

David Atlee Phillips

Intelligence Vignette

THE SPY WHO WENT TO THE MOUNTAIN

In 1806, the United States considered it essential to conduct a military reconnaissance of the entire territory drained by the Arkansas and Red Rivers. Selected to lead the intelligence mission was Lieutenant Zebulon Montgomery Pike, a reliable young officer who, the previous year, had conducted an exploration of the upper course of the Mississippi River.

The cover story selected for the mission was that the expedition was returning a party of Osage Indians to their homelands. Further, if he encountered Spanish forces, he was to contend that he was traveling to the isolated American outpost at Natchitoches, but had lost his bearings. To reinforce his cover story, it was hoped that he might be able to pay a courtesy call to the Spanish *comandante* at Santa Fe.

On 3 December 1806, Lieutenant Pike first saw the inspiring peak in the Colorado Rockies that was later to bear his name.

Shortly thereafter, Pike's expedition was overtaken and captured by Spanish troops. They were taken first to Santa Fe and then to Chihuahua. The party was finally released and succeeded in reaching Natchitoches on 1 July 1807.

Pike's personal journal of these travels was published, over some military objection, in 1810. It is said to have been one of the few reliable military intelligence documents concerning Mexican territory in the possession of the War Department at the outbreak of the Mexican War some thirty years later.

Commissioned a Brigadier General at the outset of the War of 1812, Pike was killed at the Battle of York (Toronto), Canada, in April 1813. He was 34.

From the Historical Intelligence Collection

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THE STORM PETRELS, by *Gordon Brook-Shepherd*. Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, New York 1978. 241 pp.

Gordon Brook-Shepherd in this well-researched book treats the experiences of five important apostate Soviet officials who fled the USSR in the period 1928-1938. In the analogy of the title, they were the storm petrels whose appearance presages the flight of other creatures from an atmospheric disturbance not yet visible to the observer. The inspiration of the book can be traced to Brook-Shepherd's extensive interviews with Boris Bajanov in Paris. Bajanov had at one time served J. V. Stalin as a secretary and, as such, had an opportunity to observe how business was conducted at the higher reaches of the Party during the long battle in the Kremlin over Lenin's succession. Bajanov, having witnessed the banishment of Trotsky and the ascendancy of Yagoda, left Moscow in the autumn of 1927 with the intention of escaping across the border into Persia.

In late December he received a permit to hunt boar near Ashkhabad in the company of one Birger, an OGPU captain, who was charged with Bajanov's eventual safe return to Tashkent. Near the border, on New Year's Day 1928, Bajanov offered his companion the options of being shot on the spot or accompanying Bajanov into Persia. Birger, realizing that his mission had failed and all that that fact implied, saw little merit in lingering on Soviet soil.

They traveled south by hill pony, Hupmobile, camel and, finally, by train to Simla, the summer seat of the Raj in British India, where the pair was genteelly debriefed for the first time.

The preliminary British report from Simla, 58 pages in length, was distributed to interested departments throughout India, to British missions in the Near and Far East, as well as to London. Although the Simla authorities urged further questioning in London, the Foreign Office declined to cooperate and, with self-congratulory cleverness, suggested that the couple be diverted to France. The French authorities welcomed their arrival and Bajanov was particularly gratified since France had always been his intended goal.

Thirteen months after Bajanov's arrival in Paris, Grigory Bessedovsky, charge d'affaires at the Soviet Embassy there, climbed the wall surrounding the embassy courtyard and sought French protection. Because the Ambassador was absent from his post, the French recognized Bessedovsky as the Acting Chief of Mission and declared their solemn obligation to provide protection to him and his family.

Soon after his escape, Bessedovsky contacted the right-wing press and wrote several articles condemning the Soviet regime. Shortly thereafter he succumbed to a better offer from the left-wing emigre press and did a series of contradictory pieces which had the effect of lending credence to the Soviet contention that he was deranged. Bessedovsky's precipitate departure from the fold, as well as subsequent revelations, suggest that financial opportunism rather than ideological apostasy fueled his flight.

Ten months later a new fugitive from Socialism in the East arrived on the Paris landscape. The newcomer was Georgi Agabekov, an OGPU chief, who two years before had led the opera bouffe search for Bajanov in and about Meshed, Persia. In October 1929 Agabekov was recalled to Moscow and given a new assignment: The elimination of Bessedovsky in Paris by Myer Trilliser, then head of the Foreign Section

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of the OGPU. The following day the mission was canceled and Agabekov was dispatched to Constantinople to take up duties as head of the illegal nets in the region. On arrival in Turkey he advertised for a tutor to provide him with English-language instruction. One of the respondents to his newspaper advertisement was a young English woman with whom he was immediately smitten. Agabekov's love for Elizabeth Streater eventually led him to abandon his duties and escape to France. He married Elizabeth and the couple survived on the limited income he earned as an occasional source for both the British and French intelligence services. His knowledge of clandestine techniques and his ready availability for spot commissions induced the Soviet service to construct a complex provocation operation, calculated to end in Agabekov's abduction or death. The plan resembled a garnished East European version of the "Mexican Prisoner con." The plan aborted and for several years afterward was popularized in the public domain as the "Philomena Affair."

When Yezov replaced Yagoda as Stalin's police chief in 1936, the Old Chekists had cause for apprehension. Many of the NKVD chiefs serving abroad were recalled and, initially, reassured of another posting and encouraged to take leave with their families in the South. A few then wrote letters to colleagues still in foreign countries, explaining that there was no real basis for hesitating to return to Moscow. Having induced a few others to return, their utility to Yezov was exhausted, and they were arrested and executed. The purge of the NKVD was in train.

Ignace Reiss, a senior NKVD chief in Western Europe who saw his immediate superior, Galinsky, fall victim to Yezov's cunning, bolted on 17 July 1937 and denounced Stalin. His remains were found seven weeks later in Switzerland; he had been "rendered harmless" by a mobile squad dispatched by Yezov. The death of Reiss was an unequivocal signal to others of Stalin's determination to cleanse, permanently, the memories of NKVD veterans who had guilty knowledge of his bloody rise to absolute power. Alexander Barmine decamped as Soviet charge d'affaires in Athens. Walter Krivitsky fled his illegal post in Holland, General Alexander Orlov escaped from Spain through Paris and General Lyushknov, NKVD commander in the Far East, sought refuge in Japan.

Brook-Shepherd, who claims no prior intelligence experience, has put five important apostate Soviet officials into a coherent context. Each of the principals had previously written memoirs which the author has corrected and complemented with official documentary materials from U.S., British, British-Indian, French, Belgian and non-communist Romanian files, most of them hitherto unpublished. In addition to Bajanov, the author interviewed Hede Massing, Mme. Agabekov and others with direct knowledge of the events described.

Refreshingly, the author does not dwell nor exhaustively speculate on motivation. Instead, he quite correctly notes that each of the five found himself measuring his life expectancy in hours and each took the sensible option which favored survival. Imputations of lofty motives and sociological complexities were indulgences which came later.

Both the Orlov and Krivitsky cases resulted in prosecutions in the United States and Britain. Krivitsky identified Capt. John Herbert King, a Foreign Office cypher clerk and Soviet agent, in the course of his London debriefing conducted by Jane (not "Janet") Archer of MI-5. Miss Archer, to whom Krivitsky described—but could not name—a British agent of the Soviets who was then with the Franco forces in Spain, later in the war served in Kim Philby's Iberian section of MI-6. (See *My Secret War*, by H.A.R. Philby). Jane Archer is believed by some to have been the model for LeCarre's "Connie Sachs."

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Books

The Storm Petrels is in some respects a catalogue of intelligence opportunities lost. The reader is made uneasy by the seemingly abstruse swivelling of the beneficiary governments and the obduracy of the fixed opinions held by officials. Despite the effusive courtesy shown Bajanov by the British political establishment in Simla, Whitehall saw him as a tale-bearing political opportunist, denied him entry into Britain, and fobbed him off on the French.

Orlov in a private meeting with the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization was able only to incite those appallingly incurious gentlemen to accede to his remaining in the country. All that they asked of him was his verbal assurance that he would not become a ward of the state; no record was made of the meeting. Fifteen years later, with the death of Stalin and the publication of a four-part series by Orlov in *Life* magazine, he was discovered and subjected to very aggressive handling by the FBI.

There is much in these essentially accurate accounts to raise more important considerations. Brook-Shepherd implies that these events are part of a continuing process which has yielded up informational treasure for 60 years. He is correct. *The Storm Petrels* warrants reading because it stresses the importance of intelligence and counterintelligence opportunities which sometimes attend unplanned events. It also begins to give a long deserved dignity to the role of the "accident" in intelligence successes.

Robert Crowley

Intelligence Vignette

FINAGLE'S FIFTH LAW OF INFORMATION

In his magisterial *The Official Rules*,* Paul Dickson attributes to the immortal Finagle four Laws of Information which have obvious application to intelligence work. In the belief that these laws should be committed to memory by every intelligence officer and project manager, the Editors reprint them below, together with the newly discovered Fifth Law of Information contributed by Dr. Bernard Mooney, a lineal descendant of the Hibernean Sage.

Law I: The information you have is not what you want.

Law II: The information you want is not what you need.

Law III: The information you need is not what you can obtain.

Law IV: The information you can obtain costs more than you want to pay.

***Law V*: What you are willing to pay will get you exactly that information you already have.**

*** *The Official Rules*, by Paul Dickson, Delacorte Press, copyright 1978 by Paul Dickson.**

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Books

A STATION IN THE DELTA, by *John Cassidy*. Scribner's, New York 1979. 380 pp.

Intelligence work and the war in Vietnam are two subjects which have proven difficult to render with both accuracy and conviction in fictional form. John Cassidy, in *A Station in the Delta* attempts to do both. From the point of view of one who has served in Vietnam, the results are mixed.

Mr. Cassidy, a retired CIA officer who served in Vietnam, sets his book in the Delta late in 1967. Toby Busch, the central figure in the story, is what was called a "POIC" or provincial officer in charge. Busch's arrival in the flat and desolate provincial town is well rendered, as are many of the initial impressions he receives of those with whom he will work. Also appropriately reflected are the differing points of view toward the war which appeared at the provincial, regional, and Saigon levels of the CIA structure: Saigon thought the war was being won, those in the provinces believed it was being lost.

I found particularly well described Busch's sense of apprehension as, for the first time, he finds himself in a wartime setting. His reactions to the ominous presence of weapons and the constant possibility of violence recalled vividly my own first reactions to the regional town in which I spent almost two years. During his first night in his new quarters Busch is saved fom a B-40 rocket only by his fruitless search for toilet paper. What happens to Busch in terms of combat experience is what I imagined might happen to me, but never did. Busch goes on almost single-handedly to stop a Viet Cong attack on his town; I was shot at only in helicopters and never fired a weapon. The combat sequences in the book have very much of a one-dimensional quality to them, and are not rendered with nearly the depth of feeling with which Mr. Cassidy describes the Vietnamese people with whom he lives and works.

I found Mr. Cassidy's depiction of the Vietnamese culture and his own blundering attempts to deal with it to be the strongest part of the book. Mr. Cassidy obviously had some deep relationships with the Vietnamese during his own tour and the texture of these relationships comes through quite vividly. The strength and fatalism of the Vietnamese, which I found everywhere during my own tour, Cassidy renders with real strength.

Somewhat less effective are the depictions of Busch's relations with his CIA co-workers and superiors. There is a subplot involving a latent stain on Busch's professional escutcheon which is resolved at the climax of the book. I found this account of bureaucratic conflict somewhat overdone, but no more so than the combat scenes which pepper the narrative.

There is a fair amount of sex depicted. Busch, a previously faithful husband, quickly acquires a Vietnamese mistress and also has one vivid encounter with an American nurse. Cassidy portrays accurately the latent sexuality which pervaded Vietnam. He deals compassionately, in my view, with the reactions and behavior of men suddenly freed from all family restraints who found themselves working and living against a background which was both threatening and inviting, sometimes in the extreme.

Cassidy writes knowledgeably of intelligence work. His descriptions of Busch's initial meetings with his Vietnamese counterparts, his reaction to the lack of hard intelligence and the preponderance of rumors, the mixed degree of competence which

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Vietnam officialdom represented, and his first meetings with his Vietnamese agent are all well done. These sections of the book, if any, justify this review in *Studies in Intelligence.*

Cassidy's writing is for the most part rather flat, although he is capable of occasional bits of dialogue or descriptive phraseology which drew me back to my own time in Vietnam. Cassidy obviously feels strongly about his experiences there, and I hope that he will try to write another book on the subject, perhaps trying to cover less ground and placing more emphasis on the haunting and ultimately tragic relationships between Americans and the Vietnamese which were spawned in that prolonged conflict.

Donald Gregg

Intelligence Vignette

MOLES

It has become fashionable in media circles to talk about "moles"—those persons who might penetrate CIA or other intelligence entities from within on behalf of our enemies. Part of the fascination of the media with the word "mole" is their belief that this is a new word in this context, probably coined by the British spy-novelist, John Le Carré, in such works as his *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, published in 1974. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The following quotation is taken from *The Historie of the Raigne of King Henry The Seventh*, written by Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, Viscount St. Alban, and published in London in 1622:

> **"Hee was careful and liberall to obtaine good Intelligence from all parts abroad. Wherein hee did not onely use his Interest in the Leigers here, and his Pensioners which hee had both in the Court of Rome, and other the Courts of Christendome; but the Industrie and Vigilancie of his owne Ambassadors in Forraine parts. . . . Requiring likewise from his Ambassadors an Answere, in particular distinct Articles, respectively to his Questions.**
>
> **"As for his secret Spialls, which hee did imploy both at home and abroad; by them to discover what Practices and Conspiracies were against him, surely his Case required it: Hee had such Moles perpetually working and casting to undermine him. Neither can it bee reprehended. For if Spialls bee lawfull against lawfull Enemies, much more against Conspirators, and Traitors."**

Walter Pforzheimer

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Operating in Moscow in the 1960s

Reflections on Handling Penkovsky (U)

(b)(3)(c)

Editor's Note: As part of the CIA's Fiftieth Anniversary celebration in 1(b)(3)(c) *organized a presentation on the Penkovsky espionage operation for the Directorate of Operations' European Division. He brought together two of the participants—*(b)(6) *who had headed the MI-6 half of the Anglo-American team that ran the case,* (b)(3)(c) *who had been assigned to Moscow to handle the CIA's share of the operational meetings with Penkov*(b)(3)(c) *who himself served in Moscow in the 1980s, had a unique opportunity to talk at length*(b)(6) *and*(b)(3)(c) *at the time, and later met agai*(b)(3)(c) *to document for the historical record some of his personal recollections of one of the most important espionage cases of the Cold War era. His reflections are recorded here in interview format. (U)*

❖ ❖ ❖

"The operation produced some 10,000 pages of intelligence on Soviet military capabilities and allowed President Kennedy to call Khrushchev's bluff over Berlin and Cuba."

The operation that produced some 10,000 pages of intelligence on Soviet military capabilities and doctrine and allowed President Kennedy to call Khrushchev's bluff over Berlin and Cuba began in August 1960 in Moscow. Oleg Penkovsky, a colonel in the Soviet military intelligence apparatus (GRU), persuaded a reluctant American tourist to accept an envelope and deliver it to the US Embassy. The envelope contained his offer to work for the US government and provided a communications plan by which to contact him. In response, the CIA assigned a case officer to Moscow to establish contact. Unable to make the connection after several months of trying, the CIA turned to Britain's MI-6 for help. In the meantime, not knowing of CIA's efforts, Penkovsky tried to enlist other Westerners to convey his offer, finally persuading British businessman Greville Wynne to help him. Shortly thereafter, Penkovsky led a Soviet trade delegation to London, during which time MI-6 and the CIA, which had formed a joint team to run the case, held several lengthy meetings with him. The team conducted further debriefing and planning sessions with him during his subsequent trips to London and Paris later that year.[2] (U)

In the summer of 1961, the wife of the MI-6 head of station in the Soviet Union began meeting with Penkovsky in Moscow. Greville Wynne also traveled on occasion to Russia and continued to see Penkovsky. The CIA recalled its first officer that summer and began to process another to take over the case. This individual had to cancel out of the assignment at the last minute, and it was not until June

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

[2] The basic facts of the Penkovsky case are set forth in Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin's *The Spy Who Saved the World* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992). The authors were given access to the CIA files on the case and conducted interviews with many of the people involved. (U)

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1962 that his replacement, [redacted] (b)(3)(c) was assigned to Moscow and began working the case. His work was short lived. Penkovsky was last seen in early September. His arrest was publicized in early December, and he and Wynne, who had been detained in Hungary and brought to Moscow, were tried and convicted of espionage in May 1963. Wynne was imprisoned and Penkovsky, reportedly, was exe(b)(3)(c) was pulled out of Moscow. (C)

How did it happen that, as a first tour officer, you were assigned to be Penkovsky's contact in Moscow, given the agent's seniority and value? (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

The main criterion for assignment to Penkovsky, however, was not operational experience but fitting into the right cover slot. When the case began, US Ambassador Lewellyn Thompson was adamantly opposed to the assignment of CIA operational personnel to the Embassy and to any espionage activity involving embassy facilities. Within the DO's Soviet Division, it was said that he believed discovery of such a connection would seriously damage his and the Embassy's relations with the host government, and that this risk far outweighed any possible benefits. He was also said to be concerned that Penkovsky might be a provocateur. Very likely, too, the publicity surrounding the recent arrest of Soviet spy Pyotr Popov and his CIA case officer, Russ Langelle, was still fresh in his mind. How absolute his prohibition was I do not know; however, [redacted]

“The main criterion for assignment to Penkovsky was not operational experience but fitting into the right cover slot.”

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)
(b)(3)(c)

Whatever the Ambassador's reasons, the Agency viewed his stance as a crippling constraint. We had an increasingly desperate and very valuable agent out there and no one in a position to contact him. Initially, the CIA's approach—evidently the best that the Agency could negotiate—had been to assign an officer to a low-level slot with no diplomatic duties or contacts and hope for the best. This first officer had been sent to Moscow as a junior administrative employee, a job that had turned out to be more like that of a maintenance man. His intelligence mission, however, was to come up with an operational plan for handling an agent who socialized with some of the mightiest in the land. Since this officer had no access to Penkovsky, either officially or socially, his contacts would have to be completely covert. The officer failed to develop a plan, not even making initial telephone contact according to the instructions Penkovsky himself had provided. He was eventually recalled and released from the Agency. Interestingly, when the British were brought into the case they evidently had no one in Moscow who could meet officially with Penkovsky either. The system they set up relied exclusively on clandestine street meetings. (C)

Penkovsky worked a cover job at the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research Work (GKKNIR), which oversaw scientific and technical exchanges with the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and perhaps other countries. As a consequence, GKKNIR officials dealt with the offices in those countries' embassies that handled such matters. These offices tended to be on the fringes of the embassies' staffs, not in the core political or economic sections. Penkovsky knew the scientific attaché at the British Embassy, for example. He also had gotten to know the Canadian commercial attaché,

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“

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

”

William Van Vliet, and had tried, at one point, to get him to accept a package for delivery to US intelligence.[3] (U)

Because of Penkovsky's GKKNIR position, the most desirable cover slots to facilitate official interaction with US personnel were not the State Department FSO political and economic positions, which the Ambassador had put off limits anyway, but those dealing with more technical matters. There were not many of these as Moscow was not a mega-embassy in those days. One office in regular contact with GKKNIR was that of the agricultural attaché. In the early 1960s, quite a few agricultural delegations and specialists of one sort or another traveled back and forth between the United States and the USSR. As a result, agricultural attachés had routine, although not necessarily frequent, official and social contact with the GKKNIR staff, including Penkovsky. (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

[3] This occurred early in Penkovsky's efforts to get in touch with us. Van Vliet kept the package for a couple of days and then returned it, a crushing blow to Penkovsky. (U)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

As far as I could tell, my cover held up perfectly until the case was eventually publicized in the Soviet press. (S)

I did not receive any special training for this assignment, although my wife was taught some basic operations skills, in case she had to help with the case. For me, the whole emphasis was on cover preparation. I had been through the CT course, which at that time included six months of operational training at the farm.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

The British had been meeting with Penkovsky in Moscow on a more or less regular basis for months before you arrived. What was the background to that? (U)

After it had become clear that the first CIA officer was not able to make contact with Penkovsky, and with no other suitable candidate immediately available, the Agency had asked MI-6 for help. They already knew about Penkovsky through his contact with Wynne, and perhaps from other sources. After all, Penkovsky, in his desperate search for someone to listen to him, had contacted a number of people, including Americans, Britons, and Canadians. When this became a joint operation, a small task force was organiz(b)(3)(c) from the CIA and(b)(6) from MI-6 became co-chiefs of the t(b)(6) decided that Janet Chisholm, wife of Roderick Chisholm, the MI-6 station chief, was the best person he had in Moscow to use on this case. He had known her as an MI-6 secretary and held her in high regard. During meetings in London, the British showed Penkovsky photos of Chisholm and her children (who

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would be props for some of their encounters) and gave him a contact plan for meetings with her. (C)

This must have been a tremendous relief for Penkovsky. At last he was actually going to be in touch with someone from Western intelligence in Moscow. It had been a long wait. Chisholm proved to be a very professional case officer. During the ensuing several months, she met a dozen or so times with Penkovsky in a park and in apartment house lobbies, often under difficult conditions—with her three children in tow on some occasions. (U)

All was not sweetness and light, however. CIA officers on the team were less than thrilled when they learned (b)(6) choice for Penkovsky's case officer was the wife of the MI-6 head of station. They viewed this as a serious security problem because of her husband's position and the fact that Soviet spy George Blake had certainly known that Roderick Chisholm was an MI-6 officer.[4] Nonetheless, they had no one in place to substitute, so there was nothing to be done about it. The CIA also thought, as this phase of the operation progressed, that Chisholm was meeting Penkovsky much too frequently, putting his long-term viability at risk for short-term gain. (U)

The frequency of the meetings, however, seems to have been largely at Penkovsky's instigation. A driven man, he apparently wanted to produce as much as possible as fast as possible. Their meeting schedule called for many alternate arrangements to give him maximum flexibility. He seemed to try to make as many of these as he could. In any event, he eventually noticed surveillance on Chisholm, and the street meetings were discontinued forthwith. Chisholm and Penkovsky met a couple more times at diplomatic receptions before she and her husband left for another assignment, and each time he passed her a package. (U)

The British were not deterred by their lack of official access to Penkovsky. The bulk of Chisholm's meetings with him were completely clandestine. MI-6 was able to do what we could not—devise and carry out a covert operational plan for the case. The British, as far as I know, made no attempt to get an officer in direct contact with Penkovsky via GKKNIR, which we were trying so hard to do. Perhaps they had no one available for this role. When Chisholm left PCS, her replacement was slated to be another former MI-6 secretary, Pamela Cowell, the wife of the incoming head of station in Moscow. The British were evidently planning to carry on very much as before. (U)

Our approach was to try to develop the kind of relationship with Penkovsky that Greville Wynne had with him. Wynne traveled to the Soviet Union and other countries in Eastern Europe in his capacity as a businessman and promoter. Penkovsky, in his GKKNIR *persona,* was his contact in Moscow, and had seized on this relationship to persuade Wynne to be his channel to Anglo-American intelligence, after failing to connect through others (b)(6) has since emphasized, it was Penkovsky, not MI-6, who recruited Wynne, although MI-6 quickly got involved. The main point, though, is that Penkovsky and Wynne usually met alone, and could pass materials back and forth with relative impunity. They did so, many times. With luck, an embassy official might be able to develop the same kind of overt relationship, justifying meetings and providing cover for exchanges with Penkovsky. (U)

Wynne may not always have been the most enthusiastic agent but he was an effective and valuable one. In my view, he was much under appreciated. He contributed enormously to this operation, at great risk and eventually great cost to himself. (U)

Thus, for the "inside handling" part of the operation, the British played the dominant role. The Americans did not get anybody, that is to say me, in place until the end of June 1962, which was barely two months before contact with Penkovsky was lost and probably after he was compromised. (U)

For the "outside handling" part of the operation—that is, the meetings during Penkovsky's trips abroad—the American side was preeminent. The CIA provided the principal case officer, at first George Kisevalter, who had also been Popov's case officer. Another experienced SR officer, who has never been publicly identified, later replaced him. The Agency also sent

[4] George Blake was an MI-6 officer who had been convicted in 1961 of spying for the Soviet Union. Subsequently, he escaped from a British prison and fled to Moscow. (U)

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Leonard McCoy, a senior reports and requirements officer, to be the Anglo-American team's resident expert on the Soviet Union. Penkovsky's trips abroad ended in fall 1961, however, and for the next several months his only contact was with his two British contacts in Moscow. (U)

You arrived in Moscow in late June 1962. Chisholm had left several weeks earlier, and Wynne was in Moscow for only a few days in late June and early July. Thus, you were the only one left on whom Penkovsky had been briefed. What happened at this stage of the operation? (U)

The American side finally got into the act in Moscow on 4 July 1962. As is customary, the American Ambassador hosted a huge Independence Day reception, and anybody who was anybody in Moscow had been invited. This of course included Penkovsky and other officials in his office. Earlier, while on one of his foreign trips, the team had shown him a tie clasp, and told him that someone was being assigned to Moscow to work with him and that he would be wearing an identical pin. A few days before the reception, Wynne had returned to Moscow, met with Penkovsky, shown him my photo, and given him my name. There was to be no confusion in Penkovsky's mind about the identity of his new contact. Wynne also had passed on instructions from the team that Penkovsky was not to bring any material for passage. It was to be an introductory meeting only, to establish an overt relationship. What Wynne did not tell Penkovsky, but which I speculate was very much on the team's mind, was that, in addition to all the other good reasons for no operational activity in the fishbowl atmosphere of this occasion, the Ambassador could hardly have been expected to agree to espionage activity at this huge national day party in his official residence. (U)

"For the 'inside handling' part of the operation, the British played the dominant role. ...For the meetings during Penkovsky's trips abroad, the American side was preeminent."

Things went exactly as planned. I met Penkovsky and the other members present from his office and chatted a bit with all of them, including one Vitaliy Petrochenko, who seemed to stick very close to him, both then and at later social events. Penkovsky and I managed a brief conversation alone. He confirmed that he would have something for us "next time." (U)

This turned out to be seven weeks later. Although Penkovsky and I had seen each other a few times at GKKNIR, it was always in a conference setting, during discussions about delegation visits and the like. During this period, Penkovsky had been invited to one or two receptions at embassy officers' apartments but had not appeared. The first real chance we had came on 27 August. I had spent the previous week traveling with a delegation of American tobacco specialists to Georgia and other tobacco-growing areas. Upon our return to Moscow, the US agricultural attaché, William Horbaly, hosted a reception for them and their Russian hosts, including Penkovsky, his boss Yevgeniy Levin, the administrator/interpreter for the delegation Zhana Danilova (who looked and acted like the KGB officer she very likely was), and some others from the GKKNIR office. (U)

I did not want to try a brush pass in this crowded apartment, a technique Penkovsky and Chisholm had used a couple of times, and which she had advised against. I had been experimenting in my own flat with a dead drop, taping a packet to the underside of a toilet tank lid. The idea was to load the drop after Penkovsky arrived; have him remove it and attach his own package in the same manner with extra tape that we supplied; then I would retrieve it as soon as feasible. This was hardly an ideal system, but nobody had any better ideas. Why the bathroom? It was the only place in an apartment where a guest could go during a party, be by himself, and have any confidence of not being observed. There were obvious drawbacks to this system. What if somebody dropped the lid and broke it? What if the tape came loose? And sequential visits to the bathroom could look suspicious. The main problem, though, was that we had never had a chance to tell Penkovsky about this idea. (U)

Some time after Penkovsky arrived at the apartment, I loaded the drop. When we had a chance to talk briefly, I tried to tell him what to

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do, but in the crowded, noisy reception room, with his colleagues ever nearby, I could not be sure that I had gotten more across than that whatever was to happen would be in the main bathroom. A few minutes later, Penkovsky asked to see the apartment, a ploy he had used with Chisholm on at least one occasion. Several others joined in the tour, including myself. As this was my supervisor's place and I knew the layout, I pointed out to the members of the tour some of the features of the apartment, including the main bathroom. As the tour was returning to the reception area, Penkovsky and I moved to the rear of the group. I again pointed out the bathroom, and Penkovsky asked if he could use it. I stepped into the room with him, ostensibly to show him how this "American bathroom" worked, had anybody asked. Penkovsky, pulling a package out of his pocket, immediately asked if I had anything for him. I pointed to the tank top, but he did not react, instead asking again if I had anything for him. I removed the lid, put it on the floor, tore off the package, and gave it to him. He then handed his to me and left immediately. There was no one in the hallway outside. I put everything back in place, waited a few moments, then rejoined the group. This was the one and only time that the American side succeeded in exchanging materials with Penkovsky inside the USSR. (U)

Penkovsky's package to us on that occasion contained his usual trove of exposed Minox film, as well as other items. Included in our package to him was an alias internal Soviet passport, to be used in the event he had to flee Moscow and go into hiding or try to get to the West. Exactly how that was to be done had not, as far as I know, been worked out in any detail. (U)

A week later, the Ambassador hosted a reception for another American delegation, and Penkovsky showed up for this event as well. There was a lavatory off the reception room, and before he arrived I had tried taping the package I had brought to the toilet tank lid. It would not stick. (Sensitivities about operational activity in the Ambassador's residence must have abated, or I would not have been trying this.) I put the package back in my pocket and went back to the reception. I was actually relieved, however, because the circumstances did not look at all good for any kind of action that night. There were not many people in the large reception room, the Soviets seemed to stick together more tightly than usual, and nobody seemed particularly happy to be there. (U)

The possibility of an exchange quickly became moot, however. Penkovsky told me he was going to a movie called "A Taste of Honey," which the British were showing the following evening, and insistently urged me to attend. Translation: "No exchange tonight; we will try tomorrow night." Alas, the film show was for Soviets only, with no third-country guests invited, despite efforts by the Station to wangle me an invitation. Penkovsky showed up as planned. This turned out to be his last public appearance, as far as we know, before his arrest. (U)

Just when the arrest occurred is unclear. The Soviets claimed it was in late September. It was probably before 2 November 1962. On that date, somebody triggered the emergency signal agreed upon with Penkovsky to warn us in the event he learned of Soviet plans to attack the West. This procedure consisted of three parts: a voiceless phone call by Penkovsky (he was to blow into the receiver but not speak); a "have loaded" mark on a utility pole; then a dead drop. Early in the case, the team had given Penkovsky the phone numbers of two embassy apartments for this purpose. One was occupied in succession by the Embassy's administrative officer, William Jones, and DCOS Montgomery; the other belonged to the Embassy's doctor, Alexis Davison. The KGB apparently found these phone numbers after Penkovsky's arrest. When the call came, Davison checked the signal site and found the mark. (U)

Since Penkovsky had not been seen or heard from for two months, the Station strongly suspected that the KGB had triggered the signal, not Penkovsky; however, nobody could be sure of this. Since the case was so important, it was decided that the dead drop would have to be cleared. The newly minted CT, (b)(3)(c) who knew about the case but had not previously been involved, was sent to unload it. (b)(3)(c), an unwitting FSO who was the Embassy's publications procurement officer, was asked (b)(3)(c) on an ostensible book-buying foray to the vicinity of the site and drop him off there. After finding and unloading th(b)(3)(c) was immediately

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arrested, although he managed to jettison the package in the process. He was detained for several hours while the KGB tried without success to get him to respond to questioning, and then released to the Embassy. I knew nothing about all this while it was going on, but late in the afternoon someone in the Station told me what had occurred. (U)

Talki(b)(3)(c) about it later, I got the impression he thought his captors were confused about something during their attempt to interrogate him. They kept asking him his name, which he had given them when the questioning began. (That was all he would tell them.) Perhaps they were expecting someone else to sho(b)(6) has said he is convinced they were expecting the British to unload the drop, apparently because they had been Penkovsky's principal contacts in Moscow. I tend to the view they were expecting me, since I was the last person to meet with him, which the KGB surely found out during their interrogation. M(b)(3)(c) and I were about the same height and build, we were both relatively young, and both wore dark-rimmed glasses. His captors may not have been able to tell the difference. (U)

Why (b)(3)(c) who was not otherwise involved in the case, sent to unload the drop? If, as was suspected, the KGB had triggered the emergency system, (b)(3)(c) instead of me (the only two CIA (b)(3)(c) choices available), would unnecessarily compromise a "clean" officer with a bright future. Nobody ever

> **"I was convinced that they were going to stop us and drag one of us, probably me, from the car."**

told me why, but it may have been out of concern that the KGB would react more zealously if I serviced the drop (b)(3)(c) did. (U)

At the end of that d(b)(3)(c) came to my office and asked me to ride home with him—we lived in the same complex. He claimed he had forgotten his diplomatic ID card and did not want to drive alone. I suspect he asked me because he thought, given my job as agricultural attaché, I would be the least likely person in the Embassy to have any connection with whatever it was that had happened that day. I felt uneasy about it because he had no way of knowing what he was letting himself in for, but I could hardly say no, so off we went. When we drove away from the Embassy, three carloads of goons pulled out behind us. They followed us the several miles to our apartments, weaving in and out in front of and behind us, flashing their headlights, yelling, and waving their fists. I was convinced that they were going to stop us and drag one of us, probably me, from the car; but they did not, and we made it home. (U)

(b)(3)(c) was arrested on 2 November and PNG'ed, but you stayed on until early December. What was going on during this interval? (U)

Nothing happened officially until early December, when the Soviet press publicized my involvement in the case. I was not expelled by the Soviets at that time, but I was ordered by our own people to move with my family from our outlying apartment into the embassy compound and leave the country as soon as possible thereafter. I was never told who made this decision, but I imagine the Embassy weighed in on it. The Embassy issued a statement to the effect that I was leaving because my effectiveness had been impaired by the publicity. Our departure was complicated by the fact that we had had a baby in Moscow just a few weeks earlier and, at the time the story broke, my wife was in Paris on a brief holiday. I was taking care of the kids. So, leaving virtually everything behind in our old apartment, I flew with the children to Copenhagen, where my wife met us. I was not officially PNG'ed until the following May. (U)

How do you think Penkovsky was compromised? Any special insights? (U)

None. That question must have been studied and restudied many times over the years. Speculation has included compromised communications, wide dissemination of Penkovsky's intelligence reports, case officer error, the agent's own recklessness, and a mole. Obviously, with two services involved, the risk of compromise by whatever means was greatly increased. It is worth noting that there was a lot going on in the world of espionage at that time. Although 1985

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has been called the Year of the Spy, the same could be said of 1961.[5] Anatoliy Golitsyn defected, with ultimately disastrous consequences for the Agency.[6] MI-6 officer George Blake was arrested and confessed (b)(6) incidentally. There were a number of other spies, both British and American, who were discovered to have been working for the Soviets at that time. Any one of these, or others still unknown, could and maybe did have access to information critically damaging to Penkovsky. (U)

Jerrold Schecter's account of his conversations in 1990 in Moscow with KGB officers about Penkovsky's compromise is intriguing. Although these officials mainly stressed that Penkovsky came under suspicion as a result of surveillance on Janet Chisholm in January 1962, one of them told Schecter that the way Penkovsky was caught could not be revealed even at that late date (nearly three decades later).[7] That suggests that there was more to Penkovsky's compromise, probably a lot more, than a suspicious sighting during routine surveillance. (U)

[5] The American news media coined the term "Year of the Spy" to refer to such 1985 espionage cases as the defection of KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko, Moscow's detention of valuable CIA agent Adolf Tolkachev, security lapses by Marine guards at the American Embassy in Moscow, and Washington's arrest of NSA mole Ronald Pelton and members of the Walker family. (U)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

[7] Schecter and Deriabin, p. 413. (U)

Aside from the great value of the information that Penkovsky passed to Western intelligence, what are some of the features of this case that strike you? What was unique about it that might be instructive? (U)

It seems to me that Penkovsky was calling the shots to an unusual degree in the part of the operation that took place inside the USSR—being his own case officer, as it were. Of course he was a man with a big ego and he liked to be in control. Moreover, this was his turf and he had demonstrated convincingly that he was an effective and astonishingly productive operator. His difficulties in making contact with Western intelligence in the first place and getting the operation going may also have encouraged him to take a hands-on approach. He seems to have been the one who came up with a lot of the operational ideas that were used in Moscow. He was the one who picked out the apartment buildings to which he led Chisholm for their meetings. He devised the ploy of asking his hosts at receptions in embassy flats to show him around, thus setting up chances for brush passes with his case officers. During the time when he was working with Chisholm, he was the one who determined the frequency of the meetings. It was he who decided that he and I should try to meet at the British film show. And, of course, it was Penkovsky who recruited Wynne to be his courier to British intelligence, a key event in the operation. Whatever the reasons, letting an agent call the shots increases the danger of compromise. Input from an agent is necessary to build a good communications plan, but the Agency should always have the final word on the details. (U)

On another matter, to correct the record, Penkovsky always passed his material to us hand-to-hand, at personal meetings, never by dead drop. The planning for this case included several proposals for dead drops, but none was ever used, except the one loaded by the KGB after his arrest. The contact plan Penkovsky provided in his initial message to us included a dead drop, as did his early warning communication plan, which incorporated the same site. As mentioned above, I tried to use a dead drop at a reception but had to revert to a hand-to-hand pass. The British came up with the clever idea of a concealment device in a dispenser of some kind that was to be installed in the bathrooms of British embassy apartments, thus providing a dead drop mechanism for use during diplomatic receptions. The case ended before this device could be used, however. Such a system would have been good for us, too, as a backup, but it is doubtful we could have gotten embassy approval for anything permanently installed, because of the danger of discovery by Soviet maids or maintenance personnel. Moscow was a dangerous environment for espionage; almost certainly Penkovsky preferred to keep incriminating material in his possession until it was turned over personally. (U)

A really remarkable thing about Penkovsky as an agent was that, in addition to the incredible access he had due to his GRU position and

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his friendships within the military elite—not to mention his diligence and creativity in exploiting this access—his cover job, too, was ideal for a spy. It allowed, even required, direct contact with officials from Western embassies, as well as Western businessmen, scientists, and academics. He was in remarkably favorable circumstances for a foreign intelligence service to handle him. The only downside to his cover position was that it was challenging to exploit it, because his job was so high profile that it automatically attracted the attention of those whose duty it was to monitor contacts between Soviet officials and foreigners. (U)

"The great tragedy of the case ... was that the CIA was unable to take advantage of this golden opportunity."

The great tragedy of the case, other than the loss of Penkovsky himself and his fabulous production, was that the CIA was unable to take advantage of this golden opportunity early on, to get somebody in place right from the start who could meet openly and legitimately with him. By the time we did, it was almost certainly too late. (U)

Penkovsky of course was an enormously productive agent and a figure of real historic importance. I cannot help but think, however, that to later generations of case officers who were stationed in the Soviet Union and handled operations there, the way we ran the Penkovsky case must have seemed rather crude. From what I have heard in subsequent years, the technical capabilities and operational ingenuity and techniques employed in the decades after Penkovsky were far superior to what we had in the early 1960s. (U)

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50 USC
18 USC 798
P.L. 86-36

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SIGINT IN SPACE

N. C. Gerson

This paper attempts to trace the events that thrust the space age first upon the United States and then upon SIGINT. I believe that my closeness to the early space effort led to my pressing for SIGINT in space. During the gestational years three threads became interwoven to produce a nationally integrated space program. The first was rocket exploration of the upper atmosphere; the second, the International Geophysical Year; and the third, the rather bitter interservice rivalry that then prevailed in this field.

My involvement with rocketry began in 1948. I was chief of the Ionospheric Physics Laboratory, in the Geophysics Research Directorate of the Air Force Cambridge Research Center (AFCRC). We were engaged in an intensive study of the upper atmosphere and its effects upon radio wave propagation.

Serious US concern with rocketry after World War II had been sparked by the availability of captured German V2 rockets. In essence, after three decades of neglect, the US began to restudy the works of Konstantin F. Tsiolkovski (USSR), Hermann Oberth (Germany), and Robert H. Goddard (US). Further, during the 1946-1948 period, the US had the practical knowledge of Wernher von Braun. To obtain hands-on experience, the V2s were to be fired from the USA rocket range at White Sands, New Mexico. Also, rather than fire the rockets with ballast, the warheads were to contain instruments which could measure properties of the upper atmosphere.

In 1948 the principal Department of Defense groups engaged in rocket-borne exploration of the upper atmosphere were the Ballistic Missile Laboratory, the Rocket Sonde Research Section of the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), and AFCRC. Each service prepared and defended its own program and budget. Although they acted independently, the groups interchanged information through a V2 Rocket Research Committee. Initially, the launch vehicles were the V2s. Later, rockets manufactured in the US were introduced (Wac Corporal, Honest John, Viking, Aerobee).

It was unfortunate, but true, that a considerable amount of tension existed between NRL and AFCRC. An unhealthy rivalry sapped the total US effort.

The first few years witnessed both successes and failures. Many of the latter could be attributed to problems in the propulsion system (leading to unpredictable rocket behavior), unreliable telemetry, or experimental deficiencies. Some of these problems persisted into the 1960s.

The International Geophysical Year (IGY) was an eighteen-month period (July 1957 – December 1958) during which most nations joined together for a

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detailed investigation of the planet as a whole. They recognized that national boundaries had no influence upon weather, ionospheric storminess, earthquake formation, and tidal changes, and that to better understand and predict these phenomena, a more thorough understanding of planetary physics was necessary.*

The International Council of Scientific Unions (an arm of the United Nations) endorsed Berkner's suggestion and invited all nations to participate. In response to this call, the US National Academy of Sciences established the US National Committee (USNC) for the IGY in 1953. I served as secretary of the USNC Executive Committee and as chairman of lesser committees.

The USNC first sought to develop an internal US program in geophysics, and then to coordinate the program internationally to insure that (a) global duplications were eliminated, and (b) gaps in coverage at national boundaries did not occur. All major nations joined the endeavor. The final program was truly global in nature. It incorporated studies on the continents and on the seas, in Arctica and Antarctica, and included rocket- and satellite-borne probings of the upper atmosphere.

The USNC Technical Panel on Rocketry contained many individuals on the old V2 coordinating committee, now named the Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel (UARRP). It also included researchers not on UARRP, and thus was more broadly based. During early meetings the panel confined itself primarily to experiments which essentially continued or improved already ongoing efforts. S. Fred Singer and James A. Van Allen expanded their rockoon (balloon launched rockets) program for studying cosmic radiation to other areas on the earth. Singer in 1952 published his MOUSE (Minimum Orbiting Unmanned Satellite – Earth) proposal. He brought this proposal to the attention of the Rocketry Panel but it was not endorsed.

Commitment to Satellites

The first convocation of the Special Committee for the IGY, known as CSAGI from the initials of its French name, met in Rome in 1954. It presented an opportunity to begin integrating the various national programs. Berkner forced a decision on US plans for satellite explorations. He asked a number of us (including Joseph Kaplan, Hugh Odishaw, Harry Wexler, Wallace Joyce, Allan Shapley, Homer Newell, S. Fred Singer, John Adkins, Athelstan Spilhaus) to visit him one evening. He broached his concern; rumors were circulating that the Soviet Union was about to propose that CSAGI endorse the launching of earth satellites as an integral portion of the IGY program. Satellite-borne instrumentation would allow direct investigations of the upper atmosphere. Berkner wanted us to propose a US position.

* The IGY was conceived by Lloyd V. Berkner, president of Associated Universities Inc., Brookhaven, New York. The IGY was a continuation of a series of Polar Years. The First Polar Year of 1872 was conceived by Karl Weyprecht, a lieutenant in the Austro-Hungarian Navy. It was followed fifty years later by the Second Polar Year of 1932. The objectives of both were extensive examinations of weather, auroras, geomagnetism, and ice conditions in the Arctic and Antarctic. Berkner's proposed IGY shortened the period between Polar Years to 25 years and expanded their scope to include middle and low latitudes.

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The discussion lasted well into the evening. It was quickly apparent that practically everyone present felt that the US should either independently propose, or join in proposing, the launch of earth satellites during the IGY. We all understood that such a stand committed the US to implementing scientific satellite experiments before the end of 1958 or shortly thereafter. However, it was the considered judgment of most that such a schedule was not unrealistic. Several of us had a working knowledge of the difficulties and problems affecting launches: thrust availability, costs, and experimental possibilities. Berkner himself was familiar with the total US effort, including progress in propulsion systems, and from a much higher level in government than any of us.

Newell raised objections: there were no readily available boosters; solar cell outputs were too low; energy requirements could not be met; experiments could not be prepared in time; proven experiments were not at hand; batteries may boil. He stated that the US could not fabricate and launch an acceptable experiment in time, that the difficulties were too great, and that there were also doubts about Soviet capabilities. The rest of us felt comfortable about a positive stand for the US. Finally Berkner asked for a vote. It was unanimously in favor: the US would propose incorporation of a satellite program within the IGY framework. With this decision in hand, Berkner on behalf of the US, and Pushkov on behalf of the USSR, jointly proposed that an earth satellite program be included in the IGY. The plenary session of CSAGI adopted this recommendation.

After we had returned to the US, the machinery of government slowly began to clank. Berkner, who was on a first name basis with the President, briefed Eisenhower. On 29 July 1955 the President announced US participation. The government now had formally committed itself to support the decision of our rump meeting.

Deliberations within the Executive Committee of the USNC took an unexpected turn. Kaplan, the chairman, stated that the US effort would be wholly civilian in concept and fulfillment. Let the USSR use its military capabilities to launch a satellite for the civilian-scientific IGY; the US would not.*

The USNC found a surplus Vanguard rocket; it was refurbished to serve as a booster for the IGY satellite. About this time rumors reached several of us on the USNC to the effect that the Army planned to launch a rocket which would "accidentally" attain earth obit. I was later told that Kaplan had objected and that as a result, the Army was told to cease efforts toward this end.

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* In "Beyond the Atmosphere," NASA (1980) contrasted actions of the two nations by considering the space effort of the US as primarily open and scientific, and that of the USSR as primarily military. It is not possible to characterize these activities so neatly. Both nations designed realistic programs to accommodate their respective national interests in both research and defense. Furthermore, the long term goals of one were not distinctly different from those of the other. Thus, their objectives *a priori* included a mixture of military applications, national prestige items (lunar and planetary probes), and space research. Both nations appreciated that research represents vital national insurance for the future.

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As refurbishment of the Vanguard progressed, a meeting was held at the US National Academy of Sciences to discuss the satellite programs planned for the IGY. My invitation, in a telegram dated 30 September 1957, noted that the gathering constituted the international working party on rockets and satellites. Attendees comprised delegates from the US and USSR. The Soviet delegation, led by General Anatoly A. Blagonravov, invited us to a party at their Embassy on 4 October 1957. The meeting included prepared papers on scientific and technical topics, followed by a discussion period. Both nations outlined their respective projects. In typical national fashion, the US provided much more information than it received.

A point of discord occurred during another meeting on the morning of 4 October 1957. It stemmed from US pressure for the Soviets to provide an official launch date for their IGY satellite. The Soviets were pushed rather relentlessly and intently—almost to the point of embarrassment. Finally Pushkov, answering forcefully, stated that, at the present state of the art, to predict the launch of a rocket is difficult. It becomes even more difficult to predict the launch of a satellite. There were too many uncertainties, too many things that could go wrong. Why state a date in advance when such doubt exists? He would prefer to provide a date after a successful launch.

Richard Porter was the chief US delegate at the meeting. At lunchtime the press got to him. He expressed himself freely and at some length. The Soviets, he claimed, were way behind the US. There was no other possible explanation for their reticence in providing a launch date for their satellite.

Sputnik 1

The sessions resumed that afternoon. Although I had an invitation for the party at the Soviet Embassy that evening, I had planned to miss it. Practically every other delegate attended. At the height of the festivities (I was later told) Berkner received a telephone call: the "beep beep" of the 40 MHz signal radiated by the earth's first satellite, Sputnik 1, had been found. Berkner returned to the room, stood on a chair, clapped his hands, and publicly commended the USSR on its accomplishment.

The USNC pursued its "open" space effort. The Vanguard was publicized and readied. The experiment was encapsulated and emplaced in the "bird." Complete television coverage took place during the day of launch to show the world that the US only utilized civilian-scientific talent in its space program. Vanguard did not cooperate. It fell over and burned—with complete television coverage. The US had learned a lesson. The Army was called in and asked to launch the next attempt. Van Allen prepared new instrumentation for observing cosmic radiation (essentially a particle counter to measure the intensity of particles bombarding the earth). The satellite, named the Explorer, discovered the radiation belts that now bear Van Allen's name. The US had not been first in space, but its scientific efforts to date had been best—we had discovered a hitherto unknown major feature of the planet.

The space effort soon was to acquire a national focus through establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

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In 1956 I left AFCRC and joined the National Security Agency (NSA). My attention turned toward applied research in SIGINT.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
18 USC 798
P.L. 86-36

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(b)(1)
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We were fortunate. After just about one week of operation we intercepted Soviet radar operating on the Arctic coast. (As a by-product of my involvement, I could never look at the moon again without thinking of our experiment.)*

What about an intercept site on the moon? It is conceivable. In time the logistic problems would be overcome, and a lunar base for that one otherwise unattainable signal might become reality. One question is whether an atmosphere could be produced on the moon, and if so, what its properties would be like.

The greatest problem is the small lunar gravity (one-sixth that of the earth) which would not allow retention of an earth-like atmosphere for any length of time. There are other problems: distilling the needed gases from lunar rocks, the thermodynamic properties of the atmosphere, and the warming of the dark side of the moon once an atmosphere is established.

In thinking about the problem, I proposed an atmosphere of 20 percent oxygen and 80 percent argon with a surface pressure about equal to that of Denver. (On the earth the composition is 21 percent oxygen, 78 percent nitrogen and 1 percent argon.) Argon rather than nitrogen was chosen as a potential "filler" gas because of its greater molecular weight. The thermodynamic properties of this atmosphere were extremely interesting and completely different than I had expected. The unsurmountable obstacle was the loss of gas; the low gravity allowed the oxygen to "boil off" at an almost irreplaceable rate. Obviously, the answer is to utilize domed cities. The needed gases could still be extracted from the rocks by using solar energy.

• • •

This paper has recounted the events that led NSA to one course of action. It illustrates the progression of thought on problems of the time, and the chain of events that led inexorably to our present concepts. What we need now are ideas for tomorrow.

This article is classified SECRET.

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* The dish at AIO has been updated considerably (b)(1) Its surface now is spherical over its 300-meter radius t(b)(3) two centimeters. It remains one of the best radio telescopes the US ever constructed, and by any reasonable measure, probably the cheapest in relation to the research potential that it provides.

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Cracking the Courtyard Crypto (U)

(b)(3)(c)

Editor's Note: In the late 1980s, under a GSA program, the CIA commissioned Washington artist James Sanborn to create a series of sculptures for CIA's new Headquarters building. Working together wit(b)(3)(c) who was soon to retire from the Office of Communications, Sanborn created a sculpture named "Kryptos" (Greek for hidden) that was dedicated in 1990 and now resides in the northwest corner of the courtyard. The curving Verdigris scroll contains an 865-character coded message that seems to flow out from a petrified tree and is located near a water-filled basin bordered by various types of stones. In the following article, (b)(3)(c) describes how he has deciphered most of the secret message contained within the sculpture.

"After more than seven years encompassing some 400 hours of laboring over piles and piles of paper covered with gibberish, I was at last looking down at a paragraph of clear English text. I had broken out the first part of the Kryptos code."

I looked down at the large number of yellow pages littering the top of my desk, obscuring its dark oak finish. Each page was covered in hundreds of alphabetic letters that, although they appeared to be arranged randomly, were really carefully laid out in columns of hidden order. For the past week or so, I had been feeling that I was very close to a solution—but was I? As a hobby, I had solved many puzzles since I was a child, and I had discovered that the most difficult challenge was continually dealing with the nagging fear that I may be on the wrong track. The voice in my head would whisper, "Maybe you're mistaken—maybe this first part of the Kryptos code is really not a polyalphabetic Vigenere Tableau after all—maybe it's a different type of code entirely. Or maybe it is a Vigenere code, but it's been double or triple encoded—or maybe it was encoded backwards, or maybe...."

This is the worst train of thought an amateur cryptanalyst can have—it goes nowhere, and it is tempting to give in to frustration at the seemingly infinite number of possible solutions and abandon the effort. So, as I had done dozens of times before, I pushed these thoughts away and pressed on. The thing to do, I told myself again and again, was simply to stick to what I knew to be the facts. Let the encoded text itself guide me, and keep speculation to an absolute minimum. I should follow my instincts—occasionally, but then remember to always keep track of my assumptions and be prepared to revise my thinking if a hunch doesn't work out.

And suddenly it happened—I was hit by that sweetly ecstatic, rare experience that I have heard described as a "moment of clarity." All the doubts and speculations about the thousands of possible alternate paths simply melted away, and I clearly saw the one correct course laid out in front of me. Taking a fresh sheet of paper, I slowly and deliberately wrote out a new column of letters, followed by another, and then another. I continued this for several pages, then computed mathematically which rows were most likely to represent the correct plaintext letters, and searched for logical combinations between adjacent letters. I tried to contain my excitement as I witnessed the miracle of letters slowly forming together into words, one after the other. Within the next few hours, I had finished. After more than seven years encompassing some 400 hours of laboring over piles and piles of paper covered with gibberish, I was at last looking down at a paragraph of clear English text. I had broken out the first part of the Kryptos code.

(b)(3)(c) is in the Directorate of Intelligence.

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A New Challenge

I don't remember the first time I saw, or even heard about, the Kryptos sculpture in the courtyard. But each day as I walked past the huge, curved copper plates, I would look at their mysterious perforated inscriptions a little longer each time until gradually I was lured into an attempt to decrypt them. Like the character of Ishmael from Melville's *Moby Dick*, I, too, embark on journeys "...whenever I find myself growing grim about the mouth" or find my soul becoming "...damp, drizzly November." Rather than putting to sea as Ishmael would have done, however, my travels are journeys of the mind. By undertaking new challenges, I explore the mysteries at hand.

(b)(3)(c)

I quickly became fascinated with the thought of that encoded message standing mutely in the Headquarters' courtyard year after year, wordlessly taunting everyone to try to read its hidden message; indeed, at its dedication, the puzzle was offered to Agency employees as a challenge. I have always been interested in all different types of puzzles: I've spent weeks uncoupling bits of twisted metal that some sadist has carefully coupled; I've poured over endless permutations of logic problems that cheerfully describe groups of people with terribly contrived lives who, it seems, are constrained to sit at the dinner table only in unique arrangements; and I've patiently studied colored cubes, labyrinths, cryptograms, and pictures that have been jigsawed into thousands of identical pieces. But I had never before undertaken a puzzle anything like that represented in the Kryptos sculpture.

Because I'm not a professional cryptanalyst, I first needed to educate myself in the different techniques used in the field of cryptography. After working on the Kryptos codes for awhile, I soon learned that the basic problem-solving techniques that I needed for decryption were not so different from those that I used in my work as a technical analyst. And in my reading I also learned that codebreaking is more than just a fascinating hobby; throughout history, lives literally have been lost and saved due to cryptanalysis. It has been estimated that, for example, the war in the Pacific in World War II was shortened by at least a year as a result of the efforts of military cryptanalysts.

From the time I initially began sharing with people the progress I had made deciphering the code covering the Kryptos sculpture, I have had the interesting experience of being inundated with questions about it. By far the most frequent question asked is, "How much did you get paid for solving that thing?" (Many people seemed to think that there was some kind of prize involved.) The next most common question is, "How long did it take you to solve it?" Notwithstanding my wife's dry riposte ("So long, that it almost wasn't worth it"), this question is more difficult. I was not keeping track of the time, and, in any event, I was not in any hurry to solve the puzzle. For me, when codebreaking ceases to be fun and begins to seem more like work, then it's time to quit and start doing something else. My best estimate of roughly 400 hours seems about right, had I been working continuously.

I had expected the most prevalent question to be, "What does the message say?"; this one, however, only made it into third place, followed closely by (usually humorously) "Don't you have anything better to do with your time?" Although I'm not sure just how to respond to this last one, I do like to talk about the

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progress I've made on the Kryptos problem. But I must confess that I am often hesitant to reveal the message without having an opportunity to provide a full explanation.

There are several reasons that I don't like to just blurt out the solution to the Kryptos puzzle. First, it is important to remember that the message is still incomplete; I have not yet broken out the last 97 characters of the 865-character inscription. Second, the message is enigmatic and open to interpretation. Finally, I believe that simply presenting the solution without showing the methodology behind it is cheating people a little. The creators of Kryptos no doubt intended to inspire people to try to solve it for themselves. Merely showing the "solution" that I have derived steals away a little of the excitement and appreciation of the problem, and can discourage people from trying their own interpretations.

When asked to write an article for *Studies in Intelligence*, I became intrigued by the idea of trying to explain what can be a complicated and convoluted subject in a manner that could be understood by anyone. After it was suggested to me that it might well be impossible to explain the methodology concisely and in a nontechnical manner, I couldn't resist taking up the challenge. The purpose of this article is not simply to reveal the content of the Kryptos message but rather to give the reader a sense of the exhilaration that is felt when solving complex problems after struggling with them for years.


Where To Begin?

When first confronted with the coded full text of the Kryptos sculpture, the task of deciphering it can seem formidable—even impossible. Even the most casual of observations, however, reveals that the writing on the sculpture is divided into two main pieces. One side (Figure 1) depicts a somewhat modified "Vigenere Tableau" (a series of alphabets used for the coding and decoding of text); the other side contains the actual coded message of 865 characters interspersed with four "question marks" (Figure 2).

One method for deciphering a code begins by counting up the number of times that each letter of the alphabet occurs throughout the message, a so-called frequency count. I saw no reason, however, why different sections of the Kryptos code could not have been enciphered with different coding schemes; if so, it would be necessary to perform frequency counts on each part separately. Looking through the code, I seemed to see different patterns throughout, but I wanted to quantify these impressions. Therefore, just as a starting point, I decided to count up the number of times each letter occurred for each row of the message depicted in Figure 2. By plotting these counts as a function of row for each letter of the alphabet (26 plots in all), I would be able to watch how often each letter was being used as the message evolved. In particular, if the count stayed approximately constant for a number of rows, this would indicate the same type of code was being used for that part of the message.


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  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D
A K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P
B R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T
C Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O
D P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S
E T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A
F O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B
G S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C
H A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D
I B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E
J C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F
K D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G
L E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H
M F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I
N G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J
O H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L
P I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M
Q J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N
R L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q
S M N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U
T N Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V
U Q U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W
V U V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X
W V W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z
X W X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K
Y X Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R
Z Z K R Y P T O S A B C D E F G H I J L M N Q U V W X Z K R Y
```

Figure 1. One side of Kryptos sculpture, depicting modified Vigenere Tableau.



```
E M U F P H Z L R F A X Y U S D J K Z L D K R N S H G N F I V J
Y Q T Q U X Q B Q V Y U V L L T R E V J Y Q T M K Y R D M F D
V F P J U D E E H Z W E T Z Y V G W H K K Q E T G F Q J N C E
G G W H K K ? D Q M C P F Q Z D Q M M I A G P F X H Q R L G
T I M V M Z J A N Q L V K Q E D A G D V F R P J U N G E U N A
Q Z G Z L E C G Y U X U E E N J T B J L B Q C R T B J D F H R R
Y I Z E T K Z E M V D U F K S J H K F W H K U W Q L S Z F T I
H H D D D U V H ? D W K B F U F P W N T D F I Y C U Q Z E R E
E V L D K F E Z M O Q Q J L T T U G S Y Q P F E U N L A V I D X
F L G G T E Z ? F K Z B S F D Q V G O G I P U F X H H D R K F
F H Q N T G P U A E C N U V P D J M Q C L Q U M U N E D F Q
E L Z Z V R R G K F F V O E E X B D M V P N F Q X E Z L G R E
D N Q F M P N Z G L F L P M R J Q Y A L M G N U V P D X V K P
D Q U M E B E D M H D A F M J G Z N U P L G E W J L L A E T G
E N D Y A H R O H N L S R H E O C P T E O I B I D Y S H N A I A
C H T N R E Y U L D S L L S L L N O H S N O S M R W X M N I
T P R N G A T I H N R A R P E S L N N E L E B L P I I A C A E
W M T W N D I T I E E N R A H C T E N E U D R E T N H A E O E
T F O L S E D T I W E N H A E I O Y T E Y Q H E E N C T A Y C R
E I F T B R S P A M H N E W E N A T A M A T E G Y E E R L B
T E E F O A S F I O T U E T U A E O T O A R M A E E R T N R T I
B S E D D N I A A H T T M S T E W P I E R O A G R I E W F E B
A E C T D D H I L C E I H S I T E G O E A O S D D R Y D L O R I T
R K L M L E H A G T D H A R D P N E O H M G F M F E U H E
E C D M R I P F E I M E H N L S S T T R T V D O H W ? O B K R
U O X O G H U L B S O L I F B B W F L R V Q Q P R N G K S S O
T W T Q S J Q S S E K Z Z W A T J K L U D I A W I N F B N Y P
V T T M Z F P K W G D K Z X T J C D I G K U H U A U E K C A R
```

Figure 2. Opposite side of Kryptos sculpture, containing the coded message.

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Box A: Encryption Schemes


Encryption schemes are methods for changing an original plaintext message into a coded one. Virtually all of them fall into two main categories: substitution codes and transposition codes.

Substitution Codes: Each letter of the plaintext message is changed into another letter of the alphabet while preserving its relative position. In a simple, monoalphabetic substitution, that is, using a single alphabet, a particular letter will be encoded by the same letter every time it is used.

Example	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
	m	e	r	i	t	a	b	c	d	f	g	h	j	k	l	n	o	p	q	s	u	v	w	x	y	z

So **The Red Badge of Courage** would be encoded: ***sct pti emibt la rlupmbt*** using the keyword "merit," followed by the remaining letters of the alphabet.

If a polyalphabetic substitution is used (one using several different monoalphabets), then a plaintext letter can be encoded by a number of different letters. One common polyalphabetic method is the so-called Vigenere Tableau.



	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
A	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
B	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A
C	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B
D	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C
E	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D
F	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E
G	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F
H	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
I	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
J	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
K	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
L	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
M	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
N	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
O	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
P	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
Q	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
R	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
S	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
T	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
U	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T
V	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U
W	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V
X	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W
Y	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X
Z	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y

Example—We choose to use the four-letter keyword "able," corresponding to four different monoalphabets:

Key:	A	B	L	E	A	B	L	E	A	B	L	E	A	B	L	E	A	B
Plaintext:	W	h	a	t	h	a	t	h	G	o	d	w	r	o	u	g	h	t
Ciphertext:	***w***	***i***	***l***	***x***	***h***	***b***	***e***	***l***	***g***	***p***	***o***	***a***	***r***	***p***	***f***	***k***	***h***	***u***

Note plaintext "W" stays "W" in the first occurrence, but changes into "A" in the second.

Transposition Codes: All the letters used in the coded message are exactly the same as those used in the plaintext, but they are arranged in a different order.

Example—The word **"secret"** *could be encoded as* **"ceerts," "rstece," "tcesre,"** *and so forth.*

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


Figure 3. Frequency of "J" occurrences by row.

A typical example of one of the 26 plots, for encoded letter "J," is shown in Figure 3. (Of course, these "J"s are not really "J"s at all, but are ciphertext letters representing plaintext letters of the alphabet.) It can be seen that the letter "J" occurred twice in the first row of the Kryptos message, once in the second row, and so on. I noted that there was a marked change in letter frequency occurring between rows 14 and 15; that is, from row 1 to 14 there were "J"s appearing in almost every row, but from row 15 to row 25 there were no "J"s appearing at all. This indicated to me that rows 1-14 were encoded with a different type of code than rows 15 and beyond. In addition, it appeared that the last two or three rows were encoded with a different type of code than the preceding rows. The dramatic change from row 14 to 15 was seen in virtually all 26 frequency plots.

Because of these results, I divided the code into a top section (rows 1-14) and a bottom section (rows 15-28). I then further divided the top section into three parts using the four question marks as the dividing points; I designated these portions as Parts I, II, and III, respectively (Figure 4). I began my attempts at deciphering with the 125 characters of Part II mainly because the repetition of the "DQM" sequence occurring in the first 11 letters made this piece look more interesting to me than the other two parts.

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


Figure 4. Top section of Kryptos code, divided into three parts.

Frequency Counts

The frequency count is one of the crypranalyst's most powerful tools. By computing how often each letter appears throughout the message, one can determine important clues about the code employed. Figure 5 shows a typical frequency count of normal English text.




Figure 5. Normal frequency distribution for the English language.

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Each bar represents the number of times that that letter occurs, on the average, for every 1,000 letters encountered. This pattern adheres so tenaciously to our language that it is virtually impossible to write or speak without it betraying its presence. And even if one were to artificially construct a few sentences or paragraphs that do not follow this distribution, it would turn out to be so contrived that new patterns would inevitably develop. Because it is an essential and unavoidable part of our language, from a cryptanalytic point of view, the pattern is also a code's greatest weakness.

In Figure 6, a frequency count for Part II of the Kryptos code is plotted. It is easily seen, from comparison with Figure 5, that the pattern is very different from the normal distribution for English.




Figure 6. Frequency count for Part II of Kryptos code.

In particular, the distribution appears much flatter. This is exactly what I would expect to see for a polyalphabetic substitution code, where the distributions for several different alphabets would tend to average out when combined. Because the modified Vigenere Tableau—a polyalphabetic substitution code—is inscribed on the Kryptos sculpture, it made sense to try this first as a working hypothesis for this part of the code.

Finding the Length of the Keyword

A common method for breaking a Vigenere code involves first determining the length of the keyword that was used to encipher the message. The code then can be broken up into its constituent single alphabets, called monoalphabets, and analysis performed on each cipher alphabet to determine to which Vigenere alphabet it corresponds. Once these Vigenere alphabets are determined, the code can be easily deciphered. Note that nowhere in this analysis is it necessary to actually resolve the content of the keyword.

To ascertain the length of the keyword used in Part II of the cipher, I needed to make use of a cryptanalytic tool known as the "index of coincidence," or I.C. This concept conveys the probability that, given a distribution of letters, any two chosen at random will be the same. The details are covered in the field

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Box B: Example Computation of I.C. for 7 Alphabets (Kryptos Code Part II)

0.038
Completely Random Letters

$$I.C. = \frac{\sum_{i=A}^{Z} f_i(f_i - 1)}{N(N-1)}$$

0.066
Mono-alphabet

f=letter frequency per column, N=number of letters per column

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
D	Q	M	C	P	F	Q
Z	D	Q	M	M	I	A
G	P	F	X	H	Q	R
L	G	T	I	M	V	M
Z	J	A	N	Q	L	V
K	Q	E	D	A	G	D
V	F	R	P	J	U	N
G	E	U	N	A	Q	Z
G	Z	L	E	C	G	Y
U	X	U	E	E	N	J
T	B	J	L	B	Q	C
R	T	B	J	D	F	H
R	R	Y	I	Z	E	T
K	Z	E	M	V	D	U
F	K	S	J	H	K	F
W	H	K	U	W	Q	L
S	Z	F	T	I	H	H
D	D	D	U	V	H	

→

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
A	0	0	1	0	2	0	1
B	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
C	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
D	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
E	0	1	2	2	1	1	0
F	1	1	2	0	0	2	1
G	3	1	0	0	0	2	0
H	0	1	0	0	2	2	2
I	0	0	0	2	1	1	0
J	0	1	1	2	1	0	1
K	2	1	1	0	0	1	0
L	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
M	0	0	1	2	2	0	1
N	0	0	0	2	0	1	1
O	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P	0	1	0	1	1	0	0
Q	0	2	1	0	1	4	1
R	2	1	1	0	0	0	1
S	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
T	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
U	1	0	2	2	0	1	1
V	1	0	0	0	2	1	1
W	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
X	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
Y	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Z	2	3	0	0	1	0	1

Alphabet 1:[2(1)+3(2)+2(1)+2(1)+2(1)]/(18)(17)=0.046
Alphabet 2:[2(1)+2(1)+3(2)]/(18)(17)=0.033
Alphabet 3:[2(1)+2(1)+2(1)]/(18)(17)=0.020
Alphabet 4:[2(1)+2(1)+2(1)+2(1)+2(1)+2(1)]/(18)(17)=0.040
Alphabet 5:[2(1)+2(1)+2(1)+2(1)]/(18)(17)= 0.026
Alphabet 6:[2(1)+2(1)+2(1)+4(3)]/(18)(17)=0.059
Alphabet 7:[2(1)]/(17)(16)=0.007

AVERAGE I.C.:
[0.046+0.033+0.020+0.040+0.026+0.059+0.007]/7
= 0.033

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of statistics, and they are not significant here; the formula and an example calculation is provided, (see Box B), if anyone wants to repeat the analysis. The important point is that for any set of letters, the average value of the I.C. will range from 0.038 up to 0.066. The closer this average value is to 0.038, the more likely it is that the set of letters is completely random. If the value is closer to 0.066, then it is more likely that the letters represent a monoalphabet.

I first divided the text of Part II into two single alphabets (corresponding to a two-letter keyword) and computed the average I.C., then divided the text into three alphabets and again computed the average I.C., then divided into four alphabets, and so on (see Box B for an example calculation using seven alphabets.) Finally, I plotted each average I.C. as a function of the number of alphabets (Figure 7).

It is easy to see from this figure that the correct key length for this piece of code should be eight because that number yields an average I.C. value of almost 0.063; thus, I knew that I needed to divide the code into eight separate alphabets (Figure 8).




Figure 7. I.C. vs. Number of Alphabets for Part II.




Figure 8. Part II of Kryptos code divided into eight alphabets.

Determining Which Vigenere Alphabets To Use

Now that I had the code divided into eight monoalphabets, I needed to determine which Vigenere alphabet corresponded to each of them. If the text of Part II had been much longer, the analysis would have been *fairly straightforward*: I could simply have performed a frequency count for each column and matched the resulting distributions to the English frequency count in Figure 5. The letter occurring most frequently would likely have corresponded to plaintext "E," and, because the Vigenere alphabets have a fixed order (cyclical permutation), the identities of the other letters could then have been found. From the example presented in Figure 9 (for the first column), however, it is obvious how impossible this method would be for the present problem:

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


Figure 9. Frequency count for first alphabet of Part II.

With only around 15 letters available per alphabet, there are just not enough to determine any kind of alphabetic structure such as that seen in Figure 5. So now what?

I must admit that I got stuck at this point for many months. No doubt a professional cryptanalyst would know several ways to proceed, but I was unsure. And then on February 21ST, 1998, I had a breakthrough. How well I remember sitting at my desk that day, with the sunlight beaming through the window and the birds chirping unusually loudly outside. Suddenly, I felt a burst of Divine Inspiration—the insights I had gained about the Kryptos code from hundreds of hours of work came together and combined with all I had learned about cryptography. Everything seemed so clear that I didn't have the slightest doubt about how to proceed, and I was confident that my plan would work.

Once again I divided the message into eight separate alphabets. What had become plain to me was that if I wrote out one of the columns along with every possible permutation for each letter in that column, then exactly one of the resulting columns would contain the true plaintext letters. True, only every eighth letter of the message would be revealed (the first, ninth, seventeenth, and so forth), but I could similarly write out the permutations for every other column and then look for likely letter combinations among the plaintext (Figure 10).

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D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C
D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C
F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E
I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N
G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F
M	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M
G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F
X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W
J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X
D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C
F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E
S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O
D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C

Figure 10. First column of Part II with every possible permutation.

One of these columns had to correspond to the correct plaintext letters for the first column of the message in Figure 8, but which one?

D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C
D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C
F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E
I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N
G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F
N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M
G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F
X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W
J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X
D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C
F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C	D	E
S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O
D	E	F	G	H	I	J	L	M	N	Q	U	V	W	X	Z	K	R	Y	P	T	O	S	A	B	C

Figure 11. Permutations of first column, with uncommon letters in red.

Looking across the columns (Figure 11), it can be seen that some appear less promising than others; those that contain a large number of uncommon letters (B, J, K, Q, X, Z), for instance (remember, these should now represent actual plaintext letters.) But this all seemed so subjective—and how could I tell

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which column was the best choice? Columns 1, 5, 7, 11, 15, and 16 each contain at least five uncommon letters—very unlikely to occur in such a short message of only 125 characters, so I could rule these out. But what about the others? Column 18, for example, contains four "R"s, which is a very common letter, and only one "J" (an uncommon letter). But is that column more likely to represent the plaintext letters than column 22, which has two "E"s and four "O"s, and no "K"s, "J"s, or "Z"s?

I needed to quantify these observations mathematically. One way to do this would be, for each column, to add up the normal English frequency count associated with each letter. Then the columns with the highest sums would be the best candidates to correspond with the true plaintext letters. Starting with column 1 for example, it can be seen from Figure 5 that letter "D" occurs 4.4 times (on the average) for every 100 letters in English, "F" occurs 2.8 times, "I" 7.4 times, and so on. I could have summed these up, but I learned in my studies that it is actually better to compute the sum of the logarithm of the frequencies instead. Thus, for the first column, log (4.4) + log (4.4) + log (3.8) + log (7.4) + ...=7.3. One advantage of using the log of the values rather than just the values themselves is that the overall sums will be penalized for containing letters B, J, K, Q, X and Z—that is, those with negative log frequency values—and will more dramatically reduce the overall score. The final log sums for each column are presented in Figure 12 (the table has been turned sideways for ease of presentation; the rows should correspond to the columns of Figure 11).

D D F I Q G N G X J J Z D F S D	7.3
E E G J U H Q H Z L L K E G A E	13.0
F F H L V I U I K M M R F H B V	16.3
G G I M W J V J R N N Y G I C G	12.8
H H J N X L W L Y Q Q P H J D H	6.4
I I L Q Z M X M P U U T I L E I	16.2
J J M U K N Z N T V V O J M F J	2.3
L L N V R Q K Q O W W S L N G L	12.8
M M Q W Y U R U S X X A M Q H M	10.1
N N U X P V Y V A Z Z B N U I N	11.4
Q Q V Z T W P W B K K C Q V J Q	-5.6
U U W K O X T X C R R D U W L U	14.8
V V X R S Z O Z D Y Y E V X M V	7.3
W W Z Y A K S K E P P F W Z N W	7.0
X X K P B R A R F T T G X K Q X	7.0
Z Z R T C Y B Y G O O H Z R U Z	6.9
R R P S E T D T I A A J R P W R	25.2
Y Y T A F O E O J B B L Y T X Y	16.1
P P O B G S F S L C C M P O Z P	15.6
T T S C H A G A M D D N T S K T	23.7
O O A D I B H E N E E Q O A R O	24.8
S S B E J C I C Q F F U S B Y S	15.4
A A C F L D J D W G G V A C P A	17.4
B B D G M E L E V H H W B D T B	16.2
C C E H N F M F W I I X C E O C	21.9

Figure 12. Log sum frequencies for each column permutation.

Again, the details of these calculations are not really important. The main point is that the rows in Figure 12 with the highest values are the most likely to correspond to the correct plaintext letters.

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Words Start To Appear

It is easy to see from Figure 12 that the three highest log sum values correspond to the rows beginning with "R" (log sum=25.2), "T" (log sum=23.7), and "O" (log sum=24.8). These three values are significantly higher than any of the others. Now, I often imagine a professional cryptographer with a bag of special tools, not unlike a consummate locksmith or doctor, but consisting of alphabetic letter tables and charts rather than picks or scalpels. The English-language frequency chart and the I.C. were such tools, and now another one—the frequency table of initial letters common in English-language words—comes into play. In other words, how likely is it for a particular letter to begin a word? The letter "O" occurs as an initial letter an average of about 7.2 times per 100 words, and "R" only about 3.1 times. Because the letter "T" begins a word an average of 16 times per every 100 words, however, it is a good letter to try first.

Knowing that one of the most common words in English is the word "THE," and given that the first letter of Part II could very well be a "T," I naturally wanted to see what would happen if "H" were the second letter and "E" the third. But, once I chose these letters, I would then be committed to using all the other letters in those rows. The permutations with log sums for the second and third columns of Figure 8 are presented in Figures 13 and 14, respectively.

Q	Q	X	M	L	D	C	Z	U	L	D	E	G	W	Z	D	
U	U	Z	N	M	E	H	K	V	M	E	F	V	X	K	E	
V	V	K	Q	N	F	I	R	W	N	F	G	W	Z	R	F	
W	W	R	U	Q	G	J	Y	X	Q	G	H	X	K	Y	G	
X	X	Y	V	U	H	L	P	Z	U	H	I	Z	R	P	H	
Z	Z	P	W	V	I	M	T	K	V	I	J	K	Y	T	I	
K	K	T	X	W	J	N	O	R	W	J	L	E	P	O	J	
R	R	O	Z	X	L	Q	S	Y	X	L	M	Y	T	S	L	
Y	Y	S	K	Z	M	U	A	P	Z	M	N	P	O	A	M	
P	P	A	R	K	N	V	B	T	K	N	Q	T	S	B	N	
T	T	B	Y	R	Q	W	C	O	R	Q	U	O	A	C	Q	
O	O	C	P	Y	U	X	D	S	Y	U	V	S	B	D	U	
S	S	D	T	P	V	Z	E	A	P	V	W	A	C	E	V	
A	A	E	O	T	W	K	F	B	T	W	X	B	D	F	W	
B	B	F	S	O	X	R	G	C	O	X	E	C	B	G	X	
C	C	G	A	S	Z	Y	H	D	S	Z	K	D	F	H	Z	
D	D	H	B	A	K	P	I	E	A	K	R	E	G	I	K	
E	E	I	C	B	R	T	J	F	B	R	Y	F	H	J	R	
F	F	J	D	C	Y	O	L	G	C	Y	P	G	I	L	Y	
G	G	L	E	D	P	S	M	H	D	P	T	H	J	M	P	
H	H	M	F	E	T	A	N	I	E	T	Q	I	L	N	T	39.4
I	I	N	G	F	O	B	Q	J	F	O	S	J	M	Q	O	
J	J	Q	H	G	S	C	U	L	G	S	A	L	N	U	S	
L	L	U	I	H	A	D	V	M	H	A	B	M	Q	V	A	
M	M	V	J	I	B	E	W	N	I	B	C	N	U	W	B	
N	N	W	L	J	C	D	X	Q	J	C	D	Q	V	X	C	

Figure 13. Probable plaintext for second column (red).

M	M	B	V	V	V	B	L	E	B	F	T	F	H	F	U	
N	N	I	W	W	W	F	M	F	C	G	O	G	I	G	V	
Q	Q	J	X	X	X	G	N	G	D	H	S	H	J	H	W	
U	U	L	Z	Z	Z	H	Q	H	E	I	A	I	L	I	X	
V	V	M	K	K	K	I	U	I	F	J	B	J	M	J	Z	
W	W	N	E	E	E	J	V	G	G	L	C	L	N	L	K	
X	X	Q	Y	Y	Y	L	W	G	H	M	D	M	Q	M	R	
Z	Z	U	P	P	P	M	X	M	I	N	E	N	U	N	Y	
K	K	V	T	T	T	N	Z	N	J	Q	F	Q	V	Q	P	
R	R	W	O	O	O	Q	K	Q	L	U	G	U	W	U	T	
Y	Y	X	S	S	S	U	R	U	M	V	H	V	X	V	O	
P	P	Z	A	A	A	V	Y	V	N	W	I	W	Z	W	S	
T	T	K	B	B	B	W	P	W	Q	X	J	X	K	X	A	
O	O	R	C	C	C	X	T	X	U	Z	L	Z	R	Z	B	
S	S	Y	D	D	D	Z	O	Z	V	K	M	K	Y	K	C	
A	A	P	E	E	E	K	S	K	W	R	N	R	P	R	D	
B	B	T	F	F	F	R	A	R	X	Y	Q	Y	T	Y	E	
C	C	O	G	G	G	Y	B	Y	Z	P	U	P	O	P	F	
D	D	S	H	H	H	P	C	P	K	T	V	T	S	T	G	
E	E	A	I	I	I	Q	D	T	E	O	W	O	A	O	H	30.5
F	F	B	J	J	J	O	E	O	Y	S	X	S	B	S	I	
G	G	C	L	L	L	S	F	S	P	A	Z	A	C	A	J	
H	H	D	M	M	M	A	G	A	T	B	K	B	D	B	L	
I	I	E	N	N	N	B	H	B	Q	C	R	C	E	C	M	
J	J	F	Q	Q	Q	C	I	C	S	D	Y	D	F	D	N	
L	L	G	U	U	U	D	J	D	A	E	P	E	G	E	Q	

Figure 14. Probable plaintext for third column (red).

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It was seen that the log sum frequency for the "H" row of Figure 13 is 29.4, and for the "E" row of Figure 14 is 30.5—certainly strong values, indicating that these rows were good candidates for being the correct plaintext letters. More importantly, when these three alphabets were lined up, no obvious impossible combinations were seen (Figure 15):

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
T	H	E					
T	H	E					
S	M	A					
C	F	I					
H	E	I					
A	T	I					
G	A	T					
A	N	D					
M	I	T					
D	E	R					
D	T	O					
N	O	W					
T	I	O					
S	L	A					
K	N	O					
T	T	H					

Figure 15. Probable plaintext for first three columns of Part II.

What I was looking for here were contradictions, that is, combinations of letters that would not be possible in English, such as "AAA" or a "Q" that was not followed by the mandatory "U," for instance. Much to my delight, there were no contradictions found, and there were even heartening signs showing I was definitely on the right track. The word "AND" appeared in row 8, and an indication of the suffix "-TION" started to peek out from row 13. Best of all, that "KNO" in the 15th row was an unexpected gift, because I knew the odds were extremely good that there must be a "W" following it. All I needed to do to find the next plaintext column was to write out the set of permutations for the fourth column of Figure 8, find the set that contained a "W" in the 15th position, and insert this column into Figure 15.

Now that I was looking for logical words, calculating the log sum frequencies was no longer necessary. I just had to pick out the one row in each set of permutations that best fit with the already selected columns of Figure 15. What a treat not to have to add up any more of those log frequencies! (I had done so many of these that, at one point, I had memorized all the letter frequencies and proudly showed off this "skill" to my very patient family, friends and co-workers.) Continuing on in this manner, finding

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the remaining letters for columns 5-8 was not difficult, and the final plaintext of Part II quickly fell into place (the message is read horizontally):

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
T	H	E	Y	U	S	E	D
T	H	E	E	A	R	T	H
S	M	A	G	N	E	T	I
C	F	I	E	L	D	X	T
H	E	I	N	F	O	R	M
A	T	I	O	N	W	A	S
G	A	T	H	E	R	E	D
A	N	D	T	R	A	N	S
M	I	T	T	E	D	U	N
D	E	R	G	R	U	U	N
D	T	O	A	N	U	N	K
N	O	W	N	L	O	C	A
T	I	O	N	X	D	O	E
S	L	A	N	G	L	E	Y
K	N	O	W	A	B	O	U
T	T	H	I	S	?		

Figure 16. Plaintext for all eight columns of Part II.

I noticed a few surprises. First, the letter "X" seemed to be serving as a punctuation mark in the fourth and 13th rows—probably a period. That could have confused the decryption if it had occurred in the first few columns, but luckily it didn't. Second, I saw that the first word was not "THE" after all, but "THEY." This was another bit of luck (or serendipity), because my initial assumption was wrong, but it still led to the right answer. Finally, I noticed that the spelling of "underground" in the 10th row was "incorrect." I was so disconcerted by this that I made one of my rare trips (only about my third) out to the Kryptos sculpture to doublecheck my copy. I actually put my hand out to feel the letter and confirm that I had it correct. But I hesitated to call it an error—it could also have been a purposeful effort by the code's authors to make deciphering more difficult or possibly to provide a clue for interpreting a deeper part of the solution.

The next thing I did was to look at Part III of the code to see if it was encoded in the same way as Part II. Surprisingly, I quickly found readable plaintext forming from Part III, showing that what I was calling Parts II and III were really a single portion of code with a single encryption scheme. Although I wasn't expecting this to be the case, it was a pleasant shock to get the remainder of the message with almost no additional work.

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When I tried to decode Part I using the same scheme, however, I found that it did not work. The first two lines of Part I were encrypted differently than the rest of the top section, so I had to start all over again, first computing the I.C.s under the assumption (which proved correct) that I was once more working with a Vigenere cipher for this part (Figure 17):




Figure 17. I.C. vs. number of alphabets for Part I.

Although the graph was cruder than for Part II because it was obtained from a fewer number of letters (note that some of the I.C.s seem to exceed the theoretical limit of 0.063), it was still obvious that a key length either 5 or 10 was being used. (These multiple high I.C. values were the result of the way the I.C.s were calculated. Because I.C. values are calculated by counting letter repetitions within a column, columns split up into multiples of the key length (5, 10, 15, and so forth) will show up as additional peaks at these values.) I tried both, but it was 10 that proved to crack this part. I performed the same analysis as just shown previously for Parts II and III, and the final decryption for the entire top half of the code is presented here (Figure 18):

BETWEEN SUBTLE SHADING AND THE ABSENCE OF LIGHT LIES THE NUANCE OF IQLUSION IT WAS TOTALLY INVISIBLE HOWS THAT POSSIBLE? THEY USED THE EARTHS MAGNETIC FIELD. THE INFORMATION WAS GATHERED AND TRANSMITTED UNDERGRUUND TO AN UNKNOWN LOCATION. DOES LANGLEY KNOW ABOUT THIS? THEY SHOULD ITS BURIED OUT THERE SOMEWHERE. WHO KNOWS ITS EXACT LOCATION? ONLY WW. THIS WAS HIS LAST MESSAGE. THIRTY EIGHT DEGREES FIFTY SEVEN MINUTES SIX POINT FIVE SECONDS NORTH SEVENTY SEVEN DEGREES EIGHT MINUTES FORTY FOUR SECONDS WEST ID BY ROWS.

Figure 18. Completed plaintext for top section of Kryptos code.

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Deciphering the Bottom Section

Of course, all the time that I was working away at the top section of the Kryptos code, I would take occasional breaks to look at the bottom section. I saw almost immediately that this section, like the top, was made up of different parts. From the frequency by row charts (Figure 3, for example), there was a strong hint that the last three lines or so were encoded with a different scheme. So I decided to divide the bottom section into two parts at the question mark, and called them Parts IV and V.




Figure 19. Encoded bottom section of Kryptos code.

Starting with Part IV, the first thing I did was call out my old friend, the frequency count:




Figure 20. Frequency count for Part IV.

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Comparing this chart to Figure 5, it was obvious that the letters in Part IV were occurring with the same frequency as they occur in normal English. This implied that this part of the code must be encoded with a transposition code (see Box A). Interesting. The Kryptos code (so far) seemed to be encoded with the two fundamental types of codes—the substitution and the transposition.

Because Part IV was almost certainly a transposition code, I knew that all 336 letters were already in plaintext, but I needed to determine their correct ordering. At first, it seemed like an impossible task, with a tremendously large number of possibilities. After reading up on the subject, however, I soon realized that there were standard ways to encrypt a transposition code, just as there were for the substitution codes. And I had a hunch that the code's authors may have used one of the most fundamental types of encryption.




Figure 21. Example of a basic transposition code.

In a basic columnar substitution code, the plaintext message usually is first written out vertically in matrix form, with a certain number of columns and rows; it may or may not be a square matrix (see Figure 21). The columns are then mixed around, and the new ciphertext is read horizontally from the rows. To decipher the message, the reverse procedure has to be carried out.

Defining the Problem

To read the Kryptos transpositional message, then, the first thing that I needed to do was to determine the basic structure of the array; that is, ascertain into how many columns and rows the 336 letters were divided. For example, one solution might be to try 18 columns by 36 rows, because 18 times 36 equals 336. Another solution could be 56 columns by six rows. But the array does not need to be completely filled in; it could be, for example, a 17 x 20 grid, but with only 13 letters in the final row. So how would I know the right choice?

The big breakthrough took place when I realized that there were really only a finite number of possible solutions. I thought about the problem this way: suppose I constructed a simpler transposition message of, say, only 29 characters. (I arbitrarily chose 29 characters only as an illustration.) By investigating a much smaller message, I could concentrate on the mechanics of the code rather than be overwhelmed by

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the large number of characters involved. Further, because I had constructed this problem myself and therefore knew the answer, it would be possible to see the methodology required to solve it by working the problem backwards.

I imagined how things would look if I only had the ciphertext, without any clues on how to solve it (Figure 22). I would first need to figure out how many rows and columns there should be, decide how to break up the original message into "pieces" (columns) of a certain length (call this length "B"), and then figure out how many letters should be in each piece. Once this was known, I would have to assemble the columns into the correct order before I could read the plaintext.




Figure 22. Deciphering a simple transposition code with array not completely filled in.

Looking at Figure 22, it is apparent that, when the array is not completely filled in, there can only be pieces of length B or B-1, because the shorter pieces will always be just one letter shorter than the longer ones needed to fill in the array. Gradually, I realized that the mathematical relation should be as follows:

$$(B-1)x + By = 29,$$

or $$y=(29-Bx+x)/B$$

where x is the number of pieces of length B-1, and y is the number of pieces of length B. Because x and y have to be integers, (pieces cannot consist of fractions of a letter), the condition that there are only a

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finite number of solutions is forced. So, for a given B, only certain y values are possible for each x. For example, if B=5:

x	*y*
0	5.80
1	**5.00**
2	4.20
3	3.40
4	2.60
5	1.80
6	**1.00**
7	0.20
.	.
.	.
.	.

Because values of x greater than 7 will always yield y values that are less than 1.0 (and therefore not positive integers), in this example there are only two possible choices for x: 1 and 6.

I was ready to try my model on the actual Kryptos code. Substituting the number of characters in Part IV into the previous equation, I obtained the formula:

$$y=(336-Bx+x)/B$$

I could then determine how many pieces of length B were possible to fit into the 336 characters inscribed on this part of the sculpture. I had noted that Part IV began with the word "END." This could be only a coincidence, but I wondered if it could be a hint by the code's author that maybe this word represented the final column in the grid. If true, this would imply either a grid made up mostly of columns of length 3 and 4 (that is, B=4), or else a grid made up all of column length 3 (B=3). The process of discovery is often intuitive as well as analytic, and, from working with the code for so long, I had gradually developed the strong feeling that the matrix seemed to consist of only a few long rows. My feelings were based on the realization that once the columns were finally assembled, they would need to be reordered into columns to make horizontal words. When I tried possible solutions using long columns, I found so many contradictions that I was forced to conclude that the columns could not be very long.

Finding the Columns

After many months of trying different ideas, based on the previous arguments, I finally decided to try B=4 as a working hypothesis. But I still needed to know how many words of length 4 and how many of length 3 there were. From symmetry, I had the feeling that the final three letters in Part IV represented a three-letter word, because I had hypothesized that the first three letters did. From the previous formula, I knew that there were only certain solutions that were allowable (x=0, y=84), (x=4, y=81), (x=8, y=78)...all the way up to (x=112, y=0). That is still 28 different solutions to check, but fortunately I tried them in order so that the correct choice of (x=8, y=78) was the third one that I considered:

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```
Y O S O E I H A N U L H S X T G H R L L P C N E
A H R C O D N C R L L S M M P A N P N E I A D E
H N H P I Y A H E D S N R N R T R E N B I E I N
R L E T B S I T Y S L O W I N I A S E L A W T R

A E D N O O D E E Q N Y I R M W T T E B F T U T
H N R H E L T N I H C C F S N E A E E T O U A O
C E E A T S I H O E T R T P H N M G R E A E E A
T U T E F E W A Y E A E B A E A A Y L E S T O R

M R T E I T T I I E C H E I O S Y R K G A N M F
A T I D A T E E E B T I I T E D D I L T R E G E
E N B D A M W R W A D L H E A D L T M D D O F U
E R S N H S P O F E D C S G O R O R L H P H M H

E M F E S R
E R E H S T E L M T F A E O
C I I N T V N N T E I G H H
D P M L T D D O W Y O H A W
```

Figure 23. Correct (but unordered) column arrangement for Part IV.

Re-ordering the Columns

I then needed to arrange the columns back into the correct order. (By the way, I should mention, if it is not already obvious, that I am presenting these steps in a certain order only for clarity. In reality, they were performed haphazardly, and I would often jump back and forth as new ideas came to me.) For this purpose, I reached into my cryptographer's bag of tricks one last time and used something called a "digraphic frequency table." This chart depicts how often, on the average, any two alphabetic letters occur next to each other. For the first two columns in Figure 23, for example, the combination "YO" occurs 0.64 times per 1,000 letter pairs, "AH" occurs 0.13 times, and so on. By summing up these frequencies for each pair of columns, I was able to calculate which columns were most likely to occur next to each other and fit them back together like a jigsaw puzzle. The final solution is presented in Figures 24 and 25.

```
F L I C K E R B U T P R E S E N T L Y D E T A I
O L E A L I T T L E I I N S E R T E D T H E C A
A S R E M O V E D W I T H T R E M B L I N G H A
S L O W L Y D E S P A R A T L Y S L O W L Y T H

L S O F T H E R O O M W I T H I N E M E R G E D
N D L E A N D P E E R E D I N T H E H O T A I R
N D S I M A D E A T I N Y B R E A C H I N T H E
E R E M A I N S O F P A S S A G E D E B R I S T

F R O M T H E M I S T X C A N Y O U S E E A N Y
E S C A P I N G F R O M T H E C H A M B E R C A
U P P E R L E F T H A N D C O R N E R A N D T H
H A T E N C U M B E R E D T H E L O W E R P A R

T H I N G Q
U S E D T H E F L A M E T O
E N W I D E N I N G T H E H
T O F T H E D O O R W A Y W
```

Figure 24. Ordered columns for Part IV.

SLOWLY DESPARATLY SLOWLY THE REMAINS OF PASSAGE DEBRIS THAT ENCUMBERED THE LOWER PART OF THE DOORWAY WAS REMOVED WITH TREMBLING HANDS I MADE A TINY BREACH IN THE UPPER LEFT HAND CORNER AND THEN WIDENING THE HOLE A LITTLE I INSERTED THE CANDLE AND PEERED IN THE HOT AIR ESCAPING FROM THE CHAMBER CAUSED THE FLAME TO FLICKER BUT PRESENTLY DETAILS OF THE ROOM WITHIN EMERGED FROM THE MIST. CAN YOU SEE ANYTHINGQ?

Figure 25. Correctly ordered text for Part IV.

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The text appears to be a quote from a book by Howard Carter on the opening of King Tut's tomb. Note the troublesome "Q" at the end—I tripped over this more times than I can remember. When I first looked at this part of the code, I thought I could use the "Q" to help me solve the message, because I believed it would absolutely have to be followed by a "U." But this turned out to be a false lead (one of many).

Wrapping Things Up

Even though it was not necessary to determine the keywords used in the substitution code in order to read Parts I, II and III, I was curious to find out what they were. It was easy enough at this point: find the plaintext letters in the top row of the Vigenere Tableau in Figure 1, follow those columns down until the ciphertext letter is found, and then read off the first letters of those rows for the keyword letters. (Because the Kryptos cipher actually uses a modified version of the Vigenere code, the alphabets down the left-hand side and along the top of Figure 1 first have to be removed for this to work properly.) It turned out that the eight-letter keyword for the first two lines of Part I was "ABSCISSA," and the 10-letter keyword for Parts II and III was "PALIMPSEST." I knew what an abscissa was, but this other word was not familiar to me. I looked it up and found that it was "A written document...that has been written upon several times, often with remnants of earlier...writing still visible." Very interesting. Is the cipher trying to tell us that the Kryptos sculpture contains multiple layers of code—written one on top of the other?

I went back to the I.C. calculations for Part I and found a surprise when they were extended out to 16 alphabets:




Figure 26. I.C. vs. number of alphabets for Part I, extended to 16 alphabets.

I knew that the peak at m=10 was caused by the 10-letter keyword, and the peaks at 5 and 15 are expected artifacts of the keyword (at one-half and one-and-a-half times the keyword length, respectively). But what was this peak at m=13? Whatever it was, it also showed up in the I.C. plot for Part II (Figure 7). Could this be a sign of another code overlaid on top of the others—possibly one using a keyword of 13 letters? Or just a coincidence?

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(b)(6)

And what about Part V of the puzzle? I haven't spent much time on this portion [redacted] but there are interesting patterns in here as well. Although this part is no doubt more difficult than the previous pieces, I am confident that it is not impossible. I doubt that the code's authors would get much pleasure out of writing an unbreakable code.

Final Thoughts

I hope I have inspired some people to study the Kryptos puzzle and to give it a try. Even the parts of the code that already have been decrypted still have to be interpreted for their deeper meaning. There are many pieces to be put together and many layers to be peeled away.

Nothing is more frustrating than reading a cryptography book where the author easily and in a straightforward manner shows how a code was solved. It is a little like reading one of those books on "How I made a million dollars." The methods typically work for that particular set of circumstances, but they often do not work in your particular case. Similarly, codes have distinct characteristics that frequently require each to be solved with a unique method. Because I did not see any need to dwell on the hundreds of things I had tried that didn't work, the methodologies I presented may seem a little too straightforward and deceptively easy. As the adage goes, "If at first you don't succeed"—and in cryptology you never do—"try, try again." If the methods that I tried had not worked, I would have tried others until I found something that did.

I genuinely enjoyed working on the Kryptos ciphers. Professional cryptographers almost certainly could have broken these codes much faster, and would have used superior methods. But I doubt that they would have derived as much satisfaction as I have. I didn't use any computers to decrypt the Kryptos codes—just pencil and paper, some common sense, and a lot of perseverance. Using a computer would have cheated me out of the feeling of accomplishment that I obtained, because I've found that often in life the journey itself can be more gratifying than arriving at the final destination. Mountains are not climbed nor marathons run merely to reach a geographical location—there are much easier ways to accomplish these feats—but as personal and spiritual challenges to the participants.

When confronted with a puzzle or problem, we sometimes can lose sight of the fact that we have issued a challenge to ourselves—not to our tools. And before we automatically reach for our computers, we sometimes need to remember that we already possess the most essential and powerful problem-solving tool within our own minds.

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Facts, Findings, Forecasts, and Fortune-telling

Jack Davis

"The needs of policymakers—especially what hands-on officials seek in support of their daily management of issues—has to be a central concern of intelligence makers."

In the post–Cold War era of declining resources for intelligence and increasing criticism of analytic performance, definition of the professional mission of CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) has become an important task for leaders and well-wishers alike. An agreed and realistic definition would boost morale and productivity by helping to determine how to select, train, deploy, and reward analysts and their managers. Clarification of mission would also provide guidance on what to do more of and less of; in effect, on how analysts and their managers should invest the Nth hour of a busy day.

Mission definition, to cite a former Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI), is by its nature a "difficult and somewhat metaphysical" task.[1] I write in part to encourage readers of *Studies in Intelligence* to join in the quest for a satisfactory characterization of the role of intelligence analysis.

The mission statement I offer, warts and all, is intended to meet three overlapping standards: provide key policy officials with distinctive professional support they will choose to rely on; promote the national interest by contributing to sound policymaking; ensure appropriate funding from Congress:

> *Intelligence analysis is the process of providing objective and effective support to help US policymakers, by means of information and assessments on events overseas, to carry out their mission of formulating and implementing national security policy.*

Under the requirements of this definition, a DI analyst's work has to provide values that are taken seriously by policymakers as well as exhibit rigorous treatment of evidence, inference, and judgment. The national interest is not well served by an unimpeachably objective assessment that key officials judge to add little value to their policymaking processes.

The needs of policymakers—especially what hands-on officials seek in support of their daily management of issues—has to be a central concern of intelligence makers. This is no trivial point. Former policy officials are quick to say on the record that they did not read some of the products the Agency sent to help them because they saw no loss in not knowing what was in them.[2]

At the same time, the national interest is not well served by an assessment much admired by policy officials that does not meet the standards of sound analytic tradecraft. Carefully weighed evidence and rigorously structured argumentation has to form the core of the analysts' papers and briefings, not their opinions or those of policy officials. This point too is made by former policy officials, both on and off the record.[3]

Analysts and managers who participated in the dozen runnings of the "Workshop on Reaching Policymakers" conducted during 1993-94 raised two thoughtful challenges to

Jack Davis served in the Directorate of Intelligence.

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this definition of the DI mission as elaborated in their reading books and in class exercises:[4]

- First, that the emphasis on close support of policy officials encourages politicization of analysis.
- Second, that constraints on analysts' opinions also debase the intelligence mission.

Politicization

Effective analysis requires the analyst to intrude into the policymaking process—to organize the available information and assumptions on contentious issues and to assist in implementing goals, including long-shot policy objectives. Analysts have to treat the most important policymakers working their accounts as "clients" in need of such professional services. Or, to use the former DDI's sports analogy, as *football coaches* in need of the specialized assistance that only *scouts* working on their behalf can provide.[5]

Why? Because policymaking is the only national security game in town. Intelligence analysts have to work through policymakers to contribute to the national interest (and, on a more pedestrian level, to earn their pay).

That said, can intelligence professionals provide close analytic support on difficult and debatable policy issues (Cuba, Caucasus, China) without opening themselves up to charges of politicization?

I know of no generally accepted definition of *politicization,* although it is usually meant to imply the breach of professionalism on the part of intelligence analysts and managers. Politicization cannot reasonably be defined to mean providing support to the policymaking process, because that is why intelligence analysis exists in the first place. At least, under my definition of mission, it cannot mean *effective* support—that is, sought-after and useful information and insight that gets at the policymakers' operational concerns about avoiding dangers and seizing opportunities.

Also, a meaningful definition of politicization should take account of the reality that the mixing of policymaking with personal, bureaucratic, and partisan politics is as American as apple pie. More than one former policymaker has observed that senior officials spend at least as much time trying to leverage their US counterparts in Washington as they do working directly against their problems overseas.

If effective relations between intelligence and policy professionals require the former to provide close support to the daily business of the latter, any mission statement that seals off intelligence analysis from politics seals it off from a significant (that is, fundable) role in the policymaking process.

That said and accepted, politicization as a debasement of professionalism cannot refer to intelligence assessments that seek to structure the substantive debates of competing policy officials by addressing contentious factors that could influence the outcome of their policy deliberations. Nor can it mean providing professional analytic support to the politically tinged action agendas that can emerge from the process. If the President wants to defy what the analysts see as the ground truth in country X, analysts are professionally obligated both to point out the long odds and to provide judgments and insights to shorten those odds.

Politicization, then, should be defined as something much different from close professional support to policymakers and policymaking. I define it as:

> *The distortion of analysis by setting aside or otherwise failing to meet the standards of objectivity in setting forth information and judgments—in order to support a world view or policy preference.*

Debasement of professional norms has happened in the past when analysts and their managers have given into bullying from a policy official or have deliberately distorted the analytic process at their own initiative. Politicization also takes place when analysts and managers, with or without awareness, let their own policy biases skew the marshaling of evidence and judgments.

The analytic profession needs to erect strong institutional guards against politicization; whatever its roots, it erodes confidence in the integrity of analysis, at times on the part of colleague analysts, at times on the part of policy officials. I contend that *objectivity* as I have defined it—a professional ethic that celebrates tough-mindedness and clarity in applying rules of evidence, inference, and judgment—is the only realistic safeguard.

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Here, *realistic* means a practice that works without turning off the policymaker as client and thus, over time, Congressional funding as well. Trying to guard integrity by distancing the analyst from policymaking will not do.

Two additional observations on taking an experience-based measure of the danger of politicization. First, policymakers want to succeed. And most have learned that faulty premises, while they can at times turn policy debates, undercut the prospects for policy success. As one former ranking official explained his own strong commitment to objectivity:

> *Policymakers are like surgeons. They don't last long if they ignore what they see when they cut an issue open.*[6]

Finally, close professional ties between analysts and policymakers usually promote frankness, mutual respect, and even mutual dependence. In my experience, these in turn promote analysis to help understand and deal with tough problems, not analysis to please.

The Analytic Food Chain

A question asked these days by DI analysts, in hallways as well as classrooms, is whether intelligence professionals are still entitled to an opinion. Based on the proposed mission definition, the answer has to be *no.* The authority to interpret today's events and predict tomorrow's developments in DI papers and briefings has to be earned, first by hard work in amassing and arraying the available evidence, and then by constructing and clarifying the

"What these hands-on policy officials want most from intelligence professionals is solid information and sound argumentation for reaching *their own* bottom-line conclusions"

argumentation, behind all judgments. Sound tradecraft works equally well as protection against politicization and as the basis for more reliable analysis generally.

I endorse the efforts by DI leaders to place greater emphasis in papers and briefings on careful consideration of evidence and on judgments anchored in research expertise and sound reasoning. Survival of the DI as an independent cadre of analysts depends in good measure on its commitment to use rigorous analytic tradecraft to distinguish its work on behalf of policymakers from that of journalists, policy advocates, and other wordsmiths working the national security field.[7]

This in turn requires pushing DI assessments down what I call the *analytic food chain:* From fortune-telling to forecasts, and ultimately to facts and findings. Here, I use the following definitions:

Facts: verified information related to an intelligence issue (for example, events, measured characteristics).

Findings: expert knowledge based on organized information that indicates, for example, what is increasing, decreasing, changing, taking on a pattern.

Forecasts: judgments (interpretations, predictions) based on facts and findings and defended by sound and clear argumentation.

Fortune-telling: inadequately explained and defended judgments.

The DI effort represents in part an adjustment to internal and external criticism of the quality of analysis. The managers professionally responsible for all issuances from the Directorate and the constituent offices want analysts to be more explicit about what they know and how they know it, as well as what they do not know that could affect the issue being addressed. One goal is to reduce avoidable error by relying more on evidence and logic and less on rhetoric and authority. As the former DDI put his bid for adding greater rigor, and thus greater modesty, to analysts' judgments, "We are not in the prophesy business."

More significantly, the DI's increased emphasis on facts and findings is a response to signals from hands-on policymakers that the analysts' in-depth knowledge helps them get through daily rounds of making decisions and taking actions. As a rule, they find that insights from what is known provide more *added value* than predictions about what is unknown, even unknowable. Why? Departmental assistant secretaries, NSC staff directors, and like policy officials see themselves as the *analysts of last resort*—the assessors who make the judgments for the President and other bosses on what is going on in country X and what lies ahead on issue Y. What these hands-on policy officials want most from intelligence professionals is solid information and sound argumentation for reaching *their own* bottom-line conclusions.[8]

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In this sense, the role of intelligence analysis is to *reduce uncertainty for policy officials.* On many issues—what next for the Russian economy, for Cuban politics, for South Africa's military, for Iranian S&T—neither intelligence nor policy professionals can eliminate uncertainty. The latter, though, would prefer to be as well informed as possible before trying to seize opportunities and ward off dangers.

How best does the intelligence analyst reduce uncertainty for key policymakers? To use the scout–coach analogy, not by predicting the score before the game is played, but by providing specialized information and insights that help the policy official in making the best game plan. And, during the game or implementation phase of policy, the analyst sits in the stands with a powerful pair of binoculars and a book full of findings on the opponent's strengths and weaknesses to provide help in calling individual plays.

Policy officials are explicit and nearly unanimous here. The reason they prefer customized assessments (for example, timely and actionable memorandums) to broadcast publications (for example, feature articles in the *National Intelligence Daily* (NID)) is that they want to be helped up their individual learning curves. A former official attested that at one time he had been spending 60 plus hours a week on an important negotiation. He was insulted when the Agency sent him a NID feature telling the "story" of the week's events:

> *I am the story. Please tell me what you know that I don't know.*[9]

Similarly, the main reason many policy officials prefer oral briefings to written products is because they welcome the opportunity to "cross-examine" the analyst, probing for what he or she knows that could be helpful in making decisions amidst inevitable uncertainty.

Facts

Based on the casual sample of DI papers I have read over the last year or so, I see a decided increase in evidence-based analysis targeted for small numbers of hands-on policy officials. But analysts, and some managers, still complain that presenting factual materials is some kind of sub-analytic pursuit—and a disruption of their "real work."

I would argue that weighing evidence to determine what is known about a complex affair is a central *analytic* responsibility. An analyst can never be too well versed in the rules of evidence. What standard of proof is needed to determine what a foreign leader said? What he meant? What he fears and hopes? What he plans to do next?

Again, knowing and applying rules of evidence is no trivial matter, if analysts expect policy officials to rely on intelligence reports in making decisions on whether, when, and how to take action. Some veteran analysts, myself included, are willing to admit that at times they placed credence in highly classified information that turned out to be either third-hand speculation or an attempt at deception.

Findings

I believe that research findings or organized information on subjects of importance to policymakers will over time become the analysts' most important and appreciated contribution to the policymaking process.

Communication technology is eroding the analyst's advantage in being first to know what happened yesterday. The policymakers' preference to make their own bottom-line call on the important issues on their agenda is eroding the analyst's advantage in being the first to predict what will happen tomorrow. These trends increase the relative importance of having organized information at the ready to inform both the analysts' interpretations and predictions and those of policy officials.

The challenge to the DI here is to provide the same resources and recognition to research that leads to a powerful database—say for analyzing the political strength of contending forces in important countries—that once were given to published research papers. By powerful I mean solidly grounded, up to date, ready to go to the support of a memo or briefing, and set up to be used by the next tenant of the substantive account. With accelerating changes in policy agenda and analyst assignments and increased reliance on "analytic teams," corporate and not individual findings will count most.

Anchoring Judgments

By definition, analytic judgments are inherently subject to error. Analysts interpret, explain, and predict on

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matters they do not or cannot know with full confidence. There is, then, no such thing as safe estimating. The peril of unintended consequences can be reduced, however, by anchoring estimative judgments via tradecraft that takes account of findings and warrants sound argumentation and precise communication of conclusion, reasoning, risk, and alternatives. Under my classification of analysis, these processes define a forecast.

The distinction between forecasting and fortune-telling is not that the first always provides a correct and the second an incorrect answer. The difference is that policy readers can see that forecasts are secured by findings and rigorous and transparent argumentation. Fortune-telling comes across to the reader as unanchored judgments. Perhaps the analyst possesses ample data and has reasoned carefully. But the reader cannot know that this is the case, and that the analyst has not relied instead on incomplete evidence, speculation, and bias. One veteran policy official refers to inadequately explained judgments as "the tablets handed down by the intelligence priesthood."[10]

Linchpin analysis is one way of showing managers and policy officials alike that all the bases have been touched. Linchpin analysis, a colorful term for structured forecasting, is an anchoring tool that seeks to reduce the hazard of self-inflicted error as well as policymaker misinterpretation. At a minimum, linchpin tradecraft induces rigor through a series of *predrafting checkpoints,* outlined below. Analysts can also use it to organize and evaluate their texts when addressing issues of high uncertainty. Reviewing managers can use linchpin standards to assure that the argument in such assessments is sound and clear:

- First, analysts identify the main uncertain factors or key variables they judge likely to drive the outcome of the issue. This forces systematic attention to the range of and relationships among factors at play.

- Second, analysts determine the *linchpin premises* or working assumptions about the drivers. This encourages testing of the key subordinate judgments that hold the estimative conclusion together.

- Third, because the premises that warrant the bottom-line conclusion are subject to debate as well as error, analysts marshal findings and reasoning in defense of the linchpins.

- Finally, because of the US stake in the outcome, analysts address the circumstances under which unexpected developments could occur. What *indicators* or patterns of development could emerge to signal that the linchpins were unreliable? And *what triggers* or dramatic internal and external events could reverse the expected momentum?

Linchpin tradecraft, again, is a tool to incorporate rigor into analysis of matters of considerable uncertainty. It is not an end in itself. Every analytic assignment represents distinct challenges regarding subject and audience and thus distinct challenges regarding how to explicate the judgments. Experienced analysts can achieve the same analytical insurance provided by linchpin tradecraft via a variety of anchoring practices.

That said, the institutional standard should be fixed: *When a DI paper or briefing makes estimative judgments on issues of importance to US national security interests, policy readers are provided with precise and powerful backup argumentation.*

But what if—as has happened—a policymaker at a briefing session wants the analyst to *hold the analysis and just make a call?* Policy officials vary at least as much as analysts, and at times some will ask for a bottom line laid bare.

Even here, I recommend the analyst substitute an *If, Then Projection* for a prediction. Explain what is driving the situation and the related linchpin premises. Make clear the call is based on these staying on track. Cause-and effect analysis will take an extra minute. But the requester will know he or she is dealing with a DI analyst.

The NID may be the toughest nut to crack, because most articles do not lend adequate space for argumentation. At least to me, this makes the case that analyst commentary should avoid prediction and rely instead on findings (especially what is seen as new and different in the reported events). Here, too, when a need to address future developments is deemed unavoidable, projections should be substituted for predictions.

There is a difference, for example, between predicting the success or failure of a military offensive, a political scheme, or an economic initiative and pointing to the precedents and patterns that will influence the

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outcome. Anchoring judgments to findings can often be executed economically, in terms of the space required to meet the standard of sound and distinctive analytic tradecraft.

NOTES

1. Douglas J. MacEachin. *The Tradecraft of Analysis: Challenge and Change in the CIA; 1994; p. 3.*
2. See, for example, Jack Davis, "A Policymaker's Perspective on Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence*, summer 1994, which cites Ambassador Robert Blackwill, former NSC Staff Senior Director.
3. Paul D. Wolfowitz, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Interview with the author, 13 December 1994.
4. The "Workshops on Reaching Policymakers through Opportunity Analysis" were taught jointly with L. Keith Gardiner.
5. Douglas MacEachin at the Meeting of the Working Group on Intelligence Reform, Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 7 February 1994.
6. A former policy official at the meeting cited above.
7. MacEachin, *Tradecraft of Analysis.*
8. Herman J. Cohen, former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. Interview with the author, 20 August 1994.
9. A former policy official at a meeting sponsored jointly by CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence and the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, March 1993.
10. Wolfowitz interview, 13 December 1994.

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

William Newton

When it began more than 20 years ago, the very existence of *The President's Daily Brief*, let alone its contents, was a carefully guarded secret. Then word gradually seeped through the Office of Current Intelligence that OCI was preparing something special for President Kennedy every day, intelligence tailored to his tastes and needs, a product designed and written for him personally. Several senior OCI analysts were obviously up to something. Ordinarily friendly, gregarious types, they had suddenly become recluses. (By this behavior they drew more attention to themselves than if they had marched around toting placards with their job descriptions printed thereon.) This was a strange sort of bait to dangle in front of intelligence officers, and frankly it posed a sort of dare to the rest of us. We were supposed to know—and up to a point did know—what Khrushchev and Nasser and Mao were doing, but what about these fellows in our very midst?

Little by precious little we found out. The first discovery—in the later stages of a cocktail party, where many things come to light in Washington—was that they were working on the "Dingbat." Since it was not at all clear whether this was some newly discovered occupational disease that might wipe us all out or a code name for a new rating system, our appetite for discovery was whetted all the more. Before long we became aware of tell-tale schedule changes in the Print Shop, noted that one of our best typists was keeping weird hours, and heard that analysts were being besieged with insistent questions at unusual times of the day and night. From all this we deduced that some sort of new publication was afoot. Next, some analyst who always came in late (there were quite a few of these) noticed that one or another of our mystery colleagues, clutching a briefcase, was driven away from the front entrance in an official car at ten minutes to nine every morning. The clues kept thrusting themselves upon us until it was finally announced (ever so cryptically) in staff meeting that OCI was indeed putting out some "very special" intelligence assessments. The next week it was revealed that these were "for the President only." Months later our Division Chief, still wide-eyed, came back from the staff meeting and announced that the Office Director had mesmerized the assemblage by holding up a copy of the "Dingbat"—in a "now you see it, now you don't" performance. In another month or two a garbled description of the publication surfaced in the *New York Times*.

This episode illustrates how nearly impossible it is to keep a secret even in CIA, not to mention other branches of the government. Inevitably other people had to be involved, unless the mystery squad members were going to do their own typing, run the presses, and drive their own cars to the White House.

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Initiation to the PICKL

With only a sketchy idea of what I was getting into, I showed up one late spring day in 1963 to be initiated into the trio of "Picklers," those chosen to produce the PICKL (*The President's Intelligence Check List*). I would fill in for regulars who were taking summer vacations. Naturally the working room, a small one in the Front Office suite, was known as the "Pickle Barrel." It wasn't particularly inaccessible, and there were no forbidding locks on the door, but casual visitors and *voyeurs* were quickly made to feel uncomfortable. As usual the "snapping in" for this job consisted of looking over the shoulders of the regulars to see what they did and why, and reading several weeks' worth of back issues. There's nothing better than this sort of on-the-job training.

Even I, a slow learner, soon understood the routine. The three men rotate assignments and you are "it"—that is, the writer—every third day, if things go "normally," a word almost without meaning in Washington. You are simply in the way if you show up before ten o'clock, since everyone is still recovering from the effort of getting out the booklet that was delivered to the White House at nine. Even so, when you do appear, there is a pile of paper on your desk. Your "reader" has been scanning the incoming paper since eight-thirty, and has not forgotten you. You are supposed to work until around ten in the evening, with time out for what passes for dinner in the cafeteria, and go home for a nap. Then you must be up, bright-eyed, at three in the morning and come back to finish up the book. All the items—usually six or eight—are to be typed and arranged for the Front Office reviewer, who will wander in about six to curse, praise, damn, or laud—but almost certainly to change—most of them. Somehow they'll get retyped (by an unflappable secretary ungallantly referred to as "the Blonde Blizzard"), then run off and assembled into booklets in the Print Shop and delivered to you barely in time for a mad dash down the Parkway (if one can "dash" down a congested Parkway) to the White House and the West basement office of Bromley Smith, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. General Clifton, the President's military aide who will actually hand the booklet to Mr. Kennedy, will also be there, along with some representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency bearing a sheaf of their own jewels. Everyone will discuss the items, General Clifton sometimes asking questions to be sure he can in turn answer the President's. When you get back to the office, you must write a brief memorandum about how the pieces were received at this meeting. Then you have the rest of that day off. But please stumble in at eight-thirty the next morning to do the scanning. As all this was explained, it sounded simple enough. When finally I tried it on my own, it wasn't simple at all. The battle to get the book out made for an active and interesting summer.

It soon became obvious that the original offer—"help out by writing three or four booklets"—was subject to drastic revision: I remained in the regular rotation until early October. A couple of years later I was asked to do a regular tour with the group that was then writing the *Daily Brief* for President Johnson. In trying to "tune in" on two different Presidents and produce booklets that each would find interesting enough to read and informative enough to serve his particular needs, I found challenges and rewards.

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Contrasting Schedules

Not the least of the challenges was getting used to the hours—which seemed to change about the time you had really settled in. The Kennedy summer was the easiest. You had plenty of time in which to get the pieces ready, and the advantage of the after dinner solitude. The telephone seldom rang, and not too many people came dashing in with some sort of rubbish that would make a "marvelous" piece. I made one hard and fast rule for myself—have two items finished before supper. If you got those two items done, you could keep up. Then about nine o'clock you get tangled up in a different piece. There are soon wads of crumpled paper, relics of one abortive attempt after another to find the handle. Your nerves are frayed, and the after effects of that barely warm chicken cacciatore are becoming more insistent. Why not wait 'till morning? This is the kiss of death. It will be no easier then, and it will be just your luck to have three late items facing you when you return. I found this out the hard way one night when I put a troublesome piece aside at quarter to eight to go see my son play football for his high school. I staggered back at three in the morning to find the item still troublesome, major changes necessary in two others, and material for a complicated new one that the Senior Duty Officer had dumped on my desk at what was probably the end of the third quarter. Never again!

In the Johnson days, we generally left to deliver the booklet to the White House about five-thirty or six in the afternoon. This meant a shorter time in which to do the job, even if you started at nine-thirty. (It also meant that most of the traffic on the Parkway was going in the other direction.) The trouble here was that when "one of those days" came along, you sat there pen in hand but with nothing happening as the afternoon wore on, your miserable little pile of pieces getting no larger.

Then one morning the White House made a "suggestion." Suppose the booklet were delivered at seven in the morning rather than in the evening. The chances would be better that it would contain intelligence the President had not already seen. Also, it might be easier to corner him long enough to get him to read it then and there. The President, we were told, "wondered" if this could be done. He didn't "wonder" very long. The next edition arrived at seven the following morning. This stripping of the gears may sound like a big order, but it really wasn't. There was simply a low-key meeting of all concerned—our team of readers and writers; someone who could speak for the Print Shop and the couriers; the Chief of the Watch Office; and of course the Front Office, for if someone from there was to review what we wrote in the wee hours (and that had to get to the Print Shop not an instant later than six in the morning) he had to be on hand early. This all got talked out and arranged in twenty minutes, and by ten-thirty that morning we were on the new schedule.

Writer's Routine

The writer would now appear about ten in the morning, and get drafts completed by about six. This gave all the regular reviewers—including Mr. Helms, whom we affectionately referred to as "The Great Editor in the

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Sky"—a chance to see and mark up most of the book before they left. The writer was to return at one o'clock next morning and (quite probably) start over again if things were really popping, or produce entirely new items. (This was supposed to be one of the advantages of the early morning delivery.) But the Front Office excused itself from participating at 0500. Instead, it delegated the honor of reviewing the book to senior OCI officers, Division Chiefs and the like, whom the writer was to call when he was about to have the book ready. This arrangement created some stirring scenes. The writer then had to hang around until seven, so that he could phone over any vital last-minute changes.

I liked the new routine, most of the time. Coming back in at one o'clock could be a little short of ideal on bitter nights when snow drifts or blizzards clogged the Parkway. It was better on moonlit summer nights. Fortunately, our two children were old enough not to make pests of themselves over this schedule, my wife could cope with anything, and our house was arranged so that one could sleep in the master bedroom even when a near riot was in full swing in the family room. I'd be up and dressed by midnight, ready to eat. No one could figure out what to call this collation, so it became known as "my meal." (My wife never complained about slinging up four meals every fourth day.) The part of this schedule that I remember most fondly were the days off. After the writing stint I'd sleep till noon and wake up feeling very foggy. In an hour, I'd get with it again and be fancy free for the rest of that day and all of the next one. Every four weeks you got a "long weekend"—that is, you finished writing on Friday morning and then they let you alone until Tuesday morning. The free time, especially on weekdays, was marvelous. You could buy a pane of glass or a new mailbox at the hardware store without fighting hordes of Saturday do-it-yourself nuts. You could work all day on a mountain for your model train layout or ransack hobby shops for that rare Central of Georgia hopper car, or slip down to the Potomac Yards to watch the freight trains being made up. You could go out to watch the Redskinettes practice their routines. When our basset presented us with nine pups, I was home to struggle with most of the feedings after the unregenerate mother lost interest in the project. That seven-thirty meal, after I had just set the President right on the world's trouble spots, was generally quite a happening. The nine balls of fur would pour out from their pen three deep and fall into the bowls of pablum. It was a hilarious way to unwind after a taxing night.

Task of the Scanner

In the usual sequence of things, before you got to be the writer you spent a day as the scanner. You arrive at eight-thirty, to be confronted with a basketful of paper, no matter whether in the Kennedy or Johnson days. No President, no Emperor, no revolution, no earthquake could stop the stuff. Piles of it descend on you all during the day, until you feel that if you were to doze for an instant the flow might well engulf you. In moments of near despair, you suspect that Egyptian intelligence must have invented paper as a "dirty trick" to bring this country to its knees. It appears as though you are the unfortunate recipient of anything and everything that has what looks like words on it:

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So, assuming that your eyes don't give out or that your ability to discriminate is not numbed into uselessness, you scan through these piles of variously colored paper and pass on the "important" things to the writer. But there is a catch here. Above and beyond the perfectly obvious winners (Vietnam, major developments in the Soviet Union, wars in progress, and the like), each writer has his own notion of what is important. Some will concern themselves only with truly earthshaking events—and generally end up with short books. Others have their own private manias that you must cater to. One makes you swear in advance that you'll pass on every word concerning China, no matter how inconsequential (or incomprehensible) it may appear to you. Another writer is a Latino fanatic who can be swept away by anything that mentions bananas or coffee beans, let alone a revolution. Then, inevitably, there are some pieces of paper that intrigue you—and you convince yourself that if they don't also intrigue the writer, they ought to. So you slip them into his collection.

Other readers also had their own ideas as to what would make a great piece. One of the group during that Kennedy summer was a more or less self-appointed reader, who went for the strange and esoteric tidbits. He was always around. He apparently never slept, and lived by nothing approaching any sort of schedule. He would pop in at all hours of any day or any night. His happy hunting ground was the reject pile that the regular reader had created, from which he would extract "very interesting" or "really great" reports. These

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One evening our volunteer reader honored me with his presence at about ten o'clock, after having written that morning's book and not slept since. At eight-thirty next morning, he charged in as the regular reader—still not having slept.

As the scanner, you have to be tuned in on the writer you are reading for, and you have to give him enough paper so that he, not you, is really deciding what to use. (This means that you pass on twice as much as you should.) Now and then, of course, you'll foul things up by failing to send on something that,

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for a reason you never did understand, was important. (Maybe some otherwise innocuous-looking cable came from a great and good friend of Mr. Helms'—and why didn't we write about it?) Naturally, the writer takes the heat for all the errors of omission or commission occasioned by the reader's carelessness, drowsiness, or bad judgment. Friendships sometimes hung in the balance after some reader had really dropped the ball. A day of this and you are quite willing to be the writer, or just about anything else.

It Is for the President

The next day you are indeed the writer. But just what do you write about, and in what style? The very nature of the product pretty much answers these questions for you. If you remember one cardinal fact you're over the hump right away: The booklet is for the President.

This means, first of all, that you write about subjects and developments that are important enough to warrant his attention, or that you have good reason to believe are of special interest to him. The first part of this statement is simply the classic distinction between national and departmental intelligence; the second part reflects our effort to tailor the PDB to the President's tastes.

(b)(3)(n)

Secondly, whatever we wrote had to be brief, and the language must be strong and direct. No tedious buildups, no hair-splitting qualifications, and no useless repetition. The PDB was printed on regular 8½ x 11 paper, but we used only the right-hand side for the text, with the title of the item on the left-hand half. This made for a less forbidding mass of words and for quick and easy reading. We sometimes had as many as four items on one page—so you had better be brief. Unless you were going to foretell with some assurance the end of the world, six sentences were considered the limit.

(b)(3)(n)

Strict adherence to our rule of thumb—importance and brevity—led one of the writers to produce a classic item.

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Then one day nothing at all occurred. Our writer thought of what the President would want to know, and wrote one word: "Quiet."

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The what-does-he-need-to-know principle helped in other obvious ways. Other publications, attuned to their more general audiences, said "President Thieu" or "Chairman Khrushchev." For the President, we could skip the titles. Just "Thieu" or "Khrushchev" would suffice.

To squeeze the essence out of a mass of information is never simple. For example, one Monday morning at one o'clock I had to create a late item

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Walking the High Wire

In the Johnson days we thought we had been doing pretty well, until Mr. Helms, then the Deputy Director, said he would receive all the writers at two-thirty in the afternoon. Such announcements seldom breed confidence. What was up? Were we going to change the schedule again? Or were we all going out to pasture? To our surprise, he told us that the President (or, more likely, Bromley Smith—it was never clear which) felt that the booklets were getting a trifle dull. Could we jazz them up a bit, without diluting their value as intelligence? Perhaps we could even insert a "funny" every now and then. After all, the President was human, and didn't always have the time (or possibly the inclination) to read Art Buchwald's columns. This sounded like a task we could handle, and we returned to our desks each determined, in his own way, to become a cross between Oscar Wilde and Josh Billings. That day's writer had left in the middle of a rather pedestrian piece about

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(b)(3)(n)

We used down-to-earth language for Johnson.

(b)(3)(n)

As with other assignments, writing the PDB was a sort of boom or bust operation. When the world was not falling apart—and there were such periods—we had trouble turning out pieces that were fresh and important. It also took some doing to stay awake on nights when the flood of paper became a mere trickle, and all your writing was long since done. The opposite side of the coin was a night in early February, 1968. The Tet offensive in Vietnam had begun on the last day of January. The *Pueblo* had been boarded and captured by the North Koreans on the 23rd, causing tremendous concern within the government and something close to rage in the country at large.

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(b)(3)(n) I tore back to our office, trying to block out any second thoughts about the piece, and arrived just in time to get it typed and make the Print Shop's deadline. Whew! And why did my car pick that morning to have a flat tire?

Contributions of Review

The PDB pieces, like anything else, had to be reviewed. (This is an innate, incurable bureaucratic passion.) And review usually meant change. Occasionally one had to review the reviewers, to make sure their changes hadn't altered the sense of the piece.

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The reviewing process did improve our product and saved us from what could have been some painful slips. Someone a little farther from the travail of creating the piece or less emotionally involved in its subject matter can spot cryptic sentences, errors, or an inappropriate phrase or tone that the writer would never notice. Sometimes the changes amounted to no more than substituting "police" for "lawmen," or deleting a phrase about "devastation" in China when the accompanying photograph showed no such thing. But the reviewers' contributions were generally more substantial than this. Like the day I let my feelings show through by writing a bitterly sarcastic piece about

(b)(3)(n)

In half an hour I returned with an unslanted piece that nevertheless managed to convey the impression that

(b)(3)(n) This *was* our judgment, and it was our duty to pass it on to the President, but in an objective way.

The reviewers could also throw cold water on other offerings which were great in themselves, but just wouldn't have made it with President Johnson. (Remember, this was *his* book.) There was, for instance,

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Here was a real gem, I thought. Let's shorten it a bit and include it as an Annex to the booklet. The reviewer nixed this proposal, pointing out that it was unlikely to help the President.

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In Retrospect

Was the hassle of producing the PDB worth it from the point of view of those involved? Well, as this narrative indicates, at the very least the job did furnish an almost inexhaustible supply of anecdotes. On slack days (and there were some) an institution called "Memory-Lane Time" was developed for whiling away the period in the late afternoon when the articles were finished and we were waiting for the reviewers to do their thing. War stories new and old were brought out, burnished, and recirculated. Most PDBers left the job better prepared for their anecdotage than when they came.

Doing the PDB garnered substantial rewards. Few institutions in the history of bureaucracy were so close to the center of things and still gave you so much individual freedom. When you had the book in the middle of the night you were *it*: you could do anything you wanted, as long as you were willing to take responsibility for it the next day. If new information came in, it was up to you and no one else to decide what to do with it. The thought was intimidating, but also heady.

At the same time, the PDB staff in the sixties and early seventies also served an institutional function of some importance, one that the logarithmic increase in the flow of information has now made impossible. The staff saw essentially *every* piece of priority traffic that came into the Intelligence Community—State cables, CIA reports, NSA products, the small numbers of imagery reports that by then were coming out. Thus the Director of OCI (who in those days briefed the DCI's morning meeting) knew that he had a staff of experienced analysts double-checking (second-guessing, if you will) to make sure that line analysts were not missing anything. This has never been a popular process among the line analysts, but it remains true that the PDBers every once in a while turned up a report or an idea that had not yet attained its rightful place in the sun.

The last question is both the most important and the hardest to answer: did the PDB—often referred to as the most expensive newspaper ever produced—do its job? Sometimes articles got kudos, more often they got brickbats, and most often there was no response at all. All one can confidently say is that the demand for the product has continued—and that suggests that some function is being served.

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The Cambodia Example

UN Peacekeeping Operations and Intelligence (U)

Maj. Peter Bartu

"If the goal is to institutionalize intelligence support to peacekeeping operations, then traditional suspicions about its use and delivery will have to be overcome."

Of the many aspects of peacekeeping, the subject of intelligence and military information remains the least explored because of the UN's long-held principles of neutrality and transparency.[1] Yet intelligence can play a critical role, particularly if it is tailored to the specific aims and objectives of a peacekeeping, peacebuilding, or peace-enforcement operation. Like other principles of UN peacekeeping (preventive diplomacy, preplanning, early deployment of staff and resources, clear and achievable goals, and exit strategies), it requires management and coordination. If the goal is to institutionalize intelligence support to peacekeeping operations, then traditional suspicions about its use and delivery will have to be overcome.

In 1991, as an Australian Army captain, I was fortunate to participate in the planning for the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and subsequently the implementation of UNTAC's mandate. For two years, I worked in Cambodia. I then went on to doctoral studies in peacekeeping with a focus on the Cambodia operation. Academic studies have enabled me to place my hands-on experience in a wider context.

The UNTAC Operation

The UNTAC operation ran from 1991 to 1993. At the time, it was the biggest operation conducted in the post–Cold War period. It probably remains the most complex operation in terms of the role and responsibilities accorded to the UN. After a prolonged negotiation period through the 1980s, the Paris Peace Agreements were signed on 23 October 1991 by 18 countries and the four Cambodian parties—the incumbent Cambodia People's Party (CPP) installed by Vietnam in 1979; the Royalist party, FUNCINPEC,[2] which drew popular support from its association with Prince Sihanouk; the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) associated with the 1970-75 Lon Nol regime; and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK)—the Khmer Rouge.

The situation in Cambodia was complex. The country had been at war from 1970 to 1991. On the surface, it was an international conflict involving Vietnam and Cambodia, but underlying this interstate conflict was the conflict between the Khmer and Vietnamese Communist Parties, the conflict between the Khmer and Vietnamese peoples, and the conflict between China and Vietnam.[3] Further complications involved the traditional animosity between Thailand and Vietnam and the relationship between the USSR and China manifest in the competing strategies in Southeast Asia.

The Paris Agreements called for a UN intervention force to oversee the administration of all four factions through a transition to elections conducted by the UN. Khmer sovereignty would reside in a body called the Supreme National Council (SNC) composed of eminent faction representatives, with Prince Sihanouk as President.

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The strategic objective of UNTAC was the establishment of a sovereign, independent, neutral, and non-aligned Cambodia that posed no threat to its neighbors. This was seen as the only viable alternative for lasting peace and political stability in Southeast Asia. Other alternatives, be it a Chinese- or Vietnam-dominated Cambodia, would not bring peace and political stability to the region—nor would they be acceptable to ASEAN.[4]

A Full Plate

The major activities for the mission were deployment, regroupment, cantonment, and disarmament of the faction armies; the repatriation of 380,000 refugees from the Thailand-Cambodia border; and the election process. For the main operation, the UNTAC military component was responsible for the regroupment and cantonment of 156,000 troops; disarming some 350,000 soldiers, including militia; and securing and guarding 300,000 weapons and 80-million rounds of ammunition. This was to occur in the context of broader UN responsibilities for the security of the borders and territorial waters of Cambodia; the resettlement of over 500,000 people, including the refugees, demobilized soldiers, and internally displaced people; and the conduct of a nationwide election. All this was to happen while the UN accepted responsibility for much of the higher administration of the state.

The military mandate also included verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces and the cessation of military assistance to the parties. There are similarities, by design or default, between UNTAC's military mandate and the provisions of earlier agreements in Southeast Asia—the 1954 Paris Agreements, the 1962 Agreements on Laos, and the 1973 Paris Agreements.[5]

This long view of the development of the 1991 Paris Agreements retains validity when one considers the immutability of Cambodian leaders, even through turbulent regime change. All the faction leaders in Cambodia during UNTAC had their formative political experiences through the dynamics of 1954, 1962 and 1973. It also highlights Cambodia's interconnection with regional stability, with Cambodia sitting on a geopolitical faultline and with its sovereignty underwritten by foreign intervention or foreign patronage, which all Cambodian politicians have been obliged to accept at one time or another. That is, the Cambodians knew what the Agreements meant, they understood the fragility of the international community, they wanted the UN to intervene, and they built their strategies around the UN intervention, hoping to use the UN to their advantage. This was fine while UNTAC was doing what the factions wanted. But when UNTAC did not, the situation changed.

While a sound framework agreed to by all the parties is a solid foundation on which to commence implementation of the mandate, it has to be recognized that the Agreements generated their own dynamics and catalyzed military activity after they were signed and during the UNTAC mandate.[6]

Even though UNTAC maintained its neutrality as best it could under the circumstances, one observer wondered how the traditional UN role as an impartial observer or mediator could be reconciled with a new position as the implementor of treaties and agreements or as the legislator or judge.[7] As part of the political process UNTAC was also part of the balance of forces, which each faction had to consider in its strategies. UNTAC thus became a fifth faction by default.

Part of the Problem

Even in a less demanding role, the UN will find it difficult to remain aloof from this problem. The first traffic accident or the first display of cultural insensitivity, be it troops visiting brothels or a less obvious transgression of local mores, will undermine the moral authority which the UN Charter provides to peacekeepers. I call this the fifth faction syndrome.

In peacebuilding operations, this is not a question of if it will happen but when. The clock starts ticking from the moment UN troops arrive. Peacebuilders have a limited timespan before they become part of the problem.

Helping Hold Elections

When the Khmer Rouge withdrew from the cantonment and disarmament phase in June 1992, the main objectives of the UNTAC military component changed from cantonment and disarmament to protection of the election process. This catalyzed a redeployment within Cambodia along electoral boundaries and brought the electoral and military components together. A unity of mission was achieved in this act. Slowly, but surely, UNTAC began to gain the confidence of the Cambodian people and to draw their support away from the various factions.

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During the months of voter registration through the conduct of the elections, the Khmer Rouge did everything they could to disrupt UNTAC's activities. UNTAC also came under attack from the incumbent administration, the CPP, which, concerned at its loss of support, began a political intimidation campaign against the other political parties and a disinformation campaign against UNTAC. It also included physical attacks on the UN. Fear spread throughout Cambodia, and in the leadup to elections there was a lot of pessimism that the polling stations would be attacked.

In response to these fears, UNTAC decreased the number of polling sites from 1,900 to 1,400, signed agreements with the participating factions to help safeguard the sites, and convinced the people that their votes would be secret. These actions are the main reason why the elections were a success, with 90 percent of registered voters able to cast their ballots in May 1993.

The EP-5

For strategy and policy, UNTAC was well served from the beginning by the presence of the Extended Permanent Five (EP-5) in Phnom Penh. This group formed around the Security Council ambassadors, and it expanded to include representation from Australia, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, India, and Malaysia. The EP-5 paralleled the Core Group in New York and ensured that Security Council resolutions were in tune with the situation on the ground. This complimented the link between the UNTAC chiefs and New York. The EP-5 also provided information on an informal basis to UNTAC.

> **"There were no formal arrangements for the receipt of satellite imagery nor for SIGINT."**

The importance of this link cannot be overemphasized. The presence and contributions of the EP-5 reinforced the polypartisan nature of the mission. In particular, Russia, China, France, and the United States provided information throughout the mission to UNTAC—information which was valuable in selecting courses of action for the way ahead, particularly when the Khmer Rouge withdrew from cantonment. This arrangement coalesced the mission at the strategic level, and it is to be counted as one of the strengths of the UNTAC operation and a minimum requirement for similar missions of the future.

The Operational Level

UNTAC was less well served at the operational level. First, UNTAC had no formal intelligence structure.[8] UN troops arriving in Cambodia depended on briefings they had received at their point of origin for information. UN military observers had to deploy to sites, sometimes with only a day of briefings as preparation.

While far from satisfactory, the fact was that in-country conditions varied considerably. Also, the situational awareness of incoming troops grew exponentially on arrival in Cambodia in comparison to that of home-country analysts.

UNTAC established a military information cell, but it did not produce the first distributed summary until 15 June 1992, eight months after the Agreements were signed. The cell was led by a French officer with a US deputy. Beneath them, there were Indian, Indonesian, and British officers, not all with formal intelligence training. There was no formal link for military information between Phnom Penh and New York until April 1993, when UNTAC officers deployed to the newly constituted Situation Center, with the role of passing information to the Department of Peacekeeping operations as required.[9]

Initially, the UNTAC cell members had no baseline for what constituted significant military activity. They did not know what the original demarcation lines between the factions were, and no one had a real grasp of the military capabilities of the factions nor their intent. This was not entirely their fault—no intelligence service had a thorough understanding of the capabilities of the Khmer Rouge before the UNTAC mission was set up.

There were no formal arrangements for the receipt of satellite imagery nor for SIGINT. Given that fighting was predominantly conducted at a low level with small arms, these tools were arguably unsuitable for the majority of the time, but nonetheless they provided collateral information.

The onus fell on field officers to observe and report what was happening in their areas. The fact that the UNTAC military component comprised 16,000 troops from 34 different countries meant that reports were varied and erratic in content and style, an inherent problem aggravated by the turnover of contingents and personnel for the duration of the mandate.

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The military information cell was fed reports from the 450 UN military observers deployed throughout Cambodia and from the battalions that ran the nine sectors into which Cambodia had been divided. Some battalions maintained military information cells at the sector headquarters alongside military observers, but others did not.

The military information branch gradually improved its capability. By the end of 1992, it was able to exploit information provided by Khmer Rouge rank and file who had deserted. While generally good, the information it provided was four to six weeks behind the situation.

There was no procedure to receive information from political meetings, from that volunteered by the diplomatic corps, and from information related to activities in Thailand and Vietnam which had a bearing on the UNTAC mandate. Consequently, there was little cross-pollination between UNTAC's civilian political analysts and the military. Contacts were initiated on a personal rather than a systemic basis. When a particular officer was away, information was not exchanged.

The main disadvantage was the consequent failure to pick up the correlation between political changes and military activity. For example, Security Council resolutions often catalyzed military activity, as did deliberations of the SNC. Political deadlines or key timelines in the UNTAC schedule were also catalysts for faction activity. The connection was often missed by the military information branch and the political officers.

"... there was little cross-pollination between UNTAC's civilian political analysts and the military."

Other UNTAC Information Managers

Parallel to the military information branch were a number of other organizations responsible for managing information, all in locations separate from the military information branch. Within the military component, there were the Strategic Information Teams (SITs). The SITs were concerned with investigating allegations of the presence of foreign forces in Cambodia. They acted on information provided by the factions. They were staffed by more senior officers, were attuned to the political sensitivity of their task, and typically produced high-quality reports.

The Mixed Military Working Group, responsible for maintaining liaison with the factions, also produced reports on faction intentions throughout the mandate.

External Organizations

Not counting the Press Office, which managed UNTAC's external audience and was attached to the Office of the Special Representative, there were five organizations external to the military that handled mission-sensitive information: the information cell of the Civilian Police Component; the Human Rights Component involved in investigations of human rights abuses; the Electoral Component, which received reports from its electoral staff deployed down to district level; the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); and the Information and Education Division (INFO/ED).

INFO/ED was one of the great innovations of the UNTAC mission. Its main task was to inform Cambodians about the Paris Agreements and about UNTAC's role and objectives and to provide the production and broadcasting facilities to spread voter education. It also was responsible for broadcasting the platforms and messages of the competing political parties.

A vital aspect was the link INFO/ED established between UNTAC and the grass roots of Cambodian society, predominantly an oral culture and for whom radio was the key medium. There is no doubt that Radio UNTAC, by emphasizing the secret ballot, convinced many Cambodians to register and to vote.[10]

A more critical part of INFO/ED was the analysis section. It brought together scholars of Cambodia from across the globe who spoke Khmer, Chinese, and Vietnamese. This team was able to conduct research throughout Cambodia and to verify the penetration of UNTAC's message, to assess UNTAC's image and credibility, and to explain Cambodia to the senior staff. The analysis gave UNTAC the depth and experience it needed in understanding Cambodian culture, its geopolitical importance, and, more important, it could indicate where UNTAC was going wrong.

If bureaucracies have a tendency to reward "yes" men, then INFO/ED analysis section were the "no" men and "no" women of the mission. Understandably, it was not a popular

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section. Its service was nonetheless critical for UNTAC. It had the expertise to detail motive and intent of the factions through the experience of its scholars. Its one shortfall was that it did not have the expertise to assess military capabilities. Conversely, the military was not equipped to assess motive and intent.

At the operational level, UNTAC's management of information was not strong. Its inability to draw information from the field and integrate it with strategic and political information to produce operationally specific intelligence was a major weakness.

Coordination of Information

The solution seems simple. If UNTAC could merge the databases of INFO/ED and all other components, then one would expect a coherent picture to emerge from the evidence. But this did not happen. During 1993, when violent incidents were endemic, it was critical to work out what had happened and who was responsible. The system was described by an SIT investigator as follows:

- An apparently politically motivated killing occurs.
- The local civilian police starts an immediate investigation.
- The local UN military observer team, concerned about all events in its area, conducts its own inquires.
- The local human rights representative decides that the incident has human rights implications and commences investigation.

“Ultimately, military activity was inseparable from the political landscape, yet it was being considered in isolation.”

- The local electoral component gets involved because it has implications for free and fair elections.
- Because the incident has appeared on local TV, the INFO/ED component gets involved to ensure fair media representation.
- It is decided that the case has similarities to other cases elsewhere in the country, and a SIT team is dispatched to check if it is part of a trend.
- The civil administration component that runs a database for all cases of political intimidation and violence considers the incident serious enough to send an investigative officer.

This scenario was a reality for many investigations. The duplication of effort and the confusion generated by any number of reports slowed the decisionmaking cycle, and the ill will that it generated caused some components to refuse to divulge their specific reports.

Spreading Confusion and Fear

Ultimately, military activity was inseparable from the political landscape, yet it was being considered in isolation.

When the military information branch took the initiative in early 1993 to convene meetings with all branches involved in assessments, there was a bewildering array of competing hypothesis about what was going on in Cambodia. Rather than analyzing the intent and capability of threats to the mission, each component put forward its own holistic analysis.

The picture became more confused during the election campaign, when the Khmer Rouge and the CPP conducted attacks and disinformation campaigns, and UNTAC started taking casualties. While information made its way to the top where executive decisions were made, the inherent communications problems within the UN meant that a coherent picture was not disseminated to the troops and civilians on the ground.

The competing hypothesis of the information management group contributed to the confusion. The murder of a Japanese district electoral supervisor in April 1993 led to a crisis in confidence among the civilian field staff, who in their electoral capacity were on the frontline. Some 40 electoral staff resigned after the murder, and the head of the UN volunteers in Geneva phoned the field staff six weeks before the election, with the message that, if one more UN volunteer was killed, they all would be withdrawn.[11] That no more were killed reflected the increased security arrangements made between the military and the electoral staff. UN staff were withdrawn at night into military compounds in the worst affected areas. As a result, there was a reduction in information, when it was needed the most.

UN personnel began to feel vulnerable, and fear spread throughout Cambodia. The period leading up to the elections was rife with rumor and disinformation. Into this vortex

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stepped a number of overnight experts, who predicted doom and gloom.

The currency of truth had been debased. In this environment, any assessment that did not identify its information source was just speculation, another hypothesis to be added to the rest of the theories.

Assumptions, Observations, and Recommendations

The lessons of my UNTAC experience in Cambodia in relation to intelligence give rise to several assumptions, observations, and recommendations. The first assumption is that the UN is not going to develop its own intelligence capability in the near future. Second, the UN Charter and its principles will not change. That means that multinational coalitions and multinational representation at all levels will be encouraged and demanded. This means that SIGINT and satellite imagery will continue to be provided on an ad hoc basis to Chapter VI operations (peaceful settlement of disputes) and through national means to Chapter VII operations (peace enforcement actions).

The first observation is that the moral authority invested in UN operations by the UN Charter has steadily eroded over time. The longer you are there, the more tenuous your position; the fifth faction syndrome will affect all UN operations. The second observation is that in crisis periods providing intelligence without identifying the source is akin to speculation, and it becomes another hypothesis.

Strategically, the key is in the field. New York is a long way from Africa or Cambodia. The Security Council has to be represented in the field and preferably extended to include concerned nations. SIGINT and satellite imagery can be delivered via the EP-5 representatives. More important, they maintain the links to the Security Council and assist in drafting resolutions that meet the aims of the mission.

At the operational level, UN operations require their own radio stations to maintain links to the grass roots. Country experts are required to assess the penetration of the UN message, credibility, and image. Baselines should be developed for faction military activity before deployment, if possible.

With the goal of institutionalizing intelligence in UN operations, I recommend that a peacekeeping information template be developed that addresses wider indicators and warnings specific to a mission. For example, the template could cover such issues as:

- Postagreement dynamics.
- The impact of Security Council resolutions.
- Faction propaganda and disinformation campaigns.
- The fifth faction syndrome.

Finally, the key recommendation is that information has to be coordinated at the operational level. UN reform is leaning toward delegating administrative, operational, and financial authority to the field. Information also should be included. The creation of an analysis and plans cell at the deputy head of mission level could be the dropoff and capture point for all sensitive information related to the mission. It is here that the components correlate the political picture with the military and the field picture, creating a coherent awareness of the situation.

NOTES

1. For a discussion as to why this is so, see Hugh Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival*, 36/3 autumn, 1994, pp. 174-191.
2. FUNCINPEC, French acronym for the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia.
3. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, *Prospects for Peace in Southeast Asia: An Indonesian Perspective* (Address to the UN 40th Session of the General Assembly, 1985), p. 13.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
5. Incorporating the *Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam*, 20 July 1954, the *Agreement of the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia*, 20 July 1954, the *Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos 1962*, the *Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos 1962*, and the *Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam 1973*.
6. For example, all factions were involved in landgrabbing operations and political activity among the population to improve the military and political balance in their favor.
7. Yasushi Akashi, *UNTAC in Cambodia: Lessons for UN Peacekeeping*, The Charles Rostov Annual Lecture on Asian Affairs, 14 October 1993.

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8. The US General Accounting Office (GAO) noted that UNTAC had "intelligence units." See US GAO Report, *UN Peacekeeping Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions*, December 1993. I suggest that this was not the case.

9. See Hugh Smith Op. Cit., p. 179 and also Mats Berdal "Reforming the UN's Organizational Capacity for Peacekeeping" in *A Crisis of Expectations UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s*, Ed Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer (Westview Press, Boulder, 1995) p. 184. The United States has installed a Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System in the center.

10. Initially, UNTAC delivered prerecorded tapes to the faction radios and to a Thai-US facility (the USIS VOA service) for twice-daily prime-time broadcasts, before borrowing a transmitter in Phnom Penh in November 1992. In April 1993, one month before elections, UNTAC established its own studios and relay transmitters. See *The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): Debriefing and Lessons*. Report of the 1994 Singapore Conference. Prepared under direction of Nassrine Azimi, Institute of Policy Studies of Singapore and the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), p. 39. For a lighter account of the radio's role, see *Radio UNTAC of Cambodia* "Winning Ears, Hearts, and Minds," Zhou Mei (White Lotus, Bangkok, 1994).


11. Akashi, *Op. Cit.*, p. 5.

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A sham withdrawal

SOVIET DECEPTION IN AFGHANISTAN

Capt. Cheryl Anne Morgan, USA

In a speech in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev announced his intention to withdraw some of Moscow's troops from Afghanistan. According to Gorbachev, "Before the end of 1986 . . . one tank regiment, two motorized rifle regiments and three antiaircraft regiments will be returned from Afghanistan to the homeland with their authorized equipment and arms. These units will return . . . in such a way that all who are interested can easily verify." The details were left to later announcements by the Ministry of Defense.

The rest of the world, particularly the US Intelligence Community, regarded such a voluntary action with widespread disbelief. Beginning with a worst-case premise that the Soviets were planning to enhance in some way their public image and improve their position in Afghanistan, US analysts were consciously looking for indicators of deception.

Soviet Problems

Gorbachev's speech came amid an effort to change the image of the USSR abroad and to alleviate economic problems at home. As an acknowledged dynamic leader with new ideas, Gorbachev made it known that he considered Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." After six and one-half years of occupation, no immediate victory was in sight. Moscow had over 118,000 men in country, in addition to those providing logisitic support from the USSR. The Soviets had suffered over 35,000 casualties, and the Afghan military and government were estimated to be in no better position than before the 1979 invasion. Finally, the Soviets' clear superiority in air power was being challenged by the introduction of improved surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, including the British Blowpipe and the US Stinger.

In the USSR, discontent with the Afghan war was becoming more vocal, ironically because of Gorbachev's openness policies. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* had also opened a Pandora's box of complaints and criticism, primarily concerning domestic economics.

In the international arena, the Soviets had continued to suffer politically from their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Sino-Soviet relations, already strained, had become virtually nonexistent. Beijing cited the Afghan situation as one of three major obstacles to normalized relations. The US embargoes and boycotts of Soviet goods and a chill in relations had only been aggravated by constant US reminders of the Afghan war. The UN annually condemned Moscow's interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

The internal and external situations associated with Afghanistan, combined with Gorbachev's desires to create a new image for the USSR, led many to believe that Moscow would undertake some type of operation in Afghanistan from which it could reap a propaganda benefit. Within the US Intelligence Community, the widespread agreement that the Soviets were not ready to abandon Afghanistan and admit defeat complicated the analysis of Soviet intentions. As a result, the Intelligence Community examined the Soviet "withdrawal" from the perspective of an attempted deception operation.

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The Indicators

There were indications concerning a Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan months before Gorbachev's speech, but these were discovered only in retrospect. At Soviet garrisons in both eastern and western Afghanistan, preparations had been under way to facilitate unit withdrawals. Once the specific types of units were announced, analysts were able to narrow search areas and to limit the number of details to be analyzed by focusing on a small number of Soviet installations.

The first tipoff was the announcement that "three air defense regiments," the only three such units in Afghanistan, would be withdrawn. This reduced the scope of intelligence collection efforts, and it also reinforced the belief that the withdrawal was designed to gain political marks without diminishing the Soviet force structure. The S-60 equipped antiaircraft artillery (AAA) regiment at Kunduz and the two SA-8/GECKO SAM regiments headquartered at Kabul and Shindand had been deployed in Afghanistan as assets organic to the initial invading divisions in 1979. They did not play a key role, because there was no air threat to facilities in Afghanistan. Their continued presence probably was due to doctrinal strictures. Their withdrawal would not degrade Soviet combat operations, and it might even streamline logistic requirements.

Preparation for the withdrawal of these units consisted primarily of consolidating the various batteries at headquarters and practicing parade and convoy formations. These units were observed on an almost daily basis, and an audit trail of their actions illustrated that the Soviets were not being deceptive about their withdrawal.

Table 1

SAM REGIMENTS' ACTIVITY AT SHINDAND, 1986

Date	Location/Unit	Activity
13 Sept.	Shindand/SA-8/Btry	Returned to vehicle park
18 Sept.	Shindand	Review platform, parade field construction
18-22 Sept.	Shindand/SA-8/Btrys	Returned to vehicle park
23 Sept.	Shindand	Visitor area construction
2 Oct.	Shindand	Parade field, review platform, visitor area construction completed
8 Oct.	**——TASS announcement of withdrawal completion dates——**	
	——US pronouncement of "sham withdrawal"——	
10 Oct.	Shindand	Second review platform completed
12 Oct.	Shindand/SA-8/Regt	All btrys at regt hqs.
20 Oct.	Shindand/SA-8/Regt	Practicing withdrawal
21 Oct.	Shindand/SA-8/Regt	Withdrawal ceremony
23 Oct.	**——Visitor areas countrywide are dissassembled——**	
23 Oct.	Towraghondi/SA-8/Regt	Unit arrives
24 Oct.	Shindand/Recon Unit	Moves into former SA-8 vehicle park
2 Nov.	USSR/SA-8/Regt	Unit permanently reassigned from Afghanistan

Similarly, the announcement of a "tank regiment" withdrawal aided in the focus of collection and analytical efforts. The only tank regiment in Afghanistan was deployed in the west at Shindand. It had limited use in a counterinsurgency environment, and its assets were used mainly to provide perimeter security for the installation or for convoy escort. Two issues

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associated with the tank unit, however, made its withdrawal suspect. First, the use of the tanks as direct-fire, static-defense weapons allowed the Soviets to use their more mobile artillery assets in combat offensives. Second, the Shindand tank unit had been allowed to fall to one-third its doctrinal strength.

If the Soviets had intended, as was indicated by the construction of reviewing stands and public statements, that the withdrawal would be observed, then the tank regiment would have to be upgraded or at least augmented. In retrospect, the Soviets began tank deliveries as early as 14 July 1986. A second delivery was made in September in time for parade and convoy practice in early October.

Table 2

TANK REGIMENT ACTIVITY AT SHINDAND, 1986

Date	Location/Unit	Activity
14 Jul.	Shindand/Tank Regt	Approx 25 tanks arrive from the USSR
28 Jul.	——Gorbachev makes withdrawal speech——	
30 Jul.	Shindand	Tents erected
31 Aug.	Shindand	Tents moved to support area
13 Sept.	Shindand/Tank Regt	Second arrival of tanks from the USSR
18 Sept.	——Review platform and parade field construction——	
23 Sept.	——Visitor area construction begins——	
10 Oct.	Shindand/Tank Regt	Parade practice
12 Oct.	Shindand/Tank Regt	Parade practice
15 Oct.	Shindand/Tank Regt	Withdrawal ceremony
23 Oct.	——Visitors' areas countrywide disassembled——	

By stripping tanks from units in the USSR, the Shindand tank regiment was brought up to strength—approximately 80 tanks. Journalists who were invited to attend the withdrawal ceremonies on 15 October observed a regimental-size tank unit convoy out of Shindand. It consisted, however, of a mix of T-55 and T-62 tanks; the Soviets doctrinally do not mix tank variants within regiments. This confirmed previous analysis that the Soviets did rely on tanks for static defense and that they were not serious about withdrawing from Afghanistan at that time.

The announcement of the withdrawal of two motorized rifle units provided little information with which to narrow the focus of the collection and analytical effort. The majority of Soviet combat units were motorized rifle regiments (MRR) deployed throughout the country, and the removal of two would be extremely difficult to track, as well as to explain in terms of Soviet propaganda. Two MRRs would equate to approximately 5,000 men, a significant number of combat forces, and their removal would have a negative impact on Soviet offensive operations.

The identification of construction activity associated with preparation for unit removals from Konduz, Shindand, and Kabul provided a basis for what indicators to look for elsewhere. When no other construction activity was noted at other garrisons, the conclusion was that the MRRs "withdrawn" would be collocated with the tanks and AAA/SAM units. The difficulty in the analysis, however, arose when the level of fighting and type of terrain in Konduz and Shindand indicated the Soviets would need to retain MRRs, not remove them, in order to conduct effective combat offensives.

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The initial indicators did not clarify the situation. In Konduz, elements from the MRR were observed moving out of their vehicle park immediately following Gorbachev's speech, and trucks with towed artillery had arrived. This activity was duplicated in September at Shindand. The replacement of BTR and BMP armored personnel carriers with trucks and towed artillery presented an extremely confusing picture. After observing the activity surrounding the Shindand tank regiment, it became apparent the Soviets were deploying equipment to create two low-strength MRRs that would be withdrawn.

Table 3

MRR ACTIVITY AT KONDUZ, 1986

Date	Location/Unit	Activity
15 Apr.	Konduz	Parade field construction
2 Jun.	Konduz	Review stand construction
7 Jun.	Konduz/MRR	Depart garrison
28 Jun.	——Gorbachev makes withdrawal announcement——	
29 Jul.	Konduz	Tents added
11 Aug.	Konduz/MRR Arty units	Consolidated at garrison
29 Aug.	Konduz/New MRR	Elements arrive CP for new MRR
7 Sept.	Konduz/New MRR	Consolidated at vehicle park
13 Sept.	Konduz/MRR	Old MRR CP departs
16 Sept.	Konduz	Construction begins, visitors' area
3 Oct.	Konduz	Parade field completed
3 Oct.	Konduz/New MRR	Parade practice
5 Oct.	Konduz/New MRR	Convoy practice
8 Oct.	——TASS announcement of withdrawal dates——	
	——US terms withdrawal "sham"——	
12 Oct.	Konduz/MRRs	Trucks moved out from new MRR; APCs moved in from old MRR
16 Oct.	Konduz/New MRR mix	Practice convoy, parade
17 Oct.	Konduz/MRRs	New MRR mix departs
22 Oct.	Konduz/MRRs	New MRR mix arrives at border
23 Oct.	Konduz/Old MRR	Old MRR vehicles return to vehicle park

By 8 October, the Soviets had progressed far enough to announce specific dates. Through TASS, Moscow stated that the six regiments would be removed between 15 and 31 October and that foreign journalists would be invited to view the departures. But by 8 October, the Intelligence Community had enough evidence to provide policymakers with the assessment that a "sham withdrawal" was under way. The US Government made its announcement.

The public US condemnation caused the Soviets to commit a final act providing confirming evidence that the withdrawal was a political move. Denying that the two MRRs were hollow units, the Soviets stripped BMPs and BTRs from the original units in Shindand and Konduz and replaced the trucks to beef up the newly created MRRs. Although journalists observed actual armored personnel carriers convoying out of these garrisons, imagery of the border area showed only equipment brought in from the USSR for the withdrawal actually crossed back into the Soviet Union. The BTRs and BMPs that had always been in Afghanistan did not cross the border but turned around and redeployed back to their original vehicle parks.

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Conclusions

The "sham withdrawal" operation is the most recent historical example of the capability of the intelligence and warning (I&W) system to support US strategic objectives. Two important factors actually oriented the I&W community and allowed it to respond in a timely and accurate manner. First, there was the predisposition to believe that the Soviets had a hidden agenda. Second, the previous six years of war had allowed for the development of a substantial collection plan against Afghanistan. Without the dedication of assets, many details might have been missed. In retrospect, several indicators that were previously present were observed only after Gorbachev's July speech.

The "sham withdrawal" brings out several lessons that remain applicable to future US I&W efforts. The importance of alerting assets by approaching a problem from the all-source viewpoint is crucial. By examining Gorbachev's speech and subsequent political announcements and press items, it was possible to direct collection efforts and filter out unrelated developments. The importance of time versus accuracy also was vital. The development of indicators and "proof" of Soviet deception required reevaluation of previous reports and compilation of evidence over a period of several weeks. Without waiting for key pieces, a clear picture might not have emerged or been made public. Still, the Intelligence Community provided the information before the event was over, allowing US policymakers to make public statements at a critical point—countering the TASS announcement.

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An Interview With John H. Waller (U)

(b)(3)(c)

John H. Waller's long and distinguished intelligence career began when he joined OSS from the State Department in 1944, after which he was assigned to Cairo as deputy chief of the wartime counterintelligence section. Following a brief postwar sojourn in the private sector, he joined the Strategic Services Unit, a successor organization to OSS, in 1946; he then remained in the intelligence profession until his retirement from CIA in 1980. Waller's career in the field in the Directorate of Operations (DO) was spent in places most Americans knew little about at the time: (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) *including extensive service in* (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) *His more important Headquarters assignments included stints as* (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) *(1963-1967), as Chief of Near East Division (1972-1975), and as Inspector General for the Agency (1976-1980). (S)*

In the interview excerpts that follow, Mr. Waller provides a fascinating and amusing portrait of his early DO career in those distant lands, where not even the long arm of Headquarters could regularly or routinely reach. It was a time when, as Mr. Waller notes in the interview, "There were very few ground rules about what anybody did. You were on your own in places like that." (U)

Mr. Waller was interviewed on 24 May 1999 in McLean, Virginia. (U)

Iran

When I was hired, it was with the fact in mind that I would go open the new Station in Iran, which, indeed, I did. I got out there in February 1947. There were not many residual things to do to pick up from OSS days. Whatever they'd had sort of disappeared, so I was starting from scratch, and the area, at that time, was beginning to loom as a highly significant flashpoint in the postwar era. As the Cold War broke out, in effect, I think you could say it almost broke out over Iran, because the Soviets—slow to move out of Azerbaijan, as they agreed to do during the war, and slow to move out of Kurdistan in Iran—left behind vassal governments which were not beholden to Tehran any more. It bit off a strategic hunk of the Azerbaijan area between the Soviet Union and Turkey. In addition to its strategic importance, Iran's oil was vital to the British. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was the largest overseas investment in the entire British empire. (U)

Our Ambassador in Tehran, George Allen, was active in working with the Iranians to stiffen their backs to protest the Soviet move. It was a definite grab for part of Iran. The small team of Americans there, all of us young- (b)(3)(c) worked

> **"Mr. Waller provides a fascinating and amusing portrait of his early DO career in those distant lands, where not even the long arm of Headquarters could regularly or routinely reach."**
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well as a team. (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

We had a fairly successful crash program to understand Iran beyond the borders of Tehran. I began my career as what you might call a specialist in the tribal areas which were interesting because they were not necessarily automatically loyal to the central government, and some, like the Kurds, were vulnerable to Soviet pressure.


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(b)(3)(c)

I lived in Tehran, but I was on the road a lot. It was an exciting experience. It was nothing quite as romantic as camels and horses, but, in fact, I did do a lot of horseback riding once I got up there, and I had to run the gamut of Kurds running out and sacrificing sheep in front of me as a sign of friendship. (U)

The southern tribes were important because of their proximity to the oilfields in the south, and the fact that for centuries they were traditionally against the Shah and the government.

(b)(3)(n)



John Waller in tribal territory in southern Iran, 1948 (photo courtesy of author). (C)

(b)(3)(n)

Right after the war and up through the death of Stalin, there was the prospect of another world war, this one with the Soviet Union.

(b)(3)(n)

I guess I started out a career not in the typical counterespionage mode, or espionage mode, for that matter. The events of the day required a paramilitary approach, and it was probably the first inklings of paramilitary [operations] that the United States (and CIA as CIA) had gotten involved with. (C)

(b)(3)(c)

Later, in 1949, (b)(3)(c) came out to be Chief of Station. He was an able senior officer and an OSS veteran. I continued my tribal meanderings

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There was almost a 19th century British "Great Game" ambiance. I was a pioneer as far as the Americans were concerned, but it was something the British had been doing for two centuries. But we were the new big power after the war—people looked to us. The name of the game, as I saw it, was first establishing the groundwork

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Ops Opportunities From Opium

(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n) stint involved dealing in some regard with both the local fathers of the province and the tribes. There were Turkmen, a Mongoloid type; Azaris; local Kurds; and various tribal peoples who were interesting to me as an intelligence officer. Khurasan, with fields of white poppies that extended as far as the eye could see in all directions, was the center of opium for the world. Despite border guards, plowed earth, and fierce dogs that the Soviets used to patrol their borders, the tribesmen were risking their lives every day to smuggle opium across the border to their relatives on the other side. (U)

This was a strategic area of the Soviet Union,

(b)(3)(n)

Here, again, we were at a time when war might have become a reality, and it was a long time before we would have much in the way of technological sensors,

(b)(3)(n)

Cocktails for Cows

It was hard to get into the tribal areas, particularly along the Soviet border. It made the Soviets nervous, and it made the tribesmen wonder what to do with you. But a terrible epidemic of rinderpest had broken out and it was decimating the cattle (b)(3)(c) A request for US foreign aid received no response. Time was running out. The cows were dying. (U)

So, again, I found Sears Roebuck useful, and I ordered 12 Waring blenders to be sent by air. I told Sears Roebuck that I would pay an extra shipping fee if necessary, but to get them to me, personally. I paid for them with Agency funds. For all intents and purposes, Sears believed that some American wanted to make a lot of cocktails. It was a time when there were few ground rules about what anybody did. You were on your own in places like that. (U)

I did this after fully explaining to the governor of the province that I had found a way to help him. If the problem was emulsifying diseased livers from those cattle that had already died [to make the vaccine needed to protect the healthy cattle], there was nothing like a Waring blender as an emulsifier. I knew that because every evening I used to make cocktails for my wife and myself with a Waring blender. I was always impressed with how efficiently it ground things into liquid. (U)

So I lined up my 12 blenders and invited the town fathers, and we had a practice session in which I demonstrated the beauties of a Waring blender. It worked like a charm, and they did have something that could be injected into the cattle to save them. I became a hero in the province, the savior of the cattle industry. That was not necessarily what I was sent to do

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up there, but it enabled me to be right up on the border to oversee my own do-it-yourself aid project, which was of great assistance to me for intelligence purposes. (U)

I got a little carried away with it because it was so successful. I got in touch with the one remaining Soviet official, a caretaker in (b)(3)(n) whom I did not know. I said I was the (b)(3)(n) and that we had just had a lot of success in putting down the rinderpest on our side of the border. I said, "I understand you have it on your side, and I'd be delighted to help you if you need any help." The answer was a grumpy "no." That was the end of that. I guess it was unrealistic to hope that I might have been able to get into the Soviet Union long enough to see what was going on. (U)

Good Medicine

Another thing I did was to make a friend of the French surgeon in charge of the official Iranian hospital. He was a former Foreign Legionnaire. On retirement, he was assigned by the French Government to do this. For all I know, he was in French intelligence. We worked well together, and he and I suddenly and for different reasons (he for medical, me for getting to know the natives) had the idea to travel around the province. With my heavy-duty truck and his medical services, we went on medical tours, stopping in every village to hold a clinic. (U)

I had done that once on my own in the south with the Qashqais. The

> **"Things were getting rough with the USSR. Stalin was still on a rampage. This was a serious time in history."**

year before I went (b)(3)(c) I had found a poor lad on the road who had been hit by a truck and left to die. With the help of a how-to-do-it medical journal left over from a World War II first-aid kit, my radio operator and I set the boy's leg. It was all that could be done, and we then put him on a truck to be taken to a hospital another two days away. I believe he lived. When it was all over, the tribes gathered around and sort of gave us standing applause, and then the chief asked me to run a clinic for him for a week because there no doctors in the outlying provinces. (U)

I wanted to do what I could. With a large medical kit I had, I held a clinic and rejected people who had things beyond my ken. But, if they were only suffering from malaria, constipation, or common diseases, I could cope with the medication I had. I think I did some good, and it made for great public relations. (U)

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After a year,

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We then started down the road to major problems. (S)


Project AJAX

Things were getting rough with the USSR. Stalin was still on a rampage. This was a serious time in history. We realized that the Soviets, having been thrown out of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, and then later out of Meshed, had decided to go after the central government of Iran and get hold of the whole country. We needed assets and information to bear on this problem. (U)

The Soviet threat was getting worse by the day, and it finally culminated in 1953 in the so-called Project AJAX. That began the Agency's first real paramilitary operation. Just before Kim Roosevelt came out to run AJAX on the spot, I went back to Headquarters to be

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Sketch by John Waller of Mohammed Mosadeq (©John Waller). (U)

in charge of AJAX on that end, working directly in [DDP Frank] Wisner's office. (U)

The chain of command for purposes of secrecy eliminated everybody except the DCI and Wisner. Dick Helms was Chief of Operations, and he was out of the loop. My division chief was also out of the loop, even though we all knew a little about it, but I knew all about it. It was embarrassing to have to deal with people directly rather than go through the chain of command. This probably was not a smart thing to do, but it is significant how compartmentation and secrecy in our first paramilitary overthrow became a "holy" project for all of us. At any rate, it worked like a charm. (U)

A Countercoup

It is maddening to see revisionist history say that Project AJAX was the root of all problems with Iran. It is the worst kind of revisionism. What is forgotten by most historians who are talking about it today is that it was not a coup. It was a countercoup. In other words, the Shah had every right in his constitution to remove a prime minister who defied his instructions. He tried to remove him, and the man who went to deliver the removal order was arrested and put in jail, and long-time liberal politician Mohammed Mosadeq took over as Prime Minister. It was clear that the Shah had better get out of town, which he did. (U)

This was Mosadeq's coup, but, from a practical point of view, he had lost most of his backing from the mullahs and from the bazaar (the business community), which was historically in league with the mullahs. He had the poor people in south Tehran because of their religiosity and the mullah connection. He had the National Front, a secular, modern group of politicians—idealistic, perhaps, but able people. He had various others, including the few fragments of the labor group that were outside the Communist labor movement. And he had the Communist Party. (U)

(b)(1) We [redacted] got serious
(b)(3)(n) out this when the mullahs defected from Mosadeq, including Ayatollah Kashani, the top mullah—the Khomeini of his day. Once Mosadeq had lost the National Front, and, particularly its important labor group, he was left with himself and the Communist Party. The Communists then moved in and said, "We're your only friends, and we can get a crowd on the street," which they did regularly, "to campaign visibly." The crowds were getting more and more rough; they were tearing down statues and things like that. (U)

The problem was that here was a man who was not a bad man—we all liked Mosadeq, and we were willing to back him. We did not do anything about him when he originally took over the British oil. We were upset because we were allies with the British, but we did not have any plans to do anything ourselves. That was not the *casus belli* solution for us. Although a lot of people claimed that we also wanted the oil, that was not our nation's policy. We had all the oil we needed in the south. (U)

Increasingly Isolated

With only the Communists supporting him, Mosadeq faced a wavering Army and an angry Shah. It was a messy situation, one which would have led to Mosadeq's calling the Army in and saying, "Get back with me, or I'll get the Soviet Army in, because the British are against us." Remember what the Soviets did in Afghanistan some years later. There was no doubt that, in the middle of the erupting Cold War, Iran would go to the Soviets if action was not taken. [redacted]

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The first time this became known as a CIA covert action operation was when President Eisenhower mentioned it during a speech he gave in Seattle. He had been eager to show how his foreign policy had run well. The centerpiece for this was Iran, and he spilled the beans and took credit for it, in effect. The reason I remember that so clearly was that I was still proud of the operation but also proud that it had been kept secret. It gave me a sinking feeling to see that it was no longer a secret, that our President had blown it. In retrospect, I do not blame Eisenhower; it would have come out anyway, eventually. (S)

In his message to Headquarters after Mosadeq was ousted, Kim said that, "This worked wonderfully, it cost virtually nothing in terms of money, and few lives were lost. But the danger of this operation is that all of us [in CIA] will be emboldened to try this frequently as a quick fix for all kinds of problems." Kim was prophetic in realizing that every president that was faced with a nasty little problem that did not merit going to war over would turn to covert action. The best example is the Bay of Pigs, which was a catastrophe. So there were a lot of lessons to be learned that were not. (U)

(b)(3)(n)

Tibet

After my stint at Headquarters as head of the Iran desk, I was transferred

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the adventures we had there were more, I suppose, identical to what intelligence is. You recruit spies, you worry about the Soviets, you worry about the Chinese, you worry about the usual things our Agency is supposed to worry about.

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The goal was to receive the Dalai Lama covertly and to give him aid and assistance in whatever way we could. This would help cement our relationships with some of the local tribesmen and others who had supported the Dalai Lama and helped him come out and who were still fighting the Chinese. (S)

With China becoming rapidly one of our more serious Cold War enemies, it was a problem that lent itself to operations with China's peripheral countries. China has a minority system, a federation of all kinds of countries that are not Chinese but have been in the empire for a long time. Historically, when an emperor in China falls, it is usually because of pressure from one or the other of the peripheral countries. So China is very conscious of its Tibets, its Manchurias, and whatever else it has.

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Strange Bedfellows

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you had Soviet, Chinese, and Bloc personnel. It can be argued that (b)(3)(n) they are more accessible. Everybody knows everybody else, and you can approach them sometimes because they are unhappy in those places.

(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(n)

I had never lived in a small town in America, but I knew what it meant to live in one after I was (b)(3)(n) After I got off the plane, we put our bags in a hotel, and I went out to buy something I needed in a store. A man behind the counter looked at me and said, "It's very nice to see you, Mr. Waller," before I introduced myself. "We've been expecting you here." Then, within a couple of weeks, some gentleman came up and said, "We have a Rotary Club here, Mr. Waller, and, as you know, we like to have a person from every profession, and our intelligence man, an Englishman, just left, so we're in the market for a new one. Would you like to be it?" I explained that I really was not into Rotary matters. (U)

I was invited up to the mountains once in a helicopter for a review of this Tibetan army, where its men went through their marching and their various target practices. It was quite impressive. I was their guest of honor, sort of a visiting colonel of the regiment. It was something that was kept quiet. They knew that I was a senior officer, but they did not know who I was. (S)

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A Small Town (b)(3)(n)

After leaving (b)(3)(n) I spent six months learning Arabic and was geared to go to some Arab country.

(b)(3)(n)

That sort of thing gets you off to a funny start, but, on the other hand, it was a country where, despite some reputation for c (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(n) I met were kind and gentle. I literally knew almost everybody in town, and, when I left—after two years—all my (b)(3)(n) friends came to the airport to say goodbye. This was a little embarra (b)(3)(n)

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(b)(3)(n)

(U)

It was interesting and, I believe, a successful tour (b)(3)(n) I found that the local service was one of the most genuinely cooperative foreign services I had ever dealt with. We did not pay them anything, they just thought it was their duty to be helpful. (S)

Being Up Front

(b)(3)(n) one somehow could operate a little more openly in dealing with politicians than in many countries where the emotions run high between the ins and the outs. I went to the liaison people with whom I was dealing, and I would say, "Look, I do not want to play games, I am not going to try to fool you. Let me just tell you in advance that I am going to be seeing as many people as I can in this country, including your opposition. I am here to interpret this country to my country. I am an intelligence man. So, unless I see them in the flesh and talk to them, how will I know what it is all about? If, at any time, you do not want me to, tell me, and I will not. I am asking your permission to see everybody, because that is the way it ought to be done." And, of course, they said, "Oh, go ahead," realizing that the people in power had all gone to the same grade school and high school with the people not in power. They were all the close friends of their opposition. I reasoned, and it turned out to be true, that it was hard for ther (b)(3)(n) to say, "Oh, you cannot go see my good friend, so and so." Because that puts it on a personal basis. He knows, I know, and he knows everybody knows. (S)

(b)(1)
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Sacrificing One's Stomach

(b)(3)(n)

Every Sunday, we had breakfast together, at his request, because he liked to get a Westerner's view of what's going on in the world—sort of his newspaper, if you will, which I found useful. I could get his views on things without exerting myself any more than telling him what I read in *The International Herald Tribune* that morning or knew from my sense of geography, because he was an insular man—but bright. My only problem at the breakfasts was that he served (b)(3)(n) But it was not my way of beginning the morning. I did it bravely, and got no diseases. He sensed that was not enough, though, so he also gave me Wheaties. After about a year of this, one Sunday morning I was disturbed to learn that, about 20 minutes after I had left him, he died. I soon had an equally good relationship with his son (b)(3)(n) We saw each other frequently, and it was a warm relationship. (U)

Bagging a Bag Man

As I mentioned earlier, we knew there was equipment passing (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) It was sent by the Chinese, probably, or sometimes the Soviets. We enlisted the help of our liaison to try to stop that, and they did. They caught some boxes at the port and broke them open, and instead of sugar there were guns and that sort of thing. It was going on all the time. (S)

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I have many other fond memories of Third World countries in the 1960s as they tried to become democracies. We were competing for influence with the Soviets and Chinese and also with the British, French, and Belgians For me, it was an exhilarating and gratifying part of my career. (U)

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Recalling a CIA Officer's Sacrifice

John Kearns and the Cold War in Laos (S)

Kenneth Michael Absher

Editor's Note: This article brings to life the story of one of CIA's silent heroes, honored by a Star on the Memorial Wall. (U)

> **"The story of one of CIA's silent heroes, honored by a Star on the Memorial Wall."**

John Kearns served two tours in Laos as a CIA paramilitary (PM) officer during the war in Indochina. By the end of 1972, Agency officers in Laos were guiding and supporting 40,000 (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) Laotian regular troops in operations that tied down elements of at least four divisions of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), preventing them from joining the war against the South Vietnamese government and allied US forces. In direct support of US foreign policy, these CIA officers confronted intense combat with the NVA on an almost daily basis. While this article focuses on Kearns, who was killed in December 1972, it is a tribute to the courage and dedication of all CIA personnel and their families who served their country during the war in Indochina. It also reminds us that today's PM officers are the guardians of a legacy of courage, sacrifice, and honor bequeathed by those who served before.[1] (S)

Born in 1942, John Wesley Kearns III grew up in Texas and joined the US Army Special Forces out of high school. Like many young men in his generation, he was posted to Vietnam, where he earned the Combat Infantryman's Badge for coming under enemy fire. He returned home in 1965 and completed a degree in geography and economics at North Texas State University. Upon graduation, Kearns joined the CIA on contract as a PM officer. After ten months of intensive training, he was assigned to Vientiane Station, Laos, as a PM contract operations officer in June 1969. (S)

The Strategic Chessboard (U)

Following World War II, as anti-colonial winds began to blow through much of the underdeveloped world and Mao Tse-tung drove Chung Kai-shek and the Nationalists out of mainland China, communist-inspired Vietminh guerrillas in Indochina began to agitate for independence from France. Determined to keep Indochina out of communist hands, President Truman provided financial and logistical support to the French in Southeast Asia.[2] (U)

The Geneva Accords of July 1954 attempted to resolve the Indochina conflict by calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Vietnam was partitioned along the 17th parallel, leaving the Vietminh in *de facto* control of the north. Although not an official participant in Geneva, the United States warned that "it would view any renewal of aggression in violation

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(b)(3)(c)

[1] This article is based on research in CIA personnel files, review of daily combat intelligence reports from Laos, and interviews with 12 people knowledgeable about John Kearns's career and Agency activities in Laos in the late 1960s and early 1970s. (S)

[2] For this and subsequent references to the origin and evolution of the Vietnam conflict, see Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994). (U)

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of the aforesaid arrangements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." In response to the opportunity for repatriation allowed under the Geneva Accords, some 80,000 to 100,000 communist sympathizers moved north, while one million North Vietnamese fled south.[3] (U)

North Vietnam launched a guerrilla war against South Vietnam in 1959, infiltrating men and supplies via Laos and Cambodia. Over 6,000 North Vietnamese troops moved into Laos to protect the logistics routes into South Vietnam and to support the communist Pathet Lao, waging a guerrilla war against the non-communist government in Vientiane. (U)

Inheriting the policy positions of his predecessors, President Kennedy judged Indochina to be the decisive battleground that would determine whether communist-led guerrilla wars could be stopped and the Cold War won. At a press conference on 23 March 1961, Kennedy warned: "The security of all Southeast Asia will be endangered if Laos loses its neutral independence. Its own safety runs with the safety of us all—in a real neutrality observed by all."[4] (U)

The CIA in Laos (S)

According to Ted Shackley, who was Chief of Station (COS) in Laos from 1966-1968, the CIA began its involvement on the ground in Laos in January 1961 with the recruitment of a force of 1,000 irregulars, mostly Meo (Hmong) tribesmen. By March, the force had grown to

> **"As time went on, the Agency found itself guiding and supporting 40,000 irregular troops, about half of whom were tribesmen from northern Laos."**
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4,000. As time went on, the Agency found itself guiding and supporting 40,000 irregular troops, about half of whom were tribesmen from northern Laos. From 1963 to 1966, after the communist Pathet Lao pulled out of a coalition government in Vientiane, CIA efforts in Laos focused on the northern provinces. US policy required that the Agency-led irregulars control enough of the population centers and land in northern Laos to allow the Royal Lao Government to negotiate with the Pathet Lao from a position of strength. The war in the north was a war of position and maneuver—ebb and flow. The non-communist side was best in the rainy season; the Pathet Lao and its backers, the NVA, were better in the dry season. The CIA-led irregulars fought hard enough during the early 1960s to keep elements of two NVA divisions tied down in the north. (S)

In 1965, the CIA received approval to open a second front. The war in the north was to continue, but action was to be stepped up in southern Laos to contribute more directly to the war in South Vietnam. The irregulars were to be used to impede NVA movement through the panhandle of Laos to supply and reinforce the communist Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam. The irregulars were to collect intelligence on the materiel that Hanoi was transporting through the panhandle, destroy it when possible, and pin down NVA troops in the area to keep them from moving into South Vietnam. (S)

[redacted] Rather than being assigned to particular units, CIA case officers in Laos were responsible for specific sectors—they went wherever action occurred in their sector. (S)

In 1970, the Department of Defense began to spend funds directly in support of CIA operations in Laos. John Eisenhower, who worked in the policy office of the Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1971, recalls money being transferred overtly and directly from the DoD budge[redacted] This was taking place at about the same tin[redacted] as the overall drawdown of US forces in Vietnam. Illustrating the pivotal role that Laos continued to play in Southeast Asia, a note seen by a CIA officer in 1971 carried the declaration, "Long Tieng [in northern Laos] must not fall." It was initialed by President Nixon. (S)

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Kearns's First Tour (U)

John Kearns spent his first year in Laos as a paramilitary operations officer [redacted]

[3] Kissinger, p. 636. (U)
[4] As quoted in Kissinger, p. 646. (U)

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
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John Wesley Kearns III, CIA file photo. (S)

responsible for all of the irregular forces and intelligence teams in the area.

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According to the testimony of his managers, Kearns showed a genuine respect for the Laotian people and a concern for their well-being. Early on, he demonstrated a leadership ability that enabled him to motivate his men to undertake difficult and dangerous assignments. From all indications, he wrote clear reports, worked hard, and established good relationships with colleagues. (S)

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> "Kearns sent action teams against North Vietnamese installations deep in enemy-held territory."

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In this capacity, he was deeply involved in high-priority special operations to send action teams against North Vietnamese installations deep in enemy-held territory. He oversaw all phases of these operations—planning, training, team leadership and motivation, command and control, and post-mission debriefing and analysis. According to his supervisor, he was decisive in his leadership and command functions, and directed his Laotian assets with quiet self-confidence. (S)

Kearns demonstrated personal courage on several occasions during this period. Once, despite suffering a high fever from malaria, he insisted on overflying dangerous terrain to support one of his teams in securing a helicopter landing zone for a major troop infiltration behind enemy lines. On another occasion, in June 1971, Kearns volunteered to try a cable landing from a helicopter to search for the missing crew of a crashed C-46 aircraft. Dense foliage had prohibited a ground search. He made it down, but only had ten minutes on the ground due to his helicopter's shortage of fuel. During that time he extracted the copilot's body, inspected the part of the fuselage that could be entered, and called out in vain for survivors. (S)

Back to Langley (U)

Kearns was selected for lateral entry into the Clandestine Service Career Staff on 3 October 1971. He returned to CIA headquarters

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he completed the basic clandestine operations course. Most weekends, he drove to Dallas see his fiancé,

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whom he had met at North Texas State University. John had insisted that Kathy receive her own degree before they were married. She received her BA in History and English in December 1971, and they were married in Dallas on Christmas Eve. (S)

In August 1972, Kearns and his new wife were posted back to Laos. Initially, he was assigned to Long Tieng in northern Laos as an operations officer. Another officer was already in the Commando/Raider slot, however, relegating Kearns to being the assistant to someone holding the position he had formerly held himself. He sought another job and

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He was immediately caught up in Agency efforts to counter the most extensive offensive yet undertaken by the North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong. (S)

The Easter Offensive (U)

On 30 March 1972, Hanoi launched a major military action, known as the Easter Offensive, to take advantage of a shift in US strategy.[7] Under President Nixon's Vietnam-

[7] The task force was named after a commander of the Laotian army in Military Region IV in southern Laos. (U)

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ization policy, which aimed to transfer responsibility for the prosecution of the war from US to South Vietnamese hands, US combat strength had been drawn down from a high of 543,000 troops in early 1969 to 69,000 in June 1972. Another 20,000 troops were slated to be sent home by 1 July 1972. The enemy told his cadres that this offensive was intended to "gain decisive victory in 1972," by means of "widespread military attacks coordinated with mass popular uprisings." The aim was to "totally change the face of the war in South Vietnam."[8] (U)

On 24 April 1972, US Army Gen. Creighton Abrams cabled Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird that the NVA was holding nothing back. "Their last reserve division has been moved south near the [demilitarized zone]," he reported. "Four divisions and an independent regiment had already been brought

> **"[redacted] he was immediately caught up in CIA efforts to counter the most extensive offensive yet undertaken by the NVA and the Vietcong."**

down from north Vietnam, joining the seven divisions, twenty-two independent regiments, and seven artillery regiments already in South Vietnam."[9] (U)

Hugh Tovar, who was COS in Vientiane from 1970-1973, recalls a meeting with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger in Washington in July 1972, during which Kissinger was emphatic that the NVA should be attacked intensely throughout Laos. Also present were CIA Deputy Director for Operations William Nelson and Laotian commander Vang Pao, whom Tovar had brought with him to Washington. Tovar recalls that Kissinger wanted to harass the NVA in Laos, bleed them, and tie them down. By disrupting the enemy's ability to rely on a stabilized situation in the adjacent country, Washington could prevent substantial numbers of NVA troops from joining the communist offensive in South Vietnam. Action in Laos would also strengthen Kissinger's hand in his ongoing negotiations with North Vietnamese representative Le Duc Tho in Paris.[10]


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[redacted]

[8] North Vietnam and the Vietcong were determined to go all out for a military victory in the south in the spring of 1972, using conventional forces. A former Minister of Justice in the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG), Truong Nhu Tang, has written about the decision to undertake the offensive. At a meeting in January 1972, PRG President Huynh Tan Phat apparently recounted how the Vietcong had regained strength following their loses during the 1968 Tet Offensive; the US had withdrawn huge numbers of troops and was vulnerable politically because of South Vietnamese military weakness; and the situation in Cambodia and Laos was adequately stabilized to support the war effort. At the end of the meeting, Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Secretary Nguyen Van Linh stated: "We intend to drive the Americans into a corner and force concessions from them before the presidential elections. If possible, we mean to destroy Nixon's chances for reelection." See Truong Nhu Tang (with David Chanoff and Doan Van Toai), *A Viet Cong Memoir* (New York, NY: Random House, 1985), pp. 199-205. (U)

[9] Vietnam Military History Institute, *A History of the People's Army of Vietnam*, as quoted in Lewis Sorley, *A Better War* (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999), pp. 195-205, 437. (U)

[10] Sorley, p. 325. (U)



Countryside around Pakse, Laos, 1972. (Photos supplied by former CIA [redacted] (b)(3)(c)) (S)

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> **Kearns was one of the 'Young Turks' in Laos who wanted to take the fight directly to the NVA.**

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case officers were responsible for advising, supporting, and leading this task force of about 4,400 men. They were not assigned to specific battalions, but traveled, met, and advised units, as needed. Each case officer and each BC had an operational assistant known as a forward air guide, who facilitated communication between the case officers and the units. Both the case officer and their assistant could call in tactical air support.

Three *Groupes Mobiles* (GM) comprising an additional 3,600 troops, most of whom were Nungs, also operated out of

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There were days when all three case officers, including the team leader, had to be in the field. Normally, they traveled only during daylight hours. They almost always used Porter aircraft or helicopters, sometimes traveling by jeep east along Route 7 to the

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All of Kearns's supervisors describe him as a highly capable, reliable case officer, who exercised good judgment and got along well with everyone. He loved his work. He tended to be quiet and unassuming, but was definitely

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sive in leading the [redacted] against the NVA. The task force chief recalls that one of the case officers had a family emergency [redacted] At times, this resulted in Kearns being assigned to the field almost every day. According to his supervisor, he preferred the field to staying behind in [redacted] was considered fearless. A case officer who shared living quarters with Kearns [redacted] described him as one of the "Young Turks" in Laos who wanted to take the fight directly to the enemy, the NVA. (S)

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Forward air guides with the irregular [redacted] in Laos. (S)

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> **"He directed counter-battery fire . . . and supervised as much of the evacuation of the wounded by helicopter as he could before being evacuated himself."**

The Pakse Battlefield (U)

During the early summer of 1972, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) the NVA had advanced to within 12 kilometers of the town and appeared determined to keep the irregular forces bottled up there. The units of Task Force Phasouk broke out, however, and began to push the NVA back along Route 23 toward Paksong, a town located 52 kilometers to the east on the strategic Bolovens Plateau. The plateau overlooked the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the communists' resupply route between North Vietnam and the war zone in the south. For some time, the Agency had placed road watchers on the plateau to gather intelligence on the movement of NVA troops and supplies. Now, the push of the thousands of irregulars in Task Force Phasouk toward Paksong presented a new and more significant threat to the NVA. From the plateau, the US-led irregulars could not only monitor movement along the trail, but also attack supply trains with mortar and artillery fire.[15] (C)

The NVA counterattacked in August, the month that Kearns arrived. They shot down two aircraft near Paksong, ambushed an irregular battalion some 13 kilometers east of Pakse, and began to use 107mm rockets, a weapon normally used by the NVA in southern Laos. NVA attacks, including the use of tanks, continued at a high level against irregular forces deployed along Route 23 east of Pakse. Casualties on both sides mounted. Captured documents indicated that the NVA understood that the strategic objective of the irregular units and Laotian government forces was to force the NVA to withdraw manpower from combat in South Vietnam to guard their flank in Laos. Nonetheless, Hanoi apparently felt it had no choice but to commit some 2,000 additional infantry and tank troops to try to prevent the capture of Paksong. (C//NF)


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Opening A Second Front (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

On (b)(3)(c)er, while the (b)(3)(n)g with [redacted] 19 kilometers east of [redacted], the CIA opened a second front. [redacted] began with the airlift of two *Groupes Mobiles* to a site 3 kilometers southwest of the (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) controlled town of Saravane. (C)

Located in a valley north of the Bolovens Plateau, nearly 100 kilometers northeast of Pakse, Saravane sat astride an important junction of rivers and highways used by the NVA to send troops and supplies into South Vietnam and Cambodia.

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Transports destroyed to prevent their falling into North Vietnamese hands. (U)

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The CIA-led action caught the NVA completely off guard. They had committed considerable manpower to protecting Paksong against Task Force Phasouk. Now they faced shifting additional forces to head off the capture of Saravane. (C)

After fighting house to house along the route of advance, the *Groupes Mobiles* secured Saravane on 27 October. The NVA counterattacked, continuously shelling the irregulars on the night of 1-2 November. On 15 November, NVA battalions succeeded in reoccupying Saravane. According to CIA reporting, the entire civilian population withdrew with the irregulars. Tactical air strikes caused heavy damage to enemy troops in the town, and irregular forces engaged the remaining NVA troops as they left the town after the air strikes. Casualties were heavy on both sides. According to Agency officers involved, Hanoi had committed over 2,000 troops to the recapture of Saravane. On 21 November, however, three GM battalions (1,200 men) reentered the town. The situation remained fluid in the area as NVA units constantly shifted in anticipation of action by Laotian government and irregular forces. (C)

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Back at Paksong

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Along Route 23 east of P[illegible] irregular units were experiencing a series of shellings and probes. [redacted] received more than 150 rounds of [illegible]ed mortar, grenade, and rocket fire. Then, beginning on 21 November, new NVA units moved into the Lao Ngam area, near Paksong. (C)

On 26 November, while the NVA was fighting for control of Saravane, the CIA arranged for the airlift of almost 1,500 GM irregulars to an area 18 kilometers north of Paksong. Once again the NVA was caught off guard by a significant movement of troops directed by [redacted]. On the following day, these irregulars began moving south toward the town. Three battalions of [redacted] were added to the force moving on Paksong. Resistance increased. On 3 December the NVA sent tanks into the area, but tactical air strikes were called in against them. Finally, on 6 December, GM forces took control of Paksong. Within days, the irregulars also commanded the strategic high ground immediately east of the town. (C)

Over the next few weeks, the situation around Paksong remained fluid. Sporadic clashes indicated that the NVA had not conceded the area. On 15 December, Kearns was on the ground near Paksong supervising the infiltration of several hundred replacement troops for a [redacted] battalion exhausted by combat, [redacted]

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[illegible]d who had arrived on the scene by helicopter. At 1930 hours, eight rounds of 82mm mortar fire impacted near a battalion of Thai irregulars; hours later, 15 more rounds slammed in. A C-47 "Spooky" gunship silenced the suspected mortar positions, but there were casualties. Among them, John Kearns. (S)

Although Kearns was seriously wounded in the mortar attack, he

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directed counter-battery fire, led others to safety, and supervised as much of the evacuation of the wounded by helicopter as he could before being evacuated himself, his [redacted] operations assistant reported. Kearns died en route to the hospital. A mortar fragment had pierced his aorta. (S)

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Denouement (U)

CIA-supported action continued in the Paksong/Saravane area for several weeks after Kearns's death. While Task Force Phasouk and GM irregulars were securing Paksong, an NVA battalion launched a counterattack against the Laotian irregulars holding Saravane. Under the cover of hundreds of mortar rounds, the NVA gained a foothold in the northern half of the town and then launched a massive assault. NVA pressure was relentless, including the shelling of one key GM position with 5,500 rounds of mortar, howitzer, rocket, tank, and recoilless rifle fire, according to CIA field reporting. The irregulars were forced to withdraw in the second week of January. (C)

Despite the signing of the Paris Peace Accords on 27 January 1973, the enemy increased its military activity in Laos. Following the recapture of Saravane, Hanoi sent additional troops against the irregulars securing the Pakse-Paksong corridor. On 8 February, a heavy NVA barrage and infantry assaults forced a disorderly retreat from Paksong—over 500 irregulars deserted their units that night and fled back to Pakse. The Agency was able to stabilize several of the GM units, however, and they recaptured Paksong on 12 February. The town remained in non-communist hands as the ceasefire finally began to take hold in March and a general calm settled over southern Laos. (C)

> **"The efforts of Agency officers in Laos were . . . an important part of our nation's . . . ultimate victory in the Cold War."**

In the Final Analysis (U)

CIA officers and their irregular forces fought elements of at least four and possibly five NVA divisions in Laos. In their efforts to retain control over the strategic Laotian towns of Paksong and Saravane, the NVA had committed nine battalions from two different divisions against the CIA-led irregulars. Troops from a third NVA division were also reported in southern Laos toward the end of 1972. During the same timeframe, the irregulars in northern Laos confronted units of two more mainline NVA Divisions. (C)

During the Easter Offensive, the enemy suffered more than 100,000 casualties in its attacking force of 200,000—including possibly 40,000 killed. They lost more than half of their tanks and heavy artillery. The anticipated general uprising of the South Vietnamese people in support of the communists failed to occur. North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap later was removed as commander of the North Vietnamese Army, almost certainly in part because of the failed Easter Offensive.[12] (U)

[12] Sorley, pp. 339-340. (U)

In the communist onslaught, the South Vietnamese lost more than 8,000 killed, some 24,000 wounded, and nearly 3,000 missing. These casualties almost certainly would have been greater if the CIA-supported irregulars had not diverted and engaged so many NVA units in Laos, substantially impeding Hanoi's ability to reinforce its divisions in South Vietnam.[13] (S)

It took three years for Hanoi to recover sufficiently from these losses to mount another major offensive. After the Paris Peace Accords were signed, the North Vietnamese began to rebuild their army and resupply their troops, which were allowed to remain in place in the south under the terms of the Accords. South Vietnam came under communist rule in April 1975, followed soon thereafter by Cambodia and Laos. (U)

Hanoi won the battle for South Vietnam in the arena of American public opinion, not on the ground. America's Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency left Indochina with their courage, integrity, and professionalism intact. They would be needed in the battles that were to come–in Afghanistan, Grenada, Panama, and Iraq. The sacrifices and efforts of the men and women who served in Laos were not in vain. They were an important part of our nation's overall effort as we moved forward

[13] The author, who was the CIA Province-Officer-In-Charge in Kien Giang Province in South Vietnam from June 1972 to March 1973, recalls being the beneficiary of the efforts of the CIA irregulars in Laos. POW interrogations in September 1972 revealed that the 1st NVA Division, which had been attacking in both Kien Giang and Chau Doc Provinces in the Vietnamese Delta, was reduced to substantially less than half its strength—fewer than 1,500 men—largely because of the difficulty in receiving reinforcements. (S)

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from victories on the battlefield to the ultimate victory in World War. (S)

(b)(1)
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(b)(6)

Postscript (U)

John Kearns was awarded the Intelligence Star posthumously.

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CIA and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, Part II

Kirsten Lundberg

Editor's Note: This is the concluding installment of the case study written for Professors Ernest May and Philip Zelikow of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government which, in cooperation with CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, develops case studies that aid in illuminating issues related to the use of intelligence by policymakers. The first installment appeared in the spring 1995 edition of Studies in Intelligence.

Many within the intelligence establishment and elsewhere assumed that President Bush would build on the legacy left him by Reagan, particularly in relations with the Soviet Union. They were wrong. Bush decided instead on a pause to re-evaluate the relationship and in particular the reliability of Gorbachev as a negotiating partner. At the same time, he re-energized the way the executive branch used intelligence.

New Chain of Command

Personnel changes alone made a considerable difference in the way the new government used intelligence analysis. For one thing, Bush himself as a former DCI took an active interest in intelligence, knew the kinds of questions he wanted answered, and had respect for the product. Brent Scowcroft, the newly appointed National Security Adviser, chose as his deputy Robert Gates—another intelligence veteran. The Soviet specialist on the NSC staff was Condoleezza Rice, a Russian speaker and expert on the Soviet general staff who quickly proved herself an informed and skillful intelligence consumer. She, together with Baker deputies Dennis Ross and Robert Zoellick, became the administration's chief counselors on Soviet policy.

As important to the CIA as individual appointments, however, was the reconstitution of the National Security Council itself as a strong policy body with influence in the Oval Office. Traditionally, the NSC served as the CIA's primary client, filtering intelligence analysis for Cabinet members, the vice-president and president. Under Reagan, the institution lacked authority, which Bush restored.

Early on, Bush demonstrated that he expected top-quality intelligence reports. When he ordered up a national security review of the Soviet-US relationship, the State Department chaired the so-called Policy Coordinating Committee steering the interagency effort.

There were two parts to the exercise. The first was an intelligence assessment examining how real were the prospects for change in the USSR; the second part explored the policy implications of that. Within SOVA, NIO Blackwell remembers, there was no real dispute over the analysis in the intelligence piece. But the Office of the Secretary of Defense found unacceptable SOVA's conclusion that real change was possible, arguing instead that Gorbachev's reforms were still reversible. In the end, the SOVA language prevailed.

“Personnel changes alone made a considerable difference in the way the new government used intelligence analysis. For one thing, Bush himself as a former DCI took an active interest in intelligence, knew the kinds of questions he wanted answered, and had respect for the product.”

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The Community's debate over details in the report proved irrelevant, for Bush found the overall result unusable. With conclusions "coordinated" as customary down to the lowest common denominator of consensus, with opposing views largely weeded out, the final product was, as Rice termed it, "a bureaucratic document."

> *It wasn't in any sense of the word presidential. It wasn't in any sense of that word forward-leaning. It wasn't operational. It got the moniker status quo plus.... I think that's the last time we did anything that way.*

Bush asked Rice, who had served as executive secretary to the committee, and senior NSC staffer Robert Blackwill to redo it with a more practical policy focus. The resulting 7-page report, given to Bush in the spring of 1989, came in the middle of his "pause" to re-evaluate Washington's policies toward Moscow.

The Pause

Arnold Kanter, a senior NSC staffer for arms control during the Bush period, remembers some of the compelling reasons for stopping to reconsider:

> *Bush's advisers felt strongly in almost an unselfconscious way that they were a new administration. I think the outside world thought it was kind of the third Reagan term. Bush didn't see it that way at all. He thought it was a new administration.*

"Meanwhile, events in the USSR and Eastern Europe were unfolding so fast it was sometimes difficult indeed to distinguish between what was real and what was not."

Gorbachev's record, says Kanter, did not inspire 100 percent confidence:

> *Very few people who thought seriously about it thought of Gorbachev as a democrat. A brilliant tactician but a poor strategist. An expedient democrat, that is, someone who faced with horrendous economic problems came to the realization that the Soviet Union would not enter the 21st century as a major power on its present course. Coming to be convinced after trying real hard that the Party was part of the problem rather than part of the solution. This is not a guy who has deep principles, abiding commitments, and who was frankly dependable. He had also given evidence of someone who would take advantage of you if he could.*

The new philosophy toward US-Soviet relations which Rice and Blackwill articulated for Bush seemed suited to a fresh start: beyond containment. As their document, called NSD-23, said:

> *Containment was never an end in itself. It was a strategy born of the conditions of the postwar world. A new era may now be upon us. We may be able to move beyond containment to a new US policy that actively promotes the integration of the Soviet Union into the international system.*[47]

Rice remembers thinking that the time had come to go beyond the postwar division of Europe:

> *The idea was that détente had really been about mediated or moderated competition between two systems. What we now had was the collapse of the Soviet social system and the possibility that it could integrate into the international order.*

Bush, sticking to his decision to be deliberate in his Soviet policy, signed NSD-23 only on September 22. He used the "beyond containment" phrase, however, in a speech in May. The crux of his message was that the United States did not need to leap at Soviet proposals: if Moscow was serious, the offers would not vanish; if they disappeared, then they were not real.

Meanwhile, events in the USSR and Eastern Europe were unfolding so fast it was sometimes difficult indeed to distinguish between what was real and what was not.

1989—Watershed Year

The year started quietly enough. March 26, however, took its place in Soviet history as the date for the first multi-candidate elections in over 70 years. Around the country, the Communist Party found its monopoly challenged and toppled, as even unopposed Party candidates failed to win votes. The elections also marked the emergence for the first time of a threat to Gorbachev's preeminence

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on the Soviet political landscape. In a stunning political comeback, the radical reformer Boris Yeltsin, bounced from the Politburo in 1987 by Gorbachev, won election to parliament as Moscow's at-large candidate.

Milestone events continued to mount. In April, violence broke out in a corner of the Soviet empire. Soviet troops massacred peaceful demonstrators for independence in Tbilisi, the capital of the Georgian republic. In July, coal miners in Siberia went on strike, an historic rebellion by some of the state's most eulogized workers. In August, a top Soviet official publicly denounced the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrip protocols which gave the Baltics into Soviet hands. Immediately after this, Lithuania declared its annexation by the Soviet Union illegal. In retaliation, Moscow hit Lithuania with a trade embargo. But that same month, Gorbachev advised the head of Poland to let Solidarity come to power.

In November, the most startling event in a disturbing year shook the world: the fall of the Berlin Wall. While Gorbachev did not ordain its opening, many felt his lukewarm support of the East German leadership contributed to the courage of those who breached the wall and, within months, brought about the fall of Communist governments across Eastern/Central Europe.

A New Question for Intelligence

The Intelligence Community worked overtime to make sense of it all. The avalanche of change had finally laid to rest the question dividing analysts and policymakers alike. Debate no longer focused on whether Gorbachev's changes were bona fide. That point was moot, as NIO Bob Blackwell relates:

> *These are tangible things. The notion that somebody is doing all these things to undermine you and is ready to suck you in somewhere and then lower the hammer on you became a ludicrous proposition. So, thereafter, the proposition shifts to how far is this going to go and how much can he manage the instability? And a lot of our debates were how long can he stay on top of this? Is he still pushing things forward or holding them back?*

The year 1989 challenged the Intelligence Community to answer instead the question: can Gorbachev survive his own reform program?

View From the CIA—1989

The CIA's answer, at least in the first half of the year, was a qualified "maybe." In January, an estimate noted ethnic tensions rising to the point where "the stage appears to be set for a protracted struggle in which the risk of miscalculation is considerable." This was followed by an April document, "*Rising Political Instability Under Gorbachev: Understanding the Problem and Prospects for Resolution.*" Calling the Soviet Union "less stable...than at any time since Stalin's great purges in the 1930s," the assessment reported that "[e]ven Gorbachev realizes...that it is far from certain that he will be able to control the process he has set in motion":[48]

> *His apparent impatience and determination to push reform simultaneously on many fronts could alienate so many groups that even Gorbachev's political skills will not be able to prevent a coalition from forming against him.*

It pointed out the growing threat from nationalism, with fully half of some 1,200 political and economic demonstrations or work actions since January 1987 inspired by nationalist aspirations:

> *Gorbachev's hope of buying local support with greater autonomy is a dangerous gamble. It is far from clear that Moscow will be able to control this process, and it could unleash centrifugal forces that will pull the Soviet Union apart or create such serious tensions among nationalities that the ensuing social and political chaos will undermine Gorbachev's reforms.*

The report called the economic program a near disaster and predicted that the next few years would be "some of the most turbulent in Soviet history." Drawing a comparison with Czechoslovakia in 1968, the paper said a constituency arguing for more radical reforms, led by Yeltsin, might gain control. On the other hand, the analysis also raised more pointedly than before the possibility of a conservative backlash and coup attempt against Gorbachev:

> *A growing perception within the leadership that reforms are threatening the stability of the regime could lead to a conservative reaction....Should a sharp polarization of the leadership prevent it from acting resolutely to deal with a growing crisis, the*

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prospects would increase for a conservative coup involving a minority of Politburo members supported by elements of the military and the KGB.

The piece predicted that Gorbachev would be looking for foreign policy successes to bolster his position at home, including arms control agreements which would allow him to reduce military spending.

A month later, the National Intelligence Council sponsored a piece on Gorbachev's chances for survival. The Intelligence Community view was that he would continue in power for at least the next three to four years. But SOVA took a formal dissent from the report, writing that the situation was so volatile and tensions so great within society and within the elite that Gorbachev could not survive unless he turned to the right politically. SOVA gave Gorbachev a blunt 50-50 chance of survival unless he retreated from his reforms.[49]

But even that gloomy view turned more pessimistic by late summer, when SOVA began its annual review of the research program for the year ahead.

SOVA Breaks Away: "Domestic Gambles"

George Kolt had just taken over as director of SOVA from Doug MacEachin. At the annual planning session for next year's research program, some analysts said that, in their opinion, Gorbachev's policies were not sustainable and were leading the country toward disaster. Says Kolt:

I think that's the turning point at which we really started to see the growing dangers to Gorbachev, and the dangers were from two sides. Number one is that others in the [Communist] Party would see where his policies were leading and would throw him out. . . .

The second process going on is that these critics of Gorbachev in the party were really right, that his policies were not sustainable, that they were leading to the loss of the Party's supremacy which Gorbachev was simultaneously trying to sustain.

The second point was strongly argued in a paper titled "*Gorbachev's Domestic Gambles and Instability*," prepared by senior analyst Grey Hodnett and published in September 1989. The paper blamed many of the symptoms of crisis on Gorbachev and his inconsistent policies. It argued that *perestroika* was too limited to fulfill expectations, that "direct and violent confrontation" with the Baltic states was nearly inevitable, and that the failure to push through a free market system would produce only economic deterioration, social unrest and perhaps revolution:

Conditions are likely to lead in the foreseeable future to continuing crises and instability on an even larger scale—in the form of mass demonstrations, strikes, violence, and perhaps even the localized emergence of parallel centers of power.[50]

While conceding he had no easy choices, the assessment said Gorbachev was gambling on ill-conceived strategies. Gorbachev's most generous offer to non-Russian nationalists, for example, would not satisfy them, while "allowing these people freedom to protest without being able to redress their basic grievances is a recipe for escalating crises." The regime's recent emergency financial stabilization plan "more likely than not will fail," while Gorbachev's tinkering with Communist Party authority was "undermining its ability to integrate Soviet society before new political institutions are capable of coping," said SOVA.

The paper predicted growing pressure on the regime to crack down, or on Gorbachev to resign. It foresaw the possibility of a "traditionalist restoration" or coup. Even were Gorbachev to remain in power, much would depend on his ability to move to a market economy, without which SOVA warned of a potential breakup of the union, or what an academic article SOVA cited had called "Ottomanization—a slow process of imperial decline with unplanned piecemeal emancipation of constituent entities":

By putting economic reform on hold and pursuing an inadequate financial stabilization program, Gorbachev has brought Soviet internal policy to a fateful crossroads, seriously reducing the chances that his rule—if it survives—will take the path toward long-term stability.

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The United States would need skill in reacting to a volatile situation, said the paper. Soviet domestic problems were, however, likely to keep the USSR out of foreign adventures:

> *Whether or not Gorbachev retains office, the United States for the foreseeable future will confront a Soviet leadership that faces endemic popular unrest. ... This instability is likely to preoccupy Moscow for some time to come and...prevent a return to the arsenal state economy that generated the fundamental military threat to the West in the period since World War II. Moscow's focus on internal order in the USSR is likely to accelerate the decay of Communist systems and the growth of regional instability in Eastern Europe.*

Kolt felt the paper deserved strong support, although some CIA analysts forcefully disagreed with the paper's conclusions. The paper's scope note reflected this, saying "the report is a speculative paper drafted by a senior analyst in the Office of Soviet Analysis":

> *In a period of epochal change in the USSR, anticipating the future is a hazardous undertaking, and the issues dealt with in the report hardly invite unanimity of judgment.*

"I decided," declared Kolt, "that I was not going to let this thing be coordinated down to the lowest common denominator":

> *We were saying no, he cannot muddle through. This situation is changing so much qualitatively, there is such a dynamic at play, that this is going to lead to major discontinuity. ... What that paper did is begin to set us aside from the rest of the Community, whose view in effect didn't change through let's say early 1991.*

"It was ironic that, just as SOVA lost hope for Gorbachev, Bush and his senior administration officials took up Gorbachev's cause in earnest."

The SOVA paper mentioned in passing "populist figure" Boris Yeltsin. Privately, some analysts within SOVA felt that the growing domestic opposition to Gorbachev would be headed by Boris Yeltsin.

The Prevailing View

The countervailing view on Gorbachev's chances for survival were laid out in an NIE prepared under NIO Bob Blackwell. The paper predicted that, although the economic situation in 1990-91 would be critical, Gorbachev would weather it. While noting that Gorbachev's policies could threaten the system's viability and in any case would produce one of the most tumultuous periods in Soviet history, it went on to say most believe Gorbachev would survive this period of tumult without imposing the kind of repression that would snuff out reform. The estimate predicted that, although harsh measures might be taken against nationalists, as in Tbilisi in April, they would be neither widespread nor lasting.

Thanks to Kolt's efforts, Hodnett's views were included in the NIE as parallel, dissenting text. Secretary of Defense Cheney, for one, found Hodnett persuasive. The lower levels of the State Department also proved a receptive audience. Gates, too, was listening. As a result of the stream of reporting out of SOVA, he set up in September 1989 a top-secret contingency planning group "looking at the possibility of the collapse of the Soviet Union and what we would do."

But, as Kolt remembers it, "the high-level people rejected it." The more optimistic NIE assessment resonated at the White House and the National Security Council. It was ironic that, just as SOVA lost hope for Gorbachev, Bush and his senior administration officials took up Gorbachev's cause in earnest.

The Administration—Learning To Love Gorbachev

By July 1989, Bush had concluded that Gorbachev was a force for stable change and should be supported. Bush decided secretly to invite Gorbachev to an "informal" summit off the coast of Malta in December 1989. Scowcroft advised against it. Gates likewise told Bush to make no moves until the Soviet internal situation grew clearer, that it was too soon to cast his lot with Gorbachev. But Bush had made up his mind. "Look, this guy *is perestroika*," he told Scowcroft.[51]

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The administration members who remained skeptical of Gorbachev were, in fact, asked to keep their opinions to themselves. Gates was scheduled to deliver a speech in the fall of 1989 at a conference in Bethesda, Maryland. The State Department vetoed the speech on the grounds that it departed too radically from administration policy. As Secretary of State Baker observed at the time:

> *If we keep saying he can't pull it off, it'll begin to sound as though that's what we want.*[52]

Gates's view had, in fact, changed remarkably little since 1985. NIO Blackwell, who saw drafts of the speech, recalls that it portrayed Gorbachev as "really out more to undermine us than he is to fundamentally change."[53] The prohibition on dissenting views did not, apparently, extend to Vice-President Daniel Quayle who, in October, publicly called Gorbachev a "master of public relations" and *perestroika* a "form of Leninism."

As the Malta summit approached, however, the unfolding drama of the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe came to dominate world headlines and policy discussions alike. Debate over the future of the USSR and Gorbachev shifted with the latest developments in the rapidly changing East bloc situation. On November 9, the Berlin Wall fell. In response, intelligence officers presented Bush, Baker, and Scowcroft with a wide range of views on Gorbachev. A CIA briefing at Camp David before Malta revealed the growing complexity of Gorbachev's situation. Led by DCI Judge Webster, George Kolt, Bob Blackwell, and SOVA's Bob Abbott and Fritz Ermarth gave brief presentations on Soviet economics, politics, society, and nationalism. At the briefing, says Ermarth, "the whole range of issues was laid out, including Gorbachev's increasingly troubled future." Asked whether *perestroika* could succeed, Ermarth replied that, first of all, different definitions of *perestroika* abounded:

> *What one believed about the long term depended in large part on whether you believed something very important but unprovable: that all humans, including Russians, want and are capable of democracy.*

But, overall, the Bush White House was sending the message that the President had confidence in his negotiating partner and was prepared to do serious business with him. His confidence seemed justified when, at the Malta meeting on December 2-3, 1989, Gorbachev told Bush that "we don't consider you an enemy anymore." Bush returned the gesture of reconciliation when he pledged to exercise restraint on the issue of Baltic independence if Gorbachev would promise to prevent violence in the region.

Bush emerged from the Malta summit, where gales tested the physical as well as the moral mettle of both presidents, with a four-part Soviet policy agenda: help Gorbachev remain in power; keep him on the path to reform; lock in agreements favorable to the United States; and concede nothing which could be harmful in the long run were Gorbachev forced out of office.[54] In substance it resembled closely the Reagan agenda, the "pause" notwithstanding. But Bush had a new factor to contend with which had arisen since Reagan left office: Boris Yeltsin.

The Yeltsin Factor

When Grey Hodnett developed his analysis of Gorbachev's decline, he and others at SOVA predicted that the growing domestic opposition to Gorbachev would be headed by Yeltsin. Events seemed to bear them out. On May 29, 1990, Yeltsin was elected leader of the Russian parliament. At the 28th Communist Party Congress in July 1990, Yeltsin quit the Party in a public display of defiance. As far as analysts could observe, Yeltsin had a more legitimate claim to representing democratic forces than did Gorbachev.

The majority of administration officials did not welcome this assessment. While a few, such as Cheney, agreed that Yeltsin represented the best hope for the future, most felt that Yeltsin was unstable, lacking in leadership qualities. There were substantiated reports that he was a heavy drinker. Most important, policymakers did not want to undermine Gorbachev by appearing to accept Yeltsin—who was only a parliamentarian—on equal terms. Thus, when Yeltsin visited Washington in September 1989, he was—despite pleas from Gates and Fritz Ermarth, chairman of the National Intelligence Council—granted an appointment with Scowcroft, not Bush. Instead, Bush "dropped in" on Scowcroft while Yeltsin was there. Yeltsin favorably impressed neither Bush nor Baker.

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The issue of what to do about Yeltsin from a policy viewpoint would continue to divide the policymaking and intelligence communities. The issue became even more complicated in early 1990 as German reunification became more certain and Moscow's approval a necessary part of that historic process. Meanwhile, Yeltsin's popularity in the USSR continued to grow, seemingly in inverse proportion to the declining reputation of Gorbachev.

Is Gorbachev Slipping?—1990

According to CIA reports in March, Gorbachev's government was losing control:

> *It is likely that political instability, social upheaval, and interethnic conflict will persist and could intensify. ...[There is] a general inability to implement its directives in many national republics, a loss of control over society in general, and the precipitous decline of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, secessionist movements in the Baltic Republics and elsewhere, serious interethnic strife, and continued economic deterioration.*[55]

The Cheney-Webster Affair

Clearly, not all branches of the US Government shared this view. In an unusual display of publicly aired, differing views, Secretary of Defense Cheney and CIA chief William Webster testified on the same day before different Congressional committees. Webster, in testimony approved in

"The recent acceleration of political events in the USSR could soon produce major discontinuity in Soviet policy and substantial changes in the top leadership."

advance by Secretary of State Baker, told the House Armed Services Committee on March 1 that he found it highly unlikely there would be any revival of the Soviet military threat. In contradiction, Cheney the same day warned the House Foreign Affairs Committee that a turnaround in the Soviet reform process could give rise to a renewed military threat.

Cheney was defending the proposed Bush defense budget of $306 billion for fiscal 1991. Nonetheless, the conflicting testimony highlighted the ongoing debate within the administration about the durability of Gorbachev's reforms. Webster asserted that even a successor regime to Gorbachev would "probably continue to pursue arms control agreements with the West. It would be unlikely, in addition, to seek a broad reversal of the changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe or to try to revive the Warsaw Pact."[56] Cheney took an opposite tack, stating that another Soviet leader "could reverse military course decisively." Both men agreed, however, that the long-term outlook for Gorbachev was not secure.

In late May, Gorbachev attended another summit with President Bush, this time in Washington. The Soviet leader clearly welcomed the adulation of American crowds. But at summit events, policymakers could see for themselves that Gorbachev was losing influence, even over his own military. On at least one occasion, he had to renege on a statement after whispered consultations with aides. A measure of Gorbachev's growing desperation was that he begged Bush to sign a trade agreement not specifically linked to the Soviet embargo against Lithuania.[57]

The news was no better in June when, once again, the CIA raised the possibility of a coup:

> *The recent acceleration of political events in the USSR could soon produce major discontinuity in Soviet policy and substantial changes in the top leadership. President Gorbachev is losing control over the political process and will be under increasing pressure to make a dramatic move to the left or right to try to regain the political initiative. The period of measured reform, directed by the central authorities in Moscow, is coming to an end.*[58]

In July, the Agency reported that "differences in the economic development of the republics are fueling ethnic tensions and strengthening the centrifugal forces that threaten the Soviet Union's continued existence as a multinational state." By September, Central Asia was the focus of concern:

> *Moscow's challenge in Central Asia is likely to evolve from policing outbreaks of violence to dealing with outright defiance of*

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its policies by republican regimes and, in the region's poorest and most Islamic areas, insurrectionist and secessionist movements.[59]

But, by then, the fall of 1990, Bush needed Gorbachev as much as Gorbachev needed him. Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait on August 2 and the United States embarked on a crusade to muster the support of the world community, through the UN, against Iraqi aggression. No country was more crucial to this multilateral effort than the Soviet Union. The two presidents met in Helsinki in September to discuss their cooperation in the Gulf.

The Helsinki Crossroads

At Helsinki, the two men felt warmly toward one another. Bush had done Gorbachev the favor of signing the trade agreement at their May summit. Gorbachev had made a major concession to Western geopolitical aims when, on July 14, he withdrew Soviet objections to a reunified Germany under NATO. His agreement laid to rest the most enduring symbol of the Cold War: a divided Germany.

The Helsinki meeting clearly had one overriding goal: to get Bush and Gorbachev together in order that they might publicly reaffirm their joint opposition to the Kuwait invasion, and in this it succeeded. The meeting was historic for reversing 45 years of US policy aimed at keeping the Soviets out of the Middle East, seeking instead their active cooperation. The two leaders also devoted several hours to discussing progress on arms control negotiations, including START and Conventional Forces in Europe.

But lively discussion centered on developments within the Soviet Union. Gorbachev seemed taken with a much-publicized economic reform scheme for the Soviet Union known as the Shatalin plan. The so-called 500-Day Plan by economist Stanislav Shatalin called, among other things, for the sale and privatization of state enterprises, the dismantling of state farms, reductions in government subsidies to a wide array of enterprises, currency reform, and a new banking system. It was an admittedly ambitious effort to jump-start Gorbachev's stalled economic reforms.[60]

But within months, Gorbachev had abandoned the Shatalin plan and taken a sharp political turn to the right. Gorbachev's move dismayed his reform-minded supporters, confirmed those doubters who had always seen in him a Communist in free market clothing, and put his international reputation as a reliable partner at risk.

A Missed Opportunity

Some of the ranking US experts on the Soviet Union saw the Helsinki meeting both at the time and in retrospect as a failed opportunity for Bush to put some very straight talk to Gorbachev. Blunt advice on the need to cooperate with even distasteful political opponents, if acted upon by Gorbachev, might in their opinion have prevented subsequent violence, kept Gorbachev as president, and fostered a peaceful transition to a confederation.
Jack Matlock went to Moscow as US Ambassador in April 1987, attended the Helsinki meeting, and witnessed Gorbachev's subsequent turn to the right:

This was one of Gorbachev's great failures, that he didn't push his reform more rapidly. But we could have pushed him harder in the fall of 1990 to do so, and I think if we had he might have made it. I think we had the chance, and I think Reagan would have done it because Reagan had more confidence in his own ability and was more willing to take chances than Bush. Bush had his emotional attachments, but basically he was very conservative and had more of a caretaker president attitude.

Matlock argues that direct advice was "the only way to have prevented [Gorbachev's] turn to the right":

We would have better served the Union by pressing him to accept the Shatalin plan and by giving him some encouragement that he would find support in the West.... Also [we sent a message] by our own actions in being too cautious in dealing with Yeltsin and the other [republican leaders]...I didn't feel I should have to go over and explain to the foreign minister every time we had a high-level appointment with Yeltsin. And the White House seemed to have that attitude.

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Eric Edelman, who moved to the Defense Department as liaison for the State Department in April 1990, also calls the summer and fall of 1990 a "tremendous missed opportunity...when Yeltsin and Gorbachev were groping toward a rapprochement and working together on the economic issue":

> *But the idea of trying to promote a coalition or a grouping, a union of the reform forces, never was pushed. In part, because everyone's attention got refocused after August 2 on the Gulf. And secondly, because there was very real bias that Gorbachev was our guy...Gorbachev's been a real prince. He's given us everything we've wanted in arms control.*

What Edelman considered an overfocus on arms control prevented the US Government in his opinion from understanding that "the political dynamic was such in Russia, moving in such a direction that if the democratic movement succeeded, not only would what we had negotiated be preserved, but that you'd be able to go further."

George Kolt at the CIA likewise felt that earlier US attention to Yeltsin could have averted later developments:

> *It was not a question of Gorbachev's policies are going to fail, therefore you should no longer deal with him. You have to deal with existing governments. But I do fault the policy people for ignoring other things that could have been done, such as dealing with Yeltsin much earlier by giving him much greater recognition, being much more supportive of the democratic movement in Russia. ...We could have facilitated a much smoother evolution in the Soviet Union than what occurred, which would have been not only in Gorbachev's interest, but our interest as well.*

But Bush administration defenders object that any attempt to push Gorbachev faster along the path of reform would only have galvanized his rightwing opponents earlier, when they might have been successful. Condi Rice, for example, believes that "had the coup come in January [1991], not August, it would have succeeded."

Arnold Kanter, the arms control expert at the NSC, also believes that Gorbachev could not have moved any faster:

> *If he would have moved in the direction of loosening Moscow's control over the various republics, if he would have moved faster or more ostentatiously from strong central control to a looser federation, it seems to me that would have done nothing but reinforce the conviction of the coup plotters that this guy is dangerous. And it would have motivated them to move sooner rather than later.*

Gates, then Deputy National Security Adviser, recalls that top US officials, and Bush in particular, may have given Gorbachev advice. In fact, says Gates, Gorbachev "was encouraged to deal with Yeltsin":

> *But you are dealing with human beings. And they hated each other by that time.*

In any event, believes Gates, an earlier acceptance of Yeltsin would have changed nothing for US policy:

> *The real issue was less Yeltsin than the pressure to abandon Gorbachev and swing to Yeltsin. While the Soviet Union still existed, that didn't make any sense at all. You could stop trashing Yeltsin. You could open lines of communication to Yeltsin. But it was Gorbachev making the decisions on START and on all of the issues that we were engaged with the Soviet Union on, about Afghanistan, on Cambodia, on Angola. So the notion that we stuck by Gorbachev too long is just nonsensical and doesn't reflect the reality.*

What had become a reality was that SOVA's backing of Yeltsin since the fall of 1989 had been noted at the White House. According to Gates, "A lot of policymakers thought the intelligence folks had an agenda and therefore I think tended sometimes to discount their influence."

Don't Shoot the Messenger

The strength of administration commitment to Gorbachev was illustrated when DCI William Webster felt compelled to deny that the CIA was in some sense "pushing"

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Yeltsin. "Don't shoot the messenger," pleaded Webster. NIC Chairman Ermarth in turn denied accusations that he was a Yeltsin lover. "I'm a Yeltsin watcher," he replied.[61]

Such defense aside, it was true that those within the CIA advocating greater openness to Soviet republican leaders came to feel that even though this administration listened to their assessments, it paid them no heed. As George Kolt puts it:

> *A lot of our analysis might have been read, but it was completely rejected when you started talking about Gorbachev's weaknesses, the weaknesses of his policy, the danger of his policy.*

Gorbachev Swings Right

By December 1990, Gorbachev gave alarming signs of retreat from his reform program as he strengthened ties to the Communist rightwing. In late November, Gorbachev had proposed a union treaty giving greater autonomy to the republics. But he countermanded that conciliatory gesture when, on December 2, he fired his moderate interior minister and replaced him with a former KGB chief. Gorbachev's close adviser, Alexander Yakovlev, warned publicly about the re-emergence of reactionary forces.

On December 17, Gorbachev told the assembled parliament that the national crisis was deeper than initially thought, and he asked for

"...those within the CIA advocating greater openness to Soviet republican leaders came to feel that even though this administration listened to their assessments, it paid them no heed."

emergency powers to create "strong government, tight discipline and control of the implementation of decisions":

> *Then we shall be able to ensure normal food supplies and rein in and stop interethnic strife. If we fail to achieve this, we will inevitably see greater discord, the rampage of dark forces and the breakup of our state.*[62]

The Congress of People's Deputies gave Gorbachev much of what he asked for despite a plea from Yeltsin, who argued that the nation did not need "Kremlin diktat":

> *The way out of the crisis requires honest dialogue, with equal rights between the center and the republics. This does not mean the disintegration of the Union. On the contrary, this is the only way to save it.*

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, tired of blame from the right for "losing" Eastern Europe, added his own warning to the rising chorus. On December 20, he resigned, startling not only the Soviet Union but the US administration. Shevardnadze warned that "dictatorship is coming":

> *No one knows what kind of dictatorship this will be and who will come—what kind of dictator, and what the regime will be like.*[63]

Within weeks, Shevardnadze's sober prediction seemed on its way to fulfillment. On January 2, crack Black Beret Soviet troops seized buildings in Lithuania and Latvia, two of the rebellious Baltic states. On January 13, Soviet troops killed 15 peaceful demonstrators in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. On January 20, dubbed "Black Sunday," Black Berets shot their way into the Latvian Interior Ministry, leaving four dead.

In the midst of this, on January 16, 1991, the UN under US leadership launched Desert Storm to retake Kuwait from Saddam Hussein.

Did Gorbachev Know?

The White House debated furiously how to respond to the Soviet developments. When Shevardnadze resigned, Bush had told reporters that:

> *Any time you move from a totalitarian, totally controlled state to an open state...you're bound to have problems. ... Far be it from me to try to fine-tune the difficulties that they're having there.*[64]

But the charges against Gorbachev were much more serious in January. Although Gorbachev denied fore-

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knowledge of the Baltic attacks, most observers were inclined to discount this disclaimer.[65] As the State Department desk officer at the time for the Soviet Union, Alexander Vershbow, remembers it, "the Lithuanian crisis sort of jarred everyone":

> *In the view of those who saw the devolution process as accelerating, spinning out of control, it was a sign of things to come. But for those who were determined to press ahead with a Gorby-centric approach, it was seen as an aberration that we had to manage and tamp down.*

NSC Soviet expert Rice remembers early 1991 as the most alarming period of her tenure at the NSC because Gorbachev had so isolated himself from his reform-minded supporters:

> *He began to resemble the classic isolated leader surrounding himself with people who had no purpose in mind but to reestablish an authoritarian state. ... The costs of* perestroika *were suddenly clear. Lithuania was about to declare independence, Ukraine and Russia were talking independence. [Plus] we were occupied in the Gulf. I still to this day think they thought they had us over a barrel. Add all of that up, and I thought that was a point of maximum danger.*

Most observers concur that, whether or not Gorbachev gave the direct orders to shoot in the Baltics, "he created the conditions," as Rice says. But public reaction, both domestic and abroad, unnerved Gorbachev at that point. The hardliners were "shocked," she adds, when the United States and European nations threatened to withdraw aid. Even more important, Gorbachev couldn't go through with it because of his personality:

> *Confronted with the bloodshed, he couldn't stomach it and he backed off. In that we were lucky it was him. I think, by the way, that was when the hard right in Russia lost faith in him and decided he was part of the problem.*

The Intelligence Report

The CIA took the view that Gorbachev was behind the violence in the Baltics. In a Spot Commentary written for Bush, the Agency assigned Gorbachev responsibility "strategically if not tactically." On January 24, the *National Intelligence Daily* carried an article titled "Crisis at the Turning Point." It said that "Gorbachev has started a conflict without a visible program and with scant prospect of long-term success. He will not easily escape the predicament for which he is largely responsible, and he may become its principal casualty."[66]

Throughout the crisis, Rice for one felt that the Intelligence Community performance was "magnificent." Much of her time during that period was spent chairing emergency sessions of a small, secret interagency committee working on contingency plans for the Soviet Union.

Using Intelligence—A Policymaker's View

Rice's committee was the one started by Gates in the fall of 1989. The committee was, says Rice, "a very small and secret effort to ask ourselves the radical questions" about the Soviet Union's future.[67] Some of the questions the committee examined were: what if Soviet nuclear weapons fell into dangerous hands?; what if the USSR ended violently?; if the US government learned of plans for a coup, would it tell Gorbachev?; what if Soviet troops in Germany refused to go home? Recalls Rice:

> *These meetings were so secret our secretaries weren't allowed to put them on our calendars because all we needed was a story that the administration was making contingency plans for the violent breakup of the Soviet Union, and our Soviet policy was dead.*

The committee, as well as her expertise, made Rice one of the more aggressive users of intelligence in the Bush administration. She was known within CIA circles for actively seeking out differing opinions directly from analysts. In general, Rice found intelligence analysis most useful in a crisis situation such as the Baltic events:

> *I think that looking for big strategic answers from the Intelligence Community is actually the wrong use. I think where they're best is at the tactical level. If you ask me, did I need the Intelligence Community to know that the Soviet Union was collapsing*

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and that Gorbachev was trying to put a finger in the dike, but that in fact the dike was coming at him and Eastern Europe was exploding? No, I could read that in The New York Times.

She found the "big picture" National Intelligence Estimates too obvious:

They would say, for example, Gorbachev could try and hold on to Eastern Europe, or he could not try and hold on to Eastern Europe. Well, I probably could have figured that out, right? But what they're very good at doing is watching with a real worm's-eye view. They can tell you it looks like the threat to move airborne forces into Lithuania to enforce the draft is credible. And they can marry that up with hard-core military intelligence. ... What you need help with is, 'This is going to happen today.' So we're not caught in the position of announcing a summit tomorrow, and the next day they invade Lithuania. That's where intelligence is helpful.

Verbal Intelligenc

Analysts and their customers alike emphasize that in many instances, the most useful intelligence to the policymaker is that conveyed in a briefing. In such a setting, policymakers solicit the well-informed opinions of analysts on issues of pressing concern. The responses, freed from the need to "coordinate" views as in a carefully crafted written estimate, can be frank and enlightening.

Two analysts recall instances when they were asked to brief officials at the White House. "Collectively," says one "we knew somewhat better than we wrote. ...While our documentary record was careful, our dialogues with top policymakers were far richer." The other asks rhetorically, "How is intelligence conveyed?" and answers himself: "Much more is conveyed orally. The written product represents 1/10th of the total."

Andrew Carpendale, an assistant to Secretary of State Baker, concurs that informal networks of communication were very important for intelligence reports:

Because these types of communications... leave little of a paper trail, there is a natural tendency to downplay them, but in my estimation, they were probably more important in shaping the mindset of decisionmakers than the formal communications.

At the State Department, he recalls, analysts would visit every two or three months to meet with top officials. Such meetings, comments Carpendale, allowed analysts to "present a more personal and sophisticated assessment of the evolving situation, as they were not required to vet their views with others [and] allowed us to ask them questions which were more policy relevant and useful than would be the case otherwise." Officials at State would, in turn, draw on this information when drafting their own analytical memorandums to the Secretary before key meetings with Soviet leaders.

An Analyst Turned Consumer

Robert Gates, knowledgeable about how intelligence analysis is produced, was not so critical of the NIE format. But he had his own problems with the intelligence he was getting at the NSC. Most had to do with the old CIA predicament of seeking a consensus view versus airing differences of opinion. Gates had concluded that seeking a completely unified view was a "serious mistake":

One of the most difficult problems that I had was that I knew there were bitter differences of view across the board on Soviet policy. And it was very tough to get SOVA to bring that to the surface.

To counteract this, recalls Blackwell, Gates would order up estimates which would try to get at the differences of opinion within the Community, to explore different scenarios. By and large, comments Blackwell, who found the exercise thought-provoking," analysts hated this. It was not "sources and methods." Gates may have been unaware of analyst resentment at what appeared to them a form of "make-work." But they did not charge him with telling them what to write. Neither did Gates ever feel during his time at the NSC that CIA intelligence analysis was written to suit a policy agenda:

I was worried about the lack of an expression of differences. I was worried about the lack of greater candor about the reliability of some of the sources. I was worried about the lack of alternative scenarios. I had a lot of

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worries. Politicization wasn't one of them. I had no concern that somebody at the Agency had an agenda. The process is too uncontrollable for that.

If anything, as 1991 unfolded, CIA assessments of Gorbachev's dwindling odds came increasingly into conflict with administration hopes for his survival. In publishing these views, comments Nick Burns, then deputy to Rice, the CIA exercised its unique responsibility within the policy community:

I think elements of the Agency were kind of fearless. They did not tell policymakers what they wanted to hear. ... You've got to have somebody [in government] who doesn't care what the president thinks of them.

The Soviet Cauldron

SOVA paused in April 1991 to do a comprehensive assessment of the unraveling events in the USSR. In a special 9-page report entitled *"The Soviet Cauldron"* and sent to policymakers on April 25, SOVA warned that "economic crisis, independence aspirations and anti-Communist forces are breaking down the Soviet empire and system of governance." The estimate characterized the central economy as broken and Gorbachev's credibility as zero. It once again raised the possibility of a coup attempt, but also the chance that such a coup might fail.

"If anything, as 1991 unfolded, CIA assessments of Gorbachev's dwindling odds came increasingly into conflict with administration hopes for his survival."

The report pointed specifically to burgeoning independence movements in Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltics, and Georgia. It pointed out that the centrally planned economy had "broken down irretrievably and is being replaced by a mixture of republic and local barter arrangements, some of whose aspects resemble a market, but which do not constitute a coherent system." New media were springing up daily, moored by the rise of "inchoate" new political parties.

Gorbachev, reported SOVA, had transformed from "ardent reformer to consolidator":

His attempts to preserve the essence of a center-dominated union, Communist Party rule, and a centrally planned economy without the broad use of force, however, have driven him to tactical expedients that are not solving basic problems and are hindering but not preventing the development of a new system.

SOVA predicted five possible early developments: public riots or strikes; heightened activity by antigovernment forces; the deaths from overwork or assassination of either Gorbachev or Yeltsin; the rise of strong republican leaders; a reactionary coup in the name of law and order. The report found a coup attempt "the most fateful" possibility, although it discerned signs of preparation for such an event:

Explosive events have become increasingly possible.... The reactionary leaders, with or without Gorbachev, could judge that the last chance to act had come and move under the banner of law and order.... Military MVD and KGB leaders are making preparations for the broad use of force in the political process.

The primary target of coup plotters would be Yeltsin, said SOVA, because he "is the only leader with mass appeal." But long-term prospects for coup leaders, it opined, "are poor, and even short-term success is far from assured" because of the uncertain loyalty of the armed forces and the likelihood of widespread opposition.

SOVA foresaw a confederal Soviet Union by the end of the 1990s:

With or without Gorbachev, with or without a putsch, the most likely prospect for the end of this decade, if not earlier, is a Soviet Union transformed into some independent states and a confederation of the remaining republics, including Russia.

The report gave scenarios for three possible Soviet Unions in the coming year: a continued political stalemate;

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an attempted dictatorship; a breakthrough by the pluralists (republican forces).

Gorbachev's Future

By May, the Agency had become even more forceful, pronouncing Gorbachev's rule over and a major shift of power to the republics already underway. In an analysis dated May 23, the DI said:

> *Gorbachev remains an important player on the Soviet political scene, especially in foreign and defense policy, but his domination of it has ended and will not be restored. Whether or not he is still in office a year from now, a major shift of power to the republics will have occurred unless it has been blocked by a traditionalist coup.*[68]

No authority was any longer in a position to cope with nationalist demands and the deteriorating economy. Although the CIA analysis saw a ray of hope in an April agreement between Gorbachev and republican leaders, long-term and lasting compromise seemed unlikely, given Gorbachev's record of fighting to maintain central control:

> *The reformers' and traditionalists' basic goals for the future of the union are diametrically opposed, so there is little prospect that Gorbachev's so-called centrist course can defuse the crisis. ...No matter what happens, the current political system in the Soviet Union is doomed.*

The assessment posited several possible outcomes: republican leaders force out Gorbachev; massive strikes topple the government; a coup by hardliners. The analysis conjectured that the danger to Gorbachev from hardliners was greatest if he were perceived as selling out to the republics:

> *In short, the Soviet Union is now in a revolutionary situation in the sense that it is in a transition from the old order to an as yet undefined new order. Although the transition might occur peaceably, the current center-dominated political system is doomed. As happened in Eastern Europe over the past two years, the ingredients are now present in the USSR that could lead not only to a rapid change in the regime, but in the political system as well. ...The current political situation is highly volatile and could quickly unravel and throw the country into a succession crisis with little warning. The security services are feeling increasingly desperate and there is a possibility that they could act against Gorbachev at any time.*

Also in May, the DI published an assessment of the Soviet economy which sounded many of the same gloomy notes as more political analyses. It made the point once again that Gorbachev had undone the old command system yet hesitated in the difficult process of introducing a market economy, with disastrous results. A smooth evolution toward a federal structure based on a draft union treaty published in March might, said the analysis, "improve economic organization by eliminating much of the confusion concerning areas of authority."[69] But the DI still foresaw a minimum drop of 10 percent in 1991 GNP.

"The Soviet Cauldron" and subsequent analyses were circulated to all leading members of the government and the relevant Congressional committee members. Within the administration, the CIA warnings were listened to, even believed. But they did not significantly affect US policy in large part, say administration officials, because it was not in the US interest to tilt support away from Gorbachev and toward the republics.

To What Degree Yeltsin?

Once again, the question of Gorbachev's staying power raised the issue of how much official support the United States should offer Yeltsin and his followers. His sway was growing: 100,000 supporters defied a Gorbachev-imposed ban on March 28 to demonstrate in Moscow on Yeltsin's behalf. Disagreement within the administration was leading to mixed policy signals. During the Baltic crisis of January, for example, some voices had argued forcefully for sending Ambassador Matlock to see Yeltsin. Rice and others at the NSC felt that was unwise. As it was, Matlock, who in Moscow did not know of the Washington discussion, visited Yeltsin on his own initiative in the midst of the crisis.

Within the executive branch, one faction strongly favored encouraging greater openness toward Yeltsin. Its members included Cheney, and, to a

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lesser degree Baker, Gates, and, Matlock. Yeltsin, says Matlock, "really was the leader of the opposition in the whole country as well as increasingly the leader of Russia." Gorbachev, he says, had become a spoiler:

> *Certainly from 1989 on, every time they had a deal Gorbachev would walk away from it. [Yeltsin aides] would bring drafts [of agreements] and Gorbachev would sit on them. ... He wasn't dealing in good faith.*

On the other side were President Bush and most members of the White House staff who still saw signs that Gorbachev was working toward reform. In March, for example, Gorbachev sponsored a nationwide referendum on whether the country should be reestablished as a federation of republics. A draft union treaty was published. In late April, Gorbachev met with Yeltsin and the leaders of eight other republics in what proved indeed to be the beginning of a political swing back toward the center.

US National Interest

But even without these encouraging political developments, say administration officials, the US national interest continued to lie with supporting Gorbachev. As National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft told his aides in no uncertain terms: "We're not going to do anything that looks like we're casting our lot with Yeltsin against Gorbachev."[70]

The Soviet leader had been cooperative in many areas of US concern, not least arms control, emphasizes Rice. With the START agreement under negotiation in the spring of 1991, says Rice, "I believe we had an obligation to push as much [as possible] through that window before it did collapse."[71]

But even had it been clear that Gorbachev was finished and his country ready to implode, adds Rice, the United States should have done nothing to accelerate the process—"The United States of America should not have any fingerprints on it":

> *If it was going to fall, let it fall of its own weight. Because we weren't prepared to deal with the consequences of a collapse that we helped engineer. We weren't going to go defend Ukraine if Russia decided to take it on.*

Rice says she did make successful efforts to organize meetings between Bush and several republican leaders. But President Bush "didn't want to go out and recognize independent states":

> *He knew there was a possibility the Soviet Union was going to fall apart. ... He could see it happening. But it's one thing for me, out of a government role, or [others] to stand up and say the Soviet Union's going to fall apart, than for the President of the United States to say it. Or someone who works for him. Because actions have consequences. And words have consequences. And [what] if it happens and it happens violently and some republic bolts prematurely because it thought the United States was going to support it?*

NSC arms control expert Kanter adds that stability, after all, was one of the overriding US interests:

> *If there was an ambivalence in US policy toward Yeltsin before the coup, it was not because of the belief that Gorbachev was in such a solid position but, on the contrary, that things were very volatile and that US interests would be better served by a soft landing than a crash landing when the Soviet Union collapsed. Fomenting the collapse of the internal Soviet empire in the shortest period possible come what may was not our policy objective.*

However, the Bush administration, particularly the NSC, did begin to look more favorably on Yeltsin, once Ed Hewett replaced Rice in March 1991. Edelman remembers that:

> *The first thing he said was, `This government's got a major Yeltsin problem and we've got to work our way out of it.'*

Moreover, in the spring the CIA began to include a situation report (sitrep) on circumstances in the republics in *its National Intelligence Daily* classified report to the President and top officials.[72] By June, matters had evolved to the extent that Bush received Yeltsin at the White House for what proved to be a 3 1/2-hour conversation.

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View From the CIA

The DI submitted its assessment of Yeltsin's political agenda in June 1991, as Bush prepared for the meeting with the Russian leader. The Agency saw in Yeltsin a "coherent Russian democratic alternative to the imperial authoritarianism of the traditionalists."[73] Charges Yeltsin was an "unprincipled opportunist" were not, said the DI, "borne out by his actions."

The assessment gave Yeltsin credit for helping to defuse the dangerous situation in January when, among other things, he went to Estonia and signed documents effectively recognizing Baltic independence. As the likely first president of Russia (elections were scheduled for July), the analysis predicted that he would promote "rapid marketization.... He is certain to emphasize that [foreign] aid should be channeled primarily through the republics and to specific projects." Yeltsin would also, it said, continue to work for a reconstituted union of equal republics:

> *The "order" and stability" projected in President Gorbachev's vision of the union is—in Yeltsin's view—inherently unstable because it denies the striving for national self-determination. True stability now will come only with a genuinely voluntary association of republics.*

Yeltsin, in a considerable boost to his own power base, was elected president of Russia on July 12, 1991. On July 16, Secretary Baker in Paris told journalists that the US intended to have contact with the opposition forces Yeltsin headed:

> *I think if you take a look at the way we have approached similar situations in the countries of Eastern Europe and in other countries as well, you would see that we have taken care to touch base with the opposition to make sure that we understand where the opposition is coming from, that they understand where we are coming from. I don't think that is inappropriate just because it is the Soviet Union.*[74]

But there was no significant shift in US policy. Instead, intelligence and policy efforts focused on preparing Bush and his staff for a late July summit with Gorbachev in Moscow.

The atmosphere was business as usual. Despite the warnings out of the CIA, despite the contingency planning by Rice's group, despite even an early summer dress rehearsal for a coup, there was little sense when the two presidents met in late July that Gorbachev would face the ultimate crisis of his career a little less than three weeks later.

The Coup

The group gathered in Moscow for the summit from July 29 to August 1, 1991, was upbeat. Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union were signing the historic START treaty on reducing nuclear weapons. The two nations also announced plans to co-sponsor a Middle East peace treaty. It was not a crisis atmosphere. Says Kanter:

> *The world was transformed three weeks later. [But] I certainly didn't have the sense in Moscow that we were on the brink of an historical transformation.*

There was, however, a general consensus that events in the Soviet Union were moving so fast nothing could really surprise observers anymore. "By 1990, certainly by 1991," says Kanter, "you could believe anything...you literally couldn't tell if someone was pulling your leg. It could be preposterous and it could also be true."

> *Everyone knew that Soviet society was in turmoil. Everyone knew that Gorbachev was riding the tide, that he was taking bold actions born of desperation rather than inspiration. Everyone knew how fluid, how volatile things were. And so in that sense no one was shocked that there was a coup three weeks later. ...But the event, when it happened and how it happened, did surprise people. If you will, people were tactically surprised but not strategically surprised.*

In the event, coup leaders moved against Gorbachev on the eve of the scheduled signing of a union treaty giving greater autonomy to the republics. Gorbachev was placed under guard in his vacation home on the Black Sea while the hardliners fought it out in Moscow against Yeltsin and his supporters. The coup leaders buckled in a surprisingly short time, revealing the amateur character of their takeover plan. Most were placed under arrest; senior military official Marshal Sergei

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
Akhromeyev committed suicide. Gorbachev returned to Moscow, but he had lost the last shreds of popular respect. In a widely noted omission, he even failed to thank Yeltsin for his part in toppling the putsch.

The Agency Before the Coup

The coup did not surprise the CIA, although it could not foresee the exact timing. SOVA director George Kolt had taken a short leave in early August, during which he had time to think about the Soviet situation away from the pressure of daily events. The United States had already received potent warning, via Ambassador Matlock, of a coup attempt in June. That coup never took place, but plans for it clearly identified those individuals who would be involved in any future takeover attempt.

On Kolt's return to work, he requested SOVA put together an analysis of the prospects for a coup. The outlook, he recalls, was not encouraging. But the paper did not go so far as to say that Gorbachev's downfall would be linked to signing the controversial union treaty, even though one analyst made exactly this connection. Says Kolt:

> *We could have said very clearly that a catalyst is this union treaty. There was one analyst who said they cannot let this be signed. But this thought was brought to my attention only after the coup. We did not pursue it in the piece. We had a hard enough time internally getting it agreed—not with our leadership; we always argued among ourselves. ... We said the possibility of a coup was growing. We even said Gorbachev may not go along this time and said it could not succeed in the long run, which was all right. But we couldn't predict it to the exact date.*



The coup did not surprise the CIA, although it could not foresee the exact timing.

On Saturday, August 17, however, signs were growing that action against Gorbachev was imminent. Alexander Yakovlev warned against a Stalinist "party and state coup." *The President's Daily Brief* for that date published SOVA's analysis, which explicitly warned that "the danger is growing that hardliners will precipitate large-scale violence."

When the coup started on Sunday, August 18, the administration seemed caught unaware, despite the intelligence reports. Most senior-level policymakers were on vacation, including President Bush, who was in Kennebunkport, Maine. But, from the start, there were signs the coup would not stick. The CIA noted virtually no military preparations by coup leaders. Kolt personally called National Security Adviser Scowcroft a few hours after the coup started, said it might not succeed, and implicitly suggested a firm condemnation of the coup leaders.

Bush's first public statement on the issue, given Monday morning, was relatively subdued, saying that, "I've said over and over again that we did not want to see a coup backed by the KGB and the military, and apparently that is what is under way." But, he added, "I think it's also important to note that coups can fail." As Gates puts it, there was little reason initially to hope the coup would fail:

> *Based on all prior experience in Russian and Soviet history, when you know at the outset that you've got the KGB and the Army and the Party all together in a coup attempt, the chances of it not succeeding based on past history are near zero... [Bush's] first public comments were as much a holding action as anything else, but fairly pessimistic based on the information.*

By Monday afternoon, however, intelligence reports indicated the coup was not going well and Bush became far tougher. By evening, and ahead of virtually all Western leaders in condemning the plotters, Bush stated that "We are deeply disturbed by the events of the last hours in the Soviet Union and condemn the unconstitutional resort to force. ... This misguided and illegitimate effort bypasses both Soviet law and the will of the Soviet people." He expressed support for both Yeltsin and Gorbachev. Gates feels that the contingency planning at the NSC helped the administration cope with the unfolding events:

> *A lot of thinking had already been done about how we would deal with this problem. And so I think people were a lot better able to cope and move with some facility in a very dangerous and unpredictable time, and I think that the way it was managed sort of underscores that it was done pretty well.*

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What could not have been predicted, he says, is the degree to which the coup plotters themselves were disorganized:

> *The key in August was that the leaders were behind the coup, but the institutions that they headed were not, or were divided. But the fundamental thing was that the coup leaders themselves were half-hearted. And nobody could count on that.*

Matlock, who had left Moscow for good on August 11, thought that a coup wouldn't occur because its leaders would understand in advance that it would fail. He agrees that the plotters "didn't know, until they confronted [Gorbachev] and he refused, what they were going to do."

On Monday, Bush returned to Washington. He tried several times to telephone Gorbachev but could not get through. Meanwhile, Yeltsin had emerged as the leader of the opposition to the coup, rallying citizens from his stronghold in the "White House" Russian parliament building. On Tuesday, Bush telephoned Yeltsin to offer his support. The coup folded by Wednesday, and Gorbachev returned to Moscow.

In subsequent weeks, Gorbachev's small remaining influence dissipated. One by one, the republics declared their independence from Moscow. One of the most radical republics was Russia. On December 8, Yeltsin and the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus met in Minsk, agreeing to form a Commonwealth of Independent States. On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned and the Soviet Union was dissolved.

NOTES

47. Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott. *At the Highest Levels;* Little, Brown and Co.; Boston, Toronto, London; 1993; p. 69.

47. *Rising Political Instability Under Gorbachev: Understanding the Problem and Prospects for Resolution.* Directorate for Intelligence, CIA; April 1989; p.iii.

49. From a speech by Robert M. Gates, *CIA and the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Hit or Miss*?; Foreign Policy Association, New York; May 20, 1992; p.6.

50. *Gorbachev's Domestic Gambles and Instability in the USSR.* Directorate of Intelligence, CIA; September 1989; p. iii.

51. Beschloss, Talbott; p.94.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

53. At lower levels, too, dissenting views were censored in the interests of presenting a common policy front. Alexander Vershbow, for example, Soviet desk officer in the State Department, was unable to publish in the spring of 1991 an article advocating a slight shift in US policy to support devolution of power to the republics.

54. Beschloss, Talbott. p. 168.

55. From Gates's speech; May 20, 1992; p.7.

56. *The Washington Post.* "Webster Sees No Revival of Soviet Threat; Conflict Continues Between CIA, Defense." March 2, 1990; p. A1.

57. Despite considerable opposition from Congress, Bush agreed. On June 30, Moscow lifted its embargo at Lithuania.

58. From Gates's speech; May 20, 1992. p.7.

59. *Ibid.*, p.8.

60. The Shatalin plan had plenty of critics. CIA economist Jim Noren feels its implementation "would have wrecked the economy to an extent that didn't materialize until 1992."

61. Beschloss, Talbott. p. 168.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 297.

65. Raymond Garthoff takes a more benign view of Gorbachev's role in the Baltic incidents, writing in *The Great Transition* that "Gorbachev had been fed a steady stream of false and misleading information on events and public opinion by his conservative security advisers." p.452

66. Beschloss, Talbott, p.317.

67. Other members of the committee were Dennis Ross from State; Fritz Ermarth from CIA; Eric Edelman from Defense; sometimes Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; and Bob Blackwell from CIA. The group was apparently not so top secret, as many staffers at the different agencies wrote papers for it.

68. *Gorbachev's Future.* Directorate of Intelligence; May 23, 1991; p.1.

69. *Soviet Economic Futures: The Outlook for 1991.* Directorate of Intelligence; CIA; May 1991; p.11.

70. Beschloss, Talbott; p.350.

71. Ermarth words this thinking somewhat differently: "Our diplomatic business with Gorbachev is preeminent; to conduct that business we must assert that he has a bright future; to assert this we must believe it and reject the case that he does not."

72. Garthoff, p.448n.

73. *Yeltsin's Political Objectives.* Directorate of Intelligence, CIA; June 1991; p.iii.

74. *The New York Times*, "Baker Says US Is Ready To Create Links with Soviet Non-Communists"; July 17, 1990.

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View from the Private Sector

OSINT: The State of the Art, the Artless State[1]

Mark M. Lowenthal

> **"If the IC were to understand OSINT better, it might get the emphasis it deserves."**

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This article is unclassified in its entirety.

One of the unique burdens of being a practitioner of and advocate for open-source intelligence (OSINT) is the constant need to define what OSINT is and why it matters. Even though these are not controversial issues, it is useful to begin on common ground.

Seen from the perspective of the Intelligence Community (IC), OSINT is usually regarded as "everything else," after the classified sources of IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT and MASINT are accounted for. Each of these four collection disciplines differs from the others in what it collects and how it collects it. Because a significant portion of OSINT is unique, extracted from an array of textual sources, it has traditionally been considered a separate category of intelligence information.

In fact, however, OSINT is the most pervasive of the INTs, rather than a separate category. It occupies its own niche as well as some part of each of the other INTs. Beyond the textual sources of OSINT, the only aspect that differentiates it from other collection disciplines is the fact that it is not clandestine in nature. Many aspects of OSINT are quite the *same* as the other collection disciplines, because open-source intelligence is a facet of each of them, not an entirely separate discipline. It is more useful and more accurate to view the disciplines as the diagram indicates.

A New Way To Visualize The Collection Disciplines

CLANDESTINE	*OPEN*
IM	INT
SIG	INT
HUM	INT
MAS	INT
	OSINT

If the IC were to understand OSINT better, it might get the emphasis it deserves. Seeing OSINT as a facet of each of the other collection disciplines underscores the importance of open-source information to the all-source process. OSINT matters because it can be a cost effective, significant source of intelligence. OSINT should be seen as a daily gift, a leg up on each day's collection tasking. Instead, OSINT is seen as something less than a consolation prize—something done grudgingly, haltingly, and poorly in the IC.

The State of the Art

Open-source intelligence today is a much wider field than a few years ago. Most OSINT practitioners still start (and, too often, stop) with unique textual sources. These fall

[1] With an appreciative nod to Dr. Amrom Katz, whose article "Verification and SALT: The State of the Art and the Art of the State" (Heritage Foundation, 1979) inspired this title.

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into two major and two minor categories.

The most important textual source, in my view, is commercial media vendors, two of whom predominate: Dow Jones Interactive and Lexis-Nexis. Both offer access to multiple worldwide sources of information via a website. These sources include newspapers, magazines, and some broadcast transcripts—all in English translations that are accurate and reliable. The websites allow specific searches by words and combinations of words, and by specific periods of time. It is possible to create permanent files of search terms so that they do not have to be reconstructed each day.

The second major OSINT text category is the worldwide web itself. Here the OSINT practitioner faces several problems:

- The first challenge is sheer volume: what were once thousands of pages of information have become billions. This may be the ultimate "needle in a haystack" problem. It is compounded by the fact that no two search engines will identify the exact same sites. A better approach is to use meta-search engines, i.e., search engines that are actually a combination of other search engines. For example, Copernic.com simultaneously searches Alta Vista, Excite, HotBot, Lycos, MSN Web Search, Yahoo, and several others. This type of search increases the chance of finding the best sites, although there still is no guarantee. Access to these meta-search engines is free via the Internet itself.[2]

- Another difficulty is source validation. The web is a vast electronic bulletin board where users can post anything they want. There is no restraint, no authorization, and no authentication. It is the First Amendment on a global scale, pushed to the point of anarchy. As with any other source, over time analysts learn which sources are reliable and which are not, but it is a pretty steep learning curve at the outset, with lots of chaff and little wheat.

"Open-source intelligence today is a much wider field than a few years ago. OSINT practitioners ...too often stop with textual sources."

The two minor textual sources of OSINT are hard copy material, primarily books, and so-called gray literature. Yes, books still matter in the "e-age." Using books, of course, usually requires visiting a library, and analysts are increasingly reluctant to do this. "If I can't get it on the web, it's not worth getting," seems to be the attitude. Gray literature is one of those phrases of art that means different things to different people. I think that some OSINT practitioners like to use the phrase "gray literature" because it gives a patina of "spookiness." It should not. The Fourth International Conference on Gray Literature, held in Washington in October 1999, defined this source as: "That which is produced on all levels of government, academics, business and industry in print and electronic formats, but which is not controlled by commercial publishers." This can be a useful range of sources, although it usually takes some search skills to hunt them down.

Those of us toiling in the commercial OSINT vineyards have seen some remarkable changes in open-source intelligence in the last few years. In additional to information from unclassified textural sources, OSINT now pervades all of the collection disciplines.

- **Open-source IMINT:** The arrival and development of commercial imagery down to resolutions of less than one meter is still a breathtaking and somewhat scary development. Once the exclusive intelligence domain of a few technically advanced states, high quality imagery is now available to anyone who can afford to buy it.

- **Open-source HUMINT:** The open elicitation of information by tasked collectors can be an incredibly useful source of intelligence. We are *not* discussing breaking and entering, bribery, or any other activity that is illegal or even questionable. We are discussing collection that is no different from what foreign service officers or defense attaches do every day. Indeed, I would

[2] Some web searchers like to use "web crawlers," in effect, search devices that look for specific words or phrases automatically. I have found these to be generally unsatisfactory. If the parameters are defined too narrowly, the returns are thin. Broaden the parameters and one faces inundation. Modulation tends to be difficult and imprecise.

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consider much of their reporting to be open source, despite its near automatic classification as SECRET, since their interlocutors know that what they say will be reported back to Washington.

- **Open-source MASINT:** Simply put, if you can purchase commercial imagery, you can purchase "imaging" that uses part of the spectrum other than the visual range. This may not be available yet across the full multi- and hyper-spectral range, but there is little reason to doubt that it eventually will be.

- **Open-source SIGINT:** Information can be gleaned from communications without resort to wiretaps or other means of intercepting signals. As just one example, on the worldwide web one can use programs to analyze traffic on a site and monitor changes in content from day to day.

Need for a Methodology

As is evident from the foregoing, there is a great deal of OSINT out there. This underscores the importance of *process*. As with any collection discipline, OSINT needs a methodology for dealing with it. My own preference is the approach used by the IC itself: requirements, collection, processing and exploitation, and analysis. The first two steps will come as no surprise. You need to know what you are collecting and why (requirements) and you need a plan for meeting this requirement (collection). It is important to note here that not

"I believe that one of the reasons why OSINT has failed to reach its potential in the IC is because responsible officials forgot that technology was the means and content the end."

everyone can collect OSINT. Even people who surf the Internet may not be skilled at open-source collection. It takes a specific set of skills and a specific analytic outlook.

OSINT does not arrive full-blown and usable from *any* of its sources. It requires some level of processing and exploitation. For open-source IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT and MASINT, the need for processing and exploitation is obvious. For OSINT, although less obvious, even the traditional textual sources require vetting, validation, interpretation, sifting, and weighing. The degree to which the exploitation process can be automated is still difficult to determine. Numerous firms offer technologies that perform text mining, text summarization, or link analysis. In the proper context, these tools can be extremely helpful to the analyst slogging through mountains of open-source information. They cannot simply be thrown at the problem, however. There has to be a plan—the right tools for the right job. It is important to avoid the American love affair with technology for its own sake. Clients' intelligence needs (whether government or commercial) cannot be met by merely placing a search engine or text miner before them. The OSINT requirement will be met by *content*. Technology is a means to that end, not the end itself. Once the information is sifted and organized, analysis of the material becomes possible.

OSINT and Commercial Clients

Providing OSINT to large commercial firms differs considerably from serving IC clients. It remains a nascent industry for several reasons:

The concept of intelligence is inherently less familiar to industry than it is to the IC or to the policy agencies that are served by the IC. One must spend more time explaining what intelligence is, and what it is not.

It is difficult to determine the right point of entry into large firms to make OSINT sales. The president or CEO is too high. Directors of research see OSINT as little more than a threat to their own activities. Other levels and individuals need to be probed. It is a more random effort than dealing with the IC.

Although commercial users of OSINT want "actionable" intelligence, just like US officials, this desire may not match their actual business practices. Large firms do not make key decisions with the same frequency as government officials. Rather, they have sales campaigns that have beginnings, mid-year and end-of-year reviews, and renewed starts. The provision of intelligence on a regular basis

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does not fit into this less frequent decisionmaking structure.

Commercial clients appear to be less comfortable dealing with the uncertainty that remains *after* intelligence has been provided. This may be a result of a general unfamiliarity with intelligence and overly high expectations as to what it can do. Again, to avoid or to overcome this problem, it takes tutoring on setting reasonable expectations.

Although there are many OSINT providers who espouse the cause of competitive intelligence, few of these firms or individuals have any real sense of what constitutes intelligence or an intelligence process. They seem more concerned with constant self-definition as a professional group than with the application of proven methods to their own activities.

That said, however, there are some interesting and challenging opportunities in the commercial OSINT field. Indeed, many of us find these more attractive than working with the IC, because they are more challenging and, to be frank, more lucrative than government contracts. Some of us also believe that our efforts to apply the methodologies we have learned in the IC to commercial clients will eventually pay off in enduring relationships. The commercial engagements also provide opportunities to experiment with new methodologies and new techniques and tools that can then be added to offerings to the IC.

"To be very clear, I do not view OSINT as a panacea for all intelligence requirements."

The Artless State

Given the rich, evolving OSINT world, why does the IC continue to lag in the use of open-source information? IC defenders of open source will point out, correctly, that the IC has always used OSINT. This is undeniably true. But it is also true that the IC's use of OSINT remains fitful and sometimes grudging, and in no way fully exploits the available opportunities.

I believe part of the reason is institutional. If all of the intelligence we needed were available openly, then we would not have an IC *per se*. We would have something else—a research center of some sort. The need to collect *some* intelligence clandestinely, however, leads to an ethos in the IC where clandestine intelligence is consistently valued more highly than open-source information. As currently practiced by the IC, open source is, at best, an add-on to clandestine collection, not a partner.

To be very clear, I do not view OSINT as a panacea for all intelligence requirements. Nor do I believe that the increased availability of OSINT ends the need for various covert sources and methods. There will always be intelligence requirements that can only be met clandestinely. At the same time, we now have more intelligence requirements that can be met openly—if the IC is willing to go in that direction.

The IC's exploitation of OSINT also has been handicapped by the problem of technology seduction noted above. The Community has prospered, in part, because of various technologies it has created—primarily in the collection area. I believe that one of the reasons why OSINT has failed to reach its potential in the IC is because responsible officials forgot that technology was the *means* and content the *end*. They pursued technological solutions, but many failed to deliver coherent, useful content to analysts, which should have been the goal.

Broader institutional problems within the IC also figure in how OSINT is handled. I will illustrate by anecdote. I had a contract with an all-source agency to provide OSINT about Bosnia. In a moment of self-abnegation, I pointed out to the agency that they already had Lexis-Nexis service and could obtain on their own some of the OSINT I planned to provide. I will lapse into dialogue to convey the exchange:

All-Source Agency: "Oh, we never use Lexis-Nexis for Bosnia."

Lowenthal: "Why not?"

All-Source Agency: "Because that would reveal that we are interested in Bosnia as a requirement."

Lowenthal: "We have some 9,000 troops in Bosnia. They rotate in and out to great publicity. Don't you think people know we are interested in Bosnia?"

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Again, the cult of secrecy gets in the way of what would appear to be a sensible use of OSINT. I have to believe that a community that creates cutouts and false fronts could figure out how to use OSINT without revealing intelligence requirements.

The use of commercial imagery is another interesting illustration of the IC's shortcomings in dealing with new OSINT opportunities. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) expects to be the sole purchaser of commercial imagery for the government, or at least for the IC. NIMA's goal is to prevent duplicative purchases, which is laudable. NIMA, however, has *no* interest in promoting greater use of commercial imagery, which it views as competition. It would be far better to give various would-be commercial imagery users their own budget, with NIMA acting as a clearinghouse, developing and maintaining a master list of what has been purchased and is on file to avoid duplication.

The way the IC handles OSINT is also bizarre. For the other INTs, the IC has designated collectors, processors, and exploiters. For OSINT, beyond the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), it has none. All-source analysts are expected to act as their own OSINT collectors ("Go surf!"), as well as their own processors and exploiters. To comprehend the ludicrousness and self-defeating aspect of this, imagine an analyst working on Iraq being told: "We have a lot of images from Israel to Pakistan and yours are in there somewhere. And we also have

"The fact that no one in the IC is responsible for OSINT, and no one seeks to be, speaks volumes."

5,000 SIGINT hits from Iran and Iraq. Good luck." That is not far different from how the IC handles OSINT. It is self-defeating and says much about how the Community views OSINT.

The clearest indication of the sad state of OSINT in the IC, however, is the fact that no one is responsible for it. If I have an IMINT problem, I go to NIMA; if I have a SIGINT problem, I go to the National Security Agency; if I have a HUMINT problem I go to the CIA or the Defense HUMINT Service; even poor MASINT has the Central MASINT Office. To whom do I go if I have an OSINT problem? No one. In Washington, bureaucrats have a nose for which programs will enhance their power and position and which programs are drags. The fact that no one in the IC is responsible for OSINT and no one *seeks* to be speaks volumes. OSINT is not worth fighting for or acquiring within the IC.

The Role of FBIS

Currently, FBIS is the centerpiece of OSINT in the IC. FBIS has been struggling and declining for years under repeated budget cuts, a sure sign of bureaucratic weakness. Strong programs prosper. FBIS has been providing open-source media coverage for as long as we have had an IC; however, FBIS's offerings are now outmoded compared to commercial vendors. These vendors are more expensive than FBIS, but the information they provide is more extensive and more timely. In my own open-source practice, I use FBIS occasionally as a supplement, but it is not my information supplier of first choice. I get better coverage from more sources more quickly by going elsewhere.

What Is To Be Done?

First, someone in the IC has to be responsible for OSINT. FBIS is too slender a reed, for the reasons already noted. I do not recommend reviving the Community Open Source Program Office (COSPO), which the DCI properly disbanded in 1998. COSPO, in my view, pursued the technology chimera and forgot about content delivery to analysts. Within the current IC structure, I would designate an OSINT Manager. The OSINT Manager would be responsible for creating a program designed to deliver usable OSINT—i.e., OSINT that has been collected, processed, batched, and sorted—to all-source analysts. I would place the OSINT Manager under the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, rather than in a specific agency. OSINT should be a service of common concern for every all-source analyst, not something controlled by one agency.

The OSINT Manager should oversee two core activities. One should be to seek the best commercially available technology and commercial vendors to "make the OSINT happen." The use of commercial off-the-shelf technology is important. There is no sense in

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reinventing the wheel, another IC failure in open source. The second—and even more important—core activity should be to determine the OSINT requirements for each analytic office. I would start small, handling offices with discrete responsibilities first. I might recommend beginning with countries of relatively low day-to-day importance to the United States, where sudden crises can catch Washington off guard and where OSINT can handle a very large part of the intelligence requirements—most of which are not being met at all currently.

Happily, the dissemination problem is already solved. Intelink provides an up and running electronic means to broadcast usable OSINT to whomever might need it. It should be easy to create an OSINT portal for Intelink, where open-source information can be posted by issue—either regional or topical per the usual IC taxonomy.

Second, to aid in fixing the IC's OSINT problem I would liberate commercial imagery. Each agency should have its own budget to buy the imagery it needs, after checking with NIMA to make sure that a particular image has not already been purchased. Third, the IC's goal should be to collect OSINT *first*, not *last*, validating it whenever possible with classified sources. OSINT would become an enabler, not a niche filler.

Will all of this take money? Of course it will—and I am well aware of the constraints posed by the IC budget. Ironically, OSINT is a potential money *saver.*

- A well-integrated, content-focused OSINT program would be the most *efficient* collection management system we have had, because the IC would know what is available openly and could concentrate its classified collection in those areas where only it will suffice.
- All-source analysts would have more time to analyze, avoiding the frustration and valuable time it takes to do their own OSINT collection, processing, and exploitation.
- The IC would have better intelligence on many of the lower priority issues, where little of what we need to know requires clandestine collection and where we currently devote few collection resources at any rate. These are often the issues that become the "surge" problems, when a Burundi or a Somalia explodes and we scramble for even the most basic information.

Utopia? Not really. It would simply be a smarter use of open-source information than we have at present. It is less an issue of money, know-how, or technology, than it is one of will. OSINT continues to grow and prosper. The IC has yet to take full advantage of it.

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Stealth, Countermeasures, and ELINT, 1960-1975 (U)

Gene Poteat

> **"The Intelligence Community (IC) had no hard information about the transmitter power of Soviet radars, their receiver sensitivity, the spatial coverage of their beams, or even how widespread they were deployed."**

Gene Poteat spent the bulk of his career in the Directorate of Science and Technology.

The late 1950s were the heydays of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft as it flew with impunity over the Soviet Union, bringing back the most-sought-after intelligence at the time: confirmation that there was no real bomber or ballistic missile gap with the Soviet Union. But the U-2 also brought back something else: a foreshadowing of its own impending demise. The U-2 camera, along with its rudimentary electronics intelligence (ELINT) receivers, had begun to pick up indications of a Soviet antiaircraft defense buildup with new and better surface-to-air (SAM) missiles and radars. The Soviets kept trying to shoot down a U-2 with interceptor fighters and SAMs; they did not succeed until 1 May 1960.

At the time of the shootdown, the CIA's U-2 program office already was well along in developing the U-2's replacement, the OXCART, at Lockheed's Skunk Works in Burbank, California. The OXCART would fly at about 90,000 feet, at Mach 3.3. It would also become the predecessor to the Air Force's better known SR-71 Blackbird. The CIA and the Air Force jointly also had the ultimate reconnaissance system under way in a parallel development, the CORONA satellite, the first in a long series that would eventually replace all overflights, including the OXCART.

Concerns about the vulnerability of the yet-to-fly OXCART to the evolving Soviet air defense network were also the basis for the most secret and sensitive aspect of the project. The OXCART was to be invisible to the Soviet radars—the first-ever stealth aircraft.

The engineering approach to stealth was to create an airplane that would result in an unnoticeable small blip on enemy radar screens by shaping the airplane with razor-sharp edges, or chines, by tilting the rudders inboard to reduce radar reflections, and by using as much composite radar-absorbing material as practical. But how small a radar target was small enough? That depended on how good the Soviet air defense radars were. But there were more intelligence questions about the Soviet air defense radars than there were answers.

The Intelligence Community (IC) had no hard information about the transmitter power of Soviet radars, their receiver sensitivity, the spatial coverage of their beams, or even how widespread they were deployed. The CIA's Clandestine Service did not have a single officer assigned to the Soviet Union because the US Ambassador in Moscow would not permit it. At that time, ELINT could not provide answers to such hard questions. Further, few in the ELINT community knew anything about the OXCART program, and fewer still knew anything about the stealth aspects of the program. It seemed to come down to making the best intelligence estimate possible with regard to Soviet radar capabilities for dealing with a high and fast airplane with a small radar cross section. In the words of other intelligence veterans, "Estimating is what you do when you do not know and cannot find out."

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Primary Sources

To understand why ELINT and the intelligence estimating process had so little to offer, and how both were regarded, one needs to take a closer look at both in the early years of the Cold War. During the first decade or so after the National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA), what we know today as SIGINT was, by and large, divided into three disciplines:

- Communications intelligence (COMINT), derived from NSA's intercept, decryption, and analysis of foreign communications.
- ELINT, based on the intercept and analysis of signals, other than communications (such as radar and other signals associated with weapon systems), and carried out by practically every element within the IC.
- Telemetry intelligence (TELINT), usually from the collection and analysis of telemetry from missiles in flight, mostly by the CIA.

These three, in conjunction with aerial photography coming mostly from the U-2s flying over the Soviet Union, provided most intelligence available at the time to intelligence analysts. The analysts also drew on information from clandestine or open sources, and they included their own views, biases, and guesses in the process of producing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), the intelligence "bibles" on Soviet strategic and tactical technologies and capabilities, and on Soviet intentions.

But there were three problems with NIEs. First, no product is ever better than its sources, and they were often too meager. Second, NIEs were often dangerously wrong on crucial strategic issues. For example, just before the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, an NIE concluded that the USSR would not place strategic weapons in Cuba—even though there was some evidence that it already had some missiles there. Third, there was often insufficient information available to produce even a guess, much less an estimate, on such esoteric topics as a radar's ability to detect stealthy aircraft. When available, COMINT and photography were considered the most credible sources of intelligence, and they provided the bulk of the NIE contributions.

"ELINT's contribution was virtually nil, and intelligence analysts considered it next to useless."

No Regard for ELINT

ELINT's contribution was virtually nil, and intelligence analysts considered it next to useless. One prominent CIA operations officer said that the Clandestine Service considered ELINT a five-letter cussword, that he viewed ELINT as worthless, and that only agents could be relied on for worthwhile information.

ELINT was mostly a passive, rudimentary means of collection. It involved getting a radio receiver and recorder within line of sight of the Soviet radars or other sources of important noncommunications signals. From radio direction finding and the recordings, one could fairly well determine the radar's location, and the signal's general frequency, pulse rate, and pulse width. From these signal parameters, an analyst could then estimate the radar's performance but not with any great accuracy or certainty.

The challenge was to find a way to intercept these radar signals beyond our line of sight, or horizon, as well as those radar signals that were within our line of sight but which the Soviets, who truly understood radiation security, simply kept off the air. The object of all this ELINT collection by various IC elements was to contribute to the Department of Defense's *Electronic Order of Battle* (EOB), a publication listing the locations of the various radars or signal sources for a number of consumers. The EOB was rather incomplete, and thus unreliable, because most Soviet radars were well out of sight of any ELINT collection assets.

This was the scene at the end of 1959, when I was a new engineer assigned to the CIA's ELINT Staff Office (ESO) in the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). I was soon cleared into the OXCART project and also into the stealth aspect. One of my early encounters was with a group of OSI analysts discussing a newly intercepted signal, apparently picked up by an ELINT site in Berlin. The analysts had sketched the signal's characteristics on a blackboard. I suggested that it probably was a missile guidance signal, because of its similarities to guidance signals I had been working with earlier at Bell Telephone Laboratories in New Jersey and at Cape Canaveral as a missile guidance development engineer.

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The mystery signal indeed turned out to be the long-sought SA-2 GUIDELINE SAM guidance signal. Additional ELINT intercepts over the ensuing years would reveal enough about the signal to build electronic jammers able to counter the SA-2. I learned later that the Soviets had easily acquired US patent information on which the SA-2's FAN SONG radar was based. The Soviets had easy access to US technology, while we had hardly any access to theirs.

Difficult Questions

The OXCART mission planners were especially concerned about just how widespread the Soviet early warning radars were and where they were located. It seemed impossible, however, to determine the number, exact location, or any other technical information on those radars. I recalled an occasion at Cape Canaveral in the 1950s, when the signal from a ground-based radar located 1,000 miles beyond our horizon was picked up at the Cape; the signal was reflected off a Thor IRBM during a test flight. The suggestion was then made that this same phenomenon (later called bistatic intercept) could be used to intercept Soviet high-powered radars well over the horizon by pointing the ELINT antennas at the Soviet ballistic missiles during their flight testing, by using the missile's radio beacon for pointing or programming the ELINT antennas to follow the missile's predicted trajectory. Previously, the common practice had been to point the ELINT antennas at the horizon in the direction of the target radars. It is little wonder that no signals were ever intercepted.

“The OXCART mission planners were especially concerned about just how widespread the Soviet early warning radars were and where they were located.”

George M., the head of the ESO, thought the idea worth pursuing and suggested I run the idea by a couple of highly regarded ELINT experts from private industry to fine-tune the concept before proceeding. Consequently, I was sent to California to discuss the idea with Dr. William Perry of Sylvania's Electronic Defense Laboratories in Mountain View and with Dr. Albert ("Bud") Wheelon of TRW in Los Angeles, both of whom offered technical and moral support. There were no computers in those days, so the feasibility studies and engineering calculations involved solving spherical trigonometry equations using slide rules, tables of logarithms, and hand-cranked mechanical calculators.

George's approach paid dividends with an unusually swift funding approval, and the finished system, which I named MELODY after one of my favorite-sounding words, was installed at CIA's ELINT and COMINT site on the shores of the Caspian Sea in northern Iran. Over the ensuing years, MELODY produced bistatic intercepts of virtually all the ground-based Soviet missile tracking radars, including all ABM radars at a test range 1,000 miles away. The fixed location of MELODY and the limited trajectories of the Soviet missiles being tracked, however, still did not provide the locations of all the air defense radars throughout the Soviet Union that were needed by the OXCART planners.

A New Challenge

A new Soviet air defense early warning radar, the TALL KING, began to appear about this time, which, if deployed widely, appeared to improve significantly the Soviets' air defenses. The TALL KING quickly became the nemesis of the OXCART planners. MELODY's success with the high-powered, missile-related radars led to the idea of using the moon as a distant bistatic reflector to intercept and locate the Soviet TALL KING radars emplaced throughout the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the Lincoln Laboratories, America's premier radar-development house, had been engaged in a "radar astronomy race" with its Soviet counterparts to see which side would be first to detect and characterize the moon's surface using radar. Lincoln won, handily. I visited Dr. John Evans at Lincoln Labs and discussed the moon radar results and the bistatic ELINT idea. Drawing on the Lincoln Labs' understanding of the moon as a reflector of radar signals, sensitive ELINT receivers, tuned to the TALL KING frequency, were attached to the 60-foot RCA radar antenna just off the New Jersey Turnpike near Moorestown and pointed at the moon (the Lincoln Labs' giant radar antenna were preoccupied with more radar astronomy experiments). The ELINT receivers were also optimized for the effects of the moon as a reflector, that is, using the Lincoln Labs' "matched filter" techniques. Over time, as the Earth and moon revolved and rotated, all the Soviet TALL KINGs came into view one at a time, and their precise geographic loca-

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tions were plotted. The large number of TALL KINGs that were found and the incredibly complete radar coverage of the Soviet Union was not good news for the OXCART Program Office—or the US Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC), which had to plot wartime bomber penetration routes.

Lockheed had made its own estimates of the OXCART's vulnerability to Soviet radars, which some felt were overly optimistic. Although some earlier efforts had already been made to quantify the older Soviet radars' capabilities by measuring their power and patterns, they had only limited results. Now assigned to the OXCART Program Office, I asked for, and was granted, the job of trying to get the hard engineering data needed on the threat radars to put the vulnerability issue to rest. The first step was to ask OSI to set up a special "Vulnerability Analysis Group" to work with the hard engineering data we expected to obtain. The group worked closely with my ELINT collectors, advising us on the data they needed (there were no formal requirements for anything we did at that time) and by suggesting collection operation ideas.

A Talented Team

In looking at the Soviet air defense radars, particularly the TALL KING, and, to a lesser degree, at all the other major acquisition, target, and missile-tracking and guidance radars, the obvious place to start was where the earlier efforts left off, but with a system that would produce repeatable and unquestionable results. I assembled a small group of engineers who were known for their innovative natures, their understanding of the Soviet air defense system, and their ability to operate anywhere in the world.

The core group never consisted of more than six people. Al N. was to run a C-97 flying ELINT laboratory operating in the Berlin air corridors, which had line-of-sight access to East German-based Soviet radars, and Richard B. ran a similarly equipped RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft operating around the periphery of the Soviet Union. Jack W., an Air Force master sergeant who had to have been the original model for television's Sergeant Bilko, ran the ground operations.

PPMS Activity

These projects lead to a series of airborne Power and Pattern Measurement Systems (PPMS) that could measure a radar's spatial coverage and its radiated power with extreme precision. The PPMS would eventually be upgraded for measuring other important radar signal parameters, including radiofrequency coherence, polarization, and internal and external signal structure details which provided even further insight into a radar's performance that would be vital to the Vulnerability Analysis Group and to the designers and builders of electronic jammers.

The precise dimensions of the TALL KING antenna were also needed for our calculations of the antenna gain for use in our radar equations. One US military attache got close-in ground photographs of the radar in East Germany. The antenna was mounted on a small brick base, and we asked for the dimensions of one of the bricks. It turned out the bricks were from the nearby Pritzwalk Brick Factory. When we asked the Clandestine Service to get us a Pritzwalk brick, we dared not admit it was for an ELINT project. We were happy to give the impression that it was to be hollowed out to conceal something.

Our PPMS were installed in a series of Air Force planes, starting with a C-97 and an RB-47, then C-130s, and finally modern RC-135s. PPMS missions were flown around the world, along the periphery of all Communist countries, and in the Berlin air corridors. Of equal importance, these projects led to an extremely close and easy working relationship among the CIA, NSA, and the Air Force. Technical reports on the product of each mission were published by the CIA's Office of ELINT (OEL) and distributed throughout the defense and intelligence communities, as well as to the industry's electronic countermeasures designers. These reports led to a flood of requests for more information about both old and new radars, which generated more missions.

One of the earliest benefits of this accurately measured air defense coverage was that it revealed that the Soviets' low-altitude coverage was far better than our analysts' earlier estimates, and SAC quickly changed its SIOP plans for wartime penetration to a much lower and survivable altitude. The projects also answered the analysts' question of whether the TALL KING radar also had a height-finding capability for determining an aircraft's altitude as well as its bearing and range. One of our RB-47s, towing its PPMS antenna a mile behind the aircraft while over the Sea of Japan, abruptly

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descended 5,000 feet and then quickly climbed back to cruise altitude. A nearby US SIGINT station was able to confirm that the Soviets' radar had in fact observed the aircraft's altitude change while the aircraft's own warning receivers confirmed no other radars were tracking it at the time. Although under strict orders never to deviate from a steady, nonthreatening flight profile near the Soviet border, the pilot explained his actions to his superior as turbulence avoidance.

Project PALLADIUM

We now knew the Soviet air defense radars' power and spatial coverage, but that was only half the answer to the OXCART's stealth—and health. We also needed to know the sensitivity of the Soviets' radar receivers and the proficiency of their operators. The OXCART Program Office had a stable of top outside scientists to draw on, and, with their help and suggestions, I came up with a scheme to electronically generate and inject carefully calibrated false targets into the Soviet radars, deceiving them into seeing and tracking a ghost aircraft.

Basically, we received the radar's signal and fed it into a variable delay line before transmitting the signal back to the radar. By smoothly varying the length of the delay line, we could simulate the false target's range and speed. Knowing the radar's power and coverage from the PPMS projects, we could now simulate an aircraft of any radar cross section from an invisible stealth airplane to one that made a large blip on Soviet radar screens—and anything in between, at any speed and altitude, and fly it along any path.

“We now knew the Soviet air defense radars' power and spatial coverage, but that was only half the answer to the OXCART's stealth—and health.”

Bud Wheelon, now the CIA's new Deputy Director for Science and Technology, dubbed our project PALLADIUM. Now, the real trick was to find some way of knowing which of our blips the Soviets could see on their radar screens—the smallest size blip being a measure of the sensitivity of the Soviets' radars and the skill of their operators. We began looking at a number of possible Soviet reactions that might give us clues as to whether our aircraft was seen. The clues ranged from monitoring the Soviets' communications, to their switching on other radars to acquire and identify the intruder. Richard B. suggested we team with NSA to provide the SIGINT monitoring of Soviet reaction to our ghost aircraft. This link was easily decrypted—and in real time. This feedback turned out to be the real key to several PALLADIUM successes.

Every PALLADIUM operation consisted of a CIA team with its ghost aircraft system, an NSA team with its special COMINT and decryption equipment, and a military operational support team. Covert PALLADIUM operations were carried out against a variety of Soviet radars around the world, from ground bases, naval ships, and submarines—submarine antenna installations being the more tricky. The logistics of such operations were often a nightmare. For example, one winter, when heavy snows closed all airports in northern Japan, Jack W. spent more than three weeks transporting his large PALLADIUM fan by train. Because of the small rail tunnels, he spent about three weeks in northern Japan, in the dead of winter, hauling his van of PALLADIUM equipment off trains and trucking and sledging it over the mountains—and putting it back on another train on the other side. Once operational, Jack flew his black ghost in and out of the Soviet air defenses.

Fooling the Cubans

When the Soviets moved into Cuba with their missiles and associated air defense radars, many of which were installed near the coast, it presented a golden opportunity to measure the system sensitivity of the SA-2 missile radar. One particularly memorable operation, conducted during the Cuban missile crisis, had the PALLADIUM system mounted on a destroyer out of Key West. The destroyer lay well off the Cuban coast, just out of sight of the Soviet radars near Havana, but with our PALLADIUM transmitting antenna just breaking the horizon. The false aircraft was made to appear to be a US fighter plane out of Key West about to overfly Cuba. A Navy submarine slipped in close to Havana Bay, and it was to surface just long enough to release a timed series of balloon-borne metalized spheres of different sizes. The idea was for the early warning radar to track our electronic aircraft and then for the submarine to surface and release the "calibrated" spheres up into the path of the oncoming false aircraft. It took a bit of coordination and timing to keep the destroyer, submarine, and false aircraft all in

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line between the Havana radar and Key West.

We hoped that the Soviets would track and report the intruding aircraft and then turn on their SA-2 target tracking radar in preparation for firing their missiles—and would report seeing the other strange targets, or spheres, as well. The smallest of the metallic spheres reported seen by the SA-2 radar operators would correspond to the size, or smallest radar cross section, aircraft that could be detected and tracked.

We got the answers we went after, but it was not without some excitement—and entertainment. Cuban fighter planes had fired on a Liberian freighter the day before, although the ship's Liberian flag, which is easily mistaken for the American flag, was quite visible. This led us to expect that the Cubans and Soviets would not hesitate to attack a US-flagged vessel. In the middle of the operation, Cuban fighter planes began circling over the spot where the submarine had surfaced, and another fighter plane gave chase to our ghost. We had no trouble in manipulating the PALLADIUM system controls to keep our ghost aircraft always just ahead of the pursuing Cuban planes. When the Cuban pilot radioed back to his controllers that he had the intruding aircraft in sight and was about to make a firing pass to shoot it down, we all had the same idea at the same instant. The technician moved his finger to the switch, I nodded yes, and he switched off the PALLADIUM system.

We were now concerned that the submarine might have lingered on the surface after releasing his balloon-borne radar targets and might be unaware of the fighters circling overhead. I asked the destroyer's captain if he could broadcast a quick, short message, in the open, to the submarine to submerge and get out of the bay. The captain passed the word to transmit the message. An eager seaman responded by hitting the intercom button and shouted down to the radio operator below deck, "Dive! Dive." And then added in response to a question from the radio operator, "No, not us. Tell the submarine to do it."

Important Achievements

By now, we felt we knew at least as much about the Soviets' radar air defenses as they did. We also knew that their radars were excellent, state of the art, and that their operators were equally proficient. We also knew which of their radars had low power, maintenance problems, or were otherwise not functioning up to par—and where the US Air Force might safely penetrate in wartime. We had finished our special mission in support of the OXCART stealth program and gave our collected data, now called Quality ELINT, to the OSI analysts. The analysts then finished their vulnerability analysis job by concluding that the OXCART would indeed be detected and tracked by the Soviets, which by then was no surprise to any of us. The OSI analysts put it to me differently, saying that we had just proved the Earth was round and that, as soon as the OXCART came over the horizon, the Soviet air defense radars would immediately see and track it. At the same time, we had also established realistic stealth radar cross section goals that, if met by the next generation of stealth aircraft, would allow the aircraft to fly with impunity right through the Soviet radar beams. The F-117 stealth fighter would be the first aircraft to meet these goals.

Seeking Countermeasures

Even before we had finished our projects, it had become obvious that, if the OXCART could not fly stealthily, it could in the meantime fly safely, relying on its superior performance to outfly the SA-2 missiles. But we would need a stable of effective electronic countermeasures systems in the future. Our small group had already spun off two other groups: one to take on the job of developing electronic jammers and warning receivers for the OXCART and the U-2s that were still flying, albeit over China rather than the Soviet Union; and a second group to continue investigations into revolutionary techniques to reduce further the OXCART's radar cross section to an acceptable level.

The second group came up with some novel schemes, such as the mounting of special electron guns on the OXCART to generate a radar-absorbing electron cloud in front of the aircraft. The new electronic jammer group in turn began to task a new, more responsive generation of ELINT collectors to obtain even more detailed information about the Soviet radar signals. One of the U-2 missile warning receivers they developed was even modified and installed in an Air Force fighter plane and became the basis of a later system called WILD WEASEL, used to locate and destroy SA-2 SAM sites in North Vietnam. WILD WEASEL became the stuff of great stories and legends about the derring-do of the pilots who hunted down the SA-2 sites, launched their radar-killing missiles in close, and dodged the

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missiles fired at them during the encounters.

Word quickly spread about our group's newfound knowledge on Soviet and Chinese radars, and calls came in from around the world seeking more information about certain operational features of specific radars. Requests even came in from submarine skippers wanting to know how certain Chinese surface search radars could detect a target as small as their periscopes, which compromised their position to enemy patrol boats. We assured them that the radars could not possibly see their small periscopes, but that they were likely seeing the submarine's ECM (SIGINT) mast. The mast was also raised above and behind the periscope; it was about the size of a totem pole, and it made an ideal target as the motion of the waves varied the mast's length, effectively optimizing it for detection by the radar. After lowering the ECM mast, the submarines were no longer detected.

Gulf of Tonkin Incident

In early August 1964, our small office received an extraordinary, and prophetic, query. My boss handed me a copy of a message from the radar operator on the US destroyer Maddox, which was operating in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of North Vietnam. The message described how the Maddox, and another destroyer, the Turner Joy had been attacked for the second time by North Vietnamese torpedo boats—and that the attacking boats were seen only on the ships' radar and heard by the ships' sonar operators. That morning, I was asked, "The people upstairs want to know if those torpedo boats were real, or could the Maddox's radar

"I felt like one of the analysts I had criticized for always coming up with only a best guess—and it was not a comfortable feeling."

have been spoofed electronically?" A fast read of the message gave few clues, and I asked if there was any more information available or expected. I came up with a list of things I needed to know to give a confident answer, such as visibility in the gulf at the time of the incident, any reports of lightning or thunderstorms in the area, the speed of the torpedo boats seen as moving radically toward the Maddox, and the presence of other ships or aircraft in the area. My boss went away with the questions, but he returned to say that nothing else would be forthcoming and that I was to do the best I could with the information I had—and soon.

After a fretful hour, I concluded the targets were most probably real, that the Maddox had not been spoofed. I would have been much more confident, however, if I could have had answers to my questions. I felt like one of the analysts I had criticized for always coming up with only a best guess—and it was not a comfortable feeling. (I later tried unsuccessfully for over a year to obtain answers to my original questions and to learn more about the situation in the Gulf of Tonkin that day.)

The Washington Post headlines the next morning carried President Johnson's authorization to the start in the bombing of North Vietnam in retaliation for the attacks. I learned later that the original query had come from the White House, and that Secretary of Defense McNamara and others were there, along with Director of Central Intelligence John McCone. I surmised that McCone was the likely source of the request, because he knew about PALLADIUM and our spoofing expertise.

HEN HOUSE

The special OXCART collection projects had taken on a life of their own. Our focus soon shifted to a broader range of other so-called intractable technical problems. We went after the signals others needed, wherever and however possible. About this time, satellite photography had disclosed a huge new radar deep in the Soviet hinterland, the HEN HOUSE. The analysts "estimated" that it was a phased-array radar with some sort of space surveillance capability. By now, early ELINT satellites were in orbit, and the radar's frequency was known to be in the VHF band. A second HEN HOUSE was also under construction in the northeastern Soviet Union, a couple of hundred miles inland from Riga but still well beyond any ELINT receivers line of sight.

Judging from the size of the radar and its probable high power, I felt we should be able to pick up its signal, even when it was not pointed our way, out to several hundred miles; the signal would be scattered forward and over the horizon via a phenomenon known as tropospheric-scatter of radio waves. Studying a map, I found an island in the Baltic Sea that looked to be at about the right distance from the HEN HOUSE to install a tropospheric-scatter receiver that could intercept and continuously monitor the radar,

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once construction was completed and it went on the air.

After extensive negotiations seeking approval for access to the island, dual antennas were installed, about 50 wavelengths apart, to reduce the expected atmospheric fading and the receiver was put on automatic pilot, or unattended operation, and then we waited. The BRIAR PATCH troposcatter system finally picked up the very first HEN HOUSE transmission and every subsequent transmission.

We learned that the radar tracked US satellites from the first orbit, and that the Soviets had an incredibly effective espionage network in place to tip off the HEN HOUSE when a US intelligence satellite was about to be launched. When there was a lengthy hold of an impending launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, the HEN HOUSE would switch off and come back on the air the instant the satellite lifted off from Vandenberg. The HEN HOUSE would thus have a track on the satellite on its first pass overhead.

We also learned that the HEN HOUSE tracked aircraft just as well and as often as satellites. This idea of monitoring a radar's operations full-time was analogous to the concept of traffic analysis in COMINT. In the HEN HOUSE case, the radar's precise frequency indicated its pointing angle, which was then correlated with the most likely targets being tracked.

OXCART flight operations out of Okinawa were eventually halted and the fleet of 13 airplanes permanently grounded while their sister aircraft, the SR-71 Blackbird, took to the air. With the nation's SIGINT activities now being consolidated under NSA auspices, NSA and the Air Force carried on and expanded our special collection programs.

“Secretary of State Kissinger, using intelligence derived from the MELODY intercepts, looked his Soviet counterpart in the eye and read him the dates and times they had cheated on the treaty.”

Caught Cheating

One of MELODY's more significant successes would come about much later, during negotiations with the Soviets on the 1972 ABM treaty—which included an obligation not to give non-ABM systems, such as the SA-5 antiaircraft missiles, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles—and not to test them in an ABM mode. As a prelude to an NIE on the subject, intelligence analysts were debating whether the SA-5 could be upgraded to become an ABM and whether the Soviets might try to test it covertly in an ABM mode.

After nearly a year of trying to come up with an agreed-on estimate of SA-5 capabilities and Soviet intentions, some analysts believed that the Soviets should never be expected to cheat on such an important treaty. I suggested that we assume that the Soviets, based on their history, should be expected to cheat on the treaty by testing their SA-5 against one of their own ballistic missiles, and that we should try to find a way to catch them at it. Much to the chagrin of the analysts, MELODY answered the questions within a few weeks. MELODY had been quickly modified by adding a special ELINT receiver tuned to the SA-5's ground-based target-tracking radar frequency—which was known by then. We relied on a radar located in another country for tipoff of Soviet IRBM launches. The SA-5 target tracking signals were bistatically intercepted from the Sary Shagan missile test site, 1,000 miles away, as the Soviets repeatedly tested the SA-5 in the forbidden ABM role.

During one of the ensuing Geneva negotiating sessions, Secretary of State Kissinger, using intelligence derived from the MELODY intercepts, looked his Soviet counterpart in the eye and read him the dates and times the Soviets had cheated on the treaty. The cheating immediately ceased, and the Soviets began a mole-hunt for the spy in their midst that most surely had tipped us off.

Counting Troops

During the Vietnam war, CIA's special task force on South Vietnam was engaged in a heated debate with the Army and the Secretary of Defense's office over just how many North Vietnamese soldiers were infiltrating into South Vietnam. The CIA estimates were much larger than those of the Department of Defense. A quick study revealed that the Air Force had emplaced acoustic sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Project IGLOO WHITE) in an attempt to detect and count infiltrators. Both the Air Force and Navy had SIGINT planes, a C-130 and a C-121, orbiting off the Vietnamese

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coast to intercept and count the number of small radios carried by the infiltrating groups, always traveling in fixed numbers, on their trek south on the trail. An estimate was obtained by multiplying the radios by the number of men per group. The problem was that the orbiting SIGINT airplanes could not fly high enough to intercept all the radios on the long trail.

Our suggested solution was to get an airplane, in this case the U-2, that could fly high enough to intercept all the radios simultaneously for an accurate count. The Air Force soon found a special COMINT receiver in its inventory and had the operation underway in about a month. Each U-2 could stay aloft 12 hours, and two could provide 24-hour coverage. The infiltration rate turned out to be more like a flood. I was relieved to move on to another assignment before the Defense Department received the news of a more accurate count.

Trailblazing

During the years that our small group of engineers was in existence, we would occasionally discuss just how far we could go in terms of probing, spoofing, and injecting false targets and information into an enemy's electronic network to learn covertly more about his hidden capabilities and intentions. We also brainstormed about what responses and observables we might look for when radiation security, energy encryption, and deception were used. The process had no name at that time, but, in retrospect, we were unwitting participants in the origins of what is now known as information warfare.

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The Nigeria Example

Career Progression Analysis and Military Biographics (C NF)

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10 USC 424

> **"... the ability to understand world politics, even in these uncharted times, can benefit substantially from a reinvigorated effort to use an old tool: biographics."**

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(b)(3) is in the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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Analysis of world politics in the late 1990s reflects the struggle to find usable concepts with which to understand events now that the Cold War era is over. The question of how to explain what is happening is being answered in academia, in think tanks, and in the press by references to the growth of technology, the emergence of a more interconnected global economy, and even the waning of the nation state itself. (U)

Despite these new analytic trends, the ability to understand world politics, even in these uncharted times, can benefit substantially from a reinvigorated effort to use an old tool: biographics. At a time when ideology no longer influences the actions of world leaders to the extent that it once did, it is more important than ever to know who leaders are as people. Whether the issue is Boris Yelt'sin's health or Jiang Zemin's ability to control the Chinese Army, biographical intelligence and analysis play an important role in international affairs. (U)

In this regard, Africa biographical analysis is perhaps even more important because institutional development in most countries there is so weak that decisions and events are much more a product of individual personalities than in other parts of the world where government bureaucracies play a determining role. Moreover, biographical analysis is especially important in Africa because the political cast of characters in most African countries tends to be small and enduring, suggesting that, once biographical analysis is done, it can have a long shelf life. (U)

African personalities in the news have been around a long time. Laurent Kabila, the successful Zairean insurgent commander, went into opposition in eastern Zaire in 1968. Similarly, Charles Taylor, the Liberian warlord and presidential aspirant, was in opposition during the Tolbert regime and was a government procurement agent during Head of State Doe's tenure. In Nigeria, General Abacha has been a key figure in practically every Nigerian coup in recent memory. (U)

Need for a New Look

In the past, biographical sketches have often focused mainly on the top civilian and military leadership, especially those figures with whom US policymakers would personally interact. A key objective centered on highlighting personal strengths and weaknesses so that policymakers might recognize possible ways to influence their counterparts. This kind of analysis is still important. When biographical research focuses on the dynamics of groups, however, it can be even more useful to policymakers because it then has the potential to provide an understanding of the underpinnings of an individual's leadership. This helps a policymaker form realistic expectations as to what kind of policy initiatives are likely to succeed. (U)

Furthermore, even though the number of military governments seems to

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be declining, military officers, active duty and retired, serving in governments merit closer scrutiny. They do not always fit current stereotypes depicting them as thugs bent solely on their own enrichment. Military personalities are no less complicated than their civilian counterparts, and they may have more diverse and cosmopolitan backgrounds. Many are also better educated and experienced in leadership than the civilians are. (U)

The Chronology of Careers

Career progression analysis is useful and valuable to the analyst's efforts to obtain an accurate reading of military personalities. It involves looking at an individual's professional assignments and activities over a period of time to see whether these details exhibit a trend or a pattern. Because it consists mainly of the chronological ordering of career events (similar in many respects to an employment résumé), it seems simple and uninteresting. It is, however, a practical technique for organizing what can prove to be large amounts of detail in a way that reveals a career's dynamic, if there is one to be discerned, and it also can provide insights that may not otherwise be apparent. (U)

Unlike many social science models and explanatory frameworks, career progression analysis requires immersion in the details of an individual's personal history, and this involves a certain amount of subjective judgment as to how to order or group the data. For example, what criteria are to be used to establish career periods? Begin with a person's age? The kinds of assignments he pursues? His rank progression? His linkages to mentors, patrons, and cliques? Or the administration of different head of state under whom he served? Each case will be unique, even though similarities among individuals will emerge, regardless of the criterion used. (U)

While career progression analysis helps immeasurably to illuminate the background of a single individual, it can be especially useful when applied to a group. Shared experiences which serve to bind individuals together and create group cohesion then become more visible. (U)

The Case of Nigeria

In the context of the Nigerian officer corps, such factors as an officer's experience in Nigeria's civil war (1967-70), his education and training (both in Nigeria and overseas), and experience in peacekeeping operations, such as the Economic Community of West Africa Cease-fire Monitoring Group in Liberia, are particularly important. Ethnicity, religion, and regional loyalties have long been used to assess the dynamics of the Nigerian officer corps.

The possibility of applying career progression analysis to an entire officer corps is greatest for countries where biographical data has accumulated for a period of many years and where it exists for a broad range of personnel. This is the case for Nigeria. (U)

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The biographical files vary in quality and depth of material, but they typically are adequate to meet the need for background information on specific officers in which a policymaker may have an interest. At times, they are also rich enough to allow the discernment of career patterns. (U)

The Rise and Fall of Colonel Gwadabe

The career of Nigerian Col. Lawan Gwadabe, a Hausa and a Muslim, who is serving a prison sentence for his role in the March 1995 coup plot against the Abacha regime, provides a good case study for career progression analysis. The three broad periods of Colonel Gwadabe's career (Figure 1) are demarcated mainly by Gen. Ibrahim Babangida's tenure as Head of State (1985-93). Gwadabe's career flourished between 1985 and 1993, not the least because he supported the 1985 coup that brought Babangida to power. Thus, a logical principle to use in organizing the events of Gwadabe's career is that of Babangida's own tenure—before, during, and after. (U)

With the data arrayed in this manner and armed with some foreknowledge of Nigerian history, Gwadabe's career can be seen to exhibit several notable characteristics. First, he is not a veteran of the Nigerian civil war. Nigerian Army colonels of Gwadabe's age group represent the next generation of Nigerian Army general officers, and many lack first-hand military experience in the war. As a result, they are excluded from the fraternity of war heroes, still a

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major factor in the degree of respect which senior officers receive and in the degree of influence they can wield over the officer corps. The value of national cohesion, strongly held by senior officers in the current regime, will be correspondingly weaker in this and succeeding generations. (U)

Gwadabe's education and military training reveal a typical mix of domestic and foreign experiences, with a prominent US aspect that is not limited to military institutions. His training background also shows the predominance of armor, the sector of the Army Babangida favored. (U)

Third, and most important, the career period framework shows clearly that Gwadabe's career flourished under Babangida and that his assignments progressed toward increasingly responsible political, rather than military, jobs. In retrospect, his role in the Angola, Sudan, and Mozambique peace processes appear to be the pinnacle of his career. Correspondingly, his career declines under Babangida's successor, General Abacha. His assignments begin to fall more and more in the military sphere, until he is ultimately convicted for his participation in the March 1995 coup plot. (U)

(b)(1)

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A Soldier's Soldier

Current Chief of Army Staff Maj. Gen. Ishaya Bamaiyi provides another illustration of the application of career progression analysis. An ethnic Zuru and Christian from northern Kebbi state, Bamaiyi reflects the reputation of the Zurus for professionalism which has earned them a special niche in the Nigerian Army. (U)

Using rank progression as the organizing principle, Bamaiyi's three main career periods (Figure 2) are that of company-grade officer, field-grade officer, and general officer. As a second lieutenant through captain, Bamaiyi was occupied primarily with small-unit commands at the level of platoon and battalion. His military training and education, unlike that of Gwadabe, centered on the infantry, Abacha's favored branch of the Army. During this period, Bamaiyi saw combat in the civil war. (U)

As a field-grade officer, Bamaiyi begins to command units at the brigade level, undertakes his first training in the United States, and, with his appointment as commander of the Brigade of Guards, he begins migrating toward the command of units associated with the regime's security. As a general officer, his training is largely complete, and he continues to lead units important to regime security with his assignment as commander of the Lagos Garrison Command. (U)

Unlike Gwadabe, whose military career centered predominantly on political jobs, Bamaiyi emerges as more of a military professional. As such, his case is especially interesting in that it contradicts the conventional wisdom which holds that Nigerian military heads of state purge loyalists of previous regimes when they come to power. To some extent this is true, but Bamaiyi's career progression demonstrates that "professional" as opposed to "political" officers not only survive, but also can flourish—an indicator of the size and complexity of the officer corps. Under Babangida (1985-93), Bamaiyi commanded such key units as the 4 Mechanized Brigade at Ilorin, the 9 Mechanized Brigade at Ikeja, and the Brigade of Guards at Abuja. Thus, under Abacha, Bamaiyi went even further. He commanded the Lagos Garrison Command, and he became Army chief of staff. (U)

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Maj. Gen. Ishaya Rizi Bamaiyi

Career Period I: Company-Grade Officer

1968	*Attended the Nigerian Defense School (probably the Nigerian Defense Academy in Kaduna); commissioned as a second lieutenant.*
	Platoon commander, 68 Infantry Battalion, Onitsha, during civil war.
1969	*Adjutant, 9 Infantry Brigade, Training Wing; promoted to lieutenant.*
1970-71	*Second in command, 184 Infantry Battalion; attended Military Training College, Kaduna (probably the Nigerian Defense Academy).*
1971-75	*Commander, 181st Infantry Battalion and 183rd Infantry Battalion.*
1973	*Promoted to captain.*
1975	*Deputy Assistant Adjutant, 26 Infantry Brigade, Ilorin.*
1976-77	*Commander, 70 Infantry Battalion.*
1977-78	*Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, Nigerian Defense Academy, Kaduna.*

Career Period II: Field-Grade Officer

1978	*Promoted to major.*
1979-80	*Attended Nigerian Command and General Staff College, Jaji.*
1980-81	*Commander, 72 Infantry Battalion, Makurdi.*
1981-82	*Attended US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.*
1982	*Served on staff of Nigerian Command and General Staff College, Jaji.*
1983	*Promoted to lieutenant colonel.*
1985	*Deputy Commandant, Nigerian Army Depot, Zaria.*
1986	*Commander, 4 Mechanized Brigade, Ilorin; promoted to colonel.*
1986-90	*Commander, 9 Mechanized Brigade, Ikeja, Lagos.*

Career Period III: General Officer

1990	*Promoted to brigadier general.*
1990	*Commander, Brigade of Guards, Abuja.*
1993	*ECOMOG Chief of Staff*
1993	*Director of Operations, Army Headquarters.*
1993	*Appointed Commander, Lagos Garrison Command.*
1994	*Promoted to major general.*
1996	*Appointed Chief of Army Staff.*

(U)

Figure 2

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Answering Questions

The compilation of career progression profiles establishes a perspective of an officer's development and capabilities, and these data assist policymakers in forming preliminary judgments about the officer. At a glance, a policymaker can see whether the person has been exposed to US values, whether there are areas of common experience that can be used as conversational points of entree if a meeting is in the offing, and whether the person is close to decisionmakers in his own government or on the periphery of power. (U)

Career progression analysis also helps a policymaker come to grips with much larger and more important questions such as that of whether a transition to civilian rule in Nigeria can work in a country which has experienced military administration for most of its post-independence history and in which the military is the only cohesive and enduring national institution. It does so by pointing up those questions which address underlying organizational dynamics. In this case, is political careerism so entrenched in the military that it cannot turnover power to civilians without risking permanent eclipse? Or, are there enough apolitical professionals left in the military to oversee a power shift and keep ambitious younger officers in check long enough for civilians to consolidate their hold on power? (U)

"Career progression analysis is a particularly useful tool for analyzing the military leadership of countries in which the military has been, is, or may become an important influence."

In addition, both policymakers and analysts can gain insight into coups and coup attempts through the use of career progression analysis. The April 1990 coup attempt in Nigeria may have been instigated by professional officers who saw their careers set back by rewards to political sycophants, while the plot of March 1995 may have been the work of "political" officers such as Gwadabe who felt marginalized by the Abacha regime. (U)

Finally, while parochial influences of ethnicity, religion, and regionalism will always be a factor in the Nigerian military, career progression analysis shows that the military is a much more complex and sophisticated organization than these traditional factors lead one to believe. It provides insight into the country's defense priorities and its foreign policy. In Nigeria, and perhaps in Third World countries in general, policymakers can expect that future politicians and government officials will be drawn in part from the ranks of the military which has afforded its officers on-the-job training as provincial governors, diplomats, and bureaucrats. (U)

Broader Applications

Career progression analysis is a particularly useful tool for analyzing the military leadership of countries in which the military has been, is, or may become an important influence. Indonesia is a good example of a country whose political dynamics could be illuminated by such analysis. The Indonesian military's political role is longstanding, its role is legally codified by the concept of "dual function," and it still holds leadership positions at all levels of government, including seats in parliament. (U)

The career progression technique can also be useful in analyzing leadership in countries that are moving to consolidate civilian rule. China, with which Nigeria is expanding relations, is perhaps a case in point. Although the military in China has largely "returned to the barracks" and the institutionalization of civilian rule is more developed than it is in Nigeria, some senior officers remain influential. If the military returned to power in the event of a security crisis or if civilian government collapsed, career progression analysis could assist analysts in judging how well military government would perform by showing the degree of international, political, and bureaucratic experience of the officers who have come to power. (U)

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Threat Perception, Scare Tactic, or False Alarm?

The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations (S NF)

Ben B. Fischer

“Reagan was repeatedly compared to Hitler and accused of “fanning the flames of war”—a more sinister image than Andropov as a Red Darth Vader.”

Ben B. Fischer is in CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence.

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Never, perhaps, in the postwar decades was the situation in the world as explosive, and hence, more difficult and unfavorable, as in the first half of the 1980s.

Mikhail Gorbachev, February 1986

US-Soviet relations had come full circle in 1983. Europeans were declaring the outbreak of a Cold War II, and President Mitterrand compared the situation to the 1962 Cuban crisis and the 1948 Berlin blockade. Such fears were exaggerated. Nowhere in the world were the superpowers squared off in a conflict likely to erupt into war. But a modern-day Rip Van Winkle waking up that year would not have noticed much change in the international political landscape or realized that a substantial period of détente had come and gone while he slept. (U)

The second Cold War was mainly a war of words. In March, President Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as the “focus of evil in the world,” as an “evil empire.” General Secretary Andropov suggested Reagan was insane and a liar. Then things got nasty. Following Andropov's lead and no doubt his direction, the Soviet media launched a verbal offensive of a kind not seen since Stalin that far surpassed Reagan's broadsides. Reagan was repeatedly compared to Hitler and accused of “fanning the flames of war”—a more sinister image than Andropov as a Red Darth Vader. (U)

The Soviet War Scare

Such rhetoric was the consequence rather than the cause of tension, but frightening words masked real fears. The Hitler analogy was more than an insult and may have been a Freudian slip, because war was on the minds of Soviet leaders. Moscow was in the midst of a “war scare” that had two distinct phases and two different dimensions—one concealed in the world of clandestine intelligence operations since 1981, and the other revealed in the Soviet media two years later. (U)

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The KGB assessment was more of a storm warning than a hurricane alert. But Politburo forecasters reached a stark political judgment: the chances of a nuclear war, including a US surprise nuclear attack, were higher than at any time during the entire Cold War. In May 1981, General Secretary Brezhnev and then KGB chief Andropov briefed the Politburo assessment to a closed KGB conference. Then Andropov took the podium to tell the assembled intelligence managers and officers that the KGB and the GRU were being placed on a permanent intelligence watch to monitor indications and warning of US war-planning and preparations. Codenamed RYAN, this alert was the largest Soviet peacetime intelligence effort. (U)

During 1982, KGB Center assigned RYAN a high, but not overriding, priority. Then, on 17 February 1983, KGB residents already on alert received "eyes only" cables telling them that it had "acquired an especial degree of urgency" and was "now of particularly grave importance." They were ordered to organize a permanent watch using their entire operational staff, recruit new agents, and redirect existing ones to RYAN requirements. A circular message from the Moscow Center to all KGB residencies put on alert status stated:

> *Therefore one of the chief directions for the activity of the KGB's foreign service is to organize detection and assessment of signs of preparation for RYAN in all possible areas, i.e., political, economic, and military sectors, civil defense and the activity of special services. Our military neighbors [the GRU] are actively engaged in similar work in relation to the activity of the adversary's armed forces. (U)*

"And, for the first time since 1953, a Soviet leader was telling the Soviet people that the world was on the verge of a nuclear holocaust."

Moscow's urgency was linked to the impending US deployment of Pershing II intermediate-range missiles in West Germany. Very accurate and with a flight time under 10 minutes, these missiles could destroy hard targets, including Soviet command and control bunkers and missile silos, with little or no warning. Guidance cables referred to RYAN's critical importance to Soviet military strategy and the need for advance warning "to take retaliatory measures." But Soviet leaders were less interested in retaliation than in preemption and needed RYAN data as strategic warning to launch an attack on the new US missile sites. (U)

The overt war scare erupted two years later. On 23 March 1983, President Reagan announced a program to develop a ground- and space-based, laser-armed, anti-ballistic-missile shield designated Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) but quickly dubbed "Star Wars" by the media. Four days later—and in direct response—Andropov lashed out. He accused the United States of preparing a first-strike attack on the USSR and asserted that Reagan was "inventing new plans on how to unleash a nuclear war in the best way, with the hope of winning it." The war scare had joined the intelligence alert. (U)

Andropov's remarks were unprecedented. He violated a longstanding taboo by describing US nuclear weapons' numbers and capabilities in the mass media. He referred to Soviet weapons and capabilities—also highly unusual—and said explicitly that the USSR had, at best, only parity with the United States in strategic weaponry. And, for the first time since 1953, a Soviet leader was telling the Soviet people that the world was on the verge of a nuclear holocaust. If candor is a sign of sincerity, Moscow was worried. (U)

The War Scare as an Intelligence Issue

The Soviet war scare posed two questions for the Intelligence Community: was it genuine, that is, did the Soviet leadership actually believe that the United States might attack? If so, why had the Kremlin reached that conclusion? If the alarm was not genuine, then what purpose did it serve? (U)

By and large, the Community played down both the intelligence alert and the war-scare propaganda as evidence of an authentic threat perception. It did so in part because the information reaching it about the alert came primarily from British intelligence and was fragmentary, incomplete, and ambiguous. Moreover, the British protected the identity of the source—KGB Col. Oleg Gordievsky, number two in the London residency— and his bona fides could not be independently established. US intelligence did have partially corroborating information from a Czechoslovak intelligence officer, but apparently it was not detailed enough or considered reliable enough to confirm what was coming from Gordievsky. (U)

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The Intelligence Community continued to scoff at the war scare even after Gordievsky defected—actually, after MI6 exfiltrated him from the USSR—and was made available for debriefing.[2] But intelligence analysts were not alone in their skepticism. For example, one critic who attributes many of the problems in US-Soviet relations to the Reagan administration concluded *10 years later* and with the benefit of hindsight: "Above all, the idea that the new American administration might actually attack the Soviet Union seems too far out of touch with reality to have been given credence."[3] A Soviet émigré scholar who wrote the most perceptive article on Soviet war-scare propaganda found the analytic task so daunting that he refused to speculate on *why* the Kremlin had adopted this line or *to whom* the message was directed—West European governments, the US electorate, or the Soviet people.[4] (U)

Searching for an explanation of the war scare, intelligence analysts and other interested observers offered three answers: propaganda, paranoia, and politics. (U)

The consensus view regarded RYAN and the war scare as grist for the KGB disinformation mill—a sophisticated political-psychological scare tactic operation. Who was the KGB trying to scare? Answers differed. Most agreed that the Soviets wanted to frighten the West Europeans and above all the nervous West Germans into backing out of an agreement to deploy US intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles on their territory. Besides, Moscow was engaged in an all-out, go-for-broke propaganda and covert action program that was flagging and needed a boost. (U)

“Searching for an explanation of the war scare, intelligence analysts and other interested observers offered three answers: propaganda, paranoia, and politics.”

Some observers, however, believed that the campaign was inwardly, not outwardly, directed toward the Soviet people. There was evidence to support this interpretation. Andropov had launched an anticorruption and discipline campaign to get the long-suffering proletariat to work harder, drink less, and sacrifice more while cutting down on the theft of state property. War scares had been used in the past to prepare people for bad times, and, with ideology dead and consumer goods in short supply, the Kremlin was trotting out a tried and true mobilization gimmick. (U)

A second explanation argued that the war scare was clearly bogus but potentially dangerous because it was rooted in Soviet leadership paranoia. Paranoia is a catchall explanation for Russian/Soviet external behavior that goes back to early tsarist times. But it was given credence. This was how Gordievsky explained the war scare, and the advanced age and poor health of Andropov and the rest of the gerontocracy suggested that the leadership's debilitation might be mental as well as physical. (U)

The third explanation held that the war scare was rooted in internal bureaucratic or succession politics. The military and intelligence services might be using it as a form of bureaucratic turfbuilder to make their budgets and missions grow at a time when the competition for resources was fierce. Or the war scare might have been connected in some way—a debate over foreign and defense policy?—to a succession struggle that was continuing despite, or because of, Andropov's poor health. Explanations were plentiful, but evidence was scarce. (U)

Although quite different, these explanations had much in common. Each started from the premise, whether articulated or not, that there was no objective threat of a US surprise attack on the USSR; therefore, the war scare was all smoke and mirrors, a false alarm being used for some other purpose. In most instances, outside observers did not give the war scare credence, refusing to imagine that the Soviet leadership could view the United States as the potential aggressor in an unprovoked nuclear war, because they themselves could not imagine the United States in that role. This idea was "too far out of touch with reality." Reagan was not Hitler, and America does not do Pearl Harbors. (U)

US perceptions of the US-Soviet balance of strategic power also weighed against the idea that the war scare could indicate genuine, even if greatly exaggerated, concern on Moscow's part. The United States was in the midst of the largest military buildup in its history whose aim was to close a perceived "window of vulnerability" in the mid-1980s created by US loss of superiority in delivery vehicles and then counterforce capabilities. The buildup had begun during the previous administration, but was greatly accelerated during Reagan's first term in the belief that the USSR might exploit a temporary advantage—appropriately called a

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window of opportunity—to engage in adventuresome behavior, use nuclear blackmail, or even perhaps attack the United States. Moreover, Soviet claims about the "irreversibility" of changes in the "correlation of forces" in the 1970s—a reference to both Soviet gains in the Third World and achievement of "robust parity" in strategic power with the US—did little to allay US concerns. (U)

US observers were half right in dismissing the war scare as groundless, but also half wrong in viewing it as artificially contrived. Moscow apparently was worried about something. (U)

Evidence From the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

For a long time, Gordievsky was the only publicly acknowledged source of information on RYAN.

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Meanwhile, former Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobryinin and ex-KGB officers Oleg Kalugin and Yuriy Shvets have published memoirs that dovetail with Gordievsky's account. We know a lot more than we did about the war scare, even though a complete understanding is still elusive. (S NF)

Gordievsky, the original source, is also the most prolific. Almost a decade after he arrived in London, he and British coauthor Christopher Andrew published a sheaf of KGB cables that describe the alert and collection requirements. No one in the US, British, or Soviet/Russian intelligence communities has questioned these documents, so silence is tantamount to authentication. (U)

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Spooking the Russians

During the first Reagan administration, US policy toward the Soviet Union was conducted on two tracks. The first encompassed normal diplomatic relations and arms control negotiations. The second was a covert political-psychological effort to attack Soviet vulnerabilities and undermine the system. According to a recent account based on interviews with Reagan-era policymakers, it was a "secret offensive on economic, geostrategic, and psychological fronts designed to roll back and weaken Soviet power."[5] For most of 1981-83, there were more trains running on the second track than on the first. (U)

RYAN may have been a response to the first in a series of US military probes along Soviet borders initiated in the Reagan administration's first months. These probes—called psychological warfare operations, or PSYOP, in Pentagon jargon—aimed at exploiting Soviet psychological vulnerabilities and deterring Soviet actions. The administration's "silent campaign" was also practically invisible, except to a small circle of White House and Pentagon aides—and, of course, the Kremlin. "It was very sensitive," recalls former Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle. "Nothing was written down about it, so there would be no paper trail."[6] (U)

The PSYOP was calculated to play on what the White House perceived as a Soviet image of the President as a "cowboy" and reckless practitioner of nuclear politics. US purpose was not to signal intentions so much as keep the Soviets guessing what might happen next:

> *"Sometimes we would send bombers over the North Pole, and their radars would click on," recalls Gen. Jack Chain the former Strategic Air Command commander. "Other times fighter-bombers would probe their Asian or European periphery." During peak times, the operation would include several maneuvers a week. They would come at irregular intervals to make the effect all the more unsettling. Then, as quickly as the unannounced flights began, they would stop, only to begin a few weeks later.*[7] (U)

Another participant echoes this assessment:

> *"It really got to them," recalls Dr. William Schneider, Undersecretary of State for Military Assistance and Technology, who saw classified "after-action reports" that indicated US flight activity. "They didn't know what it all meant. A squadron would fly straight at Soviet airspace, and other radars would*

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light up and units would go on alert. Then, at the last minute, the squadron would peel off and return home."[8]

The Navy played an even bigger role than SAC after President Reagan authorized it in March 1981 to operate and exercise in areas where the US fleet had rarely—or never—gone before. Major exercises in 1981 and 1983 in the Soviet far northern and far eastern maritime approaches demonstrated US ability to deploy aircraft carrier battle groups close to sensitive military and industrial areas without being detected or challenged.[9] Using sophisticated and carefully rehearsed deception and denial techniques, the Navy eluded the USSR's massive ocean reconnaissance system and early-warning systems.[10] Some naval exercises included "classified" operations in which carrier-launched aircraft managed to penetrate Soviet shore-based radar and air-defense systems and simulate "attacks" on Soviet targets. Summing up a 1983 Pacific Fleet exercise, the US chief of naval operations noted that the Soviets "are as naked as jaybird there [on the Kamchatka Peninsula], and they know it."[11] His remark applied equally to the Kola Peninsula in the far north. (U)

Was there a connection between PSYOP and RYAN? There clearly was a temporal correlation. The first US missions began in mid-February 1981; Andropov briefed RYAN to the KGB the following May. Moreover, when top officials first learned of RYAN, they reportedly connected it to the Soviet border probes, noting that the Soviets were "increasingly frightened by the Reagan administration."[12] (U)

"Andropov's advisers urged him not to overreact, but overreact he did, accusing the President of "deliberately lying" about Soviet military power to justify SDI."

The Intelligence Community, not clued in to the PSYOP program, could be forgiven for not understanding the cause-and-effect relationship. This is a reminder of a perennial problem in preparing estimates that assess another country's behavior in terms of its interaction with the United States and in response to US actions. The impact of the action-reaction-interaction dynamic is often overlooked or neglected, not because of analytic failure or conceptual inadequacy, but for the simple reason that the intelligence left hand does not always know what the policy right hand is doing. (U)

There may have been another problem in perception that affected policymakers as well as intelligence analysts. While the US probes caught the Kremlin by surprise, they were not unprecedented. There was a Cold War antecedent that Soviet leaders may have found troubling. From 1950 to 1969, the Strategic Air Command conducted similar operations, both intelligence-gathering and "ferret" missions aimed at detecting the location, reaction, and gaps in radar and air-defense installations along the USSR's Eurasian periphery in preparation for nuclear war.[13] It is possible, though not provable, that the Soviets remembered something the American side had already forgotten. (U)

1983 Through the War-Scare Prism

Despite their private assessment, Soviet leaders maintained a public posture of relative calm during 1981-82. Even Reagan's erstwhile Secretary of State Alexander Haig gave them credit, saying "[t]he Soviets stayed very, very moderate, very, very responsible during the first three years of this administration. I was mind-boggled with their patience." But that patience wore thin as 1983 wore on. In September, Andropov would officially close off an internal debate over the causes and consequences of the collapse of détente in an unusual foreign policy "declaration." In it, he limned the outline of the war scare:

> *The Soviet leadership deems it necessary to inform the Soviet people, other peoples, and all who are responsible for determining the policy of states, of its assessment of the course pursued in international affairs by the current United States administration. In brief, it is a militarist course that represents a serious threat to peace.... If anyone had any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the policy of the present American administration, recent events have dispelled them once and for all.* [emphasis added]

What were those "recent events"?

SDI. The SDI announcement came out of the blue for the Kremlin—and most of the Cabinet. Andropov's advisers urged him not to overreact, but overreact he did, accusing the President of "deliberately lying" about Soviet military power to justify SDI. He denounced it as a "bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the face

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of the US nuclear threat." Space-based defense, he added,

> *... would open the floodgates of a runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive. Such is the real significance, the seamy side of, so to say, of Washington's 'defensive conception'.... The Soviet Union will never be caught defenseless by any threat.... Engaging in this is not just irresponsible, it is insane.... Washington's actions are putting the entire world in jeopardy.* (U)

SDI had obviously touched a sensitive nerve. The Soviets seemed to treat it more seriously than many US scientists and even some White House aides did at the time. There were two reasons. First, the Soviets, despite their boasting in the 1970s, had practically unlimited faith in US technical capability. Second, SDI had a profound psychological impact that reinforced the trend predicted by the computer-based "correlation of forces" model. In a remarkable tête-à-tête with a US journalist and former arms control official, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, first deputy defense minister and chief of the general staff, assessed the symbolic significance of SDI:

> *... We cannot equal the quality of United States arms for a generation or two. Modern military power is based on technology, and technology is based on computers.*
>
> *In the United States, small children...play with computers.... Here, we don't even have computers in every office of the Defense Ministry. And, for reasons you know well, we cannot make computers widely available in our society.*
>
> *... We will never be able to catch up with you in modern arms until we have an economic revolution. And the question is whether we can have an economic revolution without a political revolution.* (U)

Ogarkov's private rumination is all the more remarkable because in his public statements he was a hawk's hawk, frequently comparing the United States to Nazi Germany and warning of the advent of new weapon systems based on entirely "new physical principles." The duality, even dichotomy, between Ogarkov's public stance calling for continuation of the Cold War and his private acknowledgment that the USSR could not compete may have been typical of other Soviet leaders and contributed to their frustration and anxiety. (U)

KAL 007. At 3:26 a.m. Tokyo time on 1 September 1983, a Soviet Su-15 interceptor fired two air-to-air missiles at a Korean Boeing 747 airliner, destroying the aircraft and killing all 269 crew and passengers. Soviet air-defense units had been tracking KAL Flight 007 for more than an hour as it first entered and then left Soviet airspace over the Kamchatka Peninsula. The order to destroy the aircraft was given as the airliner was about to leave Soviet airspace for the second time after overflying Sakhalin Island. The ill-fated Boeing 747 was probably downed in international airspace. (U)

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the White House learned about the shootdown within a few hours of the event and, with Secretary of State Shultz taking the lead, denounced the Soviet act as one of deliberate mass murder of innocent civilians. President Reagan called it "an act of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations." (U)

Air Force intelligence dissented at the time of the incident, and eventually US intelligence reached a consensus view that the Soviets probably did not know they were destroying a civilian airliner. The charge should have been criminally negligent manslaughter, not premeditated murder. But the official US position never deviated from the initial assessment. The incident was used to keep up a noisy campaign in the UN and to spur worldwide efforts to punish the USSR with commercial boycotts, law suits, and denial of landing rights for Aeroflot airliners. These various efforts focused on indicting the Soviet system itself and the top leadership as being ultimately responsible. (U)

Moscow's public response to the incident came more than a week later on 9 September in the form of an unprecedented two-hour live press conference conducted by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov with support from Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Kornienko and Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the Central Committee's International Information Department. The five-star spin-doctor's goal was to prove—despite 269 bodies to the contrary—that the Soviet Union had behaved rationally in

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deciding to destroy Flight 007. At first, Ustinov said the regional Soviet air defense unit had identified the aircraft as a US intelligence platform, an RC-135 of the type that routinely performed intelligence collection operations along a similar flightpath. In any event, Ogarkov asserted, whether an RC-135 or a 747, the plane was unquestionably on a US or joint US-Japanese intelligence mission, and the local Soviet commander had carried out the correct order. The real blame for the tragedy, he argued, lay with the United States, not the USSR. (U)

Remarkably, a classified memorandum coordinated by the Ministry of Defense and the KGB shows that privately the Soviet leadership took pretty much the same view as their public pronouncement on KAL 007. Released in 1992, the secret memorandum was sent to Andropov by Ustinov and KGB Chairman Chebrikov. It claimed that:

> *... We are dealing with a major, dual-purpose political provocation carefully organized by the US special [intelligence] services. The first purpose was to use the incursion of the intruder aircraft into Soviet airspace to create a favorable situation for the gathering of defense data on our air-defense system in the Far East, involving the most diverse systems, including the Ferret reconnaissance satellite. Second, they envisaged, if this flight were terminated by us, using that fact to mount a global anti-Soviet campaign to discredit the Soviet Union.* (U)

Soviet angst was reflected in the rapid and harsh propaganda reaction, with Andropov once again taking the lead rather than remaining silent. He moved quickly to exploit KAL 007, like SDI before it, for US-baiting propaganda. Asserting that an "outrageous military psychosis" had overtaken the United States, he declared that:

> *The Reagan administration, in its imperial ambitions, goes so far that one begins to doubt whether Washington has any brakes at all preventing it from crossing the point at which any sober-minded person must stop.* [emphasis added]

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the Soviet air-defense commander made an honest, though serious, error because the entire air-defense system was on high alert and in a state of anxiety. He claims this was a result of incursions by US aircraft from the Pacific Fleet in recent months during a joint fleet exercise with the Japanese. He could not provide details, but he did know that there was concern about both military and military reconnaissance aircraft. (U)

The specific incident to which he almost certainly was referring occurred on or about 4 April, when at least six US Navy planes from the carriers Midway and Enterprise flew simulated bombing runs over a heavily fortified Soviet island in the Kuril chain called Zeleny. The two carriers were part of a 40-ship armada that was patrolling in the largest-ever exercise in the north Pacific. According to the Soviet démarche protesting the incursion, the Navy aircraft flew 20 miles inside Soviet airspace and remained there for up to 20 minutes each time.[14] As a result, the Soviet air-defense organization was put on alert for the rest of the spring and summer—and perhaps longer—and some senior officers were transferred, reprimanded, or dismissed. (U)

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Andropov himself issued a "draconian" order that readiness be increased and that any aircraft discovered in Soviet airspace be shot down. Air-defense commanders were warned that if they refused to execute Andropov's order, they would be dismissed. There is corroborating information for this from a curious source—an apparent KGB disinformation project executed in Japan and then fed back into the USSR. A *Novosti* news agency pamphlet entitled *President's Crime: Who Ordered the Espionage Flight of KAL 007?* revealed that two important changes—one in Article 53 of the Soviet Air Code on 24 November 1982 and the other in Article 36 of the Soviet Law on State Borders on 11 May 1993—in effect had closed Soviet borders to all intruders and made Andropov's shoot-to-kill order a matter of law, changing the Soviet (and internationally recognized) rules of engagement.[15] (U)

This incident raised Soviet fears of a possible US attack and made Moscow more suspicious that US military exercises might conceal preparations for an actual attack. Within weeks, Soviet intelligence would react in exactly that way to a US-NATO exercise in Western Europe—with potentially dangerous consequences. (U)

Able Archer 83. The second significant incident of 1983 occurred during an annual NATO command post exercise codenamed Able Archer 83.

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The Soviets were familiar with Able Archer from previous years, but the 1983 version included several changes. First, in the original scenario that was later changed, the exercise was to involve high-level officials, including the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in major roles with cameo appearances by the President and Vice President. Second, the exercise included a practice drill that took NATO forces from the use of conventional forces through a full-scale mock release of nuclear weapons. (U)

The story of Able Archer has been told many times, growing and changing with each retelling. The original version came from Gordievsky, who claims that on the night of 8 or 9 November—he cannot remember which—Moscow sent a flash cable from the Center advising, incorrectly, that US forces in Europe had been put on alert and that troops at some US bases were being mobilized. The cable reportedly said that the alert may have been in response to the recent bombing attack on a US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, or related to impending US Army maneuvers, or the US may have begun the countdown to a surprise nuclear war. Recipients were asked to evaluate these hypotheses. At two airbases in East Germany and Poland, Soviet fighters were put on alert—for the first and last time during the Cold War. As Gordievsky described it:

> *In the tense atmosphere generated by the crises and rhetoric of the past few months, the KGB concluded that American forces had been placed on alert—and might even have begun the countdown to war.... The world did not quite reach the edge of the nuclear abyss during Operation RYAN. But during Able Archer 83 it had, without realizing it, come frighteningly close—certainly closer than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.* [emphasis added] (U)

British and US journalists with inside access to Whitehall and the White House have repeated the same story.[16] Three themes run through it. The United States and USSR came close to war as a result of Kremlin overreaction; only Gordievsky's timely warning to Washington via MI6 kept things from going too far; and Gordievsky's information was an epiphany for President Reagan, who was shaken by the idea that the Soviet Union was fearful of a US surprise attack. According to US journalist Don Oberdorfer:

> *Within a few weeks after...Able Archer 83, the London CIA station reported, presumably on the basis of information obtained by the British from Gordievsky, that the Soviets had been alarmed about the real possibility that the United States was preparing a nuclear attack against them. A similar report came from a well-connected American who had heard it from senior officials in an East European country closely allied to Moscow. McFarlane, who received the reports at the White House, initially discounted them as Soviet scare tactics rather than evidence of real concern about American intentions, and told Reagan of his view in presenting them to the President. But a more extensive survey of Soviet attitudes sent to the White House early in 1984 by CIA Director William Casey, based in part on reports from the double agent Gordievsky, had a more sobering effect. Reagan seemed uncharacteristically grave after reading the report and asked McFarlane, "Do you suppose they really believe that?"... I don't see how they could believe that—but it's something to think about," Reagan replied. In a meeting that same day, Reagan spoke about the biblical prophecy of Armageddon, a final world-ending battle between good and evil, a topic that fascinated the President. McFarlane though it was not accidental that Armageddon was on Reagan's mind.*[17]

For all its drama, however, Able Archer seems to have made more of an impression on the White House than on the Kremlin. A senior Soviet affairs expert who queried Soviet political and military leaders reported that none had heard of Able Archer, and all denied that it had reached the Politburo or even the upper levels of the defense ministry.[18] The GRU officer cited above said that watch officers were concerned over the exercise. Tensions were high as a result of the KAL 007 incident, and Soviet intelligence always worried that US military movements might indicate war, especially when conducted during major holidays.[19] Other than that, he saw nothing unusual about Able Archer.

The Iron Lady and the Great Communicator

Did Gordievsky's reporting, especially his account of the KGB Center's reaction to Able Archer,

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influence US attitudes toward the Soviet Union? Gordievsky and coauthor Andrew believe so and have repeated the story dozens of times in books, articles, and interviews. The British agent's information, Andrew noted, "was of enormous importance in providing warning of the almost paranoid fear within some sections of the Reagan leadership that President Reagan was planning a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union."[20] (U)

But did the British go further and put their own spin on the reporting in an effort to influence Reagan? Analysts who worked with the Gordievsky file during the war scare think so, and their suspicions are supported, if not confirmed, in British accounts. Prime Minister Thatcher was engaged in an effort to moderate US policy toward the USSR, convinced that the US hard line had become counterproductive, even risky, and was threatening to undermine the NATO consensus on INF deployments. She also was mindful of the growing strength of the peace movement in Britain and especially in West Germany. (U)

Thatcher launched her campaign to modify US policy, appropriately enough, in Washington at the annual dinner of the Churchill Foundation Award on 29 September, where her remarks were certain to reach the White House and attract US media coverage. Her theme—"we live on the same planet and must go on sharing it"—was a plea for a more accommodating alliance policy that she repeated in subsequent addressees. As her biographer notes, Thatcher did not make an urgent plea or sudden flight to Washington to press her views, rather:

> **"Stalin's heirs decided that it is better to look through a glass darkly than through rose-colored glasses."**

> *... the essence of the [Thatcher-Reagan] partnership at this stage was that the two governments were basing their decisions on much the same evidence and on shared assessments at professional [sic] level. In particular, both governments would have had the same intelligence. A critical contribution in this field was made over a period of years by Oleg Gordievski [sic]....*[21] (U)

British intelligence sources confided to a US journalist that London used the Gordievsky material to influence Reagan, because his hardline policy was strengthening Soviet hawks:

> *Since KGB reporting is thought to be aimed at confirming views already held in Moscow—to bolster the current line—the British worried that the impact on Moscow of the bluster in Washington would be enlarged by the KGB itself. They had cause to worry.*[22] (U)

The question is: how much spin did MI6 use? Unfortunately, Gordievsky did not include the KGB Center's flash message on Able Archer in his otherwise comprehensive collection of cables published in 1992. Gordievsky's claim to fame for influencing White House perceptions of Soviet "paranoia" is probably justified, but his assertion that a paranoid Kremlin almost went to war by overreacting to Able Archer is questionable. (U)

RYAN and the Soviet Pearl Harbor

A Czechoslovak intelligence officer who worked closely with the KGB on RYAN noted that his counterparts were obsessed with the historical parallel between 1941 and 1983. He believed this feeling was almost visceral, not intellectual, and deeply affected Soviet thinking. (U)

The German invasion was the Soviet Union's greatest military disaster, similar to—but much more traumatic than—Pearl Harbor. It began with a surprise attack that could have been anticipated and countered, but was not because of an intelligence failure. The connection between surprise attack and inadequate warning was never forgotten. (U)

The historical example of Operation Barbarossa may account for the urgency, even alarm, that field intelligence officers like Gordievsky and Shvets attributed to Kremlin paranoia. This gap in perceptions may have reflected a generation gap. The Brezhnev–Andropov generation had experienced the war firsthand as the formative experience of their political lives; for younger Soviets, it was history rather than living memory. (U)

The intelligence "failure" of 1941 was a failure of analysis, not collection.[23] Stalin received multiple detailed and timely warnings of the impending attack from a variety of open and clandestine sources. But he gave the data a best case or not-so-bad case interpretation, assuming—incorrectly—that Hitler would not attack without issuing an ultimatum or fight a two-front war while still engaged in the West. Stalin erred in part because he deceived himself and in part because German counterintelligence also deceived him. Stalin's heirs decided

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that it is better to look through a glass darkly than through rose-colored glasses. This was probably one reason why RYAN employed an explicit worst case methodology. (U)

RYAN appears to have incorporated—or misappropriated—another lesson from 1941. Despite the prowess of his intelligence services, the ever-suspicious Stalin ironically distrusted clandestinely acquired intelligence, including agent reporting and even communications and signals intercepts. He did so because he believed that all sources could be controlled by the enemy and corrupted by disinformation, leading him to reject both accurate and inaccurate information. As a corrective, he insisted that Soviet intelligence select indirect indicators of war planning that could not be concealed or manipulated. His chief of military intelligence had the idea of surveying mutton prices in Nazi-occupied Europe, arguing that the Germans would need sheepskin coats for winter campaigning in Russia, and, by buying up available livestock supplies for skins, they would flood the market with cheap mutton.[24] This deceptively simple indicator turned out to be simply deceptive. Hitler believed he could defeat the Red Army by fall and did not prepare for wintertime operations. (U)

RYAN requirements reveal the same kind of unorthodox thinking. For example, the KGB residency in London was instructed to monitor prices paid for blood at urban donor banks. The Center assumed that prices would increase on the eve of war as the banks scurried to stockpile supplies. But there was a problem: British donor banks do not pay donors, all of whom are volunteers. Another example: the London residency was told to visit meat-packing plants, looking for signs of "mass slaughter of cattle and putting of meat into long cold storage" in preparation for RYAN. The parallel with 1941 is so close as to suggest that some of the RYAN requirements were dug out of the NKVD and GRU files. (U)

> **"What the Soviets feared most was that they were losing the Cold War and the technological arms race with the US."**

Finally, there is another plausible, but unprovable, lesson learned from 1941. The prewar intelligence failure was Stalin's, but he blamed the intelligence services. This left an indelible stain on Soviet intelligence that Andropov, as KGB chief and later party chief, may have been determined not to let happen again. Soviet intelligence certainly had a vested interest in promoting a dire threat assessment of US intentions, but bureaucratic self-interest may not have been as important as professional, not to say hurt, pride. (U)

Conclusion

RYAN was for real. Skeptics should consider Dobrynin's response to a doubting Thomas TV interviewer: "Make your conclusions from what he [Andropov] said in telegrams to his residents." The KGB-GRU—or more appropriately the joint Warsaw Pact—alert was a crash effort to build a strategic warning system by substituting manpower for technology, HUMINT for satellites and sensors. Soviet actions were panicky, but not paranoid or unprecedented. As one historian noted, even under the tsars Russian strategists were often quite fearful when confronted by superior Western military technology, but their fears, while exaggerated, were scarcely insane.[25] Dobrynin claims that Andropov worried because President Reagan was "unpredictable." But this places too much weight on a single personality. What the Soviets feared most was what their "correlation of forces" calculations told them—that they were losing the Cold War and the technological arms race with the US. (U)

The real war scare almost certainly was not the one the Kremlin envisioned. The presumed threat of a US surprise nuclear attack was nonexistent. The possibility of Soviet preemptive strike may have been more likely. Well-informed observers like Gyula Horn, the last Communist foreign minister and current Prime Minister of Hungary, revealed in his memoirs that Soviet marshals, fortified with a little vodka, openly advocated an attack on the West "before the imperialists gain superiority in every sphere." The information is anecdotal, but there is a certain grim logic to it.

The war scare was the last paroxysm of the Cold War. It was a fitting end. (U)

NOTES

1. This was a reference to the 1973 overthrow of Marxist President Salvador Allende.

2. According to interviews conducted by Murray Marder, "[m]any senior administration officials scoff now, as they did then, at the suggestion that the Soviet Union was genuinely alarmed by US military moves or

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public statements, or that Moscow had any justification for feeling vulnerable. The "war scare" in the Soviet Union in 1982-83 was deliberately engineered for propaganda purposes, these officials maintain—a pretext to create a siege mentality in the Soviet Union and to frighten the outside world about US intentions. ("Defector Told of Soviet Alert; KGB Station Reportedly Warned US Would Attack," *Washington Post*, 8 August 1986, p. A1.)

3. Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 60. Garthoff carefully considers all the details surrounding Gordievsky's recruitment and espionage for British intelligence, his bona fides, and his defection, but still questions whether the Soviets could have really believed in the war-scare scenario. Garthoff states, wrongly, that Gordievsky's information on RYAN was given to US intelligence only after his defection in May 1985. The British shared the information—in sanitized form to conceal the source—contemporaneously with the United States. Garthoff speculates that the British had some doubts about Gordievsky's reporting and did not want to offend the Reagan administration with intelligence that might suggest that its hardline policies were raising Soviet anxiety to an unusually high level. In fact, one reason the British pressed Gordievsky's information on US intelligence was precisely to influence Reagan's views on the USSR.

4. Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Moscow's War Propaganda and Soviet Public Opinion," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 33 (September-October 1983), p. 88.

5. Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. xvi.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. See Gregory L. Vistica, *Fall from Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S. Navy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 105-108, 116-118, and 129-135, *passim.*

10. Equally important, the Navy was able to offset the Soviets' ability to track the fleet by reading naval communications, which the KGB had been able to decrypt since the late 1960s, thanks to ex-sailor John Walker and his spy ring. The FBI arrested Walker in 1985.

11. As cited in Seymour Hersh, *"The Target is Destroyed": What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What Americans Really Knew About It* (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 18.

12. Schweizer, *Victory*, p. 190.

13. In 1970, the United States abandoned the risky practice of flying into Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean airspace to provoke reactions by radar and air-defense installations. For recently declassified information on the US overflight program, see "Secrets of the Cold War," *U.S. News & World Report*, Vol. 114, No. 10 (15 March 1993), pp. 30-50.

14. This incident is recounted in Seymour Hersh, *"The Target is Destroyed"*, chapter 2, *passim.* The Soviets saw both political and military machinations in the overflight, because Zeleny is one of several islands that comprise the so-called northern territories that have been in dispute between Moscow and Tokyo since the Soviets seized them in 1945. The United States does not recognize the Soviet claim to the islands and supports Japan. The Soviets viewed the overflight as provocative and a challenge to their sovereignty over the islands. Hersh notes on p. 18 that the "Navy never publicly acknowledged either the overflight or its error; it also chose to say nothing further inside the government."

15. This strange pamphlet was issued by a one-room Japanese "publishing" firm in editions of 1,000 each in English and Japanese. However, *Novosti* "reprinted" 100,000 copies in Russian. This suggests two things: the pamphlet was intended primarily for the internal Soviet audience, and the Soviet people did not believe their government's explanation of the KAL 007 tragedy. See Murray Sayle, "Closing the File on Flight 007," *The New Yorker*, Vol. LXIX, No. 42 (13 December 1993), pp. 90-101, especially 94-95.

16. The two British accounts of Gordievsky's role and how British intelligence used him to influence President Reagan's thinking on Soviet policy are: Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Storm Birds: The Dramatic Stories of the Top Soviet Spies Who Have Defected Since World War II* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), chapter 18, *passim;* and Geoffrey Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), pp. 122-23. See also Nicholas Bethell, *Spies and Other Secrets: Memoirs from the Second Cold War* (New York: Viking, 1994), p. 191. Brooke-Shepard received assistance from British and US intelligence. Smith's book is an "authorized" inside account of its subject. Bethell is a Tory MP and friend and fan of Gordievsky's. The US version, which is identical in many respects, is Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From Cold War to a New Era* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), p. 67.

17. Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, p. 67.

18. Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, p. 139, n. 160.

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19. Able Archer coincided with October Revolution Day, the USSR's national holiday. Holidays turned into national drinking binges that incapacitated practically the entire country. This is an interesting bit of mirror-imaging, because NATO military planners almost certainly did not factor the holiday into Allied war plans.

20. Christopher Andrew, "We Will Always Need Spies," *The London Times*, 3 March 1994, Features, p. 1

21. Smith, *Thatcher and Reagan*, p. 122.

22. John Newhouse, *War and Peace in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), p. 338.

23. For a discussion of the wealth of accurate information that was available to Stalin, see John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions: The KGB Dossier Reveals Stalin's Master Spy* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1993), pp. 85-90. This analysis is based on declassified Soviet intelligence reports from the KGB archive. See also Barton Whaley, *Codeword BARBAROSSA* (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1973), which details more than 80 indications and warnings received by Soviet intelligence.

24. Viktor Suvorov, *Icebreaker: Who Started World War II?* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990), pp. 320-321.

25. William J. Fuller, Jr., *Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 12.

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The 1964 presidential race

Election Operation In Chile

T.F. Schmidt

This article is based on a study submitted in May 1965 by a member of the former Plans and Evaluation Group of the Covert Action Staff of the Directorate of Operations (DO). It was prepared from material submitted by operating elements of the DO.

In the spring of 1964 the US Government looked at Chile with concern and apprehension. In the presidential election to be held in September, for the first time in Latin American history either a Christian Democratic Party or a Marxist-controlled front appeared assured of gaining power legally. Ostensibly, the campaign was a three-way race. But the issue was bound to be decided between 53-year-old Senator Eduardo Frei, leader of the Christian Democrats, and Doctor Salvador Allende, 56-year-old standard bearer of the Popular Action Front (FRAP). The so-called Radical Party led by Senator Julio Duran, aged 46, appeared to have a fair chance before March 1964. In March, however, Duran's right-wing coalition with the Liberals and Conservatives was destroyed after an unexpected FRAP by-election victory. Thereafter, the Liberals and Conservatives threw their support behind Frei, leaving Duran with only his faithful Radicals. Thus the campaign narrowed to a struggle between the moderately left Frei and Allende, who was so far left that about half his FRAP support came from the Communist Party. If Allende should win, and his chances did not look bad in the spring, the sheer weight of communist influence in FRAP might have resulted in a communist-dominated regime in Chile. This would give Moscow and Beijing a southern hemisphere satellite and base of operations potentially more useful than Cuba in the northern hemisphere; such a base would multiply US problems in Latin America.

One of the most dangerous aspects of such a development would, perhaps, be that of establishing a Marxist government in a Latin American country by manipulating the existing and legal democratic process. It would present a workable alternative to the use of violence and insurrection practiced in Cuba. Even if there were no chain reactions in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia, counteracting communist appeals to such countries to follow the "example of Chile" would become much more costly and difficult.

The Copper Question

In 1964, copper accounted for some 80 percent of Chilean exports, while taxes on it contributed an estimated 20 percent of the fiscal budget. Two American-owned companies, Anaconda and Kennecott, supplied 65 percent of Chile's foreign revenue. Both Frei and Allende promised changes in policies affecting foreign copper companies. Frei, a former college professor and founder of the National Falange, the predecessor of the Christian Democratic Party, had worked hard to build up his party until it became the largest vote-getter in municipal elections with 22.6 percent of the ballot in 1963. The Christian Democrats were moderately socialist and, in foreign affairs, stubbornly independent. Frei insisted on a redistribution of wealth: roughly 2 million peasants were outside Chile's money economy, while 2.5 percent of the landowners controlled 75 percent of the land.

Frei opposed nationalization of the copper mines on the grounds that it was not economically feasible. Instead, he proposed putting the marketing of copper under state control and to raise yearly capacity from the then prevailing 600,000 tons to 1 million tons. He also wanted to encourage more foreign, but not US, investments and to try to reduce US influence in the economy.

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A Political Physician

Allende initially promised the nationalization of the copper industry. He subsequently toned down his threat to include only the major companies, and he promised to compensate them. But Chile, suffering from galloping inflation, could not afford to pay just compensation. Allende's proposed nationalization might have forced the US to invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment, which would have forced suspension of the annual $100-million US aid program for Chile. Although FRAP was widely advertised as a fraternal six-party coalition of socialists, communists, and populist groups, the Communist Party was the strongest element. It accounted for nearly half of FRAP's strength, and the socialists accounted for another 45 percent.

The program worked out by Allende in cooperation with the communists called for land reform and a variety of social improvements. On the face of it, there was little difference, except for the copper question, between Allende's and Frei's programs. But how far could the communists push Allende? The communist program called for taking over all banks, insurance companies, and foreign-owned firms. There was much else about Allende that was disturbing. He admired Fidel Castro, he made frequent visits to Moscow and Beijing, and he often used the US as a whipping boy.

Pre-election estimates gave Frei a substantial margin. But such estimates did not include the 700,000 undeclared voters, of which 500,000 were new voters. Previous voting records could not project their preference.

The Special Group

As early as April 1962, CIA had presented two papers on Chile to the Special Group, an element of the National Security Council that cleared CIA covert action proposals. The first paper proposed to support the Christian Democratic Party covertly and securely to help it draw popular support away from the FRAP and to strengthen it for any further coalition. The proposal asked for [redacted] and it was approved with the caveat that the Chilean recipients of the subsidy must not know the true source of this support. The second paper proposed a subsidy of [redacted] per month to enable the leader of the Radical Party to devote full time to politics. This was considered desirable, because policymakers might want the Radical Party to form a coalition with the Christian Democrats in preparation for the 1964 election.

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Coordination

CIA's covert political efforts to elect Frei involved close and continuous coordination of policy at the upper levels of the US Government. This coordination included the White House, but it was mainly conducted between appropriate working levels of CIA and the State Department, both in Santiago and in Washington. CIA was responsible for carrying out this program. The Department of State was kept fully informed on all relevant matters, participated in overall planning, and voted on those operational decisions of CIA which had policy implications. Throughout the program, the Special Group was kept fully informed and approved modifications, mainly involving additional funding. In total, the Special Group approved [redacted] for the elections.

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In Santiago, coordination was effected through a special election team made up of the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), the Embassy's political and economic counselors, and senior CIA station officers. This team was set up in April 1964 and deliberately kept small, with other government representatives (b)(1) heads attending as required. As of mid-May this team met daily, with the DCM acting as a permanent member and the Ambassador chairing it whenever he felt it necessary.

Helping the Christian Democrats

The problems of the Christian Democratic Party were largely those of insufficient funds and lack of experience in conducting a major campaign. Previously, most Christian Democratic campaigns tended to be local affairs rather that operations on a national scale. FRAP had people with experience in conducting competent political campaigns on the national level and at the grass roots. It also appeared to be well funded, with indications that its subsidies came from abroad.

US funds provided to Frei were used to employ full- and part-time workers in urban, rural, and slum areas, as well as to pay for equipment and training, and to make mass propaganda possible. On two occasions, Frei intended to reduce his campaign propaganda drastically and to discharge a large number of party workers because of lack of funds. It was only an increase in the CIA subsidy that permitted him to cancel these proposed retrenchments. The US Government provided more than half of the money expended by the pro-Frei forces, according to a reliable estimate.

The next step was to strengthen Frei's inefficient party organization. To fill the gaps in its support from women's groups, a women's organization under CIA guidance was affiliated with Frei's campaign committee. During the next five months, it succeeded in opening 91 executive branch offices throughout the country, which helped to increase Frei's already strong appeal to female voters. An estimated 150,000 women voters were thus influenced. Helped by specially trained and selected "activists," these women's committees operated largely in the poorer suburbs and slum areas. They led anti-communist discussions, explained voting procedures and the electoral law, and provided free sewing, typing, and first-aid lessons. Largely, thanks to their efforts, an unprecedented 46.6 percent of women voters were persuaded to go to the polls.

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A far-reaching effort also was made to try to mobilize Protestant voters for Frei. These had been largely pro-Allende, because most of them belonged to the underprivileged classes.

Keeping the Radicals In

How to keep Duran in the race was a problem throughout the campaign. Had the Radical Party withdrawn its own candidate in favor of endorsing Allende, the latter would have received the bulk of the Radical Party votes and added respectability. Such respectability would have tended to deprive the anti-Allende forces of their most effective campaign charge that Allende was a tool of the communists.

A CIA operation countered efforts made by FRAP to secure Duran's withdrawal and Radical Party endorsement of Allende. When the Radical Party executive committee met on 10 May 1964, it was only CIA's 11th-hour financial and political action support which enabled Duran to withstand attacks against his candidacy and to frustrate a drive to get Radical Party endorsement of Allende.

Throughout the campaign, subsequent FRAP attempts to force Duran's withdrawal were beaten off by Duran and his associates. To ensure that keeping Duran in the race did not create a mechanism which would siphon off critically needed votes from Frei, CIA's assistance to Duran was designed only to enable him to hold his party together.

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Moreover, Frei had to be urged periodically to control some of his more passionate followers who were needlessly attacking the Conservative and Liberal Parties, thereby causing friction. It was also the (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) as well as the other independent groups, which carried out the bulk of the anti-communist and anti-Castro propaganda effort.

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Communism Versus Democracy

Well before the beginning of 1964, it was clear that the Chilean voter wanted a change. Frei was no propaganda match for Allende, who promised essentially the same changes as Frei, but better and faster. The polls showed a majority of the voters to be anti-communist. But Allende appeared insufficiently identified with communism to ensure his defeat. Frei thus was unable to portray the election as a battle between communism and democracy. Yet it was precisely the presentation of the choice in these simplified terms which was recognized as the emotional issue which might induce Chile's anti-communist majority to vote for Frei, even though his religious and political ideology was distasteful to many of these people. This held true for large segments of the Liberals, the Conservatives, the Radicals, the Protestants, and Freemasons. Realizing this, Santiago Station directed its many independent press and radio contacts to stress the theme that the choice facing the voters of Chile was one between communism and freedom. A propaganda attack was launched to portray Allende as a willing tool of Castro-communism.

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Joint CIA and Christian Democratic propaganda presented Frei as a wise, sincere, high-minded statesman, a good family man, capable of solving Chile's economic and social problems. Frei was helped by the fact that his public appearances and public personality came close to what the average Chilean thought a president should be. In this propaganda effort, CIA contributed only the funds necessary to support a large-scale campaign and wide distribution of material. The Christian Democratic Party did a good job of handling propaganda themes and style.

Allende's Image

Allende tried to show that he was a man of the people who would expropriate natural resources and means of production, take from the rich and give to the poor, establish a "scientific" Marxist regime, and free Chile from US "imperialism." The communist role in FRAP was played down in its propaganda, as were Allende's previous admiring remarks about Fidel Castro, the Soviet Union and China. His alleged moderation was stressed, although FRAP's propagandists couched most of their material in Marxist terms.

The aim of most of CIA's propaganda operations was to call this Allende/FRAP image into question and to try to substitute a more menacing image. CIA prepared a detailed study on Allende covering what was known of his background, personalty, and activities in order to find his vulnerable spots. His number-one vulnerability remained communist sponsorship of him and of FRAP. In 1954, Allende had gone on a grand tour of the communist bloc. He had also visited Cuba several times since Castro had come to power. Therefore, it was easy to insinuate that Allende was a willing communist tool. In addition, it was possible to

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depict Allende as a man of overwhelming personal ambition, a calculating schemer who had joined with the communists long ago and was now committed to serve their interests.

Intelligence Support

No single factor compares in importance to intelligence and its evaluation, both before and during the election campaign. Without the detailed data acquired continuously, neither election strategy and tactics nor the overall concept of these complex political action operations could have been developed successfully. Information continuously produced by Santiago Station sources was augmented by US Embassy reporting and information from the press. Collection and evaluation of information as the campaign developed was indispensable in keeping separate but complementary operations going effectively.

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

Financial Support

Providing Frei, the leaders of his party, and other contacts with large sums of lo(b)(3)(n)y in a secure and secret manner was difficul(b)(1) separate fund transfers to the Christian Democrats were made without detection.

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

Well-Meaning Allies

Parallel to the official US concern about the outcome of the presidential election, there developed at about the same time among US corporations with substantial holdings in Chile, particularly the Anaconda Copper Company, a disposition to work on their own to ensure the defeat of Allende.

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(b)(1)

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

Another development which required delicate political handling involved Julio Duran and a rightist group, the "Legion of Liberty, " which was plotting to take power by an armed coup if Allende won. It also envisaged the possibility of trying to seize power in the event that Frei, once elected, should enter a leftist coalition. Duran acted as a spokesman for the plotters, who wanted to assure themselves of US recognition once they had seized power. This move had to be carefully discouraged and an effort made to persuade a majority of this group to abandon its plans in favor for working for Frei's election.

Ensuring A Majority

CIA's covert financial and political assistance made the difference between an ample plurality and the absolute majority Frei received. CIA's covert action effort contributed at least (b)(3)(n) to Frei's margin of victory of approximat(b)(1) votes. Without these votes, the US would have been faced with difficult problems resulting from the likely subsequent efforts by Chile's Congress to select a president. In such an event, FRAP would have had an opportunity for maneuvering both in Parliament and in the streets and, if successful, could have seized power. Frei was the first candidate in Chile since 1942 to gain an absolute majority. Eighty-seven percent of the registered electorate voted, less than 1 percent of the ballots were invalidated, and the election proceeded with complete calm and order.

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It took two years' advance planning by CIA to mount this successful election operation. No shortcuts or pat formulas would have been a substitute for the hard work that had to be done. All segments of the electorate had to be mobilized, and CIA was largely responsible for stimulating this mobilization and keeping it going until election day. Throughout the campaign, both in Santiago and in Washington, officers had to have the ability to change and modify operational tactics in the face of frequently changing situations.

A Communist Setback

Chile's Communist Party and its allies, with their thesis of the "Peaceful Route to Power," received a serious setback. Allende, however, nearly tripled his 1958 vote. He increased his percentage of the electorate from 29 to 39, confirming that Chilean Marxism remained a powerful force.

The most important campaign issue contributing to Allende's defeat was the people's fear of communism, which was exploited and dramatized during the campaign. Nationalistic Chileans were determined not to let their country become a second Cuba. Both Allende and the communist press admitted that fear of communism was the dominant factor in FRAP's defeat. The democratic press commented that Fidel Castro had been the big loser in the election.

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A Technical Triumph

The "Quiet" Helicopter (S)

(b)(3)(c)

Editor's Note: In 1970, CIA's Technical Services Division (TSD) of the then Directorate of Plans undertook a program to construct a "quiet" helicopter which would be able to undertake dead-dark operations at low altitudes. The program's goal was to develop a vehicle that could clandestinely insert equipment or personnel into denied areas. (U//FOUO)

The details about the operation that the helicopter would support and the results of that operation cannot yet be revealed. But the speed with which the Agency met the project's technical demands is an outstanding example of managerial excellence. The ability to enlist the backing and participation of a number of technical personnel in the government, the military, and private industry and to mold them into an effective team was at the heart of this successful project, one whose long-term benefits have been substantial. And it was achieved at a remarkably low cost. (U//FOUO)

During the course of the program, a minimum of documentation was assembled. This article is aimed in part at providing some background on the program. (U//FOUO)

> **"The program's goal was to develop a vehicle that could clandestinely insert equipment or personnel into denied areas."**

(b)(3)(c) served in CIA's former Technical Services Division.

I returned to TSD in January 1970, after attending the Armed Forces Staff College, and was assigned to head up the Engineering Branch.

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

(b)(1) After examining many other options, it became apparent that it would take something like a helicopter to accomplish this mission. It was generally believed that any helicopter would have both an acoustic and radar signature that would be unacceptable and that range considerations would also be unacceptable. Despite these negatives, we decided to at least look at all the options for this approach. (C)

After examining several potential helicopters for this mission, the range and capability of the Hughes OH-6 suggested that it could be successfully modified. In 1964, this chopper had established a world record for unrefueled range by flying directly from Culver City, California, to Daytona Beach, Florida. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) had done a low-effort study of three helicopters to see if their "noise" signature could be reduced. Again, the OH-6 had shown the most promise in this area. ARPA was then headed by Dr. Steven Lukasik, with whom we in TSD

(b)(1)

My boss, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, C/TSD, backed us on pure guts, and he tracked our progress closely. This survey took less than a month. (C)

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Assembling the Team

Within TSD, this effort was almost entirely put together by members of the Engineering Branch, with deputy chief [redacted] and [redacted] providing the most direct participa[redacted] from the operations side of TSD, became the principal test pilot and hands-on operator. At that time, he was in a reserve Navy helicopter unit, and he had more than 1,000 hours in helicopter operations. He was key to a lot of our accomplishments. (C)

Technical Services Division

On the industry side, A. L. "Al" Browning of the Hughes Aircraft Corporation in Fullerton, California, was the principal leader and coordinator of this effort. At Hughes, Carl Schalbe was, in fact, the actual program manager, and he spent countless hours coordinating every aspect of the project. The Hughes "Aircraft" group does not build planes of any kind, but it is a world leader in electronics and air defense systems. The Hughes Tool Company in Culver City was the actual builder of the OH-6. Rod Taylor, a brilliant helicopter engineer, led a team of about 30 engineers and craftsmen that began constructing these helicopters. (C)

It was truly a "Skunk Works" type of operation that was located in an outbuilding at the Tool Company's Culver City factory. This building housed the original H-1 racer with which Howard Hughes had set several world records in the 1930s. In addition, it housed all the engines from the "Spruce Goose" were stored there, and every two weeks hot oil was run through the engines to keep them operable. (C)

There were several other key players in the Agency who supported this program, especially Charles Briggs, who was then the Comptroller. He guided this program through the bureaucracy with great skill and kept the naysayers off our backs. (C)

Our TSD contracting officer, [redacted] worked miracles with both the contractual and payment aspects with the various industrial participants (not the least of which was getting the Hughes people to accept the fact that the Agency contracting officer [redacted] There were legitimate questions about this all the way up to DCI Richard Helms on how we were going to make it all work, but the DCI approved it, based on our research and the urgency of the requirement. There was a lot of faith involved with these key decisions. (C)

Through Dr. Lukasik, we made presentations to the principal Army staff about our program, including the vice chief of staff, General Palmer, and the chief of Army Aviation, Lieutenant General Williams. The vice chief supported the entire concept, but he pointed out that if the Army became directly involved, the whole program would be slowed down by the military bureaucracy. General Williams agreed to "loan" US Army pilots and OH-6s to support the program. In return, they would get considerable data on learning to fly helicopters off of 2D (TV) displays. That was one of the major unknowns when we went into this effort. (C)

Solving Technical Problems

From the first day, there were several seemingly unsolvable problems involving the "bird." For example, to reduce main rotor noise, the RPMs would have to be reduced. To regain the loss of lift that this would produce, we decided to create a five-blade rotor to replace the normal four-blade unit. (Both modifications turned up later in the civilian version of the helicopter known as the 500D model.) (C)

The second major "noise" attack had to do with the main gear box, which was a product of Western Gear, Inc. They modified some gear boxes for us that included "silicone" inserts in the main ring gear as a way of reducing the gear contact noise and improving the ability of the box to handle higher horsepower. The tail rotor and the tail rotor gear box were similarly modified. (C)

The engine (the Allison C-18) had its own story. It had a horsepower rating of 317, but it was derated in the case of the OH-6 to 250hp. It was a product of the Allison Division of General Motors in Indianapolis. We visited them for the specific purpose of finding ways to "push" this engine and to locate the ones with the lowest specific fuel consumption per hour. Talk about bureaucracy! The GM people were afraid that we would change even one "hair" on this without years of testing, and they

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cited "liability" after "liability" reasons. Finally, they made Paul Baynes available to us. He was one of their roaming troubleshooters, and he took on our problems with a vengeance. (C)

In less than a week, Paul had indicated that horsepower possibilities in the order of 400hp from "stock" engines were possible and would give us the lowest specific fuel consumption per hour. He suggested that we deal with a facility in Burbank that was rebuilding these engines for both civil and military use, and that we select individual engines that had demonstrated the highest horsepower index when they were tested. This led to a quick program in which, as these rebuilt engines were tested, those that showed the highest output were first put aside and then replaced as even more powerful ones came along. In the end, we wound up with about six engines that had been selected from several hundred, and they were truly blue-ribbon specials. Even the Hughes people were astounded at the quality of these particular engines. (C)

Once the main quieting had been accomplished with the changes in the rotor systems and gearboxes, other interesting "signatures" started to emerge—things that would never be noted on a standard chopper. There was a noisy relief valve on the engine fuel system that Bendix cured for us, although they are probably still wondering why a slight noise like that would pose any problem. There were also a couple of rotating inverters that emerged as noisy, and these were replaced with solid-state devices that were lighter, better—and quiet. (C)

The final attack on the noise signature was the development of an exhaust muffler. We initially contracted with a famous acoustic engineering company in Boston which, after about three weeks, came up with nothing usable. We then found an engineer at Lockheed who was working on quieting problems of the Rolls Royce RB-211 engines. We tried to obtain his services, but Lockheed said he could not be spared from their programs. He wound up doing this in his garage at night, and, within a week, had produced a design that was almost perfect. This was one more case where a specific individual with specific skills came through and saved the day. (C)

The helicopter would require an auxiliary fuel-tank system which led us onto several paths. We finally had tanks constructed that were "semipliable" and were filled with foam. These were tanks that had been developed for the racing world, and they had great crash resistance and a light weight when empty. A fast-acting "dump" system was installed which would enable the pilot to offload this fuel immediately in the event of an emergency. When fully loaded, the OH-6 was considerably beyond the weight limit that would allow a safe "auto rotation," but this dump system enabled the pilot to restore the aircraft to a safe flight profile immediately. (C)

This aircraft had an empty weight of around 1,100 pounds, and we were operating with takeoff weights in the order of 3,000 pounds or more. Hughes considered a safe maximum to be about 2,400 pounds, a weight that would make feasible an emergency landing under all circumstances. Our testing of this system proved it worked exceptionally well. (C)

The "noise" signature on this vehicle was a direct product of speed. The quietest mode was about 85 knots, although it still had a low detectability up to about 120 knots. In fact, the mission could be tailored so that the minimum noise level would only be required at certain locations on the flight profile. The maximum-range speed (lowest fuel per mile) was in the order of 110 knots. This "quiet" envelope became broader as the mission progressed and the total weight came down with fuel burnoff. (U//FOUO)

Professional flight planning became the watchword. Missions would have to be carefully planned around both the quieting aspect and specific speeds and altitudes in order to avoid hostile radar detection. Fortunately, these profiles were compatible and not mutually exclusive. (U//FOUO)

The extra horsepower of this unit required major changes in the construction of the helicopter itself. The tail-boom system had to be reinforced and altered, and the new five-blade rotor produced tail-rotor interface problems that were eventually solved. The true key here,

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however, was the speed with which these problems were addressed and corrected. The first test bird was up and flying in about 60 days, and it was fully operational in about six months. (U//FOUO)

The Navigation Systems

At the same time that the development of the chopper was under way, the entire problem of navigating this unit at low-levels (100 feet or less above ground level) in a dead-dark environment was being vigorously pursued. We had concluded at the outset that the only thing that would make cross-country flight over varied terrain under dead-dark conditions work was a high-performance Forward-Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) system. This was probably one of the major innovations that emerged from this program, and it has had a long-term effect on many of our subsequent military aviation systems. (U//FOUO)

A FLIR is a TV system that looks at temperature differences rather than visible light—the world as seen through the eyes of a thermometer. Unfortunately, we had also concluded that the maximum weight we could stand for this system was about 85 pounds, and the experimental units then flying were about 300 pounds. To make matters worse, they were terrible performers, with low thermal sensitivity. Using these units was a lot like looking through a venetian blind with some of the slats skewed. We investigated several units that were under development at Hughes, Aerojet General, and

"The first test bird was up and flying in about 60 days, and it was fully operational in about six months."

Raytheon, but they all came up too heavy, too insensitive, and had poor thermal resolution. (C)

We approached the systems people at Hughes with this problem and told them we were willing to look at anything that might be around, even if it were still in the idea stage. There were two young engineers who had a spectacular idea that was totally unproven but which would result in a system weighing in at less than 15 pounds. Despite the misgivings of the Hughes management about taking such a risk on an unproven idea, we opted to turn the two loose to see what they could do. We had no real choice. Unless we could get the weight and performance that this idea envisioned, the program would fail. (C)

Until this time, all the thermal-imaging equipment consisted of long linear arrays that were mechanically scanned and had wide variations in sensitivity line to line. The idea was to take a single array of about 15 detectors and electronically "stack" them into a single point by the use of delay lines between each element. It could then be treated as a "single-point" detector with the power and sensitivity of 15 units and could scan mechanically in both the horizontal and vertical planes. Near-standard TV rates could be achieved. To increase sensitivity even more, we elected to use a detector operating at liquid helium temperatures rather than liquid nitrogen. In fact, the best sensor then available was actually being made by Raytheon (but not used in this time-delay mode), and they made this available to us for this program. (C)

In less than 60 days, the two engineers had a fully operational FLIR system on the bench and operating. It performed so well that it was truly a ten-year jump in the technology and instantly rendered just about every other idea or system of this type obsolete. From both a display and sensitivity standpoint, it was even possible to recognize facial features just by the temperature differences in the blood-vessel patterns inherent in any person. (Pilots inside the helicopters in which these FLIRs were eventually installed could recognize individual ground-crew members as they walked in front of the aircraft.) (U//FOUO)

Although the FLIR was to become the primary navigation aid, we also installed an Inertial Navigation System (INS) made by Singer-Kearfoot. At that time, the best unit available had an error rate of about 1 nautical mph, but Singer put some packages together for us that used "selected" gyros that yielded us an error rate of less than one-fourth nautical mph. This was to be an "option" package, but, after testing, the pilots all wanted it retained because it enabled them to take up an exact heading when they left each checkpoint. Normally, with other navigation systems, the pilot has to fly a course for some time

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and then "split the needle" to compensate for crosswinds. With the INS system, they could immediately take up a heading that was on the money. (C)

The Testing Program

One of the great unknowns was whether or not pilots could safely adapt to flying this unit from a TV-type, that is, two-dimensional display. Even before the first chopper was flying, we took one borrowed OH-6 and installed a standard TV unit with the cockpit on one side completely closed off. With this as a training vehicle, Cal Lacey, the Hughes test pilot, and the two Army pilots on loan started an intensive investigation of this in normal flying situations. The bottom line was that it turned out to be possible, but the "adjustment" time was just about equivalent to learning to fly for the first time. It took about 8 hours before a pilot gained any confidence, and about another 30 hours to become proficient. By 50 hours total time, they were doing amazing things flying with this 2D display. (C)

As a practical matter, while flying initially on the TV and later on the FLIR, the pilots experienced no significant problems in learning to hold heading or to follow a prescribed track over the ground (given the assistance of a radar altimeter). Similarly, no great problems were experienced in learning to hold heading and altitude in a hover (once a hover had been established), to go down from a low hover to a landing, or to take off and climb out. But learning to transition from forward flight to a stationary hover over a preselected point was a problem of unexpected magnitude. This problem was experienced by all pilots, and the reaction of each new pilot on his first attempt was easily predicted and invariably observed. (U//FOUO)

"DCI Helms was still concerned about what we meant by quiet, and he did not trust the evaluations of the engineers."

When a helo transitions from forward flight to a hover, it has to decrease and eventually cease its forward movement over the ground. This is accomplished by putting the helo into a nose-up attitude. Then, as the hover altitude and position are reached, and as ground speed decreases to zero, the helo is put back into a level attitude. This means that just as the helo reaches a hover, the pilot pushes the nose down, and this meant, in our case, that the nose-mounted FLIR was pushed closer to the ground. Hence, although the helo itself was merely changing its attitude (not its altitude) to the pilot, who was watching things through the FLIR, everything in the FLIR picture of his ground reference suddenly began to get closer and bigger. It appeared that the helo had suddenly started forward and down at an alarming rate of descent. The immediate pilot reaction was to climb and back up. This exaggerated backward climb generated a lot of humor at the expense of each pilot on his first attempted landing on the FLIR. (U//FOUO)

Following several weeks of flight testing, which proved the operational feasibility of the overall system and refined pilot and mission procedures. (b)(1)

There was an interesting side development in this period. DCI Helms was still concerned about what we meant by quiet, and he did not trust the evaluations of the engineers. As a result, CIA General Counsel Larry Houston asked us to arrange a night demonstration flight for him a(b)(1) We had a standard OH-6 make a low-level flyby, and then, about three minutes later, we had the quiet bird fly

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over with no lights. Houston, who was chatting with project officers, did not even notice it. We then had it fly over a second time and had the pilot turn on its running lights when he was directly overhead. Houston was impressed and passed this on to the Director. The question of acoustic detectability was no longer an issue. (C)

The Radar Air Defense Problem

From the beginning, there was great concern about the ability of hostile air defense systems to detect this vehicle, and we spent considerable time working on this problem. Hughes Aircraft (Fullerton) was the primary builder of most air defense systems, and it had some remarkable analytic abilities in this area. It turned out that the main rotor on this aircraft was made of composite materials and had a very low radar "signature." In addition, it was envisioned that it would be flying mostly nap-of-the-earth missions, which would provide considerable direct protection from air defense systems. (C)

Hughes had a computer program called the Radar Coverage and Penetration Analysis System (RACPAS), which was primarily used for the purpose of siting radars and air defense systems worldwide. It was designed to show optimum placement of systems to ensure the greatest possible coverage. We turned this program around and plotted the hostile radars. From this, it was possible to work out flight paths that had a low probability of detection. (C)

There was one other characteristic of the helicopter that further lowered its detection probability, and that had to do with the technical operation of Moving Target Indicator (MTI) systems inherent in virtually all radars. These are designed to enhance detection of low-flying targets that are theoretically "buried" in the ground clutter. These systems are usually built with "blind" speeds of between 50 to 75 knots and will not detect targets with "radial" speeds below this. As a result, even in those areas where air defense systems would normally detect the helicopter, it was possible to slow down below these critical speeds and go undetected. Our testing of this entire concept produced some exceptionally good results. (C)

Long-Term Benefits

This system had to be considered a total technical success, and it was employed operationally. Moreover, there were several aspects of this program that have had, and continue to have, long-range positive effects:

- The development of this special FLIR spawned a whole new generation of devices that dramatically changed night military operations. Much of what happened in the Gulf War in this area can be traced back to this development.

- We proved that helicopter operations can be worked from 2D displays and that, with proper training, this can be done safely. Later, these systems would be backed up for precise landing with night-vision goggles on one pilot, with the FLIR providing primary guidance.

- Helicopters can be quieted to a remarkable degree, and missions can be configured to ensure a low detectability by air defense radar systems. (U//FOUO)

We proved anew that American companies can be highly cooperative when they are presented with problems that have national significance and when they are not burdened with excessive red tape. The number of companies that freely supplied us with either expert help or equipment would fill a page. Both the official and unofficial help we received from the US Army was outstanding. At one point, they supplied us with their transmission and component engineers from St. Louis to evaluate the maximum number of hours we could "push" some of these components with a high degree of reliability. General Williams gave us everything we asked for, and then some. (U//FOUO)

Maintenance considerations, particularly pre-mission checking of everything, took on a high priority. Hughes made a two-man team available for direct support and these people were so professional and competent that there were virtually no system failures of any kind while in flight. Based on the fact that many components were being "pushed" beyond normal limits, we set a low useful life on many components, particularly the transmissions. Typically, these were rerated at about 50 hours. Safety

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and mission reliability were paramount, and the Hughes team never let us down. (C)

The last remaining bird was turned over to the Army Night Vision Labs at Fort Belvoir, where it continued for many years to function as a test platform. I was told later that they finally contacted Hughes for a replacement tail-rotor gearbox when they had passed over 2,500 hours—far more than the 50 hours we had contemplated. I was also told several years later that they still did not have anything in inventory that could approach the performance level that we had achieved. If nothing else, we gave them a target to shoot at. (C)

A final word of tribute. One night about 8 p.m., I stopped in the Skunk Works at Culver City, where I found 15 people hard at work. I commente(b)(3)(c) that I was going to get some horrendous overtime bills from this, and he informed me that each one of the people who were there were working on this voluntarily. It turned out that they considered 16-hour days as normal. I wish we could have given each one of those people a medal. (C)

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10 USC 424 and 50 USC 403-1(i)

Response of the Defense HUMINT Service to the 1996 Central African Crisis (U)

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
> **Between April and July 1994, an estimated 800,000 people were brutally murdered.**

The carnage continued. Between April and July 1994, an estimated 800,000 people were brutally murdered.[1] RPF forces rushed south from their bases in the Uganda border area to assist their Tutsi kinsmen who were being slaughtered by the Hutus. More than 1.6 million Hutus, fearing retribution, fled into Zaire, until the border was closed in mid-July. Hutu extremists took control of the refugee camps, using them to recruit and stage continued attacks on the Tutsis, who now controlled the Rwandan government. The Hutu rebels intercepted the food provided by UN humanitarian relief organization for the refugees and sold it on the open market, using the proceeds to support their operations in Rwanda. The RPF protested the situation to the UN and the US government, to no avail. Finally, in the fall of 1996, RPF supporters took matters into their own hands. They attacked the Hutu camps, triggering a mass migration of close to a half million refugees back to Rwanda. Around 200,000 refugees who identified with the Hutu extremists moved west, deeper into Zaire. These were

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[1] See "US Memos Reveal Delay on Rwanda," *The Washington Post*, 28 August 2004, p. A9, and "Africa's Great War," *Economist*, 6-12 July 2002. (U)


NIGERIA
Sarn
Ogbomosho
Ibadan
Lagos
Bangui
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Fort Sibut
CAMEROON
Yaounde
Malabo
BIOKO
Bata
Libreville
GABON
Lisala
Mbandaka
Kisangani
Bandundu
Bandundu
Brazzaville
Pointe Noire
Kinshasa
Brazzaville
ZAIRE
Goma
Bukavu
Kigali
RWANDA
Gitarama
Butare
Cyangugu
Kibungo
Kibuye
Gisenyi
Ruhengeri
Addis Ababa
Mekele
Gore
Jima
ETHIOPIA
Hargeisa
Berbera
SOMALIA
Djibouti
Mogadishu
Merca
Equator
UGANDA
Kampala
Entebbe
KENYA
Nairobi
Mombasa
Voi
Dar es Salaam
TANZANIA
Mwanza
Bujumbura
Musoma
Mbeya
Iringa
Dodoma
Tabora
Kigoma
Mpulungu
Kasama
Lusaka
Ndola
Kabwe
Mongu
Livingstone
Zimba
ZAMBIA
Lubumbashi
Kolwezi
Likasi
Kolwezi
Mutshatsha
Kamina
Kananga
Luena
Saurimo
Malanje
Lobito
Benguela
Huambo
Cuito
Lucusse
Menongue
Cuito Cuanavale
Luanda
Malanje
Caxito
ANGOLA
Cabinda
Soyo
Matadi
Boma
Moanda
Pointe Noire
Brazzaville
Owando
Ouesso
Impfondo
Bangui
Fort Sibut
Kaga Bandoro
Bambari
Bria
Birao
Ndele
Sarh
Moundou
Abeche
Am Timan
Mongo
Abeche
Biltine
Adre
Faya Largeau
Tibesti Mts
Ennedi Plateau
Tibesti
Kufra
Sebha
Ghat
Murzuq
Waw al Kabir
Sirte
Tripoli
Benghazi
Tobruk
Derna
Al Bayda
Tobruk
Sollum
Mersa Matruh
Alexandria
Cairo
Suez
Port Said
Ismailia
Aswan
Luxor
Qena
Asyut
Beni Suef
Giza
Faiyum
Minya
Al Minya
Sohag
Hurghada
Ras Gharib
Safaga
Qusayr
Marsa Alam
Halaib
Wadi Halfa
Abu Hamed
Atbara
Shendi
Khartoum
Omdurman
Kosti
Sennar
Wad Medani
Gedaref
Kassala
Port Sudan
Suakin
Tokar
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An Exclusionary Position

General MacArthur and the OSS, 1942-1945

Clayton D. Laurie

> **"MacArthur did not accept OSS until after his designation as Commander of US Army Forces in the Pacific...and then his approval was limited to certain special weapons with their operators."**

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This article is unclassified in its entirety.

A cable sent by Gen. Douglas MacArthur on 22 June 1943 from his Brisbane, Australia, headquarters to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington was characteristically blunt: "Any Office of Strategic Services base in Australia would create impossible situation and jeopardize existing harmony. Due to security and to avoid political questions inexpedient to send any organization for participation in the military operations of the Southwest Pacific Area."[1] With this cable, MacArthur again persuaded the nation's top military leadership that the authority and ability of the theater commander to include or exclude any personnel or agency from his area of command responsibility, according to his solitary assessment of proper military needs and requirements, should remain sacrosanct.

But MacArthur's cable also addressed one of the lesser known civil-military conflicts of the war: the role of a paramilitary civilian agency, the OSS, in gathering intelligence and conducting psychological warfare and special operations in support of military campaigns in combat theaters abroad. The successful efforts of MacArthur and his intelligence officers, in particular Maj. Gen. Charles B. Willoughby, Col. Robert F. Merle-Smith, and Col. Courtney Whitney, to exclude the OSS from the Southwest Pacific Theater reveals how the two institutions viewed their respective missions, defined and conducted operations, used personnel and resources, and interacted with national leaders and the bureaucracies they controlled. The incident also reveals much about the personalities of MacArthur and OSS chief William J. Donovan and the colorful subordinates they commanded.

In the decades since 1945, a vast body of literature has described the worldwide exploits of the OSS, often in mythic terms. Yet the *War Report of the OSS* published in 1975, based on declassified documents at the National Archives, quickly passes over the OSS in the Southwest Pacific, merely stating that "MacArthur did not accept OSS until after his designation as Commander of US Army Forces in the Pacific...and then his approval was limited to certain special weapons with their operators."[2] This passage, while essentially correct, glosses over the fact that the OSS was essentially excluded from this major combat theater in spite of intense efforts on the part of Donovan and his staff to persuade the JCS, the War Department, and the officers of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, of OSS utility. This story is best told from the OSS viewpoint because the

[1] Memo, MacArthur to JCS, 22 June 1943 in File Chronology April - June 1943, Box 3, Entry Edward Lilly Papers, Record Group 218, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Washington, DC.

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General Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area left little record and even fewer explanations as to why it chose to exclude an agency that operated successfully in every other combat theater from mid-1942 onward, and which most likely would have performed successfully in their theater as well.[3]

A Longstanding Rivalry

The origins of the conflict between MacArthur and the OSS predated America's entry into the war. President Franklin D. Roosevelt named Donovan, a colorful New York City lawyer, federal civil servant, and World War I soldier, Director of the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) in July 1941. The COI, a vaguely defined organization and one of many agencies performing similar functions for the government, had as its official purpose the collection of information relating to the national defense buildup as well as a foreign propaganda and counterpropaganda function. From the outset, however, Donovan intended that his organization be much more than a mere information clearinghouse, and he methodically set about creating a multifaceted, centralized psychological warfare and intelligence-gathering agency capable of performing a whole host of military and paramilitary "strategic services" in support of American combat forces abroad, under JCS auspices.

Although Donovan had impressive contacts within Allied circles and within many federal departments who supported and sympathized with his goals, he also had powerful military critics within the War and Navy Departments who viewed his agency as superfluous, and its unorthodox activities as a dangerous intrusion into traditional military affairs. Many others considered Donovan to be a dilettante, if not a troublesome and self-promoting empire builder. Nonetheless, Donovan ensured the survival of the COI (eventually in the form of the OSS), in the months after its formation, despite a growing chorus of those calling for its abolition, and he managed to increase the size and mission of the agency in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor.[4]

Information and Propaganda Support

The first contact of record between Donovan's organization and MacArthur took place three weeks before Pearl Harbor, when Edgar Ansell Mowrer, a journalist working for the COI, met with the US Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) commander in Manila to acquaint him with the organization and its areas of expertise. Although already aware of COI's existence, MacArthur was evidently neither impressed nor enthusiastic about its mission, reportedly making clear that "while the COI was still in its infancy...he saw no reason for the creation of a new intelligence service under Donovan." By 28 December 1941, however, MacArthur—besieged on Corregidor and Bataan—was making urgent requests for material from

[2] For quote, see Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, two volumes, (New York: Stewart, 1976), 2:358. Among the many important standard works on the wartime role of the OSS are Clayton D. Laurie, *The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany*, Military Studies Series (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996); Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981); Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970); Anthony Cave Brown, *The Secret War Report of the OSS* (New York: Berkeley Medallion Books, 1976); R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: The OSS and the Origins of the CIA* (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Anthony Cave Brown, *Wild Bill Donovan: The Last Hero* (New York: Times Books, 1982); Richard Dunlop, *Donovan: America's Master Spy* (New York: Rand McNally, 1982); William J. Casey, *The Secret War Against Hitler* (Washington: Regnery, 1988); Edward Hymoff, *The OSS in World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); and Clayton D. Laurie, "The US Army and Psychological Warfare Organization and Operations, 1918-1945," forthcoming manuscript, US Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC. OSS records are in Record Group (RG) 226 at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in Washington, DC. Donovan's papers are at the US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

[3] The OSS carried out psychological warfare, special operations, and intelligence-gathering missions in North Africa; in Sicily and Italy; in the Middle East; throughout Central, Southeast, and Western Europe; in Scandinavia; in China, Burma, and India; and throughout Southeast Asia. Except for the Southwest Pacific, the only other theater to largely exclude OSS participation was the US Navy and US Marine Corps-dominated Central Pacific Theater (CENPAC) under Adm. Chester Nimitz.

[4] For the history of the COI and the early days of the OSS, see Laurie, *Propaganda Warriors*, especially chapters 4 and 5, and Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, chapters 4 and 5. COI records are found in Entry 99, RG 226, NARA, especially boxes 70-72, 80, and 97. Other documents on the COI may be found in the William J. Donovan Papers, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Boxes 99b, 121a, and 122a, and in RG 208, Records of the Office of War Information, Boxes 1, 4, and 8, Entry 6E, NARA.

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the COI Foreign Information Service (FIS) to counteract what he termed the devastating effects of Japanese propaganda on his beleaguered Filipino and American forces. The FIS immediately responded and delivered to the Philippines materials for broadcast over the 12 radio stations still in Filipino-American hands. These shortwave and mediumwave stations broadcast at least eight FIS programs daily, in Tagalog, Japanese, and Mandarin Chinese, until Japanese advances cut the lines of communication. Even then, however, the FIS continued making radiobroadcasts to the Philippines from Batavia in the Netherlands East Indies and from Singapore.[5]

In addition, in January and then again in March 1942, two newly created JCS supporting committees, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC), noting that MacArthur had set up an improvised radio station to counter Japanese propaganda, emphasized that much more could be done to aid his command. The FIS responded by providing entertainment broadcasts consisting of news and features, sports news, humor, and popular music.

The JIC and the JPWC further offered the assistance of other personnel with expertise in propaganda, espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare—personnel that would have come from Donovan's COI even though the

"Donovan was on record as having responded to MacArthur's requests in a timely and complete manner, offering just the services the USAFFE commander claimed he so desperately needed."

organization, and its OSS successor, were always chronically short of personnel. Further, on their own initiative, COI members developed plans to insert agents into the Philippines in early 1942 to form a "staybehind force" around which Filipino and American resistance groups could form after the archipelago fell to the Japanese. Even though no such personnel were sent, either to the Philippines or to Australia, Donovan was on record as having responded to MacArthur's requests in a timely and complete manner, offering just the services the USAFFE commander claimed he so desperately needed.[6]

Unwarranted Criticism

Major General Willoughby, MacArthur's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2), later claimed, in response to OSS criticisms that "they [the COI/OSS] were arbitrarily kept out of MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Theater," that the general could not wait for the COI to send personnel to Australia, where intelligence was needed immediately in April 1942, if not before. MacArthur, Willoughby wrote, had to go it alone "because he could not afford to wait" for the COI, and its successor, the OSS, "to get up and running." Asia, he claimed, was a shooting war from the outset, unlike Europe, and MacArthur "had to improvise his intelligence from scratch with the Japanese breathing down his neck. He could not sit back and ransack libraries, even assuming data were there." MacArthur, Willoughby declared, "had to have his reports from a 3,000-mile battle arc long before Roosevelt had even given Bill Donovan his basic directives on Europe."

Despite Willoughby's assertions, the record clearly shows that the COI was organized and operational by late 1941, and had already placed agents in Asia by the time of Pearl Harbor. Had MacArthur availed himself of Donovan's expertise when it was originally offered, the creation of guerrilla groups in the Philippines and the establishment of an efficient intelligence and psychological warfare network in the Southwest Pacific may have taken place months, if not years, before it actually did in 1943 and 1944.[7]

Indeed, the FIS in New Caledonia and Australia had established an

[5] See also Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 1:38-39; Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, p. 130; Smith, *OSS*, pp. 104-5, and Dunlop, *Donovan*, p. 302.

[6] See Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 1:39. The FIS broadcasts were eventually ended as they were increasingly thought to be counterproductive. As Donovan later claimed, it was easy to have good propaganda when the news was good. It was hard when the news was bad. See Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 1:39; and Memo, Onthank to Secies, 18 March 42, File: Intertheater Relations, Box 6, and File: Chronological, Jan-Mar 45, Box 3, both in: Lilly Papers, RG 218, NARA.

[7] See Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, *MacArthur, 1941-1951* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1954), p. 144. Willoughby's claims are erroneously repeated in Bradley F. Smith's, *Shadow Warriors*, p. 129.

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initial base of operations for an American psychological warfare campaign against the Japanese in early 1942, well before MacArthur's arrival from the Philippines. The FIS established an outpost in Sydney to provide information to Australians about the American war effort as well as to assist US Army officials in laying the groundwork for a psychological warfare campaign against Japan in the Home Islands, Netherlands East Indies, and South Pacific. In the first months of 1942, an FIS campaign was launched against the Japanese in cooperation with Britain's Political Warfare Executive, when the latter began using the FIS Australian transmitter for shortwave broadcasts to Japan.

As in Europe, however, FIS members found it difficult to establish the type of psychological warfare establishment they preferred, having to compete for limited space, supplies and personnel, physical facilities, and radio frequencies with many war-related groups. Nonetheless, psychological warfare services were available to MacArthur far earlier than MacArthur's General Headquarters officials would later admit and by an agency that had been in existence for nearly a year by the time the Southwest Pacific Area command was created in Australia in April 1942.[8]

[8] For early efforts to establish a propaganda base in Australia, see Rpt on FELO Activities from Jun 42 to Sep 45, Box 2, Bonner F. Fellers Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Palo Alto, CA (hereafter HIWRP).

Donovan Rebuffed

MacArthur and Donovan crossed paths again soon after the creation of the Southwest Pacific Area command and the founding of the OSS in June 1942.[9] In early July, Donovan submitted his first plan to the JCS and the War Department proposing the establishment of an OSS intelligence network in Australia. The idea was turned down almost immediately by MacArthur and the JCS Joint Intelligence Committee. Endeavoring to make his proposal clearer and more specific, Donovan encouraged US Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall again to pass on to MacArthur his offers to provide an Australian-based OSS Secret Intelligence (SI) group to operate in the Netherlands East Indies under Dr. Amry Vandenbosch.

[9] MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area command was officially formed on 18 April 1942. The wartime locations of GHQ were Melbourne (18 Apr. 42) and Brisbane, Australia (20 Jul. 42), Hollandia, New Guinea (Aug. 44), Tacloban-Tolosa, Leyte, Philippines (Oct. 44); Manila (Feb. 45); and Tokyo (17 Sep 45). See D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur, 1941-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 2:119-22. The OSS was created by Military Order of 13 June 1942, and was placed under JCS control by JCS 67, approved on 23 June 1942. OSS headquarters were in Washington, DC, with major subordinate offices in London, Algiers, Chungking, Kandy, New Delhi, and Paris. The agency contained Secret Intelligence (SI), Counter-intelligence (X-2), Special Operations (SO), including maritime units (MU) and operational groups (OG), Research and Analysis (R&A), Foreign Nationalities (FN), and Morale Operations (MO) Branches by 1944. It could also perform a host of cartographic, translation, and photographic services. For orders forming OSS, see Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, pp. 427-28, appendices E and F, respectively.

Within 48 hours, MacArthur replied that an "interallied secret service [was already] established here on a sound basis from combat to strategic intelligence" under the supervision of General Headquarters. In addition, MacArthur explained, experts on the Netherlands East Indies were already available. If and when further expertise was needed, General Headquarters would request Vandenbosch's services.[10] Decrypted, the message read: "Thank you, but no thank you."

Uncertain as to what sort of psychological warfare and intelligence establishment MacArthur was referring to, the War Department's Operations and Plans Division, perhaps at Donovan's urging, queried the general further on 29 July about his need for services. MacArthur again reiterated that Allied organizations and plans were already in place and no further assistance was needed. His rejection of the OSS was supported by the chairman of the JIC, Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, who also served as the Chief of the War Department General Staff's Military Intelligence Division. Strong, an outspoken critic of the OSS and its director, wrote Donovan that Marshall had stated "quite definitely that OSS activities in a theater of operations must come under the control of the theater commander and are subject not only to coordination, but also to utilization solely to serve the needs of the commander in the execution of the mission furnished him by the JCS."

[10] See Cable, Marshall to MacArthur, 14 Jul 42, and Reply, MacArthur to AGWAR, 17 Jul 42, OSS Activities, Box 9, Lilly Papers, RG 218, NARA.

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The JCS, Strong continued, "have delegated to that theater commander the decision as to what intelligence activities shall exist and how they shall be utilized." Strong closed by stating that "It appears to me that unless and until the JCS have indicated another procedure, the action taken by the JIC [in rejecting Donovan's proposal] at its last meeting should stand."[11]

Seeking Alternatives

The initial rejection of a base in Australia under the parameters of the theater commanders' principle prompted OSS personnel in Washington to investigate alternatives in gaining access to the Southwest Pacific theater, perhaps doing an end run around MacArthur if necessary. These efforts would last for more than two years and prompted one group of OSS officers at Washington headquarters to develop a tongue-in-cheek "Penetrate MacArthur Project."

One suggestion involved currying favor with Maj. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., who, in August 1942, was the Chief of the Army Public Relations Office, but was then allegedly being considered for the post of commander of ground troops in the Southwest Pacific and even as a possible replacement for MacArthur. As one OSS member stated, Richardson "is said to be a very approachable person" and, if MacArthur is relieved, the OSS could realistically enter Australia with Richardson. These efforts came to naught, unfortunately, when Maj. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger was sent to serve under MacArthur instead of General Richardson.[12]

At the same time, in August 1942, the OSS began a major, formal effort through the JPWC, which Donovan directed, and its subcommittee to impress on the JCS and the War Department that the General Headquarters in the Southwest Pacific Area lacked the necessary expertise in psychological warfare and special operations, and that MacArthur's staff was totally ignorant of what the OSS was and what it could do. The JPWC report pointed out that General Headquarters lacked "properly qualified officers familiar with...psychological warfare and subversive operations" and could not effectively or vigorously carry out such activities. Furthermore, psychological warfare and intelligence operations transcended the boundaries of any single theater, as the OSS was already demonstrating elsewhere, and these activities in areas surrounding MacArthur's command were bound to affect Southwest Pacific Area operations. Therefore, an OSS base in Australia was necessary. Point by point, the seven-page report outlined the OSS case. In the Southwest Pacific Theater in matters of psychological warfare, intelligence-gathering, and special operations, the OSS was desperately needed, in spite of the theater commander's opinion to the contrary.[13]

No Help Needed

MacArthur and his staff were quick to rebut the JPWC report. General Headquarters in the Southwest Pacific, they asserted, already had many combined civilian and military agencies from several nations performing the very tasks the OSS sought. The US Office of War Information, for example, was conducting leaflet and radio operations in conjunction with the Australian-dominated Far Eastern Liaison Organization throughout New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, the Admiralties, and the Netherlands East Indies. A Central Bureau, also under General Headquarters control, was conducting counterintelligence and radio intercept functions to MacArthur's alleged satisfaction.

In addition, another OSS-style organization, the combined and joint Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) formed in April 1942, was doing all the rest of the tasks needed, including translation and interpretation of enemy documents, cartographic services, general research and analysis, POW interrogations, and subversive and espionage operations.

[11] See Letter, Strong to Donovan, 28 Jul 42, File 38, Box 111, Entry 92, RG 226; CCS 385 "SWPA" (6-12-43) "Psychological Warfare in S.W. Pac.," Chronological Apr.-Jun. 43, Box 4; and Memo, Blakeney to Strong (thru MIS), 12 Aug. 42, OSS Activities, Box 9, both in Lilly Papers, RG 218, all NARA.

[12] See Memo, Lt. Col. Hugh D. Butler to Maj. David Bruce, 5 Aug. 42; and Memo, Bruce to Donovan, 5 Aug. 42, both in File 38, Box 111, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA.

[13] Memorandum to JPWC Sub-Committee On Message From General MacArthur, 13 Aug. 42, File: Chronological Apr.-Jun. 42, Box 3, Lilly Papers, RG 218, NARA.

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The AIB

Apparently an unknown entity to most OSS officials, the AIB did perform missions in Southwest Pacific Area that were similar to those carried out by the OSS worldwide, but it was a diffuse, combined Allied agency, employing military and civilian personnel from at least four nations, most not subject to American or US Army authority. Also unknown to OSS leaders, after mid-1943 MacArthur's interest in the AIB diminished. In keeping with his preferred style of personal and direct command and control, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area took over most of the intelligence, psychological, and unconventional warfare operations previously performed by AIB. So while AIB was ostensibly "MacArthur's OSS," and was referred to as such by several of his subordinates, within 18 months of its formation, the General Headquarters had largely discarded it for similar offices of their own creation.

Yet for the purposes of undercutting and excluding the OSS from the Southwest Pacific Area, the existence of AIB admirably served the purpose, no matter how under used and despised it was by MacArthur and his staff. According to one historian, the general felt "that his authority and ego were best protected by avoiding Washington agencies such as the OSS and by using the special operations machinery that he had developed in cooperation with the Australians and others." The AIB did not have direct ties to London or Washington, and that was what mattered. Thus MacArthur used the existence

"The OSS Planning Group in Washington, the entity which determined future operations, fully understood by mid-1942 'that General MacArthur is reluctant to receive OSS representatives.'"

of AIB, a bureau whose own multinational and fragmented command structure was not entirely to his liking, to persuade the JCS and the War Department to keep the OSS out.[14]

Other Approaches

The OSS Planning Group in Washington, the entity which determined future operations, fully understood by mid-1942 "that General MacArthur is reluctant to receive OSS representatives." But it still believed that his objection was due to some ignorance as to what the OSS actually did. Therefore, the planning group adopted a different tack. In September 1942, it began formulating plans for participation in the Southwest Pacific Area predicated on the idea that if specific mission proposals were submitted to MacArthur, outlining detailed operations by a set number of OSS agents in a particular area, the general "could judge for himself whether they would be valuable or not" and would ultimately agree to allow the office to enter the theater.

In addition, as OSS member Hugh R. Wilson wrote to Donovan's deputy, Col. G. Edward Buxton, the plans should be drawn "as to offer the men rather than the projects." This was based on the assumption, as Wilson wrote, "that were I commanding general I might well be interested in men of these qualifications offered for my service even though I was unwilling to admit an organization." If such a plan worked, Wilson concluded, it "might well give us an opportunity for future and more widespread collaboration."[15]

Thus the OSS developed the Pacific Islands Project which provided two operational plans for secret intelli-

[14] For a history of the AIB and other agencies allegedly fulfilling OSS roles in SWPA, see Allison Ind, *The Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan* (New York: David McKay, 1958); Introduction, Clayton D. Laurie, to Bob Stahl, *You're No Good to Me Dead: Behind Japanese Lines in the Philippines*, Special Warfare Series (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. xv-xxvi; Allison B. Gilmore, "In the Wake of Winning Armies: Allied Psychological Warfare Against the Imperial Japanese Army in the Southwest Pacific Area During World War II," Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1989; and US Department of the Army, Far East Command, *Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ/SWPA* (Tokyo: MIS, GHQ, FEC, 1951), Vol. IV. See also Memo to Adm. King for C/S Sig, sub: OSS in SWPA, 29 Sep 44, PWB/SWPA, Box 9; Lt. Col. G. W. L. Townsend, AIF, "FELO Activities in New Guinea," SWPA, Box 13; and Ch. 3, Sec. III, Box 16, all in Lilly Papers, RG 218; and Memo, E. A. W. re: History of Relations of OWI With GHQ, 5 May 43, File: OWI Propaganda to NEI, Box 10, Entry: 283K, and File: Indoctrination Course in Psychological Warfare/ FELO, Box 31, Entry 283L, both RG 331, all in NARA; and Rpt on FELO Activities from Jun. 42 to Sep 45, Box 2, Bonner Fellers Papers, HIWRP. For quote, see Smith, *Shadow Warriors*, p. 310.

[15] See Memo, Hugh R. Wilson to Col. G. Edward Buxton, 14 Sep 42, File 19, Box 125, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA. Wilson was a former Ambassador to Nazi Germany who joined the COI in 1941, while Buxton, a lawyer and World War I comrade of Donovan, had the distinction of being the commanding officer of AEF hero Sgt. Alvin York, see Laurie, *Propaganda Warriors*, p. 72, 259.

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gence and subversive activities in New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and adjacent islands to include Bali and most of the Netherlands East Indies. Under this plan, three exceptionally well-qualified OSS agents, appropriately named "Rip," "Alden," and "Sam," who were already undergoing training in the United States, would be inserted into the area, where they would collect intelligence and conduct subversive operations "designed to harass the enemy" for the JCS and the Commanding General, United States Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, at a projected cost of a little more than $17,000. As with similar OSS plans in Asia and Europe, however, the Pacific Islands Project had difficulties gaining JCS approval, and MacArthur rejected it. On 13 January 1943, the OSS cancelled the project, while focusing it hopes and attention on a new and different plan entitled "Proposed Psychological Warfare Undertaking in the Philippine Islands," which was then already working its way through JCS and War Department channels to MacArthur's Southwest Pacific headquarters.[16]

Even while the Pacific Islands Project remained under consideration, OSS member S. Dillon Ripley had suggested another back-door entry. In a memo to fellow OSS member N. F. Allman, Dillon recounted a luncheon he had with a member of the Netherlands Information Bureau in Washington, DC, in late October 1942. The Dutchman had suggested that some means be undertaken to facilitate closer communications between the Dutch in Australia and the United States, which Dillon saw as both an opportunity to create a close Dutch-OSS affiliation and to infiltrate the General Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area with at least one OSS agent. As Dillon wrote, if:

> *...the OSS could secure cordial relations with the Dutch Economic and Trade Missions.... The further possibility arises that the Dutch might cooperate to the extent of suggesting that an attaché be appointed between the Dutch in Australia and General MacArthur's headquarters. If a member of the OSS in uniform could be selected for such a job and could be certified as persona grata by the Dutch here, it is difficult to see how the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific, could fail to approve such an appointment.*

Allman suggested that the idea should be followed up, but it appears that this plan came to nothing, even though the OSS was still planning to recruit and train agents for the Netherlands East Indies as late as July 1943, should MacArthur reconsider.[17]

The Hayden Ploy

As the OSS Planning Group continued to formulate specific operational plans they hoped would attract Mac Arthur's favorable attention, Donovan turned to the personal approach. He reasoned that if paper plans and cables had failed to gain access for the organization to the Southwest Pacific, perhaps one influential OSS member attached to MacArthur's staff could persuade the general of the office's utility where all else had failed. A previous envoy to the Southwest Pacific, a Col. Warren Clear, a veteran Army intelligence officer and Japanese specialist sent to investigate the establishment of a COI espionage network, had clearly run "afoul" of MacArthur. As a result, Donovan decided to send Joseph Ralston Hayden, a University of Michigan political science professor and an original member of the COI's prestigious Board of Analysts, who had known the Southwest Pacific commander personally since the 1930s. Hayden, a Far Eastern specialist, was widely recognized as the world's foremost expert on Philippine political affairs and had served as vice-governor in Manila and as acting governor during the 1935 Sakdal revolt. He was just completing an OSS assignment to China in December 1942, and Donovan ordered him to MacArthur's General Headquarters.

Hayden reached Australia on 15 January 1943 and extended to MacArthur Donovan's greetings, while informing the general, who he later described as cordial and receptive, that Donovan was perfectly willing to have any OSS personnel in the

[16] See Far East Section, SA/B, Pacific Islands Project, 10 Sep 42, and Pacific Islands Project, #5, Pt. 2, 10 Sep 42, and Memo, Beale to Allman, 13 Jan 43, all in File 19, Box 125, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA.

[17] Memo, Ripley to Allman, 23 Oct. 42, sub: Liaison With the Dutch in the Southwest Pacific, File 59, Box 116, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA. For continuing OSS efforts to recruit and train agents for NEI operations, see Memo to Acting Director, 14 Jul. 43, Report on Trip to West Coast, File 3, Box 87, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA.

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Pacific Theater placed under his, MacArthur's, command, explaining that Donovan did not want to intrude.[18] MacArthur rejected out of hand Hayden's overtures, which included several of the latest OSS plans. The general did imply that the OSS could perform a valuable function by acquiring information on the Netherlands East Indies, but only if agents were under MacArthur's direct and complete control. MacArthur then referred Hayden to his intelligence aides for further discussion.

To Hayden's amazement, Major General Willoughby and Colonel Merle-Smith, among others on MacArthur's staff, proved totally uncooperative because they already had established their own networks in the Pacific and wanted no OSS interference in their area. Hayden only learned later that Willoughby in particular already had persuaded MacArthur that the OSS was not needed.

Three weeks later, in early February 1943, Hayden was abruptly informed that MacArthur had changed his mind and that the OSS was not welcome, either in the Philippines or in any other Southwest Pacific operational area. The general, according to his staff officers, did not care to discuss the matter further, although Hayden was invited to stay on as the OSS civil adviser to General Headquarters.[19]

Another Rejection

Donovan tried anew to break into the Southwest Pacific a few months later, in midsummer 1943, again through the JCS. In early June, he sent forward the OSS "Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Theater," describing once more to the JCS and the War Department the special and morale operations, and guerrilla and secret intelligence missions he hoped to perform there. It was manifest to planning group members that this was simultaneously a crucial first step and also perhaps a last chance to carve an official OSS niche within the region. Dr. James Grafton Rogers, the head of the planning group, wrote in his diary: "Today, the Planning Group hacking away at a SW Pacific mission plan we hope to get MacArthur to accept. OSS is still unadmitted to the Pacific and SW Pacific theaters; the former through neglect, the latter because MacArthur is so independent and [MacArthur's Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Richard K.] Sutherland wants his own show [sic]." The draft plan called for 62 US Army officers and 273 enlisted men, with some Indonesian native help, all under OSS control, to conduct psychological warfare and special operations as well as intelligence-gathering activities throughout the Southwest Pacific with emphasis on the Netherlands East Indies and Borneo.[20]

The new OSS plan immediately ran into trouble with the Joint Staff Planners who were sensitive to the fact, as Rogers confided in his diary, that "MacArthur doesn't want us."[21] When MacArthur was informed of the existence of the plan by the Joint Staff Planners, and given the opportunity to review it, he declined. With the strong support of his intelligence officers, including Willoughby and now Col. Courtney Whitney, he repeated his argument that the OSS was not needed in the Southwest Pacific, that Allied agencies performing similar tasks already existed there, and that, when and if OSS services were needed, they would be used, but only for temporary, specific missions.

Donovan persisted, and on 23 June MacArthur again cabled the JCS that "any OSS base in Australia would

[18] See Thomas Troy, ed., *Wartime Washington: The Secret OSS Journal of James Grafton Rogers, 1942-1943* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1987), p. 69 n. 37; see also Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, p. 87; and Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda* (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 167-68. Hayden was a peculiar choice for this mission because he had recently published a book critical of MacArthur's prewar defensive plan for the Philippines. It does appear, however, that the OSS planned to make Hayden its representative to MacArthur's GHQ depending on the outcome of his mission; see Memo, Francis P. Miller to Whitney H. Shepardson, 26 Jan 43, Australia, File 38, Box 111, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA.

[19] D. Clayton James, *Years of MacArthur*, 2:510-11; and Smith, *Shadow Warriors*, pp. 195-96. Hayden was first attached to the Philippine Regional Section of the AIB, G-2, GHQ/SWPA, and was later transferred to G-1 and G-5, GHQ/SWPA and then the Civil Affairs Section, Headquarters, USAFFE; see Roosevelt, *War Report OSS*, 2:367.

[20] See "Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare in Southwest Pacific Theater," [OSS Planning Group] PG/26, 9 Jun 43, File 3, Box 087, Entry 92, RG 226, NARA; see also the JCS version of the plan routed through the War Department labeled [Joint Planning Staff] JPS 212/D and JPS 214/D, Box: 971, Entry: 203, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, both NARA. Rogers quote from *Wartime Washington*, p. 106, entry for Saturday 5 Jun. 43.

[21] Quote from *Wartime Washington*, p. 115, entry for 2 Jul. 43.

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create impossible situation and jeopardize existing harmony." All psychological warfare, intelligence gathering, and special operations were currently being handled by General Headquarters and "due to security and to avoid political questions," it was "inexpedient to send any organization for participation." The OSS plan was again "routinely shot down" by MacArthur, and, following the now-familiar pattern, the JCS issued its rejection on 8 July. "After careful consideration," the memo to Donovan read, the JCS "feel that the proposals made in the plan are not susceptible of practicable application in the Southwest Pacific Theater." On hearing of this latest rejection, Rogers conceded: "We are shut [out] of MacArthur's theater."[22]

A Direct Approach

With the failure of all efforts to date, Donovan decided to visit the Southwest Pacific General Headquarters to present his case in person. Mac Arthur's invitation was soon forthcoming. The two men had served together in the 42d "Rainbow" Division in World War I, when MacArthur was the division chief of staff and Donovan was a colonel commanding the division's 69th "Fighting Irish" Regiment, one of the American Expeditionary Force's most decorated and bloodied units. Donovan and MacArthur had been the 42d's most colorful and prominent commanders, and both received multiple decorations during the war, including the Distinguished Service Cross from AEF commander Gen. John Joseph "Black Jack" Pershing at a ceremony held on 7 September 1918. Some historians claim that MacArthur resented Donovan's success as a soldier and his military decorations, including the Purple Heart and Medal of Honor (a decoration MacArthur would not receive until 1942); others deny that any animosity existed between the two men.

"By most accounts, MacArthur and Donovan had a cordial personal relationship during the interwar years, and Donovan had the deepest regard for MacArthur's brilliance as a military strategist."

By most accounts, MacArthur and Donovan had a cordial personal relationship during the interwar years, and Donovan had the deepest regard for MacArthur's brilliance as a military strategist. During the final months of World War I, one authority claims, MacArthur did manage, at Donovan's request, to prevent his transfer from combat duty in France to the US Army Staff College, a posting Donovan did not want while the war was still on.[23]

With high hopes, Donovan set out to visit MacArthur on 2 April 1944. He was probably correct in believing that only he could get MacArthur's approval in a face-to-face meeting, and he was well received onboard MacArthur's headquarters ship off Hollandia, New Guinea, on his arrival. During frank discussions, MacArthur indicated a willingness to have OSS personnel attached to his staff and to use frogmen from the OSS Maritime Units, but he again refused to allow the service the same autonomy it enjoyed in the European Theater of Operations under Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, and he flatly rejected OSS Morale Operations personnel for his Psychological Warfare Branch in Australia. In addition, "MacArthur refused to accept any OSS-trained personnel unless they lost their identity with the agency and were transferred bodily to his command;" in effect, all Donovan's personnel were to be placed directly under MacArthur's control rather than remaining under the authority of the OSS director.[24]

Although MacArthur's demands were in keeping with military doc-

[22] See Memo, Donovan to JCS, 12 Jun. 43; Memo, MacArthur to JCS, 22 Jun. 43; and Memo, MacArthur to JCS, 30 Jul. 43, all in File: Chronology Apr.-Jun. 1943, Box 3; and Interview, Edward Lilly with Col. J. Woodhall Greene, 16 Oct. 51, File SWPA, Box 13; and Memo to Adm. King for C/S Sig, re: OSS in SWPA, 29 Sep 44, File: PWB/SWPA, Box 9, all in Lilly Papers, RG 218, NARA. The OSS created another similar plan, PG 91/1 on 15 Sep 44, one of many basic plans created by the OSS and GHQ/SWPA; see File: Basic Plan-WD for PWB, Box 3, Fellers Papers, HIWRP; and Chronology Jul.-Dec. 1945, Box: 3 and Japan, Box 6, in Lilly Papers, NARA. See also, Smith, *Shadow Warriors*, pp. 254-55. For Rogers quote see *Wartime Washington*, p. 121, entry for Saturday 17 Jul. 43, 18:05.

[23] Dunlop, *Donovan*, pp. 79, 95, and 99, Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, pp. 46, 52. Donovan's 69th New York National Guard Regiment was redesignated the 165th Infantry after being called into federal service, but its members continued to refer to it as the 69th.

[24] See Cave Brown, *Wild Bill Donovan*, pp. 515-17; Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, pp. 252-53, 253n; and Smith, *Shadow Warriors*, pp. 310-11.

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trine and the theater commander principle, they were absolutely contrary to the way the OSS did business elsewhere. In each and every other theater of war, the OSS operated with the theater commander's approval. MacArthur's insistence on total personal control in theater was unique in World War II: only US Army units controlled by the General Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area were ultimately allowed to conduct intelligence, propaganda, or special operations after late 1943, particularly in the Philippines and beyond.

MacArthur's requirements were unacceptable to Donovan and the top OSS leadership because any personnel sent to MacArthur's theater would cease to be part of the integrated worldwide OSS effort against the Axis. The OSS would, in effect, become mere suppliers of highly trained and specialized personnel to the military and not the comprehensive psychological warfare and centralized intelligence agency as Donovan intended. MacArthur's offer was turned down, and the OSS remained outside the Southwest Pacific.[25]

Stymied by Subordinates

Yet, as several observers have speculated, the exclusion of the OSS was probably not owed to any particular animosity toward the organization by MacArthur, but in all probability resulted from the negative attitudes toward Donovan, the OSS, and civilians in general held by MacArthur's subordinates who acted in his name and, as the OSS leadership alleged, perhaps without his knowledge. Donovan was convinced of this, and he believed the lack of acceptance was not because his old commander and cofounder of the American Legion had anything against Donovan personally, but because MacArthur's chief of staff, Richard K. Sutherland, and especially MacArthur's intelligence staff led by Charles Willoughby and Robert Merle-Smith, believed there was nothing that the OSS could do in the Pacific that their own organizations could not do as well or even better.

"Neither Donovan nor MacArthur could live with the knowledge that someone could do their respective jobs, or any portion thereof, equally as well as they themselves did."

MacArthur followed the most minute happenings at General Headquarters, and was supposedly well aware what his subordinates were doing, but Donovan was convinced the stonewalling arose elsewhere, not in the commander-in-chief's office. After all, each time Donovan had sent personal emissaries to MacArthur during the past two years, both Clear and Hayden, the general had appeared amenable to OSS participation in the theater. When MacArthur's intelligence personnel were consulted, however, negotiations always collapsed in a welter of prevarication. According to one author, Willoughby and Merle-Smith did not want the OSS in their theater, where they wielded absolute authority over all intelligence, counterintelligence, subversion, propaganda, and guerrilla operations. Yet, while Sutherland, Willoughby, and Merle-Smith often did the general's dirty work, MacArthur orchestrated all decisionmaking and surely knew full well what his subordinates were doing in regards to the OSS. Thus, in much the same manner that the AIB was edged out of General Headquarters deliberations and operations after 1943, so was the OSS.[26]

[25] See Cable #45924, OSS to USTRAVIC, London, 26 May 44; and Cable #48544, OSS to USTRAVIC, 29 May 44, both in File 1369, Box 219, Entry 134, RG 226, NARA.

[26] Cave Brown, *Wild Bill Donovan*, p. 517; Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, pp. 252-53; Soley, *Radio Warfare*, pp. 157-58. Other Allied intelligence and psychological warfare agencies, such as Britain's SOE and PWE, were also excluded from SWPA. After MacArthur's return to the Philippines in 1944, the AIB was also relegated to a position of secondary importance. The power and ability of MacArthur's staff to exclude groups extended beyond the OSS, and included new offices in MacArthur's own GHQ. General Sutherland successfully prevented the establishment of a psychological warfare branch at GHQ/SWPA until the summer of 1944, even though MacArthur approved of the use of combat propaganda and the PWB's proposed leader, Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers, a former OSS member, see Memo, Fellers to DCofS, 4 Jun. 44, Establishment of PWB, Annex 1, Rpt, Fellers to MacArthur, Psychological Warfare Against Japan, Ref Copy, RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupational Headquarters, NARA; and Intrv, Lilly with Fellers, 26 Aug. 46, Japan, Box 6, Lilly Papers, RG 218, NARA.

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A Clash of Egos

Donovan biographer Corey Ford maintained that OSS members had many of their own private theories, which included speculation that Willoughby, anxious to ensure full credit for his intelligence unit, feared that Donovan would grab the spotlight. Others held that MacArthur, a West Pointer and firm believer in the chain of command, objected to the presence of a uniformed civilian acting independently in his theater, especially a civilian with so many close ties to powerful persons in Washington.

A few intimates, such as OSS Morale Operations Branch Chief K. D. Mann, who knew Donovan's own determination, suspected the inevitable huge clash between two strong personalities, equally fixed in purpose, as the reason for the continued exclusion. Neither Donovan nor MacArthur could live with the knowledge that someone could do their respective jobs, or any portion thereof, equally as well as they themselves did. The ever outspoken James Grafton Rogers of the OSS Planning Group simply concluded that "MacArthur is too vain and political." After speaking with Joseph R. Hayden, Rogers came to share his view that "MacArthur distrusts OSS as uncontrollable like British SI [the Secret Intelligence Service] or OWI [the US Office of War Information]."[27]

[27] See Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, pp. 253-54; and Intrv., Lilly with K. D. Mann, 6 Jul. 53, Black, Box 2, Lilly Papers, RG 218, NARA; and Roger's quotes in *Wartime Washington*, p. 74 and p. 69, entries for 27 Mar 43 and 16 Mar 43, respectively.

"During Donovan's April visit, MacArthur did indicate a possible need for further OSS Special Operations personnel for use in the Philippine Islands."

Rays of Hope

In 1944, several glimmers of hope remained. During Donovan's April visit, MacArthur did indicate a possible need for further OSS Special Operations personnel for use in the Philippine Islands. The possibilities were discussed with Cdr. Charles A. Parsons, USN, who had commanded guerrilla groups in the Philippines since 1942 and who had MacArthur's complete confidence and authority to recruit anyone needed to help carry out his work, even OSS men, if necessary. Parsons was prepared to take OSS people under his command, but preferred sailors as opposed to soldiers or civilians. During a follow-up meeting at OSS headquarters in Washington, it was proposed that Parsons be offered 13 men from OSS for guerrilla work. All 13 were evidently provided, without fanfare or public announcement, at the end of 1944. Where they fit in terms of command and control within OSS and General Headquarters, as well as what they may have accomplished, remains unknown.[28]

[28] See Rpt, Lt. John W. Auchincloss, Meeting on Proposed OSS Activities in the Philippines, 6 Dec. 44, File 1, Box 28, Entry 1, RG 226, NARA.

The acceptance of a few men from the Special Operations Branch gave rise to new hope that plans for OSS clandestine radio stations operated by the Morale Operations Branch would also gain quiet acceptance if they did not interfere with theater communications and kept a generally low profile. The Five Star Plan was the first of several schemes which proposed making shortwave broadcasts to the Philippine Islands and enemy forces throughout the Southwest Pacific from mobile transmitters located in New Guinea. As American forces moved, so would the transmitters, keeping the enemy under a constant propaganda barrage. Developed by OSS member Gordon Auchincloss, the Five Star Plan and a similar program, the Agana Plan, calling for shortwave propaganda transmitters on Guam, likewise failed to gain the approval of the Southwest Pacific Theater command.[29]

Welcome Analytic Support

As the Pacific War neared an end, the last hope for the OSS lay in the person of Joseph R. Hayden, who was still serving in MacArthur's General Headquarters as an adviser. Hayden now sought to capitalize on the fact that GHQ lacked specific information on the soon to be invaded Philippine Islands, in particular details on potential landing beaches, local food supplies, and transportation routes and facilities, as well as other aspects of the Philippine political and economic infrastructure. This information could be readily provided by the

[29] Soley, *Radio Warfare*, pp. 167-68, 171.

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scholars of the OSS Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) in Washington.

Eager to obtain this information, and overlooking their previous views of the OSS, MacArthur's planning staff welcomed the information the R&A Branch had collected, in particular the reports derived from OSS interviews of American businessmen with interests in the Philippines. So valuable was this information that General Willoughby flew to Washington and personally called on R&A Branch director Dr. William D. Langer, requesting 20 of his best men to work directly at MacArthur's headquarters.

As Dr. Langer recounted the episode, he first "thought the ice was finally broken," and that perhaps Willoughby's visit indicated a willingness of MacArthur to accept OSS personnel after nearly two years. But Willoughby soon made plain that the OSS "must give them up completely and MacArthur would take them over." As before, General Donovan declined the offer. Although some tenuous connections were maintained between MacArthur's staff and the R&A Branch scholars throughout 1944 and into 1945, largely through the efforts of Hayden, no further OSS inroads were made.[30]

Giving Up

General Donovan's 1944 visit ended attempts within the OSS to get units assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area. Although a few intelligence missions were carried out in Java and Sumatra in the Netherlands East Indies on the fringe of MacArthur's advance in 1944, these were administered from Lord Mountbatten's British-dominated Southeast Asia Command. An OSS Morale Operations unit was allowed to operate from Saipan in the Marianas, however, gaining direct approval for their activities from both MacArthur and Central Pacific Theater commander Adm. Chester Nimitz in March 1945. This OSS unit began operations the following month, but it was a small effort, basically entering the Pacific too late and only on the coattails of the much larger Overseas Branch of the OWI. In the spring and summer of 1945, the OSS did receive MacArthur's permission to transfer its JAVAMAN Operation, involving the use of remote-controlled boats for attacks on enemy harbor installations, to the Southwest Pacific, but the war ended before the project became operational. For the remainder of the war, except for a single OSS member attached to Tenth Army headquarters to assist with planning for future US Army operations against Japan, the OSS for all intents and purposes was excluded from MacArthur's commands in both thought and deed.[31]

"The fact that no significant OSS unit participated in Southwest Pacific campaigns had a negative impact on the organization's image in 1945, especially during budget hearings before Congress."

Perhaps the ultimate blow to OSS prestige came in early May 1945, when a psychological warfare conference was held in Manila to create a "Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan." Although military and civilian representatives were present from the China Theater; the India-Burma Theater; from OWI's San Francisco, Honolulu, Southwest Pacific Area, China, and India-Burma offices; from the US Seventh Fleet, the Seventh Amphibious Forces; the US Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Armies; and the Psychological Warfare Branch of the General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area; no OSS members were invited and no mention of that organization was made in the 50-plus pages of the

[30] Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, p. 253. Some of the most useful reports were the "OSS Digests of World Transportation." These were factual descriptions of various geographical locations, or area studies as they came to be known, that were done for many areas of the Pacific, Asia, Europe, and the Near East. Surviving examples may be found in Box: 1, Entry: 192, RG 226, NARA. One particular OSS report, #1752, entitled "The Government of the New Philippines: A Study of the Present Puppet Government in the Philippines," published in a revised edition on 15 May 1944, was of particular interest to MacArthur and his staff who learned that many of the most prominent Filipino families, many with close prewar associations with MacArthur and members of his staff, had openly collaborated with the Japanese occupation government and fully embraced the Japanese-sponsored Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; see Folio: OSS R&A Rpt #1752, Box: 34, Entry: 283L, RG 331, NARA. GHQ had its own equivalent of the OSS R&A Branch after July 1944 in the Collation Section, Psychological Warfare Branch/SWPA, under Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers.

[31] For small OSS inroads following mid-1944, see Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 1:230, 2:366-67; and Smith, *Shadow Warriors*, p. 312. For the Saipan MO operation, see Soley, *Radio Warfare*, pp. 184-89.

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final operational plan—a plan that was very similar in form and content to the 1943 OSS document rejected by the General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area.[32]

A Bad Press

The fact that no significant OSS unit participated in Southwest Pacific campaigns had a negative impact on the organization's image in 1945, especially during budget hearings before Congress. As historian Thomas Troy recounted in *Donovan and the CIA*, on 16 May 1945 Walter Trohan, a reporter for the McCormick-Patterson press, wrote a headline story appearing in *The Washington Times-Herald* entitled "MacArthur Bars OSS Propaganda," which stated that MacArthur, to his alleged credit, had reportedly refused Donovan's offer of a large corps of what Trohan characterized as "propagandists and information sifters" in the Southwest Pacific.

Trohan went on to describe the OSS as the most mysterious agency in the federal government whose members comprised the "the glamour set" and who took "oaths of secrecy as awesome as [those in] a fraternity initiation." Trohan further advised his readers that Donovan had earlier been rejected when his plan to "take over all foreign intelligence" was publicized and "widely

"The growing public impression, many in the OSS feared, was that the secretive agency was a frivolous waste of time, scarce war resources, and taxpayer dollars."

denounced in Congress as a scheme to create an American Gestapo." Others chimed in during the spring of 1945, alleging that the OSS supported liberal causes and had close ties to Communists at home and abroad. Still others repeated the claim that "OSS" really stood for "Oh So Secret" or "Oh So Social," with Austin Cassini, also of *The Washington Times-Herald*, observing that the OSS contained the blue-bloods of society, "ex-polo players, millionaires, Russian princes, society gambol boys, scientists, and dilettante detectives" and "the prettiest, best-born, snappiest girls who used to graduate from debutantdom to boredom." The growing public impression, many in the OSS feared, was that the secretive agency was a frivolous waste of time, scarce war resources, and taxpayer dollars.[33]

The articles by Trohan were soon followed by more bad news for the OSS when Rep. Paul W. Shafer publicly alleged that MacArthur and Nimitz owed their victories in the Pacific "in no small measure" to their decisions "to keep OSS from cluttering up the area with misinformation and well-meaning but ineffective propaganda." War, Shafer had learned, was the business of fighting men, not of "economists, psychologists, historians, and other joy-riders in the OSS, OWI, and like organizations." Such comments produced the inevitable inquiries by the JCS to MacArthur seeking his estimate of Donovan's organization. The general's reply, much to the joy of OSS haters, was that he knew "little of its methods," had "no control of its agencies" and, consequently, had "no plans for its future employment."[34]

The Autonomy Issue

The exclusion of the OSS from the Southwest Pacific raises many issues. In barring OSS participation, MacArthur exercised the theater commanders' principle as was his right to do. Renowned for strict control of the personnel and agencies under his command, MacArthur could not tolerate a civilian agency within his theater that answered directly to Washington and the JCS rather than to him. The OSS would be an agency whose activities, and perhaps even worse, whose correspondence and contacts at the top Washington headquarters, MacArthur could not oversee, or have knowledge of, or control.

[32] For the Manila Conference, see "Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan with Appendices and Minutes of the Conference on Psychological Warfare Against Japan, Manila, 7-8 May 1945," Psychological Warfare Pacific, Box 329, Entry 172, RG 165, NARA.

[33] Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, p. 280; "MacArthur Bars OSS Propaganda," *Washington Times-Herald*, 16 May 45, and "Strategic Offices' Aid also Turned Down by Nimitz," *Washington Times-Herald*, 20 May 45; and Laurie, *Propaganda Warriors*, p. 131.

[34] Shafer quoted in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, p. 281; MacArthur quoted in Smith, *Shadow Warriors*, pp. 310-11. Chester Nimitz was of similar opinion and once referred to the OSS as a "superfluous impracticality" for which he had no use.

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The Southwest Pacific commander also could not have been oblivious to the high degree of autonomy the OSS enjoyed elsewhere, virtually in every other theater where its members were deployed. If the OSS were to exercise this characteristic autonomy in the Southwest Pacific Area, it could supposedly interfere with, or seriously jeopardize, the proper exercise of command and control of the military forces that were MacArthur's first and foremost responsibility.

A Conventional Outlook

A career military officer, MacArthur was undoubtedly most comfortable when dealing just with military organizations and personnel, from the lowest units under his command to military leaders in the War Department and JCS. The wartime OSS was an unknown entity, with ideological, operational, and institutional views very much different from those practiced to by conventional soldiers in traditional military institutions and units. Then again, perhaps it was the very unconventional nature of OSS operations that prompted MacArthur and his staff to lobby so vehemently to keep the OSS away at a far and, in their opinion, safe distance.

Having risen through the ranks in a conventional military world, MacArthur and members of his staff practiced conventional warfare. Intelligence and special operations were useful at the tactical level, and any "strategic services," by nature emphasizing the grand, overall picture and unorthodox practices, were of less utility to soldiers in the foxhole than the knowledge of what or who was facing him directly across the front line. MacArthur and Willoughby emphasized conventional means of gathering intelligence that was immediately useful to the soldier, to include POW interrogation, captured enemy documents, and radio intercepts. Perhaps this last explanation could be most instructive as to why the OSS was excluded—it was simply seen as superfluous in a command that already gathered in the G-2 section commanded by Willoughby, Merle-Smith, and Whitney, all that it needed in the way of tactical and strategic intelligence. Finally, one cannot dismiss the fact that MacArthur, as his critics often alleged, entertained no rivals for attention, much less command, especially one as flamboyant and well-connected as Donovan, who led a glamorous and romantic secret agency in an ugly and unromantic war. Such an agency at his elbow could detract enormously from MacArthur's own accomplishments. In the final analysis, the OSS did not make significant contributions to any major campaign against the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific Area, leaving the gaping hole in the history of an otherwise colorful and useful agency.

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Setting the Record Straight

CIA and the Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954 (S)

Gerald K. Haines

> **"... CIA historians discovered that the records had not been included in a CIA Inspector General report of 1967 on alleged assassination plotting or in the 1976 Church Committee investigation volumes on CIA assassination plotting."**

Gerald K. Haines is CIA's Chief Historian.

(b)(3)(c)

Author's Note: During a thorough review of CIA records relating to Operation PBSUCCESS, an operation designed to get rid of the Jacobo Arbenz Guzman regime in Guatemala in 1954, Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) reviewers in 1995 uncovered a sensitive file of material pertaining to proposals for the assassination or limitation of Guatemala Communist leaders, including President Arbenz.[1] Researching the background or provenance of the file, CIA historians discovered that the records had not been included in a CIA Inspector General report of 1967 on alleged assassination plotting or in the 1976 Church Committee investigation volumes on CIA assassination plotting. In addition, the entire Guatemala collection had been pulled together from CIA records in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in 1979. (U)

Further research revealed that the 1979 Agency-wide review for the FOIA request had found several documents relating to discussions and proposals regarding assassination, elimination, disposal, and executive action proposals against Guatemalan officials. The original reviewers separated the sensitive documents and placed them in a separate (b)(3)(n) envelope. They also informed Deputy Director of Operations John McMahon and DCI Adm. Stansfield Turner of the material. McMahon ordered name traces on all the Guatemalans mentioned to determine if, in fact, any of them had been assassinated. The traces turned up no evidence of assassination. The Intelligence Oversight Board and the Congressional oversight committees also were informed about the documents and the name traces. (U)

Here the matter rested until the records were rediscovered during the CSI review of 1995. CIA historians further determined that the PBSUCCESS material was an artificial collection of documents that broke the original provenance of the recordkeeping system of the Directorate of Operations (DO), and the further separation of the sensitive materials distorted the overall interpretation of the records by removing them from their original context. The Director of CSI, Brian Latell, after notifying the Executive Director of CIA, the White House, the NSC, and the Department of State, ordered a page-by-page review of the entire DO collection and other Directorate records relating to PBSUCCESS for additional documents mentioning assassination, elimination, disposal, or executive action suggestions or proposals with regard to Guatemala in the early 1950s. With all the records identified and their proper file location noted, Latell then asked the CIA History Staff to undertake a thorough analysis of the materials to determine exactly what the CIA role was in assassination planning for PBSUCCESS. The following article tries to detail CIA's role in the proposals and to place the assassination planning proposals in their proper historical context.[2] (U)

In the early 1950s, the CIA directed covert operations aimed at removing the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman from power in Guatemala. Included in these efforts were various suggestions for the disposal of key

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Arbenz government officials and Guatemalan Communists. The Agency drew up lists of individuals for assassination, discussed training Guatemalan exiles for assassination teams, and conducted intimidation programs against prominent Guatemalan officials. (U)

This brief article traces, in a chronological manner, the injection of assassination planning and proposals into the PBFORTUNE covert operation against the Arbenz government in 1952 and into the PBSUCCESS operation in 1954. It tries to illustrate the depth of such planning and the level of involvement of Agency officials. It also details where the proposals originated, who approved them, and how advanced the preparations for such actions were. Finally, the study examines the implementation of such planning and the results, that is, were any Arbenz officials or Guatemalan Communists killed as a result of CIA or US assassination planning? The article is based almost exclusively on DO records relating to PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS. (U)

Background

As early as 1952, US policymakers viewed the government of President Arbenz with some alarm. Although he had been popularly elected in 1950, growing Communist influence within his government gave rise to concern in the United States that Arbenz had established an effective working alliance with the Communists. Moreover, Arbenz's policies had damaged US business interests in Guatemala; a sweeping agrarian reform called for the expropriation and redistribution of much of the United Fruit Company's land.[3]

> **"CIA and Intelligence Community reports tended to support the view that Guatemala and the Arbenz regime were rapidly falling under the sway of the Communists."**

Although most high-level US officials recognized that a hostile government in Guatemala by itself did not constitute a direct security threat to the United States, they viewed events there in the context of the growing global Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union and feared that Guatemala could become a client state from which the Soviets could project power and influence throughout the Western Hemisphere.[4] (S)

CIA and Intelligence Community (IC) reports tended to support the view that Guatemala and the Arbenz regime were rapidly falling under the sway of the Communists.[5] DCI Walter Bedell Smith and other Agency officials believed the situation called for action. Their assessment was, that without help, the Guatemalan opposition would remain inept, disorganized, and ineffective. The anti-Communist elements—the Catholic hierarchy, landowners, business interests, the railway workers' union, university students, and the Army—were prepared to prevent a Communist accession to power, but they had little outside support.[6] (S)

Other US officials, especially in the Department of State, urged a more cautious approach. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, for example, did not want to present "the spectacle of the elephant shaking with alarm before the mouse." It wanted a policy of firm persuasion with the withholding of virtually all cooperative assistance, and the concluding of military defense assistance pacts with El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras.[7] Although the Department of State position became the official public US policy, the CIA assessment of the situation had support within the Truman administration as well. This led to the development of PBFORTUNE. (U)

PBFORTUNE

Following a visit to Washington by Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza in April 1952, in which Somoza boasted that if provided arms he and Guatemalan exile Carlos Castillo Armas could overthrow Arbenz, President Truman asked DCI Smith to investigate the possibility. Smith sent a case officer from the Directorate of Plans (DDP) to contact Guatemalan dissidents about armed action against the Arbenz regime.[8] After seeing the case officer's report,[9] J. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the DDP, proposed to DDCI Allen Dulles that the Agency supply Castillo Armas with arms and $225,000 and that Nicaragua and Honduras furnish the Guatemalans with air support.[10] Gaining Department of State support, Smith, on 9 September 1952, officially approved King's request to initiate operation PBFORTUNE to aid Guatemalan exiles in overthrowing Arbenz. Planning for PBFORTUNE lasted barely a month, however, when Smith terminated it after he learned in October that it had been blown.[11] (S)

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> **"In addition to monitoring events in Guatemala, the Agency continued to try to influence developments and to float ideas for disposing of key figures in the Arbenz government."**

Throughout the planning for PBFORTUNE, there were proposals for assassination. Even months before the official approval of PBFORTUNE, DDP officers compiled a "hit list." Working from an old 1949 Guatemalan Army list of Communists and information supplied by the Directorate of Intelligence, in January 1952 DDP officers compiled a list of "top flight Communists whom the new government would desire to eliminate immediately in event of a successful anti-Communist coup." Headquarters asked the (b)(3)(c) to verify the list and recommend any additions or deletions.[12] Headquarters also asked (b)(3)(c) to verify a list of an additional 16 Communists and/or sympathizers whom the new government would desire to incarcerate immediately if the coup succeeded.[13] (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) in Guatemala added three names to the list in his reply.[14] Nine months later, the case officer forwarded to Headquarters a disposal list compiled by Castillo Armas. That list called for the execution through executive action of 58 Guatemalans (Category I) and the imprisonment or exile of 74 additional Guatemalans (Category II).[15] The case officer also reported at the same time, 18 September 1952, that Gen. Rafael Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic, had agreed to aid Castillo Armas in return for the "killing of four Santo Dominicans at present residing in Guatemala a few days before D-Day." According to the case officer, Castillo Armas readily agreed, but cautioned that it could not be done before D-Day because of security reasons. Castillo Armas further added that his own plans included similar action and that special squads were already being trained.[16] There is no record that Headquarters took any action regarding Castillo Armas's list. (S)

After the PBFORTUNE operation was officially terminated, the Agency continued to pick up reports of assassination planning by the Guatemalan opposition. In late November 1952, for example, an opposition Guatemalan leader, in a conversation with the case officer, confirmed that Castillo Armas had special K Groups whose mission was to kill all leading political and military leaders, and that the hit list with the location of the homes and offices of all targets had already been drawn up.[17] On 12 December, the case officer reported further that Castillo Armas planned to make maximum use of the K Groups.[18] Another source subsequently reported that Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Salvadoran soldiers in civilian clothes would infiltrate Guatemala and assassinate unnamed Communist leaders.[19] (S)

In addition to monitoring events in Guatemala, the Agency continued to try to influence developments and to float ideas for disposing of key figures in the Arbenz government. J. C. King in 1953 proposed not only to focus on sabotage, defection, penetration, and propaganda efforts with regard to Guatemala, but also to eliminate Arbenz himself. According to King's draft memorandum, after creating a story that Arbenz was preparing to oust the Communists, he could be eliminated. His assassination would be "laid to the Commies" and used to bring about a mass defection of the Guatemalan Army.[20] A Western Hemisphere Division memo of 28 August 1953 also suggested possibly assassinating key Guatemalan military officers if they refused to be converted to the rebel cause.[21] In September 1953, King also sent Allen Dulles, now DCI, an updated plan of action which included a reference to "neutralizing" key Guatemalan military leaders.[22] (S)

In the psychological warfare area, Guatemala sent (b)(3)(c) all leading Communists in Guatemala, "death notice" cards for 30 straight days beginning 15 April 1953. (b)(3)(c) repeated the operation beginning 15 June 1953, but it reported no reaction from the targeted leaders.[23] (S)

PBSUCCESS

By the fall of 1953, US policymakers, including CIA officials, were searching for a new overall program for dealing with Arbenz. The Guatemalan leader had moved even closer to the Communists. He had expropriated additional United Fruit Company holdings, legalized the Guatemalan Communist Party, the PGT, and suppressed anti-Communist opposition following an abortive uprising at Salamá. In response, the NSC authorized a covert action operation against Arbenz and gave the CIA primary responsibility.[24] (U)

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The CIA plan, as drawn up by J. C. King's Western Hemisphere Division, combined psychological warfare and economic, diplomatic, and paramilitary actions against Guatemala. Named PBSUCCESS and coordinated with the Department of State, the plan's stated objective was "to remove covertly, and without bloodshed if possible, the menace of the present Communist-controlled Government of Guatemala." In the outline of the operation, the sixth stage called for the "rollup" of Communists and collaborators after a successful coup.[25] (S)

Dulles placed Frank Wisner in charge of PBSUCCESS and sent a senior DDP officer, (b)(3)(c) to establish a temporary (LINCOLN), in Florida, to coordinate the planning and execution of PBSUCCESS. Other key Agency figures involved were King and Tracy Barnes, chief of the Political and Paramilitary Operations Staff. Department of State officials Henry Holland, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Raymond Leddy, from the office of Middle American Affairs; and James Lampton Berry, State liaison to the Agency also played major roles. (U)

Training

Although assassination was not mentioned specifically in the overall plan, the chief of Paramilitary Operations, LINCOLN, requested on 5 January 1954 a special paper on liquidation of personnel. This paper, according to the paramilitary chief, was to be used to brief the training chief for PBSUCCESS before he left to begin training Castillo Armas's forces in Honduras on 10 January 1954. A (b)(3)(c) cable from LINCOLN the following day requested 20 silencers (converters) for .22-caliber rifles. Headquarters sent the rifles.[26] The paramilitary chief also discussed the training plan with the case officer on 13 January 1954, telling him that he wanted Castillo Armas and the PBSUCCESS training officer to train two assassins. In addition, he discussed these "assassination specialists" with Castillo Armas on 3 February 1954.[27] (S)

> **"CIA planning for sabotage teams in early 1954 also included creating a K Group trained to perform assassinations."**

The idea of forming assassination teams (K Groups) apparently originated with Castillo Armas in 1952. Adapting Castillo Armas's concept, the paramilitary chief routinely included two assassination specialists in his training plans.[28] (S)

CIA planning for sabotage teams in early 1954 also included creating a K Group trained to perform assassinations. The main mission of the sabotage teams or harassment teams, however, was to attack local Communists and Communist property and to avoid attacks on the Army.[29] A chart depicting the paramilitary chief's plan for the CALLIGERIS (Castillo Armas) organization showed the K Group. It was distributed in various paramilitary planning packets as late as the spring of 1954.[30] In June 1954, in a briefing for David Atlee Phillips, chief of SHERWOOD, the CIA's clandestine radiobroadcasting program aimed at the Arbenz regime, also mentioned that sabotage teams would assassinate known Communists in their areas once the invasion operation began.[31] (S)

Psychological Warfare

As in PBFORTUNE, an intensive psychological warfare program paralleled the planning for paramilitary action. Using the anti-Communist network established by a Guatemalan dissident, the chief of Political and Psychological Operations at LINCOLN developed a major propaganda campaign against the Arbenz government. Part of this program included the sending of new mourning cards to top Communist leaders that lamented the imminent purge or execution of various Communists throughout the world and hinted of the forthcoming doom of the addressee. Death letters were also sent to top Guatemalan Communists such as (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(n) The Guatemala (b)(1) prepared these letters for a dis(b)(3)(c) sident student leader. The "nerve wa(b)(3)(n) against individuals," as it was called in Guatemala, also included sending wooden coffins, hangman's nooses, and phony bombs to select individuals. Such slogans as "Here Lives a Spy" and "You Have Only 5 Days" were painted on their houses.[32] (S)

Wanting to go beyond mere threats, the dissident student leader suggested that the "violent disposal" of one of the top Guatemalan Communists would have a positive effect on the resistance movement and undermine Communist morale. The dissident leader's recommendations called for the formation of a covert action group to perform violent, illegal acts against the government. LINCOLN cautioned the dissident leader, however, that such techniques

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were designed to destroy a person's usefulness. By destroy, "We do not mean to kill the man," LINCOLN cabled the dissident leader. Responding to the proposal that a top Communist leader be killed, (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) told LINCOLN he could not then recommend assassinating any "death letter" recipients because it might touch off "wholesale reprisals." Reiterating that the plan was "to scare, not kill," he nevertheless suggested that LINCOLN might want to "study the suggestion for utility now or in the future."[33] (S)

While Agency paramilitary and psychological warfare planning both included suggestions that inferred assassination proposals, these proposals appear never to have been implemented. The paramilitary chief had sought to use Castillo Armas's K Group scheme, but there was no State Department or White House (b)(3)(c) support. Such was also the case when the subject of assassination emerged in high-level Agency and interagency planning discussions. (U)

Target Lists

A weekly PBSUCCESS meeting at Headquarters on 9 March 1954 considered the elimination of 15 to 20 of Guatemala's top leaders with "Trujillo's trained pistoleros." Those (b)(3)(c) attending the meeting were Wisner; Barnes; ; King; Richard Helms, the DP's Chief of Operations; and State Department representatives Berry and Leddy. Addressing the (b)(3)(c) group, while stating clearly that "such elimination was part of the plan and could be done," objected to the proposal at that time. however, expressed the view that "knocking off the leaders might make

(b)(3)(c)

> **"CIA received further Department of State encouragement for assassination plotting in April 1954."**

it possible for the Army to take over."[34] (S)

Following this meeting, (b)(3)(c) appears to be the Agency official who revived discussion of assassination as an option. On 25 March, he broached the subject with (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, who had just returned from the OAS meeting in Caracas, Venezuela, that voted 17 to 1 to condemn Communism in Guatemala. With (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) again present, asked if he had changed his thinking since the conference on the possible methods to get rid of the Arbenz government. (b)(3)(c) replied that in his opinion, "The elimination of those in high positions of the government would bring about its collapse." He then qualified his statement, according to (b)(3)(c) memo, by saying that perhaps "even a smaller number, say 20, would be sufficient."[35] (S)

Less than a week later, Allen Dulles visited LINCOLN on 31 March. The records do not indicate why Dulles flew to LINCOLN,[36] but on that date the LINCOLN officers were asked to draw up an updated target list. Criteria for inclusion on the disposal list required that individuals be (1) high government and organizational leaders "irrevocably implicated in Communist doctrine and policy," (2) "out-and-out proven Communist leaders," or (3) those few individuals in key government and military positions of tactical importance "whose removal for psychological, organizational or other reasons is mandatory for the success of military action."[37] (S)

The paramilitary chief took the new list with him when he consulted Castillo Armas on 7 April 1954. Chief, LINCOLN (b)(3)(c) also borrowed a copy of the list on the same day. The paramilitary chief and Castillo Armas apparently discussed the list, and, at least tentatively, agreed that any assassination would take place during the actual invasion of Guatemala by Castillo Armas's forces. There was still no time date for the actual beginning of hostilities, however. (S) (b)(3)(c)

Agency contacts with conservative Guatemalan exile leader (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(n) in El Salvador at the same time also produced an assassination list. (b)(3)(n) provided a CIA cutout with a list of Communist leaders he would like to see executed, but LINCOLN saw (b)(3)(n) a loose cannon. They did not want him to become involved in PBSUCCESS.[39] (S)

CIA received further Department of State encouragement for assassination plotting in April 1954. Fueling the fire for action (b)(3)(n) in a meeting with Wisner; Richard Bissell, Special Assistant to Dulles; Barnes; and another CIA officer concluded that "more drastic and definitive steps to overthrow the government [in Guatemala] must be taken." In response to a question of whether (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(n) as "salvageable," replied in the negative and suggested that "he be eliminated."[40] (S)

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On 16 May 1954, the executive officer at LINCOLN proposed in a memorandum to (b)(3)(c) LINCOLN, that assassination be incorporated into the psychological part of PBSUCCESS. The executive officer laid out a specific assassination schedule leading up to D-Day, the actual invasion by Castillo Armas. On D-12 he proposed a raid on "El Cajon," the *finca* of Arbenz. This was to be a show of force; no one was to be harmed, and the attack was to take place when Arbenz was absent from the plantation. On D-10, however, the executive officer proposed the disposal of (b)(3)(n) as a means of paralyzing the Guardia and eliminating "the prime symbol of (b)(3)(n) oppression." On D-8, the executive officer suggested that (b)(3)(n) be killed. According to the executive officer, this would eliminate the police-state character of the Arbenz regime. On D-6, the executive officer called for the disposal (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(n) the executive officer believed. On D-4, (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(n) would be eliminated. On D-1 or D-Day, Arbenz himself was to be eliminated so that the rebel forces would not have to worry about him or deal with him after victory. The executive officer considered the possibility of reprisals as a weakness in his scheme, but he decided that "such actions were expected anyway." The executive officer argued that his proposal, if adopted, would not only be physically impressive but also psychologically significant by providing a show of strength for the opposition. It would also "soften up" the enemy. He added that his first three suggestions had (b)(1) ious approval (S) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c)

On 21 May, asked Headquarters for permission to implement the executive officer's proposal and asked for suggestions about the specific individuals to be targeted.[42] No reply from Headquarters to has been found. (b)(3)(c) On 29 May 1954, however, the paramilitary chief requested the names of the "four men" he and the executive officer discussed assassinating. More than likely, the paramilitary chief wanted to take up the issue again with Castillo Armas. Again, no cable reply from Headquarters or LINCOLN has been found.[43] At the same time, LINCOLN continued compiling information on Arbenz's *finca* and lists of home addresses for individuals named on the "disposal list" drafted in April.[44] believed Arbenz's *finca* was a "worthy tar- (b)(1) ger."[45] (S) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c)

In Washington submitted a proposal on 1 June 1954 that suggested that, as an alternative approach to the paramilitary action program, "specific sabotage and possibly political assassination should be carefully worked out and effected."[46] (b)(3)(c) took up suggestion in discussions with Henry Holland on 1 and 2 June. According to Wisner, Holland considered the proposal and then ruled it out, "at least for the immediate future," on the grounds that it would prove counterproductive. Holland wanted more specific plans concerning the individual targets, timing, and statement of purpose. Both Wisner and Holland agreed that the advantages gained by this type of activity needed to be clearly spelled out.[47] This appears to be the end of serious planning in Washington for the inclusion of selective assassination proposals in PBSUCCESS. Returning from Washington to LINCOLN, on 2 June 1954, Barnes, however, reported to his staff that the consensus in Washington was that "Arbenz must go; how does not matter."[48] (S)

The Paramilitary Operation

On 16 June 1954, Castillo Armas's CIA-supported force of armed exi (b)(1) entered Guatemala. While these (b)(3)(c) forces advanced tentatively in the hinterland Guatemala City on 16 and 17 June met with a leading Guatemalan military commander, in the hopes of convincing him to lead a coup against Arbenz. In these discussions, the military commander hinted he would like to see (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(n) killed. The , frustrated by the continued inaction of the Guatemalan military commander, told him that if he wanted them killed he should do it himself. Despite the Guatemalan military commander's vacillation, a cable indicated that he remained convinced that Arbenz had to be eliminated.[49] (S) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

With the Guatemala Army's positio (b)(1) uncertain and the outcome still in doubt, the (b)(3)(c) Nicaragua, requested permission a few days later to bomb the Presidential Palace and Arbenz's *finca*. LINCOLN responded on 22 June that it did not want to waste airstrikes on the *finca* or the palace while a battle was raging at Zacapa.[50] In a dramatic cable that ended "bomb repeat bomb,"[51] the and the Ambassador also supported the paramilitary

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

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chief's request to bomb the palace. LINCOLN and Headquarters held fast, and the palace was never bombed. "We do not take action with grave foreign policy implications except as an agent for the policymakers," Dulles cabled LINCOLN.[52] (S)

President Arbenz, on 27 June 1954, in an anti-American speech, resigned his office and sought asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala City. Even at that late date, [redacted] suggested that Arbenz should be killed.[53] After Castillo Armas assumed the presidency, however, Arbenz was allowed to leave the country for Mexico, where he was granted political asylum. In addition, 120 other Arbenz government officials or Communists departed Guatemala under a safe passage agreement with the Castillo Armas government.[54] There is no evidence that any Communist leaders were executed. (S)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

Conclusion

CIA officers responsible for planning and implementing covert action against the Arbenz government engaged in extensive discussions over a two-and-a-half-year period about the possibility of assassinating Guatemalan officials, including Arbenz himself. Consideration of using assassination to topple Arbenz and purge Guatemala of Communist influence was born of the extreme international tensions in the early Cold War years. The Agency did not act unilaterally, but it consulted with State Department officials with responsibility for policy toward Latin America. In the end, no assassinations of Guatemalan officials were carried out, according to all available evidence. (S)

"Yet, no covert action plan involving assassinations of Guatemalans was ever approved or implemented."

Proposals for assassination pervaded both PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS, rather than being confined to an early stage of these programs. Even before official approval of PBFORTUNE, CIA officers compiled elimination lists and discussed the concept of assassination with Guatemalan opposition leaders. Until the day that Arbenz resigned in June 1954, the option of assassination was still being considered. (S)

Discussions of assassination reached a high level within the Agency. Among those involved were [redacted] (b)(3)(c) was present at least one meeting where the subject of assassination came up. DCI Allen Dulles and his special assistant, Richard Bissell, probably were also aware in general terms that assassination was under discussion. Beyond planning, some actual preparations were made. Some assassins were selected, training began, and tentative "hit lists" were drawn up. (S)

Yet, no covert action plan involving assassinations of Guatemalans was ever approved or implemented. The official objective of PBSUCCESS was to remove the Guatemalan Government covertly "without bloodshed if possible." Elimination lists were never finalized, assassination proposals remained controversial within the Agency, and it appears that no Guatemalans associated with Arbenz were assassinated. Both CIA and State Department officers were divided (and undecided) about using assassination. (S)

Discussion of whether to assassinate Guatemalan Communists and leaders sympathetic to Communist programs took place in a historical era quite different from the present. Soviet Communism had earned a reputation of using whatever means were expedient to advance Moscow's interests internationally. Considering Moscow's machinations in Eastern Europe, role in the Korean War, sponsorship of subversion through Communist surrogates in the Third World, and espousal of an ideology that seemed to have global hegemony as the ultimate objective, US officials and the American public alike regarded foreign Communist parties as Soviet pawns and as threatening to vital US security interests. (S)

Cold War realities and perceptions conditioned American attitudes toward what political weapons were legitimate to use in the struggle against Communism. It would be over two decades after the events in Guatemala before DCI William Colby prohibited any CIA involvement in assassination and a subsequent Executive Order banned any US Government involvement in assassination. (S)

NOTES

1. The Historical Review Group, as part of CSI, reviewed these records for

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possible declassification and release under a selective subject release program. The Guatemalan records were originally pulled together by the Information, Privacy, and Classification Review Division for an FOIA request. For this request, Agency records were assembled from all the Directorates. (U)

2. This article, a previously classified review of Operation PBSUCCESS, and a large segment of the original records have been sanitized, declassified, and released to the National Archives and Records Administration. (U)

3. See Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 187-88. United Fruit dominated Guatemalan banana production, controlled the International Railroad of Central America, and its merchant fleet had a virtual monopoly of Guatemalan overseas shipping. It was second only to the Guatemalan Government as an employer. (U)

4. See Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope* and Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982) for general overviews of the Guatemalan situation in the early 1950s and US reaction. See also John Peurifoy, US Ambassador to Guatemala, statement of 23 October 1953 in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, The American Republic, 1950-1954*, 4:1039. (Hereinafter cited as *FRUS*). (U)

5. See PBSUCCESS Planning Documents, Directorate of Operations, Latin American Division Records, Job Number 79-101025A, CIA Archives (S). See also NSC 144/1, 18 March 1953, *FRUS* 4: 1-79 and J. C. King, memo for DDP, "Estimate of Situation in Guatemala," 11 January 1952 printed in Michael Warner, ed. *The CIA Under Harry Truman* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1994), pp. 452-53. (U)

6. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, dispatch, 22 March 1952, Box 7 (S).

7. See Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, "Alternative Policy Lines, 1953," and NSC, "Guatemala," 19 August 1953, *FRUS*, 4:1074-1086. (U)

8. See cable to Dulles, "Conference with...), 4 August 1952, Box 69. (S)

9. See memorandum to Dulles "Guatemalan Situation," 9 July 1952, Box 67 (S) and memorandum to Dulles, "Conference with...), 4 August 1952, Box 69. (S)

10. See King, "Chronology of Meetings Leading to Approval of Project A," 8 October 1952, Box 69 (S); to King, "Guatemala," 8 October 1952, Box 69 (S); and to Dulles, "Guatemala Situation," 9 July 1952, Box 69. (S)

11. See King, "Chronology of Meetings Leading to Approval of Project A." (S). See also Immerman, *CIA in Guatemala*, pp. 120-22. Because of security leaks and the boasting of General Somoza about his and the Agency's role in supporting the rebellion, PBFORTUNE was soon called off. Secretary of State Dean Acheson asked DCI Smith to stop the operation in October 1952. (U)

12. See [redacted] (b)(3)(c) [redacted] to [redacted] 26 January 1952, Box 7 (S). For a list of the names and biographical data see, Chief, Economic Warfare Operations, LINCOLN to All Staff Officers, "Selection of Individuals for Disposal by Junta Group," 31 March 1954, Box 145. (S)

13. Washington (b)(3)(c) to [redacted], 29 January 1952, Box 7. (S)

14. [redacted] (b)(3)(c) [redacted] to Headquarters, 29 January 1952, Box 10. (S)

15. See to King, "Guatemala Communist Personnel to be Disposed of During Military Operations of CALLIGERIS," (Castillo Armas), 18 September 1952, Box 134. (S)

16. See Report #3 to King, "Liaison between CALLEGERIS and General Trujillo of Santo Domingo," 18 September 1952, Box 134 (S). Assassination was a nasty but frequent tool of Guatemalan politics. Arbenz himself benefited from the killing of his archrival for the presidency, Franciso Arana, in 1949. (U)

17. See to King, memorandum, "Conference," 1 December 1952, Box 134. (S)

18. To King, memorandum, "Current Planning of CALLIGERIS Organization," 12 December 1952, Box 134 (S). See also, Acting Chief, Psychological Warfare Branch, Western Hemisphere Division, that reported in November 1952 that Castillo Armas was studying PW use of liquidation lists. Memorandum for the record, "PW Conference," 5 November 1952, Box 151 (S). The case officer also reported that the Arbenz government had targeted Castillo Armas for assassination. (S)

19. See [redacted], 30 March 1953, Box 150. (S) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

20. See King, memorandum, "Proposed Course of Action If Plan is Not Continued in Present Form"; undated but probably 1953, Box 154. (S)

21. Western Hemisphere Division, memorandum, "PBFORTUNE," 28 August 1953, Box 72. (S)

22. See King, memorandum to Dulles, "Guatemala—General Plan of Action," 11 September 1953, Box 5 (TS). See also the attached memorandum from Hans Tofte to King, 9 September 1953. (S)

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23. See dispatch, [redacted] to LINCOLN, "Death Notices," 19 April 1954, Box 99. (S)

24. NSC Policy Paper, 19 August 1953, *FRUS* 4:1083. (U)

25. See King to Dulles, "Guatemala—General Plan of Action," Box 5 (TS) [redacted] Special Deputy for PBSUCCESS, memorandum for the record, "Program for PBSUCCESS," 12 November 1953, Box 135 (C). See also, memorandum to [redacted] "Summary of Directives and Instructions on PBSUCCESS," 5 November 1953, Box 142 (S).

[redacted]

26. LINCOLN [redacted] for PBSUCCESS. See LINCOLN [redacted] to Headquarters, 5 January 1954, Box 1 (S) and LINCOLN [redacted] to Headquarters 6 January 1954, Box 1 (S). See also [redacted] to Headquarters, 9 March 1954, Box 13 (S); LINCOLN [redacted] to Headquarters, 4 January 1954, Box 1. (S)

27. See the paramilitary chief to Chief, LINCOLN [redacted] "CALLIGERIS Briefing Notes," 3 February 1954, Box 147 (S). See also, Chief, Technical Operations, Technical Services Staff, memorandu[redacted] "Cost of Support for PBSUCCESS," 27 September 1954, Box 43 (S). He listed the 20 silenced rifles. See also LINCOLN [redacted] to Headquarters, 6 January 1954, Box 75 (S) and LINCOLN [redacted] to Headquarters, 21 January 1954, Box 1. (S)

28. To King, Report #5, "Manuel Alfredo Pedroza G., "18 September 1952, Box 73 (S) and paramilitary chief, memorandum for the record, "PM Conference Held at LINCOLN," 13 February 1954, Box 74 (S). See also LINCOLN [redacted] to Headquarters, 4 January 1954, Box 1 (S).

[redacted]

[redacted]

29. See LINCOLN [redacted] to Headquarters, 8 June 1954, Box 5 (S) or LINCOLN, [redacted] to Headquarters, 8 June 1954, Box 5. (S)

[redacted]

30. See to King, Report #22, "Current Planning of CALLIGERIS Organization," 12 December 1952, Box 134

[redacted]

31. See dispatch to [redacted] Guatemala City, "Trainin[redacted] 6 June 1954, Box 75 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat). (S)

32. To LINCOLN, 26 May 1954, "Tactical Instructions (part II)," (S) and to LINCOLN, "Instructions' Nerve War Against Individuals," 9 June 1954, Box 50. (S)

33. See [redacted] Guatemala City, to Western Hemisphere Division, undated, Box 46 (C) and Guatemala City [redacted] LINCOLN, 14 May 1954. Se[redacted] also the [redacted] dispatch Guatema[redacted] City to LINCOLN, 14 May 195[redacted] Box 145 (S). SHERWOOD was the black radio propaganda program for PBSUCCESS. (S)

34. See King, memorandum for the record, "Weekly PBSUCCESS Meeting with DD/P," 9 March 1954, Box 154 (TS). [redacted]

[redacted]

15 April 1954, Box 70 (S); King, memorandum for the record, "Meeting," 2 March 1954, Box 70. (S)

35. King, memorandum for the record, "Report of Mr. Thomas Mann on OAS Conference," 29 March 1954, Box 145. (S)

36. See Chief, Economic Warfare, LINCOLN, memo to All Staff Officers, "Selection of Individuals for Disposal by Junta Group," 31 March 1954, Box 145 (S). We know Dulles visited LINCOLN on this date from the LINCOLN visitors' log book. He signed into LINCOLN on 31 March. See LINCOLN Log Book for 31 March 1954, Box 138. (S)

37. Memorandum, Box 145. (S)

38. [redacted]

39. Ydígores Fuentes was living in exile in El Salvador, and the Agency was cultivating him as well as Castillo Armas. Arbenz had defeated Fuentes in the presidential election of December 1950. See memo to Barnes, "Summary of Operation," 18 April 1954, Box 134 (S). See also Dispatch, LINCOLN [redacted]

[redacted]

40. See memorandum for the record, "Synthesis of Ambassador Peurifoy's Remarks Relevant to PBSUCCESS Made at a Meeting 21 April 1954," 22 April 1954, Box 151. (S)

41. See executive officer, LINCOLN, memo to Barne[redacted] "Acts of Force Before D-Day," 16 May 1954, Box 142 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat). [redacted]

[redacted]

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)

Box 145 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat). (S)

(b)(3)(c)

42. See LINCOLN to Director, 21 May 1954, Box 4 (S) and LINCOLN to Director. 21 May 1954, Box 4. (S)

43. See to Headquarters, 29 May 1954, Box 13 (S). Perhaps executive officer, LINCOLN, and chief paramilitary talked at a conference held at LINCOLN on 2 June 1954. See LINCOLN (b)(3)(c) 2 June 1954, Box 146 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat). (S)

(b)(1) (b)(3)(c) See dispatch, Guatemala to LINCOLN, "K Program, Arbenz's Finca," 25 May 1954, Box 145 (Secret PBSUCCESS, Rybat). (S)

45. See "Disposal List Home Addresses," copied from an attachment to dispatch, Guatemala to LINCOLN, 1 June 1954, Box 145, (S). It contained 15 names. See also LINCOLN routing slip for the attachment. (Dispatch dated 25 May 1954), Box 145 (Secret, Rybat). (S)

(b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

46. See Barnes, draft memo, "Present Status and Possible Future Course of PBSUCCESS," 1 June 1954, Box 145. (S)

47. Wisner, memorandum for the record, "Points Covered in H/W Discussions of June 1 and 2," 3 June 1954, Box 145 (S). This memo is originally from Job 00075R, Box 1, Folder 3. (S)

48. See (b)(3)(c) 2 June 1954, Box 146 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat). See also Wisner, memorandum for the record, "Points Covered in H/W Discussion of June 1 and 2," 3 June 1954 and LINCOLN, note for the file, "Disposal List Prepared by C/EW," 1 June 1954, Box 145. (S)

49. See Guatemala City to Headquarters, 17 June 1954, Box 75 (S); Guatemala City to Headquarters, 18 June 1954, Box 11 (S). See earlier Agency meetings with Guatemalan military leader, "First Meeting, 4 May 1954, Dispatch, Guatemala City to LINCOLN, 1 June 1954, Box 134 (S); Dispatch, 11 June 1954, Box 134 (S); and Dispatch Guatemala City to LINCOLN, (b)(1) May 1954, Box 154 (S). For (b)(3)(c) see Guatemala City to LINCOLN, 24 June 1954, Box 153 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat).

(b)(3)(c)

50. See to LINCOLN, 14 June 1954, Box 93 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat); Guatemala City to LINCOLN, 19 June 1954, Box 93 (S); and LINCOLN, to Headquarters, 22 June 1954, Box 93 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, Rybat).

(b)(3)(c)

51. SHERWOOD to LINCOLN, (b)(1) 25 June 1954, Box 146 (S) and (b)(3)(c) Guatemala City to Dulles, 19 June 1954, Box 91. (S)

52. See Headquarters to LINCOLN, 5857, 22 June 1954, Box 143. (S).

53. See Guatemala City to LINCOLN, 27 June 1954, Box 145 (Secret, PBSUCCESS, RYBAT).

(b)(3)(c)

54. John H. Waller, CIA Inspector General, letter to Thomas Farmer, Chairman of the Intelligence Oversight Board, 15 October 1979. (S)

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There is no substitute for access to the President.

GERALD FORD AND THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

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In the late spring of 1974, when it became apparent that President Richard Nixon would not survive the Watergate scandal, the Director of Central Intelligence saw both a responsibility and an opportunity. Director William Colby decided that CIA should help Vice President Gerald Ford prepare for his elevation to the Presidency. Colby's initiative later afforded CIA unprecedented direct and daily access to the President when Mr. Ford moved into the Oval Office.

Colby invited the Vice President to visit CIA Headquarters. Mr. Ford came, on June 12, 1974, and was given wide-ranging briefings on intelligence operations and assessments. In response to his request, Colby agreed to send him *The President's Daily Brief* (PDB), in addition to *The National Intelligence Daily* (NID) he had been receiving. I was assigned to facilitate intelligence support to the Vice President.

Mr. Ford accepted my suggestion that the PDB be brought to him directly, acknowledging that this would be the most secure way to receive the sensitive document. He specified that he would like to see it early each morning, preferably as his first appointment. Beginning on July 1, that became the regular routine.

It was altered only occasionally by such diversions as a Vice Presidential breakfast with Mr. Nixon or by a speaking engagement out of town. On a few occasions I saw Mr. Ford at his Alexandria home before he flew off to keep such an engagement. Always a gracious host, he, himself, brewed and served instant coffee.

THE OVAL OFFICE

When Mr. Nixon resigned and Mr. Ford was sworn in as President on August 9, 1974, we were uncertain whether the briefings would continue. It seemed probable that Dr. Kissinger would intervene and terminate the sessions, substituting some other arrangement. (He was described to me later as "furious" when he learned of the CIA briefing routine, of which he hadn't been informed.) The uncertainty was short-lived; that evening Mr. Ford passed the word that he wanted his usual briefing the next morning at the White House.

That Saturday morning Mr. Ford seemed as awed as I was when he entered the Oval Office to begin his first full day as Chief Executive. With us was General Haig, who was to carry on as principal assistant to the President. The walls and furniture in the Office were bare—thanks to the removal of Mr. Nixon's pictures and possessions. The famous desk had only a telephone console on it, promoting the new President to tell Haig that he would rely on him to help keep the desk uncluttered.

Somewhat to my surprise in view of General Haig's presence, the President first asked for his intelligence briefing. I gave him a status report on a sensitive operation that interested him, after which he read the PDB, punctuating his perusal with a couple of questions.

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He asked Haig for his views on how the intelligence briefing should fit into the daily Presidential schedule. Haig replied that President Nixon had received the PDB along with several other reports, cables, and overnight summaries to read as time permitted during the day. The General went on to say, however, that an early daily intelligence briefing was a better idea. Mr. Ford agreed, expressing satisfaction with the routine that had been established and observing that such an arrangement would help prepare him for a subsequent daily meeting with Mr. Kissinger. The new President evidently felt at some disadvantage in discussing foreign affairs with his Secretary of State and wanted as much advance support as he could get. Accordingly, I would continue to be the President's first appointment each morning.

That initial session in the Oval Office ended on a mildly embarrassing note for me. I exited the Office through the nearest door—only to find myself at a dead end. A second door, which I later learned led to a smaller, more private office for the President, was locked, trapping me in the passageway. The Presidential lavatory was on one side opposite a pullman kitchen where stewards prepared refreshments. It was obvious that unless I was prepared to stay indefinitely I would have to reenter the Oval Office, where the President and General Haig were still conferring. I knocked, opened the door with apologies and sheepishly explained my predicament. Mr. Ford laughed and professed that he didn't yet know his way around the West Wing very well, either. He directed me out another door to the hallway. I observed that this door had no frame and was papered to blend with the wall.

A SECURE CHANNEL

For two days during that first week of the Ford Presidency I met alone with the President each morning. On the third morning General Brent Scowcroft, then Kissinger's assistant as National Security Adviser, informed me that henceforth he would accompany me. While this arrangement probably was prompted in part by Kissinger's desire to know what CIA was telling the President, Scowcroft's presence undoubtedly enhanced the value of the intelligence briefing for Mr. Ford. The President would raise questions about the policy implications of the intelligence we were providing, and Scowcroft either would provide the answers or undertake to obtain an early assessment. It soon became evident that no previous President had derived such prompt benefit from the Agency's current intelligence reports.

The daily contact with Mr. Ford facilitated CIA's ability to respond to his intelligence needs. Immediately after each briefing session, I would report via secure telephone to my immediate boss, the Director of the Office of Current Intelligence, who would relay any Presidential queries, messages or comments to the DCI's daily staff meeting at 9:00 a.m. With that kind of communication, the Director and his senior aides could get rapid feedback, and the President's needs could promptly be served.

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A further advantage of the direct contact with the President involved the security of the PDB. By carrying it away after he read it, we were able to maintain complete control of his copy of the publication. Coupled with the more stringent controls that were applied to a second copy I handed to General Scowcroft, which he later showed to Dr. Kissinger and we subsequently retrieved, we were able to terminate the wide exposure that the PDB had among members of the White House and National Security Council staffs under Mr. Nixon.

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Thus, we enjoyed to Mr. Ford a secure and expeditious channel for sensitive compartmented information, some of which would have been sent to him by less direct means, but with no assurance that he would actually see it. The advantage of having direct access was not lost on the Director and others at CIA.

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An ancillary benefit from these daily meetings with President Ford was the closer cooperation that developed between the PDB staff and the White House Situation Room, which provides round-the-clock support to the President on foreign developments and national security affairs. At General Scowcroft's request, after each briefing session I would give an account of the meeting to Situation Room personnel so they could get a better insight on the President's interests and concerns. In addition, our PDB staff began to inform them each evening of the topics to be covered in the PDB the following morning so they would not duplicate coverage of any current development in the Situation Room's morning summary for the President.

One morning Mr. Ford's dog, Liberty, was in the Oval Office. While the President read the PDB, the friendly and handsome Golden Retriever padded back and forth between General Scowcroft and me until I calmed her by patting and scratching her neck. All was quiet and peaceful until her wagging tail struck the President's nearby pipe rack. The clatter of pipes and other smoking paraphernalia brought swift Presidential retribution; Liberty was banished, never to appear again during a PDB meeting.

A BEARER OF BAD NEWS

The President soon became acutely conscious that our reporting was problem-oriented. After I told him once that we didn't have much to tell him that day, he replied that he wasn't disappointed because "when there is more to report that usually means you have more bad news."

On one occasion the bad news preceded me into the Oval Office. It was in March 1975, the day after Bill Colby had testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the situation in Cambodia, where the Lon Nol regime was under heavy attack by Khmer Rouge forces. The President's first words to me that morning were

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that he was unhappy about "what your boss said on the Hill yesterday." He had read an account of the Director's testimony in the *Washington Post*, which quoted Colby as saying the Lon Nol regime would have little chance to survive even with the supplemental U.S. aid the President had requested from Congress.

General Scowcroft pointed out that the advance text of the Director's statement did not include any such remark. Scowcroft offered to find out what had happened. After the session I called to forewarn the DCI. As we had speculated, his reponse to a question from the Committee had been quoted out of context.

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The PDB was not confined solely to current intelligence. Selected National Intelligence Estimates and memoranda occasionally were summarized in annexes to the *Brief*.

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THE BRIEFINGS END

President Ford gave every indication that he liked the briefing sessions, but this did not save them from becoming an incidental victim of the shake-up he instituted on November 3, 1975, among his senior National Security advisers. Director Colby and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger were replaced, respectively, by George Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, until then the President's White House Chief of Staff. General Scowcroft was elevated to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the position Secretary Kissinger had retained, with Scowcroft as his deputy, after assuming stewardship of the Department of State.

As part of the new arrangement, Scowcroft gave up his early morning meetings with the President during the PDB sessions. With his absence from that session, the CIA presence ended too. The fact that our briefings had originated under Colby's aegis probably contributed to their expendability. Thereafter, President Ford read his PDB in private, without either Scowcroft or me in attendance.

What we at CIA lost was the President's immediate reaction to each PDB. Thereafter, I delivered it to General Scowcroft, who immediately would take it to the Presidential receptionist for delivery to Mr. Ford. It was also retrieved from her. Because he was not present when the President read the PDB, although he saw him on other occasions, Scowcroft had little to pass on in the way of the President's views and questions relating to the intelligence we were giving him. As a consequence the PDB could no longer be tailored as well to suit Mr. Ford's personal needs.

There was no indication that President Ford felt seriously deprived after the daily PDB sessions ended. The appointment of George Bush as DCI soon put the Agency and the Intelligence Community in regular weekly contact with the President regarding the whole gamut of intelligence activities, and Mr. Bush provided feedback that was helpful to the PDB staff. Bill Colby had met Mr. Ford less frequently. (On several occasions he had me convey personal messages to the President.)

The experience of 14 months of daily meetings with President Ford, and the succeeding months without those meetings, suggest that CIA and the Intelligence Community as a whole can serve a President best if at least one or two means of access to the Oval Office exist. First and foremost is regular and personal contact with the President by the DCI. This ensures that the Intelligence Community viewpoint on all relevant issues is presented directly to the Chief Executive by the Community's authoritive voice. These contacts, moreover, can be an invaluable aid to producers of the PDB when the DCI in turn regularly advises them on its preparation. This kind of guidance is provided by Admiral Turner.

The second existed during the original arrangement with Mr. Ford: a CIA representative in attendance when the President receives the PDB each day. This facilitates immediate responses to his current intelligence needs and makes it possible to produce a *Brief* that is more relevant and useful.

There is, in short, no substitute for direct access. Indirect feedback, filtered and interpreted by others, leaves us ill-informed and unsure. At times in the past that is all we've had. *The above article is Secret.*

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Some lessons for estimative intelligence on Communist China derived from analysis of errors past.

POST MORTEM: THE CHINESE ECONOMY [1]

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Seldom has Western intelligence been so awry as in the estimates which it made of Communist China's strength during the past few years. Without decrying the difficulties involved in those estimates, a candid examination of finished intelligence during the unfolding of China's economic history will reveal gross errors in interpreting the events as they occurred and in estimating the probable consequences of the regime's extreme economic policies. The causes of these errors were complex, but as a central one it may be suggested that until very recently there existed in the Western intelligence world a disposition to respect, or at least a reluctance to disparage, Communist China's own claims and policies in economic matters.

This attitude probably had its origin in the early years of the Communist regime, when the leadership conveyed by its actions a distinct impression of being more adroit, adaptable, honest, and reasonable than its counterpart in Stalin's USSR. Western travellers and diplomats in China had found that the Chinese were not so neurotically heavy-handed as the Russians in such matters as the security supervision of foreign visitors. The leaders had controlled inflation and suppressed corruption. They managed land reform with comparative ease, even though they found it necessary to kill many landlords. Furthermore, they showed at an early stage that they were capable of really big achievements: progress in the rehabilitation of transport facilities had been rapid and the Chinese armed forces had put up an effective fight in the Korean war. Perhaps these and other early attitudes and achieve-

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ments put us into a receptive frame of mind for what they were subsequently to claim and to propose; perhaps we tended to translate our general impression of Chinese energy and flexibility into a belief that they possessed sufficient acumen to develop smoothly a modern economy.

The First Five-Year Plan

When China first began to issue over-all production figures in 1954 and 1955, we tended to accept them with little reservation, even though our own estimates had been lower, in general, than the Chinese claims. In the circumstances, we were probably justified in doing this: the Chinese figures were accompanied by hitherto unrevealed detail which appeared to permit them to be checked, and such few tests as we could apply for internal consistency gave a general credibility to some of the more abstract data released at about the same time, data such as gross value of production, budgetary and investment figures, and financial and banking information.

Allowing that we were justified in accepting these early claims, there were grounds for looking sceptically at the claimed performances in agriculture from 1956 onwards. By and large, however, the intelligence community accepted that the Chinese Communists substantially collectivized agriculture in a single year and in that same year achieved a record harvest. In a later section of this paper I shall raise the question of whether the collectivist principle is suitable to agriculture anywhere or at any time; but even if the general long-term efficacy of collectivization had been above suspicion, there was ample evidence in the USSR and the European Satellites that considerable trouble and loss of production can attend its early stages. It behoved us to inquire whether such a crash programme as China's in 1955 and 1956 could have been achieved without detrimental effects on morale and production, at least in the short term. Had we given more weight to this danger we might have been less willing to accept Chinese claims that food production increased in *every* year of the first five-year plan, and it is possible that we should have suspected the strongly illiberal and doctrinaire tendencies which were to culminate in the Leap Forward.

It has become customary within the intelligence community, when discussing the first five-year plan, to describe it as

"well conceived and impressively implemented," with the connotation that the able leadership of the regime was a principal causal factor. Knowing what we now know about agricultural difficulties, is there justification for persisting in this formulation? The plan's neglect of investment in agriculture is surely a serious black mark against it. If the underlying policy of giving highest priority to heavy industrialization is accepted, perhaps the plan can be accurately described as "well conceived." But even then, it is permissible to wonder if the term is really apt; after all, the plan was not promulgated until half way through the period of its operation. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the Russians exercised a restraining influence on the Chinese, who wanted a much more ambitious rate of growth; indeed, the first five-year plan can appropriately be described as Russian, rather than Chinese, in concept and largely in execution as well.

What can still be said about the plan is that an impressive amount of industrial plant was installed during the period; there is not much doubt of this. But even this achievement, it can now be seen, is somewhat tarnished. The Chinese were able to install this plant only with massive Soviet assistance. I do not believe that either the Chinese or we should be criticized for failing to discern all the pitfalls in such an extreme dependence on the USSR, but it is now clear that when the Chinese were leapfrogging to high levels of technology in selected fields they were only postponing the serious problems of developing a broad and sound industrial base.

The Leap Forward

Thus while Western intelligence appreciations were not badly awry during the period of the first plan, they provided a sufficiently biased picture to make us vulnerable to the claims of the Leap Forward. With the advent of the latter in 1958, reality and intelligence appreciations began to diverge so widely as to impair very seriously the fulfillment of our intelligence aims. In the last months of 1957 there were signs of Chinese dissatisfaction with the application of the Soviet model to China, but the counsels for temperate and rational modification were soon overwhelmed, and a frenetic movement developed which was to bring China to the verge of economic disaster. Even allowing that so many matters become

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clear in the wisdom of hindsight, it is difficult at this stage to understand why the West was so slow in appreciating the outrageous character of the Leap Forward.

Under the grand slogan "more, better, faster, cheaper," the regime was attempting something almost magical, something never before attempted. It had already destroyed the profit motive, and when it virtually abandoned central control it provided a strong case for predicting that, unless truly effective alternative means of coordinating and regulating economic activity were introduced, chaos would result. Instead, it was long implicit in the Western intelligence community's assessments that the Chinese had discovered an entirely new economic system and that this system not only could work but could achieve very impressive results.

It is strange to recall for how long we acquiesced in the Chinese statistics with their spiralling production figures. Any country's national statistics are subject to the possibility of honest mistake and to the fact that all governments like to show their best statistical faces to the world, but there are three reasons for treating Communist statistics with particular circumspection, and these reasons applied with special force to Communist China during the Leap Forward years.

First, there may be inbuilt tendencies towards exaggeration, even where the leadership does not countenance them. But during the Leap Forward the inbuilt forces of exaggeration received a strong impetus from the exhortations of the regime. If ever there was an invitation to reject statistics, it was the leadership's injunction that statistics should serve politics. Whatever might have been the precise meaning of this injunction, it was pregnant with dangers for the statistical reporting system. It would have been well if, when that slogan was first coined, we had tentatively concluded that we could no longer believe the statistics.

The Western intelligence community's recognition that China was promulgating false statistics was not only belated; it was also inconsistent. After being forced to the conclusion that agricultural statistics were greatly exaggerated, we tended for some time to accept statistics for industrial output, despite the fact that industry was known to be heavily dependent on agriculture; and even after some of us had

scouted the industrial claims, others continued to accept them. Our tendency to be influenced by the regime's exaggerated claims was so marked that even after rejecting these claims we provided estimates of our own which were also much too high.

Second, even accurate statistical data can fail to convey the true picture. Economic statistics can provide an exaggerated idea of the state of prosperity in a Communist country, as measured by a qualitative assessment of the socio-economic-political situation. Poland in about 1956 and more recently East Germany are good examples of this. Conversely, we can think of some non-Communist economies which, statistically, should have been dead and buried long ago, for example Egypt and Indonesia. With respect to Communist China in 1958, it would have been possible to conclude from the industrial production and investment figures given out that the country was firmly on the path to industrial greatness; but a qualitative appreciation would surely have suggested that the statistics did more than justice to China's basic industrial capability and that continuing Soviet support of the economy would be necessary even to maintain the industrial gains which had been achieved.

Third, the data may be too crude for use with advanced methodology. There is reason to believe that we have gone too far in applying advanced theorems and statistical procedures to Chinese Communist data which do not really lend themselves to refined development. Much as we should like to obtain confident constructions and projections of China's national product and its sub-aggregates and to comprehend more fully the interactions of those sub-aggregates, the quality of the basic inputs seems quite inadequate for the purpose. Though great ingenuity has been applied to the effort, we are faced with paucity and unreliability of information on incomes and expenditure; the pricing data available to us are often extremely faulty; information on types and rates of production is so spotty as to make estimates of industrial output most hazardous; and the quality and quantity of investment are too uncertain to permit realistic estimates of capital yields. Only to a very limited extent can refined methodologies compensate for faulty data.

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The Communes

The communes episode is now justly regarded as an absurdly executed experiment. The precipitateness with which this radical programme was introduced smacked of the actions of fanatics who believed that they had discovered the blinding truth and that somehow Providence would provide. Almost from the beginning the disruptive possibilities inherent in such rapid regimentation and in interference with family life and the staggering management difficulties involved in the system were privately recognized, or at least suspected, in many quarters. Many of us recall having said, or having heard our colleagues say, "They have gone too far this time; they will never pull this off." Yet the written appreciations which appeared revealed the same fatal bent which characterized our approach to the Leap Forward; they pointed to some dangers, it is true, but in general they emphasized the great potential strength of the system, its economic advantages in terms of proportionality and scale, and its probable efficacy in bringing about true full employment.

Sources of Error

If the greatest sin in the intelligence world is to underestimate our enemy, we thus committed the second greatest sin during the era of the Leap Forward and the communes; we greatly over-estimated Communist China's capabilities and did so largely on the basis of what the Chinese themselves told us. It is true that we subjected their statements to analysis (perhaps over-sophisticated analysis), but frequently, I am afraid, with too great a readiness to give them the benefit of the doubt.

A number of attitudes and pressures were responsible for this approach. Doubtless the chief of these was the desire to avoid the danger of underestimating a country dedicated to hostility to the West. Doubtless also the earlier example of the leadership's realism, adroitness, and flexibility had impressed us to the extent that we failed to regard the Leap Forward as an indication that our original assessment of the regime's astuteness had been wrong.

Much of the fault, however, lay in the analytical procedures which we adopted at the time. It is natural that specialists in

particular analytical fields should be prone to consider their own areas of activity somewhat in vacuo, and it must be conceded that the Leap Forward claims for almost any single industrial commodity might have been capable of achievement if the remainder of industry had not simultaneously been leaping forward. It behoved the generalists among us to question the feasibility of achieving, simultaneously, very large increases in virtually all fields of production. But the generalist, enmeshed in his craft, tended for too long merely to aggregate the specialists' estimates for individual fields of activity; furthermore, he subjected these aggregates to technical refinements which were not warranted by the quality of the data.

For the sake of internal consistency, I shall allude here also to a factor which I shall treat in more detail at a later stage; I refer to the pressure on the analyst for determinate and quantitative answers. These pressures came from both within and without the intelligence community and, combined with our earlier impression of Chinese capabilities, they led almost inevitably to our being misled by Leap Forward claims. Had the analyst been permitted and encouraged to adopt a more frankly intuitive and premonitory approach, we might have foreseen from the beginning that the small-scale movement in industry would fail; in early 1959 we could have warned our policy makers that serious food shortages were likely and that industrial breakdowns were imminent; and from the moment the Soviet technicians departed we could have stated that the formula for industrial chaos was complete.

Basic Postulates

It is clear from this review that to some extent we could have avoided serious pitfalls if we had been more prone to challenge certain conventions which we had earlier accepted. This consideration points to the need to examine constantly the basic postulates which govern our approach to the study of Communist China. There is nothing very original in this thought; indeed, it is a truism that in any of the social sciences our assumptions are often erected on shifting sands, having frequently been formulated, not because they necessarily accorded exactly with reality, but because some pre-

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liminary formulation is necessary if a scientific approach is to be used at all.

There is obviously an infinite number of postulates underlying our intelligence studies of Communist China. Many of these are beyond the expertise of the intelligence economist (for example the assumption that the regime has firm political and military control), but it seems to me that of the many postulates which bear directly on the intelligence economist's task there are four which are particularly deserving of continuous examination. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The first is *that the Chinese Communist leadership is flexible, realistic, and willing to learn by its mistakes.* In the five years that have elapsed since China's economic planning became purely Chinese, in the sense that it was no longer heavily influenced by the USSR, the Chinese leadership's record in this respect has been very bad indeed. It has at times shown itself to be unrealistic, perverse, and obstinate. It has been so doctrinaire in its approach to economic development, particularly in agriculture (where the Chinese certainly cannot be considered inexperienced), and has exhibited such simple faith in ideological indoctrination as the touchstone of economic progress that one can but wonder if these rude revolutionaries really are capable of comprehending China's complex economic problems. I do not mean to imply, however, that the Chinese Communist leadership is necessarily incapable of being flexible and of learning from its errors. I merely propose that for the time being we should retain a wholesome distrust of any approach which attempts to judge or predict the Chinese Communist regime's actions and policies by its reputation, however and by whom that reputation may be gauged.

Another is *that the collectivist principle can work well in agriculture.* Wherever collectivism of the Communist type has been tried, the record has been poor. The success of tropical plantation farming and cooperative farming in Israel suggest that organizationally and even psychologically some type of collective farming with workers who are not owners may be feasible. It does seem definite, though, that collective farming will not succeed if it is imposed on a population which

is hostile to it. Furthermore, the collectivist principle will be difficult to establish in small-scale, intensive agriculture, with its great emphasis on opportunism in cultivation. On both these counts it is unsuitable in China. If these views are valid, they point to a dilemma for the Communist regime, for which collectivization is a means of gaining the necessary control of agricultural output.

A third is *that it is possible for the Chinese to achieve an acceptable measure of success in agriculture without making agriculture paramount in their planning.* Our earlier acceptance of this postulate was implicit in the fact that, although we realized that agricultural investment was being neglected in favour of industry, we did not forecast a consequent early failure of agricultural production to keep pace with population growth. Perhaps we were correct in assuming that such factors as the rehabilitation of the long-neglected irrigation works, the salutary effects of land redistribution, and the restitution of law and order would give the regime an adequate margin of time to develop a heavy industry which could, in turn, be directed to the support of agriculture. In retrospect, however, it is questionable whether we paid sufficient attention to the interaction of these same factors and the growth of population.

Whether or not we were justified in retaining this implicit assumption in the past, we should now examine it extremely critically. We are all prone to expound the huge problem of the world's population explosion, and it is surely necessary for us to remember that China is the world's leading example of that problem. In view of the parlous condition of China's agriculture today and the long period needed to acquire modern implements, seeds, fertilizers, and scientific tilling techniques, it would seem wise to adopt a tentative assumption that nothing short of a brilliant and sustained effort in agriculture would be sufficient to give the Chinese Communist regime a chance of surmounting its problems of food and people.

It will be noted that in stating this postulate I did not define what constitutes an "acceptable" measure of success in agriculture. Here it may be well to call attention to another assumption implicit in our analyses, namely, that the Commu-

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nist leadership will bend every effort to prevent starvation among the Chinese people. I grant that failure to do this would bring great loss of face on an already somewhat discredited regime: inevitably more Chinese, who for the past decade have been prepared to endure hardship in the cause of nation building, would conclude that the Communists had lost the mandate of Heaven. Nevertheless, a ruthless regime might take a calculated risk, particularly if it was then engaged in a programme of capital improvement in agriculture that would bear fruit in the near future. I suggest, therefore, that an acceptable measure of success in agriculture might have to allow for a tolerable margin of starvation in bad years.

The fourth is *that Communism, as we know it, will work well and be retained in China.* At least until comparatively recently, we have implicitly assumed that Communism would persist in China in a form closely akin to that in the rest of what we still call the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We were therefore not prepared to recognize and appreciate the radical nature of the deviation which the Leap Forward represented. Even though that deviation was cloaked in the pious phrases of fundamentalist Communism, it was in fact a complete departure from the principles of central planning applied elsewhere in the Bloc. Today, although the Chinese have recoiled from the excesses of the Leap Forward and are trying to rectify the damage, they are still faced with the same basic economic problems that they were trying to solve when they embarked on that frenzied campaign. Can China be any less concerned now than it was then to exploit fully its most abundant resource, manpower? Must it not continue to seek out labor-intensive production techniques which can be feasibly substituted for the capital-intensive techniques of Communist practice?

This inspires the question whether China's natural setting will exert such powerful influences as to cause a marked and permanent modification of Communism as we know it. The Chinese have a long record of regurgitating or radically modifying foreign intrusions. Today they are experiencing severe economic difficulties which are the resultant of their grim natural setting and their interpretation of an alien dogma.

It is legitimate to speculate whether they are in the early stages of modifying out of existence yet another alien intrusion, or at least to conjecture that they may be in the process of working out a radically different practical interpretation of Marxist dogma.

These considerations bring to question whether we are regarding China sufficiently as a unique problem. It is incumbent on the Western intelligence world to go back and ascertain, exhaustively and in detail, the nature of Communist China's departures from the orthodox Communist method—such departures, for example, as the abandonment of rigid planning, the dropping of the scientific approach, and the apparent rejection of the notion that material abundance is prerequisite to the move to Communism. If we could obtain a reasonable hypothesis explaining why these departures took place, we could come closer to saying whether the Chinese are in the process of rejecting or substantially modifying yet another alien infringement.

Conclusions

The most important single conclusion which emerges from this study is that experience precludes us, for the time being at least, from employing the inductive method to obtain confident generalizations about the wisdom, realism, and ability of Communist China's leadership. We must try to assess the meaning of the regime's statements and actions largely in isolation from what we are tempted to think we know about the regime itself. We simply are not sufficiently familiar with the mainsprings of the leadership's behaviour to be able to say with any real assurance that it has learned from its past mistakes, or whether it is likely to pursue its aims consistently, or even what those aims may be.

If this conclusion be valid it is big with implications for our intelligence assessments of what is happening in China at present and of what is likely to happen in the future. The three most important basic variables affecting the future Chinese course are the forces of nature, the state of Sino-Soviet relations, and the wisdom and realism of the regime. The first of these is imponderable, the second is full of uncertainty, and we are now forced to treat the third as being intractable to confident assumptions.

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These remarks might be taken to suggest that there is very little that the intelligence world can say about the condition and prospects of Communist China's economy, but the position is by no means as gloomy as this. What is suggested is that our estimates will have to be much less determinate than in the past, and I think our intelligence efforts will improve if we recognize this. We must be boldly frank with our customers whenever situations arise with which our conventional analytical approach cannot cope; in particular, we must avoid quantifying in the absence of adequate reliable data. We must sometimes be content to describe qualitatively what is occurring, pointing out the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese position and predicting, with appropriate qualifications, whether the strengths or weaknesses will dominate. Had we used this approach during the Leap Forward we should have obtained an understanding of what was happening in China sooner, perhaps very much sooner, than we did.

It is probable, too, that a less rigid and less ambitious analytical approach will permit us to make better use of such limited hard intelligence as is available. As early as 1959 there was what can now be recognized as fairly clear evidence of a food shortage in China, but we could not give sufficient weight to this evidence because it was so patently inconsistent with our previous conclusions. There is little enough reliable information emerging from Communist China, and we cannot afford to allow our basic postulates and methodologies to become so crystallized as to prevent us from wringing the full meaning from hard intelligence when it comes our way.

In this post-mortem on our experiences with China's Leap Forward I have dealt mainly with problems springing from our analytical attitude. It would be a rash person indeed who would care to suggest an organizational cure-all for our difficulties, but I would like now to touch briefly and lightly on the subject of organization for research on Communist China. Are there any organizational lessons we can derive from our failures?

The dearth of usable official information has seriously affected our research, and we have freely admitted this. I wonder, however, if we have been fully aware of what it was

doing to our organizations during the Leap Forward. Fine divisions of research responsibility had earlier been established to pursue research in some depth. These divisions served us ill as the information dried up. More and more analysts lost their moorings, fewer people had the big picture, and in the scramble to keep up intelligence production more conjecture—fragmented, uncoordinated conjecture at that—went on at all levels. The pressure for determinate results was of course part of the malaise. But in retrospect, we might have maintained somewhat greater organizational flexibility as well as the more realistic research requirements previously mentioned, and the need for this still exists and seems likely to continue.

Another aspect of organization deserves some consideration. We have tended to conduct our economic research on China somewhat in isolation from other disciplines. I do not wish to depreciate my own craft nor to discourage wide-ranging economic research. At the same time we must recognize the pitfalls of parochial viewpoints. I suspect that our judgements on the management factor in Chinese economic development would benefit from the insights of political scientists; and I feel confident that we could have made sounder assessments of the prospects for the communes if we had not confined ourselves to the strictly economic aspects of the problem. We all face the frustrations of jurisdictional limits in our research, but we might have another look at the possibilities for promoting a broader interdisciplinary and inter-speciality approach to problems.

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PREDICTING THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT*

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The most common measures of the Soviet intercontinental attack force involve the size of the force. Since the early 1970s, however, the aggregate size of the force has been governed by the SALT agreements, so predictions of it usually have been accurate. In this arms control environment, issues of force modernization have become as important as issues of force size. To predict the Soviet threat, US analysts today have to predict how quickly the Soviets will improve their force. These improvements take the form of new technologies and the new weapon systems that use them, and US analysts thus have to predict the rate of force modernization. Consequently, new measures of the Soviet strategic threat have been developed that capture the issues of force modernization, and these new measures have been used to evaluate the forecasting record on modernization. The new measures focus on the number of weapon systems that enter the Soviet force during some period rather than the total number existing in the force at the end of the period.

All of the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on Soviet strategic forces have offered alternative projections based on various assumptions about the general pattern of Soviet behavior, but some consistent criteria were needed to construct a unified forecasting record. Most NIEs since 1970 have contained two alternative sets of forces to incorporate both possibilities with regard to arms control: "SALT" force projections within the numerical limits and "No-SALT" force projections exceeding those limits. Because the Soviets have basically adhered to the key numerical SALT limits, we used the SALT force projections for our evaluations whenever they were available. We used the unconstrained force projections only when an NIE did not contain any SALT forces.

Similarly, the NIEs expressed uncertainty in the future Soviet level of effort by presenting more possible force projections. The NIE authors first constructed a "Moderate" or "Best" force that was consistent with past Soviet efforts; next, they constructed "High" and "Low" forces as excursions on either side of the first. In general, the high and low forces reflect high and low levels of effort and success with development and deployment. We used two forces from each NIE, a high force and a low force. Some NIEs did not contain a force labeled "Low," and, in those cases, the force labeled "Moderate" or "Best" was used.

The Forecasting Record

For this evaluation, we introduce the parameter new Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) as an aggregate measure of the Soviet intercontinental attack force. It is the number of new ICBMs, new SLBMs, and new heavy bombers entering the force each year. This measure has been implicitly predicted in each NIE, but it has not been emphasized. It also has been implicitly measured by National Technical Means each year. The rate at which new SNDVs enter a force is a measure of how quickly the threat is growing, as well as a measure of the level of effort being applied to upgrade the force.


* This article is based on a Research Paper published by CIA's Office of Soviet Analysis in April 1989.

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Figure 1 compares the number of new SNDVs projected in each NIE from 1970 through 1988 to those that were actually deployed. The horizontal scale shows NIE dates and the number of years into the future each comparison extends. The number of years compared is either the NIE's total projection period or the number of years to 1989, whichever comes first. Comparisons begin in 1970 because the Soviets had deployed most of their initial intercontinental attack force by then; from that point on, they have been modernizing that force. The heights of the bars represent the numbers of new weapons entering the force during each NIE's specified projection period. The blue and green bars are the low and high projections, respectively, and the red bars in between are the actual historical deployments. For example, the chart shows that the 1970 NIE projected that during the next eight years the Soviets would deploy between 1,521 and 2,726 new SNDVs and that they actually deployed 1,880 new SNDVs.

Figure 1
Forecasting Record on Modernization: New Soviet SNDVs



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The High force projections always depicted a modernization rate in excess of what actually occurred, often by a factor or two or more, even though for most of them the total SNDV count was assumed to be limited by the SALT agreements. In all of the NIEs from 1974 through 1986, the modernization rates derived from the Low/Moderate force projections also exceeded actual Soviet deployments. In some cases, even the Low/Moderate projections of force modernization were high by a factor of two.[1]

The Low/Moderate forces in Figure 1 are the lowest forces projected in each NIE. However, as the name implies, not all of the Estimates contain forces based on an assumption of a "low level of effort." The 1971 lowest force projection is described as a "likely" force. The

[1] The heights of the bars in Figure 1 generally increase from 1970 to 1974, then decrease to 1988. These trends should not be interpreted as changes in projections or history from year to year. The increase is due to the lengthening of the NIE projection period from 8 to 11 years, while the decrease is due to the gradual reduction in historical data available as one approaches the current year.

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
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1977-1979 lowest projections were labeled "Moderate," and they were based on the assumption of a moderate level of effort and technological success. The lowest force projections in the 1981 and 1982 NIEs were based on the assumption that the SALT era was nearly over, so they cannot properly be interpreted as low-effort or SALT forces. The 1983-1986 lowest force descriptions are similar to the earlier descriptions of "moderate" forces because they contain statements such as "a pace reasonably consistent with that observed over the past 10 years." The series of high force projections does not suffer from such ambiguity; every NIE has at least one force based on a high level of effort.

The fact that about half of the Low/Moderate forces were intended to be "Moderate" rather than "Low" does not explain why every one of these force projections turned out to be high in terms of modernization. Theoretically, the record on these "Moderate" forces should have been equally split between high and low. Nor does it explain why several of them were high by more than a factor of two. Regardless of whether the frequent omission of a true "Low" force was proper or improper, the Intelligence Community did not project modernization rates for Soviet intercontinental attack forces accurately from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s.

The conclusion reached from the comparison in Figure 1 requires further justification, to demonstrate that it is not merely a consequence of our procedures or assumptions. To that end, our inquiry is broadened to include, in addition to new systems, the major modifications to those systems that the Soviets routinely deploy later. These results are shown in Figure 2. The modernization rates derived from the High force projections again exceeded the actual modernization rates every time. In all of the NIEs from 1973 through 1986, the Low/Moderate force modernization rates also exceeded the actual modernization rates. Thus, the problem is not simply one of interpretation of the degree to which the Soviets would modernize each weapon system. If some of the major modifications had been labeled follow-ons or vice versa, the trend would still be evident.

Figure 2
Forecasting Record on Modernization: New Soviet SNDVs and Major Modifications



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Each aggregate projection is the summation of many individual weapon system projections, each of which is composed of an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date projection and a deployment rate projection. These two component projections were compared to historical data for all the intercontinental attack weapon systems deployed since 1970. The record on the first component, IOC dates, is summarized in Table 1. Ten of the 17 weapon systems were generally predicted to reach IOC earlier than they actually did. In six cases, the projections were fairly accurate, while in only one case were the projected IOC dates later than the actual Soviet performance. Thus, since 1970 the NIEs have generally overestimated IOC dates of new Soviet weapon systems.

Table 1. The Record on IOC Dates Since 1970

Projected IOC Generally Early	Projected IOC Generally Accurate	Projected IOC Generally Late
SS-16*	SS-17 or 19	Bear H
SS-17 follow-on*	SS-18	
SS-18 follow-on	SS-25	
SS-19 follow-on*	SS-N-8	
SS-24	SS-N-18	
SS-N-6 follow-on*	SS-N-23	
SS-N-8 follow-on*		
SS-N-17		
SS-N-20		
Blackjack		

* IOC never actually achieved

There were three specific reasons for the trend of early IOC date projections. First, some weapon development programs were overestimated because US analysts misperceived Soviet military requirements. Second, sometimes the Soviets adjusted their weapon development plans for arms control reasons. Third, the Soviets sometimes delayed or canceled a development program in progress because it had serious and expensive technical problems. Often, two of these reasons were operative on the same weapon system at the same time.

In addition to predicting when a new weapon system will reach IOC, analysts have to project that system's deployment rate. Only six Soviet intercontinental attack weapon systems can be used to evaluate the record on new system deployment rates since 1970 because they have been in the field long enough—at least five years—to provide adequate historical data. In three cases the projections were generally high, in two cases the projections were generally successful, and in one case the projections were generally low. These results are summarized in Table 2. Of course, all the projected systems from Table 1 that did not actually achieve IOC had deployment rates equal to zero, so the projections of those systems' deployment rates turned out to be high.

Table 2. The Record on Deployment Rates Since 1970

Generally High	Generally Accurate	Generally Low
SS-17	SS-18	SS-N-18
SS-19	SS-N-8	

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The principal cause of the trend of high deployment rate projections was the use of the third-generation ICBM program, the SS-9 and the SS-11, as a model for the fourth-generation ICBM program, the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19. Current projections of the fifth-generation ICBM program do not use the fourth-generation ICBM program as a model to such an extent, but there is not enough historical data to date to evaluate these projections.

Popular Notions

When one first recognizes the consistency of the quantitative overestimates, it is intellectually tempting to rush to an obvious explanation, such as analysts "playing it safe" by shading their projections toward the high side or analysts bending under bureaucratic pressure.

While it might be "safe" to shade the high force toward the high side every year, to make low force projections "safe" analysts would shade them in the opposite direction, toward the low side. The record does not show both high forces that are very high and low forces that are very low, which is what one would expect if analysts had been "playing it safe." In addition, during the late 1970s, President Carter was negotiating and then seeking ratification of the SALT II treaty. There is certainly nothing "safe" about shading the SALT-limited projections toward the high side when the Administration is committed to a treaty. Finally, even if we could identify some specific instances of "playing it safe" by yesterday's analysts, this knowledge would not necessarily inspire tomorrow's analysts to perform better.

Regarding the second popular notion, the military intelligence services, civilian policymakers, legislators, and Administration officials occasionally bring strong views to bear on the format and sometimes the content of the NIEs. This practice is well known in the Intelligence Community, and it is generally understood to be part of the working environment. It reflects the legitimate desire to make NIEs truly "national" by providing a forum for alternative views and addressing a wide variety of policy concerns.

For example, the Team "B" Experiment in Competitive Analysis, conducted from June through December of 1976, addressed the concern that the NIE 11-3/8 series might have been significantly underestimating the Soviet threat. This exercise was designed from its inception to apply pressure on the authors of NIE 11-3/8, as evidenced by the following quote from one of the Team "B" reports:

The mandate of Team "B" was to . . . determine whether a good case could be made that Soviet strategic objectives are, in fact, more ambitious and therefore implicitly more threatening to US security than they appear to the authors of the NIEs.

However, we find no evidence that this pressure produced any substantial effects. The projections of the Soviet force modernization rate did not increase dramatically in the wake of the Team "B" experiment, and US perception of Soviet strategic doctrine had already begun to change before the experiment. The projected threat to Minuteman silos did increase at this time, but this change was due to new evidence, not Team "B" analysis.[2]

The numerous footnotes and alternative views taken by the various intelligence agencies in the texts of the NIEs year after year also indicate that they often did not achieve the degree

[2] In the spring of 1978, DCI Stansfield Turner charged NIO/SP Howard Stoertz, Jr. with "running scared of Team 'B'," when Stoertz proposed changing the estimates of future Soviet ICBM accuracy, thus increasing the expected threat to Minuteman. Stoertz denied bending under any such pressure, and he showed Turner the evidence for the revised assessment. This incident is significant because it illustrates how important it was to those involved to remain objective and to base the NIEs strictly on evidence.

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of influence they desired. Finally, as is the case with playing it safe, even if we could identify some specific instances of unwarranted influence of bureaucratic pressures on yesterday's NIE authors, this would not preclude tomorrow's authors from repeating the error.

Corrective Actions

There is no procedure that analysts can use to make correct projections every time. Inevitably, some intelligence projections will be wrong. Nevertheless, our study of the NIEs has provided some insights into the projections process, and several steps recently have been taken toward projecting aggregate modernization more accurately.

First, a low force projection has been restored to the NIE series. In the 1987 NIE, we were able to use some of what had been learned in this study about the trend of overestimates in the aggregate number of new SNDVs. For this NIE, the decision was made to include a low force projection, which had happened only once in the previous 10 years.[3]

Second, increasing credence is being given to aggregate economic factors. Evidence on the Soviet economy usually has provided a restraining influence, but the Intelligence Community believed that the Soviets placed a higher priority on achieving their strategic objectives and that those objectives were ambitious. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the NIEs contained statements such as, "We believe that economic difficulties will have little or no impact on Soviet strategic programs during the period of this Estimate" and that these programs were intended to achieve a "capability to fight and survive a nuclear war."

In the early 1980s, evidence became available that the Soviet economy had deteriorated dramatically in the second half of the 1970s. But even though analysts realized the depth of Soviet economic difficulty, they still saw little reason for it to influence their projections. They continued to emphasize the Soviets' desire for "superior war-fighting capabilities" and did not "believe that domestic economic difficulties (would) bear significantly on the size and composition of future Soviet strategic forces because of the high priority the Soviets place on such forces."

In 1985, the NIE authors began to reevaluate the impact of economic factors and consequently the priority of strategic programs. It took another two years, however, before the reevaluation was explicitly translated into a force projection. The recognition that in some circumstances Soviet economic problems could have a major impact on future forces was an important consideration in the decision to restore a low force projection to the NIE series in 1987.


As a result of these two corrective actions, the 1987 NIE's low force projection is truly low. Figure 3 shows that it contains an aggregate modernization rate measured in terms of new SNDVs that is lower than any other NIE published during the SALT era. A figure using our alternative measure—new SNDVs plus new mods—would be similar. Figure 3 also shows that the aggregate modernization rate derived from the low force continued to be low in the 1988 NIE. (Because of time constraints, the 1989 NIE was not evaluated for this article.)

[3] The low-level-of-effort force projections were discontinued in the 1977 NIE. From that time until 1987, the only NIE to contain a force labeled "low" had been the 1980 NIE.

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Figure 3
Recent Reductions in Projections of Modernization: New Soviet SNDVs



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Third, more attention is being focused on aggregate quantitative force modernization. US analysts are now using the measures we introduced—new SNDVs and new SNDVs plus new mods—as additional analytical tools when constructing Soviet force projections. Before a force is completed, analysts compute the number of new SNDVs and the number of new SNDVs plus new mods contained in that force for each year and for the full 10-year projection period; then they compare those values to past Soviet accomplishments. Analysts may then choose similar modernization rates or different ones, depending on their judgments about how similar the Soviets' current political, military, and economic conditions are to those in the past.


Interviews with the analysts involved indicate that aggregate modernization was not receiving explicit attention in the 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, it was difficult for the Intelligence Community to recognize the trend as it developed. If the focus of interest had been on aggregate modernization earlier, then the tendency to overestimate aggregate Soviet force modernization could have been detected earlier.

Figure 4 illustrates how this tendency might have been recognized. It displays an aggregate modernization bar chart of the type displayed earlier, but it was drawn using data available in 1980. As of 1980, the Estimates through 1974 usually contained the correct number of new SNDVs—the high and low projections bounded history. Beginning in 1975, however, the modernization rates derived from both the high and low/moderate force projections consistently exceeded history. Another chart based on the alternative modernization measure, new SNDVs plus new mods, again using only data available in 1980, would display similar characteristics—accurate projections from 1970 to 1974 and high projections thereafter. Thus, US analysts could have detected the trend as early as 1980.

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Figure 4
Forecasting Record on Modernization as of 1980: New Soviet SNDVs



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As a corollary to the above, it appears that the Intelligence Community has neither an institutional mechanism nor a strong built-in incentive to seek out overestimates vigorously. On the other hand, because the Community and its principal consumers of Soviet strategic estimates are charged with protecting the nation against external threats, underestimates are likely to be viewed as serious mistakes. Although underestimates are sought out and corrected, this may not be the case with overestimates.

Fourth, the projections are being integrated more completely. The analysts responsible for predicting Soviet weapon system IOC dates and deployment rates are coordinating their projections with each other in greater detail. These discussions encourage each analyst to understand how his projection influences other projections. This also encourages analysts to develop a better understanding of the directions of total Soviet force modernization, rather than focusing on their own components of modernization.

Until recently, US analysts had predicted system IOC dates and deployment rates separately by projecting the IOC dates first and then by projecting the deployment rates. This procedure has worked well for individual weapon systems, but, if we consider a system and its immediate follow-on, we can find instances when this procedure may have caused problems. When the IOC date for a specific replacement system follows close on the heels of the current system, the existing system has to be deployed quickly or be overtaken. The early projected IOC dates for the follow-ons probably have contributed to making some projected deployment rates high.

Recommendation

To prevent the development of persistent error trends in the future, studies like this one should be performed periodically. Such studies also should be conducted on other forecasts, including theater-range weapons and strategic defense forces. If a study detects a growing

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trend of misestimates, then analysts may be able to halt it early. But those who perform the evaluations of projections should not restrict their inquiry to only those parameters that were emphasized in the NIEs. If this had been done in this study, we would not have noticed the pattern of aggregate modernization overestimates. In addition to describing the accuracy of past projections, the studies should serve as checks on the Intelligence Community's focus of interest.

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A mark that will endure

THE PENKOVSKIY CASE

Leonard McCoy

The thought process which led GRU Colonel Oleg V. Penkovskiy to shift his personal loyalty from the USSR to the West may well have begun as early as 1955, while he was assigned to Ankara. It was there that the hypocrisy and dishonesty of the Soviet system first made a significant impact on him and his professional life. We do know that by the summer of 1960 he had made his decision and taken the first concrete step toward the West—he had prepared the letter and information which he planned to use to establish contact with American officials. Even so, if it is correct that it takes two to make a conspiracy, we would say that the Penkovskiy case began 12 August 1960, when the first communication from him reached CIA via two Indiana University students and the American Embassy, Moscow.

Penkovskiy had spotted the two students on a train in Kiev, identified their Moscow hotel, and intercepted them as they returned to the hotel from the American Exhibition in Sokolniki Park. He urged them to take his letter directly to the American Embassy, which they did.

Penkovskiy did not identify himself in his letter, but asserted his determination to break with communism and serve the West. He enclosed a report on the shootdown of the U-2 over Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960 and a list of the graduates of the (GRU) Military Diplomatic Academy for 1960, with their language qualifications and future assignments; the list included 18 illegals. He inserted a clue to his identity: a photo taken in Ankara in 1955 which showed the US Army attache and himself, but with his face cut out of the picture.

CIA had records on GRU officers in Ankara in the mid-1950s from which a name might be extracted to match the missing face. The operational branch chief (and senior case officer on the US side throughout the operation) found and interviewed the two students, using a photo spread wich included a picture of Penkovskiy. Both of them picked him out as their Moscow contact. This sounds easy enough, but one of the students was serving on the DEW Line. The senior case officer left Washington at close of business on a Friday night, journeyed to Anchorage, conducted the interview, and returned with the results by opening of business on Monday, after 60 continuous hours in the service of the taxpayer. This was a harbinger of the pace which the operation was to maintain.

Since Penkovskiy stated in his letter that he would be coming out to London in April 1961, CIA decided to bring MI-6 into the operation. Penkovskiy's next attempt to make contact with us—he gave a telephone number to two British businessmen and asked that they pass the number to the US Embassy in London—would probably have had this effect anyway.

On 10 January 1961 in Moscow Penkovskiy approached two Canadian diplomats who accepted his letter "for the Americans" and then called him to

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the Canadian Embassy to retrieve it. On 5 February 1961 an abortive attempt to let Penkovskiy know that his messages had been favorably received was made in Moscow by telephone. Unfortunately, the inexperienced and linguistically limited junior officer who placed the call from a public phone was incomprehensible to Penkovskiy. The officer had disobeyed instructions, changed the text of the message, and was brought home short of tour and fired.

Meanwhile, Penkovskiy turned to British businessman Greville Wynne as his go-between with the West, and on 6 April in Moscow he handed Wynne a thick packet of documents for Wynne to take out with him to London. When Wynne turned those documents over to MI-6, the joint operation to run Penkovskiy became established fact.*

Clandestine Meetings



Penkovskiy

MI-6 advised CIA of Penkovskiy's impending arrival in London at the head of a six-man Soviet trade delegation, and CIA dispatched two case officers to London to coordinate the operational plan with MI-6. The British assigned counterpart officers as their operational team. In addition, MI-6 appointed a senior "R" officer (military reports and requirements specialist) to the team. CIA did the same, sending me from the Soviet Division Reports Staff to provide substantive support to the American side of the team. By the time Penkovskiy brought his group back to London from the Leeds-Birmingham industrial tour (where Penkovskiy was met twice), the operational meeting series, which was to include 17 clandestine meetings in London, was on a firm foundation.

On the day the joint operational team returned to London from the north, the London newspapers were filled with the story of the arrest and arraignment of George Blake, the MI-6 officer who had been recruited by the KGB in a North Korean prison camp, if not earlier (he was MI-6 representative in Seoul

* Most overt accounts of the Penkovskiy case are based on the two books by Greville Wynne, *The Man From Moscow* and *The Man From Odessa*. Unfortunately, much of Wynne's account is fictitious. Considering the personal sacrifice which he made (18 months in a Soviet prison), no one begrudges him whatever proceeds he received from his books, although MI-6 was quite upset that he wrote anything at all. Having violated the Official Secrets Act, Wynne thought it best to retire to Majorca. His story of MI-6 having spotted and begun to develop Penkovskiy as early as 1955, when Penkovskiy was assigned to Ankara, is fantasy. An even worse bit of apocrypha is the anecdote about Penkovskiy (and Wynne) meeting President Kennedy in the White House. This intriguing (and totally false) account has been used by other writers who purport to describe highlights of the Penkovskiy case. For example: *Her Majesty's Secret Service*, by Christopher Andrew, and *Secrets of the Service*, by Anthony Glees.

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when the North Koreans overran the city in June 1950). Contrary to overt information, Blake actually confessed to his old friend, the senior MI-6 officer on the Penkovskiy case.

Most of the meetings with Penkovskiy were held in the Mount Royal Hotel, where the three American officers, Penkovskiy, and his Soviet group stayed. While the hotel is on Oxford Street between Selfridge's and Marble Arch, its entrance is on the side street north of Oxford Street. One of the Americans served as primary handler and interlocutor. The other three officers would interject questions or comments. Substantive questions were prepared by the reports/requirements officers and discussed with the case officers prior to each meeting. Much of the time of the first series of London meetings was spent hearing out Penkovskiy's story and establishing his personal and documentary access. Considerable time was also spent working out future communications procedures for contact with him in Moscow.

Not everything was so rational. One of the most difficult meetings occurred at the beginning of the series, when Penkovskiy presented his plan for taking Moscow, and the Soviet leadership, hostage. He proposed deploying 29 small nuclear weapons in random fashion throughout Moscow in suitcases or garbage cans. We were to provide him the weapons, instruct him in welding them into the bottoms of standard Moscow garbage cans, and provide him with a detonator to be activated at our direction. Only with difficulty was Penkovskiy persuaded that such a plan was impractical. The low state-of-the-art in nuclear-weapon miniaturization was the key to Penkovskiy's eventual acceptance of our lack of enthusiasm.

Penkovskiy was working at a furious pace. The Soviet group was supposed (b)(1)
to collect all it could during the visit to London, and he had personal GRU (b)(3)(n)
requirements to satisfy. [redacted] and he was to collect a metal sample off the floor of a particular mill in the north of England. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

A more troublesome, and time-consuming, requirement which was at least as important for the long-term success of the operation was the voluminous list of personal requests which Penkovskiy had brought with him. Among these items were several pairs of shoes, each request accompanied by a drawing of the feet of the lady requiring the shoes. Penkovskiy also had to buy suitable souvenirs for family, friends, superiors, and official contacts. MI-6 assigned an operations officer and clerical support to fill Penkovskiy's combined shopping lists while he was escorting his group, meeting with Soviet Embassy personnel, and meeting with his Anglo-American case officers. Had the KGB focused on the huge collection of items which Penkovskiy took back to Moscow with him, there would have been questions as to when he had time to make the purchases and where he got the money. We split this cost with MI-6.

An example of the fortuitous events which occurred during the operation to enhance Penkovskiy's prestige and intimidate any potential critic of his behavior took place just before he left for London. The GRU chief, Ivan Serov, called Penkovskiy in to say that his own wife and daughter were going to

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London as tourists, and he would appreciate it if Penkovskiy would look out for them. This Penkovskiy did, commenting later that Serov's daughter had played footsy with him in the car from the airport to their hotel in London. While in London, Penkovskiy visited the grave of Karl Marx, in Highgate Cemetery, only to find it overgrown with weeds and a collecting place for debris. He reported this to the Central Committee, was commended, and later faced some heat from the Soviet Embassy in London, which was reprimanded for this state of affairs.

Penkovskiy's personal requirements were for dental treatment and to meet some English ladies. MI-6 (with MI-5 help) met the requirements. Because of this kind of operational problem, and to arrange for technical monitoring of meetings as well as occasional surveillance/countersurveillance requirements, MI-5 had to be brought into the operation. This occasioned the request by Roger Hollis, then director of MI-5, for the name of the agent. While some authors have subsequently made much of this request, in light of accusations against Hollis that he was a Soviet agent, the request did not seem unreasonable at the time, and it is doubtful that MI-6 chief Dick White was surprised by this request, as some British writers have asserted.

There were incidents which tested the Americans' ingenuity. The first occurred in the north of England, when MI-6 plugged in its tape recorder only to find that the electrical system in the area was 50 cycle/220 volt DC instead of AC, which meant that the recorder would not function without a rectifier—not available on Sunday. At this point the senior American case officer pulled out his battery-powered Mohawk, saving the day. Back in London, while the entire team was meeting in the Mount Royal room which was being prepared by the MI-5 technician for meetings, there was a furtive knock on the door. The support team and technicians disappeared into the closet and Penkovskiy entered the room very excited and anxious. The desk clerk had handed him a telephone message with only a number and request to call. Since he had no reason to expect a call, and the number was not the Soviet Embassy, he was disturbed. The team left the hotel to have dinner at the Lyons' Corner House across the street. A British officer stopped at the bank of telephones to place a call to his command post, giving them the number in double talk and code. Meanwhile the team examined the number, on the Fleet Street exchange, and I suggested that it was a journalist. Another American officer recommended that we look up TASS in the phone book. The number was TASS—obviously wanting to interview the head of the Soviet delegation. Hours later came the reply from MI-5 confirming this discovery.

Many of the first series of London meetings ran late into the night/morning, with Penkovskiy sometimes becoming excited about his information and expressing his views about the Soviet system, his own organization, and his personal situation, as well as his advice to the West as to how to deal with the Soviets. A strong personal bond began to form between Penkovskiy and his case officers, a bond which well may have become Penkovskiy's secondary motivation for working hard to sustain a productive relationship. The team took the precaution of drinking nothing stronger than Rhine wine. Even so, the empty bottles accumulated in such a large pile that there was concern they might

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draw attention (and bring on a corkage fee). The American team members often would carry bags of these empty bottles out to the garbage cans in the alleys around the hotel.

Penkovskiy was a perfectionist. When he took training on the Minox camera, he mastered it rapidly and flawlessly, basking in the praise of the case officers—what did they expect? Learning the system for clandestine communication by radio, he showed the same aptitude. He manifested the same facility with the one-time pad for enciphered communications, even detecting a purposely introduced error. When he was asked to provide copies of the General Staff journal, *Military Thought,* and to look for the SECRET version of this publication (which we had learned of from Soviet Navy defector Nikolay Artamonov), he asked if we also wanted the TOP SECRET version. Of course we did, but we had never heard of it. This publication became one of his top-priority requirements, and he provided almost every copy of it, as well as the SECRET and RESTRICTED versions.

Moscow Contacts

When Penkovskiy returned to Moscow in early May 1961, contact continued with him through Wynne and his first meeting with the wife of the MI-6 man in Moscow, who took her children to the park to receive a small box of candy from Penkovskiy, in which Minox cassettes were also concealed. From the American side, the difficulty was that we had lost our man in Moscow in October 1959, when he was arrested on a bus with GRU Lieutenant Colonel Petr Popov and declared PNG. His replacement did not arrive until the middle of 1962, though a more junior officer was in place in early 1961. The British capability was therefore preeminent at the time.

This Moscow situation led to an unfortunate confrontation arising from the uncoordinated use of a recognition signal tie clasp by the MI-6 man in Moscow at a reception. The reaction in Washington was that the British were trying to run away with the operation. I was in London at the time, visiting the various consumers of the Penkovskiy material to develop requirements to be used in the next series of meetings. Our COS called me in, handed me the CIA Headquarters cable of protest, and asked for an opinion. I stated that the protest was not entirely justified, as we were forced to rely on the judgment and initiative of the MI-6 man in Moscow, and that any consequence of the contact would redound to our mutual advantage. In other words, we should not make a major issue of the incident. Headquarters disgreed, so when our case officers arrived in London, a meeting with the MI-6 case officers was scheduled. After an initial exchange of the two sides' positions, the COS quickly terminated the meeting, declaring it a draw, and advising that it be put behind us so we could get on with the operation. While that was the course of action inevitably taken, some ill feeling generated by this incident and other minor events up to this point was to persist throughout the course of the operation.

Most of the meetings dealing with the operation were conducted in an oversized VIP conference area on the ground floor of 3 Carlton Gardens, overlooking Pall Mall and St. James Park. The activities were reviewing transcriptions of meeting tapes, extracting operational and intelligence infor-

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mation, interviews of the team by various senior MI-6 officials, and afternoon "tea" (sherry). By this time, MI-6 had withdrawn its "R" officer from the team and the reports-requirements function was turned over entirely to me, which meant that I was subsequently obliged to spend more time in London soliciting requirements and follow-up questions from British consumers to be assimilated into the lists of requirements prepared by American consumers.

One of the more amusing incidents occurred when one of the MI-6 transcribers emerged from the wine cellars where they were working on the meeting tapes to ask what to do with the name "Govnyuk", not further identified. Our principal Russian linguist was too modest to tell her that "Shithead" was not a family name even in Russian, so he told her to card him as G——. He is probably still in the records system, a mystery forever to analysts whose Russian was learned in polite circumstances.

The days were occupied with transcribing, discussing, transmitting, and evaluating the previous meeting's results, and preparing for the next meeting. The MI-6 officers reported each day to their superiors, and the American team exchanged high-precedence traffic with Headquarters. Two challenging incidents occurred during the London meetings. First, Penkovskiy gave Wynne a letter asking to meet the Queen of England and the President of the United States. A rapid exchange of cables with Headquarters resulted in an arrangement for him to meet Robert Kennedy, while MI-6 arranged for him to meet Lord Mountbatten, which meeting then took place. (Penkovskiy knew that we had once taken a GRU colonel illegal to the US for a quick meeting with the DDCI.) Then, Penkovskiy wished to be photographed in "his" British and American uniforms (once it had been tactfully explained to him that there was no such thing as a NATO uniform). The British dug up an ill-fitting colonel's uniform and our team borrowed a uniform from the Army attache. Because decorations had been sewn on the US uniform, the British protested that we had tried to curry favor with Penkovskiy by decorating him.

One of the major secondary responsibilities on the MI-6 side (besides filling Penkovskiy's requirements lists) was debriefing and briefing Greville Wynne. Wynne was not a very good businessman and an even worse candidate for the historic intelligence role which fate had conferred upon him. MI-6 did its best to initiate him into fundamental security and tradecraft methods. This was an impossible task, and his lack of experience and instinct for his role did some harm later. MI-6 would not permit us to pay Wynne anything, insisting that he was their responsibility.

London and Paris

During the second series of 13 meetings in London, from 16 July to 7 August 1961, the routine proceeded very much as it had in the first series. It was complicated by the presence of another Soviet asset, in the entourage of Yuriy Gagarin (first man in space), who was met by another Soviet Division case officer, supported by me and a polygraph operator. In addition, MI-6 decided that the combination of language, personality, and expertise possessed by one of our case officers was an opportunity to attempt to get Soviet illegal "Gordon Lonsdale" (arrested January 1961) to talk. Our man visited Lonsdale in prison,

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but Lonsdale was uncooperative; he was already aware that a plan to trade him would be implemented as soon as the Soviets had the wherewithal (ironically, it turned out to be Greville Wynne).

The London series ended and preparations began almost at once for the Paris meetings. Penkovskiy would be attending the Paris trade fair in the fall. Before the Paris series, Penkovskiy was again met by Wynne and the MI-6 wife in Moscow, but now CIA also had an officer in place and began to exchange material with Penkovskiy at social events in Moscow. The communications procedures were continuously revised and expanded as circumstances changed and new opportunities arose.

The Paris meeting sequence did not begin auspiciously, primarily because Penkovskiy's arrival was delayed and because both of the British case officers and the American junior case officer were living in a two-bedroom safehouse apartment in the 16th Arrondissement in which they had to maintain a low profile. In addition, the MI-6 safehouse keeper, who passed as an engineer spending a few months in France, also lived next door, as did the MI-6 clerical support officer. Both of these officers had been involved in support of the operation in London, and were as outstanding in their ways as the two MI-6 case officers. The engineer went swimming in a floating pool in the Seine every day, and had gradually reached a point where he was fed up with the entire operational team. By the time I arrived in Paris (taking a room in a hotel up the street), the engineer was referring to his team as the "Amcraps" and the "Britshits", and there were bitter arguments between the two nationalities as to whose turn it was to take the Perrier bottles back to get the deposit and replenish the supply. At this point an excursion to Fontainebleau was finally negotiated, including a stop at the PX, and some of the hostility dropped off. At last, Penkovskiy came, Wynne met him, the trade fair was under way, and the operational meetings began.

The 12 Paris meetings were just as hectic as the two series in London. They ran from 20 September to 14 October 1961. After Wynne picked Penkovskiy up at Orly, they started off with a debriefing of Penkovskiy on the possibility of the Berlin confrontation turning into World War III. The nucleus of this report was a conversation which included the Soviet Defense Minister commenting to Penkovskiy's mother that there would not be a war. This occurred at the 60th birthday party of Penkovskiy's patron, Chief Marshal of Artillery Sergey Varentsov. (For Penkovskiy's use at this party, the British had persuaded a very reluctant British distiller to falsify the label on a 58-year-old bottle of brandy to show that it was 60 years old.) Khrushchev was present and told an anecdote presaging the building of the Berlin Wall. He said that when the barbed wire was put up first, the West would look at it like a sheep looking at a newly painted fence. Then, while we were still in doubt about what was going on, the wall would be put up, and so it went. The report was drawn up, transmitted to London and Washington, and helped to reduce the level of tension on the Western side. A SNIE was written in CIA, and the MI-6 "R" chief came right over to Paris with the European Controller to discuss the report, departing after a long session to brief the JIC that the report was well-founded and had to be weighed very seriously in the assessment of the international situation.

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In one of those unpredictable operational incidents, the meeting place chosen for picking Penkovskiy up in the evening had to be changed; it turned out that the trysting place for homosexuals was the same end of the Alexander III bridge we were using for clandestine meetings.

One evening, as the entire team of officers sat at an outdoor cafe on the Champs Elysees, opposite Fouquet's, I noticed Penkovskiy walking slowly, with a glum face, up the sidewalk toward the Etoile. He spotted the team and it appeared that he fully intended to come over and join the group. I nudged our case officer, who looked up, then walked into the alley at the side of the cafe. Penkovskiy followed. Our man explained to Penkovskiy why he could not join us, and they left the alley in opposite directions.

The Paris meetings took place during the height of the Algerian violence in France. One night during an operational meeting there was a strong explosion not far off, and when the dust settled it became known that a cafe at the bottom of the street in which the safehouse was located had been bombed by the OAS.

Processing of Penkovskiy's now voluminous material had begun in both London and Washington, but the emergency measures of drafting translators, mostly case officers, and trying to handle the material within the existing organizational structure clearly were inadequate to assure timely dissemination of the material according to its intelligence priority. We composed a cable to Washington proposing that a processing task force be established in London, under my supervision, with authority to draft any and all available language and clerical personnel needed for the project. The Washington reply was rapid and predictable—the task force would be established in Washington, all other conditions accepted as proposed. A British officer was instructed to serve as my deputy in the Washington task force, and the project was under way. Upon our arrival back in Washington, candidates for assignment to the task force had been identified, and the newly evacuated second floor of Alcott Hall was made available as a work area. A veteran Soviet operations officer and debriefer subsequently agreed to defer his retirement for two years to serve as the foreman and linguistic authority for the task force.

Inherent Risks

After the Paris meeting series, as the operation entered into its internal USSR phase, another CIA case officer was brought in to handle the exchange of messages with Penkovskiy and coordination with the British. The operation continued at a frantic pace in Moscow. To be sure, it was Penkovskiy's fervor which drove this pace, but the inherent risks were raised continuously by the American side and acknowledged by the British side, although held by them to be inevitable. While some security concern was expressed by general agreement in the messages sent to Penkovskiy (written by the Americans and approved by the British side), all of us believed that there was no stopping Penkovskiy and that there was some logic to the argument that he was going to compromise himself sooner or later, and that we had best get all we could from him short of consciously assigning him tasks which would inevitably lead to his apprehension.

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The processing task force had by then moved to the second floor of Central Building and was directly involved in preparing those sections of operational messages dealing with substantive evaluation and requirements. In addition, we were preparing a summary (otsenka) of a book on the US space program which Penkovskiy wanted to have us translate for him so that he could present it to his superiors as his own work, thereby earning praise and points toward his promotion to general.

Upon Penkovskiy's return to Moscow, the primary meeting method was again contact with the wife of an MI-6 officer. She received materials from him in the park and during visits to the commission store. In all, she had 16 exchanges of material with Penkovskiy from October 1961 to the end of August 1962. During this same period, since it was customary for Penkovskiy to attend social functions involving foreign visitors of intelligence interest, he began to receive invitations from the British and American embassies (when appropriate, and along with other ranking officials of the State Committee for Scientific-Research Work where he worked under cover), where we could make contact with him and exchange materials. During the meetings at social events, Penkovskiy passed along 36 cassettes, along with letters containing both intelligence and personal notes, including the fact that additional trips abroad were being planned for him.

After his last meeting with the MI-6 officer's wife, on a side street, Penkovskiy reported in his next letter that she was under surveillance when they met. (In fact, Penkovskiy was under suspicion before this.) The KGB had detected a connection between the British woman and an unidentified Soviet, had dressed a decoy to test the woman's reaction to him, and confirmed from her reaction that she was engaged in suspicious activity with some Soviet man. Penkovskiy was identified as the man when the KGB followed him to his residence, where he lived among the cream of party and government officials. The KGB rented the apartment above Penkovskiy's and drugged him in a restaurant so that he could be kept in the hospital while they searched his apartment. The KGB then installed a silent camera in a flower pot and lowered it from the balcony to photograph Penkovskiy when the bugs indicated some activity on his part. They noted he was preoccupied with a certain area of his desk, which the KGB then searched to discover his cameras, cassettes, one-time pads, and messages which he had prepared to pass to us.

The last meeting with Penkovskiy was at a US Embassy reception on 5 September 1962, when Penkovskiy informed his US contact that he would pass material to him the next day at a British Embassy reception. Unfortunately our man was not an appropriate guest for that event; Penkovskiy attended, and that was the last we saw of him until his trial in May 1963. He did not use his invitations for social events on 13, 15, and 26 September. He probably was arrested during this period.

During the meetings with Penkovskiy in Paris in autumn 1961 we had given him an early warning signal to be used under three specific circumstances. He was to place a signal on a post which could be seen with binoculars from the American Embassy, the thought being that if the USSR did plan to attack the US, diplomats of the US and certain other countries might well be

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confined to their premises. One of the conditions was an operational emergency, requiring exfiltration of Penkovskiy (and his family). The other two were indications of imminent hostilities: first, that Penkovskiy knew, from information provided by individuals in a position to know (e.g. Chief Marshal Varentsov), that the USSR intended to attack the US in the near future; and second, that Penkovskiy had concluded from his own analysis of evidence collected among his official contacts from GRU preparations, and from changes in the activities of his cover organization that Soviet attack on the US was imminent. Rather than separate signals for each condition, there would be one signal—followed immediately by our using an asset with freedom of movement in Moscow to pick up a dead drop which Penkovskiy would have put down before making the signal, and which would explain the nature of the emergency.

On 2 November 1962, the emergency signal appeared on the post. COS Moscow sent a CRITIC message to CIA Headquarters while a Moscow Station officer was dispatched to pick up the dead drop. The warning signal was relayed to key officials in Washington, with the caution that its meaning was not necessarily that war was imminent, but that this was a possibility. Considering the international situation at the time, primarily the Cuban missile crisis, this warning had to be taken seriously. Within a few hours it became clear that the emergency was operational—Wynne had been arrested in Budapest the same day, and our case officer was arrested at the Pushkin Street dead drop site. The operation was over.

After his arrest, a plan was proposed to rescue Penkovskiy, using the threat of exposing certain sensitive information which would definitely have embarrassed the Soviet leadership enough to cause them to consider releasing Penkovskiy. This proposal was circulated throughout the management level of the Clandestine Service without any one placing a mark on it. It returned to the originator's desk in pristine condition, with oral word that the proposal had been disapproved.

Impact

During the third week of October 1962, Penkovskiy's information on the deployment of the Soviet MRBM went into the *President's Daily Brief*. No doubt the information bearing on the launch readiness of the missiles was useful to the policymakers, but this most probably was not the most important impact of the Penkovskiy operation on the Cuban missile crisis. We may never know precisely, but the effect of Penkovskiy's arrest and interrogation in September/October 1962 within the Soviet Government and Party leadership must have been devastating. The KGB could not be sure just what Penkovskiy had passed to us. (When our officer was arrested at the dead drop site and asked to call his embassy, a senior KGB officer present asked, "Which goddamn embassy?" The Russians were thoroughly confused by Anglo-American cooperation in the case.) Penkovskiy could not himself have recalled all that he had passed, as we estimated that we had published 10,000 pages of English-language reports based on his materials. Had the KGB asked him if he had told us about missiles going into Cuba, he would have undoubtedly said he had, and he would have tried in every other way to exaggerate his reporting (not an easy thing to do,

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considering its sensitivity and volume) and make the worst case that he could for the KGB. He hated them. The KGB report to the Party leadership, i.e., to Khruschchev, at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, on the actual and possible damage done by Penkovskiy, must have undermined Khruschev's confidence and resolve in his response to President Kennedy's challenge. The timing of Penkovskiy's arrest gave Kennedy the upper hand.

Another document provided by Penkovskiy also is known to have had an important bearing on President Kennedy's attitude toward Khrushchev and Kennedy's demeanor during the missile crisis. Kennedy had met Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, and Khrushchev had treated the American President like an inexperienced, incompetent, immature politician who barely deserved respect. Khrushchev's version of this meeting, reflecting this attitude, was disseminated to Central Committee members and other key Party officials. Penkovskiy got his hands on this letter and copied it. We disseminated it in limited form to the White House. The President found it most enlightening.

The immense volume of intelligence which Penkovskiy provided required efficient but careful processing and protection of the source. Since we had never seen copies of original TOP SECRET Soviet documents before (Popov's reports were hand-copied), we felt that their actual form would be of long-term value to analysts. When the first report was received from the documents Penkovskiy copied at the tactical rocket forces academy, the SR Division chief handed it to me and asked if it was bonafide. Its infinite detail was the only thing to go on—the designation SA-75 meant nothing at the time, although the performance characteristics and dimensions told us it had to be what we called the SA-2—the SAM first seen at Glau, East Germany in 1958 and later deployed throughout the USSR. (It was first photographed in the USSR by a legal traveler near Rostov; the site which brought down the U-2 on 1 May 1960 had been photographed by a legal traveler in 1959.) Our experts believed that the report was genuine, but had no conclusive proof. In discussing how we could go about publishing this and the other reports on tactical rockets/missiles which we expected to reach us soon, it was suggested that we place the reports in the [redacted] The mechanics were worked out, special codewords were assigned and printed on stationery for use only by this project, and the material began to flow to consumers. Each consumer was briefed before receiving material, and strict instructions for access and use of the material were included with every report.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Material directly related to the Soviet military establishment was distributed under one codeword, IRONBARK, and material relating to missiles/rockets under another, CHICKADEE. The mass of material on other topics was disseminated as though from other sources—this material consisted of telephone directories of the various Soviet ministries and agencies with which Penkovskiy had contact, including the Kremlin secure line, GRU documents, and substantial amounts of general military information. It was also decided that some of the text was so technical or unusual in comparison with overt Soviet terminology that it was advisable to publish the material in the original Russian. The search for Russian typists was hopeless. The first document was typed by a high school graduate who knew no Russian, but taught himself to recognize and type the cyrillic letters as soon as he heard that a $100 award

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awaited the first person who could do so. His first document was 400 pages long. Before this part of the project was completed the DCI authorized me to employ my oldest daughter to complete the Russian typing.

From the end of the Paris meetings the major task was to prepare and translate messages passed by Penkovskiy in Moscow. The processing occupied about a dozen officers, who turned it over to the SR Division Reports Staff for reproduction, registration, and distribution. NSA established a special office for handling the most sensitive material, and this was one reason it did not fall into the hands of Sergeant Jack Dunlap, then employed as a documents distribution clerk at NSA. A number of Penkovskiy's less sensitive, non-military documents were present in Dunlap's home in May 1962 when investigators searched the premises after his suicide. While these documents would not likely have led to identification of Penkovskiy as the source, they would certainly have indicated to the KGB that there was a penetration of the Soviet Government with access to internally controlled documents.

Considering other possible compromises of Penkovskiy's production, Lieutenant Colonel William E. Whalen is a prime candidate. Although his period of cooperation with the Soviets ran from probably 1959 to 1961, this was not known until he was formally arrested and charged in 1966. As the codeword control officer in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there is a strong possibility that he had access to Penkovskiy's production and compromised it to the Soviets. This would greatly have reduced the time needed to isolate Penkovskiy as a prime candidate for penetration of the Soviet defense establishment.

Significance

The significance of the Penkovskiy material runs the gamut from educating operations and analytical officers in the reality of Soviet classified document methodology to affecting policy decisions related to the national security of the US. The Army G-2 was so stunned by the vast amount of material relevant to his requirements, and its contrast in many respects with his traditional knowledge and beliefs about the Soviet military, that he entertained reservations about the validity of the material until he learned from his biographics officer of the existence in her safe of the numerous telephone directories which Penkovskiy had provided—a fact that we could not share with any consumer until the case was over. He then stated that the Soviets would never allow those directories to fall into hostile hands—quite right, but the same was true for all Penkovskiy's other, more highly classified documents.

The most highly publicized contribution of Penkovskiy to US strategy and policy toward the Soviets was in the Cuban missile crisis, described above. While analysts were and are reluctant to accept Penkovskiy's statement in 1961 that the Soviets had no actual ICBM capability at the time, he was undoubtedly right. By that time the Soviets had a major campaign established to convince us that they were far ahead in ICBM production and deployment, with Khrushchev himself playing a major role in this deception. The ICBM gap, which played a dominant role in the 1960 presidential election, was barely acknowledged to exist by CIA analysts, but to military analysts, especially in the Air Force, the Soviets could have had as many as 75 ICBM's deployed before our

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satellite reconnaissance revealed that our urgent ICBM effort had quickly placed us ahead of the Soviets in deployed missiles. Penkovskiy's report had to be given some weight, but was politically unwelcome, particularly in the Department of Defense.

Some of Penkovskiy's information which made no great splash at the time of its dissemination later became fundamental in analysis of the Soviet military and government establishments. The Military-Industrial Commission was first defined by Penkovskiy, bringing into focus the bits and pieces on it collected by collateral sources. When Nosenko told us in 1964 that Andrey Sakharov was the father of the Soviet H-bomb, the only record of Sakharov's existence was in the Academy of Sciences directory which Penkovskiy had provided us (and a visa request to the Italians to attend a nuclear physics conference in Frascati, although Sakharov never came). The Soviet command and control diagram drawn up by the British at the time was made possible only by the phone directories Penkovskiy supplied. Our operational philosophy for targeting Soviet scientific delegations was based for many years on Penkovskiy's information and documents, until the Soviets began to allow more significant numbers of scientists in classified work to travel abroad. Camouflage and deception (Maskirovka) came into vogue as a result of one of Penkovskiy's manuals.

The few Soviet agents whom Penkovskiy identified were not particularly important. Considering that his service had been in the Near Eastern department, no more could have been expected of him. After his service in Turkey, during which he reported malfeasance by the KGB resident, Penkovskiy was not popular in the Center, but was, nevertheless, being prepared to go out to Pakistan/India. As the advisor for the GRU Military Diplomatic Academy class of 1960, Penkovskiy was able to provide the class roster, which included 18 men destined to be assigned as illegals, with their languages and places of assignment identified. Other GRU material which Penkovskiy provided included some of the most important and sensitive GRU operational instructions and directives. Penkovskiy's own career path, had he managed to stay on it, would have taken him to New York as GRU resident.

• • •

For me, the Penkovskiy case was the most challenging and trying task of 35 years of intelligence work. The major reason for the challenge reaching this magnitude is the sheer complexity of the substance of Penkovskiy's documents. They ranged across information areas which were served by hundreds of analysts, from the ICBM to the T-62 tank, from the Central Committee to steel production. Many of the questions used in the debriefings and briefings of Penkovskiy came from follow-up questions posed by analysts, both in London and in Washington. To develop questions of this type, I usually visited the analysts or was visited by them and the subject matter was discussed sufficiently to prepare the questions and to be able to return to Penkovskiy in the very next meeting to continue discussion of the same topic or to elaborate on his answer. Many of the questions arose from the processing of the material—the exact origin of a particular document, the meaning of a word, background of a Soviet author, the disposition of a particular document, recommendation, or policy.

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No matter what was asked of him, he always went us one better—providing responses and documents which more than satisfied the requirements.

In retrospect, any operation could have been done better. We always wish we had known at the beginning what we knew at the end. This operation was characterized by great intensity, emergency conditions, the personality and motivation of Penkovskiy himself, particularly his view that "you tell me how to behave in the West, but don't tell me about Moscow—I know better than you what goes there". We were very likely operating at an extremely high level of efficiency and productivity. Despite all that, it ended with Penkovskiy gone and Wynne imprisoned, to be exchanged in 1964 for "Gordon Lonsdale", much to the surprise of George Blake, who expected to be the one traded at that time. There is little probability that Penkovskiy survived beyond the date of his reported execution. The damage he caused was too great, and the immediate consignment of his high-level contacts (whose existence intimidated the KGB investigators) onto the path to professional oblivion was surely in the aftermath of his own execution.

There are many analysts today who are probably quite unaware that the sense of reality they have of the Soviet system, and a degree of confidence that in their institutional past we had exceptional insight into the Soviet system, are the doing of a GRU colonel who shifted his loyalty from the USSR to the West. Penkovskiy left a mark on Western intelligence that will endure.

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The lead time is inversely proportional to the confidence in the judgment

ALERT MEMORANDA—THE TRACK RECORD

(b)(3)(c)

The *Alert Memorandum* is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. It warns explicitly of impending potential developments abroad that may have serious implications for US interests. It is a fast reaction document, with usually no more than forty-eight hours transpiring between conception and promulgation. While designed primarily for the Washington policy community, it receives wide electrical dissemination abroad. Additionally, each memorandum is published in the next *National Intelligence Daily* to further inform consumers of national level concern.

The Alert Memorandum was an active vehicle between 1974 and 1976. When the Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategic Warning rotated to a new position in 1976, the position was left unfilled and Alert Memoranda fell into disuse. In October 1978, a National Intelligence Officer for Warning was appointed, largely in response to Congressional demands for a central point of warning responsibility, and the Director of Central Intelligence concurrently revivified Alert Memoranda. Since then, (b)(3)(c) have been issued.

The decision to publish an Alert Memorandum is reserved to the Director of Central Intelligence, although anyone in the policy or intelligence communities may request he do so. In practice, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning usually has taken the initiative.

An Alert Memorandum is not predictive; rather, it explores the possible outcome of development abroad which have serious implications for US policy. In fact, the greater the potentially adverse effect on US policy, the lower the threshold for issuing an Alert Memorandum.

It is aximomatic that the amount of lead time is inversely proportional to the confidence of the community's judgment. There has been a constant, and probably healthy, struggle between the warners, who wish to act earlier, and the analysts, who like to wait for more evidence in order to buttress their confidence. There is also the risk of false alarms, of "crying wolf" and flooding the market with warnings. In the final analysis, there is no rule of thumb. Each incipient crisis has been judged on its own merits, and the decision whether to issue an Alert Memorandum has been unique to the problem at hand.

The Track Record

I. Iran: On 29 November 1978, the Director of Central Intelligence warned, "the Shia Muslim holy month of Moharram that begins on 2 December 1978 is likely to bring an especially severe challenge to the Shah of Iran and to the military government installed by the Shah in early November." (This was the first in the new series of Alert Memoranda.) In a second Alert Memorandum on 5 December, the Director's judgment was, "we see no reason to alter our conclusions that civil unrest may threaten

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the survival of the monarchy, and that the risk to Americans will increase. Serious demonstrations began in Tehran and the provincial cities at the outset of Moharram, and will continue to build, taxing the resources and morale of the military and security services." The Shah departed Tehran on 16 January 1979, about six weeks after the first Alert Memorandum, and the Bakhtiar government which he had installed collapsed on 10 February. A third Alert Memorandum, published on 1 March 1979, warned, "the Bazargan Government may not survive the combined pressures posed by internal friction and a sustained external challenge from the left." On 6 November 1979, the Bazargan Government fell (two days after the American Embassy was occupied). In this case, about nine months warning had been given.

II. *Beagle Channel:* On 8 December 1978, as Argentina was moving substantial military forces south to strengthen its claims in the Beagle Channel area, an Alert Memorandum warned, "Argentina will be prepared to make a military move after 15 December. Should hostilities break out, Chile will almost certainly invoke the Rio Treaty." The Pope intervened, and the situation subsequently quieted down. This Alert Memorandum was the first to refer explicitly to United States policy considerations—involving the Rio Treaty—a trend which was to continue.

III. *China-Vietnam:* On 5 January 1979, the Director of Central Intelligence warned that "Vietnamese military operations against Kampuchea are proceeding rapidly in the face of only token resistence from out-gunned and out-manned Kampuchean units. With some Vietnamese forces already west of the Mekong River and within striking distance of Phnom Penh, it is possible that the capital could fall or be abandoned in the next several days and a Vietnamese client regime be established there. At the same time, China appears to be preparing for a major show of force along its frontier with Vietnam. Thus, the present situation contains the seeds of rapid escalation to Sino-Vietnamese conflict and heightened Sino-Soviet tension." Phnom Penh fell two days later on 7 January. On 19 January, a second Alert Memorandum reported, "the Chinese appear to be completing a deployment of forces and a propaganda groundwork that will enable them to take military action against Vietnam at a time of their choosing." A third Alert Memorandum on 14 February 1979, said, "the Chinese buildup along the Vietnamese border has grown unabated since our last Alert Memorandum of 19 January. We think that in military terms the Chinese are ready to go, and that their push, if it occurs, would be larger than we thought in mid-January." The Chinese punitive action started on 22 February. Six weeks of warning had been given.

IV. *Pakistan:* On 8 February 1979, an Alert Memorandum opined that upholding the death sentence of former Prime Minister Bhutto would place Zia's position in heightened jeopardy. Obviously, Zia survived. This was the first instance, however, of an Alert Memorandum being used to gain attention while policymakers were preoccupied with another crisis (China/Vietnam).

V. *Lebanon:* On 2 March 1979, an Alert Memorandum stated, "Christian Militias and Syrian forces in Beirut seem to be heading for a new outbreak of heavy fighting within the next two months." It then discussed the possibility of an Israeli-Syrian confrontation. While the situation in Lebanon did not result in an Israeli-Syrian clash, once again the Alert Memorandum raised policy implications for the United States Government.

VI. *Egypt/Libya:* Sadat and Quadhaffi's mutual animosity results in a perennial warning situation. On 29 March 1979, an Alert Memorandum warned, "tension along the border has been heightened by alerts and troop movements by both sides, and has increased the chances that war will break out either by deliberate attack or by

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unpremeditated escalation of border incidents." On 1 August 1979, the Director of Central Intelligence warned that "the Egyptian plan for a large-scale military incursion into eastern Libya—scheduled for later this month or September—is still on track." This Alert Memorandum, too, went on to discuss the implications for United States policy. The attack has yet to materialize, but the root problem remains.

VII. *Cuban Troops in South Africa:* On 27 April 1979, the Director of Central Intelligence reported, "there has been accumulation of reports and rumors recently which suggests that some number of Cuban forces, or possibly a significant increment of advisory personnel, are about to be introduced into Frontline States contending with Rhodesia. The intelligence is by no means conclusive, but I believe that the situation bears especially close watching at this time, and I am making you aware of my concern." This Alert Memorandum provided a good example of the lower threshold assigned to a potential event of very high political significance; it was published on extremely fragmentary information. While Cuban troops did appear later on, their arrival was not related to the evidence sited in this Alert Memorandum—it was a false alarm.

VIII. *Nicaragua:* In a 12 June 1979 Alert Memorandum entitled "Marxist Threat to Somoza in Nicaragua," the Director of Central Intelligence estimated that the possibility of a victory by the Sandinistas "looms large." Somoza fell on 17 July, five weeks later.

IX. *Basques:* On 19 June 1979, while all eyes were on Nicaragua, the Director of Central Intelligence warned that the Basque autonomy negotiations were encountering problems, and that Prime Minister Suarez was under strong pressure to resort to force. Once again, the Alert Memorandum served to focus attention on a secondary, simultaneous potential crisis.

X. *Afghanistan:* The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided probably the most serious policy crisis during the period covered in this paper. It prompted three Alert Memoranda. The first, on 14 September 1979, said, "The Soviet leaders may be on the threshold of a decision to commit their own forces to prevent the collapse of the Taraki regime and protect their sizeable stake in Afghanistan." Further, "the Soviets may now be more inclined to gamble on a substantial intervention in Afghanistan." The second, on 19 December, reported, "the Soviet leaders have crossed a significant threshold in their growing military involvement in Afghanistan." And, "the Soviets are building up other more substantial forces near the Soviet-Afghan border." The third, on Christmas day, reported—correctly—that the invasion probably had begun. About twelve weeks warning had been given.

XI. *El Salvador:* A 5 October 1979 Alert Memorandum predicted the coup which took place on 15 October, and highlighted the possibility of "an opening for extreme leftists to organize a general insurrection." In a following Alert Memorandum on 24 January 1980, the judgment was that "a leftist extremist thrust for power . . . could come at any time, and with little warning."

(b)(1)

XIII. *Thai-Kampuchea Border:* On 6 December 1979, an Alert Memorandum reiterated that the increasing pressure Vietnam was placing on Thailand might cause

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the Thai to invoke the assistance of the Manila Pact or seek an accommodation with Vietnam if all else failed. Again, policy implications were highlighted.

XIV. *Saudi Arabia/Yemens:* On 11 January 1980, an Alert Memorandum discussed the implications that Yemeni unity might have for Saudi Arabia and the United States.

XV. *South Korea:* Following the assassination of President Park on 26 October 1979, two Alert Memoranda were issued. On 8 February 1980, the Director of Central Intelligence said, "I am concerned that a showdown in Seoul, which may involve open fighting, will lead to North Korean miscalculations." The showdown did not result in open fighting, but on 9 May 1980, a second Alert Memorandum reported, "while what we have observed of North Korean reactions to developments in the South since the Park assassination does not yet suggest an intention to exploit the situation militarily, I continue to be concerned about the adequacy of warning on Korea. In this light, the current South Korean unrest, which brings with it the possibility of a military takeover, is yet another in a series of recent events that could undermine stability in the South and tempt Pyongyang to attack."

XVI. *Syria:* In July 1980, the administration's attention was rivetted on Iran and Afghanistan. Once again, to direct it to another potential problem, the Director of Central Intelligence on 11 July reported, "Although not imminent, Syrian President Assad's assassination or overthrow is significantly more likely today than it was before the 26 June assassination attempt. I believe that United States policymakers need to focus sooner rather than later on the potential adverse regional consequences of Assad's removal from the scene. The attached Alert Memorandum outlines briefly some of these regional implications."

XVII. *Poland:* On 19 July 1980, an Alert Memorandum noted, "Labor unrest in Poland has dramatically increased in recent days in the Southeast city of Lublin. While our information about unrest in other areas of Poland is sparse, it is possible that disturbances will intensify and spread to other areas." On 19 September, a second reported, (b)(1) leads me to believe that the Soviet leadership is preparing to intervene militarily in Poland if the Polish situation is not brought under control in a manner satisfactory to Moscow. Recent events in Poland itself suggest that the Kania regime may encounter severe difficulties in meeting Moscow's requirements." In a third, published 25 November, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence said, "The Polish leadership is facing its gravest challenge since the strikes on the Baltic Coast in August. I am concerned the Kania regime may resort to force. The present situation moves us closer to coercive measures by the regime or a possible Soviet military invasion." In a fourth on 2 December, the Director opined, "I believe the Soviets are readying their forces for military intervention in Poland. We do not know, however, whether they have made the decision to intervene, or are still attempting to find a political solution." Finally, a fifth memorandum on 2 April 1981, judged, "We believe that the Soviet leaders have been convinced by the evident impotence of the Polish party and government that military intervention is necessary."

XVIII. *Iran-Iraq:* On 17 September 1980, an Alert Memorandum reported, "the intensification of border clashes between Iran and Iraq has reached a point where a serious conflict is now a distinct possibility." The war started five days later, on 22 September.

XIX. *Iran-Kuwait:* On 14 November 1980, the Director of Central Intelligence warned that "recent attacks by Iranian aircraft on Kuwaiti border installations raise the possibility that Tehran is now prepared to widen the war in order to stop Arab aid

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to Iraq. I believe the greatest danger—should Iran continue this course of action—is the possibility that Kuwait or other Arab oil facilities will become targets for Iranian attacks."

What Did We Miss?

If, on the one hand, we examine those crises which were anticipated and of which we warned, the other side of the coin may reveal situations which we missed altogether. This, of course, raises the questions of thresholds and relevance to US policy. While Poland's importance is obvious, a coup in Guinea-Bissau may be of little more than passing interest.

For some time the Cybernetics Technology Division of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has been conducting research in the area of crisis identification and prediction. Among their efforts is an Executive Aids System based on open source data. Querying that data base yielded more "crises" than those treated by Alert Memoranda, to wit:

(b)(1)

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(b)(1)

The reader is left to ponder which of these situations might have deserved Alert Memoranda.

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Where the action is

OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS: 1947 TO 1985

(b)(3)(c)

This brief history of the Office of Communications is intended to provide a general understanding of the office and its mission with the Central Intelligence Agency. In some ways the history is similar to that of dynamic private enterprises operating during the 40 years following World War II. It has been marked by initiative, development, growth, and then divestiture. The office has been the progenitor of key programs now located in the Directorate of Science and Technology and other offices in the Directorate of Administration. Agency activity in (b)(3)(c) communications, satellite communications,(b)(3)(n) TEMPEST (the investigation and study of compromising emanations) began as OC programs. In support of the Agency's domestic communications activities—recently made a responsibility of the Office of Information Technology—the Office of Communications has adapted a commercial computer to become the standard terminal for domestic communications, engineered the largest secure telephone system in government, and is designing a modern local area network information distribution capability. The core mission, the provision of telecommunications support for overseas activities, has remained as the base challenge for the office.

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

In the Beginning

The Office of Strategic Services was demobilized in 1945 in the great rush to dismantle the machines of war and bring the boys home. But the vital services provided by the far-flung network of the OSS Communications Branch could not be summarily terminated and many of the OSS communicators remained abroad. When the remnants of OSS were divided between the departments of State and War, the Communications Branch was given to the Department of War, which established a Strategic Services Unit (SSU) to absorb the transferred OSS elements. The Operational Auxiliaries Branch—predecessor of today's Directorate of Administration—was formed within the SSU and became the home of the Communications Branch.

The SSU found itself with a substantial communications capability. There were facilities and communications people in Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria, the Near East, the Mediterranean region, China, India-Burma, and in the United States. In 1946 the Communications Branch had 324 people operating 63 circuits, 22 radio stations, and 31 radio links. It is noteworthy that 23 of the circuits were operated by non-communications personnel who performed communications functions as a collateral duty. This tradition of the customer-operated circuit supported by communications professionals is an old and successful one which continues today.

The former OSS Communications Branch thus immediately became an active member of the larger government community with elements (b)(1)

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(b)(1)

In 1946, the Washington Message Center was straining under the load of 20,000 coded groups per day. An equivalent volume is now transmitted in under three hours over a 100 words-per-minute on-line circuit (over which encryption and transmission are accomplished simultaneously) and would be little more than a blip on modern high speed data circuits, an indication of how technology has helped the communicator over the years.

Interlude

In January 1946, President Harry S. Truman directed that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy assign persons and facilities from their respective departments to collectively form a Central Intelligence Group (CIG) under a Director of Central Intelligence. Six months later the SSU and its Communications Branch, which had various titles but hereafter will be referred to as OC, were transferred to the CIG.

OC was faced with a number of tasks upon becoming part of an independent agency. Interestingly, the most demanding were associated with unanticipated requirements to provide service where OSS had not. The CIG was directed to assume the intelligence mission from the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Latin America. This was the beginning of the CIA Latin American morse network. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover did not particularly welcome the unsolicited help, and CIG's takeover of the 14 FBI stations was a somewhat contentious affair. Beyond the turf struggle, the main problem CIG encountered was recruiting enough technically qualified people willing to accept assignment to South America. An analysis of the problem indicated that recruitment efforts were inefficient and the salary offered for communicators was too low, especially since the technical and security standards were so high that only a few qualified people could meet them. People were eventually found and trained and communications responsibilities at the sites were assumed by OC. The last station, Havana, began operating into a receiver site (b)(1)

(b)(1)

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(b)(1)

The first memorandum of understanding concerning OC communications support was signed in April 1947 by OC and the Foreign Broadcast Intercept Branch (FBIB), now the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The memorandum called for OC to render advice and assistance to meet FBIB communications needs and allowed FBIB to draw from OC stocks but be responsible for its own equipment except on cryptographically protected circuits. Although FBIS no longer draws from OC stocks, that modus operandi characterizes today's relationship between FBIS and OC.

The final days of CIG saw the establishment of its own domestic receiver site at (b)(1) and the move of the transmitter site to (b)(1) (b)(1) Overseas, a facility at (b)(1) was selected as an experimental base linking the United States and Europe and performing the special (b)(3)(n) services it continues to provide.

Agency Configuration: 1947 to 1951

The Central Intelligence Agency was established by law on 26 July 1947 and CIG ceased to exist when CIA was officially activated on 18 September 1947. The CIG Communications Branch moved to CIA and continued to function in the new organization as it had under OSS, the SSU, and CIG. Almost immediately OC was again pressed to expand when the Director of Central Intelligence asked the Associate Director for Special Operations to determine if a communications support station was required in (b)(1) North Africa. (That the question was put to the operations chief reflected the fact that OC had moved from the CIG support arm to the CIA operational arm. Over the years, OC has moved between support and operations and existed as an independent office, with no lasting agreement regarding where the function belongs in an intelligence agency.) OC saw the expanded tasking as an opportunity to gain the resources needed to meet a growing number of requirements which demanded a more extensive worldwide network. There were ever growing traffic loads; FBIS was increasing its operations at Headquarters and at eight field sites; the Domestic Contacts Division required secure communications in 15 US cities; and the new CIA Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was asking for broadcast services, communications in support of covert action, and personnel training. Demand invariably exceeded supply. The office always encountered difficulty in generating the enthusiasm and gaining the resources to fully satisfy such needs. Nonetheless, it developed plans calling for people for training and (b)(1) (b)(1) planning; an operations staff in the Far East for project support; a technical staff for projects (b)(1) a training staff for European covert operations; radio bases in (b)(1) more people for (b)(1) transmitters for deception programs in Europe; and personnel to support a capitalization program.

OC, in what was to become a customarily difficult swim in the bureaucratic waters, pushed for the resources necessary to complete the buildup. In this era of clandestine support, OC leaders looked upon staff communications and support to non-clandestine customers as a drain of resources away from the

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primary mission. Thus there were suggestions that (b)(1) established in CIG days, be turned over (b)(1) to save positions if additional resources were not forthcoming.*

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

There were early turf disputes within the Agency as well. The DCI was forced to intervene between the Directors of Special Operations and Policy Coordination to prevent duplication of communication structures and efforts. Because OPC felt that it was not receiving adequate support from OC for its covert action programs or in the training of its personnel to perform communications tasks, it had started to build an independent communication capability. The DCI directed that the OPC and OC efforts be combined and that OC do a better job of serving all customers.

OC buckled down and, following its "can-do" tradition, compiled an impressive record of achievements over the next few years. A training site was purchased in Northern Virginia, (b)(3)(c) and OC began to meet its training obligations to OPC. (The training complex was later to serve as the home for the domestic receiver and transmitter stations.) The first OC radio operator class enrolled in June 1951. A healthy budget in 1951 allowed for continued work on base stations even though plans for an (b)(1) West Coast or Alaskan base were canceled. The record of base station accomplishment:

1948 — The (b)(1) base was completed.

1949 — (b)(1) was named as a base.

1950 — (b)(1) was established as a sub-base.

1950 — (b)(1) was established as a sub-base.

1950 — (b)(1) as the Middle Eastern base (because (b)(1) was judged too politically unstable). The Agency also took on a military project (b)(1) which became the foundation (b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

1950 — A (b)(1) base was established at the (b)(1) site, a location now used as a repair and logistics facility. The receiver site was moved to (b)(1) in 1951 and remained there until local political considerations forced a move (b)(1) (b)(1) in 1976.

* This ploy was a mistake OC repeated in later years when a hiatus of CIA activity in Africa was accompanied by a withdrawal of OC communicators. Faced with the loss of CIA-operated radio communications, and with no reliable commercial or military communications to fall back on,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

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1950 — A mobile sleeper base—a facility with installed operational equipment which is activated only during contingency circumstances—was installed in (b)(1) and activated in 1951 while permanent structures were being built. This was one of several times that OC base operations were conducted in mobile vans.

1951 — (b)(1) Base complex was activated at (b)(1) request for cooperative communications support in the Far East.

1951 — (b)(1) was activated as a small, special purpose base.

The sub-bases of the early 1950s are the mini-relays of today. Then as now it was recognized that a network structured around a single major base is subject to the perturbations of nature, politics, and other forces, much more so than a network structured around several smaller, geographically dispersed sites. Over the years, larger facilities in (b)(1) and (b)(1) had to be closed before operations were placed in jeopardy by local political events. Early sleeper type minor relays were established in (b)(1) Later (b)(1) were used to relay morse code messages from other South American stations when direct contact with Headquarters was difficult due to low power and poor north/south radio paths. Many other stations were used for mini-relay functions over the years.

This period also saw the beginning of the Area Headquarters distributed management approach still used by OC. Ten different sites were used as Area Headquarters at various times during the 1950s. The first meeting of area management personnel, not yet called Area Chiefs, was held in 1951.

Diverse Challenge: 1947 to 1965

This was a dynamic and rewarding period for people in OC. They became accustomed to ever growing demands and expansion to meet these demands. They were led by entrepreneurs trained during World War II when moving ahead was more important than technical refinements and detailed planning. The period represents the height of OC influence as an organization. It operated as (b)(3)(n) a technical trainer a supporter of covert action projects, and as a self-sufficient service organization with integrated communications security, logistics, personnel, and training capabilities.

The office demanded a great deal from its people to meet its commitments. Time after time, awards, salary increases, and medals were turned down on the basis that excellence was expected of OC people. This management philosophy appeared to motivate the employee of this era to greater heights of performance and pride in the office. But, the lack of formal recognition has left little historical record of the exceptional and often heroic performance by hundreds of communications personnel in the China theater after World War II, during the Korean War, the various wars, coups, and revolutions in the Middle East and Latin America, during the death of colonialism in Africa, in jungle camps preparing for the Bay of Pigs, (b)(3)(n) and in the

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Berlin Tunnel. Imbedded in memory, if not properly in annals, are stories of OC officers who were among the last to leave Havana when relations were broken, of officers (b)(1) (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) Never has an OC employee been known to abandon his or her post in the face of danger unless ordered to do so by higher authority, or allow classified material to fall into the wrong hand due to inaction.

The early OC communicator was both a radio operator and a technician; hence the job title of Communications Technician, Radio (CTR). Electronic technicians handled the radio frequency equipment and the wire technicians worked on the electro-mechanical teletype and crypto machines. The cryptographic systems of the day were either one-time pad or one-time tape. The cryptographic process required that each letter of the classified message be combined with a letter of randomly produced key (used only one time—hence the name). In the one-time pad system the key was printed on paper and the process was done manually with a pencil and paper. In the one-time tape system the key took the form of perforated tape and the process was done on a teletype-like device. Those systems, when used correctly, offer absolute security and are still used for backup purposes. Specialists retained for this labor-intensive job were called Communications Technician, Cryptographic (CTC). These employees staffed the Headquarters signal center and supplemented high volume overseas posts. There were a few engineers, most of whom did not hold a degree but became certified as engineers. Even fewer employees were hired as utility specialists to install and maintain large base station generators. Because the newer cryptographic equipment being installed resisted working in overheated and inadequately powered facilities, the utility specialists soon became involved in air conditioning and no-break power systems. (In OC fashion, the troops had previously worked in shorts and undershirts in the tropics; air conditioning was considered too expensive to provide for mere people.) Several other occupational specialities were staffed with people seeking a career path out of the operator and technician ranks. Communications security officers were initially drawn mainly from the CTC ranks but included those from the technician and CTR ranks as systems became more technical. Security officers later included engineers as the communications security community began to understand TEMPEST and the seriousness of the threat from compromising emanations. Operations officers, those who (b)(3)(n) and managed overseas networks, were drawn principally from CTRs. OC also employed various other disciplines during this period. The cable secretariat employee at Headquarters was adept at message analysis and distribution. A small cadre of telephone specialists kept the unclassified system running on a shoestring for years and nurtured an infant secure voice system that grew to become the largest in government. Secretaries traveled the world to support OC activities and provided a sense of office management professionalism and consistency. Many employees with trade skills were employed at the training installation to support base station and training needs, and various support professionals have served with distinction as members of the OC family over the years. Finally, OC hired

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and used many logistics employees who later moved to the Office of Logistics but forever felt the family tie with OC.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

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Important technical progress was made during this period. In the beginning, OC radio operators used morse code to send messages encrypted in the one-time pad. The late 1950s saw a gradual shift to radio teletype and one-time tape operation. The informal radio teletype network was formalized in 1959 with the introduction of standardized procedures and routings which define the CIA network of today. On-line communications were introduced in 1959 with the establishment of KW-26 links between Washington and (b)(1) and Washington and (b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

More Change: 1966 to 1985

This period was ushered in with a technical achievement that would affect how the office would do business in the future and which would permit a great increase in the flow of information without more people. The MAX I message switch was activated at (b)(1) in 1965. Similar switches were installed at Headquarters and the US Base Station in 1968. These computer message switches, some of the first to be used by civilian agencies, meant the end of the base station sweat shop environment with its ever increasing need for more paper tape machines and people to process the tape. Technology had allowed for improved service to the customer, and had improved the quality of life for the OC communicator.

This success, along with the obvious trends of the future, spelled the end of the OC entrepreneur manager with little technical education but a lot of street sense. This managerial type was in the main gradually replaced with the technocrat who was more organized and less inclined to take risks. New technology also called for new expertise and OC soon developed a group of automation specialists mainly from the ranks of the cryptographers to tend to switch software and technicians to maintain the new line printers and computers. The growth of automated systems, e.g. the DATEX data switch, and voice systems, induced the office to create a Domestic Networks Division in the mid-1960s with the concurrent need for telephone and data specialists to staff these facilities.

OC still needed to staff overseas positions. The overseas personnel and their families were faced with demanding and dangerous missions in (b)(1) (b)(1) the Middle East,

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to name a few. OC reacted by resisting the specialization trend and attempting to force all to take their turn serving overseas. This was the source of some tension between those who wanted to settle down in one place and specialize, and the managers who had to relieve personnel serving in ever more hostile overseas environments. OC officers carried on in the tradition of service with distinction. In Vietnam they served at places like Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Plieku and they

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In the early 1970s OC moved to provide more reliable overseas circuitry with a satellite program based upon the Defense Satellite Communications System. This program proved to be extremely successful, if expensive. OC then moved to automate the manual message distribution process in Headquarters with the Cable Dissemination System and to install more message switches. This left the office with a system that provided reliable circuits when the satellites were working, efficient message switching systems, and a semi-automated message distribution system. The field station was then looked at as the next logical step for improvement but the results were mixed. An experimental automated field terminal (AFT) project drew the attention of Agency customers who wanted to climb aboard if OC would provide some data processing support in field stations, e.g. financial data input.

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program and the Directorate of Operations commenced its CRAFT program to satisfy the need for field station customer automation assistance.

Except for advances in message switches and satellite systems the 1970s saw the office fall into a general malaise. One innovation of note was FASTCAST. Introduced late in the decade, it was a technique of systematically reallocating reserve satellite power and bandwidth from station to station thereby allowing

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messages which had queued up in switches overnight to be transmitted at over 2,000 words per minute. Volumes which previously kept two regular teletype channels running all day could now be transmitted in less than an hour and messages could be in the hands of action officers early in the work day.

More concern was focused on people problems, but there was only marginal success in convincing the newer employees that this was the case. The employee saw a system that did not allow for pay increases as skill demands grew. He/she did not understand why OC was always the office saddled with the bulk of position cuts as two presidents called for a reduction of US presence abroad, or why OC could not keep up to strength even with the reduced numbers of positions. The high frequency radio, cryptographic, and terminal equipment in use in the overseas network had been installed in the 1960s and there seemed to be no plan or budget to upgrade. Meanwhile, other elements of the Agency moved ahead with large, well funded, successful programs and

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The 1980s saw resurgence for the office. A major capitalization program was approved and implementation began. Advances in technology allowed radio teletype circuits to be operated at rates three to six times faster than previously possible. OC was carrying an astonishing workload in comparison with previous years and doing the job well. The number of *messages* being handled in th (b)(3)(c)
network in the 1980s was approaching the number of *words* or *groups* processe (b)(3)(n)
in 1946. The number of overseas and [redacted] had increased drama-
ically. OC found itself again deeply involved with (b)(3)(n) communication support and with large contingency projects. Under the capitalization program the office was challenged to upgrade almost every system in use. A round of position upgrades partially satisfied the pleas for equity with other Agency employees, and an experiment with a new pay system for communications operators (known as banding) had been approved. OC finally approached its strength allocation by becoming directly involved in the recruitment and hiring process. During 1983 and 1984 OC moved aggressively to improve relations with both Agency and external customers, and it protected its budget and personnel gains.

Looking Back and Ahead

The American public has received an excellent return on investment from the Office of Communications. After initial buildups, the office has essentially maintained a flat line in the number of personnel used to accomplish a substantially more demanding mission. OC has used technology wisely to satisfy problems with little waste on blue sky systems.

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opportunities, and challenging career tracks. Nevertheless, OC personnel have continued to be where the action is and to perform their mission in exceptional fashion.

The office will continue to face new challenges in the overseas network. OC must successfully complete the capitalization program and reinforce the message that capitalization is a continuing need. New pay and award mechanisms will make OC a more attractive place to work. Network modernization must continue to provide an error-free flow of information at high data rates between the foreign field and Headquarters with alternative transmission means such as a satellite terminal combined with a high frequency radio capability to ensure continued communications during any contingency. OC personnel as technical intelligence officers, by whatever organizational name they work, with their tradition of hard work, loyalty, and can-do spirit, must be there ensuring that the intelligence is quickly communicated to the right reader and that the DCI has an effective means of command and control.

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VALUE OF CLANDESTINE RECORDS IN INTELLIGENCE

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The collection, processing, analysis, and presentation of intelligence information must be of the highest quality to enable consumers to make accurate decisions on any given subject. It is imperative that members of the intelligence community be provided with the exact information needed in the right place at the right time. The Directorate of Operations Information Resources Management Program was created to meet federal statutory requirements and consists primarily of the US Government's counterintelligence index.

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The National Security Act of 1947 set forth in its implementing directives the establishment of a central file and index. In 1952, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) and Office of Strategic Operations (OSO) were merged to form what is now the Directorate of Operations. Along with this merger the OPC Registry files were integrated with those of the Clandestine Services records division, subsequently named Records Integration Division (RID) and currently the Information Management Staff (IMS). Responsibility for replying to requests for information from other US Government agencies was gradually assumed by IMS.

In 1958 the DO recognized that the manual process being used to respond to the intelligence community was too slow. Some responses were taking up to four months. Recognition of the problem introduced completely new approaches in the application of automation, but it would be another ten years before the central index would be automated. In 1975, a planning group was established to identify the DO's information service requirements over the next ten years and to develop design specifications for the information systems needed to meet those requirements. This resulted in the creation of "A blueprint for the 1980's," approved by the DDO in November 1976. This document described the approach, objectives, tasks, findings, and recommendations of the Planning Group. Thus was born the concept of the Directorate of Operations Records and Information Control Systems (DORIC).

Today DORIC provides information services in support of the DDO; analysis, research, reporting, and operational policy and management; interagency activities and responsibilities of common concern; and the DO's response to Privacy Act, Freedom of Information Act, and Executive and Legislative inquiries. A new planning effort designed to achieve desired objectives and maximum use of human and technical capabilities is also

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underway. It has been named the DO Long-Range Plan for Handling Information (DOLPHIN). IMS research specialists involved in this effort have been tasked to define goals and objectives, fully accommodate the plethora of information management challenges generated by the automated information explosion, and chart the course that information handling within the DO is to take in the immediate and long-term future. The DO's current automated foreign intelligence and counterintelligence data base has the capability to search millions of records in seconds to locate counterintelligence information in support of DO operations, other CIA directorate and intelligence community trace requests, and to surface information relevant to congressional investigations and inquiries.

The development of a sophisticated directorate-wide Information Resource Management Program to manage information as a resource has provided the DO with a capability to research, review, and evaluate vast collections of information with great effectiveness. Some US law enforcement Agencies consistently assign top priority to requests for information on persons of interest; most notably, those who may pose a threat to the President or other senior officials. The DO has surfaced positive, derogatory information during these searches, making it possible for the requesting agency to further evaluate the situation and determine a course of action. The DO has provided other US Government agencies information leading to the expulsion or exclusion from the United States of subversive persons who wish to undermine or disrupt our government.

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To disregard the value of records in the world of intelligence would defeat the purpose of the United States foreign intelligence mission and the policy that supports it. It is for this reason that the DO has attempted to stay atop of the most important developments in automated data processing, tailoring the most desired automated creations to our existing systems. A new era in electronic communications has far reaching effects on how we collect, store, retrieve, and evaluate today's information for tomorrow's use. The DO is accelerating its efforts to ensure that the information created in automated systems is securely compartmented, maintained and disposed of in compliance with federal laws and statutes, and that personnel are educated on their legal responsibilities and requirements for maintaining federal records.

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THE CARLISLE PAPERS: IV


For a fourth year, the Editorial Board of *Studies in Intelligence* is publishing papers drawn from a Conference on Intelligence and Military Operations conducted by the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The fourth annual conference, held 9-11 May 1989, brought together an international group of scholars to discuss the role of intelligence in strategic assessment, low-intensity warfare, military operations, politics, deception, strategic surprise, and on the battlefield in the age of high technology. Representative of the material offered at the conference are two papers presented here:

— Early Warning Systems, by (b)(6)

— From the Okhrana to the KGB, by (b)(6)

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EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

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The period of unusual tension in Israeli-Syrian relations described in the following account came to a close in the summer of 1986, but the situation on the two countries' common border continues to be fraught with danger. In the fall of 1988, Israeli leaders issued a number of declarations reaffirming their perception of a Syrian threat and the concomitant need "for overall watchfulness, for intelligence alertness and for constant battle-readiness on the Golan Heights."[1] The inauguration of an Israeli program to place satellites in orbit over the Middle East, some of which would have a surveillance capability, can be partly seen in the context of this imperative. A few days before the launch of Ofeg 1, Chief of Staff Shomron justified the investment in early warning systems costing hundreds of millions of dollars by saying that the alternative would be to keep Israeli troops on constant standby.[2]

From September 1985 to June 1986, the Israeli Army was on heightened alert on at least five separate occasions as a result of forebodings of a possible Syrian attack. This was after Israel's final withdrawal from most of Lebanon in June 1985, three years after the 1982 invasion, when presumably tension with Syria should have decreased. The Syrian Army responded by taking precautionary measures, and tension rose dangerously. The slightest miscalulation could have resulted in war.

But Syria was not immediately "heading for war," as the frequently expressed Israeli slogan claimed. Indeed, in early 1987 Israel reached this conclusion. Why was it, then, that Israel so seriously misjudged Syria's position? What were the causes of Israel's repeated alarms? Had Israel replaced the fatal complacency of the pre-October 1973 war period by a no less precarious tendency to "cry wolf?"

Israeli Threat Assessments

The military intelligence branch of the general staff, Aman, is the largest and most powerful of Israel's intelligence agencies. It bears responsibility for the national security estimate, and it exerts strong influence over government thinking on all matters pertaining to the Arab world. Whenever there is a convergence of opinion among Israeli ministers and senior Army commanders on some Middle Eastern issue, the odds are that it derives from a military intelligence assessment, and this helps to piece together Aman's views. Aman's opinions are also more directly available from the occasional briefings given by the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) and senior intelligence officers.

The work of Israeli intelligence has always rested on the assumption that some or all of Israel's neighbors are bent on its destruction. Because of its small population, Israel is obliged to rely in a national emergency on the mobilization of the reserves. And a timely mobilization requires an effective early warning system, which is maintained by the intelligence corps and the intelligence branch of the general staff. Since its failure in October 1973 to provide sufficient advance warning of the impending Egyptian-Syrian attack, Aman has placed redoubled emphasis on the accurate detection of threats to national security to ensure that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) are not caught off guard again.

Following the Yom Kippur War and the Agranat commission of inquiry into the "blunder," various structural changes were introduced into the work of intelligence. There was

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to be greater coordination between military intelligence officers at the general staff and command levels; field intelligence-gathering capabilities were improved; new rules for the distribution of intelligence material were determined; a devil's advocate unit was set up within the intelligence branch charged with presenting counter-arguments to the prevailing consensus; the burden of administering the intelligence corps was removed from the shoulders of the DMI by the appointment of a separate chief intelligence officer with his own staff; and intelligence pluralism was fostered by strengthening the Foreign Ministry Research Department (henceforth known as the Center for Research and Policy Planning) and by establishing an independent evaluaton unit within the Mossad.[3]

But the most interesting change concerns the new analytical procedures proposed for the assessment of threat and the consequent sounding of an alert. On the eve of the Yom Kippur War, numerous indicators available to Israeli intelligence pointed to the readiness for battle of the Egyptian and Syrian Armies. However, these were disregarded because of the assumption that Egypt would not dare to attack Israel without a long-range aerial strike capability and that Syria would not go it alone. To this was added the failure to envisage the possibility that President Sadat might eschew a war aimed at recapturing the whole of the Sinai Peninsula in favor of a limited war intended to catalyse a political process. A successful Egyptian campaign of deception reinforced the Israeli conclusion that the Egyptian Army was engaged in exercises.[4]

As a direct result of this error, serious doubt was cast on the wisdom of relying on an appraisal of enemy intentions for a threat assessment. The Agranat report proposed that threat should not be assessed on the basis of what were at best subjective judgments about intentions, perceptions, or policy trends in the enemy camp. What really counted was the opponent's preparedness for attack on the ground. Only information, then, about the enemy's order of battle was to be relied upon in reaching an assessment of threat.[5]

The case for redefining the work of intelligence along these lines was cogently argued by Yitzhak Rabin, chief of staff in 1967, prime minister responsible for inmplementing the recommendations of the Agranat report in 1975 and 1976, and defence minister at the time of the war scares of 1985 and 1986: [6]

> Concerning intelligence, there is room to distinguish between two interconnected systems: One system—the reception of data on what is happening in enemy countries and their armies, the influence of the superpowers and other factors, the analysis of the options available to the enemy to go to war against us; the second system—the matter of intentions. In everything connected to data, to the analysis of options, I think that over the years military intelligence has been outstanding, with impressive achievements, providing facts that it would be hard to improve on, in everything connected with the size of the enemy's forces, their quality, deployment, possibilities. The matter of intentions is less dependent on the military echelon, in enemy countries as well. It is the political echelon that decided to exploit military options, in other words, to go to war. Here a difficulty arises. We are speaking of totalitarian regimes where, on occasion, the final say is that of a single individual. Therefore, it is much harder to acquire factual information on intentions. As an intelligence consumer, as chief of staff and prime minister, I wanted to get both things. But at the same time I always said and was always convinced that, as far as enemy intentions were concerned, intelligence estimates should not be considered immutable dogma. *It is the political echelon that has to make its own estimate of enemy intentions in the course of discussions with the intelligence community.*

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If threat assessment was to be grounded in information on enemy capabilities rather than intentions, Aman's role would be to determine whether or not certain pre-established criteria had been fulfilled. Only one narrow question would concern it: Had the enemy acquired the option of launching an attack? Judgment of whether or not he actually intended to implement that option would supposedly be transferred to the surer grasp of the politicians. Aman would be deprived of the kind of discretion that it was alleged to have abused in 1973.

A close monitoring of the enemy's order of battle would aim at detecting early warning indicative signs of enemy military preparations. Indicative signs are involuntary and unavoidable actions taken by an opponent as he readies his forces for war, and they can be divided into circumstantial and immediate signs. Circumstantial signs are changes in enemy dispositions or capabilities that would put him in a better general position to launch an attack. These might include a redeployment of enemy forces, an increase in his mobilized strength on the front, or the emplacement of new weapon systems.[7]

The definitive estimate of an impending attack would depend on the detection of certain indications that the enemy had actually begun his countdown to war. These immediate indicative signs might include the cancellation of leave, civil defense preparations, the evacuation of civilian hospitals, adoption of characteristic deployment patterns determined by offensive military doctrine, the issue of specified types of battle equipment, the activation of certain communication networks, a change in the pattern of radio traffic, the movement of forces and equipment to prepared jumping-off points, and so on at each stage of the countdown, at all command levels, and in every branch of the services.

In practice, a doctrinaire application of the Agranat approach was hardly feasible under all conditions. As General Ehud Barak, DMI from 1983 to 1986, argued in an important article, preoccupation with the eventuality of an all-out attack overlooked Aman's obligation to provide warning of limited "smash and grab" or terror operations from which an enemy such as Syria might obtain substantial political benefit but which would not require the sort of advance preparation detectable by monitoring his order of battle.

Another major problem, overlooked by Agranat, Barak pointed out, was the practical impossibility of establishing an infallible early warning system. Sophisticated equipment was subject to technical failure or the vagaries of the weather, and the effort put by Israel into collecting information was matched by an equal enemy attempt to frustrate that effort. The fruits of surprise, Barak added, had proven so great in 1973 that the Arabs could be expected to try to repeat and even improve on that performance in the future. Finally, reliance on indicative signs also had its drawbacks; a state planning to go to war could make many of its logistical preparations well ahead of time and thereby deprive the opponent's intelligence of vital pointers. Barak concluded that, in current circumstances or with any additional investment of men and equipment, Aman could not promise with absolute assurance to give, say, five day's advance warning of an enemy attack.[8]

Red Lines in Lebanon

On 10 June 1985, the Israeli Army completed the final stage of its withdrawal from Lebanon in the aftermath of the ill-fated Lebanon war of 1982. Israel had sought to arrive at an understanding with Syria regulating the presence and activities of the two countries in Lebanon, but Syria did not respond to attempts to make contact. As far as Syria was concerned, Israel was not a legitimate party to any arrangement concerning Lebanon and should withdraw its forces unconditionally.

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Israel thus was obliged to revert to the pre-1982 concept of "red lines," tacit "rules of the game" defining the kind and scope of behavior permitted and prohibited to the parties on "non-zero-sum" situations of conflict. Red lines can be communicated in declaratory form, via a third party or by dint of practise. There need be no acknowledgement of their existence other than their effective operation on the ground. Nor need they entail cooperation beyond the limited sphere of their application. Their sole purpose is to avoid unnecessary abrasion while protecting the essential security interests of rivals. Although they are meant to prevent escalation to war, by indicating the limits of one's tolerance they often function as a central component in strategies of deterrence and their infringement by an opponent may be deemed a *casus belli*.

The red lines drawn by Israel in Lebanon consisted of several basic elements:

— Syria's existing sphere of influence in the country was acknowledged, but its forces were not to move south of their present dispositions into areas vacated by the withdrawing Israelis.

— Syrian ground-to-air antiaircraft missiles were not to be deployed on Lebanese soil.

— Israel reserved for its air force the freedom of Lebanese air space for aerial reconnaissance and for raids on terrorist bases.

— It was hoped that Syria might restrain guerrilla incursions against Israel out of Al Biqa' (the Bekaa Valley), which was under the control of Syrian troops.

Although Syria effectively gave tacit consent to the first three points, it never showed any inclination to accept the last one. Syria also would not bestow any kind of legitimacy on the security zone created by Israel north of the international boundary between Israel and Lebanon that was policed by troops of the South Lebanese Army with the support of the IDF.

Israeli military intelligence appraisals of Syria were dominated by a debate over the meaning of Assad's declared goal of achieving "strategic parity" with Israel. The dimensions of Syria's military buildup were clear enough: a new command and control system for Syria's air defenses and her air force; long-range SA-5 ground-to-air missiles capable of interdicting planes well inside Israeli territory; SS-21 ground-to-ground missiles capable of striking at northern and central Israel; and an increase in Syrian ground forces from six to nine divisions since 1982 that allowed Syria to put more than 500,000 men into the field.

What did it all mean? The rather moderate view of the DMI, General Barak, was that Syria sought to acquire the capability to defend itself and also to perform offensive operations without the participation of any other Arab factor. Its long-range strike capability and strategic cooperation with the USSR were intended to counterbalance Israel's strategic alliance with the US. Barak did not believe that war was inevitable. The Syrians, in his opinion, understood that although they could forecast the beginning of an all-out war they could have no assurance as to its conclusion. They knew enough about the strength of the IDF to realize that resort to all-out war would be highly problematic from their point of view.[10]

A more pessimistic interpretation was put on Syrian policy by a senior officer in the research department of the intelligence branch. He agreed that strategic parity had a defensive dimension and was intended to obviate the possibility of an imposed settlement. But he also argued that Syria "hoped to conduct an aggressive policy in the military sphere."[11] This latter view was endorsed by Chief of Staff Moshe Levi, who believed that "the Syrians will try to attack us in some form."[12] Syria said outright that it wanted to annihilate Israel, albeit under convenient conditions.

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Alarm #1: September 1985

News of a security alert on the Golan front was released to the Israeli press on 3 September 1985, when the chief of staff announced that the IDF had taken appropriate steps "to deal with the possibility of a sudden attack on the Golan Heights by the Syrians." [13] The announcement would have been made to prevent the spread of exaggerated rumor among the general public in the light of preventive measures being taken and to scuttle any Syrian hopes of achieving surprise. On 10 September, Defense Minister Rabin took the grave and extraordinary step of issuing a public warning to the Syrians "lest they make a fatal mistake and initiate an ill-considered move against Israel. The outcome would be a crushing Israeli victory." [14]

The major factor causing this alarm was the completion by Syria of the redeployment of three divisions from Lebanon to permanent bases around Damascus. The bulk of the Syrian Army, comprising six armored divisions with over 2,000 tanks, was now deployed between the Golan front and the Syrian capital. This was not a sudden move, and it had been closely observed by military intelligence at least since June, when it was referred to by Barak. But with shorter lines of communication and more units available, the Syrian Army enjoyed greater freedom of maneuver than before. It had also strengthened its fortifications on the Golan and put its forces through an intensive training program described as "unprecedented in scope" by intelligence sources.[15]

No indicative signs of an imminent attack had been detected. Deputy Chief of Staff General Shomron admitted that he had "no information that would attest to a Syrian resolution to launch a war against Israel." [16] Nor did anyone believe that a Syrian attack made any kind of sense, because Syria was politically isolated and militarily inferior to Israel. But while there was nothing in its deployment to indicate an imminent attack, the Syrian Army could quickly shift to an offensive footing. General Ori Or, in charge of the Northern Command, noted that the Syrians had "the potential to be an immediate threat," and, in line with the recommendations of the Agranat commission of inquiry, IDF units had been reinforced so that Israel had "a better ratio of power in case something does happen." [17]

The September alert would seem to have been a straightforward application of the Agranat guidelines. Threat assessment, according to this version, was to be based on the state of enemy capabilities. Irrespective of the political and strategic logic of the situation, IDF intelligence doctrine, therefore, required that the transfer of Syrian forces from the Bekaa to the Golan set off the alarm. In point of fact, the Israeli assessment was less detached from surrounding circumstances than might appear at first sight and did contain an evaluation of Syrian intentions.

Assorted developments contributing to Israeli disquiet were cited in a commentary by the military correspondent of *Davar*, printed next to the report of Rabin's warning of 10 September. There had recently been, the article explained, a spate of minings and other attempted terrorist acts on the Golan by the Syrian-backed "refusal front." Moreover, Syria was constantly enlarging its influence in Lebanon and had moved its forces into Zahlah, the Christian town on the Beirut-Damascus Highway that had been the scene of a previous Syrian-Israeli crisis in 1981. The article concluded that Israel was concerned "that burgeoning Syrian strength and self-confidence might lead to Syria's feeling that she could launch a war against Israel." [18]

The points touched on in the *Davar* commentary were repeated in various statements being made at the time by senior ministers and officers, including the foreign minister, the defense minister and the chief of staff. Given the close relationship between military

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intelligence and some Israeli military correspondents, it was probably an accurate reflection of Aman's views. If so, then it follows that, Agranat notwithstanding, an evaluation of both capability and intention, albeit with an emphasis on the former, had been restored to the assessment of threat.

Alarm #2: November-December 1985

Of all the episodes dealt with here, the Syrian missile crisis was potentially the most dangerous. Action and reaction followed in rapid succession, and soon a classic deterrence crisis had emerged, with both parties perceiving their credibility challenged. Only an intensive US effort at mediation over several tense weeks disentangled the situation.

Ever since the June withdrawal, the Israeli Air Force had maintained freedom of action over Lebanese territory, flying reconnaissance patrols and striking at Palestinian guerrilla targets in the Bekaa Valley. In the weeks preceding the crisis, however, Syrian planes had begun to appear, and on several occasions Israeli patrols had been broken off "to prevent an exacerbation of the situation." On 19 November, Israeli aircraft were on a routine surveillance patrol over the northern Bekaa Valley near Ba'labakk about 10 kilometers from the Syrian border. Two Syrian MIG-23 fighters were detected on an apparent interception course and were shot down while over Syrian territory on the orders of a senior commander in the air force control center. Israel later learned that the Syrians had no intention of clashing with the Israeli aircraft.[19]

At this point, a blackout was imposed by the local media on reporting of the crisis at the request of the Israeli Government. Later accounts, however, provide a skeletal reconstruction of events. On 24 November, having complained to the UN Secretary-general and warned the US that serious consequences would follow from the Israeli penetration of Syrian air space, the Syrian Government reacted with two moves. First, short-range SAM-6 and SAM-8 missile batteries and radar equipment were introduced into the area of the Bekaa Valley. Second, longer-range SAM-2 missiles were moved up to various sites on the Syrian-Lebanese border. In an atmosphere punctuated by Israeli protests and warnings, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy hurried to the area and conducted contacts with the two sides in order to defuse the crisis. On 1 December, the shorter-range missiles were withdrawn from Lebanon. However, the SAM-2 missiles on Syrian soil were left in place. Tension remained high for some weeks, the SAM-6s and 8s were reintroduced and withdrawn for a second time, and the crisis only wound down when Israel reluctantly reconciled herself to the presence of the Syrian-based SAM-2s.

An idea of the serious effect of the crisis on Aman's perceptions of Syria can be obtained by comparing two interviews given by General Barak, one just before and one just after the events described above. Speaking on Israeli TV on 16 October 1985, the DMI reiterated the moderate assessment of Syrian intentions that he had given in June: "In our opinion, Syria is not going to go to war in the next few weeks and there is no need to run to the air raid shelters." Barak's main concern was that Syria might try to undermine political progress between Jordan and Israel. Even so, Syria had a wide range of options in such circumstances "other than beginning a conflagration with us." His perception of the Syrian leadership was of

> a group of military professionals, level-headed and experienced generals who know the balance of power exactly as it really is and who realize the risks the Syrian Army would be taking by entering into an all-out confrontation with Israel on its own. In my opinion, they will think very carefully before making such a decision.

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Speaking to military correspondents on 18 January 1986, Barak adopted a much more pessimistic tone with regard to Syria. In 1986, Syria's long-term plans for building up its military power would be completed or at least highly advanced. There would be "a higher potential than in previous years for developments not necessarily presaged by past behavior." This would require maximum alertness and preparedness on the part of military intelligence. "The overall military capability that Syria is acquiring and the potential for deterioration implicit in the deployment of the Syrian ground-to-air missiles might constitute a turning point in the situation." [20]

As in the September episode, a number of factors combined to produce the latest threat assessment. First and foremost, the missile deployment was seen as a change in the *status quo* that had existed in Lebanon since June 1982, when Syria agreed to refrain from placing antiaircraft missiles on Lebanese soil. In practise, Syria had also voluntarily kept its missiles away from its side of the Syrian-Lebanese border—where they might threaten Israel's freedom of flight in Lebanese airspace. On the very day that the missiles were moved forward, a rare report, datelined Paris, had Defense Minister Rabin telling his visiting French counterpart that Israel "would not concede the right to fly in Lebanese airspace," which he described "as a vital Israeli defense need." [21] The Syrian deployment, then, threatened that right.

Despite the accidental nature of the initial incident, for which, if anything, responsibility lay with Israel, some observers believed that Syria had simply been looking for a pretext to deploy the missiles. The imputation of intentionality, the assumption that the opponent is purposefully manipulating events, is a classic psychological process associated with the perceptions of threat in an international crisis.

One military commentator, writing in mid-December, pointed out that the missile sites and dugouts had been prepared beforehand, and he went on to argue that the dogfight was only an excuse for the Syrians to implement their intentions. Syria's main motive was to assert its exclusive control over Lebanon and to deprive Israel of aerial access to vital intelligence on the terrorists and the Syrian Army.[22] The deputy chief of staff offered a similar analysis. He believed "Syria will advance and seek any opening through which it can make political or military achievements." Syria was a patient foe and would "move toward the brink very cautiously." But the situation had "potential for a deterioration" and "in the end" the missiles would be destroyed.[23]

In line with the view advanced by Barak in October that Syria had a wide range of options available to torpedo the political process between Israel and Jordan, defense "experts" quoted by another military correspondent argued that Assad had "in fact posed a direct diplomatic challenge to Israel that is far wider than just Israel's ability to patrol the skies of Lebanon." Syria did not want war. "But they also do not want movement on the peace front between Israel and Jordan, nor do they want the 'idyllic situation' on Israel's northern border to continue unchallenged." [24]

If this last point was true, and the Syrians wanted to "warm up" the northern border, the potential for escalation was grave. Evidence for this came in the form of increased attacks against the South Lebanese Army by guerrillas operating out of the Bekaa Valley. Because the effect of the Syrian missiles was precisely to restrict Israeli freedom of action against guerrilla bases in the Bekaa and obstruct intelligence gathering, the image of some concerted and malevolent scheme was reinforced. Interrogation by military intelligence of infiltrators captured during the crisis in November and December 1985 indicated that senior Syrian intelligence officers were behind the planning of the raids.[25] Particularly ominous was the capture in November of a squad belonging to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of

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Palestine. Sent in this case from Syria, and trained at Ma'lula, not far from the Lebanese border, it had been intercepted in the Hermon area while on a mission to capture Israeli citizens and to negotiate the release of terrorists jailed in Israel.[26] This particular item was so sensitive that it was only reported to the public on 29 January, after things had calmed down.

Inevitably, there was concern about whether the situation might escalate to war. To add to the various disturbing items of information at the disposal of military intelligence, a large-scale Syrian military exercise was held in mid-December, and appropriate measures were taken by the IDF. But the monitoring of Syrian capabilities gave no grounds to conclude that an attack was imminent. No significant changes in Syrian deployment were observed on the Golan, nor were indicative signs picked up that might point to Syrian preparations for a surprise attack.[27]

The trouble was that the absence of indicative signs provided no comfort. Why this was so was hinted at in an article appearing in *Jane's Defence Weekly* for 28 December 1985, quoting Israeli defense and intelligence sources. The main themes of this article were to reappear on several occasions in the coming months. The article probably was intended as a signal to Syria to inform her that Israel was fully aware of her "plans." Since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, the *Jane's* piece argued, Syria had been able to concentrate its forces opposite Israel on the Golan behind a strengthened defensive line. From this new disposition it could move to the offensive "within a very short space of time," hoping to repeat the surprise achieved in 1973. The worst-case scenario described by the article was one in which Syria would try to neutralize Israel's early warning system by making its preparations for war slowly and imperceptibly. Either an all-out attack or the seizure of an Israel position, such as Mount Hermon, was possible.

Alarm #3: March 1986

The missile crisis was a turning point in Israeli perceptions of Syria. It erased the view of a Syria which, ideology notwithstanding, could be relied upon to maintain the *status quo*. The irony is that it was just at this time that external signs of a deepening economic crisis in Syrian affairs, hardly compatible with a militant foreign policy, were becoming evident. At any rate, henceforth Aman displayed an increased sensitivity to real—or apparent—threatening cues. All traces of a reliance on objective indices of capability, recommended by the Agranat report, disappeared, to be replaced by resort to a traditional and subjective appraisal of intentions. Threat *perception* then tended to overshadow threat *assessment*.

The March 1986 scare was provoked by a speech given by Assad inaugurating the newly elected People's Assembly in Damascus on 27 February. Most of the speech was dedicated to internal matters, but three items concerned Israel. First, Assad made a statement of support for armed resistance to Israel's security zone in south Lebanon. Second, there was a vague declaration of solidarity with Palestinians under Israeli occupation. But the item that galvanized Israeli observers came in a reference to the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel since 1967 and annexed in December 1981:

> Twelve million Syrian citizens are capable of regaining the Golan. We have no worries or doubts about this. If the Israelis work to put the Golan within their borders, we will work to put the Golan in the middle of Syria and not on its borders. They should remember Begin's letter to Al-Sadat before the latter's visit to Jerusalem in which he said that the enemy always came to them from the north . . . History will record that the Golan was the climax of the disaster for the Israelis.[28]

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To Israeli ears, Assad's oration and particularly his affirmation "to put the Golan in the middle of Syria" sounded like a commitment to the conquest of Israel and the establishment of a greater Syria. Assad was a cautious speaker, not usually given to flights of rhetoric. Here, it seemed, was shocking first-hand evidence of the Syrian president's aggressive designs. War suddenly moved closer.

An initial expression of Israeli assessments came from the new commander of Northern Command. Syria, he stated, was preparing for a possible full-scale confrontation with Israel. And the war would not be an easy one for the IDF. General Barak, who became commander of the Central Command in January, saw Syria "deploying its forces with the aim of imposing its views on the future of the Golan Heights from a position of power and under the appropriate conditions, namely through use of force." Defense Minister Rabin told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, in a briefing supposed to be confidential, that the situation on the Syrian border was "worrisome" and that Israel had to be alert to the possibility of Syrian aggression. Confirming that preventive measures had been taken by the IDF, he noted that "the Syrian president's aggressive talk demands that we forestall a war we do not want." Prime Minister Peres agreed that Assad's speech had a "warlike character." Syria's economic crisis was fraught with peril for Israel. Once Assad achieved strategic parity with Israel, it was not inconceivable that he would want to act.

An additional hint of Aman's likely thinking came in the form of an article in the *London Sunday Telegraph*. The article quoted "a highly placed political source" in Jerusalem as saying that the danger of an imminent Syrian offensive was "very realistic." "Israeli analysts" agreed that Assad "may now have realized his goal of achieving military parity with Israel" and wanted to propel himself "into a position of leadership in the Arab world." They suggested that "the grave economic crisis facing Damascus" might incline Assad to "initiate hostilities" as an escape from his problems. Although he was "unlikely to launch an all-out war," it was possible that he would "attempt a limited, lightning land grab to establish a stephold on the Golan Heights." He would then try and hold out until the international community imposed a cease-fire. Diplomatic pressure could then be exerted to restore the entire area to Syrian control.[29]

A more elaborate version of this same scenario came in an article by the veteran military correpondent of *Ha'aretz*, Ze'ev Schiff, probably Israel's best-informed civilian expert on intelligence matters. Schiff's analysis indicated serious concern that the intelligence corps could no longer provide early warning. Syria, he argued, could deny to Israel "some of the early signs indicating preparations of an impending attack" needed to call a preventive alert. Whenever Assad saw fit, he could launch a surprise assault using infantry and armored divisions already deployed near the border. Long-range missiles could hinder a mobilization of the reserves, and helicopter-borne commandos could attack targets deep inside Israel. An increasingly sophisticated Soviet arsenal and proven staying power put Syria in a position where it would soon be able to fight Israel without support from other Arab countries.[30]

One of the puzzling features in Assad's thinking not yet satisfactorily resolved in Israeli analyses was the connection between Syria's known economic plight and the seeming bellicosity of Assad's 27 February speech. More light was shed on the matter in a second speech given by Assad on 8 March, when his theme was the need for economic sacrifice in the face of Israeli military might.[31]

> We are prepared to live a most frugal life because nothing means more to our people than the land and dignity, which we must preserve and defend. Our rapacious, aggressor enemies, who came from all parts of the world to occupy our land and to

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> fight us and to live a harsh, frugal life, in addition to exposing themselves to killing and bloodshed, must know that we are more prepared to live such a harsh life and to offer our blood . . .

As Israeli analysts mulled over the meaning of the speech, a contrary hypothesis offered itself: that Assad's speech was intended less as a declaration of war than a patriotic clarion call to exhort his people to buckle down to economic deprivation and to dissuade his financial backers in the Persian Gulf states and Saudi Arabia from reducing financial aid.

On 11 March, *Tishrin*, the organ of the ruling Ba'ath Party, published an explanatory commentary:

> While it is true that the battle for liberation requires sufficient preparations and that Syria is proceeding on the path of completing its preparations and ensuring the requirements of victory in this battle, the other battle of development and reconstruction is no less important.

Against a background of almost daily power cuts in the cities and a fall in foreign currency reserved to an emergency 20-day level, Syria's economic plight could now be seen for what it really was, a severe obstacle to military adventurism.

Belated acceptance of this corrected assessment came in the remarkable form of an item on the main evening news on Israeli television. (All news reports in Israel on security matters are subject to the military censor.) "The intelligence establishment," the report ran, "believes that President Assad's sharp speeches over the past few days are aimed more at domestic needs, because of the economic crisis, than at raising the tension in relations between Syria and Israel." [32] Because the military intelligence branch bears overall responsibility for Israel's national security estimate, the reference to "the intelligence establishment" implied a clear acknowledgment of error on the part of Aman.

The view that Syria was on the verge of economic catastrophe and that it was therefore unlikely that it had decided to attack Israel was soon reflected in ministerial statements. This did not spare Aman from criticism for its initial oversight. A well-informed veteran correspondent launched a barely concealed attack on the research department of military intelligence. It was, he wrote, "on a constant downswing. The ill-considered reaction to Assad's two speeches is only the latest example of this." [33]

Alarm #4: May 1986

Despite the seeming victory in March of the "optimistic" interpretation of Syrian intentions, there is evidence of a continuing and lively debate. Defense Minister Rabin remarked that the fundamental question, to which there was no sure answer, was "where is Syria heading?" He was "plagued with more and more questions about this." The main factors were Syria's economic difficulties and signs of domestic instability, such as terrorist operations against the Syrian Army. Could Syria, under these circumstances, sustain its policy of military growth? [34]

A curious report was also broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew, citing unspecified "sources," which claimed that the Syrian authorities had decreased their financial allocation to their agents in the Golan Druze villages by a third to a half. This was "apparently . . . a result of the worsening economic situation in Syria." [35] Presumably, the implication was that if Syria was cutting back on its intelligence gathering on the Golan, it could hardly be planning a war. Was this a tendentious leak by one side in the controversy?

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At the beginning of May, the pessimistic reading of events regained the upper hand—with a vengeance. On 8 May, Prime Minister Peres came out with another Israeli warning to Syria, cautioning President Assad "against any adventures" in the light of his "domestic situation." [36] Other messages were passed on through the good offices of the US. The Syrians now had their own reasons to fear an Israeli attack. The US had recently launched airstrikes against Libya for its support of international terrorism. There was evidence that Syria was deeply involved in the same game. In an interview on 23 April, Defense Minister Rabin had hinted that a preventive war was under consideration, while ostensibly denying that there would be "any merit" in it.[37] The situation became so tense that a report was broadcast on CBS television on 9 May, citing "American and Western European intelligence experts," that Israel was "preparing a major military strike against Syria." [38]

Another threat assessment, another alert. The reasoning behind the latest alarm was soon revealed. As on previous occasions, a coherent pattern had been perceived in the conjunction of diverse trends. First, there was the unresolved puzzle of the Syrian economy. One school of thought in Israel continued to insist that Assad might launch a military adventure to divert attention from his country's dire economic predicament. Second, information had reached Israel from the UK that the foiled attempt to blow up an El Al Boeing 747 departing from Heathrow Airport in November 1985 "was worked out and implemented under the responsibilities of an authoritative Syrian body." Such a move, in Rabin's words, would have been "a grave novelty." [39] In Israeli eyes, the blowing up of an Israeli civil aircraft by a Syrian agent's bomb was scarcely different from its downing by a Syrian jet. One possibility was that the Assad regime had lost control over its intelligence agencies. Another was that the planned disaster was intended as a provocation or a deception preceding a major war. In October 1973, after all, a terrorist act against Soviet Jewish emigrants in Austria had diverted the attention of Israel's top leadership on the eve of the Yom Kippur War.

The third element of the pattern, and the catalyst of the threat assessment, was information that fortication and construction work being carried out in Lebanon by the Syrian Army in the southern sector of the Bekaa Valley had reached an advanced stage. Since January, Syria had been working on tank dugouts and antiaircraft defense ditches south of its previous positions, in areas occupied by Israel before the withdrawal. No movement of Syrian forces had yet occurred, but there were those who thought the fortications would change the strategic balance.[40] The earthworks, then, could be interpreted as a potential infringement of the *status quo* and an augury of the sort of redeployment the Agranat report had deemed to constitute grounds for a security alert.

Senior Israeli commanders openly claimed that the fortifications were another step in Syria's preparations for war. Both Syria's defensive and offensive capability would be improved. There was no warning of an "immediate threat," but the "potential" for one did exist. Since the shooting down of the two jets on 19 November, the Syrian Army had been on a constant alert. "The transition from this state of readiness to an actual initiation of operations," Israel's chief of staff argued, was "easier both technically and psychologically." He accepted that the timing was wrong for the Syrians. On the other hand, there was a variety of reasons why they might say, "Well, if this is going to be the situation anyway, then let us go ahead and launch a war." [41]

Alarm #5: June 1986

A final, albeit minor, alert in the series took place in mid-June 1986. No Israeli objection was initially raised when Syrian troops entered the south Lebanese town of Mashgharah in an

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operation against radical Hizballah forces. However, there was strong objection to the additional deployment of four tanks. This was considered to be an infringement of the "red line" indicating the limit of Syria's military presence in Lebanon, following the Israeli withdrawal in June 1985. It might also be seen as part of a pattern of encroachment southward. Syrian tanks were moving close to the dugouts prepared over the past few months but not hitherto manned.[42]

Israel's reaction to this perceived incursion, according to Lebanese sources, was to declare a state of alert and dispatch reinforcements to its security zone in southern Lebanon. Convoys were observed passing through the "good fence" at Metulla travelling north, and new positions and observation posts were said to be under construction on the Hasbayya-Shab'a sector, about 10 miles south of the area of Syrian activity.[43]

On this occasion, no public warning was issued by Israel, though other channels may have been used. A puzzling report appeared in *Jane's Defence Weekly* for the week ending 28 June that claimed that Syria was seeking support from neighboring Arab states for a limited war against Israel on the Golan Heights later in the year. Citing "moderate Arab sources," the report noted that Syrian officials and military officers had visited a number of Arab capitals, including Tripoli and Amman, to seek support. In a scenario remarkably similar to that sketched by *Jane's* in December and well-informed Israeli commentators in March, Syrian plans were said to center on a surprise attack launched by forces already in place in order to avoid triggering a prewar Israeli mobilization. The assault might last as little as 36 hours, after which a standstill cease-fire would be sought at the UN. Syria's military buildup and domination of events in Lebanon, the article continued, had apparently given Assad confidence to contemplate a short and limited war.[44]

There must be more than a suspicion that this report, together with others on similar lines, reflected thinking in Israeli circles and was intended to warn Syria off. It is hard to believe that Syrian envoys would be sent on a tour of Arab capitals ostentatiously seeking support for an offensive, the success of which would depend on Israel's being caught unaware. Pro-Western Jordan was certainly not a party that the Syrians would want to confide their most closely guarded secrets to. No, the *Jane's* account fitted into a campaign conducted for months by Israel through diplomatic channels and the media to inform friendly governments of its fears and hostile governments of its vigilance. Underlying the campaign was the genuine fear that Syria, under the slogan of "strategic parity," was preparing for war and that, when it was ready, it would seek to overwhelm Israel with a surprise assault.

Reduced Tension

Following the Mashgharah alert, there was an easing of much of the immediate tension between Israel and Syria. The surprise-attack scenario was sketched out in the international press for the last time on 20 July 1986. Reports of threatening deployments ceased to appear. At the end of January 1987, the military correspondent of *The Jerusalem Post* reported a recent analysis of developments in Syria that portrayed "a weak, divided, isolated and economically shaky country ruled by an ailing president whose iron grip is beginning to slip." A "scholarly" source is cited, but no further details are given of the authors, publication, or research institution.

On the military side, the report noted that the Syrian armed forces seemed incapable of absorbing the huge quantities of equipment they had received since 1982. Some weapon systems known to have been in the pipeline had been delayed or canceled. Syria's involvement in Lebanon had had a deleterious effect on the training and morale of the army. Assad

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continued to be unwell, and political intrigue was rampant. The economy was a major problem. Syria's currency reserves were low; budgetary constraints had necessitated major cuts in defense spending. In recent months, economic pressures had become extremely grave, and, as a result, internal unrest was increasing. A further deterioration was predicted for 1987, with no resources available to bring about an improvement. All in all, given Israel's clearcut military superiority and Syria's regional isolation, it was considered "highly improbable" that Assad would risk war in 1987. The view that Assad would do so in order to deflect attention from his internal problems and mobilize the Arab world behind him was rejected.[45]

Within a week, the main themes of this "scholarly analysis" began to appear in ministerial statements. The tone was set by a TV appearance by Defense Minister Rabin on 4 February 1987. Economic difficulties, he noted, had led Syria to reduce the size of its ground forces. The next day, Prime Minister Shamir enlarged on Syria's economic plight and gave the latest assessment of the Syrian threat: "Syria is not heading for war." [46] The army view was given in unmistakable terms by the head of the planning branch. Even before the publication of recent reports about the reduction of the Syrian order of battle, planning "had taken into account . . . the low probability of war with Syria in the coming year." [47]

Israel's Early Warning System

The first conclusion to emerge from this survey is the limited confidence that Aman had at the time in its own capacity to provide sufficient early warning. Fears about the inadequacy of the system appeared in General Barak's *Ma'arakhot* article of March 1985, and they were emphasized in remarks made by Chief of Staff Levi on 9 May 1986. However, they are implicit in the many varients of the surprise-attack scenario to be published in the press. All proceed from the the assumption that Syria might stealthily prepare its forces for an attack without triggering an intelligence alert and the subsequent mobilization of Israel's reserve forces. After the missile crisis of November-December 1985, the salience of this danger increased because of a protracted high state of alert in the Syrian Army.

It was Aman's sober awareness of the vulnerability of its early warning system that rendered it so acutely sensitive to minimal threatening cues. Given apparently reasonable grounds for suspicion, it could not afford the luxury of awaiting more definitive indicators. Aware of the endemic uncertainty of international relations and the ambiguity of most information about an opponent, it preferred to err on the side of extreme caution.

This self-critical vigilance is markedly different from the atmosphere of over-confidence prevailing in military intelligence before the October War, when the DMI gave the unconditional promise to provide sufficient warning of an impending attack to permit a timely mobilization. This reversal surely reflected an altered intelligence reality. Before the 1973 War, Israel enjoyed an overwhelming intelligence advantage over the Arab states, including Syria. This superiority was especially the case in the area of communications and electronic intelligence. In addition, Israeli victories in 1956 and 1967 had put into Aman's hands priceless information about the working of the Arab intelligence service. On the eve of the Yom Kippur War, the collection department of military intelligence was able to place an unprecedented wealth of information at the disposal of its colleagues in research.[48]

Israel's intelligence supremacy was gravely compromised, at one fell swoop, on 6 October 1973, when a batallion of Syrian helicopter-borne troops captured Israel's major listening and observation post for the Golan and Syrian located on Mount Hermon. The base, which was ideally situated to cover the whole field of battle and the approaches to Damascus, contained sensitive radar and electronic equipment of all kinds. On 22 October, it was recaptured by

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Israel after a bloody battle. One Israeli soldier explained the importance of the mission with poignant simplicity: "We were told that Mount Hermon is the eyes of the State of Israel, and we knew we had to take it, whatever the cost." [49]

But great damage had already been done. Now it was the Arabs, and their Soviet backers, who had acquired access to Israel's most closely kept secrets. Shortly after the Syrian capture of the Mount Hermon position, Soviet advisers had arrived to take charge of an unprecedented intelligence haul. Some years later, General Shlomo Gazit, DMI from 1974 to 1979, admitted eliptically that Arab intelligence had been allowed to acquire a much better knowledge of the Israel defense forces and their strength and operational methods, thanks to the "interrogation of prisoners and documents that fell into its hands." [50]

Enough time probably had passed between 1973 and 1985 for Israel to regain some of its technological advantage in the intelligence field over Syria. But things could never be quite the same again. The IDF spokesman recently published a report providing information about the "enormous resources" required to maintain "a close watch over the technological advancement of the Arab countries, which is unprecedented in its scope and quality." Surveillance was complicated by the Arab possession of new ways to disrupt Israel's intelligence-monitoring systems. "In competing with these challenges, the Intelligence branch must take into account the accelerated development of the enemy's intelligence, which is constantly improving its capability and its collection means and stepping up its efforts to stop Israeli Intelligence from acquiring information." [51]

Even assuming that Israel can beat Syria in the race between the acquisition of signals intelligence and its denial via electronic deception and countermeasures, Aman labors under a serious, objective, disadvantage. Since 1967, Syria has maintained a large standing army in close proximity to any likely battle and can rapidly switch from a defensive to an offensive mode. From a standing start, the Syrian Army needs several days to prepare an offensive. But from a state of relative preparedness Assad requires hours rather than days to launch a sustainable operation.[52] Thus the challenge facing Aman is not simply to monitor developments and raise the alarm but to do it within severe time constraints.

In the light of these various difficulties, Aman can hardly afford to rely exclusively on the data being provided by its electronic monitoring stations, however sophisticated their equipment. It is bound to supplement its knowledge by other forms of intelligence gathering. Aerial photography, long-range electro-optical observation, and the dispatch of pilotless drones are vital to completing the intelligence picture of the Syrian order of battle. Syrian attempts to prevent Israeli aerial surveillance would be bound, as was indeed demonstrated in the missile crisis of November-December 1985, to arouse great disquiet and the suspicion that Syria sought to deprive Israel of information about the former's preparations for war.

Some Speculation

It may be more than a coincidence that the period of almost continuous crisis with Syria covered by this study involved the Israeli intelligence services in heavy losses of agents. From May 1985 to January 1986, eight Syrian nationals were reported by the Syrian media to have been executed on charges of spying for Israel.[53]

Jonathan Pollard, the analyst employed by the Threat Analysis Division of the US Naval Investigative Service, who was arrested in November 1985, charged and later convicted of spying for Israel, also reached the height of his activity at this time. According to a US Justice Department memorandum, Rafi Eitan, the director of the unit running Pollard, invited the

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agent to Israel in July 1985. At various meetings between the two, Pollard "was encouraged to redouble his espionage efforts on the part of Israel." Following the latter's return to Washington in August 1985, "the volume of US classified documents which he routinely delivered to his Israeli co-conspirators increased substantially." Further encouragement was given to Pollard in the fall of 1985 "to accelerate his efforts."[54]

Detection of Pollard's espionage activity was the inevitable result of his regularly obtaining large amounts of information, unrelated to his professional duties, from classified repositories and removing them from his place of work. Had Pollard's handlers been less insistent and had the purloined information been used more circumspectly by Israel, Pollard might not have been apprehended. Among the voluminous material passed on to Israel was data facilitating the Israeli Air Force attack on the PLO headquarters in Tunis on 1 October 1985 and also details of Syria's chemical warfare production capability.

All this evidence is circumstantial, but the implication is that Israel was trying to supplement routine intelligence sources. It was as though unusual efforts were being made to compensate with human intelligence for gaps left by signals intelligence. One wonders whether enough information was reaching Israel using electronic and other means of remote surveillance at this period of grave tension with Syria to enable Aman to fulfill its paramount warning role with an adequate margin of safety or certainty.

The Economic Dimension

Over the years, Aman has been criticized for giving excessive emphasis in its assessments to military hardware over political considerations. After all, decisions—especially those involving going to war—are usually made by the political echelon, based on a broad consideration of the national interest rather than on narrowly military grounds. Notable errors, such as the belief that the 1956 Sinai campaign would topple Nasser from power or that Sadat would be deterred by military inferiority from going to war in 1973, and oversights, such as the failure to anticipate Sadat's 1977 peace overture, the ending of the Iraq-Iran War, and the outbreak of the *intifada,* arguably derived from insufficient sensitivity to political factors, widely defined to include social and economic considerations.

In the present case, the evidence suggests that, until late in 1986, the significance of Syria's economic crisis was incompletely understood by military intelligence. Evidence of Syria's plight was available from the IMF towards the end of 1985. The balance of payments was in serious deficit, as a result of a contraction in exports and the relentless fall in workers' remittances from abroad. Iran had suspended the supply of oil on highly favorable terms, and Syria had to spend precious foreign currency in the spot market. Drought had severely jeopardized food supplies. From October 1985, the electricity supply was cut for three hours each day.

By the spring of 1986, it was clear that Syria's GDP was actually shrinking. Overseas aid and investment plummeted, and emergency measures had to be taken to stop the slide in the value of the Syrian pound. Reports began to appear of the increasing hardships in Syria, including serious shortages of foodstuffs and cooking gas, daily power cuts, and sharply reduced industrial production.

Israeli experts seem to have displayed insufficient awareness of the true dimensions of Syria's economic crisis, until it was being openly mentioned in the international press. As late as November 1986, for example, General Amnon Shakak, General Barak's successor as chief of military intelligence, was expressing skepticism about the severity of Syria's economic problems.[55]

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Inadequate attention paid to the socio-economic dimension of Syrian policy had its origins in an incomplete conceptualization of the nature of power. In an interview in June 1986, General Shakak affirmed that "Syria's internal economic weakness does not necessarily reflect a weakness on the part of its leadership." Nor did it affect the Syrian Army.[56] It was surely this assumption that underlay Aman's remarkable assessment that economic weakness might prove an incentive rather than an obstacle to Syrian adventurism.

This was tunnel vision in its most acute form: a perception that Syria was prepared to subordinate all national interests to the single goal of attacking Israel; that social wellbeing and political stability might rate lower than military gratification; and that Syrian priorities, morale, and armed might could remain unaffected by the state of the economy and society. What conceivable sense did it make for Assad to resort to war when his treasury was empty, his economy shrinking, external debt burgeoning, and the people hungry? How precisely would an unpredictable military adventure "divert the attention" of the Syrian people from a shortage of bread and onions? Given the realities in the Persian Gulf and the oil market, why should a war loosen the Arab oil-producers' purse strings? It was fantastic to propose as the basis of a national intelligence estimate the argument that Assad might seek to solve his economic and social problems at the cost of the demolition of his industry and infrastructure by the Israeli Air Force.

Capability Versus Intention

The main recommendation of the Agranat report concerning the analytical procedures of the research department of military intelligence was to switch from a threat assessment deriving from an overall evaluation of capability and intention to one relying on indicative signs of enemy preparations for war on the ground. On the basis of the foregoing cases, our second conclusion has to be that Aman was obliged by force of circumstances to revert from a strict implementation of the Agranat recommendation to a traditional, integrated approach.

In four out of the five cases "circumstantial," though not "immediate," indicative signs triggered the threat assessment. In September 1985, it was the redeployment of two Syrian divisions from Lebanon to the Golan accompanied by an "unprecedented" and intensive retraining program. In November 1985, it was the introduction of antiaircraft missiles into the Bekaa Valley and along the Syrian-Lebanese border. In May 1986, it was the completion of fortification and construction work in the Bekaa Valley beyond the area occupied by Syria in June 1985, when the IDF withdrew. In June 1986, it was the appearance of Syrian tanks at Mashgharah over the existing red line delineating the *status quo*. Even in the instance of Assad's "Golan" speech, the Syrian leader's seemingly bellicose declaration could be interpreted as an "indicative sign," albeit of a political kind.

By themselves, though, these indicative signs were incomplete and ambiguous. All were explicable in less sinister ways. One could be seen as a reflexive response to Israeli conduct, the other as part of a program of routine redeployment. All could be read as either defensive or offensive preparations—or both. It is true that what lent them particular point was the looming shadow of Assad's extraordinary and single-minded dash for "strategic parity." But even this long-term program was open to alternative interpretations.

If one accepts the Israeli assumption that war is an ever-present possibility and that Syria is not reconciled to the existence of Israel and, sooner or later, has to go to war to regain the Golan Heights, then any change in Syria's order of battle bears a potentially minatory significance. In a constantly shifting military context, however, where armies are constantly seeking to improve and strengthen their dispositions, fieldworks, level of training, and

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armanents, it is impractical to rely exclusively on indices of capability, except in particularly blatant cases. One is bound to supplement an inherently ambiguous interpretation of the meaning of the enemy's order of battle with an evaluation of his possible intentions in the light of other kinds of evidence.

Examination on the basis of admittedly incomplete data of Aman's assessments of threat in the episodes in question suggests that all rested on an integrated analysis combining consideration of capability with that of intentions. Research into the perception of threat in international relations indicates that anticipations of impending harm invariably entail the apprehension by the observer of a certain order or *gestalt* amid diverse and ambiguous items of information. The cases examined here proved no exception to this tendency. When Syrian encouragement for guerrilla incursions against Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon, support for terrorism outside the Middle East, opposition to Israeli-Jordanian contacts, harsh anti-Israel rhetoric and various other symptoms were combined with some change in deployment, the tendency was to piece it all together into a pattern of menace.

In my view, there are three necessary conditions for threat perception: an assumption of the rival's hostility, the vital nature of the issue or area under observation, and a subjective sense of vulnerability. The observer's sensitivity may be accentuated by idiosyncratic factors and shared national experiences, such as war or some other traumatic event. There is no doubt that in the case of Israel the threshold of threat perception is lowered by memory of the Nazi extermination and previous Arab-Israel wars, especially the 1948 war of independence and the surprise of Yom Kippur 1973.

Against the background of these necessary but not sufficient preconditions, the event completing the *gestalt* and thereby triggering the threat perception is often found to be a violation of the "rules of the game," the normative framework ordering the relations between the parties. Rules of the game consist of the *status quo*, as well as explicit and implicit permissions and prohibitions. Israeli perceptions of the Syrian threat in the period in question certainly seem to exemplify this characterization. Indeed, they suggest that threat assessment by military intelligence analysts is subject to the same sort of psychological tendencies as threat perception in the sense of the subjective intuition of danger.

Also familiar from the general phenomenon of threat perception was the tendency to go beyond the evidence and project deliberate intention, planned malevolence, on random and perhaps benign events. This can be seen in the argument voiced in December 1985 that the Israeli downing of the two Syrian jets had merely served as a pretext for a move—the advancement of the missiles—prepared in advance. Another projection of this kind was the dubious argument that Assad might seek to divert attention from economic crisis by launching a war. A third was the view that Syrian activity in the southern Bekaa was part of a steady process of encroachment on the red lines *status quo*.

Whether or not a given assessment of threat was well-founded in logical terms and the extent to which it was actually vitiated by subjective distortions cannot be answered definitely without access to the sort of primary sources that are not available to the researcher of contemporary intelligence. What is clear is that, notwithstanding Agranat's structural and procedural recommendations and technical advances in intelligence-gathering equipment, there is ultimately no alternative to a sound analysis of enemy intentions, as free as possible from pathological factors. Self-consciousness about personal, institutional, and cultural biases may help, though it is hard to transcend one's deepest instincts and fears. In the final analysis, because every situation in international relations is unique, riddled with uncertainty and ambiguity, there is no foolproof analytical recipe.

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False Alarms?

It is clear from the preceding account that the 1985-1986 period in Israeli-Syrian relations was marked by considerable tension and a reciprocal fear of surprise attack. First, a series of heightened military alerts on the Israeli side, based on perceptions of a Syrian military threat of varying intensity, triggered Syrian counteralerts. Second, Israeli military leaders openly admitted on a number of occasions that the early warning capacity of the IDF had been seriously impaired by Syrian countermeasures and the nature of Syria's military deployment in close proximity to the front line. Third, loose talk in Israeli military circles of the desirability of a preventive war against Syria in the light of the ultimate inevitability of war aroused serious concern in the West and presumably no less anxiety in Damascus.

All these factors should have been seriously destabilizing. Indeed, if one were to apply the logic of reciprocal expectations, it is hard to understand how war was avoided at all. The outbreak of hostilities could have resulted from one or other of the following three processes: a pre-emptive attack arising from miscalculation—or in anticipation of the other side's miscalculation—against the menacing background of an escalating spiral of alert and counteralert; a considered decision by Syria to take Israeli generals at their word when they lamented the inadequacies of their early warning system; a preventive war launched either by Israel—as openly discussed—or by Syria which, concerned by Israeli threats, would surely be sorely tempted to seize the initiative and to get its own blow in first.

Why, in spite of these factors and Syria's enormous military buildup, was a war avoided in the period in question? There are various possible answers to this question, which continues to lie at the core of the Syrian-Israeli relationship.

Despite Israeli *angst*, Syria was actually not confident of achieving surprise, and the scenarios depicting her stealthily preparing an offensive undetected were more the product of fevered imaginations than reality. On the contrary, given Israeli expectations of this possibilty and acute sensitivity after 1973 to ambiguous cues of an impending attack, even an ingenious deception campaign on the part of Syria would likely prove ineffective. Most important, the Syrians were surely well aware of this. Indeed, Syria may have been afraid to initiate genuine preparations for fear of a real Israeli pre-emption. In this regard, it should be noted that the successful deception by Syria and Egypt in 1973 was from their point of view a close-run thing and could have been aborted by a whole list of errors and misadventures that subsequently came to light. To launch a surprise attack against an alert opponent, one has to be highly confident of success, utterly desperate, prepared to run abnormally high risks, or rate the retrieval of one's national honor above the possibility of defeat. It is doubtful whether any of these conditions existed in the case of Syria in the period in question.

In the Middle East, with its notorious penchant for conspiracy theories, the Israelis' complaints about the inadequacies of their early warning system were not taken by Syria at face value but were understood as cunning provocations intended to tempt Syria into a rash move that Israel could then exploit for a pre-emptive attack along the lines of June 1967. Alternatively, but no less beneficial to Israel, her claimed lack of confidence in her famed intelligence services was taken as added evidence of hyperalertness and a declaration of determination to try even harder to get it right in the future. From this perspective, it is not tortured soul-searching about one's failings that encourages an enemy but rather complacent trumpetings about one's strong points. The latter, after all, can often be outflanked.

Israel's alerts were not "false" in the usually accepted sense. That is, Syria was not planning an attack but was testing Israeli alertness. Israel's early warning system passed the test

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with flying colors. It should be noted that Syria may have perceived Israel's prompt reactions to be proof of the effectiveness of her early warning system, whether or not the test was deliberate or accidental. So what may at one level seems to be evidence of a precarious stability was actually stabilizing, in that it reinforced the deterrent capacity of the IDF. This would tend to challenge the common assumption that the likelihood of war increases in direct proportion to the number of crises between the opponents—a view seemingly corroborated by experience of the periods preceding the two world wars, but which may have lost validity in the light of modern surveillance technology.

If it is accepted that the "false" alarms that characterized the 1985-1986 period improved rather than diminished Israel's deterrent posture, then it may be that one has to look anew at the very utility of the concept of the false alarm. An imminent enemy attack may be called off precisely because of its detection, thereby apparently "falsifying" what was really a fully justifiable alert.[57] We may add to that the corollary that even an empty alert may sometimes be justified if it provides a disincentive to an opponent gambling on achieving surprises. Alarms, then, may be compared to forecasts. Their justification is not whether the event they anticipate indeed occurs but whether they were logically well formed at the time they were made on the basis of available evidence and were useful to decisionmaking. One can only verify with certainty an intelligence estimate after the event, by which time it is too late.

Furthermore, the usual assumption that "crying wolf" diminishes one's credibility and fosters complacency also requires qualification. It may hold under certain defined conditions, for instance, if the intelligence agency supplying the estimate has a less than impeccable reputation or if the premise that there is to be some kind of attack under all circumstances—and only the timing is in doubt—is far from unquestioned. In the case of an actor with a chronically lowered threshold of threat perception or some kind of obsession and whose only doubt is not if but when, recurrent alarms may heighten and not reduce sensitivity. The oft-cited example of the October War surprise, which was preceded and assisted by the "false" alarm of May 1973, should perhaps be seen as a limiting rather than paradigmatic case. At any rate, it is clear that additional, comparative research is required here.

NOTES

1. Prime Minister Shamir in *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), 28 Aug. 1988; Defense Minister Rabin in *The Jerusalem Post*, 11 September 1988.
2. Chief of Staff Dan Shomron in *Davar*, 11 Sept. 1988. (*Davar* is the semi-official organ of Rabin's Labor Party.)
3. The Agranat Report, (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975); Prime Minister Rabin to the Knesset, in *Ha'aretz*, 27 May 1976; Ha'aretz Nov. 1976; Shlomo Gazit in *The Jerusalem Post* Magazine, 16 April 1982.
4. Reuven Pda'tsur, "Improvement is Possible," *Ha'aretz*, 18 Apr. 1985. See also Michael I. Handel, "Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case pf the Yom Kippur War," Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute, The Hebrew University, 1976.
5. Ze'ev Schiff, "A New Page Opens in Current Security," *Ha'aretz*, 4 April 1975.
6. Interviewed in *Yediot Ahronot*, 24 April 1984. My emphasis.
7. Ze'ev Schiff, op. cit.
8. Ehud Barak, "Problems of Intelligence Work 1985," *Ma'arakot*, No. 298, March-April 1985.
9. Ehud Barak interviewed on Israeli TV, FBIS, 17 Oct. 1985.
10. Barak interviewed in *Ha'aretz*, 6 June 1985.
11. Interview in *Davar*, 7 June 1985.
12. In an address on 7 June 1985. FBIS, 11 June 1985.

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13. *The Jerusalem Post*, 4 Sept. 1985.
14. *Davar*, 11 Sept. 1985.
15. Yitzhak Rabin in FBIS, 5 Sept. 1985; *The Jerusalem Post*, 19 Sept. 1985.
16. FBIS, 13 Sept. 1985.
17. FBIS, 12 Sept. 1985.
18. *Davar*, 11 Sept. 1985.
19. Air Force Commander General Lapidot interviewed on Israel radio, 19 Nov. 1985, FBIS, 20 Nov. 1985.
20. *Ha'aretz*, 19 Jan. 1985.
21. *Al Hamishmar*, 24 Nov. 1985.
22. *Yediot Ahronot*, 16 Dec. 1985.
23. FBIS, 18 Dec. 1985.
24. *The Jerusalem Post*, 29 Dec. 1985.
25. *Al Hamishmar*, 16 Dec. 1985.
26. FBIS, 30 Jan. 1986.
27. *The Jerusalem Post*, 26 Dec. 1985, quoting "senior military and diplomatic sources."
28. FBIS, 28 Feb. 1986.
29. The *Sunday Telegraph*, 9 Mar. 1986.
30. *Ha'aretz*, 17, 18 Mar. 1986.
31. FBIS, 10 Mar. 1986.
32. FBIS, 21 Mar. 1986.
33. *Ma'ariv*, 2 Apr. 1986.
34. Interviewed in ibid, 23 Apr. 1986.
35. FBIS, 7 Apr. 1986.
36. Ibid, 8 May 1986.
37. *Ma'ariv*, 23 Apr. 1986.
38. FBIS, 9 May 1986.
39. Interviewed on IDF radio, 11 May 1986; in FBIS, 12 May 1986.
40. *Ma'ariv*, 6 May 1986.
41. General Amir Drori, Israel radio 16 May 1986; in FBIS, 16 May 1986; General Moshe Levi, IDF radio 9 May 1986; in FBIS, 9 May 1986; and on Israel radio 20 May 1986; in FBIS, 20 May 1986.
42. *The Jerusalem Post*, 25 June 1986.
43. FBIS, 19, 26 June 1986.
44. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 28 June 1986.
45. *The Jerusalem Post*, 29 January 1987.
46. Israel domestic radio, 6 Feb. 1987.
47. General Avihu Bin-Nun, interviewed on Israel armed forces radio, 11 Feb. 1987.
48. See Uri Dan, *Ma'ariv*, 23 April 1976; Shlomo Nakdimon, interview with Brigadier Yoel Ben-Porat, head of the collection department of Aman in 1973, *Yediot Ahronot*, 21 Oct. 1983.
49. Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984, pp. 305-6).
50. *Ma'ariv*, 12 June 1978.
51. FBIS, 18 June 1987.
52. General Ehud Barak interviewed on Israeli TV, FBIS, 17 Oct. 1985.
53. FBIS, 9 Jan. 1986.
54. "The Pollard Case: Government's Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing," *American-Arab Affairs*, Fall 1987, No. 22, pp. 136-7.
55. *The Jerusalem Post*, 3 Oct. 1986.
56. *Bamahane*, 11 June 1986.
57. Arie Ofri, "Crisis and Opportunity Forecasting," *Orbis*, 26:4, Winter 1983, pp. 821-828.

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Nobody ever defected
because he was happy

PSYCHOLOGY OF TREASON

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The Agency definition of a defector is an individual who has committed treason, a person who first accepted identification with a regime and then betrayed his allegiance to cooperate with a hostile foreign intelligence service. Thus the word is used here differently than in the media.

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The emphasis here is on the hard core defector, the individual who has committed an act of treason.

Because I am a psychiatrist, this paper reflects a psychiatric bias. A sociologist, a political scientist, a historian would present a different view. But additionally my being a psychiatrist has certain clinical implications. I wish to allay any misconception implying that defectors are crazy, or that a person has to be crazy to become a defector. Quite to the contrary, the percentage of mental disorders of the psychotic type or of seriously neurotically impaired individuals among defectors is less than one would expect to find in an ordinary population of the same size. Psychotics and neurotics rarely enter the kinds of work that would make them attractive, as defectors, to the Agency. Though it might take different forms in other societies, a certain amount of screening goes on. Even without a psychiatrist or psychologist involved, there would be commanding officers and physicians or teachers weeding out individuals who were obviously mentally or emotionally unsuitable to receive information of a national security interest. When we find amongst our defector population people who do suffer from psychotic or neurotic difficulties, their disorders are usually of a very late and/or insidious onset. Even disorders such as alcoholism appear less frequently among defectors than among the population at large. Overall, severe clinical psychopathology is not usually a major factor among defectors.

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After we had interviewed many defectors we were asked to create a profile of a typical defector. I think the original requesters had something in mind akin to the profile of a skyjacker. This paper evolved out of the search for that profile. I begin by acknowledging defeat. We never found one single profile that would describe them all. After a dozen years of searching we were convinced that this was a futile task. If anything, what we did discover were parallel mutually exclusive pathways toward eventual acts of defection. So this is, in fact, a paper of generalizations, describing clusters of characteristics which fit most defectors.

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Despair

That said, I will begin with the one statement (aside from something as obvious as they all defected) which does describe all defectors: nobody ever defected because he was happy. While a defector might look happy at the moment, exhilarated at having executed a dramatic escape, or having pulled off a personal coup, or even after considerable contemplation having finally resolved his dilemma with a deliberate decision, the act was first put in motion by despair. Defection, at least on the part of people who are willing and/or driven to commit treason, is an act of strong feelings. Often it is an act of desperation. It is the act of a person who feels compelled to do it out of dissatisfaction, disillusionment, depression, and defeat. In our experience defection is a response to an acute overwhelming life crisis or to an accumulation of crises or disappointments; the individual finally feels forced to act. We use the word unhappy in the widest sense—someone unhappy because he was passed over for promotion, someone desperate because the auditors were arriving on Monday.

What are defectors unhappy about? This runs an enormous gamut of feelings and circumstances in life. Contrary to what you might believe, ideology would rank very low on the list of motivations. The reasons are much more likely to be personal, the stuff of soap operas, the ordinary unhappiness of everyday life. It is more likely to be intimate than ideological—marital problems, mistress problems, wrong sexual preference problems, drinking problems, gambling problems, money problems, career problems. Ideology seldom, certainly seldom alone, causes a defection. Almost never Leninism or communist ideology. The ideological exceptions in our experience were much more likely to be those of nationalism or of religion. But even those ideological defections seem to have been historically and geographically limited.

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Defection should not be viewed as a problem of communism, but as a human problem with security and political consequences. We have had serious defections from our side and the defectors who have gone from our side to the other were a mirror image of what I describe.

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The psychological underpinnings of defection transcend not only ideological but also cultural lines.

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Eventually I asked this defector about his family background. And he began a very excited response: "You know, I'm glad somebody asked me that. Because you know but for the character of my mother, I don't think I'd have been here."

Defections then are seen as reactions to the vicissitudes of life playing upon an already existing character structure. I have designed a rough equation to describe this: I x C = D. "I" stands for the individual psychology, times "C" stands for the circumstances of life, equals "D" the act of defection. I have drawn this model to make a simple mathematical analogy. There are many combinations or variables by which you can arrive at 48. The extremes are 48 times 1 and 1 times 48. There is a relationship between the magnitude of the crisis or circumstances that precipitates a defection and the underlying character structure or life history of the individual who is being impinged upon. As you can imagine from this equation, the more overwhelming the crisis, the fewer distortions in the individual psychology and the life history required. If someone is making "progress" in his personal life he is seldom motivated to defect. Not only did defectors need an inclination or vulnerability to defect, many of them had to be moved by external circumstances.

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At the other extreme, we have seen people defect simply because they were miffed, passed over, disregarded, humiliated. They defected to seek vengeance, to strike back. Between these two extremes we see an enormous range of human possibilities. We have had people defect for such base reasons as attempting to avoid the legitimate pursuits of the ordinary justice of their own countries. One was an embezzler. The auditors were coming on Monday. He knew he had information of interest to American intelligence so he came rushing to make a deal. We have had people defect to us who imagined themselves to be under suspicion. They were frightened, perhaps feeling guilty, or suspicious of the intentions of their colleagues.

Many crises are related to age and circumstances. For example, a "Dear John" letter to a 21-year-old border guard could result in his defection because

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it comes when a young man is still forming his sense of identity and sexual acceptance. Not getting a promotion would probably have a less severe effect on him because many alternative career paths remained open. A 51-year-old executive might be much more overwhelmed by being passed over because of a lack of options at that time of his life.

Some defections are so deliberately dangerous as to risk life and limb. These are desperate attempts: escapes from immediate physical dangers, or flights from depression. Some defections have followed suicidal attempts. Others were hardly more than suicidal equivalents, the acts of individuals who had nothing more to live for and were desperately seeking a relief from the agony of despair as much as a wild hope for a second chance in a new life. Obviously the potential for redefection would be high in such individuals if their fantasized hopes could not be adequately realized in their new lives.

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Prominent in the psychology of many defectors is the mechanism of projection, the casting out of devils. The individual preserves his emotional virginity and deflects guilt, blame, and responsibility. Whatever the actual source of his difficulties, the defector perceives them as arising outside of himself rather than from within and so preserves his grandiose view of his immaculate self.

A British historian archly noted that a man is never so dangerous as when he can identify a private grievance with a matter of principle. Defection usually has a significant personal meaning in the context of patterns and expectations implicit in the earlier life history. Sometimes the act of defection seems to be a replaying of an earlier life crisis, especially in cases where there was in the life history a parental abandonment by separation, divorce, or death.

Few of us are actually as self-contained or independent as we imagine. The human condition is one of interdependency. Most of us have dependency needs without apologies, and inherent in most relationships are the reciprocal obligations implied on the part of both parties to meet the needs of the other. An

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unwritten social compact exists in all societies involving all the parties, individuals, and organizations. Many defections arise out of situations in which the individual feels that the regime reneged on its part of this implicit compact. The ties of reciprocal obligation are broken and often the individual will respond to this perceived betrayal with a treason of his own.

The defectors the Agency deals with usually are quite pragmatic, streetwise, cynical people who seldom really accepted the ideology of the system. They understood the corruption of the system the way a surf rider knows waves. They used the system to their individual advantage. Only when the system failed their pursuits, or when the system turned upon them did they suddenly become excited about the problems of communism. Scattered throughout the world must be many ordinary refugees who left for ideological reasons. But the kinds of people whom the Agency defines as defectors were not the downtrodden of the earth, because if they were they would have never obtained access to the kind of information that they traded or sold to us. Their defections may have been made psychologically easier for them simply because they were never committed to the official ideology. Even individuals who are not ideologists may express their personal discontent in political terms. This is especially likely to be the case if the person has been conditioned to explain himself this way or if he thinks picturing himself as politically motivated will convince a listener of his sincerity. Also ideological arguments tend to be high sounding and apt to be less embarrassing than a confession of base motives or humiliating personal indiscretions. One seldom chooses to play the fool.

Loyalty

I will now address the individual psychological factor in our equation and the factors underlying the development of an individual defector psychology. Since we are discussing treason we might stop and ask, "Where does loyalty come from anyway? Why is anybody ever loyal to anything?" There may be some genetic exceptions, but almost everyone is born with a capacity for loyalty. But this capacity has to be engaged and engendered in early life. Most of us learn about loyalty in the family. It has its origins in the mother-child relationship and in the natural process of growth and maturation. This sense of mutual warmth, obligation, response, and reciprocity expands to include the larger family, the neighborhood, friends, schoolmates, teammates, our colors, our flag, our country. We have to look at the special circumstances which might interfere with this normal development. Increasingly, studies are suggesting that there may be some individuals born with a diminished capacity for experiencing love, warmth, and hence loyalty.

There are individuals born in unusual geographical circumstances, such that there might be an attachment to mother and family but no sense of an attachment or affiliation to any larger field.

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The vagaries of geopolitical history are such that defectors may not feel loyalty to a nation but only to a tribe or an ethnic group or to a people. Frequently the nation in which they had been raised or the nation in whose service they found themselves may have played a role in the fracture of the original identity of that tribe or the turf of that tribe or ethnic group. The identification may be only cultural. (b)(3)(n)

But even assuming that someone was born intact and that his geographical circumstances were tolerable, an individual still needs a home, a warm, receptive, understanding, and encouraging family. Many defectors were born into chaotic families divided or broken or shattered, often with its parts scattered, what is colloquially referred to as a broken home. The opportunity to form a sense of affiliation was absent in their childhood. They grew up without the proverbial ties that bind

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The capacity for splitting and shifting loyalties, once incorporated into the personality of the developing child, remains present even if unconscious throughout life, a latent mechanism which can be quickly reactivated and drawn upon later.

So defectors often come from broken homes or distorted family backgrounds. But not always. This is a point at which there are parallel but mutually exclusive pathways toward defection. Obviously any defector is in opposition to his regime. But that doesn't mean that every defector is necessarily a rebel. Some defectors in their oppositional behavior are playing out in their adult lives the unresolved conflict of the adolescent striking back at his parents. Only now the regime has taken the place of the parent. An obvious instance of an immature individual striking back at a parent

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Not surprisingly the family history revealed that this young man hated his father. Obviously what we were seeing was the playing out of a family romance on the international stage. Such immature rebellious defectors often demonstrate an opposition and immaturity

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in many aspects of their adult behavior and so they are frequently difficult individuals to deal with under any circumstances.

But we also see defectors who are not rebels, individuals who are obviously identified with the values of their parents, products of warm, receptive, understanding, and encouraging families which were secretly dissident against the regime. The family history might have included some defeat at the hands of the regime with the defector now imagining himself the loyal avenger of the family. In his defection he is picking up the family's fallen banner of honor and shafting the regime with it. He is striking back not only in his own name, not just out of his own disappointment, but further emboldened, further strengthened by the emotional support he imagines from the family. He fantasizes that his parents would secretly applaud his actions. In some cases the support is even more obvious. Some potential defectors have confided their wistful, tentative intentions to their families and were immediately and wholeheartedly encouraged to act.

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So a defection can arise out of a warm and close family. Defectors who come from families with close ties are usually more mature and more stable individuals. They are usually (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) likely to resettle more smoothly in their new lives.

Traits

In examining the individual factors I use words which in another context could be psychiatric diagnoses. While some defectors met such criteria, most did not. But I wish to emphasize that now I use these terms not as psychiatric diagnoses but as adjectives only because defectors often exhibit behaviors, traits, vulnerabilities, and proclivities which are best described by such words. Frequently it is a combination of these traits and proclivities which interact and culminate in the individual decision to defect.

We have observed a triad of three frequently recurring traits in defections. The first of these is immaturity or impulsivity. In particular these people exhibit a lack of tolerance for frustration and/or an inability to defer gratification. The conduct of such individuals is often emotion ridden. They display a consequent impairment in the regulation of their conduct. They act before they think or they over-react. Example: the young man who gets a "Dear John" letter and goes over the wall. Or the pilot who is the teacher's pet of the squadron commander. When the squadron commander is suddenly replaced by a severe disciplinarian the young man doesn't even wait for the change to sort out. He takes his plane over

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the border at the next turn. I would include in impulse disorders the individual who cannot control his gambling or his expenditures. Occasionally we will see a defector who is so grossly immature or so obviously disordered in terms of his impulse control that the clinical diagnosis is justified. More often we are dealing with an individual in whom we see only indicators.


The second trait of this triad is sociopathy. These individuals demonstrate problems with conscience or morals. They seldom hesitate to violate the rights of others to serve their own ends. A lay definition might be a chronic "son-of-a-bitch." There are two basic types of sociopaths. The less common variant would be the "hit and run" sociopath, the common criminal. Such people usually turn up in courts as defendants and they frequently wind up in jail. You read about them in the newspapers because they tend to do very exciting and dramatic things. The much more common variant is the "smile and suck" sociopath, the hustler and the confidence man, the con artist. They frequently turn up in court also, but are just as likely to be lawyers, judges, jurists; unfortunately they are sometimes psychiatrists, physicians, and case officers as well. Their depredations are in the long run probably more damaging than those of their "hit and run" colleagues but are usually less obviously dramatic. Often their acts are betrayals of a trust or a confidence. Although these people are an enormous problem, many of them never leave a discernable trail. Sociopaths are frequently referred to as people with "moth-eaten or swiss cheese" consciences. With some of these people what falls through the hole is a sense of loyalty to their country.

The third trait in this triad is narcissism. This is difficult to describe to a lay audience, especially in our society where self-reliance, initiative, confidence, self-assertiveness, and competitiveness are so emphasized as positive attributes. But narcissism is more than just self-love. It is a a pathologic self-absorption, a preoccupation with the self at the expense of all else. Such individuals often possess a grandiose sense of their own importance. They exaggerate their accomplishments. They make unrealistic demands upon the attentions and affections of others, yet they are unable to reciprocate. Thus they are seen as exploitative. Their interpersonal relationships are fraught with disappointments. Often they alienate others and so defeat themselves. Such individuals are grievance accumulators. They go through life perceiving themselves as the unjust victims of jealous or incompetent but powerful rivals. Often a defector in which this trait is prominent was the special child of the family, the mother's obvious favorite. The family banner was handed down to him at an early age. Special things were expected. The obvious narcissist is totally unaware of his arrogance. These individuals almost never have any sense of humor about themselves. They are terribly defensive, sensitive to any slight. Often they verge on the paranoid. When their exaggerated ambitions for preeminence are thwarted they may become assassins or defectors as an attempted cheap shot into at least the footnotes of history where they all along believed that they belonged. Consider Lee Harvey Oswald, first a defector, then a redefector, ultimately an assassin. His mother referred to herself as "a mother in history."

Narcissistic individuals frequently possess a sense of special entitlements in terms of how other people will regard them and behave toward them, special

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
exemptions from some of the ordinary anticipated rules of human conduct. The exemptions possibly include loyalty to one's country. I make an analogy to a dark star or black hole. Their self-absorption is so enormous that everything goes in. No light, no love, no warmth, no understanding ever comes back out.

In rare cases grandiosity can take a magnanimous form as in the martyr complex. The individual imagines that he has been selected by God or History to Advance Science or Save Humanity. Often this is the attempt of a desperate defeated individual, many times betrayed by his own lights, now finally seeking to identify with an intellectualized formless ideal which cannot betray him in a human sense. At this level of sublime aspiration even in the event of failure the word defeat would not apply.

I originally described the individual psychology and the circumstances of life as independent variables. In real life, of course, they are not. In real life the individual plays a very large role in creating his circumstances. What if the individual has problems with the control of impulses or problems with sociopathic tendencies? Add problems with narcissism. How easily such problems become the mother of mischief.

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In summary, imagine a triangular diagram with the individual at the apex and the family and the regime forming the two points at the bases. Each leg of the triangle represents an emotional tie that binds each part in a reciprocal affiliation susceptible to fracture. The child that is welcomed, raised with understanding, love, and encouragement can be expected to respond to this love and warmth with a reciprocal love and loyalty. The family members are loyal citizens of their regime and serve its interests. The regime recognizes their contributions with rewards, responsibilities, and opportunities. The state provides the child with the possibilities to fulfill his potential. This child responds by becoming a loyal citizen of his country. But that's only in the best of all possible worlds. In the real world



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there are many other possibilities. Imagine the consequences of a break in any of these links. I have mentioned the divided family. I have described the case of a young man who hated his father. What about the case of a family secretly dissident against the regime? Or a family through no perceived fault of its own repressed by the regime? What about the delayed effects of such a history? A defector may tell us how years before his family was damaged by the regime; now years later he strikes back. But this individual had his life impacted upon even while his character and his attitudes were in formation. The proverbial twig was bent. He might have simply taken all of this in, lived with it, lived around it, apparently succeeding anyway, but now a crisis occurs in his own life. On top of this background it is too much. Now he must strike back against that regime.

• • •

Life has its balances and its compensations for the adaptable, flexible, and well balanced individual who can share the success of others. The more immature individual, the more narcissistic person, will be less able to accept a share of anybody else's success. With many defectors the problems are cumulative. Perceived insults, failures and humiliations are particular burdens upon character structures with a lessened capacity to accept these setbacks.

So in the end I can't give you any one profile. Life is simply too variable and complex. Individuals' backgrounds differ enormously. Each child brings into the world a different capacity with which to react to opportunities and vicissitudes. I am sure that there are many latent defectors who never defected simply because they avoided failure. Some broke out on top and managed to remain front runners. The Agency probably has had many potential defectors who retired with honors.

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Counterintelligence in 1814

A Historical Damage Assessment

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Author's Note: This article grew out of research for a book on the Ghent negotiations of 1814, focusing on the personalities of the five men who made up the American side. This group was probably the most prestigious American negotiating team ever assembled in terms of their contributions to American history, and it included such colorful characters as Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams. The original diaries, letters, and memories of the five American and three British negotiators and of the American and British leaders of that era supplied the bulk of information used here. As this research progressed over the years, it became ever clearer to the eyes of an intelligence officer that there was an intriguing espionage story surrounding Ghent, which had never been explored.

"While this is a historical damage assessment, the methodology of analysis is quite similar to how a modern counterintelligence officer might examine a current suspected security problem..."

The head of the American delegation believes those across the table from him have clandestinely acquired copies of his negotiating instructions. Several members of his own delegation are sharing secret information about the state of the negotiations with relatives and friends, sometimes through the public mail. The delegation is surrounded socially by individuals seeking information on progress at the negotiating table, ostensibly for "business" reasons, and some are known to be in the pay of "commercial firms" of the enemy country. To add to this security nightmare, it is likely that that country has broken the American encryption system.

While the foregoing may sound like a situation from the height of the Cold War and the opponent the Soviet Union, these are in fact the circumstances faced by John Quincy Adams at Ghent, Belgium, in 1814 as head of the five-man American delegation sent there to negotiate an end to the war with Great Britain. "Mr. Madison's war," which neither side had really wanted, had been going badly for the Americans since the start in June 1812. For America, the war was about freedom of the seas and neutrals' rights. The British, who were greatly occupied with Napoleon, saw America's declaration of war as an attempt to kick the former mother country when she was down and to steal Canada at the same time. When the negotiations began in June 1814, the war in Europe was over and the British had to decide whether "to give Johnathan a good drubbing" or to come to a solution at the peace table.

What follows is a look at the intelligence and security aspects surrounding those negotiations from the perspective of a late-20th-century intelligence officer. While this is a historical damage assessment, the methodology of analysis is quite similar to how a modern counterintelligence (CI) officer might examine a current suspected security problem: looking at the security practices of the American side, while trying to learn as much as possible about the capabilities and modus operandi of the opposition intelligence service. In the contemporary setting, the latter is accomplished by recruiting penetrations of the hostile service and by running double-agent operations. If it is a suspect HUMINT problem, detailed records of who had what access and when are crucial. If the suspect list is short, studying their personalities, lifestyles, and financial

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conditions is useful. One should also look for patterns of effects that could result if there was a spy or a cryptographic compromise. Regarding Ghent, that meant looking at British negotiating positions and tactics. Today, that might mean seeing a pattern over time of a station's assets, or assets of a particular nationality around the world, being wrapped up.

Whether 1814 or 1995, foreign intelligence services do not run operations against America for intellectual amusement. If they have successful operations, there will be observable, negative results from them, no matter how subtle. In the world of CI, there is no such thing as coincidence. Occasionally, a CI problem dramatically appears such as when, in December 1986, US Marine Corporal Lonetree suddenly told US Embassy personnel in Vienna, Austria, about his KGB ties.

More often, however, an investigation begins slowly, based on mere suspicion—a feeling that something just is not right. So wrote Adams in his diary on 12 October, 1814. Did the British side appear to know too well the American negotiating position? Did one of them let something slip in conversation that raised Adams's suspicions? Or was he just being paranoid after spending five years as the American Minister in Russia?

Adams's instincts about such things had been correct 15 years earlier at another European post; unfortunately, he offered no explanation for his suspicion in his diary or in letters. The British Secret Service and the lesser known British Decypher ing Branch were experienced practitioners of their craft long before 1814, and the Americans were appallingly lax in safeguarding their documents and communications. This was a potentially dangerous combination, which Britain could have exploited—but did it?

American diplomats and their correspondence were of interest to the British Service in those decades. France was, no doubt, the focus of British attention during Napoleon's reign, but, as tensions rose with America and certainly after America declared war on Britain in 1812, American diplomatic missions in Europe would have risen on the list of priorities as targets for the Secret Service. An accounting, performed in 1818 by the British Commission for Auditing the Public Account, listed the following monies expended by Lord Bathurst "for Secret Service as His Majesty's Principal Secretary for the War and Colonial Departments":

	(*English pounds*)
1812	6,650.0.4
1813	13,672.15.0
1814	15,657.9.8
1815	13,234.19.6
1816	5,360.3.11

As noted, France was the main adversary, but, given the dramatic budget jump coinciding with the war against America, a fairly large intelligence effort was clearly directed against the Americans as of 1813. Presumably, the majority of the "American money" was for espionage efforts in the United States and Canada, but some certainly would have been spent working on American targets in Europe, particularly an attractive one such as the group sent to negotiate a peace treaty.

The espionage threat to the American mission at Ghent could have come in three forms:

- Interception of official dispatches or private letters to and from the commissioners, whether encoded or open text.
- Surreptitious access to the papers of the commissioners kept at their rented house in Ghent.
- Proverbial loose lips of mission members, or even recruitment of an American at Ghent.

No documentary evidence has ever surfaced to prove British espionage at Ghent, but there are few Secret Service papers available, or perhaps even in existence, from that period. The following presents the circumstantial evidence as to whether any or all of these potential security breaches might have occurred, thus giving His Majesty's Government insights into the American negotiating position.

The Cryptographic Threat

A quick look at the background and capabilities of the British in this field is useful in order to assess the possible threat. William Blencowe, while still an undergraduate at Magdalen College, became the first person to bear the official title of Decypher and to earn a regular salary for his cryptologic work in 1703. Edward Willes at the age of 22 became Decypher in 1716, and his descendants carried on the tradition for the next century. The cryptographic

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threat in 1814 would thus have come from the Willes family.

By the early 1800s, the Decyphering Branch consisted of specialists in opening the seals on letters and diplomatic dispatches, as well as the actual cryptographers. Their foreign "material" came from the Secret Office, while domestic letters came from the Private Office. Both were subdivisions of the Post Office. The legal basis for the opening of mail dated back to the establishment of the postal service itself in 1657 and was reconfirmed by the Post Office Act of 1711.

Money for the work of the Decyphering Branch came from Parliament's surplus revenue and was issued to the Secretary of the Post Office as part of Secret Service funds. An individual's salary was sometimes provided for in imaginative ways. For example, Anthony Corbiere, who became a Decypher in 1719, had an appointment as a naval officer in Jamaica and drew an income as such although he never left England while doing his crytographic work.

The Decyphering Branch, through the 18th century and into the first third of the next, was extremely proficient. According to the noted author on cryptology, David Kahn, the British were able to read secret dispatches of nearly every country in Europe during that era. France was the principal object of British activity, but both Britain and France took an interest in American correspondence from the beginning of the new republic. The British intercepted letters and were able to read the portions in secret writing going from Paris to London in 1777. The deciphered correspondence still exists that shows that the British intercepted and read correspondence in the period 1798-1800 between American Ministers in London, The Hague, and Berlin. John Q. Adams was the Minister in Berlin at that time.

Adams wrote on 9 December 1799 to his counterpart in London, Rufus King, of his suspicions that his correspondence to the King was being read by the British. Despite his correct suspicion, the two continued to use the same cipher for several more months. Adams had noted in late 1798 that a letter to him from Murray, the American Minister in The Hague, had taken an extra 11 or 12 days to reach him via the public mail and the seal looked different from those on previous letters. Clearly, Adams was attuned in 1814 to the threat of espionage against his confidential communications.

The code used by the American commissioners at Ghent was officially designated as WE028, and also was known as Mr. Monroe's cypher. It was a 1,700-element nomenclator, that is, it had the numbers 1 to 1,700 for letters and commonly used words. It was a weak system because the words were placed in alphabetical sequence, that is, 1242=H, 1243=HA and 1244=HAD. It had first been used in 1803 by Monroe, when he was sent to France to help negotiate the purchase of the Louisiana territory. Monroe subsequently used this code in Spain in 1805 for dispatches to Washington about the purchase of West Florida.

WE028 was used for correspondence in 1805 and 1806 between Monroe in London and the Department of State. William Pinkney, who replaced Monroe at the Court of St. James's, used WE028 in 1808. Adams took this code to St. Petersburg in 1809 and used it extensively; he sent 1,001 lines of encoded words in dispatches in 1811. The American Minister in Paris, William Crawford, used this code in 1813 for dispatches to Washington and in 1814 for corresponding with his colleagues at Ghent.

Thus, there would have been ample opportunity for the British to have intercepted dispatches encoded with WE028 between 1803 and 1814 and to have broken the code before the start of the negotiations. The British could have even stolen and copied code sheets in London, Paris, St. Petersburg, or Madrid. We know the British were eventually able to read WE028 messages, perhaps as a result of the work of the Decyphering Branch, but it is unclear when they first had this ability.

American Minister Vail in 1841 wrote from Spain to Washington in this same code. A letter was intercepted. A copy of his dispatch is in the British Museum with a notation on the top: "Recd from Mr. Backhouse April 15, 1841. Returned April 29, 1841—but the old Amrn key has not yet been found." (The British still managed to decipher the message.) Thus, the British had indeed broken or stolen WE028 years before, but, by 1841, so much time had passed they could not find it in their files. One can only speculate when the British first cracked, or stole, the code. The volume of encoded messages from American ministers in Europe dropped dramatically after 1814. British espionage efforts against America would have declined as well, once the war ended. Thus, it is most likely that the code had been obtained before December 1814, when it was most in use and

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of most interest to the British Government.

Postulating that the British had the capability by 1814 to decipher messages written in WE028, the Decyphering Branch would still have needed to obtain copies of American dispatches. "Access" is as important as the ability to decipher. America did not have a professional diplomatic courier service in those years, and diplomatic dispatches were usually carried by American officials already headed in the needed direction or even by private American citizens.

On a few occasions, messages were sent as far as Britain courtesy of the Russian Minister in Washington, or from his counterpart in London on to St. Petersburg. The most sensitive instance of this was a letter from Secretary of State Monroe to peace negotiators Albert Gallatin and James Bayard of 23 June 1814 that spelled out negotiating positions to be taken at Ghent. Monroe handed over this encoded letter in Washington to Russian Minister Daschkoff to be carried to Europe via one of his secretaries.

Finally, the public mails were sometimes used for communicating with colleagues, relatives, and personal friends, in which the state of the negotiations at Ghent was discussed. On 28 August and again on 6 December 1814, Bayard, for example, wrote to Levitt Harris, Adams's assistant in St. Petersburg, via the public mails, providing assessments on the progress of the negotiations.

By current standards, these were appalling security procedures. The mission did have assigned to it William Shaler as a courier, and he served this function on several occasions, principally between the commissioners and Minister Crawford in Paris, but one man was not enough. In reconstructing a log of how messages concerning the negotiations were transmitted, the situation appears a little better than at first glance. Fortunately, most of the sensitive messages traveled in trusted and presumably secured hands. As noted below, there were a few egregious exceptions where something might have happened, but there is only one piece of documentary evidence available wherein an official American letter ended up in British hands during the negotiations. Minister Crawford had written to Count Hoogendorf of Holland, discussing the subject of neutral rights and how Britain violated those rights while the United States respected them. The British Minister to Holland, Lord Clancarty, acquired a copy of this letter in some manner and sent it to the British commissioners at Ghent.

The worst known lapse of security and thus the best opportunity for the British Secret Service to have obtained access to sensitive papers occurred in early March 1814. Nathanial W. Strong, who was on his way to Gothenburg as the new consul, had been tasked by Secretary Monroe to deliver dispatches and to inform Bayard and Adams of their participation in the proposed direct negotiations with the British. According to Bayard's diary, Strong found him in Amsterdam on 5 March: "In the evening, read the dispatch by Mr. Strong of the Secretary of State of the 31 Jany."

The problem was that Strong had left a number of dispatches on board the ship he took from England to Holland. These were graciously returned by British authorities 10 days later to Beasley, the American prisoner-of-war representative in London. The evidence suggests that among the dispatches Strong was carrying and then left on board the channel ship were letters from Secretary of State Monroe of 1 and 28 January, both of which discussed the desirability of annexing Canada. If the British did obtain access to either of these letters, they would have had ample reason to believe that Canada was the true object of war, an allegation they frequently made during the negotiations.

Possible Thefts of Documents

Possession of the cipher key or code sheet being used by an adversary reduced the cryptographic task to a simple matter of doing the substitutions. The existence of a "duplicate" code sheet could result from the analytic work of a cryptographer, or more directly from clandestinely stealing a copy. In those precamera or pre-Xerox days, that meant gaining access to the code sheets and copying them by hand. If a spy had access to where the sheets were stored, he could perhaps also read or copy documents that were not encrypted. Long before 1814, the British had an established pattern of clandestine acquisition of documents from American diplomats.

One of the most spectacular British spy successes of a slightly earlier era occurred during the American Revolution, when the British had an agent working with Benjamin Franklin in Paris. Paul Wentworth had recruited Dr. Edward Bancroft, who served as Franklin's secretary, to

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spy for the British. (It was nearly a century later before Bancroft's duplicity was uncovered.) There is also some circumstantial evidence that Franklin himself provided information to the British.[1]

Whatever the truth about Franklin, the fact is that the British, through Bancroft, had access to the American codes and most everything else written or received by the American Mission in Paris. Copies of the secret treaties of alliance and commerce signed with France in February 1778 were in British hands less than two days after they were signed.

The acquisition of documents in Paris was by means of a recruited agent; in Berlin, the British simply arranged to steal the papers of America's representative. Arthur Lee was residing at the Hotel Corzica of that city in June 1777. Hugh Elliot, the British Ambassador, bribed a servant of the hotel to obtain the keys to Lee's room and to his writing desk. The papers were rushed back to the Embassy for copying by four waiting conspirators. Unfortunately for Elliot, Lee returned and discovered the theft before the papers could be returned. Lee complained to the Prussian authorities, King Fredrick accused Elliot, and King George III rebuked his Ambassador's actions. At the same time, the British Government quietly rewarded Elliot with 500 pounds for his special effort at the hotel.

The most likely threat to American documents at Ghent was from surreptitious entry and theft. As for the possibility of there having been a British spy within the American Mission, all that can be said is that it was possible. However, in the subsequent 175-odd years since, no evidence has surfaced to cast suspicion on any of the group.

No American documents provided by some unknown spy have turned up in the British Secret Service archives in these intervening years; at least none have been revealed to the public, but there are a number of opportunities for the British to have possibly stolen official American papers at Ghent. The hotel where the Americans first stayed in Ghent and, subsequently, their rented house would have been the most attractive "targets." There were also the lodgings of delegation members Jonathan Russell and Henry Clay after they moved out of the house, and of the secretaries as well. According to Adams's diary, the Mission secretary, Christopher Hughes, would keep at his lodging Mission papers while he was making copies of them.

At the rented house, items of interest would have been the WE028 code sheets kept by Adams, and even the diaries and personal correspondence of Adams, Bayard, and the others. Adams's diary gives no clue as to where he secured the code sheets, his diary, or the Mission documents. It is unlikely there was a safe, so presumably they were kept in a lockable writing desk or trunk, and the room probably had a lock as well.

The house was rented from Mr. Lannuier Quetelet. Little is known about him, other than the fact that he was enterprising enough to sell most of the house's furniture as souvenirs for a tidy profit after the treaty was signed. Ghent was an occupied city under the British military in 1814, so Quetelet could have been inclined to be accommodating, had the British requested a "favor" from him, such as the use of duplicate keys.

There were numerous occasions when all the American commissioners were out for the evening, which would have afforded an excellent opportunity to enter the house, steal and copy documents, and return them undetected. Interestingly, the rented house of the British commissioners was guarded by sentries.

Loose Lips

None of the Americans at Ghent was ever accused of being a British spy, as was Edward Bancroft by Arthur Lee.[2] There were, however, cases of alleged indiscretions and several obvious efforts at "commercial espionage" at Ghent. A number of friends, relatives, and Americans just passing through often dined with the American commissioners, plus there were a number of local residents who became friends of the American delegation. Some of these people were looking for information about the state of the negotiations for reasons other than just natural curiosity. Adams's diary entry for 18 October noted that their messenger, Shaler, had told Henry Clay "of the young Americans who were here upon a stipend from English commercial houses to discover and report news from the negotiation." British banking and investment houses knew that inside and advance information meant major profits. Most of these people were no doubt interested only in information for business reasons, but some may have been in the pay of the British Secret Service. Claiming to want information for commercial reasons has long been a convenient ploy for

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political espionage attempts, because the information often is useful for other purposes.

For any of the people present in Ghent with such ulterior motives to have been successful, there would have had to have been someone willing to divulge information for profit, or who was just indiscreet. Shaler ran afoul of the latter accusation by several of the commissioners. Russell told his colleagues at a meeting on 18 October that Shaler had a habit of speaking of Mission business in front of non-Mission members, citing in particular several incidents with Elias M. Stillwell, the shipping agent for the ship Chauncey. By the 23rd, it had been decided to send Shaler with a message for Minister Crawford, as a tactful way to remove his loose lips from Ghent.

Despite the commissioner's efforts at keeping secret the contents of the British note of 27 November which indicated that a peace treaty was close as hand, there were obviously leaks, for the next day two of the "regulars" around the commissioners made a departure for Le Havre and London. One of these, a Mr. Howland, of whom little is known, had been around Ghent since early September and on a least three occasions had dined with the Americans at their house. Adams noted in his diary on 2 December about his hasty departure for Le Havre that "We know that he was here with views of speculation."

Adrian Bentzon, John Jacob Astor's son-in-law, was the other individual. Bentzon had likewise been a fixture around the American house since early September, attending numerous dinners and parties there, as well as being in Clay's all-night card games. He returned to Ghent on 21 December, and he had the good fortune to be invited by Bayard to dine with the commissioners the night of the 24th—the day the treaty was signed. At the signing, both sides had agreed that the event should be kept secret until noon of the next day.

Adams described Bentzon at dinner that night as "all eye and ear—watching to catch some certainty of what he suspected we had been doing." He said he was considering leaving the next day for London, but following afterdinner visits to Clay's room and then to Secretary Carroll's, Bentzon suddenly departed for Ostend just before midnight. Baker, the British Mission's secretary, had set out earlier in the evening with the official news of the signing for His Majesty's Government. Unfortunately, his carriage broke down on the road to Ostend, delaying him for many hours, which allowed Bentzon to reach London first. Thus, Bentzon's efforts of toadying up to the American delegation for several months finally paid off. As Adams noted, "The news was certainly there three or four hours before him [Baker] and consequently much business on the stock exchange."

George Milligan, Beard's secretary, also fell under suspicion for indiscretion or perhaps even speculative activities. Milligan had left Ghent to visit Britain on 22 August, just after the opening rounds of the negotiations were completed. In a letter on 10 September to his mother, Adams stated that there had been a great deal of speculation on cotton and tobacco in London just after Milligan's arrival and accusations in the press that the American plenipotentiaries were engaging in speculation. Milligan traveled extensively, including six weeks in Ireland, and only returned to Ghent on 23 November. He remained just 13 days.

As noted above, the British note of 27 November gave the Americans the belief that the major obstacles had been overcome and a treaty would soon be signed. A peace treaty seemed probable after the 1 December meeting of the delegations, and Milligan left on 6 December with but an hour's advance warning to anyone and against the advice of Gallatin. He told Gallatin only that he was going to meet some of his Scottish relatives. The wife of Adam's secretary told Adams the following day that "Milligan had fallen desperately in love with one of his cousins and was to be married." Whether Milligan's sudden urge to travel to London in early December was prompted by love or money, or both, is unknown.

It is clear that commercial espionage occurred at Ghent and that members of the American delegation may have engaged in speculative activities. Aside from Milligan's case, several commissioners provided "inside" information via letters to friends and relatives back home, which could have given them financial advantage. Beasley, the prisoner-of-war representative in London, engaged in commodities speculation and at one point blatantly sought news from his colleagues at Ghent on the prospects for peace for the purpose of making the right investment moves.

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Weighing the Evidence

Given the breadth of British espionage efforts of that era and the large Secret Service budget for 1814, it is almost certain there were efforts made at Ghent against the Americans and their official correspondence. Whether there were any successes is the important question. If there is little or no documentary evidence to prove directly the existence of espionage operations, an alternative "test" is to look at the potential results would have occurred from any hypothetically successful British operations. Specifically, to look for any pattern to the negotiating maneuvers by the British that would suggest they knew in advance what the American would do next, or what points they might yield on in the bargaining.

From this perspective, it does not appear that the British had an "agent" within the American commission who could report to them on a daily basis. The best evidence for this conclusion concerns the controversy over the proposed article dealing with the fisheries question and the British right to navigation on the Mississippi River. At the meeting of the American commissioners on 14 December, all but Adams were willing to yield to the British position, if necessary. They decided to try one last time in the note sent to the British that afternoon but agreed they would accept the British position, if the British still insisted. After receiving this note, the British Government decided that it would be best to drop the troublesome article. If the British had had an inside source, they would have known that they needed to insist only once more and they could have gotten the article they desired.

“Given the breadth of British espionage efforts of that era and the large Secret Service budget for 1814, it is almost certain there were efforts made at Ghent against the Americans and their official correspondence.”

Showing that the British did not have an "agent" within the inner circle of the official Americans does not mean they might not have had "access agents" in contact with the Americans, picking up tidbits on their opinions about the negotiations. Nor does the above logic of the dropped article show that the British might not have been intercepting some personal or official correspondence and thus had knowledge of strategic-level thinking. In fact, on this point there are indications to suggest that the British Government did have access to confidential instructions to the American commissioners. The argument for this conclusion revolves around the strong British belief that the annexation of Canada was the real reason America declared war and the incompetence of Nathaniel Strong while carrying the dispatches from Washington.

The accusation that annexation of Canada was the true purpose of the war appeared in the British notes of 4 and 19 September, 8 October, and in several private letters between British correspondents. British negotiator Henry Goulburn wrote Lord Bathurst on 24 August and again on 23 September expressing this opinion. His second letter stated that "The maritime questions were only the pretended causes of the war, and that the government of the United States were [sic] willing and did instruct their ministers to give them up as soon as they found the real object of the war, viz. the conquest of Canada, unattainable."

In their official notes, the British cited as proof for this accusation the proclamations by General Hull in July 1812 and by General Smyth in November 1812 calling for annexation, upon the occasions of their respective invasions of Canada, and the fact that the American Government never repudiated their statements. There was this publicly available "evidence" for the British charge that Canada was the true goal of the war, but, given the strength of this belief, the question arises whether they had access to nonpublic information which strengthened this opinion.

The best possibility for the British to have acquired such information would have been when the two letters from Secretary Monroe dated 1 and 28 January giving his commissioners further instructions, including confidential paragraphs on the desirability of annexing Canada, were in the possession of the British for 10 days as a result of Strong's carelessness. It seems unlikely they would not have taken advantage of this opportunity to have a look at them.

Aside from the golden opportunity when left on the ship, Gallatin or Bayard presumably had these two dispatches in their possession when they visited Britain in April 1814, and they were stored somewhere in the Americans' rented house in Ghent from July onward. There is no direct

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proof available that this occurred, but the British had a record of such activity, had the technical expertise to open letters, and probably had broken WE028 by then. It would explain why they believed so strongly that annexation of Canada was the real purpose of the war.

Given British expertise in such affairs, the size of the Secret Service budget in 1812-14, and what circumstantial evidence is available, combined with the lax American security procedures, a reasonable conclusion is that there were British espionage attempts against the American commissioners and their communications. And, while it can not be proved, it is likely there were some limited successes. Unless some dusty files one day emerge from the British Secret Service archives, the full truth probably will never be known. Thus, this damage assessment ends as do many modern ones—with a number of suspicions and possibilities.

What is interesting is how little espionage has changed in the past two centuries: recruitment of assets in place providing documents, access agents, surreptitious entry, mail intercepts, and the never-ending contest between codemakers and breakers. The complaints of a hypothetical American Mission security officer at Ghent would have sounded rather familiar as well: insecure storage of sensitive documents, people taking documents home to work on, indiscreet talk, and unethical sharing of information with friends and relatives.

As noted at the beginning, the CI tools of analysis also are still the same today—look at the hostile threat, look at the defensive security practices, and look at potential results had there been an intelligence success by the other side. Regarding the last point, as for Ghent, it must be noted that any "intelligence" gained by the British did not seem to have given them any noticeable advantage at the negotiating table. This fact is not, however, a firm proof that there was no useful intelligence obtained, for there are numerous instances in history of where policymakers have failed to believe or act upon valid information.

NOTES

1. Cecil Curry's book, *Ben Franklin: Patriot or Spy?*, makes this argument, although G. J. A. O'Toole effectively refutes much of the evidence in his 1989 article "Ben Franklin: American Spymaster or British Mole?"

2. Lee, for his efforts, was sent home by Ben Franklin, thus adding to historical suspicion that Franklin himself was cooperating with the British.

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Intelligence in Recent Public Literature

Spymasters: Ten CIA Officers in Their Own Words

Edited By Ralph E. Weber. Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, 1999.

Reviewed by Thomas M. Troy

This book supports the argument that one should never pay any attention to the "blurbs" from "reviews" that the publisher includes on the dust jacket, especially if the author (in this case, the editor, Professor Ralph E. Weber) acknowledges and thanks the "reviewers" for their assistance. *Spymasters* is disappointing. It is a collection of oral interviews of five former Directors of Central Intelligence (DCIs) and five other senior officials of the CIA. The five former DCIs are Sidney W. Souers, Allen W. Dulles, John A. McCone, Richard M. Helms, and William E. Colby. The other officials are former Deputy Director for Plans Richard M. Bissell; former Deputy Directors for Intelligence Robert Amory, Jr., and Ray S. Cline; former Executive Director Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.; and former Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director for Plans Samuel Halpern.

Most of the interviews were conducted by staff members of the various presidential libraries, and nearly all are very dated. The first interview, for example, is of the first DCI, Sidney W. Souers, and dates from 1954. Others date from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The exception is the interview conducted of Samuel Halpern, who was interviewed in 1995 by the editor of this book. (Halpern retired from CIA in 1974; although the interview took place fairly recently, the subject matter discussed is dated. Nonetheless, this interview does provide some interesting—and even amusing—substantive material.)

The interviewers generally were friendly and did not ask provocative or probing questions. Even the interviewers from the so-called Rockefeller Commission who questioned Richard Bissell in 1975 seemed almost embarrassed to ask tough questions—and they were discussing CIA's "alleged" involvement in plans to assassinate foreign leaders. Again, there is an exception. David Frost, who in 1978 conducted one of the three interviews in this book of former DCI Helms, did pose some difficult questions. Mr. Helms answered all the questions, but he apparently did his utmost to avoid provocative answers. In any event, Frost did not ask many follow-up questions.

The interviewers also seemed totally uninterested in what at least some intelligence professionals and other people believe are the meat and potatoes of intelligence work: the collection and analysis of information. A reader will look in vain in *Spymasters* for a discussion of how case officers seek to spot, assess, and recruit people to become spies, or how technical experts invent or adapt new technologies to aid in collecting information, or how analysts seek to make sense of disparate and often contradictory pieces of information and then to present to policymakers a coherent picture of what is happening around the world.

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Despite its title, *Spymasters* is not about "spies" or those who direct spies.[1] This is definitely not a book for readers looking for serious discussion of tradecraft or even of perhaps apocryphal stories of case officers meeting agents in the dead of night in some safehouse in a foreign land. Oleg Penkovsky's name, for example, is mentioned once by an interviewer, and the question about Penkovsky is posed to a former Deputy Director for Intelligence, Robert Amory, Jr. In the same vein, some of the CIA's greatest achievements—the development of the U-2 and the CORONA satellite reconnaissance program—are barely mentioned. And forget about finding any glimpses into the analytic process. (In two separate interviews, Mr. Helms tried to discuss what, at least, he regarded as a great analytic success: the prediction that Israel would militarily succeed in the war against the Arab states in 1967 within a week. The interviewers apparently were not interested.)

There are two other flaws in this book that, given its nature, are unavoidable but still disconcerting. One is that the subjects were all former DCIs or occupied other senior-level positions. A reader is naturally interested in learning what the senior people thought, but a strictly top-down approach actually prevents a reader from discovering the "real" story. Knowing what then-Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower and other US and British generals thought about the D-Day landings in France is interesting, but Cornelius Ryan and Steven Ambrose have already "captured" D-Day by making available the thoughts and actions of the true heroes—the ordinary GIs.

The other unavoidable flaw of *Spymasters* is that it is a collection of interviews by different people of different subjects conducted at different times. Although the same topics are frequently mentioned, there is no continuity, no attempts to use material presented by earlier "witnesses," no cross-examinations, no rebuttals. The reader notices, for example, Mr. Helms is clear in his opinion that former DCI William E. Colby made a serious blunder and caused "considerable damage" to CIA in "exposing CIA to the public." Mr. Helms, in response to a question from David Frost: "I don't believe that Colby was a KGB agent" (pages 285-286 of the paperback edition). Mr. Helms seems to be implying that it would not have mattered had Colby been a KGB agent. Now, the reader thinks, we have something really interesting. What does Colby say about this matter in his interview (the very next one)? Nothing—because the interviewer never brought up the subject—at least not in the interview published in this book.

Two subjects were utmost on the minds of the interviewers: the relationship of the DCI with "his" president (or presidents), and so-called covert action programs. The former DCIs who were interviewed answered all questions about their contacts and relations with "their" presidents very carefully. Thus, with one important exception, the former DCIs did not reveal much about their relations with the presidents or even implicitly criticize the presidents they served—even if they had been fired. The important exception was Mr. Helms, who was pressed rather hard and persistently by David Frost about this and CIA's relationships with former President Nixon. Mr. Helms was at his most diplomatic when answering questions about Nixon, but he did opine that he thought that the Nixon administration had "abused" the CIA (page 271).

The topic of covert action occupies much of *Spymasters*. The reader is thus "treated" again to discussions about the Bay of Pigs disaster; Operation MONGOOSE, the Chilean

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fiasco of the early 1970s; various programs in and about Vietnam (especially Operation PHOENIX); Operations CHAOS and MUDHEN (surveillance of US citizens such as Jack Anderson); and earlier operations such as MKULTRA (drugs research) and HTLINGUAL (mail intercepts). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the questions and answers on these topics would have been front-page news items. In 1999, they appear almost trivial because so much has already been revealed and published.

Spymasters contains little or no discussion of some not insignificant geographical portions of the world and historical events. Topics not mentioned at all or treated lightly include the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China, the Middle East, South Asia, the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Berlin crises of 1958 to 1962, and the Indo-Pakistani war of the early 1970s.

Still, a reader can find some interesting tidbits in *Spymasters*. For example:

- John McCone denied in 1970 that the Cuban missile crisis was resolved in part by a "trade" of Soviet missiles in Cuba for US missiles in Turkey. In fact, as recently published material shows clearly, the Kennedy administration's willingness to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey "clinched" the "deal" for Soviet leader Khrushchev. Mr. McCone presumably did not know of the deal, or he was still presenting the cover story of the Kennedy administration—as one would have expected him to do.

- Then-Vice President Johnson was disappointed when the Chinese did not bombard offshore islands to "celebrate" Johnson's visit to Taiwan in 1961. According to Ray Cline, he had told Johnson that the Chinese had fired about 140,000 rounds at Quemoy and Chinmen when former President Eisenhower had visited Taiwan. Alas, the Chinese "ignored" Johnson's presence.

- To "conceal" the CIA role in the Bay of Pigs invasion, then-DCI Dulles allegedly took a "cover trip" on the eve of the invasion. The idea presumably was that nobody would suspect CIA was involved if the DCI were not in Washington on the day of the invasion!

- Robert Amory was a decorated war hero who had served as a combat engineer during World War II and participated in 26 assault landings in the Pacific. He was not consulted by those planning the Bay of Pigs invasion ("need to know," you know).

- Allen Dulles denied that he ever briefed then-Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy during the 1960 campaign about the plans to invade Cuba. Richard Bissell also denied that he briefed Kennedy. (Nixon later charged that Kennedy knew about the plans and irresponsibly used the information to gain an advantage during the campaign.)

- Richard Bissell was still angry in 1967 about the criticism of the handling of the Bay of Pigs invasion contained in the report prepared six years earlier by the then-Inspector General Lyman B. Kirkpatrick. In the same year, Kirkpatrick continued to defend the report. (Meetings of the Executive Committee in 1961 after the Bay of Pigs must have been something to behold.)

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- Richard Helms in 1978 still doubted the *bona fides* of Yuri Nosenko, who defected from the KGB in 1963.
- And, my favorite: Samuel Halpern revealed that in 1952 a minor "war" had been fought between competing elements (b)(1) Those people who had originally served in the Office of Po (b)(3)(c) nation (OPC)—the covert action "warriors"—were skirmishing with those people who originally served in the Office of Special Operations (OSO)—the intelligence collectors. Halpern said that the OPC people actually were shooting at the OSO officers and had abducted the OSO communicator to prevent OSO from sending messages to Washington!

Spymasters does have some positive aspects. In fact, its editor, a professor of history at Marquette University and (not incidentally) a former Scholar in Residence at both CIA and the National Security Agency, has provided an enormous service to those interested in the history of intelligence by compiling this collection of interviews. Professor Weber did diligent work at the various presidential libraries just in unearthing these interviews. Then, he (presumably) faced the onerous tasks of having them declassified and obtaining permission to have them printed in this collection. He also provides a brief and scintillating history of intelligence in America up to the creation of CIA in 1947. His thumbnail biographies of the CIA officials who are interviewed are also interesting and models of how to present such material.

Note

1. "Spymaster" is a neologism that may date from the late 1930s or World War II—depending on which dictionary one consults. It is not contained in the 2nd edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, which was published in 1989. As I recall, "spymaster" was tossed around in the 1970s in popular magazines and on television programs mainly to describe characters from the novels of John le Carré. The term reappeared in the media in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when journalists used it to describe Markus Wolf, the chief of the foreign intelligence department of the East German Stasi. I assume that nearly all the subjects of this book would have been amused if somebody tried to tag them with the appellation "spymaster." Allen Dulles, who seemed to revel in the nickname "The Great White Case Officer," might have accepted and enjoyed the moniker.

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The Evolution of US Government Restrictions on Using and Exporting Encryption Technologies (U)

Michael Schwartzbeck

> **"In the last year, several academic, commercial, and free speech advocates have seriously jeopardized the US Government's legal right to control encryption."**

Encryption technology has long been an important and closely guarded tool for military, diplomatic, and government missions. Nations depend on encryption to communicate private information across the world and through "enemy" territory; without encryption, any nation's most valued secrets are easily compromised. History books attest to the value the Allies placed on the broken German and Japanese encryption systems during World War II. It is with this sense of worth that the United States guards its encryption capabilities and it efforts to decrypt other countries' communications. For decades, the US Government has monopolized encryption and decryption efforts, capabilities, and research. In recent years, however, the information revolution has begun to challenge this monopoly with some success. In the last year, several academic, commercial, and free speech advocates have seriously jeopardized the US Government's legal right to control encryption.

An Early Challenge

On 24 October 1952, President Truman signed a top secret presidential memorandum[1] that consolidated many of the service and national cryptological functions into the National Security Agency (NSA). Since then, NSA has been tasked with protecting and advancing America's cryptologic capabilities. For decades, NSA has had several mechanisms designed to limit the public discussion of cryptologic research. One such method was to embrace corporate and educational research labs and think tanks through organizations such as the National Security Agency Scientific Advisory Board (NSASAB).

Through the NSASAB, senior NSA scientists historically met with leading industry and university mathematicians and scientists to discuss the cryptologic applications of emerging theories in science and technology.[2] While NSA officials had a true interest in attracting the brightest thinkers in the United States, they also used the NSASAB as a tool to bring cryptology's leading thinkers into association with NSA and thus be able to classify their work, which then removed it from the public vision and the eyes of foreign cryptological services.

Another similar project was the creation in 1958 of the Communications Research Division (CRD) within the Institute for Defense Analysis. The CRD was a private, independent think tank dedicated to helping NSA solve advanced cryptologic problems. Co-located at Princeton University's John von Neumann Hall and a site near the Pentagon, the CRD has been led by such cryptological luminaries as Dr. [redacted] a professor of mathematics at Cornell University; [redacted] a mathematician with both the Sandia Corporation and the University of Illinois; and Dr. [redacted] the chairman of the University of Chicago's mathematics department.

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
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The CRD regularly welcomed the nation's brightest thinkers. Their work at CRD was heavily classified, however, and no CRD research has ever been published in the open press.[3]

The union of compartmented postgraduate research and NSA sponsorship was disrupted in the late 1960s by the introduction into the university environment of affordable computer technology and corporate financial interests. During that time, IBM board chairman Thomas Watson, Jr., set up a cryptology research group that developed a cipher (codenamed Lucifer) for use in a cash-dispensing system that IBM had been developing.[4] At first, the Lucifer cipher was not very sophisticated, but, with the help of Carl Meyer, a German-born electrical engineer with a doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania, IBM retooled the cipher a number of times; in 1974, it was ready for the market. This cipher had a key that was 128 bits long, significantly longer than the keys of any other publicly developed encryption programs available to the public at the time.[5]

This incredibly long cipher key led many to believe that the Lucifer code would be truly unbreakable, even by NSA's standards. For the first time in its history, NSA's decryption capabilities were seriously threatened by public research, and the agency quickly moved to rectify the situation.



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“For the first time in its history, NSA's decryption capabilities were seriously threatened by public research, and the agency quickly moved to rectify the situation.”

This action effectively demonstrated that "strong" cryptography was still controlled by the government and not available for public sector use. Unfortunately for NSA, this did not solve their problem. The NSA/IBM key-length agreement was widely publicized, and many public researchers felt that the NSA was unfairly stifling their work for secretive, and possibly ulterior, reasons. Many protests were lodged, and a variety of public cryptographic research groups emerged throughout educational and corporate centers in response.

The Information Revolution and Changing Contexts

This disagreement between Intelligence Community (IC) cryptographers and public researchers simmered until the late 1980s, when the information revolution first began to be felt. As interconnectivity and computer technology began to increase exponentially, the Internet began to grow in popularity, and telecommunications, business practices, and international political realities changed dramatically. New issues developed concerning the Global and National Information Infrastructures, global electronic commerce, legal jurisdictions, and intelligence requirements, including:[6]

- *US defense and intelligence needs evolved.* There has been considerable debate on the IC's roles, missions, and resources. Public perception of government needs changed with greater interests in counternarcotics, terrorism, transnationalism, and economic issues.
- *Encryption needs proliferated, especially for nongovernment and nonmilitary purposes.* Businesses and individuals created legitimate needs for "strong" encryption. Increasing needs for an electronic means to transfer funds, send and receive data, and conduct commerce over intra- and internets led to a greater need for strong encryption.
- *Expertise in encryption was no longer found only in the military and in the government.* Computer software and hardware firms and academic institutions began producing high-quality encryption codes. Many businesses exist for the sole purpose of creating strong encryption for business purposes.
- *Encryption capabilities became dependent on computer software and hardware.* This led to a greater union between encryption and industry, with all sectors being transformed by the growth of computer technologies.
- *Strong cryptography became widely available.* Both inside the United States and abroad, encryption software has come to be widely marketed.[7] Even if no US-originated cryptography products are ever exported, it will still proliferate worldwide.
- *The information revolution changed business practices, concepts of government sovereignty, and the way the*

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world is viewed. To a significant degree, the trust that most citizens placed in their governments and their willingness to defer to government authority are gone.

- *Computers are now viewed as contributing significantly to the expansion of personal freedoms such as free speech.* Many see encryption as a critically important method of protecting personal privacy on computer networks. Many also use computer networks extensively for their private business and personal communications needs.

- *Traditional definitions of intellectual property became questionable.* Information no longer has to be printed or made available through newsstands, bookshops, and libraries to be widely circulated.

- *"Product cycles" in computer software, hardware, and telecommunications industries became considerably shorter than government "policy cycles."* Timelines for research, development, production, and marketing of new technologies are much shorter than timelines for government's implementation of new policies. Ponderous government approaches are seen as increasingly illogical and unwarranted.

These issues led public and government cryptoanalysts to feel a need to revisit the issue of government control of cryptography. The Clinton administration understood the changing role of cryptography and tried to address these issues early on. Its first attempt came in April 1993 with the "Clipper chip." The chip was to be installed in all US-produced computers, and it depended on a key escrow[8] account that would allow the government to hold copies of every key in use by the public, so it could decrypt any message it felt necessary. Even though the administration promised strict control of the decryption keys,[9] including storage and warehousing by a disinterested third party, privacy groups complained of an Orwellian plot. AT&T was the only major corporation to sign up for the chip, in a move that its management discovered to be a tremendous error. The Clipper chip was recognized as a failure that would never be accepted by corporate America, and the Clinton administration stopped pushing it.

Next, the Clinton administration suggested that the encryption industry adopt the NSA-approved Digital Encryption Standard (DES) and Digital Signature Standard (DSS)[10] for its encryption needs. The administration wanted DES and DSS to be the standard, all-purpose encryption programs for all public and corporate needs. The largest encryption keys that DES and DSS could use were 56 bits long, and critics complained that 56-bit keys were not strong enough. Besides, critics argued that for NSA to endorse any code, it had to be able to decrypt it on a regular basis. Again, NSA was portrayed as "Big Brother."

Exportation Issue Reveals a Need For Change

The major changes in technology and encryption were illustrated by one US software encryption company when it decided to export its strong encryption code internationally. RSA Data Security was founded in 1979 by three scientists at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who had created and patented a strong encryption program. For a long time, their code was too complex for available computer technologies. By 1987, however, the computer industry had caught up to RSA and the company began signing contracts with Lotus, Motorola, Apple, and others. But their biggest controversy came in 1991,[11] when RSA Data Security tried to market its program to Microsoft, which then wanted to integrate the code into its programs to be marketed at home and abroad.

RSA landed the contract with Microsoft. MasterCard, Visa, and other large financial institutions later announced specifications for Internet financial transactions based on RSA encryption.

This proliferation of RSA's strong code was disconcerting to NSA's cryptoanalysts. NSA feared that if this program was made commercially available and widely disseminated, it would no longer be able to collect, analyze, and produce communications intelligence.[12]

NSA felt that if the people it targets were to get this software, they could communicate electronically without any fear being monitored.

The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 and the International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR), revised 1992,[13] severely restrict US companies from exporting

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any and all military and intelligence-related technologies. During the Cold War, most aspects of encryption technology, including the hardware, software, and the mathematical algorithms on which cryptography is based, were classified as military technologies and placed on AECA's "Munitions List." This same list is used to prohibit the export of tanks, fighter jets, and aircraft carriers.

The Department of State had statutory responsibility for administering the AECA and ITAR regulations, which it managed through the Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC). Any US corporation wishing to export a technology on the AECA Munitions List was required to submit an export license application to the ODTC, which would then pass the application to the government agency best qualified to decide whether the technology should be exportable or not. ODTC always passed encryption export applications to NSA for review, and any code too strong was denied an export license.

[redacted]

The Clinton administration was adamant that US companies would not be allowed to export strong encryption.[14] [redacted] Bidzos and RSA were not yet done. Bidzos realized that there was a simple way to skirt the export limitation laws.

Both the AECA and the ITAR are US laws, and, as such, they only pertain only to US companies. Bidzos went to Japan and established a Japanese subsidiary, Nihon RSA.[15] Nihon RSA qualified as a distinct Japanese company, subject only to Japanese law, and Bidzos was able to do whatever he wanted with his strong encryption technologies.[16] Knowing that his encryption technology was a desired commodity, he shopped it around the Japanese marketplace. He promptly struck a deal to produce encryption chips for Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

"The Clinton administration was adamant that US companies would not be allowed to export strong encryption."

Others Enter the Exportation Fray

At about the same time NSA and the Clinton administration were losing the battle with RSA and Jim Bidzos, several other public sector cryptographers were beginning to find success in propagating strong cryptography. In the early 1990s, a cryptographer named Philip Zimmerman created PGP (for Pretty Good Protection), data-encryption software that scrambles e-mail messages. PGP is a strong encryption program; 1,024-bit keys are common in this program.[17] Because PGP is a strong program, it fell under AECA and ITAR export control guidelines. Before the US Government could place controls on it, however, the PGP software appeared on the Internet as shareware.[18] Placing PGP on the Internet made it available worldwide to anybody with a computer and a modem,[19] so it had in effect been exported without the prior approval of the US State Department.

Although several other encryption programs were already available on the Internet, users from around the world began downloading PGP; the program became very popular and well respected among Internet users. The US Department of Justice was not pleased with the disregard for US export regulations, and it decided to prosecute Philip Zimmerman. Unfortunately for the Department's case, it could not link Zimmerman to the software website on the Internet, and, in 1996, Zimmerman was acquitted of any wrongdoing.[20] This court case was viewed by many as a major victory for the public use and availability of strong encryption.

Another case occurred in February 1995, when the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) sued the US Government on behalf of Daniel Bernstein. The EFF charged that the Federal government was violating Bernstein's First Amendment rights by stifling the research he did as a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley in strong cryptography. As with the PGP case, Bernstein was trying to publish his research papers and place his encryption software, known as Snuffle 5.0, on the Internet, and the government was citing his disregard for AECA and ITAR regulations. In January 1997, Judge Marilyn Patel ruled in favor of Bernstein,[21] on the grounds that AECA and ITAR violated the free-speech guarantees of the Constitution.

Before long, three separate bills were on the floor of Congress, each guaranteeing the right of Americans to use or sell any encryption they wanted domestically and eliminating export controls on any free or mass-market commercial encryption programs.[22] These separate bills were

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introduced by Senator Conrad Burns, Representative Bob Goodlatte, and Senator Patrick Leahy; the Goodlatte and Leahy bills would have also made it a Federal crime to use encryption to conceal the commission of a felony. Senator Robert Dole co-sponsored the Senate bills, charging that "the administration's big brother proposal will literally destroy America's computer industry."[23] Leahy stated, "These bills are pro-privacy, pro-jobs, and pro-business." While none of these bills became law, they did attract the attention of the media. Government control of strong cryptography quickly became a controversial and popular topic in the media.

Players and the Issues

By this time, each of the major interest groups in this debate had come out with compelling arguments for their own cases and similarly strong arguments denouncing opposing viewpoints.[24] The groups can be summarized as follows:

- *NSA cryptoanalysts.* NSA's stake in this argument has been its desire to continue to be able to carry out its primary mission. NSA analysts have stated that the proliferation of strong encryption has severely degraded their ability to collect intelligence. (b)(3)(n) Sophisticated nonstate actors, such as terrorist cells and drug cartels, will be even harder to track.

- *Public researchers.* This group's main arguments have been the preservation of free speech and the right to continue to do scholarly research. The US courts have shown that the free speech argument has some validity.

The lines of battle were generally drawn with NSA and law enforcement officials on one side and public researchers and corporate investors on the other.

- *Corporate investors.* Investors have been looking for a way to ensure that electronic money transactions can be done with a high degree of confidence. Without strong encryption, consumers will not place their trust in electronic transfers, and systems like the Internet will never reach their business potential.

- *Law enforcement officials.* If strong encryption becomes available to the world's criminals, this group will not be able to gather evidence and track criminals to prevent crimes; this group also fears that its ability to fulfill its duties will be degraded, with serious impact on public safety.

The lines of battle were generally drawn with NSA and law enforcement officials on one side and public researchers and corporate investors on the other. Public researchers and corporate investors complained that the US Government was still operating with a Cold War mentality, despite the fact that Cold War paradigms have been replaced; they claimed that any organization as secretive and manipulative as NSA had no place in a free and democratic society. In their eyes, US citizens should have the right to communicate privately, without any fear of government eavesdropping, and they believe free and private speech can only be guaranteed with strong encryption. Bruce Scheier, director of the International Association for Cryptographic Research, also pointed out that, "The ability to publish is required in any vibrant academic discipline."[25]

Business leaders emphasized that electronic financial transactions will only be reliable and safe from tampering when strong encryption is used. And encryption software writers complained about the business opportunities they were missing: the estimated US data encryption market grew from $384 million in 1991 to $946 million in 1996. Worldwide totals are believed to have been $695 million in 1991 and $1.8 billion in 1996.[26] The software industry estimated that, if export controls were removed, US companies could sell as much as $60 billion a year[27] in encryption hardware and software by 2000.

On the other hand, law enforcement concerns generally paralleled NSA's in that strong encryption would give wrongdoers impenetrable communications that would allow them to operate undetected. As more strong encryption programs become available, more groups will acquire and use encryption, and, even if the US Government is able to crack those codes, it will be at a much greater expense, particularly in costs of computer time.[28] Many in the government have also felt that the "free and private speech" argument was disingenuous; as retired Vice Admiral McConnell, vice president of Booz-Allen & Hamilton and former NSA director, charged, "Those who argue in this arena usually have an agenda. Often when they are arguing one set of conditions, they will be using the privacy argument when what they are really trying to do is sell software encryption."[29]

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The National Research Council Report

By now, the Clinton administration realized that its encryption policies were not effective and were not addressing the pertinent issues of the debate. Its Clipper chip had failed, its DES and DSS encryption standards were similarly unsuccessful, and the exportation rules were disliked and increasingly ineffective in stopping the spread of strong encryption. President Clinton responded by tasking the National Research Council to do a study on the various arguments for and against US export controls on strong cryptography. The 20 members of the panel represented a wide variety of interests, and they included Kenneth Dam of the University of Chicago Law School, Bruce McConnell of the Office of Budget and Management, former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, former deputy director of NSA Ann Caracristi, and Council on Foreign Relations President Leslie Gelb.[30] Their 500-page report, "Cryptography's Role In Securing the Information Society," or CRISIS,[31] was finished in June 1996, and it was highly critical of the Clinton administration's position.

The report concluded that using arms control laws to regulate encryption "is not adequate to support the information security requirements of an information society."[32] The authors also believed that the broad outlines of a national cryptography policy could be analyzed in an unclassified environment and that export control restrictions should be "progressively relaxed but not eliminated." The panel also noted that the plan to introduce escrowed encryption keys was not without merit, but that it was "relatively untried and entails its own potential risks."[33]

The panel's consensus was that "widespread commercial and private use cryptography is inevitable in the long run and...its advantages, on balance, outweigh its disadvantages."[34] One benefit of adopting this policy, the panel noted, is that US companies could start putting much stronger encryption programs in their software, which would allow US citizens to have an increased standard of cryptographic protection. The panel's final conclusion was that government encryption policies should be examined in the same light as other US economic regulations.

The Administration Moves

The administration did not take long to respond to the National Research Council's recommendations. On 15 November 1996, President Clinton released Executive Order 13206: "Administration of Export Controls on Encryption Products." In this Executive Order, Clinton followed many of the recommendations of the CRISIS report; most important, he took cryptographic hardware, software, and technologies off of the AECA Munitions List and placed them under the statutory responsibility of the US Department of Commerce. Specifically, management of encryption fell under the regulations guiding "dual-use" (both military and civilian) commodities outlined in the Export Administration Act of 1979.[35] This move greatly eased the government controls on public use and exportation of strong crypotography. The only major requirement for exportation was a key escrow system. The resulting differences in the old and new encryption policy are listed below:[36]

<u>"Clipper Chip" Era Policy</u> (February 1994)

- *Hardware implementation:* Clipper chip required in each piece of US software.
- *Algorithm classification:* Secret.
- *Maximum key length:* 40-bits.
- *Decryption keys held by:* US Government.
- *Decryption keys held:* For all crypto, both domestic or internationally exported.
- *Keys available to:* Law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
- Exported strong crypto requires key recovery.
- No limit on domestic use of cryptography.

<u>Newer, Revised Policy</u>
(October 1996)

- *Algorithm classification:* Unclassified.
- *Maximum key length:* Unlimited, if keys are recoverable when requested.
- *Decryption keys held by:* Corporate third parties following government guidelines.
- *Decryption keys held:* Only for exported crypto with keys 56 bits or longer.
- *Keys available to:* Law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

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- Exported strong crypto requires key recovery.

- No limit on domestic use of cryptography.

This major shift in policy was met with increased enthusiasm from the public sector as well as the government. Vice President Gore said, "This initiative will make it easier for Americans to use stronger encryption products—whether at home or abroad."[37] Robert Holleyman, President of the Business Software Alliance, was also impressed, calling the plan "forward progress."[38] Stephen Walker, CEO of Trusted Information Systems, likened the policy change to "imagining during the Cold War that the Berlin Wall would fall."[39] A few others were not so impressed: Senator Conrad Burns stated, "This debate is not over by any stretch of the imagination."[40]

Encryption Key Recovery

Although some public researchers and corporate investors were still leery of the key escrow mandate, most of the groups involved in this debate accepted the escrow requirement, which was one of President Clinton's major requirements for this easing of encryption regulations. The administration has given industry a two-year grace period, at the end of which there will need to be a viable key recovery system in place and operating. Many large companies have backed the escrow system; Dorothy Denning, a cryptography expert from Georgetown University, lauded it as a useful way to recover keys "necessary to unscramble important data left by a deceased, departed, or unethical employee."[41] That the escrow accounts would be held by a trusted third party in the corporate world eased many of the "Big Brother is watching" concerns. More important, keys will only be given to the US Government in response to warrants or court orders. To show its support, IBM has teamed up with Apple, Digital, Groupe Bull, Hewlett-Packard, NCR, Sun, Trusted Information Systems, and even RSA Data Security[42] to develop an interoperable key-recovery industry standard. RSA's James Bidzos conceded, "We are seeing the market move to emergency access [of keys]."[43] Soon after, America Online, Compaq, Motorola, Novell, Northern Telecom, and 29 others joined in escrow discussions, which has strengthened the industry alliance.[44]

Detractors of the key escrow system are led by Victor Parra, president and CEO of the 550-member Electronic Messaging Association (EMA). Parra is frustrated that keys have to be held by third parties; he feels that employees of the user company are the only key holders that can really be trusted. Parra notes that e-mail and Internet transactions will tend to be limited to domestic firms, because international trading partners will be uneasy with a third party having escrow access. EMA has also noted that the two-hour limit to turn over requested keys is unreasonable, and many software makers have agreed that encryption software prices will rise as a result of escrow requirements.[45]

Escrow Goes International

William Reinsch, the Undersecretary for Export Administration at the US Department of Commerce, wants the policy to move beyond US borders and create a worldwide standard for key escrow. Reinsch theorizes that, if escrow becomes pervasive and institutionalized in international commerce, terrorists and criminals will be forced to submit to key recovery systems.[46] This would also help prevent US companies from relocating overseas to avoid current US escrow requirements.

The European Commission is considering an encryption industry standard for key recovery similar to the one proposed by the Clinton administration, and, if implemented, all codes used throughout Europe would require a trusted third party to hold a copy of the key. IBM supports the new US and European escrow proposals; to those US firms that oppose the move, they state, "We would prefer that they take a more global focus."[47] Another group, a consortium called Eurobit-ITAC-ITI-JEIDA, comprised of major Canadian, European, Japanese, and US business firms, has called for the harmonization of regulations on the export, import, re-export, and use of cryptography. Their goal is to develop a set of principles that, "reach consensus on issues which need to be treated at the worldwide level."[48]

International support does seem to be growing. Representatives from the nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) backed the concept of key recovery systems[49] during a January 1997 conference. The OECD emphasized that information security is an international matter because information systems cross national boundaries. At a separate RSA Data Security-sponsored conference, David Aaron, US Special

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Envoy to the OECD, stated that important US allies support President Clinton's position that governments should be able to recover encryption keys when necessary. He also added that he had discussed cryptography issues with representatives of France, the UK, Germany, Belgium, and Canada.

The Future of Strong Encryption

The Clinton administration has made a serious, if belated, effort to meet the evolving encryption needs of US citizens and industries. It was quick to notice and act on the outdated Cold War standards of Department of Defense control on encryption technologies and algorithms. After several false starts, the administration has produced a policy that goes a long way toward meeting the requirements of four diverse and often diametrically opposed groups: public researchers, corporate investors, law enforcement officials, and intelligence analysts.

The US Government, and NSA in particular, would like to return to the Cold War era of complete government control over strong cryptography and skillful manipulation of the research and corporate communities. But strong encryption has proliferated beyond US Government control. A failure to make any concessions to the changing times would have been disastrous for the Clinton administration's relationship with US business and free speech communities. It would also have crippled US software encryption companies trying to compete with overseas companies not shackled by restrictive regulations. And, even if the administration could keep strong encryption out of US industry, it would still proliferate; other nations around the world are just as likely to create strong codes.

So, acknowledging that strong encryption regulations needed to be addressed, the administration took the safest possible route by initiating a series of limited reforms aimed at pleasing all parties while continuing to meet intelligence and security needs. The Clipper chip, DES, DSS, and the key escrow system were each successive attempts to produce a policy that would meet the burgeoning needs of US business and free speech communities without forgetting the critical requirements of the law enforcement and intelligence communities.

What is next? Obviously, an international resolution on the control and management of encryption technologies is a desirable goal, if not a lofty one. Critics of the Clinton administration are right in noting that sophisticated criminals and terrorists will not use the encryption systems that require key escrow registration. If an international referendum requires all encryption systems and users to register their keys, however, then criminals and terrorists will be forced into the escrow system. A worldwide key escrow system will not be put into place quickly, but with serious effort it may be attainable, and it is a worthwhile goal. The proliferation of strong encryption is already beyond control, but perhaps the continued monitoring of criminals and terrorists is not.

NOTES

1. James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace: Inside The National Security Agency, America's Most Secret Intelligence Organization* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 80.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 247.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 430-433.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 434-435.
5. A passage from *The Puzzle Palace* (p. 438) accurately relates the importance of the length of a key to a code's strength:

   "How long it takes to break a code depends on the length of the key. For a 56-bit key, the number of possible combinations would be about 70 quadrillion. By using a computer with a million special-purpose chips, capable of testing 2 trillion possible keys per second, the entire range of keys could be searched in 70,000 seconds—or less than 20 hours [with most solutions found within 10 hours]....

   Then there is the matter of cost. According to two Stanford scientists, the chips themselves could be produced for about $10.00 each, or $10 million altogether...[the entire computer] could be built for about $20 million.... The daily operating cost would be about $10,000 a day, meaning that each solution would cost about $5,000.

   [With the 128-bit key,] the results would have been dramatically different. As opposed to the moderate $5,000 price tag, each solution would cost an unimaginable $200 septillion, or $200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,."

   The general principle is that the longer the length of the key, measured in bits, the more difficult it is to crack the code.
6. Stuart J. D. Schwartzstein, "Export Controls On Encryption Technologies," *SAIS Review*, (winter 1996), pp. 17-21.
7. For a review of several commercially available encryption software pro-

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grams see: Jay Munro, "Psst! Keep A Secret?" *PC Magazine* 15, (17 December 1996), pp. 45-50.

8. An encryption key "unlocks" or decrypts a coded message.

9. Steve Levy, "Scared Bitless," *Newsweek* 127, (10 June 1996), p. 50.

10. David Stipp, "Techno-Hero or Public Enemy?" *Fortune* 134, (11 November 1996), pp. 178-180.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 180-182.

13. Schwartzstein, pp. 15-16.

14. Ivars Peterson, "Boosting Cryptography's Role in Security," *Science News* 149, (8 June 1996), p. 357.

15. Tim Beardsley, "For Your Eyes Only?" *Scientific American* 275, (September 1996), p. 44.

16. The US Department of Justice confirmed this loophole by choosing not to prosecute Bidzos.

17. David L. Wilson, "Pretty Good Privacy: Software Is a Popular tool for Encrypting Messages," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 43, (13 September 1996), pp. A28-A29.

18. Shareware is software openly available on the Internet for public use at no cost.

19. PGP is still available on the Internet at <<http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp.html>>

20. Wilson, "Pretty Good Privacy...," p. A28.

21. David L. Wilson, Karla Haworth, and Andrew Mytelka, "Federal Judge Strikes Down Government Restrictions On Computer encryption," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 43, (10 January 1997), p. A24.

22. Rick Henderson, "Know The Code," *Reason 28*, (June 1996), p. 16.

23. Levy, p. 50.

24. Robert K. Acherman, "Security Balances Needs of Privacy, Law Enforcement," *Signal* 51, (February 1997), p. 23.

25. Wilson, Haworth, and Mytelka, p. A24.

26. Schwartzstein, p. 14.

27. Henderson, p. 16.

28. Schwartzstein, p. 26.

29. Acherman, p. 23.

30. Elizabeth Koch, "Confronting A Crisis: Clipping Clinton's Encryption Policies," *Reason* 28, (November 1996), p. 22.

31. This report can be found on the Internet at http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/crisis.

32. Koch, p. 22.

33. Peterson, p. 357.

34. Levy, p. 50.

35. Schwartzstein, p. 16.

36. Gary H. Anthes, "Feds Ease Crypto Rules, But With a 'Key' Catch," *Computerworld* 30, (7 October 1966), p. 32.

37. Anthes, "Feds Ease...," p. 32.

38. *Ibid.* p. 32.

39. John Carey, "Big Breakthrough--or Big Brother?" *Business Week* 3502, (18 November 1996), pp. 88-90.

40. *Ibid*, pp. *88-90.*

41. Anthes, *"Feds Ease...,"* p. 32.

42. Lynda Radosevich, "HP Pushes Encryption Scheme," *Infoworld* 18, (25 November 1966), p. 9.

43. Carey, p. 90.

44. Marthew Woolacott, "Vendors Coalesce on Encryption," *Infoworld* 18, (23/30 December 1966), p. 39.

45. Barb Cole, "Encryption Conniption," *Computerworld* 31, (6 January 1997), p. 3.

46. Gary H. Anthes, "Encryption Policies Still Under Fire," *Computerworld* 30, (9 December 1996), p. 74.

47. Graeme Browning, "Another Federal Code to Crack," *National Journal* 29, (11 January 1997), p. 89.

48. Schwartzstein, p. 30.

49. John Markoff, "A Consensus Is Sought On Coding," *The New York Times*, (29 January 1997), p. D-19.

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